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author | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
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committer | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
commit | 4bfd864f10b68b71482b35c818559068ef8d5797 (patch) | |
tree | e3989f47a7994642eb325063d46e8f08ffa681dc /doc/rfc/rfc8573.txt | |
parent | ea76e11061bda059ae9f9ad130a9895cc85607db (diff) |
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diff --git a/doc/rfc/rfc8573.txt b/doc/rfc/rfc8573.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0faf070 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/rfc/rfc8573.txt @@ -0,0 +1,283 @@ + + + + + + +Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) A. Malhotra +Request for Comments: 8573 S. Goldberg +Updates: 5905 Boston University +Category: Standards Track June 2019 +ISSN: 2070-1721 + + + Message Authentication Code for the Network Time Protocol + +Abstract + + The Network Time Protocol (NTP), as described in RFC 5905, states + that NTP packets should be authenticated by appending NTP data to a + 128-bit key and hashing the result with MD5 to obtain a 128-bit tag. + This document deprecates MD5-based authentication, which is + considered too weak, and recommends the use of AES-CMAC as described + in RFC 4493 as a replacement. + +Status of This Memo + + This is an Internet Standards Track document. + + This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force + (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has + received public review and has been approved for publication by the + Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on + Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841. + + Information about the current status of this document, any errata, + and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at + https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8573. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the + document authors. All rights reserved. + + This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal + Provisions Relating to IETF Documents + (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of + publication of this document. Please review these documents + carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect + to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must + include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of + the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as + described in the Simplified BSD License. + + + + + +Malhotra & Goldberg Standards Track [Page 1] + +RFC 8573 MAC for NTP June 2019 + + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 + 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 + 2. Deprecating the Use of MD5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 + 3. Replacement Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 + 4. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 + 5. Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 + 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 + 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 + 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + +1. Introduction + + The Network Time Protocol [RFC5905] states that NTP packets should be + authenticated by appending NTP data to a 128-bit key and hashing the + result with MD5 to obtain a 128-bit tag. This document deprecates + MD5-based authentication, which is considered too weak, and + recommends the use of AES-CMAC [RFC4493] as a replacement. + +1.1. Requirements Language + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and + "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in + BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all + capitals, as shown here. + +2. Deprecating the Use of MD5 + + RFC 5905 [RFC5905] defines how the MD5 digest algorithm described in + RFC 1321 [RFC1321] can be used as a Message Authentication Code (MAC) + for authenticating NTP packets. However, as discussed in [BCK] and + RFC 6151 [RFC6151], this is not a secure MAC and therefore MUST be + deprecated. + +3. Replacement Recommendation + + If NTP authentication is implemented, then AES-CMAC as specified in + RFC 4493 [RFC4493] MUST be computed over all fields in the NTP header + and any extension fields that are present in the NTP packet as + described in RFC 5905 [RFC5905]. The MAC key for NTP MUST be an + AES-128 key that is 128 bits in length, and the resulting MAC tag + + + + +Malhotra & Goldberg Standards Track [Page 2] + +RFC 8573 MAC for NTP June 2019 + + + MUST be at least 128 bits in length, as stated in Section 2.4 of RFC + 4493 [RFC4493]. NTP makes this transition possible as it supports + algorithm agility as described in Section 2.1 of RFC 7696 [RFC7696]. + + The hosts that wish to use NTP authentication share a symmetric key + out of band. So they MUST implement AES-CMAC and share the + corresponding symmetric key. A symmetric key is a triplet of ID, + type (e.g., MD5 and AES-CMAC) and the key itself. All three have to + match in order to successfully authenticate packets between two + hosts. Old implementations that don't support AES-CMAC will not + accept and will not send packets authenticated with such a key. + +4. Motivation + + AES-CMAC is recommended for the following reasons: + + 1. It is an IETF specification that is supported in many open source + implementations. + + 2. It is immune to nonce-reuse vulnerabilities (e.g., [Joux]) + because it does not use a nonce. + + 3. It has fine performance in terms of latency and throughput. + + 4. It benefits from native hardware support, for instance, Intel's + New Instruction set GUE [GUE]. + +5. Test Vectors + + For test vectors and their outputs, refer to Section 4 of RFC 4493 + [RFC4493]. + +6. IANA Considerations + + This document has no IANA actions. + +7. Security Considerations + + Refer to Appendices A, B, and C of the NIST document [NIST] for a + recommendation for the CMAC mode of authentication; see the Security + Considerations of RFC 4493 [RFC4493] for discussion on security + guarantees of AES-CMAC. + + + + + + + + + +Malhotra & Goldberg Standards Track [Page 3] + +RFC 8573 MAC for NTP June 2019 + + +8. References + +8.1. Normative References + + [NIST] Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of + Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication", NIST Special + Publication 800-38B, DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38B, October + 2016, <https://www.nist.gov/publications/recommendation- + block-cipher-modes-operation-cmac-mode-authentication-0>. + + [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, + DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. + + [RFC4493] Song, JH., Poovendran, R., Lee, J., and T. Iwata, "The + AES-CMAC Algorithm", RFC 4493, DOI 10.17487/RFC4493, June + 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4493>. + + [RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, + "Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms + Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905>. + + [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC + 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, + May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. + +8.2. Informative References + + [BCK] Bellare, M., Canetti, R., and H. Krawczyk, "Keying Hash + Functions and Message Authentication", Advances in + Cryptology - Crypto 96 Proceedings, Lecture Notes in + Computer Science, Vol. 1109, N. Koblitz ed, Springer- + Verlag, 1996. + + [GUE] Geuron, S., "Intel Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) New + Instructions Set", May 2010, + <https://www.intel.com/content/dam/doc/white-paper/ + advanced-encryption-standard-new-instructions-set- + paper.pdf>. + + [Joux] Joux, A., "Authentication Failures in NIST version of + GCM", + <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/ + comments/800-38_Series-Drafts/GCM/Joux_comments.pdf>. + + + + + +Malhotra & Goldberg Standards Track [Page 4] + +RFC 8573 MAC for NTP June 2019 + + + [RFC1321] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321, + DOI 10.17487/RFC1321, April 1992, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1321>. + + [RFC6151] Turner, S. and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations + for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms", + RFC 6151, DOI 10.17487/RFC6151, March 2011, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6151>. + + [RFC7696] Housley, R., "Guidelines for Cryptographic Algorithm + Agility and Selecting Mandatory-to-Implement Algorithms", + BCP 201, RFC 7696, DOI 10.17487/RFC7696, November 2015, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7696>. + +Acknowledgements + + The authors wish to acknowledge useful discussions with Leen + Alshenibr, Daniel Franke, Ethan Heilman, Kenny Paterson, Leonid + Reyzin, Harlan Stenn, and Mayank Varia. + +Authors' Addresses + + Aanchal Malhotra + Boston University + 111 Cummington St + Boston, MA 02215 + United States of America + + Email: aanchal4@bu.edu + + + Sharon Goldberg + Boston University + 111 Cummington St + Boston, MA 02215 + United States of America + + Email: goldbe@cs.bu.edu + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Malhotra & Goldberg Standards Track [Page 5] + |