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authorThomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100
committerThomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100
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+Network Working Group G. Camarillo
+Request for Comments: 5361 Ericsson
+Category: Standards Track October 2008
+
+
+ A Document Format for Requesting Consent
+
+Status of This Memo
+
+ This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
+ Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
+ improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
+ Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
+ and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
+
+Abstract
+
+ This document defines an Extensible Markup Language (XML) format for
+ a permission document used to request consent. A permission document
+ written in this format is used by a relay to request a specific
+ recipient permission to perform a particular routing translation.
+
+Table of Contents
+
+ 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
+ 2. Definitions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
+ 3. Permission Document Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+ 3.1. Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+ 3.1.1. Recipient Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+ 3.1.2. Identity Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+ 3.1.3. Target Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
+ 3.1.4. Validity Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
+ 3.1.5. Sphere Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
+ 3.2. Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
+ 3.2.1. Translation Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
+ 4. Example Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
+ 5. XML Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+ 6. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+ 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+ 7.1. XML Namespace Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+ 7.2. XML Schema Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+ 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+ 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+ 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+ 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+ 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
+
+
+
+
+
+Camarillo Standards Track [Page 1]
+
+RFC 5361 Permission Document Format October 2008
+
+
+1. Introduction
+
+ The framework for consent-based communications in the Session
+ Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC5360] identifies the need for a format
+ to create permission documents. Such permission documents are used
+ by SIP [RFC3261] relays to request permission to perform
+ translations. A relay is defined as any SIP server, be it a proxy,
+ B2BUA (Back-to-Back User Agent), or some hybrid, which receives a
+ request and translates the Request-URI into one or more next-hop URIs
+ to which it then delivers a request.
+
+ The format for permission documents specified in this document is
+ based on Common Policy [RFC4745], an XML document format for
+ expressing privacy preferences.
+
+2. Definitions and Terminology
+
+ The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
+ "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
+ document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
+
+ This document uses the terms defined in [RFC5360]. For completeness,
+ these terms are repeated here. Figure 1 of [RFC5360] shows the
+ relationship between target and recipient URIs in a translation
+ operation.
+
+ Recipient URI:
+
+ The Request-URI of an outgoing request sent by an entity (e.g., a
+ user agent or a proxy). The sending of such request can have been
+ the result of a translation operation.
+
+ Relay:
+
+ Any SIP server, be it a proxy, B2BUA (Back-to-Back User Agent), or
+ some hybrid, that receives a request, translates its Request-URI
+ into one or more next-hop URIs (i.e., recipient URIs), and
+ delivers the request to those URIs.
+
+ Target URI:
+
+ The Request-URI of an incoming request that arrives to a relay
+ that will perform a translation operation.
+
+ Translation logic:
+
+ The logic that defines a translation operation at a relay. This
+ logic includes the translation's target and recipient URIs.
+
+
+
+Camarillo Standards Track [Page 2]
+
+RFC 5361 Permission Document Format October 2008
+
+
+ Translation operation:
+
+ Operation by which a relay translates the Request-URI of an
+ incoming request (i.e., the target URI) into one or more URIs
+ (i.e., recipient URIs) that are used as the Request-URIs of one or
+ more outgoing requests.
+
+3. Permission Document Structure
+
+ A permission document is an XML document, formatted according to the
+ schema defined in [RFC4745]. Permission documents inherit the MIME
+ type of common policy documents, 'application/auth-policy+xml'. As
+ described in [RFC4745], this type of document is composed of three
+ parts: conditions, actions, and transformations.
+
+ This section defines the new conditions and actions defined by this
+ specification. This specification does not define any new
+ transformation.
+
+3.1. Conditions
+
+ The conditions in a permission document are a set of expressions,
+ each of which evaluates to either TRUE or FALSE. Note that, as
+ discussed in [RFC4745], a permission document applies to a
+ translation if all the expressions in its conditions part evaluate to
+ TRUE.
+
+3.1.1. Recipient Condition
+
+ The recipient condition is matched against the recipient URI of a
+ translation. Recipient conditions can contain the same elements and
+ attributes as identity conditions.
