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authorThomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100
committerThomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100
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+Network Working Group J. Park
+Request for Comments: 4010 S. Lee
+Category: Standards Track J. Kim
+ J. Lee
+ KISA
+ February 2005
+
+
+ Use of the SEED Encryption Algorithm
+ in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
+
+Status of This Memo
+
+ This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
+ Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
+ improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
+ Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
+ and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
+
+Copyright Notice
+
+ Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
+
+Abstract
+
+ This document specifies the conventions for using the SEED encryption
+ algorithm for encryption with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).
+
+ SEED is added to the set of optional symmetric encryption algorithms
+ in CMS by providing two classes of unique object identifiers (OIDs).
+ One OID class defines the content encryption algorithms and the other
+ defines the key encryption algorithms.
+
+1. Introduction
+
+ This document specifies the conventions for using the SEED encryption
+ algorithm [SEED][TTASSEED] for encryption with the Cryptographic
+ Message Syntax (CMS)[CMS]. The relevant object identifiers (OIDs)
+ and processing steps are provided so that SEED may be used in the CMS
+ specification (RFC 3852, RFC 3370) for content and key encryption.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Park, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]
+
+RFC 4010 The SEED Encryption Algorithm in CMS February 2005
+
+
+1.1. SEED
+
+ SEED is a symmetric encryption algorithm developed by KISA (Korea
+ Information Security Agency) and a group of experts since 1998. The
+ input/output block size and key length of SEED is 128-bits. SEED has
+ the 16-round Feistel structure. A 128-bit input is divided into two
+ 64-bit blocks and the right 64-bit block is an input to the round
+ function, with a 64-bit subkey generated from the key scheduling.
+
+ SEED is easily implemented in various software and hardware because
+ it takes less memory to implement than other algorithms and generates
+ keys without degrading the security of the algorithm. In particular,
+ it can be effectively adopted in a computing environment with a
+ restricted resources, such as mobile devices and smart cards.
+
+ SEED is robust against known attacks including DC (Differential
+ cryptanalysis), LC (Linear cryptanalysis), and related key attacks.
+ SEED has gone through wide public scrutinizing procedures. It has
+ been evaluated and is considered cryptographically secure by credible
+ organizations such as ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 and Japan CRYPTREC
+ (Cryptography Research and Evaluation Committees)
+ [ISOSEED][CRYPTREC].
+
+ SEED is a national industrial association standard [TTASSEED] and is
+ widely used in South Korea for electronic commerce and financial
+ services operated on wired and wireless communications.
+
+1.2. Terminology
+
+ The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
+ "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document (in uppercase,
+ as shown) are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
+
+2. Object Identifiers for Content and Key Encryption
+
+ This section provides the OIDs and processing information necessary
+ for SEED to be used for content and key encryption in CMS. SEED is
+ added to the set of optional symmetric encryption algorithms in CMS
+ by providing two classes of unique object identifiers (OIDs). One
+ OID class defines the content encryption algorithms and the other
+ defines the key encryption algorithms. Thus, a CMS agent can apply
+ SEED either for content or key encryption by selecting the
+ corresponding object identifier, supplying the required parameter,
+ and starting the program code.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Park, et al. Standards Track [Page 2]
+
+RFC 4010 The SEED Encryption Algorithm in CMS February 2005
+
+
+2.1. OIDs for Content Encryption
+
+ SEED is added to the set of symmetric content encryption algorithms
+ defined in [CMSALG]. The SEED content-encryption algorithm in Cipher
+ Block Chaining (CBC) mode has the following object identifier:
+
+ id-seedCBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
+ { iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410) kisa(200004)
+ algorithm(1) seedCBC(4) }
+
+ The AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field MUST be present, and the
+ parameters field MUST contain the value of Initialization Vector
+ (IV):
+
+ SeedCBCParameter ::= SeedIV -- Initialization Vector
+
+ SeedIV ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16))
+
+ The plain text is padded according to Section 6.3 of [CMS].
