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| author | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
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| committer | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
| commit | 4bfd864f10b68b71482b35c818559068ef8d5797 (patch) | |
| tree | e3989f47a7994642eb325063d46e8f08ffa681dc /doc/rfc/rfc7518.txt | |
| parent | ea76e11061bda059ae9f9ad130a9895cc85607db (diff) | |
doc: Add RFC documents
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diff --git a/doc/rfc/rfc7518.txt b/doc/rfc/rfc7518.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e649cc2 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/rfc/rfc7518.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3867 @@ + + + + + + +Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Jones +Request for Comments: 7518 Microsoft +Category: Standards Track May 2015 +ISSN: 2070-1721 + + + JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) + +Abstract + + This specification registers cryptographic algorithms and identifiers + to be used with the JSON Web Signature (JWS), JSON Web Encryption + (JWE), and JSON Web Key (JWK) specifications. It defines several + IANA registries for these identifiers. + +Status of This Memo + + This is an Internet Standards Track document. + + This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force + (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has + received public review and has been approved for publication by the + Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on + Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741. + + Information about the current status of this document, any errata, + and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at + http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the + document authors. All rights reserved. + + This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal + Provisions Relating to IETF Documents + (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of + publication of this document. Please review these documents + carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect + to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must + include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of + the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as + described in the Simplified BSD License. + + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 1] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 3. Cryptographic Algorithms for Digital Signatures and MACs . . 6 + 3.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWS . . . . 6 + 3.2. HMAC with SHA-2 Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 3.3. Digital Signature with RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 . . . . . . . . 8 + 3.4. Digital Signature with ECDSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 3.5. Digital Signature with RSASSA-PSS . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 3.6. Using the Algorithm "none" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 4. Cryptographic Algorithms for Key Management . . . . . . . . . 11 + 4.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWE . . . . 12 + 4.2. Key Encryption with RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 . . . . . . . . . . 13 + 4.3. Key Encryption with RSAES OAEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + 4.4. Key Wrapping with AES Key Wrap . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + 4.5. Direct Encryption with a Shared Symmetric Key . . . . . . 15 + 4.6. Key Agreement with Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman + Ephemeral Static (ECDH-ES) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 4.6.1. Header Parameters Used for ECDH Key Agreement . . . . 16 + 4.6.1.1. "epk" (Ephemeral Public Key) Header Parameter . . 16 + 4.6.1.2. "apu" (Agreement PartyUInfo) Header Parameter . . 17 + 4.6.1.3. "apv" (Agreement PartyVInfo) Header Parameter . . 17 + 4.6.2. Key Derivation for ECDH Key Agreement . . . . . . . . 17 + 4.7. Key Encryption with AES GCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + 4.7.1. Header Parameters Used for AES GCM Key Encryption . . 19 + 4.7.1.1. "iv" (Initialization Vector) Header Parameter . . 19 + 4.7.1.2. "tag" (Authentication Tag) Header Parameter . . . 19 + 4.8. Key Encryption with PBES2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 + 4.8.1. Header Parameters Used for PBES2 Key Encryption . . . 20 + 4.8.1.1. "p2s" (PBES2 Salt Input) Header Parameter . . . . 21 + 4.8.1.2. "p2c" (PBES2 Count) Header Parameter . . . . . . 21 + 5. Cryptographic Algorithms for Content Encryption . . . . . . . 21 + 5.1. "enc" (Encryption Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for + JWE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 + 5.2. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 + 5.2.1. Conventions Used in Defining AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 . . . 23 + 5.2.2. Generic AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithm . . . . . . . . . 23 + 5.2.2.1. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Encryption . . . . . . . . . . 23 + 5.2.2.2. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Decryption . . . . . . . . . . 25 + 5.2.3. AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 + 5.2.4. AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 + 5.2.5. AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 + 5.2.6. Content Encryption with AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 . . . . . . 26 + 5.3. Content Encryption with AES GCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 + 6. Cryptographic Algorithms for Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 + 6.1. "kty" (Key Type) Parameter Values . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 2] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + 6.2. Parameters for Elliptic Curve Keys . . . . . . . . . . . 28 + 6.2.1. Parameters for Elliptic Curve Public Keys . . . . . . 28 + 6.2.1.1. "crv" (Curve) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 + 6.2.1.2. "x" (X Coordinate) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . 29 + 6.2.1.3. "y" (Y Coordinate) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . 29 + 6.2.2. Parameters for Elliptic Curve Private Keys . . . . . 29 + 6.2.2.1. "d" (ECC Private Key) Parameter . . . . . . . . . 29 + 6.3. Parameters for RSA Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 + 6.3.1. Parameters for RSA Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . 30 + 6.3.1.1. "n" (Modulus) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 + 6.3.1.2. "e" (Exponent) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 + 6.3.2. Parameters for RSA Private Keys . . . . . . . . . . . 30 + 6.3.2.1. "d" (Private Exponent) Parameter . . . . . . . . 30 + 6.3.2.2. "p" (First Prime Factor) Parameter . . . . . . . 31 + 6.3.2.3. "q" (Second Prime Factor) Parameter . . . . . . . 31 + 6.3.2.4. "dp" (First Factor CRT Exponent) Parameter . . . 31 + 6.3.2.5. "dq" (Second Factor CRT Exponent) Parameter . . . 31 + 6.3.2.6. "qi" (First CRT Coefficient) Parameter . . . . . 31 + 6.3.2.7. "oth" (Other Primes Info) Parameter . . . . . . . 31 + 6.4. Parameters for Symmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 + 6.4.1. "k" (Key Value) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 + 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 + 7.1. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry . . 33 + 7.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 + 7.1.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 + 7.2. Header Parameter Names Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 42 + 7.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 + 7.3. JSON Web Encryption Compression Algorithms Registry . . . 43 + 7.3.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 + 7.3.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 + 7.4. JSON Web Key Types Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 + 7.4.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 + 7.4.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 + 7.5. JSON Web Key Parameters Registration . . . . . . . . . . 45 + 7.5.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 + 7.6. JSON Web Key Elliptic Curve Registry . . . . . . . . . . 48 + 7.6.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 + 7.6.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 + 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 + 8.1. Cryptographic Agility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 + 8.2. Key Lifetimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 + 8.3. RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 Security Considerations . . . . . . . . 50 + 8.4. AES GCM Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 + 8.5. Unsecured JWS Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . 51 + 8.6. Denial-of-Service Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 + 8.7. Reusing Key Material when Encrypting Keys . . . . . . . . 51 + 8.8. Password Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 + 8.9. Key Entropy and Random Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 3] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + 8.10. Differences between Digital Signatures and MACs . . . . . 52 + 8.11. Using Matching Algorithm Strengths . . . . . . . . . . . 53 + 8.12. Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . 53 + 8.13. Timing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 + 8.14. RSA Private Key Representations and Blinding . . . . . . 53 + 9. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 + 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 + 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 + 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 + Appendix A. Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference . . . . . . . . 59 + A.1. Digital Signature/MAC Algorithm Identifier Cross- + Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 + A.2. Key Management Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference . . . 61 + A.3. Content Encryption Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference . 62 + Appendix B. Test Cases for AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithms . . . . 62 + B.1. Test Cases for AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 . . . . . . . . . 63 + B.2. Test Cases for AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 . . . . . . . . . 64 + B.3. Test Cases for AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 . . . . . . . . . 65 + Appendix C. Example ECDH-ES Key Agreement Computation . . . . . 66 + Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 + Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 + +1. Introduction + + This specification registers cryptographic algorithms and identifiers + to be used with the JSON Web Signature (JWS) [JWS], JSON Web + Encryption (JWE) [JWE], and JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] specifications. + It defines several IANA registries for these identifiers. All these + specifications utilize JSON-based [RFC7159] data structures. This + specification also describes the semantics and operations that are + specific to these algorithms and key types. + + Registering the algorithms and identifiers here, rather than in the + JWS, JWE, and JWK specifications, is intended to allow them to remain + unchanged in the face of changes in the set of Required, Recommended, + Optional, and Deprecated algorithms over time. This also allows + changes to the JWS, JWE, and JWK specifications without changing this + document. + + Names defined by this specification are short because a core goal is + for the resulting representations to be compact. + +1.1. Notational Conventions + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and + "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in + "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" [RFC2119]. + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 4] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + The interpretation should only be applied when the terms appear in + all capital letters. + + BASE64URL(OCTETS) denotes the base64url encoding of OCTETS, per + Section 2 of [JWS]. + + UTF8(STRING) denotes the octets of the UTF-8 [RFC3629] representation + of STRING, where STRING is a sequence of zero or more Unicode + [UNICODE] characters. + + ASCII(STRING) denotes the octets of the ASCII [RFC20] representation + of STRING, where STRING is a sequence of zero or more ASCII + characters. + + The concatenation of two values A and B is denoted as A || B. + +2. Terminology + + The terms "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", "Base64url Encoding", "Header + Parameter", "JOSE Header", "JWS Payload", "JWS Protected Header", + "JWS Signature", "JWS Signing Input", and "Unsecured JWS" are defined + by the JWS specification [JWS]. + + The terms "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", "Additional Authenticated Data + (AAD)", "Authentication Tag", "Content Encryption Key (CEK)", "Direct + Encryption", "Direct Key Agreement", "JWE Authentication Tag", "JWE + Ciphertext", "JWE Encrypted Key", "JWE Initialization Vector", "JWE + Protected Header", "Key Agreement with Key Wrapping", "Key + Encryption", "Key Management Mode", and "Key Wrapping" are defined by + the JWE specification [JWE]. + + The terms "JSON Web Key (JWK)" and "JWK Set" are defined by the JWK + specification [JWK]. + + The terms "Ciphertext", "Digital Signature", "Initialization Vector", + "Message Authentication Code (MAC)", and "Plaintext" are defined by + the "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2" [RFC4949]. + + This term is defined by this specification: + + Base64urlUInt + The representation of a positive or zero integer value as the + base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big-endian + representation as an octet sequence. The octet sequence MUST + utilize the minimum number of octets needed to represent the + value. Zero is represented as BASE64URL(single zero-valued + octet), which is "AA". + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 5] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +3. Cryptographic Algorithms for Digital Signatures and MACs + + JWS uses cryptographic algorithms to digitally sign or create a MAC + of the contents of the JWS Protected Header and the JWS Payload. + +3.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWS + + The table below is the set of "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter + values defined by this specification for use with JWS, each of which + is explained in more detail in the following sections: + + +--------------+-------------------------------+--------------------+ + | "alg" Param | Digital Signature or MAC | Implementation | + | Value | Algorithm | Requirements | + +--------------+-------------------------------+--------------------+ + | HS256 | HMAC using SHA-256 | Required | + | HS384 | HMAC using SHA-384 | Optional | + | HS512 | HMAC using SHA-512 | Optional | + | RS256 | RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using | Recommended | + | | SHA-256 | | + | RS384 | RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using | Optional | + | | SHA-384 | | + | RS512 | RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using | Optional | + | | SHA-512 | | + | ES256 | ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256 | Recommended+ | + | ES384 | ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384 | Optional | + | ES512 | ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512 | Optional | + | PS256 | RSASSA-PSS using SHA-256 and | Optional | + | | MGF1 with SHA-256 | | + | PS384 | RSASSA-PSS using SHA-384 and | Optional | + | | MGF1 with SHA-384 | | + | PS512 | RSASSA-PSS using SHA-512 and | Optional | + | | MGF1 with SHA-512 | | + | none | No digital signature or MAC | Optional | + | | performed | | + +--------------+-------------------------------+--------------------+ + + The use of "+" in the Implementation Requirements column indicates + that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future + version of the specification. + + See Appendix A.1 for a table cross-referencing the JWS digital + signature and MAC "alg" (algorithm) values defined in this + specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards + and software packages. + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 6] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +3.2. HMAC with SHA-2 Functions + + Hash-based Message Authentication Codes (HMACs) enable one to use a + secret plus a cryptographic hash function to generate a MAC. This + can be used to demonstrate that whoever generated the MAC was in + possession of the MAC key. The algorithm for implementing and + validating HMACs is provided in RFC 2104 [RFC2104]. + + A key of the same size as the hash output (for instance, 256 bits for + "HS256") or larger MUST be used with this algorithm. (This + requirement is based on Section 5.3.4 (Security Effect of the HMAC + Key) of NIST SP 800-117 [NIST.800-107], which states that the + effective security strength is the minimum of the security strength + of the key and two times the size of the internal hash value.) + + The HMAC SHA-256 MAC is generated per RFC 2104, using SHA-256 as the + hash algorithm "H", using the JWS Signing Input as the "text" value, + and