+
+ When performing a translation, a relay matches the recipient
+ condition of the permission document that was used to request
+ permission for that translation against the destination URI of the
+ outgoing request. When receiving a request granting or denying
+ permissions (e.g., a SIP PUBLISH request as described in [RFC5360]),
+ the relay matches the recipient condition of the permission document
+ that was used to request permission against the identity of the
+ entity granting or denying permissions (i.e., the sender of the
+ PUBLISH request). If there is a match, the recipient condition
+ evaluates to TRUE. Otherwise, the recipient condition evaluates to
+ FALSE.
+
+ Since only authenticated identities can be matched, this section
+ defines acceptable means of authentication, which are in line with
+ those described in Section 5.6.1 of [RFC5360].
+
+
+
+Camarillo Standards Track [Page 3]
+
+RFC 5361 Permission Document Format October 2008
+
+
+ The 'id' attribute in the elements <one> and <except> MUST contain a
+ scheme when these elements appear in a permission document.
+
+ When used with SIP, a recipient granting or denying a relay
+ permissions is considered authenticated if one of the following
+ techniques is used:
+
+ SIP Identity [RFC4474], as described in Section 5.6.1.1 of
+ [RFC5360]. For PUBLISH requests that are authenticated using the
+ SIP Identity mechanism, the identity of the sender of the PUBLISH
+ request is equal to the SIP URI in the From header field of the
+ request, assuming that the signature in the Identity header field
+ has been validated.
+
+ P-Asserted-Identity [RFC3325] (which can only be used in closed
+ network environments) as described in Section 5.6.1.2 of
+ [RFC5360]. For PUBLISH requests that are authenticated using the
+ P-Asserted-Identity mechanism, the identity of the sender of the
+ PUBLISH request is equal to the P-Asserted-Identity header field
+ of the request.
+
+ Return Routability Test, as described in Section 5.6.1.3 of
+ [RFC5360]. It can be used for SIP PUBLISH and HTTP GET requests.
+ No authentication is expected to be used with return routability
+ tests and, therefore, no identity matching procedures are defined.
+
+ SIP digest, as described in Section 5.6.1.4 of [RFC5360]. The
+ identity of the sender is set equal to the SIP Address of Record
+ (AOR) for the user that has authenticated themselves.
+
+3.1.2. Identity Condition
+
+ The identity condition, which is defined in [RFC4745], is matched
+ against the URI of the sender of the request that is used as input
+ for a translation.
+
+ When performing a translation, a relay matches the identity condition
+ against the identity of the sender of the incoming request. If they
+ match, the identity condition evaluates to TRUE. Otherwise, the
+ identity condition evaluates to FALSE.
+
+ Since only authenticated identities can be matched, the following
+ subsections define acceptable means of authentication, the procedure
+ for representing the identity of the sender as a URI, and the
+ procedure for converting an identifier of the form user@domain,
+ present in the 'id' attribute of the <one> and <except> elements,
+ into a URI.
+
+
+
+
+Camarillo Standards Track [Page 4]
+
+RFC 5361 Permission Document Format October 2008
+
+
+3.1.2.1. Acceptable Means of Authentication
+
+ When used with SIP, a request sent by a sender is considered
+ authenticated if one of the following techniques is used:
+
+ SIP Digest: the relay authenticates the sender using SIP digest
+ authentication [RFC2617]. However, if the anonymous
+ authentication described on page 194 of [RFC3261] is used, the
+ sender is not considered authenticated.
+
+ Asserted Identity: if a request contains a P-Asserted-ID header
+ field [RFC3325] and the request is coming from a trusted element,
+ the sender is considered authenticated.
+
+ Cryptographically Verified Identity: if a request contains an
+ Identity header field as defined in [RFC4474], and it validates
+ the From header field of the request, the request is considered to
+ be authenticated. Note that this is true even if the request
+ contained a From header field of the form
+ sip:anonymous@example.com. As long as the signature verifies that
+ the request legitimately came from this identity, it is considered
+ authenticated.
+
+3.1.2.2. Computing a URI for the Sender
+
+ For requests that are authenticated using SIP Digest, the identity of
+ the sender is set equal to the SIP Address of Record (AOR) for the
+ user that has authenticated themselves. For example, consider the
+ following "user record" in a database:
+
+ SIP AOR: sip:alice@example.com
+ digest username: ali
+ digest password: f779ajvvh8a6s6
+ digest realm: example.com
+
+ If the relay receives a request and challenges it with the realm set
+ to "example.com", and the subsequent request contains an
+ Authorization header field with a username of "ali" and a digest
+ response generated with the password "f779ajvvh8a6s6", the identity
+ used in matching operations is "sip:alice@example.com".