+
+2.2. OIDs for Key Encryption
+
+ The key-wrap/unwrap procedures used to encrypt/decrypt a SEED
+ content-encryption key (CEK) with a SEED key-encryption key (KEK) are
+ specified in Section 3. Generation and distribution of key-
+ encryption keys are beyond the scope of this document.
+
+ The SEED key-encryption algorithm has the following object
+ identifier:
+
+ id-npki-app-cmsSeed-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
+ { iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410) kisa(200004) npki-app(7)
+ smime(1) alg(1) cmsSEED-wrap(1) }
+
+ The parameter associated with this object identifier MUST be absent,
+ because the key wrapping procedure itself defines how and when to use
+ an IV.
+
+3. Key Wrap Algorithm
+
+ SEED key wrapping and unwrapping is done in conformance with the AES
+ key wrap algorithm [RFC3394].
+
+3.1. Notation and Definitions
+
+ The following notation is used in the description of the key wrapping
+ algorithms:
+
+
+
+
+Park, et al. Standards Track [Page 3]
+
+RFC 4010 The SEED Encryption Algorithm in CMS February 2005
+
+
+ SEED(K, W) Encrypt W using the SEED codebook with key K
+ SEED-1(K, W) Decrypt W using the SEED codebook with key K
+ MSB(j, W) Return the most significant j bits of W
+ LSB(j, W) Return the least significant j bits of W
+ B1 ^ B2 The bitwise exclusive or (XOR) of B1 and B2
+ B1 | B2 Concatenate B1 and B2
+ K The key-encryption key K
+ n The number of 64-bit key data blocks
+ s The number of steps in the wrapping process,
+ s = 6n
+ P[i] The ith plaintext key data block
+ C[i] The ith ciphertext data block
+ A The 64-bit integrity check register
+ R[i] An array of 64-bit registers where
+ i = 0, 1, 2, ..., n
+ A[t], R[i][t] The contents of registers A and R[i] after
+ encryption step t.
+ IV The 64-bit initial value used during the
+ wrapping process.
+
+ In the key wrap algorithm, the concatenation function will be used to
+ concatenate 64-bit quantities to form the 128-bit input to the SEED
+ codebook. The extraction functions will be used to split the 128-bit
+ output from the SEED codebook into two 64-bit quantities.
+
+3.2. SEED Key Wrap
+
+ Key wrapping with SEED is identical to Section 2.2.1 of [RFC3394]
+ with "AES" replaced by "SEED".
+
+ The inputs to the key wrapping process are the KEK and the plaintext
+ to be wrapped. The plaintext consists of n 64-bit blocks containing
+ the key data being wrapped. The key wrapping process is described
+ below.
+
+ Inputs: Plaintext, n 64-bit values {P[1], P[2], ..., P[n]}, and
+ Key, K (the KEK).
+ Outputs: Ciphertext, (n+1) 64-bit values {C[0], C[1], ..., C[n]}.
+
+ 1) Initialize variables.
+
+ Set A[0] to an initial value (see Section 3.4)
+ For i = 1 to n
+ R[0][i] = P[i]
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Park, et al. Standards Track [Page 4]
+
+RFC 4010 The SEED Encryption Algorithm in CMS February 2005
+
+
+ 2) Calculate intermediate values.
+
+ For t = 1 to s, where s = 6n
+ A[t] = MSB(64, SEED(K, A[t-1] | R[t-1][1])) ^ t
+ For i = 1 to n-1
+ R[t][i] = R[t-1][i+1]
+ R[t][n] = LSB(64, SEED(K, A[t-1] | R[t-1][1]))
+
+ 3) Output the results.
+
+ Set C[0] = A[s]
+ For i = 1 to n
+ C[i] = R[s][i]
+
+ An alternative description of the key wrap algorithm involves
+ indexing rather than shifting. This approach allows one to calculate
+ the wrapped key in place, avoiding the rotation in the previous
+ description. This produces identical results and is more easily
+ implemented in software.
