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authorThomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100
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+Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Jones
+Request for Comments: 8230 Microsoft
+Category: Standards Track September 2017
+ISSN: 2070-1721
+
+
+ Using RSA Algorithms with
+ CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Messages
+
+Abstract
+
+ The CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) specification defines
+ cryptographic message encodings using Concise Binary Object
+ Representation (CBOR). This specification defines algorithm
+ encodings and representations enabling RSA algorithms to be used for
+ COSE messages. Encodings are specified for the use of RSA
+ Probabilistic Signature Scheme (RSASSA-PSS) signatures, RSA
+ Encryption Scheme - Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (RSAES-
+ OAEP) encryption, and RSA keys.
+
+Status of This Memo
+
+ This is an Internet Standards Track document.
+
+ This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
+ (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
+ received public review and has been approved for publication by the
+ Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
+ Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
+
+ Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
+ and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
+ http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8230.
+
+Copyright Notice
+
+ Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
+ document authors. All rights reserved.
+
+ This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
+ Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
+ (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
+ publication of this document. Please review these documents
+ carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
+ to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
+ include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
+ the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
+ described in the Simplified BSD License.
+
+
+
+Jones Standards Track [Page 1]
+
+RFC 8230 Using RSA Algorithms with COSE Messages September 2017
+
+
+Table of Contents
+
+ 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+ 1.1. Requirements Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . 3
+ 2. RSASSA-PSS Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+ 3. RSAES-OAEP Key Encryption Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+ 4. RSA Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+ 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
+ 5.1. COSE Algorithms Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
+ 5.2. COSE Key Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
+ 5.3. COSE Key Type Parameters Registrations . . . . . . . . . 7
+ 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
+ 6.1. Key Size Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
+ 6.2. RSASSA-PSS Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+ 6.3. RSAES-OAEP Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+ 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+ 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+ 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+ Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+ Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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+Jones Standards Track [Page 2]
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+RFC 8230 Using RSA Algorithms with COSE Messages September 2017
+
+
+1. Introduction
+
+ The CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [RFC8152] specification
+ defines cryptographic message encodings using Concise Binary Object
+ Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049]. This specification defines
+ algorithm encodings and representations enabling RSA algorithms to be
+ used for COSE messages.
+
+1.1. Requirements Notation and Conventions
+
+ The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
+ "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
+ "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
+ 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
+ capitals, as shown here.
+
+2. RSASSA-PSS Signature Algorithm
+
+ The RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm is defined in [RFC8017].
+
+ The RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm is parameterized with a hash
+ function (h), a mask generation function (mgf), and a salt length
+ (sLen). For this specification, the mask generation function is
+ fixed to be MGF1 as defined in [RFC8017]. It has been recommended
+ that the same hash function be used for hashing the data as well as
+ in the mask generation function. This specification follows this
+ recommendation. The salt length is the same length as the hash
+ function output.
+
+ Implementations need to check that the key type is 'RSA' when
+ creating or verifying a signature.
+
+ The RSASSA-PSS algorithms specified in this document are in the
+ following table.
+
+ +-------+-------+---------+-------------+-----------------------+
+ | Name | Value | Hash | Salt Length | Description |
+ +-------+-------+---------+-------------+-----------------------+
+ | PS256 | -37 | SHA-256 | 32 | RSASSA-PSS w/ SHA-256 |
+ | PS384 | -38 | SHA-384 | 48 | RSASSA-PSS w/ SHA-384 |
+ | PS512 | -39 | SHA-512 | 64 | RSASSA-PSS w/ SHA-512 |
+ +-------+-------+---------+-------------+-----------------------+
+
+ Table 1: RSASSA-PSS Algorithm Values
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+Jones Standards Track [Page 3]
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+RFC 8230 Using RSA Algorithms with COSE Messages September 2017
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+
+3. RSAES-OAEP Key Encryption Algorithm
+
+ RSAES-OAEP is an asymmetric key encryption algorithm. The definition
+ of RSAEA-OAEP can be found in Section 7.1 of [RFC8017]. The
+ algorithm is parameterized using a mask generation function (mgf), a
+ hash function (h), and encoding parameters (P). For the algorithm
+ identifiers defined in this section:
+
+ o mgf is always set to MGF1 as defined in [RFC8017] and uses the
+ same hash function as h.
+
+ o P is always set to the empty octet string.
+
+ The following table summarizes the rest of the values.