+
+ For requests that are authenticated using [RFC3325], the identity of
+ the sender is equal to the SIP URI in the P-Asserted-ID header field.
+ If there are multiple values for the P-Asserted-ID header field
+ (there can be one sip URI and one tel URI [RFC3966]), then each of
+ them is used for the comparisons outlined in [RFC4745]; if either of
+ them match a <one> or <except> element, it is considered a match.
+
+
+
+
+Camarillo Standards Track [Page 5]
+
+RFC 5361 Permission Document Format October 2008
+
+
+ For requests that are authenticated using the SIP Identity mechanism
+ [RFC4474], identity of the sender is equal to the SIP URI in the From
+ header field of the request, assuming that the signature in the
+ Identity header field has been validated.
+
+ SIP also allows for anonymous requests. If a request is anonymous
+ because the digest challenge/response used the "anonymous" username,
+ the request is considered unauthenticated and will not match the
+ <identity> condition. If a request is anonymous because it contains
+ a Privacy header field [RFC3323], but still contains a P-Asserted-ID
+ header field, the identity in the P-Asserted-ID header field is still
+ used in the authorization computations; the fact that the request was
+ anonymous has no impact on the identity processing. However, if the
+ request had traversed a trust boundary and the P-Asserted-ID header
+ field and the Privacy header field had been removed, the request will
+ be considered unauthenticated when it arrives at the relay, and thus
+ not match the <sender> condition. Finally, if a request contained an
+ Identity header field that was validated, and the From header field
+ contained a URI of the form sip:anonymous@example.com, then the
+ sender is considered authenticated, and it will have an identity
+ equal to sip:anonymous@example.com. Had such an identity been placed
+ into a <one> or <except> element, there will be a match.
+
+3.1.2.3. Computing a SIP URI from the id Attribute
+
+ If the <one> or <except> condition does not contain a scheme,
+ conversion of the value in the 'id' attribute to a SIP URI is done
+ trivially. If the characters in the 'id' attribute are valid
+ characters for the user and hostpart components of the SIP URI, a
+ 'sip:' is appended to the contents of the 'id' attribute, and the
+ result is the SIP URI. If the characters in the 'id' attribute are
+ not valid for the user and hostpart components of the SIP URI,
+ conversion is not possible and, thus, the identity condition
+ evaluates to FALSE. This happens, for example, when the user portion
+ of the 'id' attribute contains UTF-8 characters.
+
+3.1.3. Target Condition
+
+ The target condition is matched against the target URI of a
+ translation. The target condition can contain the same elements and
+ attributes as identity conditions.
+
+ When performing a translation, a relay matches the target condition
+ against the destination of the incoming request, which is typically
+ contained in the Request-URI. If they match, the target condition
+ evaluates to TRUE. Otherwise, the target condition evaluates to
+ FALSE.
+
+
+
+
+Camarillo Standards Track [Page 6]
+
+RFC 5361 Permission Document Format October 2008
+
+
+3.1.4. Validity Condition
+
+ The <validity> element is not applicable to this document. Each
+ <permission> element has an infinite lifetime and can be revoked
+ using an independent mechanism, as described in Section 5.8 of
+ [RFC5360]. In any case, as discussed in Section 4.1 of [RFC5360],
+ permissions are only valid as long as the context where they were
+ granted is valid. If present, <validity> elements MUST be ignored.
+
+3.1.5. Sphere Condition
+
+ The <sphere> element is not applicable to this document and therefore
+ is not used. If present, <sphere> elements MUST be ignored.
+
+3.2. Actions
+
+ The actions in a permission document provide URIs to grant or deny
+ permission to perform the translation described in the document.
+
+ Note that the <trans-handling> element is not an action, as
+ defined in Common Policy [RFC4745], but rather an informational
+ element. Therefore, the conflict resolution mechanism does not
+ apply to it.