+
+ Inputs: Plaintext, n 64-bit values {P[1], P[2], ..., P[n]}, and
+ Key, K (the KEK).
+ Outputs: Ciphertext, (n+1) 64-bit values {C[0], C[1], ..., C[n]}.
+
+ 1) Initialize variables.
+
+ Set A = IV, an initial value (see Section 3.4)
+ For i = 1 to n
+ R[i] = P[i]
+
+ 2) Calculate intermediate values.
+
+ For j = 0 to 5
+ For i=1 to n
+ B = SEED(K, A | R[i])
+ A = MSB(64, B) ^ t where t = (n*j)+i
+ R[i] = LSB(64, B)
+
+ 3) Output the results.
+
+ Set C[0] = A
+ For i = 1 to n
+ C[i] = R[i]
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Park, et al. Standards Track [Page 5]
+
+RFC 4010 The SEED Encryption Algorithm in CMS February 2005
+
+
+3.3. SEED Key Unwrap
+
+ Key unwrapping with SEED is identical to Section 2.2.2 of [RFC3394],
+ with "AES" replaced by "SEED".
+
+ The inputs to the unwrap process are the KEK and (n+1) 64-bit blocks
+ of ciphertext consisting of previously wrapped key. It returns n
+ blocks of plaintext consisting of the n 64-bit blocks of the
+ decrypted key data.
+
+ Inputs: Ciphertext, (n+1) 64-bit values {C[0], C[1], ..., C[n]},
+ and Key, K (the KEK).
+ Outputs: Plaintext, n 64-bit values {P[1], P[2], ..., P[n]}.
+
+ 1) Initialize variables.
+
+ Set A[s] = C[0] where s = 6n
+ For i = 1 to n
+ R[s][i] = C[i]
+
+ 2) Calculate the intermediate values.
+
+ For t = s to 1
+ A[t-1] = MSB(64, SEED-1(K, ((A[t] ^ t) | R[t][n]))
+ R[t-1][1] = LSB(64, SEED-1(K, ((A[t]^t) | R[t][n]))
+ For i = 2 to n
+ R[t-1][i] = R[t][i-1]
+
+ 3) Output the results.
+
+ If A[0] is an appropriate initial value (see Section 3.4),
+ Then
+ For i = 1 to n
+ P[i] = R[0][i]
+ Else
+ Return an error
+
+ The unwrap algorithm can also be specified as an index based
+ operation, allowing the calculations to be carried out in place.
+ Again, this produces the same results as the register shifting
+ approach.
+
+ Inputs: Ciphertext, (n+1) 64-bit values {C[0], C[1], ..., C[n]},
+ and Key, K (the KEK).
+ Outputs: Plaintext, n 64-bit values {P[0], P[1], ..., P[n]}.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Park, et al. Standards Track [Page 6]
+
+RFC 4010 The SEED Encryption Algorithm in CMS February 2005
+
+
+ 1) Initialize variables.
+
+ Set A = C[0]
+ For i = 1 to n
+ R[i] = C[i]
+
+ 2) Compute intermediate values.
+
+ For j = 5 to 0
+ For i = n to 1
+ B = SEED-1(K, (A ^ t) | R[i]) where t = n*j+i
+ A = MSB(64, B)
+ R[i] = LSB(64, B)
+
+ 3) Output results.
+
+ If A is an appropriate initial value (see Section 3.4),
+ Then
+ For i = 1 to n
+ P[i] = R[i]
+ Else
+ Return an error
+
+3.4. Key Data Integrity -- the Initial Value
+
+ The initial value (IV) refers to the value assigned to A[0] in the
+ first step of the wrapping process. This value is used to obtain an
+ integrity check on the key data. In the final step of the unwrapping
+ process, the recovered value of A[0] is compared to the expected
+ value of A[0]. If there is a match, the key is accepted as valid,
+ and the unwrapping algorithm returns it. If there is not a match,
+ then the key is rejected, and the unwrapping algorithm returns an
+ error.
