diff options
author | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
commit | 4bfd864f10b68b71482b35c818559068ef8d5797 (patch) | |
tree | e3989f47a7994642eb325063d46e8f08ffa681dc /doc/rfc/rfc4325.txt | |
parent | ea76e11061bda059ae9f9ad130a9895cc85607db (diff) |
doc: Add RFC documents
Diffstat (limited to 'doc/rfc/rfc4325.txt')
-rw-r--r-- | doc/rfc/rfc4325.txt | 395 |
1 files changed, 395 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/doc/rfc/rfc4325.txt b/doc/rfc/rfc4325.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bc26745 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/rfc/rfc4325.txt @@ -0,0 +1,395 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group S. Santesson +Request for Comments: 4325 Microsoft +Updates: 3280 R. Housley +Category: Standards Track Vigil Security + December 2005 + + + Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Authority Information + Access Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Extension + +Status of This Memo + + This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the + Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for + improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet + Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state + and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). + +Abstract + + This document updates RFC 3280 by defining the Authority Information + Access Certificate Revocation List (CRL) extension. RFC 3280 defines + the Authority Information Access certificate extension using the same + syntax. The CRL extension provides a means of discovering and + retrieving CRL issuer certificates. + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction ....................................................2 + 1.1. Terminology ................................................3 + 2. Authority Information Access CRL Extension ......................3 + 3. Security Considerations .........................................5 + 4. References ......................................................5 + 4.1. Normative References .......................................5 + 4.2. Informative References .....................................6 + + + + + + + + + + + + +Santesson & Housley Standards Track [Page 1] + +RFC 4325 Authority Information Access CRL Extension December 2005 + + +1. Introduction + + RFC 3280 [PKIX1] specifies the validation of certification paths. + One aspect involves the determination that a certificate has not been + revoked, and one revocation checking mechanism is the Certificate + Revocation List (CRL). CRL validation is also specified in RFC 3280, + which involves the constructions of a valid certification path for + the CRL issuer. Building a CRL issuer certification path from the + signer of the CRL to a trust anchor is straightforward when the + certificate of the CRL issuer is present in the certification path + associated with the target certificate, but it can be complex in + other situations. + + There are several legitimate scenarios where the certificate of the + CRL issuer is not present, or easily discovered, from the target + certification path. This can be the case when indirect CRLs are + used, when the Certification Authority (CA) that issued the target + certificate changes its certificate signing key, or when the CA + employs separate keys for certificate signing and CRL signing. + + Methods of finding the certificate of the CRL issuer are currently + available, such as through an accessible directory location or + through use of the Subject Information Access extension in + intermediary CA certificates. + + Directory lookup requires existence and access to a directory that + has been populated with all of the necessary certificates. The + Subject Information Access extension, which supports building the CRL + issuer certification path top-down (in the direction from the trust + anchor to the CRL issuer), requires that some certificates in the CRL + issuer certification path includes an appropriate Subject Information + Access extension. + + RFC 3280 [PKIX1] provides for bottom-up discovery of certification + paths through the Authority Information Access extension, where the + id-ad-caIssuers access method may specify one or more accessLocation + fields that reference CA certificates associated with the certificate + containing this extension. + + This document enables the use of the Authority Information Access + extension in CRLs, enabling a CRL checking application to use the + access method (id-ad-caIssuers) to locate certificates that may be + useful in the construction of a valid CRL issuer certification path + to an appropriate trust anchor. + + + + + + + +Santesson & Housley Standards Track [Page 2] + +RFC 4325 Authority Information Access CRL Extension December 2005 + + +1.1. Terminology + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this + document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. + +2. Authority Information Access CRL Extension + + This section defines the use of the Authority Information Access + extension in a CRL. The syntax and semantics defined in RFC 3280 + [PKIX1] for the certificate extensions are also used for the CRL + extension. + + This CRL extension MUST NOT be marked critical. + + This extension MUST be identified by the extension object identifier + (OID) defined in RFC 3280 (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1), and the + AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax MUST be used to form the extension value. + For convenience, the ASN.1 [X.680] definition of the Authority + Information Access extension is repeated below. + + id-pe-authorityInfoAccess OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 1 } + + AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF + AccessDescription + + AccessDescription ::= SEQUENCE { + accessMethod OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + accessLocation GeneralName } + + id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 } + + id-ad-caIssuers OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 2 } + + When present in a CRL, this extension MUST include at least one + AccessDescription specifying id-ad-caIssuers as the accessMethod. + Access method types other than id-ad-caIssuers MUST NOT be included. + At least one instance of AccessDescription SHOULD specify an + accessLocation that is an HTTP [HTTP/1.1] or Lightweight Directory + Access Protocol [LDAP] Uniform Resource Identifier [URI]. + + Where the information is available via HTTP or FTP, accessLocation + MUST be a uniformResourceIdentifier and the URI MUST point to a + certificate containing file. The certificate file MUST contain + either a single Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X.690] encoded + certificate (indicated by the .cer file extension) or a collection of + certificates (indicated by the .p7c file extension): + + + + +Santesson & Housley Standards Track [Page 3] + +RFC 4325 