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| author | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
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| committer | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
| commit | 4bfd864f10b68b71482b35c818559068ef8d5797 (patch) | |
| tree | e3989f47a7994642eb325063d46e8f08ffa681dc /doc/rfc/rfc9190.txt | |
| parent | ea76e11061bda059ae9f9ad130a9895cc85607db (diff) | |
doc: Add RFC documents
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diff --git a/doc/rfc/rfc9190.txt b/doc/rfc/rfc9190.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..28d8a7e --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/rfc/rfc9190.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1658 @@ + + + + +Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Preuß Mattsson +Request for Comments: 9190 M. Sethi +Updates: 5216 Ericsson +Category: Standards Track February 2022 +ISSN: 2070-1721 + + + EAP-TLS 1.3: Using the Extensible Authentication Protocol with TLS 1.3 + +Abstract + + The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in RFC 3748, + provides a standard mechanism for support of multiple authentication + methods. This document specifies the use of EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 + while remaining backwards compatible with existing implementations of + EAP-TLS. TLS 1.3 provides significantly improved security and + privacy, and reduced latency when compared to earlier versions of + TLS. EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 (EAP-TLS 1.3) further improves security + and privacy by always providing forward secrecy, never disclosing the + peer identity, and by mandating use of revocation checking when + compared to EAP-TLS with earlier versions of TLS. This document also + provides guidance on authentication, authorization, and resumption + for EAP-TLS in general (regardless of the underlying TLS version + used). This document updates RFC 5216. + +Status of This Memo + + This is an Internet Standards Track document. + + This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force + (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has + received public review and has been approved for publication by the + Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on + Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841. + + Information about the current status of this document, any errata, + and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at + https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9190. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the + document authors. All rights reserved. + + This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal + Provisions Relating to IETF Documents + (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of + publication of this document. Please review these documents + carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect + to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must + include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the + Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described + in the Revised BSD License. + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction + 1.1. Requirements and Terminology + 2. Protocol Overview + 2.1. Overview of the EAP-TLS Conversation + 2.1.1. Authentication + 2.1.2. Ticket Establishment + 2.1.3. Resumption + 2.1.4. Termination + 2.1.5. No Peer Authentication + 2.1.6. Hello Retry Request + 2.1.7. Identity + 2.1.8. Privacy + 2.1.9. Fragmentation + 2.2. Identity Verification + 2.3. Key Hierarchy + 2.4. Parameter Negotiation and Compliance Requirements + 2.5. EAP State Machines + 3. Detailed Description of the EAP-TLS Protocol + 4. IANA Considerations + 5. Security Considerations + 5.1. Security Claims + 5.2. Peer and Server Identities + 5.3. Certificate Validation + 5.4. Certificate Revocation + 5.5. Packet Modification Attacks + 5.6. Authorization + 5.7. Resumption + 5.8. Privacy Considerations + 5.9. Pervasive Monitoring + 5.10. Discovered Vulnerabilities + 5.11. Cross-Protocol Attacks + 6. References + 6.1. Normative References + 6.2. Informative references + Appendix A. Updated References + Acknowledgments + Contributors + Authors' Addresses + +1. Introduction + + The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in [RFC3748], + provides a standard mechanism for support of multiple authentication + methods. EAP-TLS [RFC5216] specifies an EAP authentication method + with certificate-based mutual authentication utilizing the TLS + handshake protocol for cryptographic algorithms and protocol version + negotiation and establishment of shared secret keying material. EAP- + TLS is widely supported for authentication and key establishment in + IEEE 802.11 [IEEE-802.11] (Wi-Fi) and IEEE 802.1AE [IEEE-802.1AE] + (MACsec) networks using