+
+ +-------------------------------+-------+---------+-----------------+
+ | Name | Value | Hash | Description |
+ +-------------------------------+-------+---------+-----------------+
+ | RSAES-OAEP w/ RFC 8017 | -40 | SHA-1 | RSAES-OAEP w/ |
+ | default parameters | | | SHA-1 |
+ | RSAES-OAEP w/ SHA-256 | -41 | SHA-256 | RSAES-OAEP w/ |
+ | | | | SHA-256 |
+ | RSAES-OAEP w/ SHA-512 | -42 | SHA-512 | RSAES-OAEP w/ |
+ | | | | SHA-512 |
+ +-------------------------------+-------+---------+-----------------+
+
+ Table 2: RSAES-OAEP Algorithm Values
+
+ The key type MUST be 'RSA'.
+
+4. RSA Keys
+
+ Key types are identified by the 'kty' member of the COSE_Key object.
+ This specification defines one value for this member in the following
+ table.
+
+ +------+-------+-------------+
+ | Name | Value | Description |
+ +------+-------+-------------+
+ | RSA | 3 | RSA Key |
+ +------+-------+-------------+
+
+ Table 3: Key Type Values
+
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+Jones Standards Track [Page 4]
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+RFC 8230 Using RSA Algorithms with COSE Messages September 2017
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+ This document defines a key structure for both the public and private
+ parts of RSA keys. Together, an RSA public key and an RSA private
+ key form an RSA key pair.
+
+ The document also provides support for the so-called "multi-prime"
+ RSA keys, in which the modulus may have more than two prime factors.
+ The benefit of multi-prime RSA is lower computational cost for the
+ decryption and signature primitives. For a discussion on how multi-
+ prime affects the security of RSA cryptosystems, the reader is
+ referred to [MultiPrimeRSA].
+
+ This document follows the naming convention of [RFC8017] for the
+ naming of the fields of an RSA public or private key, and the
+ corresponding fields have identical semantics. The requirements for
+ fields for RSA keys are as follows:
+
+ o For all keys, 'kty' MUST be present and MUST have a value of 3.
+
+ o For public keys, the fields 'n' and 'e' MUST be present. All
+ other fields defined in the following table below MUST be absent.
+
+ o For private keys with two primes, the fields 'other', 'r_i',
+ 'd_i', and 't_i' MUST be absent; all other fields MUST be present.
+
+ o For private keys with more than two primes, all fields MUST be
+ present. For the third to nth primes, each of the primes is
+ represented as a map containing the fields 'r_i', 'd_i', and
+ 't_i'. The field 'other' is an array of those maps.
+
+ o All numeric key parameters are encoded in an unsigned big-endian
+ representation as an octet sequence using the CBOR byte string
+ type (major type 2). The octet sequence MUST utilize the minimum
+ number of octets needed to represent the value. For instance, the
+ value 32,768 is represented as the CBOR byte sequence 0b010_00010,
+ 0x80 0x00 (major type 2, additional information 2 for the length).
+
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+ The following table provides a summary of the label values and the
+ types associated with each of those labels.
+
+ +-------+-------+-------+-------+-----------------------------------+
+ | Key | Name | Label | CBOR | Description |
+ | Type | | | Type | |
+ +-------+-------+-------+-------+-----------------------------------+
+ | 3 | n | -1 | bstr | the RSA modulus n |
+ | 3 | e | -2 | bstr | the RSA public exponent e |
+ | 3 | d | -3 | bstr | the RSA private exponent d |
+ | 3 | p | -4 | bstr | the prime factor p of n |
+ | 3 | q | -5 | bstr | the prime factor q of n |
+ | 3 | dP | -6 | bstr | dP is d mod (p - 1) |
+ | 3 | dQ | -7 | bstr | dQ is d mod (q - 1) |
+ | 3 | qInv | -8 | bstr | qInv is the CRT coefficient |
+ | | | | | q^(-1) mod p |
+ | 3 | other | -9 | array | other prime infos, an array |
+ | 3 | r_i | -10 | bstr | a prime factor r_i of n, where i |
+ | | | | | >= 3 |
+ | 3 | d_i | -11 | bstr | d_i = d mod (r_i - 1) |
+ | 3 | t_i | -12 | bstr | the CRT coefficient t_i = (r_1 * |
+ | | | | | r_2 * ... * r_(i-1))^(-1) mod r_i |
+ +-------+-------+-------+-------+-----------------------------------+
+
+ Table 4: RSA Key Parameters
+
+5. IANA Considerations
+
+5.1. COSE Algorithms Registrations
+
+ IANA has registered the following values in the IANA "COSE
+ Algorithms" registry [IANA.COSE].