Authority Information Access CRL Extension December 2005 + + + .cer A single DER encoded certificate as specified in + RFC 2585 [PKIX-CERT]. + + .p7c A "certs-only" CMS message as specified in RFC 2797 [CMC]. + + Conforming applications that support HTTP or FTP for accessing + certificates MUST be able to accept .cer files and SHOULD be able + to accept .p7c files. + + HTTP server implementations accessed via the URI SHOULD use the + appropriate MIME content-type for the certificate containing file. + Specifically, the HTTP server SHOULD use the content-type + application/pkix-cert [PKIX-CERT] for a single DER encoded + certificate and application/pkcs7-mime [CMC] for CMS certs-only + (PKCS#7). Consuming clients may use the MIME type and file + extension as a hint to the file content, but should not depend + solely on the presence of the correct MIME type or file extension + in the server response. + + When the accessLocation is a directoryName, the information is to + be obtained by the application from whatever directory server is + locally configured. When one CA public key is used to validate + signatures on certificates and CRLs, the desired CA certificate is + stored in the crossCertificatePair and/or cACertificate attributes + as specified in [RFC2587]. When different public keys are used to + validate signatures on certificates and CRLs, the desired + certificate is stored in the userCertificate attribute as specified + in [RFC2587]. Thus, implementations that support the directoryName + form of accessLocation MUST be prepared to find the needed + certificate in any of these three attributes. The protocol that an + application uses to access the directory (e.g., DAP or LDAP) is a + local matter. + + Where the information is available via LDAP, the accessLocation + SHOULD be a uniformResourceIdentifier. The URI MUST specify a + distingishedName and attribute(s) and MAY specify a host name + (e.g., ldap://ldap.example.com/cn=example%20CA,dc=example,dc=com? + cACertificate;binary,crossCertificatePair;binary). Omitting the + host name (e.g., + ldap:///cn=example%20CA,dc=example,dc=com?cACertificate;binary) has + the effect of specifying the use of whatever LDAP server is locally + configured. The URI MUST list appropriate attribute descriptions + for one or more attributes holding certificates or cross- + certificate pairs. + + + + + + + +Santesson & Housley Standards Track [Page 4] + +RFC 4325 Authority Information Access CRL Extension December 2005 + + +3. Security Considerations + + Implementers should take into account the possible existence of + multiple unrelated CAs and CRL issuers with the same name. + + Implementers should be aware of risks involved if the Authority + Information Access extensions of corrupted CRLs contain links to + malicious code. Implementers should always take the steps of + validating the retrieved data to ensure that the data is properly + formed. + +4. References + +4.1. Normative References + + [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. + + [RFC2587] Boeyen, S., Howes, T., and P. Richard, "Internet X.509 + Public Key Infrastructure: LDAPv2 Schema", RFC 2587, June + 1999. + + [PKIX1] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet + X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and + Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, + April 2002. + + [HTTP/1.1] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., + Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext + Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999. + + [URI] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform + Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC + 3986, January 2005. + + [LDAP] Wahl, M., Howes, T., and S. Kille, "Lightweight Directory + Access Protocol (v3)", RFC 2251, December 1997. + + [PKIX-CERT] Housley, R. and P. Hoffman, "Internet X.509 Public Key + Infrastructure Operational Protocols: FTP and HTTP", RFC + 2585, May 1999. + + [CMC] Myers, M., Liu, X., Schaad, J., and J. Weinstein, + "Certificate Management Messages over CMS", RFC 2797, + April 2000. + + + + + + +Santesson & Housley Standards Track [Page 5] + +RFC 4325 Authority Information Access CRL Extension December 2005 + + +4.2. Informative References + + [X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-1:2002), + Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One, + 2002. + + [X.690] ITU-T Recommendation X.690 Information Technology - ASN.1 + encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules + (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished + Encoding Rules (DER), 1997. + +Authors' Addresses + + Stefan Santesson + Microsoft + Tuborg Boulevard 12 + 2900 Hellerup + Denmark + + EMail: stefans@microsoft.com + + + Russell Housley + Vigil Security, LLC + 918 Spring Knoll Drive + Herndon, VA 20170 + USA + + EMail: housley@vigilsec.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Santesson & Housley Standards Track [Page 6] + +RFC 4325 Authority Information Access CRL Extension December 2005 + + +Full Copyright Statement + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). + + This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions + contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors + retain all their rights. + + This document and the information contained herein are provided on an + "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS + OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET + ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, + INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE + INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED + WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +Intellectual Property + + The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any + Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to + pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in + this document or the extent to which any license under such rights + might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has + made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information + on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be + found in BCP 78 and BCP 79. + + Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any + assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an + attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of + such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this + specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at + http://www.ietf.org/ipr. + + The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any + copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary + rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement + this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf- + ipr@ietf.org. + +Acknowledgement + + Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the + Internet Society. + + + + + + + +Santesson & Housley Standards Track [Page 7] + |