+
+ The exact properties achieved by this integrity check depend on the
+ definition of the initial value. Different applications may call for
+ somewhat different properties; for example, whether there is a need
+ to determine the integrity of key data throughout its lifecycle or
+ just when it is unwrapped. This specification defines a default
+ initial value that supports the integrity of the key data during the
+ period it is wrapped (in Section 3.4.1). Provision is also made to
+ support alternative initial values (in Section 3.4.2).
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Park, et al. Standards Track [Page 7]
+
+RFC 4010 The SEED Encryption Algorithm in CMS February 2005
+
+
+3.4.1. Default Initial Value
+
+ The default initial value (IV) is defined to be the hexadecimal
+ constant:
+
+ A[0] = IV = A6A6A6A6A6A6A6A6
+
+ The use of a constant as the IV supports a strong integrity check on
+ the key data during the period that it is wrapped. If unwrapping
+ produces A[0] = A6A6A6A6A6A6A6A6, then the chance that the key data
+ is corrupt is 2^-64. If unwrapping produces A[0] = any other value,
+ then the unwrap must return an error and not return any key data.
+
+3.4.2. Alternative Initial Values
+
+ When the key wrap is used as part of a larger key management protocol
+ or system, the desired scope for data integrity may be more than just
+ the key data, and the desired duration may be more than just the
+ period that it is wrapped. Also, if the key data is not just a SEED
+ key, it may not always be a multiple of 64 bits. Alternative
+ definitions of the initial value can be used to address such
+ problems. According to RFC 3394 [RFC3394], NIST will define
+ alternative initial values in future key management publications as
+ they are needed. To accommodate a set of alternatives that may
+ evolve over time, non-application-specific key wrap implementations
+ will require some flexibility in the way the initial value is set and
+ tested.
+
+4. SMIMECapabilities Attribute
+
+ An S/MIME client SHOULD announce the set of cryptographic functions
+ it supports by using the S/MIME capabilities attribute. This
+ attribute provides a partial list of OIDs of cryptographic functions
+ and MUST be signed by the client. The functions' OIDs SHOULD be
+ logically separated in functional categories and MUST be ordered with
+ respect to their preference.
+
+ RFC 3851 [RFC3851], Section 2.5.2 defines the SMIMECapabilities
+ signed attribute (defined as a SEQUENCE of SMIMECapability SEQUENCEs)
+ to be used to specify a partial list of algorithms that the software
+ announcing the SMIMECapabilities can support.
+
+ If an S/MIME client is required to support symmetric encryption with
+ SEED, the capabilities attribute MUST contain the SEED OID specified
+ above in the category of symmetric algorithms. The parameter
+ associated with this OID MUST be SeedSMimeCapability.
+
+ SeedSMimeCapabilty ::= NULL
+
+
+
+Park, et al. Standards Track [Page 8]
+
+RFC 4010 The SEED Encryption Algorithm in CMS February 2005
+
+
+ The SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing SEED MUST be DER-encoded as
+ the following hexadecimal strings:
+
+ 30 0C 06 08 2A 83 1A 8C 9A 44 01 04 05 00
+
+ When a sending agent creates an encrypted message, it has to decide
+ which type of encryption algorithm to use. In general, the decision
+ process involves information obtained from the capabilities lists
+ included in messages received from the recipient, as well as other
+ information, such as private agreements, user preferences and legal
+ restrictions. If local policy requires the use of SEED for symmetric
+ encryption, then both the sending and receiving S/MIME clients must
+ support it, and SEED must be configured as the preferred symmetric
+ algorithm.
+
+5. Security Considerations
+
+ This document specifies the use of SEED for encrypting the content of
+ a CMS message and for encrypting the symmetric key used to encrypt
+ the content of a CMS message, with the other mechanisms being the
+ same as the existing ones. Therefore, the security considerations
+ described in the CMS specifications [CMS][CMSALG] and the AES key
+ wrap algorithm [RFC3394] can be applied to this document. No
+ security problem has been found on SEED [CRYPTREC].