IEEE 802.1X [IEEE-802.1X] and it's the + default mechanism for certificate-based authentication in 3GPP 5G + [TS.33.501] and MulteFire [MulteFire] networks. Many other EAP + methods such as Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling (EAP- + FAST) [RFC4851], Tunneled Transport Layer Security (EAP-TTLS) + [RFC5281], the Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol (TEAP) + [RFC7170], as well as vendor-specific EAP methods such as the + Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol (PEAP) [PEAP], depend on + TLS and EAP-TLS. + + EAP-TLS [RFC5216] references TLS 1.0 [RFC2246] and TLS 1.1 [RFC4346] + but can also work with TLS 1.2 [RFC5246]. TLS 1.0 and 1.1 are + formally deprecated and prohibited from being negotiated or used + [RFC8996]. Weaknesses found in TLS 1.2 as well as new requirements + for security, privacy, and reduced latency have led to the + specification of TLS 1.3 [RFC8446], which obsoletes TLS 1.2 + [RFC5246]. TLS 1.3 is in large part a complete remodeling of the TLS + handshake protocol including a different message flow, different + handshake messages, different key schedule, different cipher suites, + different resumption mechanism, different privacy protection, and + different record padding. This means that significant parts of the + normative text in the previous EAP-TLS specification [RFC5216] are + not applicable to EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3. Therefore, aspects such as + resumption, privacy handling, and key derivation need to be + appropriately addressed for EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3. + + This document updates [RFC5216] to define how to use EAP-TLS with TLS + 1.3. When older TLS versions are negotiated, RFC 5216 applies to + maintain backwards compatibility. However, this document does + provide additional guidance on authentication, authorization, and + resumption for EAP-TLS regardless of the underlying TLS version used. + This document only describes differences compared to [RFC5216]. When + EAP-TLS is used with TLS 1.3, some references are updated as + specified in Appendix A. All message flows are example message flows + specific to TLS 1.3 and do not apply to TLS 1.2. Since EAP-TLS + couples the TLS handshake state machine with the EAP state machine, + it is possible that new versions of TLS will cause incompatibilities + that introduce failures or security issues if they are not carefully + integrated into the EAP-TLS protocol. Therefore, implementations + MUST limit the maximum TLS version they use to 1.3, unless later + versions are explicitly enabled by the administrator. + + This document specifies EAP-TLS 1.3 and does not specify how other + TLS-based EAP methods use TLS 1.3. The specification for how other + TLS-based EAP methods use TLS 1.3 is left to other documents such as + [TLS-EAP-TYPES]. + + In addition to the improved security and privacy offered by TLS 1.3, + there are other significant benefits of using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3. + Privacy, which in EAP-TLS means that no information about the + underlying peer identity is disclosed, is mandatory and achieved + without any additional round trips. Revocation checking is mandatory + and simplified with Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) + stapling, and TLS 1.3 introduces more possibilities to reduce + fragmentation when compared to earlier versions of TLS. + +1.1. Requirements and Terminology + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and + "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP + 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all + capitals, as shown here. + + Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts used + in EAP-TLS [RFC5216] and TLS [RFC8446]. The term EAP-TLS peer is + used for the entity acting as EAP peer and TLS client. The term EAP- + TLS server is used for the entity acting as EAP server and TLS + server. + + This document follows the terminology from [TLS-bis] where the master + secret is renamed to the main secret and the exporter_master_secret + is renamed to the exporter_secret. + +2. Protocol Overview + +2.1. Overview of the EAP-TLS Conversation + + This section updates Section 2.1 of [RFC5216] by amending it in + accordance with the following discussion. + + If the TLS implementation correctly implements TLS version + negotiation, EAP-TLS will automatically leverage that capability. + The EAP-TLS implementation needs to know which version of TLS was + negotiated to correctly support EAP-TLS 1.3 as well as to maintain + backward compatibility with EAP-TLS 1.2. + + TLS 1.3 changes both the message flow and the handshake messages + compared to earlier versions of TLS. Therefore, much of Section 2.1 + of [RFC5216] does not apply for TLS 1.3. Except for Sections 2.2 and + 5.7, this update