+
+ Each policy rule contains at least two <trans-handling> elements; one
+ element with a URI to grant and another with a URI to deny
+ permission.
+
+3.2.1. Translation Handling
+
+ The <trans-handling> provides URIs for a recipient to grant or deny
+ the relay permission to perform a translation. The defined values
+ are:
+
+ deny: this action tells the relay not to perform the translation.
+
+ grant: this action tells the server to perform the translation.
+
+ The 'perm-uri' attribute in the <trans-handling> element provides a
+ URI to grant or deny permission to perform a translation.
+
+4. Example Document
+
+ In the following example, a client adds 'sip:bob@example.org' to the
+ translation whose target URI is 'sip:alices-friends@example.com'.
+ The relay handling the translation generates the following permission
+ document in order to ask for permission to relay requests sent to
+ 'sip:alices-friends@example.com' to 'sip:bob@example.org'. The
+
+
+
+Camarillo Standards Track [Page 7]
+
+RFC 5361 Permission Document Format October 2008
+
+
+ target URI is 'sip:alices-friends@example.com', and the recipient URI
+ is 'sip:bob@example.org'. The sender's identity does not play a role
+ in this example. Therefore, the permission document does not put any
+ restriction on potential senders.
+
+ +--------+ +--------------------------------+ Permission
+ | | | | Request
+ | Client | | Relay | with
+ | | | sip:alices-friends@example.com | Permission
+ +--------+ | | Document
+ | |+-------+ |-------------+
+ | ||Transl.| | |
+ |Manipulation ||Logic | | |
+ +------------>|+-------+ | |
+ Add +--------------------------------+ |
+ sip:bob@example.org V
+ +---------------------+
+ | |
+ | Recipient |
+ | sip:bob@example.org |
+ | |
+ +---------------------+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Camarillo Standards Track [Page 8]
+
+RFC 5361 Permission Document Format October 2008
+
+
+ <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+ <cp:ruleset
+ xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules"
+ xmlns:cp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy">
+ <cp:rule id="f1">
+ <cp:conditions>
+ <cp:identity>
+ <cp:many/>
+ </cp:identity>
+ <recipient>
+ <cp:one id="sip:bob@example.org"/>
+ </recipient>
+ <target>
+ <cp:one id="sip:alices-friends@example.com"/>
+ </target>
+ </cp:conditions>
+ <cp:actions>
+ <trans-handling
+ perm-uri="sips:grant-1awdch5Fasddfce34@example.com"
+ >grant</trans-handling>
+ <trans-handling
+ perm-uri="https://example.com/grant-1awdch5Fasddfce34"
+ >grant</trans-handling>
+ <trans-handling
+ perm-uri="sips:deny-23rCsdfgvdT5sdfgye@example.com"
+ >deny</trans-handling>
+ <trans-handling
+ perm-uri="https://example.com/deny-23rCsdfgvdT5sdfgye"
+ >deny</trans-handling>
+ </cp:actions>
+ <cp:transformations/>
+ </cp:rule>
+ </cp:ruleset>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Camarillo Standards Track [Page 9]
+
+RFC 5361 Permission Document Format October 2008
+
+
+5. XML Schema
+
+
+ <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+ <xs:schema
+ targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules"
+ xmlns:cr="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules"
+ xmlns:cp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy"
+ xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
+ elementFormDefault="qualified"
+ attributeFormDefault="unqualified">
+
+ <!-- Conditions -->
+ <xs:element name="recipient" type="cp:identityType"/>
+ <xs:element name="target" type="cp:identityType"/>
+
+ <!-- Actions -->
+ <xs:simpleType name="trans-values">
+ <xs:restriction base="xs:string">
+ <xs:enumeration value="deny"/>
+ <xs:enumeration value="grant"/>
+ </xs:restriction>
+ </xs:simpleType>
+
+ <xs:element name="trans-handling">
+ <xs:complexType>
+ <xs:simpleContent>
+ <xs:extension base="trans-values">
+ <xs:attribute name="perm-uri" type="xs:anyURI"
+ use="required"/>
+ </xs:extension>
+ </xs:simpleContent>
+ </xs:complexType>
+ </xs:element>
+
+ </xs:schema>
+
+6. Extensibility
+
+ This specification defines elements that do not have extension points
+ in the "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules" namespace. Instance
+ documents that utilize these element definitions SHOULD be schema
+ valid. Applications processing instance documents with content that
+ is not understood by the application MUST ignore that content. IETF
+ extension documents of this specification MAY reuse the
+ "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules" namespace to define new
+ elements.
