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author | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
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committer | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
commit | 4bfd864f10b68b71482b35c818559068ef8d5797 (patch) | |
tree | e3989f47a7994642eb325063d46e8f08ffa681dc /doc/rfc/rfc4753.txt | |
parent | ea76e11061bda059ae9f9ad130a9895cc85607db (diff) |
doc: Add RFC documents
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diff --git a/doc/rfc/rfc4753.txt b/doc/rfc/rfc4753.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fcf3d99 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/rfc/rfc4753.txt @@ -0,0 +1,899 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group D. Fu +Request for Comments: 4753 J. Solinas +Category: Informational NSA + January 2007 + + + ECP Groups for IKE and IKEv2 + +Status of This Memo + + This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does + not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this + memo is unlimited. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). + +Abstract + + This document describes new Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) groups + for use in the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) and Internet Key Exchange + version 2 (IKEv2) protocols in addition to previously defined groups. + Specifically, the new curve groups are based on modular arithmetic + rather than binary arithmetic. These new groups are defined to align + IKE and IKEv2 with other ECC implementations and standards, + particularly NIST standards. In addition, the curves defined here + can provide more efficient implementation than previously defined ECC + groups. + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction ....................................................2 + 2. Requirements Terminology ........................................3 + 3. Additional ECC Groups ...........................................3 + 3.1. 256-bit Random ECP Group ...................................3 + 3.2. 384-bit Random ECP Group ...................................4 + 3.3. 521-bit Random ECP Group ...................................5 + 4. Security Considerations .........................................6 + 5. Alignment with Other Standards ..................................6 + 6. IANA Considerations .............................................6 + 7. ECP Key Exchange Data Formats ...................................7 + 8. Test Vectors ....................................................7 + 8.1. 256-bit Random ECP Group ...................................8 + 8.2. 384-bit Random ECP Group ...................................9 + 8.3. 521-bit Random ECP Group ..................................10 + 9. References .....................................................12 + + + + +Fu & Solinas Informational [Page 1] + +RFC 4753 ECP Groups for IKE and IKEv2 January 2007 + + +1. Introduction + + This document describes default Diffie-Hellman groups for use in IKE + and IKEv2 in addition to the Oakley groups included in [IKE] and the + additional groups defined since [IANA-IKE]. This document assumes + that the reader is familiar with the IKE protocol and the concept of + Oakley Groups, as defined in RFC 2409 [IKE]. + + RFC 2409 [IKE] defines five standard Oakley Groups: three modular + exponentiation groups and two elliptic curve groups over GF[2^N]. + One modular exponentiation group (768 bits - Oakley Group 1) is + mandatory for all implementations to support, while the other four + are optional. Thirteen additional groups subsequently have been + defined and assigned values by IANA. All of these additional groups + are optional. Of the eighteen groups defined so far, eight are MODP + groups (exponentiation groups modulo a prime), and ten are EC2N + groups (elliptic curve groups over GF[2^N]). See [RFC3526] for more + information on MODP groups. + + The purpose of this document is to expand the options available to + implementers of elliptic curve groups by adding three ECP groups + (elliptic curve groups modulo a prime). The reasons for adding such + groups include the following. + + - The groups proposed afford efficiency advantages in software + applications since the underlying arithmetic is integer arithmetic + modulo a prime rather than binary field arithmetic. (Additional + computational advantages for these groups are presented in [GMN].) + + - The groups proposed encourage alignment with other elliptic curve + standards. The proposed groups are among those standardized by + NIST, the Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG), ISO, + and ANSI. (See Section 5 for details.) + + - The groups proposed are capable of providing security consistent + with the new Advanced Encryption Standard. + + These groups could also be defined using the New Group Mode, but + including them in this RFC will encourage interoperability of IKE + implementations based upon elliptic curve groups. In addition, the + availability of standardized groups will result in optimizations for + a particular curve and field size and allow precomputation that could + result in faster implementations. + + In summary, due to the performance advantages of elliptic curve + groups in IKE implementations and the need for further alignment with + other standards, this document defines three elliptic curve groups + based on modular arithmetic. + + + +Fu & Solinas Informational [Page 2] + +RFC 4753 ECP Groups for IKE and IKEv2 January 2007 + + +2. Requirements Terminology + + The keywords "MUST" and "SHOULD" that appear in this document are to + be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. + +3. Additional ECC Groups + + The notation adopted in RFC 2409 [IKE] is used below to describe the + new groups proposed. + +3.1. 256-bit Random ECP Group + + IKE and IKEv2 implementations SHOULD support an ECP group with the + following characteristics. The curve is based on the integers modulo + the generalized Mersenne prime p given by + + p = 2^(256)-2^(224)+2^(192)+2^(96)-1 + + The equation for the elliptic curve is: + + y^2 = x^3 - 3 x + b + +Field Size: + 256 + +Group Prime/Irreducible Polynomial: + FFFFFFFF 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000000 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF + +Group Curve b: + 5AC635D8 AA3A93E7 B3EBBD55 769886BC 651D06B0 CC53B0F6 3BCE3C3E 27D2604B + +Group Order: + FFFFFFFF 00000000 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF BCE6FAAD A7179E84 F3B9CAC2 FC632551 + + The group was chosen verifiably at random using SHA-1 as specified in + [IEEE-1363] from the seed: + + C49D3608 86E70493 6A6678E1 139D26B7 819F7E90 + + The generator for this group is given by g=(gx,gy) where + +gx: + 6B17D1F2 E12C4247 F8BCE6E5 63A440F2 77037D81 2DEB33A0 F4A13945 D898C296 + +gy: + 4FE342E2 FE1A7F9B 8EE7EB4A 7C0F9E16 2BCE3357 6B315ECE CBB64068 37BF51F5 + + + + + +Fu & Solinas Informational [Page 3] + +RFC 4753 ECP Groups for IKE and IKEv2 January 2007 + + +3.2. 