applies only when TLS 1.3 is negotiated. When TLS + 1.2 is negotiated, then [RFC5216] applies. + + TLS 1.3 introduces several new handshake messages including + HelloRetryRequest, NewSessionTicket, and KeyUpdate. In general, + these messages will be handled by the underlying TLS libraries and + are not visible to EAP-TLS; however, there are a few things to note: + + * The HelloRetryRequest is used by the server to reject the + parameters offered in the ClientHello and suggest new parameters. + When this message is encountered, it will increase the number of + round trips used by the protocol. + + * The NewSessionTicket message is used to convey resumption + information and is covered in Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3. + + * The KeyUpdate message is used to update the traffic keys used on a + TLS connection. EAP-TLS does not encrypt significant amounts of + data so this functionality is not needed. Implementations SHOULD + NOT send this message; however, some TLS libraries may + automatically generate and process this message. + + * Early Data MUST NOT be used in EAP-TLS. EAP-TLS servers MUST NOT + send an early_data extension and clients MUST NOT send an + EndOfEarlyData message. + + * Post-handshake authentication MUST NOT be used in EAP-TLS. + Clients MUST NOT send a "post_handshake_auth" extension and + Servers MUST NOT request post-handshake client authentication. + + After receiving an EAP-Request packet with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS as + described in [RFC5216], the conversation will continue with the TLS + handshake protocol encapsulated in the data fields of EAP-Response + and EAP-Request packets. When EAP-TLS is used with TLS version 1.3, + the formatting and processing of the TLS handshake SHALL be done as + specified in version 1.3 of TLS. This update only lists additional + and different requirements, restrictions, and processing compared to + [RFC8446] and [RFC5216]. + +2.1.1. Authentication + + This section updates Section 2.1.1 of [RFC5216] by amending it in + accordance with the following discussion. + + The EAP-TLS server MUST authenticate with a certificate and SHOULD + require the EAP-TLS peer to authenticate with a certificate. + Certificates can be of any type supported by TLS including raw public + keys. Pre-Shared Key (PSK) authentication SHALL NOT be used except + for resumption. The full handshake in EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 always + provides forward secrecy by exchange of ephemeral "key_share" + extensions in the ClientHello and ServerHello (e.g., containing + Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) public keys). + SessionID is deprecated in TLS 1.3; see Sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 of + [RFC8446]. TLS 1.3 introduced early application data that like all + application data (other than the protected success indication + described below) is not used in EAP-TLS; see Section 4.2.10 of + [RFC8446] for additional information on the "early_data" extension. + Resumption is handled as described in Section 2.1.3. As a protected + success indication [RFC3748], the EAP-TLS server always sends TLS + application data 0x00; see Section 2.5. Note that a TLS + implementation MAY not allow the EAP-TLS layer to control in which + order things are sent and the application data MAY therefore be sent + before a NewSessionTicket. TLS application data 0x00 is therefore to + be interpreted as success after the EAP-Request that contains TLS + application data 0x00. After the EAP-TLS server has sent an EAP- + Request containing the TLS application data 0x00 and received an EAP- + Response packet of EAP-Type=EAP-TLS and no data, the EAP-TLS server + sends EAP-Success. + + Figure 1 shows an example message flow for a successful EAP-TLS full + handshake with mutual authentication (and neither HelloRetryRequest + nor post-handshake messages are sent). + + EAP-TLS Peer EAP-TLS Server + + EAP-Request/ + <-------- Identity + EAP-Response/ + Identity (Privacy-Friendly) --------> + EAP-Request/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + <-------- (TLS Start) + EAP-Response/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + (TLS ClientHello) --------> + EAP-Request/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + (TLS ServerHello, + TLS EncryptedExtensions, + TLS CertificateRequest, + TLS Certificate, + TLS CertificateVerify, + <-------- TLS Finished) + EAP-Response/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + (TLS Certificate, + TLS CertificateVerify, + TLS Finished) --------> + EAP-Request/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + <-------- (TLS Application Data 0x00) + EAP-Response/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS --------> + <-------- EAP-Success + + Figure 1: EAP-TLS Mutual Authentication + +2.1.2. Ticket