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author | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
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committer | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
commit | 4bfd864f10b68b71482b35c818559068ef8d5797 (patch) | |
tree | e3989f47a7994642eb325063d46e8f08ffa681dc /doc/rfc/rfc8588.txt | |
parent | ea76e11061bda059ae9f9ad130a9895cc85607db (diff) |
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diff --git a/doc/rfc/rfc8588.txt b/doc/rfc/rfc8588.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ddee108 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/rfc/rfc8588.txt @@ -0,0 +1,507 @@ + + + + + + +Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) C. Wendt +Request for Comments: 8588 Comcast +Category: Standards Track M. Barnes +ISSN: 2070-1721 iconectiv + May 2019 + + + Personal Assertion Token (PaSSporT) Extension for Signature-based + Handling of Asserted information using toKENs (SHAKEN) + +Abstract + + This document extends the Personal Assertion Token (PASSporT), which + is a token object that conveys cryptographically signed information + about the participants involved in communications. The extension is + defined based on the "Signature-based Handling of Asserted + information using toKENs (SHAKEN)" specification by the ATIS/SIP + Forum IP-NNI Task Group. It provides both (1) a specific set of + levels of confidence in the correctness of the originating identity + of a call originated in a SIP-based telephone network as well as (2) + an identifier that allows the Service Provider (SP) to uniquely + identify the origin of the call within its network. + +Status of This Memo + + This is an Internet Standards Track document. + + This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force + (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has + received public review and has been approved for publication by the + Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on + Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841. + + Information about the current status of this document, any errata, + and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at + https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8588. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Wendt & Barnes Standards Track [Page 1] + +RFC 8588 SHAKEN May 2019 + + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the + document authors. All rights reserved. + + This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal + Provisions Relating to IETF Documents + (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of + publication of this document. Please review these documents + carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect + to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must + include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of + the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as + described in the Simplified BSD License. + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 + 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 + 3. Overview of "shaken" PASSporT Extension . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 4. PASSporT "attest" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 5. PASSporT "origid" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 6. Example "shaken" PASSporT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 7. Using "shaken" in SIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 8. Order of Claim Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 + 10. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 + 11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 11.1. JSON Web Token claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 11.2. PASSporT Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Wendt & Barnes Standards Track [Page 2] + +RFC 8588 SHAKEN May 2019 + + +1. Introduction + + The Signature-based Handling of Asserted information using toKENs + (SHAKEN) [ATIS-1000074] specification defines a framework for using + Secure Telephone Identity Revisited (STIR) protocols including the + Personal Assertion Token (PASSporT) [RFC8225], SIP Authenticated + Identity Management [RFC8224], and the STIR certificate framework + [RFC8226] for implementing the cryptographic validation of an + authorized originator of telephone calls using SIP. Because the + current telephone network contains traffic originated from both VoIP + and TDM/SS7 (Time Division Multiplexing / Signaling System 7), there + are many scenarios that need to be accounted for where PASSporT + signatures may represent either direct or indirect call origination + scenarios. The SHAKEN [ATIS-1000074] specification defines levels of + attestation of the origination of the call as well as an origination + identifier that can help create a unique association between the + origin of a particular call to the point in the VoIP or TDM telephone + network the call came from to identify, for example, either a + customer or class of service that call represents. This document + specifies these values as claims to extend the base set of PASSporT + claims. + +2. Terminology + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and + "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in + BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all + capitals, as shown here. + + In addition, the following terms are used in this document: + + o Verified association: Typically defined as an authenticated + relationship between a customer and a device that initiated a call + on behalf of that customer, for example, a subscriber account with + a specific SIM card or set of SIP credentials. + + o PASSporT: Defined in [RFC8225] is a JSON Web Token [RFC7519] + defined specifically for securing the identity of an initiator of + personal communication. This document defines a specific + extension to PASSporT. + + + + + + + + + + +Wendt & Barnes Standards Track [Page 3] + +RFC 8588 SHAKEN May 2019 + + +3. Overview of "shaken" PASSporT Extension + + The SHAKEN framework is designed to use PASSporT [RFC8225] as a + method of asserting the caller's telephone identity. In addition to + the PASSporT base claims, there are two additional claims that have + been defined for the needs of a service provider to signal + information beyond just the telephone identity. First, in order to + help bridge the transition of the state of the current telephone + network (which has calls with no authentication and non-SIP [RFC3261] + signaling not compatible with the use of PASSporT and Secure + Telephone Identity (STI) in general), there is an attestation claim. + This provides three levels of attestation: a full attestation when + the service provider can fully attest to the calling identity, a + partial attestation when the service provider originated a telephone + call but cannot fully attest to the calling identity, and a gateway + attestation, which is the lowest level of attestation and represents + the service provider receiving a call from a telephone gateway that + does not support PASSporT or STI. + + The second claim is a unique origination identifier that should be + used by the service provider to identify different sources of + telephone calls to support a traceback mechanism that can be used for + enforcement and identification of a source of illegitimate calls. + + The use of the compact form of PASSporT is not specified in this + document and is not specified for use in SHAKEN [ATIS-1000074]. + + The next two sections define these new claims. + +4. PASSporT "attest" Claim + + This indicator allows for both identifying the service provider that + is vouching for the call as well as clearly indicating what + information the service provider is attesting to. The "attest" claim + can be one of the following three values: 'A', 'B', or 'C'. These + values correspond to 'Full Attestation', 'Partial Attestation', and + 'Gateway Attestation', respectively. See [ATIS-1000074] for the + definitions of these three levels of attestation. + +5. PASSporT "origid" Claim + + The purpose of the "origid" claim is described in [ATIS-1000074]. + The value of "origid" claim is a Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) + as defined in [RFC4122]. Please refer to Section 10 for a discussion + of the privacy considerations around the use of this value. + + + + + + +Wendt & Barnes Standards Track [Page 4] + +RFC 8588 SHAKEN May 2019 + + +6. Example "shaken" PASSporT + + Protected Header + { + "alg":"ES256", + "typ":"passport", + "ppt":"shaken", + "x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.cer" + } + Payload + { + "attest":"A" + "dest":{"tn":["12155550131"]} + "iat":"1443208345", + "orig":{"tn":"12155550121"}, + "origid":"123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426655440000" + } + +7. Using "shaken" in SIP + + The use of the "shaken" PASSporT type and the "attest" and "origid" + claims for SIP is formally defined in [ATIS-1000074] using the SIP + [RFC3261] Identity header field defined in [RFC8224]. + +8. Order of Claim Keys + + The order of the claim keys MUST follow the rules of Section 9 of + [RFC8225]; the claim keys MUST appear in lexicographic order. + Therefore, the claim keys discussed in this document appear in the + PASSporT Payload in the following order: + + o attest + + o dest + + o iat + + o orig + + o origid + + + + + + + + + + + +Wendt & Barnes Standards Track [Page 5] + +RFC 8588 SHAKEN May 2019 + + +9. Security Considerations + + This document defines a new PASSporT [RFC8225] extension. The + considerations related to the security of the PASSporT object itself + are the same as those described in [RFC8225]. + + [RFC8224] defines how to compare the values of the "dest", "orig", + and "iat" claims against fields in a SIP message containing a + PASSporT as part of validating that request. The values of the new + "attest" and "origid" claims added by this extension are not used in + such a validation step. They are not compared to fields in the SIP + message. Instead, they simply carry additional information from the + signer to the consumer of the PASSporT. This new information shares + the same integrity protection and non-repudiation properties as the + base claims in the PASSporT. + +10. Privacy Considerations + + As detailed in Section 26 of [RFC3261], SIP messages inherently carry + identifying information of the caller and callee. The addition of + STIR cryptographically attests that the signing party vouches for the + information given about the callee, as is discussed in the Privacy + Considerations of [RFC8224]. + + SHAKEN [ATIS-1000074] furthermore adds an "origid" value to the STIR + PASSporT, which is an opaque unique identifier representing an + element on the path of a given SIP request. This identifier is + generated by an originating telephone service provider to identify + where within their network (e.g. a gateway or particular service + element) a call was initiated; "origid" can facilitate forensic + analysis of call origins when identifying and stopping bad actors + trying to spoof identities or make fraudulent calls. + + The opacity of the "origid" claim value is intended to minimize + exposure of information about the origination of calls labeled with + an "origid" value. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that implementations + generate a unique "origid" value per call in such a way that only the + generator of the "origid" can determine when two "origid" values + represent the same or different elements. If deployed systems + instead use a common or related "origid" for service elements in + their network, the potential for discovering patterns through + correlation of those calls exists. This could allow a recipient of + calls to, for instance, learn that a set of callers are using a + particular service or coming through a common gateway. It is + expected that SHAKEN PASSporTs are shared only within an [RFC3324] + trust domain and will be stripped before calls exit that trust + domain, but this information still could be used by analytics on + + + + +Wendt & Barnes Standards Track [Page 6] + +RFC 8588 SHAKEN May 2019 + + + intermediary and terminating systems to reveal information that could + include geographic location and even device-level information, + depending on how the "origid" is generated. + +11. IANA Considerations + +11.1. JSON Web Token claims + + IANA has added two new claims to the "JSON Web Token Claims" registry + as defined in [RFC7519]. + + Claim Name: attest + Claim Description: Attestation level as defined in SHAKEN framework + Change Controller: IESG + Specification Document(s): RFC 8588 + + Claim Name: origid + Claim Description: Originating Identifier as defined in SHAKEN + framework + Change Controller: IESG + Specification Document(s): RFC 8588 + +11.2. PASSporT Types + + IANA has added a new entry in the "Personal Assertion Token + (PASSporT) Extensions" registry for the type "shaken", which is + specified in this document. + +12. References + +12.1. Normative References + + [ATIS-1000074] + ATIS/SIP Forum IP-NNI Task Group, "Signature-based + Handling of Asserted information using toKENs (SHAKEN)", + January 2017, <https://access.atis.org/apps/group_public/ + download.php/32237/ATIS-1000074.pdf>. + + [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, + DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. + + [RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally + Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122, + DOI 10.17487/RFC4122, July 2005, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4122>. + + + + +Wendt & Barnes Standards Track [Page 7] + +RFC 8588 SHAKEN May 2019 + + + [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token + (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>. + + [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC + 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, + May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. + + [RFC8224] Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt, + "Authenticated Identity Management in the Session + Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 8224, + DOI 10.17487/RFC8224, February 2018, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8224>. + + [RFC8225] Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "PASSporT: Personal Assertion + Token", RFC 8225, DOI 10.17487/RFC8225, February 2018, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8225>. + + [RFC8226] Peterson, J. and S. Turner, "Secure Telephone Identity + Credentials: Certificates", RFC 8226, + DOI 10.17487/RFC8226, February 2018, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8226>. + +12.2. Informative References + + [RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, + A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. + Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, + DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>. + + [RFC3324] Watson, M., "Short Term Requirements for Network Asserted + Identity", RFC 3324, DOI 10.17487/RFC3324, November 2002, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3324>. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Wendt & Barnes Standards Track [Page 8] + +RFC 8588 SHAKEN May 2019 + + +Acknowledgements + + The authors would like to thank those that helped review and + contribute to this document including specific contributions from Jon + Peterson, Russ Housley, Robert Sparks, and Andrew Jurczak. The + authors would like to acknowledge the work of the ATIS/SIP Forum + IP-NNI Task Force to develop the concepts behind this document. + +Authors' Addresses + + Chris Wendt + Comcast + One Comcast Center + Philadelphia, PA 19103 + United States of America + + Email: chris-ietf@chriswendt.net + + + Mary Barnes + iconectiv + + Email: mary.ietf.barnes@gmail.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Wendt & Barnes Standards Track [Page 9] + |