384-bit Random ECP Group + + IKE and IKEv2 implementations SHOULD support an ECP group with the + following characteristics. The curve is based on the integers modulo + the generalized Mersenne prime p given by + + p = 2^(384)-2^(128)-2^(96)+2^(32)-1 + + The equation for the elliptic curve is: + + y^2 = x^3 - 3 x + b + +Field Size: + 384 + +Group Prime/Irreducible Polynomial: + FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFE + FFFFFFFF 00000000 00000000 FFFFFFFF + +Group Curve b: + B3312FA7 E23EE7E4 988E056B E3F82D19 181D9C6E FE814112 0314088F 5013875A + C656398D 8A2ED19D 2A85C8ED D3EC2AEF + +Group Order: + FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C7634D81 F4372DDF + 581A0DB2 48B0A77A ECEC196A CCC52973 + + The group was chosen verifiably at random using SHA-1 as specified in + [IEEE-1363] from the seed: + + A335926A A319A27A 1D00896A 6773A482 7ACDAC73 + + The generator for this group is given by g=(gx,gy) where + +gx: + AA87CA22 BE8B0537 8EB1C71E F320AD74 6E1D3B62 8BA79B98 59F741E0 82542A38 + 5502F25D BF55296C 3A545E38 72760AB7 + +gy: + 3617DE4A 96262C6F 5D9E98BF 9292DC29 F8F41DBD 289A147C E9DA3113 B5F0B8C0 + 0A60B1CE 1D7E819D 7A431D7C 90EA0E5F + + + + + + + + + + +Fu & Solinas Informational [Page 4] + +RFC 4753 ECP Groups for IKE and IKEv2 January 2007 + + +3.3. 521-bit Random ECP Group + + IKE and IKEv2 implementations SHOULD support an ECP group with the + following characteristics. The curve is based on the integers modulo + the Mersenne prime p given by + + p = 2^(521)-1 + + The equation for the elliptic curve is: + + y^2 = x^3 - 3 x + b + +Field Size: + 521 + +Group Prime/Irreducible Polynomial: + 01FFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF + FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF + FFFF + +Group Curve b: + 0051953E B9618E1C 9A1F929A 21A0B685 40EEA2DA 725B99B3 15F3B8B4 89918EF1 + 09E15619 3951EC7E 937B1652 C0BD3BB1 BF073573 DF883D2C 34F1EF45 1FD46B50 + 3F00 + +Group Order: + 01FFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF + FFFA5186 8783BF2F 966B7FCC 0148F709 A5D03BB5 C9B8899C 47AEBB6F B71E9138 + 6409 + + The group was chosen verifiably at random using SHA-1 as specified in + [IEEE-1363] from the seed: + + D09E8800 291CB853 96CC6717 393284AA A0DA64BA + + The generator for this group is given by g=(gx,gy) where + +gx: + 00C6858E 06B70404 E9CD9E3E CB662395 B4429C64 8139053F B521F828 AF606B4D + 3DBAA14B 5E77EFE7 5928FE1D C127A2FF A8DE3348 B3C1856A 429BF97E 7E31C2E5 + BD66 + +gy: + 01183929 6A789A3B C0045C8A 5FB42C7D 1BD998F5 4449579B 446817AF BD17273E + 662C97EE 72995EF4 2640C550 B9013FAD 0761353C 7086A272 C24088BE 94769FD1 + 6650 + + + + + +Fu & Solinas Informational [Page 5] + +RFC 4753 ECP Groups for IKE and IKEv2 January 2007 + + +4. Security Considerations + + Since this document proposes new groups for use within IKE and IKEv2, + many of the security considerations contained within [IKE] and + [IKEv2] apply here as well. + + The groups proposed in this document correspond to the symmetric key + sizes 128 bits, 192 bits, and 256 bits. This allows the IKE key + exchange to offer security comparable with the AES algorithms [AES]. + +5. Alignment with Other Standards + + The following table summarizes the appearance of these three elliptic + curve groups in other standards. + + 256-bit 384-bit 521-bit + Random Random Random + Standard ECP Group ECP Group ECP Group + ----------- ------------ ------------ ------------ + + NIST [DSS] P-256 P-384 P-521 + + ISO/IEC [ISO-15946-1] P-256 + + ISO/IEC [ISO-18031] P-256 P-384 P-521 + + ANSI [X9.62-1998] Sect. J.5.3, + Example 1 + ANSI [X9.62-2005] Sect. L.6.4.3 Sect. L.6.5.2 Sect. L.6.6.2 + + ANSI [X9.63] Sect. J.5.4, Sect. J.5.5 Sect. J.5.6 + Example 2 + + SECG [SEC2] secp256r1 secp384r1 secp521r1 + + See also [NIST], [ISO-14888-3], [ISO-15946-2], [ISO-15946-3], and + [ISO-15946-4]. + +6. IANA Considerations + + IANA has updated its registries of Diffie-Hellman groups for IKE in + [IANA-IKE] and for IKEv2 in [IANA-IKEv2] to include the groups + defined above. + + In [IANA-IKE], the groups appear as new entries in the list of + Diffie-Hellman groups given by Group Description (attribute class 4). + The descriptions are "256-bit random ECP group", "384-bit random ECP + + + + +Fu & Solinas Informational [Page 6] + +RFC 4753 ECP Groups for IKE and IKEv2 January 2007 + + + group", and "521-bit random ECP group". In each case, the group type + (attribute class 5) has the value 2 (ECP, elliptic curve group over + GF[P]). + + In [IANA-IKEv2], the groups appear as new entries in the list of + IKEv2 transform type values for Transform Type 4 (Diffie-Hellman + groups). + +7. ECP Key Exchange Data Formats + + In an ECP key exchange, the Diffie-Hellman public value passed in a + KE payload consists of two components, x and y, corresponding to the + coordinates of an elliptic curve point. Each component MUST have bit + length as given in the following table. + + Diffie-Hellman group component bit length + ------------------------ -------------------- + + 256-bit Random ECP Group 256 + 384-bit Random ECP Group 384 + 521-bit Random ECP Group 528 + + This length is enforced, if necessary, by prepending the value with + zeros. + + The Diffie-Hellman public value is obtained by concatenating the x + and y values. + + The format of the Diffie-Hellman shared secret value is the same as + that of the Diffie-Hellman public value. + +8. Test Vectors + + The following are examples of the IKEv2 key exchange payload for each + of the three groups specified in this document. + + We denote by g^n the scalar multiple of the point g by the integer n; + it is another point on the curve. In the literature, the scalar + multiple is typically denoted ng; the notation g^n is used in order + to conform to the notation used in [IKE] and [IKEv2]. + + + + + + + + + + + +Fu & Solinas Informational [Page 7] + +RFC 4753 ECP Groups for IKE and IKEv2 January 2007 + + +8.1. 256-bit Random ECP Group + + IANA assigned the ID value 19 to this Diffie-Hellman group. + + We suppose that the initiator's Diffie-Hellman private key is + +i: + C88F01F5 10D9AC3F 70A292DA A2316DE5 44E9AAB8 AFE84049 C62A9C57 862D1433 + + Then the public key is given by g^i=(gix,giy) where + +gix: + DAD0B653 94221CF9 B051E1FE CA5787D0 98DFE637 FC90B9EF 945D0C37 72581180 + +giy: + 5271A046 1CDB8252 D61F1C45 6FA3E59A B1F45B33 ACCF5F58 389E0577 B8990BB3 + + The KEi payload is as follows. + + 00000048 00130000 DAD0B653 94221CF9 B051E1FE CA5787D0 98DFE637 FC90B9EF + 945D0C37 72581180 5271A046 1CDB8252 D61F1C45 6FA3E59A B1F45B33 ACCF5F58 + 389E0577 B8990BB3 + + We suppose that the response Diffie-Hellman private key is + +r: + C6EF9C5D 78AE012A 011164AC B397CE20 88685D8F 06BF9BE0 B283AB46 476BEE53 + + Then the public key is given by g^r=(grx,gry) where + +grx: + D12DFB52 89C8D4F8 1208B702 70398C34 2296970A 0BCCB74C 736FC755 4494BF63 + +gry: + 56FBF3CA 366CC23E 8157854C 13C58D6A AC23F046 ADA30F83 53E74F33 039872AB + + The KEr payload is as follows. + + 00000048 00130000 D12DFB52 89C8D4F8 1208B702 70398C34 2296970A 0BCCB74C + 736FC755 4494BF63 56FBF3CA 366CC23E 8157854C 13C58D6A AC23F046 ADA30F83 + 53E74F33 039872AB + + + + + + + + + + +Fu & Solinas Informational [Page 8] + +RFC 4753 ECP Groups for IKE and IKEv2 January 2007 + + + The shared secret value g^ir=(girx,giry) where + +girx: + D6840F6B 42F6EDAF D13116E0 E1256520 2FEF8E9E CE7DCE03 812464D0 4B9442DE + +giry: + 522BDE0A F0D8585B 8DEF9C18 3B5AE38F 50235206 A8674ECB 5D98EDB2 0EB153A2 + + These are concatenated to form + +g^ir: + D6840F6B 42F6EDAF D13116E0 E1256520 2FEF8E9E CE7DCE03 812464D0 4B9442DE + 522BDE0A F0D8585B 8DEF9C18 3B5AE38F 50235206 A8674ECB 5D98EDB2 0EB153A2 + + This is the value that is used in the formation of SKEYSEED. + +8.2. 