+
+
+
+
+Camarillo Standards Track [Page 10]
+
+RFC 5361 Permission Document Format October 2008
+
+
+7. IANA Considerations
+
+ This section registers a new XML namespace and a new XML schema per
+ the procedures in [RFC3688].
+
+7.1. XML Namespace Registration
+
+ URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules
+
+ Registrant Contact: IETF SIPPING working group <sipping@ietf.org>,
+ Gonzalo Camarillo <Gonzalo.Camarillo@ericsson.com>
+
+ XML:
+
+ BEGIN
+ <?xml version="1.0"?>
+ <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML Basic 1.0//EN"
+ "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml-basic/xhtml-basic10.dtd">
+ <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
+ <head>
+ <meta http-equiv="content-type"
+ content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"/>
+ <title>Consent Rules Namespace</title>
+ </head>
+ <body>
+ <h1>Namespace for Permission Documents</h1>
+ <h2>urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules</h2>
+ <p>See <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5361.txt">RFC 5361
+ </a>.</p>
+ </body>
+ </html>
+ END
+
+7.2. XML Schema Registration
+
+ URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:consent-rules
+
+ Registrant Contact: IETF SIPPING working group <sipping@ietf.org>,
+ Gonzalo Camarillo <Gonzalo.Camarillo@ericsson.com>
+
+ XML: The XML schema to be registered is contained in Section 5.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Camarillo Standards Track [Page 11]
+
+RFC 5361 Permission Document Format October 2008
+
+
+8. Security Considerations
+
+ RFC 5360 [RFC5360] discusses security-related issues, such as how to
+ authenticate SIP and HTTP requests granting permissions and how to
+ transport permission documents between relays and recipients, that
+ are directly related to this specification.
+
+9. Acknowledgements
+
+ Jonathan Rosenberg provided useful ideas on this document. Hannes
+ Tschofenig helped align this document with common policy. Ben
+ Campbell and Mary Barnes performed a thorough review of this
+ document. Lakshminath Dondeti provided useful comments.
+
+10. References
+
+10.1. Normative References
+
+ [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
+ Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
+
+ [RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
+ Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
+ Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
+ RFC 2617, June 1999.
+
+ [RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
+ A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
+ Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
+ June 2002.
+
+ [RFC3323] Peterson, J., "A Privacy Mechanism for the Session
+ Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 3323, November 2002.
+
+ [RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
+ January 2004.
+
+ [RFC4474] Peterson, J. and C. Jennings, "Enhancements for
+ Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
+ Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4474, August 2006.
+
+ [RFC4745] Schulzrinne, H., Tschofenig, H., Morris, J., Cuellar, J.,
+ Polk, J., and J. Rosenberg, "Common Policy: A Document
+ Format for Expressing Privacy Preferences", RFC 4745,
+ February 2007.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Camarillo Standards Track [Page 12]
+
+RFC 5361 Permission Document Format October 2008
+
+
+ [RFC5360] Rosenberg, J., Camarillo, G., and D. Willis, "A Framework
+ for Consent-Based Communications in the Session Initiation
+ Protocol (SIP)", RFC 5360, October 2008.
+
+10.2. Informative References
+
+ [RFC3966] Schulzrinne, H., "The tel URI for Telephone Numbers",
+ RFC 3966, December 2004.
+
+ [RFC3325] Jennings, C., Peterson, J., and M. Watson, "Private
+ Extensions to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for
+ Asserted Identity within Trusted Networks", RFC 3325,
+ November 2002.
+
+Author's Address
+
+ Gonzalo Camarillo
+ Ericsson
+ Hirsalantie 11
+ Jorvas 02420
+ Finland
+
+ EMail: Gonzalo.Camarillo@ericsson.com
+
+
+
+
+
+
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+Camarillo Standards Track [Page 13]
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+RFC 5361 Permission Document Format October 2008
+
+
+Full Copyright Statement
+
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+Camarillo Standards Track [Page 14]
+