using the shared key. The HMAC output value is the JWS + Signature. + + The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to + indicate that the JWS Signature is an HMAC value computed using the + corresponding algorithm: + + +-------------------+--------------------+ + | "alg" Param Value | MAC Algorithm | + +-------------------+--------------------+ + | HS256 | HMAC using SHA-256 | + | HS384 | HMAC using SHA-384 | + | HS512 | HMAC using SHA-512 | + +-------------------+--------------------+ + + The HMAC SHA-256 MAC for a JWS is validated by computing an HMAC + value per RFC 2104, using SHA-256 as the hash algorithm "H", using + the received JWS Signing Input as the "text" value, and using the + shared key. This computed HMAC value is then compared to the result + of base64url decoding the received encoded JWS Signature value. The + comparison of the computed HMAC value to the JWS Signature value MUST + be done in a constant-time manner to thwart timing attacks. + Alternatively, the computed HMAC value can be base64url encoded and + compared to the received encoded JWS Signature value (also in a + constant-time manner), as this comparison produces the same result as + comparing the unencoded values. In either case, if the values match, + the HMAC has been validated. + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 7] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + Securing content and validation with the HMAC SHA-384 and HMAC + SHA-512 algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for HMAC + SHA-256 -- just using the corresponding hash algorithms with + correspondingly larger minimum key sizes and result values: 384 bits + each for HMAC SHA-384 and 512 bits each for HMAC SHA-512. + + An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.1 of [JWS]. + +3.3. Digital Signature with RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 + + This section defines the use of the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 digital + signature algorithm as defined in Section 8.2 of RFC 3447 [RFC3447] + (commonly known as PKCS #1), using SHA-2 [SHS] hash functions. + + A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with these algorithms. + + The RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 SHA-256 digital signature is generated as + follows: generate a digital signature of the JWS Signing Input using + RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-SIGN and the SHA-256 hash function with the desired + private key. This is the JWS Signature value. + + The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to + indicate that the JWS Signature is a digital signature value computed + using the corresponding algorithm: + + +-------------------+---------------------------------+ + | "alg" Param Value | Digital Signature Algorithm | + +-------------------+---------------------------------+ + | RS256 | RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using SHA-256 | + | RS384 | RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using SHA-384 | + | RS512 | RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using SHA-512 | + +-------------------+---------------------------------+ + + The RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 SHA-256 digital signature for a JWS is + validated as follows: submit the JWS Signing Input, the JWS + Signature, and the public key corresponding to the private key used + by the signer to the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY algorithm using SHA-256 + as the hash function. + + Signing and validation with the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 SHA-384 and RSASSA- + PKCS1-v1_5 SHA-512 algorithms is performed identically to the + procedure for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 SHA-256 -- just using the + corresponding hash algorithms instead of SHA-256. + + An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.2 of [JWS]. + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 8] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +3.4. Digital Signature with ECDSA + + The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [DSS] provides + for the use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography, which is able to provide + equivalent security to RSA cryptography but using shorter key sizes + and with greater processing speed for many operations. This means + that ECDSA digital signatures will be substantially smaller in terms + of length than equivalently strong RSA digital signatures. + + This specification defines the use of ECDSA with the P-256 curve and + the SHA-256 cryptographic hash function, ECDSA with the P-384 curve + and the SHA-384 hash function, and ECDSA with the P-521 curve and the + SHA-512 hash function. The P-256, P-384, and P-521 curves are + defined in [DSS]. + + The ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 digital signature is generated as follows: + + 1. Generate a digital signature of the JWS Signing Input using ECDSA + P-256 SHA-256 with the desired private key. The output will be + the pair (R, S), where R and S are 256-bit unsigned integers. + + 2. Turn R and S into octet sequences in big-endian order, with each + array being be 32 octets long. The octet sequence + representations MUST NOT be shortened to omit any leading zero + octets contained in the values. + + 3. Concatenate the two octet sequences in the order R and then S. + (Note that many ECDSA implementations will directly produce this + concatenation as their output.) + + 4. The resulting 64-octet sequence is the JWS Signature value. + + The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to + indicate that the JWS Signature is a digital signature value computed + using the corresponding algorithm: + + +-------------------+-------------------------------+ + | "alg" Param Value | Digital Signature Algorithm | + +-------------------+-------------------------------+ + | ES256 | ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256 | + | ES384 | ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384 | + | ES512 | ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512 | + +-------------------+-------------------------------+ + + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 9] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + The ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 digital signature for a JWS is validated as + follows: + + 1. The JWS Signature value MUST be a 64-octet sequence. If it is + not a 64-octet sequence, the validation has failed. + + 2. Split the 64-octet sequence into two 32-octet sequences. The + first octet sequence represents R and the second S. The values R + and S are represented as octet sequences using the Integer-to- + OctetString Conversion defined in Section 2.3.7 of SEC1 [SEC1] + (in big-endian octet order). + + 3. Submit the JWS Signing Input, R, S, and the public key (x, y) to + the ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 validator. + + Signing and validation with the ECDSA P-384 SHA-384 and ECDSA P-521 + SHA-512 algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for + ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 -- just using the corresponding hash algorithms + with correspondingly larger result values. For ECDSA P-384 SHA-384, + R and S will be 384 bits each, resulting in a 96-octet sequence. For + ECDSA P-521 SHA-512, R and S will be 521 bits each, resulting in a + 132-octet sequence. (Note that the Integer-to-OctetString Conversion + defined in Section 2.3.7 of SEC1 [SEC1] used to represent R and S as + octet sequences adds zero-valued high-order padding bits when needed + to round the size up to a multiple of 8 bits; thus, each 521-bit + integer is represented using 528 bits in 66 octets.) + + Examples using these algorithms are shown in Appendices A.3 and A.4 + of [JWS]. + +3.5. Digital Signature with RSASSA-PSS + + This section defines the use of the RSASSA-PSS digital signature + algorithm as defined in Section 8.1 of RFC 3447 [RFC3447] with the + MGF1 mask generation function and SHA-2 hash functions, always using + the same hash function for both the RSASSA-PSS hash function and the + MGF1 hash function. The size of the salt value is the same size as + the hash function output. All other algorithm parameters use the + defaults specified in Appendix A.2.3 of RFC 3447. + + A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with this algorithm. + + The RSASSA-PSS SHA-256 digital signature is generated as follows: + generate a digital signature of the JWS Signing Input using RSASSA- + PSS-SIGN, the SHA-256 hash function, and the MGF1 mask generation + function with SHA-256 with the desired private key. This is the JWS + Signature value. + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 10] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to + indicate that the JWS Signature is a digital signature value computed + using the corresponding algorithm: + + +-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+ + | "alg" Param Value | Digital Signature Algorithm | + +-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+ + | PS256 | RSASSA-PSS using SHA-256 and MGF1 with | + | | SHA-256 | + | PS384 | RSASSA-PSS using SHA-384 and MGF1 with | + | | SHA-384 | + | PS512 | RSASSA-PSS using SHA-512 and MGF1 with | + | | SHA-512 | + +-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+ + + The RSASSA-PSS SHA-256 digital signature for a JWS is validated as + follows: submit the JWS Signing Input, the JWS Signature, and the + public key corresponding to the private key used by the signer to the + RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY algorithm using SHA-256 as the hash function and + using MGF1 as the mask generation function with SHA-256. + + Signing and validation with the RSASSA-PSS SHA-384 and RSASSA-PSS + SHA-512 algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for + RSASSA-PSS SHA-256 -- just using the alternative hash algorithm in + both roles. + +3.6. Using the Algorithm "none" + + JWSs MAY also be created that do not provide integrity protection. + Such a JWS is called an Unsecured JWS. An Unsecured JWS uses the + "alg" value "none" and is formatted identically to other JWSs, but + MUST use the empty octet sequence as its JWS Signature value. + Recipients MUST verify that the JWS Signature value is the empty + octet sequence. + + Implementations that support Unsecured JWSs MUST NOT accept such + objects as valid unless the application specifies that it is + acceptable for a specific object to not be integrity protected. + Implementations MUST NOT accept Unsecured JWSs by default. In order + to mitigate downgrade attacks, applications MUST NOT signal + acceptance of Unsecured JWSs at a global level, and SHOULD signal + acceptance on a per-object basis. See Section 8.5 for security + considerations associated with using this algorithm. + +4. Cryptographic Algorithms for Key Management + + JWE uses cryptographic algorithms to encrypt or determine the Content + Encryption Key (CEK). + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 11] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +4.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWE + + The table below is the set of "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter + values that are defined by this specification for use with JWE. + These algorithms are used to encrypt the CEK, producing the JWE + Encrypted Key, or to use key agreement to agree upon the CEK. + + +--------------------+--------------------+--------+----------------+ + | "alg" Param Value | Key Management | More | Implementation | + | | Algorithm | Header | Requirements | + | | | Params | | + +--------------------+--------------------+--------+----------------+ + | RSA1_5 | RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 | (none) | Recommended- | + | RSA-OAEP | RSAES OAEP using | (none) | Recommended+ | + | | default parameters | | | + | RSA-OAEP-256 | RSAES OAEP using | (none) | Optional | + | | SHA-256 and MGF1 | | | + | | with SHA-256 | | | + | A128KW | AES Key Wrap with | (none) | Recommended | + | | default initial | | | + | | value using | | | + | | 128-bit key | | | + | A192KW | AES Key Wrap with | (none) | Optional | + | | default initial | | | + | | value using | | | + | | 192-bit key | | | + | A256KW | AES Key Wrap with | (none) | Recommended | + | | default initial | | | + | | value using | | | + | | 256-bit key | | | + | dir | Direct use of a | (none) | Recommended | + | | shared symmetric | | | + | | key as the CEK | | | + | ECDH-ES | Elliptic Curve | "epk", | Recommended+ | + | | Diffie-Hellman | "apu", | | + | | Ephemeral Static | "apv" | | + | | key agreement | | | + | | using Concat KDF | | | + | ECDH-ES+A128KW | ECDH-ES using | "epk", | Recommended | + | | Concat KDF and CEK | "apu", | | + | | wrapped with | "apv" | | + | | "A128KW" | | | + | ECDH-ES+A192KW | ECDH-ES using | "epk", | Optional | + | | Concat KDF and CEK | "apu", | | + | | wrapped with | "apv" | | + | | "A192KW" | | | + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 12] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + | ECDH-ES+A256KW | ECDH-ES using | "epk", | Recommended | + | | Concat KDF and CEK | "apu", | | + | | wrapped with | "apv" | | + | | "A256KW" | | | + | A128GCMKW | Key wrapping with | "iv", | Optional | + | | AES GCM using | "tag" | | + | | 128-bit key | | | + | A192GCMKW | Key wrapping with | "iv", | Optional | + | | AES GCM using | "tag" | | + | | 192-bit key | | | + | A256GCMKW | Key wrapping with | "iv", | Optional | + | | AES GCM using | "tag" | | + | | 256-bit key | | | + | PBES2-HS256+A128KW | PBES2 with HMAC | "p2s", | Optional | + | | SHA-256 and | "p2c" | | + | | "A128KW" wrapping | | | + | PBES2-HS384+A192KW | PBES2 with HMAC | "p2s", | Optional | + | | SHA-384 and | "p2c" | | + | | "A192KW" wrapping | | | + | PBES2-HS512+A256KW | PBES2 with HMAC | "p2s", | Optional | + | | SHA-512 and | "p2c" | | + | | "A256KW" wrapping | | | + +--------------------+--------------------+--------+----------------+ + + The More Header Params column indicates what additional Header + Parameters are used by the algorithm, beyond "alg", which all use. + All but "dir" and "ECDH-ES" also produce a JWE Encrypted Key value. + + The use of "+" in the Implementation Requirements column indicates + that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future + version of the specification. The use of "-" indicates that the + requirement strength is likely to be decreased in a future version of + the specification. + + See Appendix A.2 for a table cross-referencing the JWE "alg" + (algorithm) values defined in this specification with the equivalent + identifiers used by other standards and software packages. + +4.2. Key Encryption with RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 + + This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE CEK with + RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 [RFC3447]. The "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter + value "RSA1_5" is used for this algorithm. + + A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with this algorithm. + + An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.2 of [JWE]. + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 13] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +4.3. Key Encryption with RSAES OAEP + + This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE CEK with RSAES + using Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [RFC3447]. Two + sets of parameters for using OAEP are defined, which use different + hash functions. In the first case, the default parameters specified + in Appendix A.2.1 of RFC 3447 are used. (Those default parameters + are the SHA-1 hash function and the MGF1 with SHA-1 mask generation + function.) In the second case, the SHA-256 hash function and the + MGF1 with SHA-256 mask generation function are used. + + The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to + indicate that the JWE Encrypted Key is the result of encrypting the + CEK using the corresponding algorithm: + + +-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+ + | "alg" Param Value | Key Management Algorithm | + +-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+ + | RSA-OAEP | RSAES OAEP using default parameters | + | RSA-OAEP-256 | RSAES OAEP using SHA-256 and MGF1 with | + | | SHA-256 | + +-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+ + + A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with these algorithms. + (This requirement is based on Table 4 (Security-strength time frames) + of NIST SP 800-57 [NIST.800-57], which requires 112 bits of security + for new uses, and Table 2 (Comparable strengths) of the same, which + states that 2048-bit RSA keys provide 112 bits of security.) + + An example using RSAES OAEP with the default parameters is shown in + Appendix A.1 of [JWE]. + +4.4. Key Wrapping with AES Key Wrap + + This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE CEK with the + Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm [RFC3394] using + the default initial value specified in Section 2.2.3.1 of that + document. + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 14] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to + indicate that the JWE Encrypted Key is the result of encrypting the + CEK using the corresponding algorithm and key size: + + +-----------------+-------------------------------------------------+ + | "alg" Param | Key Management Algorithm | + | Value | | + +-----------------+-------------------------------------------------+ + | A128KW | AES Key Wrap with default initial value using | + | | 128-bit key | + | A192KW | AES Key Wrap with default initial value using | + | | 192-bit key | + | A256KW | AES Key Wrap with default initial value using | + | | 256-bit key | + +-----------------+-------------------------------------------------+ + + An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.3 of [JWE]. + +4.5. Direct Encryption with a Shared Symmetric Key + + This section defines the specifics of directly performing symmetric + key encryption without performing a key wrapping step. In this case, + the shared symmetric key is used directly as the Content Encryption + Key (CEK) value for the "enc" algorithm. An empty octet sequence is + used as the JWE Encrypted Key value. The "alg" (algorithm) Header + Parameter value "dir" is used in this case. + + Refer to the security considerations on key lifetimes in Section 8.2 + and AES GCM in Section 8.4 when considering utilizing direct + encryption. + +4.6. Key Agreement with Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static + (ECDH-ES) + + This section defines the specifics of key agreement with Elliptic + Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static [RFC6090], in combination with + the Concat KDF, as defined in Section 5.8.1 of [NIST.800-56A]. The + key agreement result can be used in one of two ways: + + 1. directly as the Content Encryption Key (CEK) for the "enc" + algorithm, in the Direct Key Agreement mode, or + + 2. as a symmetric key used to wrap the CEK with the "A128KW", + "A192KW", or "A256KW" algorithms, in the Key Agreement with Key + Wrapping mode. + + A new ephemeral public key value MUST be generated for each key + agreement operation. + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 15] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + In Direct Key Agreement mode, the output of the Concat KDF MUST be a + key of the same length as that used by the "enc" algorithm. In this + case, the empty octet sequence is used as the JWE Encrypted Key + value. The "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter value "ECDH-ES" is + used in the Direct Key Agreement mode. + + In Key Agreement with Key Wrapping mode, the output of the Concat KDF + MUST be a key of the length needed for the specified key wrapping + algorithm. In this case, the JWE Encrypted Key is the CEK wrapped + with the agreed-upon key. + + The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to + indicate that the JWE Encrypted Key is the result of encrypting the + CEK using the result of the key agreement algorithm as the key + encryption key for the corresponding key wrapping algorithm: + + +-----------------+-------------------------------------------------+ + | "alg" Param | Key Management Algorithm | + | Value | | + +-----------------+-------------------------------------------------+ + | ECDH-ES+A128KW | ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and CEK wrapped with | + | | "A128KW" | + | ECDH-ES+A192KW | ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and CEK wrapped with | + | | "A192KW" | + | ECDH-ES+A256KW | ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and CEK wrapped with | + | | "A256KW" | + +-----------------+-------------------------------------------------+ + +4.6.1. Header Parameters Used for ECDH Key Agreement + + The following Header Parameter names are used for key agreement as + defined below. + +4.6.1.1. "epk" (Ephemeral Public Key) Header Parameter + + The "epk" (ephemeral public key) value created by the originator for + the use in key agreement algorithms. This key is represented as a + JSON Web Key [JWK] public key value. It MUST contain only public key + parameters and SHOULD contain only the minimum JWK parameters + necessary to represent the key; other JWK parameters included can be + checked for consistency and honored, or they can be ignored. This + Header Parameter MUST be present and MUST be understood and processed + by implementations when these algorithms are used. + + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 16] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +4.6.1.2. "apu" (Agreement PartyUInfo) Header Parameter + + The "apu" (agreement PartyUInfo) value for key agreement algorithms + using it (such as "ECDH-ES"), represented as a base64url-encoded + string. When used, the PartyUInfo value contains information about + the producer. Use of this Header Parameter is OPTIONAL. This Header + Parameter MUST be understood and processed by implementations when + these algorithms are used. + +4.6.1.3. "apv" (Agreement PartyVInfo) Header Parameter + + The "apv" (agreement PartyVInfo) value for key agreement algorithms + using it (such as "ECDH-ES"), represented as a base64url encoded + string. When used, the PartyVInfo value contains information about + the recipient. Use of this Header Parameter is OPTIONAL. This + Header Parameter MUST be understood and processed by implementations + when these algorithms are used. + +4.6.2. Key Derivation for ECDH Key Agreement + + The key derivation process derives the agreed-upon key from the + shared secret Z established through the ECDH algorithm, per + Section 6.2.2.2 of [NIST.800-56A]. + + Key derivation is performed using the Concat KDF, as defined in + Section 5.8.1 of [NIST.800-56A], where the Digest Method is SHA-256. + The Concat KDF parameters are set as follows: + + Z + This is set to the representation of the shared secret Z as an + octet sequence. + + keydatalen + This is set to the number of bits in the desired output key. For + "ECDH-ES", this is length of the key used by the "enc" algorithm. + For "ECDH-ES+A128KW", "ECDH-ES+A192KW", and "ECDH-ES+A256KW", this + is 128, 192, and 256, respectively. + + AlgorithmID + The AlgorithmID value is of the form Datalen || Data, where Data + is a variable-length string of zero or more octets, and Datalen is + a fixed-length, big-endian 32-bit counter that indicates the + length (in octets) of Data. In the Direct Key Agreement case, + Data is set to the octets of the ASCII representation of the "enc" + Header Parameter value. In the Key Agreement with Key Wrapping + case, Data is set to the octets of the ASCII representation of the + "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter value. + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 17] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + PartyUInfo + The PartyUInfo value is of the form Datalen || Data, where Data is + a variable-length string of zero or more octets, and Datalen is a + fixed-length, big-endian 32-bit counter that indicates the length + (in octets) of Data. If an "apu" (agreement PartyUInfo) Header + Parameter is present, Data is set to the result of base64url + decoding the "apu" value and Datalen is set to the number of + octets in Data. Otherwise, Datalen is set to 0 and Data is set to + the empty octet sequence. + + PartyVInfo + The PartyVInfo value is of the form Datalen || Data, where Data is + a variable-length string of zero or more octets, and Datalen is a + fixed-length, big-endian 32-bit counter that indicates the length + (in octets) of Data. If an "apv" (agreement PartyVInfo) Header + Parameter is present, Data is set to the result of base64url + decoding the "apv" value and Datalen is set to the number of + octets in Data. Otherwise, Datalen is set to 0 and Data is set to + the empty octet sequence. + + SuppPubInfo + This is set to the keydatalen represented as a 32-bit big-endian + integer. + + SuppPrivInfo + This is set to the empty octet sequence. + + Applications need to specify how the "apu" and "apv" Header + Parameters are used for that application. The "apu" and "apv" values + MUST be distinct, when used. Applications wishing to conform to + [NIST.800-56A] need to provide values that meet the requirements of + that document, e.g., by using values that identify the producer and + consumer. Alternatively, applications MAY conduct key derivation in + a manner similar to "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method" [RFC2631]: + in that case, the "apu" parameter MAY either be omitted or represent + a random 512-bit value (analogous to PartyAInfo in Ephemeral-Static + mode in RFC 2631) and the "apv" parameter SHOULD NOT be present. + + See Appendix C for an example key agreement computation using this + method. + +4.7. Key Encryption with AES GCM + + This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE Content + Encryption Key (CEK) with Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in + Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) ([AES] and [NIST.800-38D]). + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 18] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + Use of an Initialization Vector (IV) of size 96 bits is REQUIRED with + this algorithm. The IV is represented in base64url-encoded form as + the "iv" (initialization vector) Header Parameter value. + + The Additional Authenticated Data value used is the empty octet + string. + + The requested size of the Authentication Tag output MUST be 128 bits, + regardless of the key size. + + The JWE Encrypted Key value is the ciphertext output. + + The Authentication Tag output is represented in base64url-encoded + form as the "tag" (authentication tag) Header Parameter value. + + The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to + indicate that the JWE Encrypted Key is the result of encrypting the + CEK using the corresponding algorithm and key size: + + +-------------------+---------------------------------------------+ + | "alg" Param Value | Key Management Algorithm | + +-------------------+---------------------------------------------+ + | A128GCMKW | Key wrapping with AES GCM using 128-bit key | + | A192GCMKW | Key wrapping with AES GCM using 192-bit key | + | A256GCMKW | Key wrapping with AES GCM using 256-bit key | + +-------------------+---------------------------------------------+ + +4.7.1. Header Parameters Used for AES GCM Key Encryption + + The following Header Parameters are used for AES GCM key encryption. + +4.7.1.1. "iv" (Initialization Vector) Header Parameter + + The "iv" (initialization vector) Header Parameter value is the + base64url-encoded representation of the 96-bit IV value used for the + key encryption operation. This Header Parameter MUST be present and + MUST be understood and processed by implementations when these + algorithms are used. + +4.7.1.2. "tag" (Authentication Tag) Header Parameter + + The "tag" (authentication tag) Header Parameter value is the + base64url-encoded representation of the 128-bit Authentication Tag + value resulting from the key encryption operation. This Header + Parameter MUST be present and MUST be understood and processed by + implementations when these algorithms are used. + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 19] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +4.8. Key Encryption with PBES2 + + This section defines the specifics of performing password-based + encryption of a JWE CEK, by first deriving a key encryption key from + a user-supplied password using PBES2 schemes as specified in + Section 6.2 of [RFC2898], then by encrypting the JWE CEK using the + derived key. + + These algorithms use HMAC SHA-2 algorithms as the Pseudorandom + Function (PRF) for the PBKDF2 key derivation and AES Key Wrap + [RFC3394] for the encryption scheme. The PBES2 password input is an + octet sequence; if the password to be used is represented as a text + string rather than an octet sequence, the UTF-8 encoding of the text + string MUST be used as the octet sequence. The salt parameter MUST + be computed from the "p2s" (PBES2 salt input) Header Parameter value + and the "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter value as specified in the + "p2s" definition below. The iteration count parameter MUST be + provided as the "p2c" (PBES2 count) Header Parameter value. The + algorithms respectively use HMAC SHA-256, HMAC SHA-384, and HMAC + SHA-512 as the PRF and use 128-, 192-, and 256-bit AES Key Wrap keys. + Their derived-key lengths respectively are 16, 24, and 32 octets. + + The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to + indicate that the JWE Encrypted Key is the result of encrypting the + CEK using the result of the corresponding password-based encryption + algorithm as the key encryption key for the corresponding key + wrapping algorithm: + + +--------------------+----------------------------------------------+ + | "alg" Param Value | Key Management Algorithm | + +--------------------+----------------------------------------------+ + | PBES2-HS256+A128KW | PBES2 with HMAC SHA-256 and "A128KW" | + | | wrapping | + | PBES2-HS384+A192KW | PBES2 with HMAC SHA-384 and "A192KW" | + | | wrapping | + | PBES2-HS512+A256KW | PBES2 with HMAC SHA-512 and "A256KW" | + | | wrapping | + +--------------------+----------------------------------------------+ + + See Appendix C of the JWK specification [JWK] for an example key + encryption computation using "PBES2-HS256+A128KW". + +4.8.1. Header Parameters Used for PBES2 Key Encryption + + The following Header Parameters are used for Key Encryption with + PBES2. + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 20] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +4.8.1.1. "p2s" (PBES2 Salt Input) Header Parameter + + The "p2s" (PBES2 salt input) Header Parameter encodes a Salt Input + value, which is used as part of the PBKDF2 salt value. The "p2s" + value is BASE64URL(Salt Input). This Header Parameter MUST be + present and MUST be understood and processed by implementations when + these algorithms are used. + + The salt expands the possible keys that can be derived from a given + password. A Salt Input value containing 8 or more octets MUST be + used. A new Salt Input value MUST be generated randomly for every + encryption operation; see RFC 4086 [RFC4086] for considerations on + generating random values. The salt value used is (UTF8(Alg) || 0x00 + || Salt Input), where Alg is the "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter + value. + +4.8.1.2. "p2c" (PBES2 Count) Header Parameter + + The "p2c" (PBES2 count) Header Parameter contains the PBKDF2 + iteration count, represented as a positive JSON integer. This Header + Parameter MUST be present and MUST be understood and processed by + implementations when these algorithms are used. + + The iteration count adds computational expense, ideally compounded by + the possible range of keys introduced by the salt. A minimum + iteration count of 1000 is RECOMMENDED. + +5. Cryptographic Algorithms for Content Encryption + + JWE uses cryptographic algorithms to encrypt and integrity-protect + the plaintext and to integrity-protect the Additional Authenticated + Data. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 21] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +5.1. "enc" (Encryption Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWE + + The table below is the set of "enc" (encryption algorithm) Header + Parameter values that are defined by this specification for use with + JWE. + + +---------------+----------------------------------+----------------+ + | "enc" Param | Content Encryption Algorithm | Implementation | + | Value | | Requirements | + +---------------+----------------------------------+----------------+ + | A128CBC-HS256 | AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 | Required | + | | authenticated encryption | | + | | algorithm, as defined in Section | | + | | 5.2.3 | | + | A192CBC-HS384 | AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 | Optional | + | | authenticated encryption | | + | | algorithm, as defined in Section | | + | | 5.2.4 | | + | A256CBC-HS512 | AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 | Required | + | | authenticated encryption | | + | | algorithm, as defined in Section | | + | | 5.2.5 | | + | A128GCM | AES GCM using 128-bit key | Recommended | + | A192GCM | AES GCM using 192-bit key | Optional | + | A256GCM | AES GCM using 256-bit key | Recommended | + +---------------+----------------------------------+----------------+ + + All also use a JWE Initialization Vector value and produce JWE + Ciphertext and JWE Authentication Tag values. + + See Appendix A.3 for a table cross-referencing the JWE "enc" + (encryption algorithm) values defined in this specification with the + equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages. + +5.2. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithms + + This section defines a family of authenticated encryption algorithms + built using a composition of AES [AES] in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) + mode [NIST.800-38A] with PKCS #7 padding operations per Section 6.3 + of [RFC5652] and HMAC ([RFC2104] and [SHS]) operations. This + algorithm family is called AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2. It also defines three + instances of this family: the first using 128-bit CBC keys and HMAC + SHA-256, the second using 192-bit CBC keys and HMAC SHA-384, and the + third using 256-bit CBC keys and HMAC SHA-512. Test cases for these + algorithms can be found in Appendix B. + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 22] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + These algorithms are based upon "Authenticated Encryption with AES- + CBC and HMAC-SHA" [AEAD-CBC-SHA], performing the same cryptographic + computations, but with the Initialization Vector (IV) and + Authentication Tag values remaining separate, rather than being + concatenated with the ciphertext value in the output representation. + This option is discussed in Appendix B of that specification. This + algorithm family is a generalization of the algorithm family in + [AEAD-CBC-SHA] and can be used to implement those algorithms. + +5.2.1. Conventions Used in Defining AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 + + We use the following notational conventions. + + CBC-PKCS7-ENC(X, P) denotes the AES-CBC encryption of P using PKCS + #7 padding utilizing the cipher with the key X. + MAC(Y, M) denotes the application of the MAC to the message M + using the key Y. + +5.2.2. Generic AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithm + + This section defines AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 in a manner that is + independent of the AES-CBC key size or hash function to be used. + Sections 5.2.2.1 and 5.2.2.2 define the generic encryption and + decryption algorithms. Sections 5.2.3 through 5.2.5 define instances + of AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 that specify those details. + +5.2.2.1. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Encryption + + The authenticated encryption algorithm takes as input four octet + strings: a secret key K, a plaintext P, Additional Authenticated Data + A, and an Initialization Vector IV. The authenticated ciphertext + value E and the Authentication Tag value T are provided as outputs. + The data in the plaintext are encrypted and authenticated, and the + Additional Authenticated Data are authenticated, but not encrypted. + + The encryption process is as follows, or uses an equivalent set of + steps: + + 1. The secondary keys MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY are generated from the + input key K as follows. Each of these two keys is an octet + string. + + MAC_KEY consists of the initial MAC_KEY_LEN octets of K, in + order. + ENC_KEY consists of the final ENC_KEY_LEN octets of K, in + order. + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 23] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + The number of octets in the input key K MUST be the sum of + MAC_KEY_LEN and ENC_KEY_LEN. The values of these parameters are + specified by the Authenticated Encryption algorithms in Sections + 5.2.3 through 5.2.5. Note that the MAC key comes before the + encryption key in the input key K; this is in the opposite order + of the algorithm names in the identifier "AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2". + + 2. The IV used is a 128-bit value generated randomly or + pseudorandomly for use in the cipher. + + 3. The plaintext is CBC encrypted using PKCS #7 padding using + ENC_KEY as the key and the IV. We denote the ciphertext output + from this step as E. + + 4. The octet string AL is equal to the number of bits in the + Additional Authenticated Data A expressed as a 64-bit unsigned + big-endian integer. + + 5. A message Authentication Tag T is computed by applying HMAC + [RFC2104] to the following data, in order: + + the Additional Authenticated Data A, + the Initialization Vector IV, + the ciphertext E computed in the previous step, and + the octet string AL defined above. + + The string MAC_KEY is used as the MAC key. We denote the output + of the MAC computed in this step as M. The first T_LEN octets of + M are used as T. + + 6. The ciphertext E and the Authentication Tag T are returned as the + outputs of the authenticated encryption. + + The encryption process can be illustrated as follows. Here K, P, A, + IV, and E denote the key, plaintext, Additional Authenticated Data, + Initialization Vector, and ciphertext, respectively. + + MAC_KEY = initial MAC_KEY_LEN octets of K, + ENC_KEY = final ENC_KEY_LEN octets of K, + E = CBC-PKCS7-ENC(ENC_KEY, P), + M = MAC(MAC_KEY, A || IV || E || AL), + T = initial T_LEN octets of M. + + + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 24] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +5.2.2.2. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Decryption + + The authenticated decryption operation has five inputs: K, A, IV, E, + and T as defined above. It has only a single output: either a + plaintext value P or a special symbol FAIL that indicates that the + inputs are not authentic. The authenticated decryption algorithm is + as follows, or uses an equivalent set of steps: + + 1. The secondary keys MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY are generated from the + input key K as in Step 1 of Section 5.2.2.1. + + 2. The integrity and authenticity of A and E are checked by + computing an HMAC with the inputs as in Step 5 of + Section 5.2.2.1. The value T, from the previous step, is + compared to the first MAC_KEY length bits of the HMAC output. If + those values are identical, then A and E are considered valid, + and processing is continued. Otherwise, all of the data used in + the MAC validation are discarded, and the authenticated + decryption operation returns an indication that it failed, and + the operation halts. (But see Section 11.5 of [JWE] for security + considerations on thwarting timing attacks.) + + 3. The value E is decrypted and the PKCS #7 padding is checked and + removed. The value IV is used as the Initialization Vector. The + value ENC_KEY is used as the decryption key. + + 4. The plaintext value is returned. + +5.2.3. AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 + + This algorithm is a concrete instantiation of the generic + AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 algorithm above. It uses the HMAC message + authentication code [RFC2104] with the SHA-256 hash function [SHS] to + provide message authentication, with the HMAC output truncated to 128 + bits, corresponding to the HMAC-SHA-256-128 algorithm defined in + [RFC4868]. For encryption, it uses AES in the CBC mode of operation + as defined in Section 6.2 of [NIST.800-38A], with PKCS #7 padding and + a 128-bit IV value. + + The AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 parameters specific to AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 + are: + + The input key K is 32 octets long. + ENC_KEY_LEN is 16 octets. + MAC_KEY_LEN is 16 octets. + The SHA-256 hash algorithm is used for the HMAC. + The HMAC-SHA-256 output is truncated to T_LEN=16 octets, by + stripping off the final 16 octets. + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 25] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +5.2.4. AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 + + AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 is based on AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256, but + with the following differences: + + The input key K is 48 octets long instead of 32. + ENC_KEY_LEN is 24 octets instead of 16. + MAC_KEY_LEN is 24 octets instead of 16. + SHA-384 is used for the HMAC instead of SHA-256. + The HMAC SHA-384 value is truncated to T_LEN=24 octets instead of + 16. + +5.2.5. AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 + + AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 is based on AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256, but + with the following differences: + + The input key K is 64 octets long instead of 32. + ENC_KEY_LEN is 32 octets instead of 16. + MAC_KEY_LEN is 32 octets instead of 16. + SHA-512 is used for the HMAC instead of SHA-256. + The HMAC SHA-512 value is truncated to T_LEN=32 octets instead of + 16. + +5.2.6. Content Encryption with AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 + + This section defines the specifics of performing authenticated + encryption with the AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 algorithms. + + The CEK is used as the secret key K. + + The following "enc" (encryption algorithm) Header Parameter values + are used to indicate that the JWE Ciphertext and JWE Authentication + Tag values have been computed using the corresponding algorithm: + + +---------------+---------------------------------------------------+ + | "enc" Param | Content Encryption Algorithm | + | Value | | + +---------------+---------------------------------------------------+ + | A128CBC-HS256 | AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 authenticated encryption | + | | algorithm, as defined in Section 5.2.3 | + | A192CBC-HS384 | AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 authenticated encryption | + | | algorithm, as defined in Section 5.2.4 | + | A256CBC-HS512 | AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 authenticated encryption | + | | algorithm, as defined in Section 5.2.5 | + +---------------+---------------------------------------------------+ + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 26] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +5.3. Content Encryption with AES GCM + + This section defines the specifics of performing authenticated + encryption with AES in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) ([AES] and + [NIST.800-38D]). + + The CEK is used as the encryption key. + + Use of an IV of size 96 bits is REQUIRED with this algorithm. + + The requested size of the Authentication Tag output MUST be 128 bits, + regardless of the key size. + + The following "enc" (encryption algorithm) Header Parameter values + are used to indicate that the JWE Ciphertext and JWE Authentication + Tag values have been computed using the corresponding algorithm and + key size: + + +-------------------+------------------------------+ + | "enc" Param Value | Content Encryption Algorithm | + +-------------------+------------------------------+ + | A128GCM | AES GCM using 128-bit key | + | A192GCM | AES GCM using 192-bit key | + | A256GCM | AES GCM using 256-bit key | + +-------------------+------------------------------+ + + An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.1 of [JWE]. + +6. Cryptographic Algorithms for Keys + + A JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] is a JSON data structure that represents a + cryptographic key. These keys can be either asymmetric or symmetric. + They can hold both public and private information about the key. + This section defines the parameters for keys using the algorithms + specified by this document. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 27] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +6.1. "kty" (Key Type) Parameter Values + + The table below is the set of "kty" (key type) parameter values that + are defined by this specification for use in JWKs. + + +-------------+--------------------------------+--------------------+ + | "kty" Param | Key Type | Implementation | + | Value | | Requirements | + +-------------+--------------------------------+--------------------+ + | EC | Elliptic Curve [DSS] | Recommended+ | + | RSA | RSA [RFC3447] | Required | + | oct | Octet sequence (used to | Required | + | | represent symmetric keys) | | + +-------------+--------------------------------+--------------------+ + + The use of "+" in the Implementation Requirements column indicates + that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future + version of the specification. + +6.2. Parameters for Elliptic Curve Keys + + JWKs can represent Elliptic Curve [DSS] keys. In this case, the + "kty" member value is "EC". + +6.2.1. Parameters for Elliptic Curve Public Keys + + An Elliptic Curve public key is represented by a pair of coordinates + drawn from a finite field, which together define a point on an + Elliptic Curve. The following members MUST be present for all + Elliptic Curve public keys: + + o "crv" + o "x" + + The following member MUST also be present for Elliptic Curve public + keys for the three curves defined in the following section: + + o "y" + +6.2.1.1. "crv" (Curve) Parameter + + The "crv" (curve) parameter identifies the cryptographic curve used + with the key. Curve values from [DSS] used by this specification + are: + + o "P-256" + o "P-384" + o "P-521" + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 28] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + These values are registered in the IANA "JSON Web Key Elliptic Curve" + registry defined in Section 7.6. Additional "crv" values can be + registered by other specifications. Specifications registering + additional curves must define what parameters are used to represent + keys for the curves registered. The "crv" value is a case-sensitive + string. + + SEC1 [SEC1] point compression is not supported for any of these three + curves. + +6.2.1.2. "x" (X Coordinate) Parameter + + The "x" (x coordinate) parameter contains the x coordinate for the + Elliptic Curve point. It is represented as the base64url encoding of + the octet string representation of the coordinate, as defined in + Section 2.3.5 of SEC1 [SEC1]. The length of this octet string MUST + be the full size of a coordinate for the curve specified in the "crv" + parameter. For example, if the value of "crv" is "P-521", the octet + string must be 66 octets long. + +6.2.1.3. "y" (Y Coordinate) Parameter + + The "y" (y coordinate) parameter contains the y coordinate for the + Elliptic Curve point. It is represented as the base64url encoding of + the octet string representation of the coordinate, as defined in + Section 2.3.5 of SEC1 [SEC1]. The length of this octet string MUST + be the full size of a coordinate for the curve specified in the "crv" + parameter. For example, if the value of "crv" is "P-521", the octet + string must be 66 octets long. + +6.2.2. Parameters for Elliptic Curve Private Keys + + In addition to the members used to represent Elliptic Curve public + keys, the following member MUST be present to represent Elliptic + Curve private keys. + +6.2.2.1. "d" (ECC Private Key) Parameter + + The "d" (ECC private key) parameter contains the Elliptic Curve + private key value. It is represented as the base64url encoding of + the octet string representation of the private key value, as defined + in Section 2.3.7 of SEC1 [SEC1]. The length of this octet string + MUST be ceiling(log-base-2(n)/8) octets (where n is the order of the + curve). + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 29] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +6.3. Parameters for RSA Keys + + JWKs can represent RSA [RFC3447] keys. In this case, the "kty" + member value is "RSA". The semantics of the parameters defined below + are the same as those defined in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of RFC 3447. + +6.3.1. Parameters for RSA Public Keys + + The following members MUST be present for RSA public keys. + +6.3.1.1. "n" (Modulus) Parameter + + The "n" (modulus) parameter contains the modulus value for the RSA + public key. It is represented as a Base64urlUInt-encoded value. + + Note that implementers have found that some cryptographic libraries + prefix an extra zero-valued octet to the modulus representations they + return, for instance, returning 257 octets for a 2048-bit key, rather + than 256. Implementations using such libraries will need to take + care to omit the extra octet from the base64url-encoded + representation. + +6.3.1.2. "e" (Exponent) Parameter + + The "e" (exponent) parameter contains the exponent value for the RSA + public key. It is represented as a Base64urlUInt-encoded value. + + For instance, when representing the value 65537, the octet sequence + to be base64url-encoded MUST consist of the three octets [1, 0, 1]; + the resulting representation for this value is "AQAB". + +6.3.2. Parameters for RSA Private Keys + + In addition to the members used to represent RSA public keys, the + following members are used to represent RSA private keys. The + parameter "d" is REQUIRED for RSA private keys. The others enable + optimizations and SHOULD be included by producers of JWKs + representing RSA private keys. If the producer includes any of the + other private key parameters, then all of the others MUST be present, + with the exception of "oth", which MUST only be present when more + than two prime factors were used. + +6.3.2.1. "d" (Private Exponent) Parameter + + The "d" (private exponent) parameter contains the private exponent + value for the RSA private key. It is represented as a Base64urlUInt- + encoded value. + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 30] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +6.3.2.2. "p" (First Prime Factor) Parameter + + The "p" (first prime factor) parameter contains the first prime + factor. It is represented as a Base64urlUInt-encoded value. + +6.3.2.3. "q" (Second Prime Factor) Parameter + + The "q" (second prime factor) parameter contains the second prime + factor. It is represented as a Base64urlUInt-encoded value. + +6.3.2.4. "dp" (First Factor CRT Exponent) Parameter + + The "dp" (first factor CRT exponent) parameter contains the Chinese + Remainder Theorem (CRT) exponent of the first factor. It is + represented as a Base64urlUInt-encoded value. + +6.3.2.5. "dq" (Second Factor CRT Exponent) Parameter + + The "dq" (second factor CRT exponent) parameter contains the CRT + exponent of the second factor. It is represented as a Base64urlUInt- + encoded value. + +6.3.2.6. "qi" (First CRT Coefficient) Parameter + + The "qi" (first CRT coefficient) parameter contains the CRT + coefficient of the second factor. It