Establishment + + This is a new section when compared to [RFC5216]. + + To enable resumption when using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3, the EAP-TLS + server MUST send one or more post-handshake NewSessionTicket messages + (each associated with a PSK, a PSK identity, a ticket lifetime, and + other parameters) in the initial authentication. Note that TLS 1.3 + [RFC8446] limits the ticket lifetime to a maximum of 604800 seconds + (7 days) and EAP-TLS servers MUST respect this upper limit when + issuing tickets. The NewSessionTicket is sent after the EAP-TLS + server has received the client Finished message in the initial + authentication. The NewSessionTicket can be sent in the same flight + as the TLS server Finished or later. The PSK associated with the + ticket depends on the client Finished and cannot be pre-computed (so + as to be sent in the same flight as the TLS server Finished) in + handshakes with client authentication. The NewSessionTicket message + MUST NOT include an "early_data" extension. If the "early_data" + extension is received, then it MUST be ignored. Servers should take + into account that fewer NewSessionTickets will likely be needed in + EAP-TLS than in the usual HTTPS connection scenario. In most cases, + a single NewSessionTicket will be sufficient. A mechanism by which + clients can specify the desired number of tickets needed for future + connections is defined in [TICKET-REQUESTS]. + + Figure 2 shows an example message flow for a successful EAP-TLS full + handshake with mutual authentication and ticket establishment of a + single ticket. + + EAP-TLS Peer EAP-TLS Server + + EAP-Request/ + <-------- Identity + EAP-Response/ + Identity (Privacy-Friendly) --------> + EAP-Request/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + <-------- (TLS Start) + EAP-Response/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + (TLS ClientHello) --------> + EAP-Request/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + (TLS ServerHello, + TLS EncryptedExtensions, + TLS CertificateRequest, + TLS Certificate, + TLS CertificateVerify, + <-------- TLS Finished) + EAP-Response/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + (TLS Certificate, + TLS CertificateVerify, + TLS Finished) --------> + EAP-Request/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + (TLS NewSessionTicket, + <-------- (TLS Application Data 0x00) + EAP-Response/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS --------> + <-------- EAP-Success + + Figure 2: EAP-TLS Ticket Establishment + +2.1.3. Resumption + + This section updates Section 2.1.2 of [RFC5216] by amending it in + accordance with the following discussion. + + EAP-TLS is typically used with client authentication and typically + fragments the TLS flights into a large number of EAP-requests and + EAP-responses. Resumption significantly reduces the number of round + trips and enables the EAP-TLS server to omit database lookups needed + during a full handshake with client authentication. TLS 1.3 replaces + the session resumption mechanisms in earlier versions of TLS with a + new PSK exchange. When EAP-TLS is used with TLS version 1.3, EAP-TLS + SHALL use a resumption mechanism compatible with version 1.3 of TLS. + + For TLS 1.3, resumption is described in Section 2.2 of [RFC8446]. If + the client has received a NewSessionTicket message from the EAP-TLS + server, the client can use the PSK identity associated with the + ticket to negotiate the use of the associated PSK. If the EAP-TLS + server accepts it, then the resumed session has been deemed to be + authenticated and securely associated with the prior authentication + or resumption. It is up to the EAP-TLS peer to use resumption, but + it is RECOMMENDED that the EAP-TLS peer use resumption if it has a + valid ticket that has not been used before. It is left to the EAP- + TLS server whether to accept resumption, but it is RECOMMENDED that + the EAP-TLS server accept resumption if the ticket that was issued is + still valid. However, the EAP-TLS server MAY choose to require a + full handshake. In the case a full handshake is required, the + negotiation proceeds as if the session was a new authentication, and + the resumption attempt is ignored. The requirements of Sections + 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 then apply in their entirety. As described in + Appendix C.4 of [RFC8446], reuse of a ticket allows passive observers + to correlate different connections. EAP-TLS peers and EAP-TLS + servers SHOULD follow the client tracking preventions in Appendix C.4 + of [RFC8446]. + + It is RECOMMENDED to use Network Access Identifiers (NAIs) with the + same realm during resumption and the original full handshake. This + requirement allows EAP packets to be routed to the same destination + as the original full handshake. If