384-bit Random ECP Group + + IANA assigned the ID value 20 to this Diffie-Hellman group. + + We suppose that the initiator's Diffie-Hellman private key is + +i: + 099F3C70 34D4A2C6 99884D73 A375A67F 7624EF7C 6B3C0F16 0647B674 14DCE655 + E35B5380 41E649EE 3FAEF896 783AB194 + + Then the public key is given by g^i=(gix,giy) where + +gix: + 667842D7 D180AC2C DE6F74F3 7551F557 55C7645C 20EF73E3 1634FE72 B4C55EE6 + DE3AC808 ACB4BDB4 C88732AE E95F41AA + +giy: + 9482ED1F C0EEB9CA FC498462 5CCFC23F 65032149 E0E144AD A0241815 35A0F38E + EB9FCFF3 C2C947DA E69B4C63 4573A81C + + The KEi payload is as follows. + + 00000068 00140000 667842D7 D180AC2C DE6F74F3 7551F557 55C7645C 20EF73E3 + 1634FE72 B4C55EE6 DE3AC808 ACB4BDB4 C88732AE E95F41AA 9482ED1F C0EEB9CA + FC498462 5CCFC23F 65032149 E0E144AD A0241815 35A0F38E EB9FCFF3 C2C947DA + E69B4C63 4573A81C + + We suppose that the response Diffie-Hellman private key is + +r: + 41CB0779 B4BDB85D 47846725 FBEC3C94 30FAB46C C8DC5060 855CC9BD A0AA2942 + E0308312 916B8ED2 960E4BD5 5A7448FC + + + +Fu & Solinas Informational [Page 9] + +RFC 4753 ECP Groups for IKE and IKEv2 January 2007 + + + Then the public key is given by g^r=(grx,gry) where + +grx: + E558DBEF 53EECDE3 D3FCCFC1 AEA08A89 A987475D 12FD950D 83CFA417 32BC509D + 0D1AC43A 0336DEF9 6FDA41D0 774A3571 + +gry: + DCFBEC7A ACF31964 72169E83 8430367F 66EEBE3C 6E70C416 DD5F0C68 759DD1FF + F83FA401 42209DFF 5EAAD96D B9E6386C + + The KEr payload is as follows. + + 00000068 00140000 E558DBEF 53EECDE3 D3FCCFC1 AEA08A89 A987475D 12FD950D + 83CFA417 32BC509D 0D1AC43A 0336DEF9 6FDA41D0 774A3571 DCFBEC7A ACF31964 + 72169E83 8430367F 66EEBE3C 6E70C416 DD5F0C68 759DD1FF F83FA401 42209DFF + 5EAAD96D B9E6386C + + The shared secret value g^ir=(girx,giry) where + +girx: + 11187331 C279962D 93D60424 3FD592CB 9D0A926F 422E4718 7521287E 7156C5C4 + D6031355 69B9E9D0 9CF5D4A2 70F59746 + +giry: + A2A9F38E F5CAFBE2 347CF7EC 24BDD5E6 24BC93BF A82771F4 0D1B65D0 6256A852 + C983135D 4669F879 2F2C1D55 718AFBB4 + + These are concatenated to form + +g^ir: + 11187331 C279962D 93D60424 3FD592CB 9D0A926F 422E4718 7521287E 7156C5C4 + D6031355 69B9E9D0 9CF5D4A2 70F59746 A2A9F38E F5CAFBE2 347CF7EC 24BDD5E6 + 24BC93BF A82771F4 0D1B65D0 6256A852 C983135D 4669F879 2F2C1D55 718AFBB4 + + This is the value that is used in the formation of SKEYSEED. + +8.3. 521-bit Random ECP Group + + IANA assigned the ID value 21 to this Diffie-Hellman group. + + We suppose that the initiator's Diffie-Hellman private key is + +i: + 0037ADE9 319A89F4 DABDB3EF 411AACCC A5123C61 ACAB57B5 393DCE47 608172A0 + 95AA85A3 0FE1C295 2C6771D9 37BA9777 F5957B26 39BAB072 462F68C2 7A57382D + 4A52 + + + + + +Fu & Solinas Informational [Page 10] + +RFC 4753 ECP Groups for IKE and IKEv2 January 2007 + + + Then the public key is given by g^i=(gix,giy) where + +gix: + 0015417E 84DBF28C 0AD3C278 713349DC 7DF153C8 97A1891B D98BAB43 57C9ECBE + E1E3BF42 E00B8E38 0AEAE57C 2D107564 94188594 2AF5A7F4 601723C4 195D176C + ED3E + +giy: + 017CAE20 B6641D2E EB695786 D8C94614 6239D099 E18E1D5A 514C739D 7CB4A10A + D8A78801 5AC405D7 799DC75E 7B7D5B6C F2261A6A 7F150743 8BF01BEB 6CA3926F + 9582 + + The KEi payload is as follows. + + 0000008C 00150000 0015417E 84DBF28C 0AD3C278 713349DC 7DF153C8 97A1891B + D98BAB43 57C9ECBE E1E3BF42 E00B8E38 0AEAE57C 2D107564 94188594 2AF5A7F4 + 601723C4 195D176C ED3E017C AE20B664 1D2EEB69 5786D8C9 46146239 D099E18E + 1D5A514C 739D7CB4 A10AD8A7 88015AC4 05D7799D C75E7B7D 5B6CF226 1A6A7F15 + 07438BF0 1BEB6CA3 926F9582 + + We suppose that the response Diffie-Hellman private key is + +r: + 0145BA99 A847AF43 793FDD0E 872E7CDF A16BE30F DC780F97 BCCC3F07 8380201E + 9C677D60 0B343757 A3BDBF2A 3163E4C2 F869CCA7 458AA4A4 EFFC311F 5CB15168 + 5EB9 + + Then the public key is given by g^r=(grx,gry) where + +grx: + 00D0B397 5AC4B799 F5BEA16D 5E13E9AF 971D5E9B 984C9F39 728B5E57 39735A21 + 9B97C356 436ADC6E 95BB0352 F6BE64A6 C2912D4E F2D0433C ED2B6171 640012D9 + 460F + +gry: + 015C6822 6383956E 3BD066E7 97B623C2 7CE0EAC2 F551A10C 2C724D98 52077B87 + 220B6536 C5C408A1 D2AEBB8E 86D678AE 49CB5709 