+
+6. References
+
+6.1. Normative References
+
+ [TTASSEED] Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA), South
+ Korea, "128-bit Symmetric Block Cipher (SEED)", TTAS.KO-
+ 12.0004, September, 1998 (In Korean)
+ http://www.tta.or.kr/English/new/main/index.htm
+
+ [CMS] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC
+ 3852, July 2004.
+
+ [CMSALG] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
+ Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002.
+
+ [RFC3851] Ramsdell, B., "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail
+ Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.1 Message Specification",
+ RFC 3851, July 2004.
+
+ [RFC3394] Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard
+ (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, September 2002.
+
+
+
+
+
+Park, et al. Standards Track [Page 9]
+
+RFC 4010 The SEED Encryption Algorithm in CMS February 2005
+
+
+ [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
+ Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
+
+6.2. Informative References
+
+ [SEED] Park, J., Lee, S., Kim, J., and J. Lee, "The SEED
+ Encryption Algorithm", RFC 4009, February 2005.
+
+ [ISOSEED] ISO/IEC, ISO/IEC JTC1/SC 27 N 256r1, "National Body
+ contributions on NP 18033 Encryption algorithms in
+ response to document SC 27 N 2563", October, 2000
+
+ [CRYPTREC] Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), Japan,
+ CRYPTREC. "SEED Evaluation Report", February, 2002
+ http://www.kisa.or.kr
+
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+Park, et al. Standards Track [Page 10]
+
+RFC 4010 The SEED Encryption Algorithm in CMS February 2005
+
+
+Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
+
+ SeedEncryptionAlgorithmInCMS
+ { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
+ pkcs9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-seed(24) }
+
+
+ DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
+
+ BEGIN
+
+ id-seedCBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
+ { iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410) kisa(200004)
+ algorithm(1) seedCBC(4) }
+
+ -- Initialization Vector (IV)
+
+ SeedCBCParameter ::= SeedIV
+ SeedIV ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16))
+
+ -- SEED Key Wrap Algorithm identifiers - Parameter is absent.
+
+ id-npki-app-cmsSeed-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
+ { iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410) kisa(200004) npki-app(7)
+ smime(1) alg(1) cmsSEED-wrap(1) }
+
+ -- SEED S/MIME Capability parameter
+
+ SeedSMimeCapability ::= NULL
+
+ END
+
+
+
+
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+Park, et al. Standards Track [Page 11]
+
+RFC 4010 The SEED Encryption Algorithm in CMS February 2005
+
+
+Authors' Addresses
+
+ Jongwook Park
+ Korea Information Security Agency
+ 78, Garak-Dong, Songpa-Gu, Seoul, 138-803
+ REPUBLIC OF KOREA
+
+ Phone: +82-2-405-5432
+ FAX : +82-2-405-5499
+ EMail: khopri@kisa.or.kr
+
+
+ Sungjae Lee
+ Korea Information Security Agency
+
+ Phone: +82-2-405-5243
+ FAX : +82-2-405-5499
+ EMail: sjlee@kisa.or.kr
+
+
+ Jeeyeon Kim
+ Korea Information Security Agency
+
+ Phone: +82-2-405-5238
+ FAX : +82-2-405-5499
+ EMail: jykim@kisa.or.kr
+
+
+ Jaeil Lee
+ Korea Information Security Agency
+ Phone: +82-2-405-5300
+ FAX : +82-2-405-5499
+ EMail: jilee@kisa.or.kr
+
+
+
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+Park, et al. Standards Track [Page 12]
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+RFC 4010 The SEED Encryption Algorithm in CMS February 2005
+
+
+Full Copyright Statement
+
+ Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
+
+ This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
+ contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
+ retain all their rights.
+
+ This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
+ "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
+ OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
+ ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
+ INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
+ INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
+ WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+
+Intellectual Property
+
+ The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
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+
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+
+
+Acknowledgement
+
+ Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
+ Internet Society.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Park, et al. Standards Track [Page 13]
+