is represented as a + Base64urlUInt-encoded value. + +6.3.2.7. "oth" (Other Primes Info) Parameter + + The "oth" (other primes info) parameter contains an array of + information about any third and subsequent primes, should they exist. + When only two primes have been used (the normal case), this parameter + MUST be omitted. When three or more primes have been used, the + number of array elements MUST be the number of primes used minus two. + For more information on this case, see the description of the + OtherPrimeInfo parameters in Appendix A.1.2 of RFC 3447 [RFC3447], + upon which the following parameters are modeled. If the consumer of + a JWK does not support private keys with more than two primes and it + encounters a private key that includes the "oth" parameter, then it + MUST NOT use the key. Each array element MUST be an object with the + following members. + +6.3.2.7.1. "r" (Prime Factor) + + The "r" (prime factor) parameter within an "oth" array member + represents the value of a subsequent prime factor. It is represented + as a Base64urlUInt-encoded value. + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 31] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +6.3.2.7.2. "d" (Factor CRT Exponent) + + The "d" (factor CRT exponent) parameter within an "oth" array member + represents the CRT exponent of the corresponding prime factor. It is + represented as a Base64urlUInt-encoded value. + +6.3.2.7.3. "t" (Factor CRT Coefficient) + + The "t" (factor CRT coefficient) parameter within an "oth" array + member represents the CRT coefficient of the corresponding prime + factor. It is represented as a Base64urlUInt-encoded value. + +6.4. Parameters for Symmetric Keys + + When the JWK "kty" member value is "oct" (octet sequence), the member + "k" (see Section 6.4.1) is used to represent a symmetric key (or + another key whose value is a single octet sequence). An "alg" member + SHOULD also be present to identify the algorithm intended to be used + with the key, unless the application uses another means or convention + to determine the algorithm used. + +6.4.1. "k" (Key Value) Parameter + + The "k" (key value) parameter contains the value of the symmetric (or + other single-valued) key. It is represented as the base64url + encoding of the octet sequence containing the key value. + +7. IANA Considerations + + The following registration procedure is used for all the registries + established by this specification. + + The registration procedure for values is Specification Required + [RFC5226] after a three-week review period on the + jose-reg-review@ietf.org mailing list, on the advice of one or more + Designated Experts. However, to allow for the allocation of values + prior to publication, the Designated Experts may approve registration + once they are satisfied that such a specification will be published. + + Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use + an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to register algorithm: + example"). + + Within the review period, the Designated Experts will either approve + or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the + review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if + applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful. + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 32] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + Registration requests that are undetermined for a period longer than + 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the + iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution. + + Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts include + determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing + functionality, whether it is likely to be of general applicability or + useful only for a single application, and whether the registration + description is clear. + + IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Experts + and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing + list. + + It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are + able to represent the perspectives of different applications using + this specification, in order to enable broadly informed review of + registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could + be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular + Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other + Experts. + +7.1. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry + + This specification establishes the IANA "JSON Web Signature and + Encryption Algorithms" registry for values of the JWS and JWE "alg" + (algorithm) and "enc" (encryption algorithm) Header Parameters. The + registry records the algorithm name, the algorithm description, the + algorithm usage locations, the implementation requirements, the + change controller, and a reference to the specification that defines + it. The same algorithm name can be registered multiple times, + provided that the sets of usage locations are disjoint. + + It is suggested that the length of the key be included in the + algorithm name when multiple variations of algorithms are being + registered that use keys of different lengths and the key lengths for + each need to be fixed (for instance, because they will be created by + key derivation functions). This allows readers of the JSON text to + more easily make security decisions. + + The Designated Experts should perform reasonable due diligence that + algorithms being registered either are currently considered + cryptographically credible or are being registered as Deprecated or + Prohibited. + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 33] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + The implementation requirements of an algorithm may be changed over + time as the cryptographic landscape evolves, for instance, to change + the status of an algorithm to Deprecated or to change the status of + an algorithm from Optional to Recommended+ or Required. Changes of + implementation requirements are only permitted on a Specification + Required basis after review by the Designated Experts, with the new + specification defining the revised implementation requirements level. + +7.1.1. Registration Template + + Algorithm Name: + The name requested (e.g., "HS256"). This name is a case-sensitive + ASCII string. Names may not match other registered names in a + case-insensitive manner unless the Designated Experts state that + there is a compelling reason to allow an exception. + + Algorithm Description: + Brief description of the algorithm (e.g., "HMAC using SHA-256"). + + Algorithm Usage Location(s): + The algorithm usage locations. This must be one or more of the + values "alg" or "enc" if the algorithm is to be used with JWS or + JWE. The value "JWK" is used if the algorithm identifier will be + used as a JWK "alg" member value, but will not be used with JWS or + JWE; this could be the case, for instance, for non-authenticated + encryption algorithms. Other values may be used with the approval + of a Designated Expert. + + JOSE Implementation Requirements: + The algorithm implementation requirements for JWS and JWE, which + must be one the words Required, Recommended, Optional, Deprecated, + or Prohibited. Optionally, the word can be followed by a "+" or + "-". The use of "+" indicates that the requirement strength is + likely to be increased in a future version of the specification. + The use of "-" indicates that the requirement strength is likely + to be decreased in a future version of the specification. Any + identifiers registered for non-authenticated encryption algorithms + or other algorithms that are otherwise unsuitable for direct use + as JWS or JWE algorithms must be registered as "Prohibited". + + Change Controller: + For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the + name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal + address, email address, home page URI) may also be included. + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 34] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + Specification Document(s): + Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter, + preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of + the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be + included but is not required. + + Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): + References to a publication or publications in well-known + cryptographic conferences, by national standards bodies, or by + other authoritative sources analyzing the cryptographic soundness + of the algorithm to be registered. The Designated Experts may + require convincing evidence of the cryptographic soundness of a + new algorithm to be provided with the registration request unless + the algorithm is being registered as Deprecated or Prohibited. + Having gone through working group and IETF review, the initial + registrations made by this document are exempt from the need to + provide this information. + +7.1.2. Initial Registry Contents + + o Algorithm Name: "HS256" + o Algorithm Description: HMAC using SHA-256 + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Required + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + o Algorithm Name: "HS384" + o Algorithm Description: HMAC using SHA-384 + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + o Algorithm Name: "HS512" + o Algorithm Description: HMAC using SHA-512 + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 35] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + o Algorithm Name: "RS256" + o Algorithm Description: RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using SHA-256 + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 3.3 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + o Algorithm Name: "RS384" + o Algorithm Description: RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using SHA-384 + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 3.3 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + o Algorithm Name: "RS512" + o Algorithm Description: RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using SHA-512 + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 3.3 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + o Algorithm Name: "ES256" + o Algorithm Description: ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256 + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended+ + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 3.4 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + o Algorithm Name: "ES384" + o Algorithm Description: ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384 + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 3.4 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + o Algorithm Name: "ES512" + o Algorithm Description: ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512 + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 3.4 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 36] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + o Algorithm Name: "PS256" + o Algorithm Description: RSASSA-PSS using SHA-256 and MGF1 with + SHA-256 + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 3.5 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + o Algorithm Name: "PS384" + o Algorithm Description: RSASSA-PSS using SHA-384 and MGF1 with + SHA-384 + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 3.5 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + o Algorithm Name: "PS512" + o Algorithm Description: RSASSA-PSS using SHA-512 and MGF1 with + SHA-512 + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 3.5 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + o Algorithm Name: "none" + o Algorithm Description: No digital signature or MAC performed + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 3.6 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + o Algorithm Name: "RSA1_5" + o Algorithm Description: RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended- + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.2 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 37] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + o Algorithm Name: "RSA-OAEP" + o Algorithm Description: RSAES OAEP using default parameters + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended+ + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.3 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + o Algorithm Name: "RSA-OAEP-256" + o Algorithm Description: RSAES OAEP using SHA-256 and MGF1 with + SHA-256 + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.3 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + o Algorithm Name: "A128KW" + o Algorithm Description: AES Key Wrap using 128-bit key + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.4 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + o Algorithm Name: "A192KW" + o Algorithm Description: AES Key Wrap using 192-bit key + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.4 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + o Algorithm Name: "A256KW" + o Algorithm Description: AES Key Wrap using 256-bit key + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.4 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + o Algorithm Name: "dir" + o Algorithm Description: Direct use of a shared symmetric key + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.5 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 38] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + o Algorithm Name: "ECDH-ES" + o Algorithm Description: ECDH-ES using Concat KDF + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended+ + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.6 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + o Algorithm Name: "ECDH-ES+A128KW" + o Algorithm Description: ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and "A128KW" + wrapping + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.6 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + o Algorithm Name: "ECDH-ES+A192KW" + o Algorithm Description: ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and "A192KW" + wrapping + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.6 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + o Algorithm Name: "ECDH-ES+A256KW" + o Algorithm Description: ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and "A256KW" + wrapping + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.6 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + o Algorithm Name: "A128GCMKW" + o Algorithm Description: Key wrapping with AES GCM using 128-bit key + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.7 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 39] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + o Algorithm Name: "A192GCMKW" + o Algorithm Description: Key wrapping with AES GCM using 192-bit key + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.7 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + o Algorithm Name: "A256GCMKW" + o Algorithm Description: Key wrapping with AES GCM using 256-bit key + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.7 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + o Algorithm Name: "PBES2-HS256+A128KW" + o Algorithm Description: PBES2 with HMAC SHA-256 and "A128KW" + wrapping + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.8 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + o Algorithm Name: "PBES2-HS384+A192KW" + o Algorithm Description: PBES2 with HMAC SHA-384 and "A192KW" + wrapping + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.8 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + o Algorithm Name: "PBES2-HS512+A256KW" + o Algorithm Description: PBES2 with HMAC SHA-512 and "A256KW" + wrapping + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.8 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 40] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + o Algorithm Name: "A128CBC-HS256" + o Algorithm Description: AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 authenticated + encryption algorithm + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "enc" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Required + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 5.2.3 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + o Algorithm Name: "A192CBC-HS384" + o Algorithm Description: AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 authenticated + encryption algorithm + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "enc" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 5.2.4 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + o Algorithm Name: "A256CBC-HS512" + o Algorithm Description: AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 authenticated + encryption algorithm + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "enc" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Required + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 5.2.5 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + o Algorithm Name: "A128GCM" + o Algorithm Description: AES GCM using 128-bit key + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "enc" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 5.3 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + o Algorithm Name: "A192GCM" + o Algorithm Description: AES GCM using 192-bit key + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "enc" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 5.3 