+
+ o Name: PS256
+ o Value: -37
+ o Description: RSASSA-PSS w/ SHA-256
+ o Reference: Section 2 of this document
+ o Recommended: Yes
+
+ o Name: PS384
+ o Value: -38
+ o Description: RSASSA-PSS w/ SHA-384
+ o Reference: Section 2 of this document
+ o Recommended: Yes
+
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+ o Name: PS512
+ o Value: -39
+ o Description: RSASSA-PSS w/ SHA-512
+ o Reference: Section 2 of this document
+ o Recommended: Yes
+
+ o Name: RSAES-OAEP w/ RFC 8017 default parameters
+ o Value: -40
+ o Description: RSAES-OAEP w/ SHA-1
+ o Reference: Section 3 of this document
+ o Recommended: Yes
+
+ o Name: RSAES-OAEP w/ SHA-256
+ o Value: -41
+ o Description: RSAES-OAEP w/ SHA-256
+ o Reference: Section 3 of this document
+ o Recommended: Yes
+
+ o Name: RSAES-OAEP w/ SHA-512
+ o Value: -42
+ o Description: RSAES-OAEP w/ SHA-512
+ o Reference: Section 3 of this document
+ o Recommended: Yes
+
+5.2. COSE Key Type Registrations
+
+ IANA has registered the following value in the IANA "COSE Key Types"
+ registry [IANA.COSE].
+
+ o Name: RSA
+ o Value: 3
+ o Description: RSA Key
+ o Reference: Section 4 of this document
+
+5.3. COSE Key Type Parameters Registrations
+
+ IANA has registered the following values in the IANA "COSE Key Type
+ Parameters" registry [IANA.COSE].
+
+ o Key Type: 3
+ o Name: n
+ o Label: -1
+ o CBOR Type: bstr
+ o Description: the RSA modulus n
+ o Reference: Section 4 of this document
+
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+ o Key Type: 3
+ o Name: e
+ o Label: -2
+ o CBOR Type: bstr
+ o Description: the RSA public exponent e
+ o Reference: Section 4 of this document
+
+ o Key Type: 3
+ o Name: d
+ o Label: -3
+ o CBOR Type: bstr
+ o Description: the RSA private exponent d
+ o Reference: Section 4 of this document
+
+ o Key Type: 3
+ o Name: p
+ o Label: -4
+ o CBOR Type: bstr
+ o Description: the prime factor p of n
+ o Reference: Section 4 of this document
+
+ o Key Type: 3
+ o Name: q
+ o Label: -5
+ o CBOR Type: bstr
+ o Description: the prime factor q of n
+ o Reference: Section 4 of this document
+
+ o Key Type: 3
+ o Name: dP
+ o Label: -6
+ o CBOR Type: bstr
+ o Description: dP is d mod (p - 1)
+ o Reference: Section 4 of this document
+
+ o Key Type: 3
+ o Name: dQ
+ o Label: -7
+ o CBOR Type: bstr
+ o Description: dQ is d mod (q - 1)
+ o Reference: Section 4 of this document
+
+ o Key Type: 3
+ o Name: qInv
+ o Label: -8
+ o CBOR Type: bstr
+ o Description: qInv is the CRT coefficient q^(-1) mod p
+ o Reference: Section 4 of this document
+
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+ o Key Type: 3
+ o Name: other
+ o Label: -9
+ o CBOR Type: array
+ o Description: other prime infos, an array
+ o Reference: Section 4 of this document
+
+ o Key Type: 3
+ o Name: r_i
+ o Label: -10
+ o CBOR Type: bstr
+ o Description: a prime factor r_i of n, where i >= 3
+ o Reference: Section 4 of this document
+
+ o Key Type: 3
+ o Name: d_i
+ o Label: -11
+ o CBOR Type: bstr
+ o Description: d_i = d mod (r_i - 1)
+ o Reference: Section 4 of this document
+
+ o Key Type: 3
+ o Name: t_i
+ o Label: -12
+ o CBOR Type: bstr
+ o Description: the CRT coefficient t_i = (r_1 * r_2 * ... *
+ r_(i-1))^(-1) mod r_i
+ o Reference: Section 4 of this document
+
+6. Security Considerations
+
+6.1. Key Size Security Considerations
+
+ A key size of 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with these algorithms.