1F473229 6579AB44 FCD17F0F + C56A + + The KEr payload is as follows. + + 0000008c 00150000 00D0B397 5AC4B799 F5BEA16D 5E13E9AF 971D5E9B 984C9F39 + 728B5E57 39735A21 9B97C356 436ADC6E 95BB0352 F6BE64A6 C2912D4E F2D0433C + ED2B6171 640012D9 460F015C 68226383 956E3BD0 66E797B6 23C27CE0 EAC2F551 + A10C2C72 4D985207 7B87220B 6536C5C4 08A1D2AE BB8E86D6 78AE49CB 57091F47 + 32296579 AB44FCD1 7F0FC56A + + + + + +Fu & Solinas Informational [Page 11] + +RFC 4753 ECP Groups for IKE and IKEv2 January 2007 + + + The shared secret value g^ir=(girx,giry) where + +girx: + 01144C7D 79AE6956 BC8EDB8E 7C787C45 21CB086F A64407F9 7894E5E6 B2D79B04 + D1427E73 CA4BAA24 0A347868 59810C06 B3C715A3 A8CC3151 F2BEE417 996D19F3 + DDEA + +giry: + 01B901E6 B17DB294 7AC017D8 53EF1C16 74E5CFE5 9CDA18D0 78E05D1B 5242ADAA + 9FFC3C63 EA05EDB1 E13CE5B3 A8E50C3E B622E8DA 1B38E0BD D1F88569 D6C99BAF + FA43 + + These are concatenated to form + +g^ir: + 01144C7D 79AE6956 BC8EDB8E 7C787C45 21CB086F A64407F9 7894E5E6 B2D79B04 + D1427E73 CA4BAA24 0A347868 59810C06 B3C715A3 A8CC3151 F2BEE417 996D19F3 + DDEA01B9 01E6B17D B2947AC0 17D853EF 1C1674E5 CFE59CDA 18D078E0 5D1B5242 + ADAA9FFC 3C63EA05 EDB1E13C E5B3A8E5 0C3EB622 E8DA1B38 E0BDD1F8 8569D6C9 + 9BAFFA43 + + This is the value that is used in the formation of SKEYSEED. + +9. References + +9.1. Normative References + + [IANA-IKE] Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Internet Key + Exchange (IKE) Attributes. + (http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipsec-registry) + + [IANA-IKEv2] IKEv2 Parameters. + (http://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters) + + [IKE] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange + (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998. + + [IKEv2] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", + RFC 4306, December 2005. + + [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. + + + + + + + + + +Fu & Solinas Informational [Page 12] + +RFC 4753 ECP Groups for IKE and IKEv2 January 2007 + + +9.2. Informative References + + [AES] U.S. Department of Commerce/National Institute of + Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption Standard + (AES), FIPS PUB 197, November 2001. + (http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/index.html) + + [DSS] U.S. Department of Commerce/National Institute of + Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard + (DSS), FIPS PUB 186-2, January 2000. + (http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/index.html) + + [GMN] J. Solinas, Generalized Mersenne Numbers, + Combinatorics and Optimization Research Report 99-39, + 1999. (http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/) + + [IEEE-1363] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. + IEEE 1363-2000, Standard for Public Key Cryptography. + (http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/index.html) + + [ISO-14888-3] International Organization for Standardization and + International Electrotechnical Commission, ISO/IEC + 14888-3:2006, Information Technology: Security + Techniques: Digital Signatures with Appendix: Part 3 + - Discrete Logarithm Based Mechanisms. + + [ISO-15946-1] International Organization for Standardization and + International Electrotechnical Commission, ISO/IEC + 15946-1: 2002-12-01, Information Technology: Security + Techniques: Cryptographic Techniques based on Elliptic + Curves: Part 1 - General. + + [ISO-15946-2] International Organization for Standardization and + International Electrotechnical Commission, ISO/IEC + 15946-2: 2002-12-01, Information Technology: Security + Techniques: Cryptographic Techniques based on Elliptic + Curves: Part 2 - Digital Signatures. + + [ISO-15946-3] International Organization for Standardization and + International Electrotechnical Commission, ISO/IEC + 15946-3: 2002-12-01, Information Technology: Security + Techniques: Cryptographic Techniques based on Elliptic + Curves: Part 3 - Key Establishment. + + + + + + + + +Fu & Solinas Informational [Page 13] + +RFC 4753 ECP Groups for IKE and IKEv2 January 2007 + + + [ISO-15946-4] International Organization for Standardization and + International Electrotechnical Commission, ISO/IEC + 15946-4: 2004-10-01, Information Technology: Security + Techniques: Cryptographic Techniques based on Elliptic + Curves: Part 4 - Digital Signatures giving Message + Recovery. + + [ISO-18031] International Organization for Standardization and + International Electrotechnical Commission, ISO/IEC + 18031:2005, Information Technology: Security + Techniques: Random Bit Generation. + + [NIST] U.S. Department of Commerce/National Institute of + Standards and Technology. Recommendation for Pair- + Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete + Logarithm Cryptography, NIST Special Publication + Publication 800-56A, March 2006. + (http://csrc.nist.gov/CryptoToolkit/KeyMgmt.html) + + [RFC3526] Kivinen, T. and M. Kojo, "More Modular Exponential + (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange + (IKE)", RFC 3526, May 2003. + + [SEC2] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group. SEC 2 - + Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters, v. 1.0, + 2000. (http://www.secg.org) + + [X9.62-1998] American National Standards Institute, X9.62-1998: + Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services + Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature + Algorithm. January 1999. + + [X9.62-2005] American National Standards Institute, X9.62:2005: + Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services + Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature + Algorithm (ECDSA). + + [X9.63] American National Standards Institute. X9.63-2001, + Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services + Industry: Key Agreement and Key Transport using + Elliptic Curve Cryptography. November 2001. + + + + + + + + + + +Fu & Solinas Informational [Page 14] + +RFC 4753 ECP Groups for IKE and IKEv2 January 2007 + + +Authors' Addresses + + David E. Fu + National Information Assurance Research Laboratory + National Security Agency + + EMail: defu@orion.ncsc.mil + + + Jerome A. Solinas + National Information Assurance Research Laboratory + National Security Agency + + EMail: jasolin@orion.ncsc.mil + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Fu & Solinas Informational [Page 15] + +RFC 4753 ECP Groups for IKE and IKEv2 January 2007 + + +Full Copyright Statement + + Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). + + This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions + contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors + retain all their rights. + + This document and the information contained herein are provided on an + "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS + OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND + THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS + OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF + THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED + WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +Intellectual Property + + The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any + Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to + pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in + this document or the extent to which any license under such rights + might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has + made any independent effort to identify any such rights. 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