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + + + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 41] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + o Algorithm Name: "A256GCM" + o Algorithm Description: AES GCM using 256-bit key + o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "enc" + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 5.3 of RFC 7518 + o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a + +7.2. Header Parameter Names Registration + + This section registers the Header Parameter names defined in Sections + 4.6.1, 4.7.1, and 4.8.1 of this specification in the IANA "JSON Web + Signature and Encryption Header Parameters" registry established by + [JWS]. + +7.2.1. Registry Contents + + o Header Parameter Name: "epk" + o Header Parameter Description: Ephemeral Public Key + o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.6.1.1 of RFC 7518 + + o Header Parameter Name: "apu" + o Header Parameter Description: Agreement PartyUInfo + o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.6.1.2 of RFC 7518 + + o Header Parameter Name: "apv" + o Header Parameter Description: Agreement PartyVInfo + o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.6.1.3 of RFC 7518 + + o Header Parameter Name: "iv" + o Header Parameter Description: Initialization Vector + o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.7.1.1 of RFC 7518 + + o Header Parameter Name: "tag" + o Header Parameter Description: Authentication Tag + o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.7.1.2 of RFC 7518 + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 42] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + o Header Parameter Name: "p2s" + o Header Parameter Description: PBES2 Salt Input + o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.8.1.1 of RFC 7518 + + o Header Parameter Name: "p2c" + o Header Parameter Description: PBES2 Count + o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.8.1.2 of RFC 7518 + +7.3. JSON Web Encryption Compression Algorithms Registry + + This specification establishes the IANA "JSON Web Encryption + Compression Algorithms" registry for JWE "zip" member values. The + registry records the compression algorithm value and a reference to + the specification that defines it. + +7.3.1. Registration Template + + Compression Algorithm Value: + The name requested (e.g., "DEF"). Because a core goal of this + specification is for the resulting representations to be compact, + it is RECOMMENDED that the name be short -- not to exceed 8 + characters without a compelling reason to do so. This name is + case sensitive. Names may not match other registered names in a + case-insensitive manner unless the Designated Experts state that + there is a compelling reason to allow an exception. + + Compression Algorithm Description: + Brief description of the compression algorithm (e.g., "DEFLATE"). + + Change Controller: + For Standards Track RFCs, list "IESG". For others, give the name + of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, + email address, home page URI) may also be included. + + Specification Document(s): + Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter, + preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of + the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be + included but is not required. + + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 43] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +7.3.2. Initial Registry Contents + + o Compression Algorithm Value: "DEF" + o Compression Algorithm Description: DEFLATE + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE] + +7.4. JSON Web Key Types Registry + + This specification establishes the IANA "JSON Web Key Types" registry + for values of the JWK "kty" (key type) parameter. The registry + records the "kty" value, implementation requirements, and a reference + to the specification that defines it. + + The implementation requirements of a key type may be changed over + time as the cryptographic landscape evolves, for instance, to change + the status of a key type to Deprecated or to change the status of a + key type from Optional to Recommended+ or Required. Changes of + implementation requirements are only permitted on a Specification + Required basis after review by the Designated Experts, with the new + specification defining the revised implementation requirements level. + +7.4.1. Registration Template + + "kty" Parameter Value: + The name requested (e.g., "EC"). Because a core goal of this + specification is for the resulting representations to be compact, + it is RECOMMENDED that the name be short -- not to exceed 8 + characters without a compelling reason to do so. This name is + case sensitive. Names may not match other registered names in a + case-insensitive manner unless the Designated Experts state that + there is a compelling reason to allow an exception. + + Key Type Description: + Brief description of the Key Type (e.g., "Elliptic Curve"). + + Change Controller: + For Standards Track RFCs, list "IESG". For others, give the name + of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, + email address, home page URI) may also be included. + + + + + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 44] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + JOSE Implementation Requirements: + The key type implementation requirements for JWS and JWE, which + must be one the words Required, Recommended, Optional, Deprecated, + or Prohibited. Optionally, the word can be followed by a "+" or + "-". The use of "+" indicates that the requirement strength is + likely to be increased in a future version of the specification. + The use of "-" indicates that the requirement strength is likely + to be decreased in a future version of the specification. + + Specification Document(s): + Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter, + preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of + the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be + included but is not required. + +7.4.2. Initial Registry Contents + + This section registers the values defined in Section 6.1. + + o "kty" Parameter Value: "EC" + o Key Type Description: Elliptic Curve + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended+ + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 6.2 of RFC 7518 + + o "kty" Parameter Value: "RSA" + o Key Type Description: RSA + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Required + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 6.3 of RFC 7518 + + o "kty" Parameter Value: "oct" + o Key Type Description: Octet Sequence + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Required + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 6.4 of RFC 7518 + +7.5. JSON Web Key Parameters Registration + + This section registers the parameter names defined in Sections 6.2, + 6.3, and 6.4 of this specification in the IANA "JSON Web Key + Parameters" registry established by [JWK]. + + + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 45] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +7.5.1. Registry Contents + + o Parameter Name: "crv" + o Parameter Description: Curve + o Used with "kty" Value(s): "EC" + o Parameter Information Class: Public + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 6.2.1.1 of RFC 7518 + + o Parameter Name: "x" + o Parameter Description: X Coordinate + o Used with "kty" Value(s): "EC" + o Parameter Information Class: Public + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 6.2.1.2 of RFC 7518 + + o Parameter Name: "y" + o Parameter Description: Y Coordinate + o Used with "kty" Value(s): "EC" + o Parameter Information Class: Public + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 6.2.1.3 of RFC 7518 + + o Parameter Name: "d" + o Parameter Description: ECC Private Key + o Used with "kty" Value(s): "EC" + o Parameter Information Class: Private + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 6.2.2.1 of RFC 7518 + + o Parameter Name: "n" + o Parameter Description: Modulus + o Used with "kty" Value(s): "RSA" + o Parameter Information Class: Public + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 6.3.1.1 of RFC 7518 + + o Parameter Name: "e" + o Parameter Description: Exponent + o Used with "kty" Value(s): "RSA" + o Parameter Information Class: Public + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 6.3.1.2 of RFC 7518 + + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 46] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + o Parameter Name: "d" + o Parameter Description: Private Exponent + o Used with "kty" Value(s): "RSA" + o Parameter Information Class: Private + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 6.3.2.1 of RFC 7518 + + o Parameter Name: "p" + o Parameter Description: First Prime Factor + o Used with "kty" Value(s): "RSA" + o Parameter Information Class: Private + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 6.3.2.2 of RFC 7518 + + o Parameter Name: "q" + o Parameter Description: Second Prime Factor + o Used with "kty" Value(s): "RSA" + o Parameter Information Class: Private + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 6.3.2.3 of RFC 7518 + + o Parameter Name: "dp" + o Parameter Description: First Factor CRT Exponent + o Used with "kty" Value(s): "RSA" + o Parameter Information Class: Private + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 6.3.2.4 of RFC 7518 + + o Parameter Name: "dq" + o Parameter Description: Second Factor CRT Exponent + o Used with "kty" Value(s): "RSA" + o Parameter Information Class: Private + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 6.3.2.5 of RFC 7518 + + o Parameter Name: "qi" + o Parameter Description: First CRT Coefficient + o Used with "kty" Value(s): "RSA" + o Parameter Information Class: Private + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 6.3.2.6 of RFC 7518 + + + + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 47] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + o Parameter Name: "oth" + o Parameter Description: Other Primes Info + o Used with "kty" Value(s): "RSA" + o Parameter Information Class: Private + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 6.3.2.7 of RFC 7518 + + o Parameter Name: "k" + o Parameter Description: Key Value + o Used with "kty" Value(s): "oct" + o Parameter Information Class: Private + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 6.4.1 of RFC 7518 + +7.6. JSON Web Key Elliptic Curve Registry + + This section establishes the IANA "JSON Web Key Elliptic Curve" + registry for JWK "crv" member values. The registry records the curve + name, implementation requirements, and a reference to the + specification that defines it. This specification registers the + parameter names defined in Section 6.2.1.1. + + The implementation requirements of a curve may be changed over time + as the cryptographic landscape evolves, for instance, to change the + status of a curve to Deprecated or to change the status of a curve + from Optional to Recommended+ or Required. Changes of implementation + requirements are only permitted on a Specification Required basis + after review by the Designated Experts, with the new specification + defining the revised implementation requirements level. + +7.6.1. Registration Template + + Curve Name: + The name requested (e.g., "P-256"). Because a core goal of this + specification is for the resulting representations to be compact, + it is RECOMMENDED that the name be short -- not to exceed 8 + characters without a compelling reason to do so. This name is + case sensitive. Names may not match other registered names in a + case-insensitive manner unless the Designated Experts state that + there is a compelling reason to allow an exception. + + Curve Description: + Brief description of the curve (e.g., "P-256 Curve"). + + JOSE Implementation Requirements: + The curve implementation requirements for JWS and JWE, which must + be one the words Required, Recommended, Optional, Deprecated, or + Prohibited. Optionally, the word can be followed by a "+" or "-". + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 48] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + The use of "+" indicates that the requirement strength is likely + to be increased in a future version of the specification. The use + of "-" indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be + decreased in a future version of the specification. + + Change Controller: + For Standards Track RFCs, list "IESG". For others, give the name + of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, + email address, home page URI) may also be included. + + Specification Document(s): + Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter, + preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of + the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be + included but is not required. + +7.6.2. Initial Registry Contents + + o Curve Name: "P-256" + o Curve Description: P-256 Curve + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended+ + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 6.2.1.1 of RFC 7518 + + o Curve Name: "P-384" + o Curve Description: P-384 Curve + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 6.2.1.1 of RFC 7518 + + o Curve Name: "P-521" + o Curve Description: P-521 Curve + o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 6.2.1.1 of RFC 7518 + +8. Security Considerations + + All of the security issues that are pertinent to any cryptographic + application must be addressed by JWS/JWE/JWK agents. Among these + issues are protecting the user's asymmetric private and symmetric + secret keys and employing countermeasures to various attacks. + + The security considerations in [AES], [DSS], [JWE], [JWK], [JWS], + [NIST.800-38D], [NIST.800-56A], [NIST.800-107], [RFC2104], [RFC3394], + [RFC3447], [RFC5116], [RFC6090], and [SHS] apply to this + specification. + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 49] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +8.1. Cryptographic Agility + + Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms become + weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and + computing performance improves, the work factor to break a particular + cryptographic algorithm will be reduced. Therefore, implementers and + deployments must be prepared for the set of algorithms that are + supported and used to change over time. Thus, cryptographic + algorithm implementations should be modular, allowing new algorithms + to be readily inserted. + +8.2. Key Lifetimes + + Many algorithms have associated security considerations related to + key lifetimes and/or the number of times that a key may be used. + Those security considerations continue to apply when using those + algorithms with JOSE data structures. See NIST SP 800-57 + [NIST.800-57] for specific guidance on key lifetimes. + +8.3. RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 Security Considerations + + While Section 8 of RFC 3447 [RFC3447] explicitly calls for people not + to adopt RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 for new applications and instead requests + that people transition to RSASSA-PSS, this specification does include + RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, for interoperability reasons, because it is + commonly implemented. + + Keys used with RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 must follow the constraints in + Section 7.2 of RFC 3447. Also, keys with a low public key exponent + value, as described in Section 3 of "Twenty Years of Attacks on the + RSA Cryptosystem" [Boneh99], must not be used. + +8.4. AES GCM Security Considerations + + Keys used with AES GCM must follow the constraints in Section 8.3 of + [NIST.800-38D], which states: "The total number of invocations of the + authenticated encryption function shall not exceed 2^32, including + all IV lengths and all instances of the authenticated encryption + function with the given key". In accordance with this rule, AES GCM + MUST NOT be used with the same key value more than 2^32 times. + + An IV value MUST NOT ever be used multiple times with the same AES + GCM key. One way to prevent this is to store a counter with the key + and increment it with every use. The counter can also be used to + prevent exceeding the 2^32 limit above. + + This security consideration does not apply to the composite AES-CBC + HMAC SHA-2 or AES Key Wrap algorithms. + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 50] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +8.5. Unsecured JWS Security Considerations + + Unsecured JWSs (JWSs that use the "alg" value "none") provide no + integrity protection. Thus, they must only be used in contexts in + which the payload is secured by means other than a digital signature + or MAC value, or they need not be secured. + + An example means of preventing accepting Unsecured JWSs by default is + for the "verify" method of a hypothetical JWS software library to + have a Boolean "acceptUnsecured" parameter that indicates "none" is + an acceptable "alg" value. As another example, the "verify" method + might take a list of algorithms that are acceptable to the + application as a parameter and would reject Unsecured JWS values if + "none" is not in that list. + + The following example illustrates the reasons for not accepting + Unsecured JWSs at a global level. Suppose an application accepts + JWSs over two channels, (1) HTTP and (2) HTTPS with client + authentication. It requires a JWS Signature on objects received over + HTTP, but accepts Unsecured JWSs over HTTPS. If the application were + to globally indicate that "none" is acceptable, then an attacker + could provide it with an Unsecured JWS over HTTP and still have that + object successfully validate. Instead, the application needs to + indicate acceptance of "none" for each object received over HTTPS + (e.g., by setting "acceptUnsecured" to "true" for the first + hypothetical JWS software library above), but not for each object + received over HTTP. + +8.6. Denial-of-Service Attacks + + Receiving agents that validate signatures and sending agents that + encrypt messages need to be cautious of cryptographic processing + usage when validating signatures and encrypting messages using keys + larger than those mandated in this specification. An attacker could + supply content using keys that would result in excessive + cryptographic processing, for example, keys larger than those + mandated in this specification. Implementations should set and + enforce upper limits on the key sizes they accept. Section 5.6.1 + (Comparable Algorithm Strengths) of NIST SP 800-57 [NIST.800-57] + contains statements on largest approved key sizes that may be + applicable. + +8.7. Reusing Key Material when Encrypting Keys + + It is NOT RECOMMENDED to reuse the same entire set of key material + (Key Encryption Key, Content Encryption Key, Initialization Vector, + etc.) to encrypt multiple JWK or JWK Set objects, or to encrypt the + same JWK or JWK Set object multiple times. One suggestion for + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 51] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + preventing reuse is to always generate at least one new piece of key + material for each encryption operation (e.g., a new Content + Encryption Key, a new IV, and/or a new PBES2 Salt), based on the + considerations noted in this document as well as from RFC 4086 + [RFC4086]. + +8.8. Password Considerations + + Passwords are vulnerable to a number of attacks. To help mitigate + some of these limitations, this document applies principles from RFC + 2898 [RFC2898] to derive cryptographic keys from user-supplied + passwords. + + However, the strength of the password still has a significant impact. + A high-entropy password has greater resistance to dictionary attacks. + [NIST.800-63-2] contains guidelines for estimating password entropy, + which can help applications and users generate stronger passwords. + + An ideal password is one that is as large as (or larger than) the + derived key length. However, passwords larger than a certain + algorithm-specific size are first hashed, which reduces an attacker's + effective search space to the length of the hash algorithm. It is + RECOMMENDED that a password used for "PBES2-HS256+A128KW" be no + shorter than 16 octets and no longer than 128 octets and a password + used for "PBES2-HS512+A256KW" be no shorter than 32 octets and no + longer than 128 octets long. + + Still, care needs to be taken in where and how password-based + encryption is used. These algorithms can still be susceptible to + dictionary-based attacks if the iteration count is too small; this is + of particular concern if these algorithms are used to protect data + that an attacker can have indefinite number of attempts to circumvent + the protection, such as protected data stored on a file system. + +8.9. Key Entropy and Random Values + + See Section 10.1 of [JWS] for security considerations on key entropy + and random values. + +8.10. Differences between Digital Signatures and MACs + + See Section 10.5 of [JWS] for security considerations on differences + between digital signatures and MACs. + + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 52] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +8.11. Using Matching Algorithm Strengths + + See Section 11.3 of [JWE] for security considerations on using + matching algorithm strengths. + +8.12. Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks + + See Section 11.4 of [JWE] for security considerations on adaptive + chosen-ciphertext attacks. + +8.13. Timing Attacks + + See Section 10.9 of [JWS] and Section 11.5 of [JWE] for security + considerations on timing attacks. + +8.14. RSA Private Key Representations and Blinding + + See Section 9.3 of [JWK] for security considerations on RSA private + key representations and blinding. + +9. Internationalization Considerations + + Passwords obtained from users are likely to require preparation and + normalization to account for differences of octet sequences generated + by different input devices, locales, etc. It is RECOMMENDED that + applications perform the steps outlined in [PRECIS] to prepare a + password supplied directly by a user before performing key derivation + and encryption. + +10. References + +10.1. Normative References + + [AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), + "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS PUB 197, + November 2001, <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/ + fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf>. + + [Boneh99] "Twenty Years of Attacks on the RSA Cryptosystem", Notices + of the American Mathematical Society (AMS), Vol. 46, + No. 2, pp. 203-213, 1999, <http://crypto.stanford.edu/ + ~dabo/pubs/papers/RSA-survey.pdf>. + + + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 53] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + [DSS] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), + "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS PUB 186-4, July + 2013, <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/ + NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf>. + + [JWE] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", + RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>. + + [JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, + DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>. + + [JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web + Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May + 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>. + + [NIST.800-38A] + National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), + "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation", NIST + Special Publication 800-38A, December 2001, + <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/ + sp800-38a.pdf>. + + [NIST.800-38D] + National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), + "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: + Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC", NIST Special + Publication 800-38D, December 2001, + <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/ + SP-800-38D.pdf>. + + [NIST.800-56A] + National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), + "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes + Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography", NIST Special + Publication 800-56A, Revision 2, May 2013, + <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/ + NIST.SP.800-56Ar2.pdf>. + + [NIST.800-57] + National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), + "Recommendation for Key Management - Part 1: General + (Revision 3)", NIST Special Publication 800-57, Part 1, + Revision 3, July 2012, <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/ + nistpubs/800-57/sp800-57_part1_rev3_general.pdf>. + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 54] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + [RFC20] Cerf, V., "ASCII format for Network Interchange", STD 80, + RFC 20, DOI 10.17487/RFC0020, October 1969, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc20>. + + [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: + Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, + DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>. + + [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, + DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. + + [RFC2898] Kaliski, B., "PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography + Specification Version 2.0", RFC 2898, + DOI 10.17487/RFC2898, September 2000, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2898>. + + [RFC3394] Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard + (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, DOI 10.17487/RFC3394, + September 2002, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3394>. + + [RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography + Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications + Version 2.1", RFC 3447, DOI 10.17487/RFC3447, February + 2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3447>. + + [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO + 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November + 2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>. + + [RFC4868] Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256, + HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec", RFC 4868, + DOI 10.17487/RFC4868, May 2007, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4868>. + + [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", + FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>. + + [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, + RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>. + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 55] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + [RFC6090] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic + Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090, + DOI 10.17487/RFC6090, February 2011, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6090>. + + [RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data + Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March + 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>. + + [SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1: + Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Version 2.0, May 2009, + <http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>. + + [SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), + "Secure Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS PUB 180-4, March 2012, + <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-4/ + fips-180-4.pdf>. + + [UNICODE] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard", + <http://www.unicode.org/versions/latest/>. + +10.2. Informative References + + [AEAD-CBC-SHA] + McGrew, D., Foley, J., and K. Paterson, "Authenticated + Encryption with AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA", Work in Progress, + draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-05, July 2014. + + [CanvasApp] + Facebook, "Canvas Applications", 2010, + <http://developers.facebook.com/docs/authentication/ + canvas>. + + [JCA] Oracle, "Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA) Reference + Guide", 2014, <http://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/techno + tes/guides/security/crypto/CryptoSpec.html>. + + [JSE] Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), "JSON Simple + Encryption", September 2010, + <http://jsonenc.info/enc/1.0/>. + + [JSMS] Rescorla, E. and J. Hildebrand, "JavaScript Message + Security Format", Work in Progress, + draft-rescorla-jsms-00, March 2011. + + [JSS] Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura, Ed., "JSON Simple Sign 1.0", + Draft 01, September 2010, <http://jsonenc.info/jss/1.0/>. + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 56] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + [JWE-JWK] Miller, M., "Using JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Web + Encryption (JWE) for Protecting JSON Web Key (JWK) + Objects", Work in Progress, + draft-miller-jose-jwe-protected-jwk-02, June 2013. + + [MagicSignatures] + Panzer, J., Ed., Laurie, B., and D. Balfanz, "Magic + Signatures", January 2011, + <http://salmon-protocol.googlecode.com/svn/trunk/ + draft-panzer-magicsig-01.html>. + + [NIST.800-107] + National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), + "Recommendation for Applications Using Approved Hash + Algorithms", NIST Special Publication 800-107, Revision 1, + August 2012, <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/ + nistpubs/800-107-rev1/sp800-107-rev1.pdf>. + + [NIST.800-63-2] + National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), + "Electronic Authentication Guideline", NIST Special + Publication 800-63-2, August 2013, + <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/ + NIST.SP.800-63-2.pdf>. + + [PRECIS] Saint-Andre, P. and A. Melnikov, "Preparation, + Enforcement, and Comparison of Internationalized Strings + Representing Usernames and Passwords", Work in Progress, + draft-ietf-precis-saslprepbis-16, April 2015. + + [RFC2631] Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method", + RFC 2631, DOI 10.17487/RFC2631, June 1999, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2631>. + + [RFC3275] Eastlake 3rd, D., Reagle, J., and D. Solo, "(Extensible + Markup Language) XML-Signature Syntax and Processing", + RFC 3275, DOI 10.17487/RFC3275, March 2002, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3275>. + + [RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, + "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, + DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>. + + [RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated + Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>. + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 57] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an + IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, + DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>. + + [W3C.NOTE-xmldsig-core2-20130411] + Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., Solo, D., Hirsch, F., Roessler, + T., Yiu, K., Datta, P., and S. Cantor, "XML Signature + Syntax and Processing Version 2.0", World Wide Web + Consortium Note NOTE-xmldsig-core2-20130411, April 2013, + <http://www.w3.org/TR/2013/NOTE-xmldsig-core2-20130411/>. + + [W3C.REC-xmlenc-core-20021210] + Eastlake, D. and J. Reagle, "XML Encryption Syntax and + Processing", World Wide Web Consortium Recommendation REC- + xmlenc-core-20021210, December 2002, + <http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-xmlenc-core-20021210>. + + [W3C.REC-xmlenc-core1-20130411] + Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., Hirsch, F., and T. Roessler, + "XML Encryption Syntax and Processing Version 1.1", World + Wide Web Consortium Recommendation REC-xmlenc- + core1-20130411, April 2013, + <http://www.w3.org/TR/2013/REC-xmlenc-core1-20130411/>. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 58] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +Appendix A. Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference + + This appendix contains tables cross-referencing the cryptographic + algorithm identifier values defined in this specification with the + equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages. + See XML DSIG [RFC3275], XML DSIG 2.0 + [W3C.NOTE-xmldsig-core2-20130411], XML Encryption + [W3C.REC-xmlenc-core-20021210], XML Encryption 1.1 + [W3C.REC-xmlenc-core1-20130411], and Java Cryptography Architecture + [JCA] for more information about the names defined by those + documents. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 59] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +A.1. Digital Signature/MAC Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference + + This section contains a table cross-referencing the JWS digital + signature and MAC "alg" (algorithm) values defined in this + specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards + and software packages. + + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | JWS | XML DSIG | + | | JCA | OID | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | HS256 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-sha256 | + | | HmacSHA256 | 1.2.840.113549.2.9 | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | HS384 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-sha384 | + | | HmacSHA384 | 1.2.840.113549.2.10 | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | HS512 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-sha512 | + | | HmacSHA512 | 1.2.840.113549.2.11 | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | RS256 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256 | + | | SHA256withRSA | 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | RS384 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha384 | + | | SHA384withRSA | 1.2.840.113549.1.1.12 | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | RS512 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha512 | + | | SHA512withRSA | 1.2.840.113549.1.1.13 | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | ES256 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#ecdsa-sha256 | + | | SHA256withECDSA | 1.2.840.10045.4.3.2 | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | ES384 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#ecdsa-sha384 | + | | SHA384withECDSA | 1.2.840.10045.4.3.3 | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | ES512 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#ecdsa-sha512 | + | | SHA512withECDSA | 1.2.840.10045.4.3.4 | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | PS256 | http://www.w3.org/2007/05/xmldsig-more#sha256-rsa-MGF1 | + | | SHA256withRSAandMGF1 | 1.2.840.113549.1.1.10 | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | PS384 | http://www.w3.org/2007/05/xmldsig-more#sha384-rsa-MGF1 | + | | SHA384withRSAandMGF1 | 1.2.840.113549.1.1.10 | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | PS512 | http://www.w3.org/2007/05/xmldsig-more#sha512-rsa-MGF1 | + | | SHA512withRSAandMGF1 | 1.2.840.113549.1.1.10 | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 60] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +A.2. Key Management Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference + + This section contains a table cross-referencing the JWE "alg" + (algorithm) values defined in this specification with the equivalent + identifiers used by other standards and software packages. + + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | JWE | XML ENC | + | | JCA | OID | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | RSA1_5 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5 | + | | RSA/ECB/PKCS1Padding | 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | RSA-OAEP | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgf1p | + | | RSA/ECB/OAEPWithSHA-1AndMGF1Padding | 1.2.840.113549.1.1.7 | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | RSA-OAEP-256 | http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#rsa-oaep | + | | & http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#mgf1sha256 | + | | RSA/ECB/OAEPWithSHA-256AndMGF1Padding | | + | | & MGF1ParameterSpec.SHA256 | 1.2.840.113549.1.1.7 | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | ECDH-ES | http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#ECDH-ES | + | | ECDH | 1.3.132.1.12 | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | A128KW | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128 | + | | AESWrap | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.5 | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | A192KW | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes192 | + | | AESWrap | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.25 | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | A256KW | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes256 | + | | AESWrap | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.45 | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 61] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +A.3. Content Encryption Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference + + This section contains a table cross-referencing the JWE "enc" + (encryption algorithm) values defined in this specification with the + equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages. + + For the composite algorithms "A128CBC-HS256", "A192CBC-HS384", and + "A256CBC-HS512", the corresponding AES-CBC algorithm identifiers are + listed. + + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | JWE | XML ENC | + | | JCA | OID | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | A128CBC-HS256 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc | + | | AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.2 | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | A192CBC-HS384 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes192-cbc | + | | AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.22 | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | A256CBC-HS512 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes256-cbc | + | | AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.42 | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | A128GCM | http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#aes128-gcm | + | | AES/GCM/NoPadding | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.6 | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | A192GCM | http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#aes192-gcm | + | | AES/GCM/NoPadding | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.26 | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | A256GCM | http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#aes256-gcm | + | | AES/GCM/NoPadding | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.46 | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + +Appendix B. Test Cases for AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithms + + The following test cases can be used to validate implementations of + the AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 algorithms defined in Section 5.2. They are + also intended to correspond to test cases that may appear in a future + version of [AEAD-CBC-SHA], demonstrating that the cryptographic + computations performed are the same. + + The variable names are those defined in Section 5.2. All values are + hexadecimal. + + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 62] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +B.1. Test Cases for AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 + + AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 + + K = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f + 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f + + MAC_KEY = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f + + ENC_KEY = 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f + + P = 41 20 63 69 70 68 65 72 20 73 79 73 74 65 6d 20 + 6d 75 73 74 20 6e 6f 74 20 62 65 20 72 65 71 75 + 69 72 65 64 20 74 6f 20 62 65 20 73 65 63 72 65 + 74 2c 20 61 6e 64 20 69 74 20 6d 75 73 74 20 62 + 65 20 61 62 6c 65 20 74 6f 20 66 61 6c 6c 20 69 + 6e 74 6f 20 74 68 65 20 68 61 6e 64 73 20 6f 66 + 20 74 68 65 20 65 6e 65 6d 79 20 77 69 74 68 6f + 75 74 20 69 6e 63 6f 6e 76 65 6e 69 65 6e 63 65 + + IV = 1a f3 8c 2d c2 b9 6f fd d8 66 94 09 23 41 bc 04 + + A = 54 68 65 20 73 65 63 6f 6e 64 20 70 72 69 6e 63 + 69 70 6c 65 20 6f 66 20 41 75 67 75 73 74 65 20 + 4b 65 72 63 6b 68 6f 66 66 73 + + AL = 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 50 + + E = c8 0e df a3 2d df 39 d5 ef 00 c0 b4 68 83 42 79 + a2 e4 6a 1b 80 49 f7 92 f7 6b fe 54 b9 03 a9 c9 + a9 4a c9 b4 7a d2 65 5c 5f 10 f9 ae f7 14 27 e2 + fc 6f 9b 3f 39 9a 22 14 89 f1 63 62 c7 03 23 36 + 09 d4 5a c6 98 64 e3 32 1c f8 29 35 ac 40 96 c8 + 6e 13 33 14 c5 40 19 e8 ca 79 80 df a4 b9 cf 1b + 38 4c 48 6f 3a 54 c5 10 78 15 8e e5 d7 9d e5 9f + bd 34 d8 48 b3 d6 95 50 a6 76 46 34 44 27 ad e5 + 4b 88 51 ff b5 98 f7 f8 00 74 b9 47 3c 82 e2 db + + M = 65 2c 3f a3 6b 0a 7c 5b 32 19 fa b3 a3 0b c1 c4 + e6 e5 45 82 47 65 15 f0 ad 9f 75 a2 b7 1c 73 ef + + T = 65 2c 3f a3 6b 0a 7c 5b 32 19 fa b3 a3 0b c1 c4 + + + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 63] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +B.2. Test Cases for AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 + + K = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f + 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f + 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f + + MAC_KEY = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f + 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 + + ENC_KEY = 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 + 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f + + P = 41 20 63 69 70 68 65 72 20 73 79 73 74 65 6d 20 + 6d 75 73 74 20 6e 6f 74 20 62 65 20 72 65 71 75 + 69 72 65 64 20 74 6f 20 62 65 20 73 65 63 72 65 + 74 2c 20 61 6e 64 20 69 74 20 6d 75 73 74 20 62 + 65 20 61 62 6c 65 20 74 6f 20 66 61 6c 6c 20 69 + 6e 74 6f 20 74 68 65 20 68 61 6e 64 73 20 6f 66 + 20 74 68 65 20 65 6e 65 6d 79 20 77 69 74 68 6f + 75 74 20 69 6e 63 6f 6e 76 65 6e 69 65 6e 63 65 + + IV = 1a f3 8c 2d c2 b9 6f fd d8 66 94 09 23 41 bc 04 + + A = 54 68 65 20 73 65 63 6f 6e 64 20 70 72 69 6e 63 + 69 70 6c 65 20 6f 66 20 41 75 67 75 73 74 65 20 + 4b 65 72 63 6b 68 6f 66 66 73 + + AL = 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 50 + + E = ea 65 da 6b 59 e6 1e db 41 9b e6 2d 19 71 2a e5 + d3 03 ee b5 00 52 d0 df d6 69 7f 77 22 4c 8e db + 00 0d 27 9b dc 14 c1 07 26 54 bd 30 94 42 30 c6 + 57 be d4 ca 0c 9f 4a 84 66 f2 2b 22 6d 17 46 21 + 4b f8 cf c2 40 0a dd 9f 51 26 e4 79 66 3f c9 0b + 3b ed 78 7a 2f 0f fc bf 39 04 be 2a 64 1d 5c 21 + 05 bf e5 91 ba e2 3b 1d 74 49 e5 32 ee f6 0a 9a + c8 bb 6c 6b 01 d3 5d 49 78 7b cd 57 ef 48 49 27 + f2 80 ad c9 1a c0 c4 e7 9c 7b 11 ef c6 00 54 e3 + + M = 84 90 ac 0e 58 94 9b fe 51 87 5d 73 3f 93 ac 20 + 75 16 80 39 cc c7 33 d7 45 94 f8 86 b3 fa af d4 + 86 f2 5c 71 31 e3 28 1e 36 c7 a2 d1 30 af de 57 + + T = 84 90 ac 0e 58 94 9b fe 51 87 5d 73 3f 93 ac 20 + 75 16 80 39 cc c7 33 d7 + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 64] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +B.3. Test Cases for AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 + + K = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f + 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f + 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f + 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 3a 3b 3c 3d 3e 3f + + MAC_KEY = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f + 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f + + ENC_KEY = 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f + 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 3a 3b 3c 3d 3e 3f + + P = 41 20 63 69 70 68 65 72 20 73 79 73 74 65 6d 20 + 6d 75 73 74 20 6e 6f 74 20 62 65 20 72 65 71 75 + 69 72 65 64 20 74 6f 20 62 65 20 73 65 63 72 65 + 74 2c 20 61 6e 64 20 69 74 20 6d 75 73 74 20 62 + 65 20 61 62 6c 65 20 74 6f 20 66 61 6c 6c 20 69 + 6e 74 6f 20 74 68 65 20 68 61 6e 64 73 20 6f 66 + 20 74 68 65 20 65 6e 65 6d 79 20 77 69 74 68 6f + 75 74 20 69 6e 63 6f 6e 76 65 6e 69 65 6e 63 65 + + IV = 1a f3 8c 2d c2 b9 6f fd d8 66 94 09 23 41 bc 04 + + A = 54 68 65 20 73 65 63 6f 6e 64 20 70 72 69 6e 63 + 69 70 6c 65 20 6f 66 20 41 75 67 75 73 74 65 20 + 4b 65 72 63 6b 68 6f 66 66 73 + + AL = 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 50 + + E = 4a ff aa ad b7 8c 31 c5 da 4b 1b 59 0d 10 ff bd + 3d d8 d5 d3 02 42 35 26 91 2d a0 37 ec bc c7 bd + 82 2c 30 1d d6 7c 37 3b cc b5 84 ad 3e 92 79 c2 + e6 d1 2a 13 74 b7 7f 07 75 53 df 82 94 10 44 6b + 36 eb d9 70 66 29 6a e6 42 7e a7 5c 2e 08 46 a1 + 1a 09 cc f5 37 0d c8 0b fe cb ad 28 c7 3f 09 b3 + a3 b7 5e 66 2a 25 94 41 0a e4 96 b2 e2 e6 60 9e + 31 e6 e0 2c c8 37 f0 53 d2 1f 37 ff 4f 51 95 0b + be 26 38 d0 9d d7 a4 93 09 30 80 6d 07 03 b1 f6 + + M = 4d d3 b4 c0 88 a7 f4 5c 21 68 39 64 5b 20 12 bf + 2e 62 69 a8 c5 6a 81 6d bc 1b 26 77 61 95 5b c5 + fd 30 a5 65 c6 16 ff b2 f3 64 ba ec e6 8f c4 07 + 53 bc fc 02 5d de 36 93 75 4a a1 f5 c3 37 3b 9c + + T = 4d d3 b4 c0 88 a7 f4 5c 21 68 39 64 5b 20 12 bf + 2e 62 69 a8 c5 6a 81 6d bc 1b 26 77 61 95 5b c5 + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 65] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +Appendix C. Example ECDH-ES Key Agreement Computation + + This example uses ECDH-ES Key Agreement and the Concat KDF to derive + the CEK in the manner described in Section 4.6. In this example, the + ECDH-ES Direct Key Agreement mode ("alg" value "ECDH-ES") is used to + produce an agreed-upon key for AES GCM with a 128-bit key ("enc" + value "A128GCM"). + + In this example, a producer Alice is encrypting content to a consumer + Bob. The producer (Alice) generates an ephemeral key for the key + agreement computation. Alice's ephemeral key (in JWK format) used + for the key agreement computation in this example (including the + private part) is: + + {"kty":"EC", + "crv":"P-256", + "x":"gI0GAILBdu7T53akrFmMyGcsF3n5dO7MmwNBHKW5SV0", + "y":"SLW_xSffzlPWrHEVI30DHM_4egVwt3NQqeUD7nMFpps", + "d":"0_NxaRPUMQoAJt50Gz8YiTr8gRTwyEaCumd-MToTmIo" + } + + The consumer's (Bob's) key (in JWK format) used for the key agreement + computation in this example (including the private part) is: + + {"kty":"EC", + "crv":"P-256", + "x":"weNJy2HscCSM6AEDTDg04biOvhFhyyWvOHQfeF_PxMQ", + "y":"e8lnCO-AlStT-NJVX-crhB7QRYhiix03illJOVAOyck", + "d":"VEmDZpDXXK8p8N0Cndsxs924q6nS1RXFASRl6BfUqdw" + } + + Header Parameter values used in this example are as follows. The + "apu" (agreement PartyUInfo) Header Parameter value is the base64url + encoding of the UTF-8 string "Alice" and the "apv" (agreement + PartyVInfo) Header Parameter value is the base64url encoding of the + UTF-8 string "Bob". The "epk" (ephemeral public key) Header + Parameter is used to communicate the producer's (Alice's) ephemeral + public key value to the consumer (Bob). + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 66] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + {"alg":"ECDH-ES", + "enc":"A128GCM", + "apu":"QWxpY2U", + "apv":"Qm9i", + "epk": + {"kty":"EC", + "crv":"P-256", + "x":"gI0GAILBdu7T53akrFmMyGcsF3n5dO7MmwNBHKW5SV0", + "y":"SLW_xSffzlPWrHEVI30DHM_4egVwt3NQqeUD7nMFpps" + } + } + + The resulting Concat KDF [NIST.800-56A] parameter values are: + + Z + This is set to the ECDH-ES key agreement output. (This value is + often not directly exposed by libraries, due to NIST security + requirements, and only serves as an input to a KDF.) In this + example, Z is following the octet sequence (using JSON array + notation): + [158, 86, 217, 29, 129, 113, 53, 211, 114, 131, 66, 131, 191, 132, + 38, 156, 251, 49, 110, 163, 218, 128, 106, 72, 246, 218, 167, 121, + 140, 254, 144, 196]. + + keydatalen + This value is 128 - the number of bits in the desired output key + (because "A128GCM" uses a 128-bit key). + + AlgorithmID + This is set to the octets representing the 32-bit big-endian value + 7 - [0, 0, 0, 7] - the number of octets in the AlgorithmID content + "A128GCM", followed, by the octets representing the ASCII string + "A128GCM" - [65, 49, 50, 56, 71, 67, 77]. + + PartyUInfo + This is set to the octets representing the 32-bit big-endian value + 5 - [0, 0, 0, 5] - the number of octets in the PartyUInfo content + "Alice", followed, by the octets representing the UTF-8 string + "Alice" - [65, 108, 105, 99, 101]. + + PartyVInfo + This is set to the octets representing the 32-bit big-endian value + 3 - [0, 0, 0, 3] - the number of octets in the PartyUInfo content + "Bob", followed, by the octets representing the UTF-8 string "Bob" + - [66, 111, 98]. + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 67] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + + SuppPubInfo + This is set to the octets representing the 32-bit big-endian value + 128 - [0, 0, 0, 128] - the keydatalen value. + + SuppPrivInfo + This is set to the empty octet sequence. + + Concatenating the parameters AlgorithmID through SuppPubInfo results + in an OtherInfo value of: + [0, 0, 0, 7, 65, 49, 50, 56, 71, 67, 77, 0, 0, 0, 5, 65, 108, 105, + 99, 101, 0, 0, 0, 3, 66, 111, 98, 0, 0, 0, 128] + + Concatenating the round number 1 ([0, 0, 0, 1]), Z, and the OtherInfo + value results in the Concat KDF round 1 hash input of: + [0, 0, 0, 1, + 158, 86, 217, 29, 129, 113, 53, 211, 114, 131, 66, 131, 191, 132, 38, + 156, 251, 49, 110, 163, 218, 128, 106, 72, 246, 218, 167, 121, 140, + 254, 144, 196, + 0, 0, 0, 7, 65, 49, 50, 56, 71, 67, 77, 0, 0, 0, 5, 65, 108, 105, 99, + 101, 0, 0, 0, 3, 66, 111, 98, 0, 0, 0, 128] + + The resulting derived key, which is the first 128 bits of the round 1 + hash output is: + [86, 170, 141, 234, 248, 35, 109, 32, 92, 34, 40, 205, 113, 167, 16, + 26] + + The base64url-encoded representation of this derived key is: + + VqqN6vgjbSBcIijNcacQGg + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 68] + +RFC 7518 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) May 2015 + + +Acknowledgements + + Solutions for signing and encrypting JSON content were previously + explored by "Magic Signatures" [MagicSignatures], "JSON Simple Sign + 1.0" [JSS], "Canvas Applications" [CanvasApp], "JSON Simple + Encryption" [JSE], and "JavaScript Message Security Format" [JSMS], + all of which influenced this document. + + The "Authenticated Encryption with AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA" + [AEAD-CBC-SHA] specification, upon which the AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 + algorithms are based, was written by David A. McGrew and Kenny + Paterson. The test cases for AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 are based upon those + for [AEAD-CBC-SHA] by John Foley. + + Matt Miller wrote "Using JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Web + Encryption (JWE) for Protecting JSON Web Key (JWK) Objects" + [JWE-JWK], upon which the password-based encryption content of this + document is based. + + This specification is the work of the JOSE working group, which + includes dozens of active and dedicated participants. In particular, + the following individuals contributed ideas, feedback, and wording + that influenced this specification: + + Dirk Balfanz, Richard Barnes, Carsten Bormann, John Bradley, Brian + Campbell, Alissa Cooper, Breno de Medeiros, Vladimir Dzhuvinov, Roni + Even, Stephen Farrell, Yaron Y. Goland, Dick Hardt, Joe Hildebrand, + Jeff Hodges, Edmund Jay, Charlie Kaufman, Barry Leiba, James Manger, + Matt Miller, Kathleen Moriarty, Tony Nadalin, Axel Nennker, John + Panzer, Emmanuel Raviart, Eric Rescorla, Pete Resnick, Nat Sakimura, + Jim Schaad, Hannes Tschofenig, and Sean Turner. + + Jim Schaad and Karen O'Donoghue chaired the JOSE working group and + Sean Turner, Stephen Farrell, and Kathleen Moriarty served as + Security Area Directors during the creation of this specification. + +Author's Address + + Michael B. Jones + Microsoft + + EMail: mbj@microsoft.com + URI: http://self-issued.info/ + + + + + + + + +Jones Standards Track [Page 69] + |