+ This key size corresponds roughly to the same strength as provided by
+ a 128-bit symmetric encryption algorithm. Implementations SHOULD be
+ able to encrypt and decrypt with modulus between 2048 and 16K bits in
+ length. Applications can impose additional restrictions on the
+ length of the modulus.
+
+ In addition to needing to worry about keys that are too small to
+ provide the required security, there are issues with keys that are
+ too large. Denial-of-service attacks have been mounted with overly
+ large keys or oddly sized keys. This has the potential to consume
+ resources with these keys. It is highly recommended that checks on
+ the key length be done before starting a cryptographic operation.
+
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+ There are two reasonable ways to address this attack. First, a key
+ should not be used for a cryptographic operation until it has been
+ verified that it is controlled by a party trusted by the recipient.
+ This approach means that no cryptography will be done until a trust
+ decision about the key has been made, a process described in
+ Appendix D, Item 4 of [RFC7515]. Second, applications can impose
+ maximum- as well as minimum-length requirements on keys. This limits
+ the resources that would otherwise be consumed by the use of overly
+ large keys.
+
+6.2. RSASSA-PSS Security Considerations
+
+ There is a theoretical hash substitution attack that can be mounted
+ against RSASSA-PSS [HASHID]. However, the requirement that the same
+ hash function be used consistently for all operations is an effective
+ mitigation against it. Unlike an Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
+ Algorithm (ECDSA), hash function outputs are not truncated so that
+ the full hash value is always signed. The internal padding structure
+ of RSASSA-PSS means that one needs to have multiple collisions
+ between the two hash functions to be successful in producing a
+ forgery based on changing the hash function. This is highly
+ unlikely.
+
+6.3. RSAES-OAEP Security Considerations
+
+ A version of RSAES-OAEP using the default parameters specified in
+ Appendix A.2.1 of [RFC8017] is included because this is the most
+ widely implemented set of OAEP parameter choices. (Those default
+ parameters are the SHA-1 hash function and the MGF1 with SHA-1 mask
+ generation function.)
+
+ Keys used with RSAES-OAEP MUST follow the constraints in Section 7.1
+ of [RFC8017]. Also, keys with a low private key exponent value, as
+ described in Section 3 of "Twenty Years of Attacks on the RSA
+ Cryptosystem" [Boneh99], MUST NOT be used.
+
+7. References
+
+7.1. Normative References
+
+ [Boneh99] Boneh, D., "Twenty Years of Attacks on the RSA
+ Cryptosystem", Notices of the American Mathematical
+ Society (AMS), Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 203-213, 1999,
+ <http://www.ams.org/notices/199902/boneh.pdf>.
+
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+ [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
+ Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
+
+ [RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
+ Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
+ October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.
+
+ [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
+ Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
+ 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
+
+ [RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A.
+ Rusch, "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version
+ 2.2", RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
+
+ [RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
+ RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.
+
+ [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
+ 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
+ May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
+
+7.2. Informative References
+
+ [HASHID] Kaliski, B., "On Hash Function Firewalls in Signature
+ Schemes", Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS),
+ Volume 2271, pp. 1-16, DOI 10.1007/3-540-45760-7_1,
+ February 2002, <https://rd.springer.com/chapter/
+ 10.1007/3-540-45760-7_1>.
+
+ [IANA.COSE] IANA, "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
+ <http://www.iana.org/assignments/cose>.
+
+ [MultiPrimeRSA]
+ Hinek, M. and D. Cheriton, "On the Security of
+ Multi-prime RSA", June 2006,
+ <http://cacr.uwaterloo.ca/techreports/
+ 2006/cacr2006-16.pdf>.
+
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+Acknowledgements
+
+ This specification incorporates text from "CBOR Encoded Message
+ Syntax" (September 2015) authored by Jim Schaad and Brian Campbell.
+ Thanks are due to Ben Campbell, Roni Even, Steve Kent, Kathleen
+ Moriarty, Eric Rescorla, Adam Roach, Rich Salz, and Jim Schaad for
+ their reviews of the specification.
+
+Author's Address
+
+ Michael B. Jones
+ Microsoft
+
+ Email: mbj@microsoft.com
+ URI: http://self-issued.info/
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