this recommendation is not + followed, resumption is likely impossible. When NAI reuse can be + done without privacy implications, it is RECOMMENDED to use the same + NAI in the resumption as was used in the original full handshake + [RFC7542]. For example, the NAI @realm can safely be reused since it + does not provide any specific information to associate a user's + resumption attempt with the original full handshake. However, + reusing the NAI P2ZIM2F+OEVAO21nNWg2bVpgNnU=@realm enables an on-path + attacker to associate a resumption attempt with the original full + handshake. The TLS PSK identity is typically derived by the TLS + implementation and may be an opaque blob without a routable realm. + The TLS PSK identity on its own is therefore unsuitable as an NAI in + the Identity Response. + + Figure 3 shows an example message flow for a subsequent successful + EAP-TLS resumption handshake where both sides authenticate via a PSK + provisioned via an earlier NewSessionTicket and where the server + provisions a single new ticket. + + EAP-TLS Peer EAP-TLS Server + + EAP-Request/ + <-------- Identity + EAP-Response/ + Identity (Privacy-Friendly) --------> + EAP-Request/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + <-------- (TLS Start) + EAP-Response/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + (TLS ClientHello + + pre_shared_key) --------> + EAP-Request/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + (TLS ServerHello, + TLS EncryptedExtensions, + <-------- TLS Finished, + TLS NewSessionTicket) + EAP-Response/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + (TLS Finished) --------> + EAP-Request/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + <-------- (TLS Application Data 0x00) + EAP-Response/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS --------> + <-------- EAP-Success + + Figure 3: EAP-TLS Resumption + + As specified in Section 2.2 of [RFC8446], the EAP-TLS peer SHOULD + supply a "key_share" extension when attempting resumption, which + allows the EAP-TLS server to potentially decline resumption and fall + back to a full handshake. If the EAP-TLS peer did not supply a + "key_share" extension when attempting resumption, the EAP-TLS server + needs to send a HelloRetryRequest to signal that additional + information is needed to complete the handshake, and the EAP-TLS peer + needs to send a second ClientHello containing that information. + Providing a "key_share" and using the "psk_dhe_ke" pre-shared key + exchange mode is also important in order to limit the impact of a key + compromise. When using "psk_dhe_ke", TLS 1.3 provides forward + secrecy meaning that compromise of the PSK used for resumption does + not compromise any earlier connections. The "psk_dh_ke" key exchange + mode MUST be used for resumption unless the deployment has a local + requirement to allow configuration of other mechanisms. + +2.1.4. Termination + + This section updates Section 2.1.3 of [RFC5216] by amending it in + accordance with the following discussion. + + TLS 1.3 changes both the message flow and the handshake messages + compared to earlier versions of TLS. Therefore, some normative text + in Section 2.1.3 of [RFC5216] does not apply for TLS 1.3. The two + paragraphs below replace the corresponding paragraphs in + Section 2.1.3 of [RFC5216] when EAP-TLS is used with TLS 1.3. The + other paragraphs in Section 2.1.3 of [RFC5216] still apply with the + exception that SessionID is deprecated. + + If the EAP-TLS peer authenticates successfully, the EAP-TLS server + MUST send an EAP-Request packet with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS containing + TLS records conforming to the version of TLS used. The message + flow ends with a protected success indication from the EAP-TLS + server, followed by an EAP-Response packet of EAP-Type=EAP-TLS and + no data from the EAP-TLS peer, followed by EAP-Success from the + server. + + If the EAP-TLS server authenticates successfully, the EAP-TLS peer + MUST send an EAP-Response message with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS containing + TLS records conforming to the version of TLS used. + + Figures 4, 5, and 6 illustrate message flows in several cases where + the EAP-TLS peer or EAP-TLS server sends a TLS Error alert message. + In earlier versions of TLS, error alerts could be warnings or fatal. + In TLS 1.3, error alerts are always fatal and the only alerts sent at + warning level are "close_notify" and "user_canceled", both of which + indicate that the connection is not going to continue normally; see + [RFC8446]. + + In TLS 1.3 [RFC8446], error alerts are not mandatory to send after a + fatal error condition. Failure to send TLS Error alerts means that + the peer or server would have no way of determining what went wrong. + EAP-TLS 1.3 strengthens this requirement. Whenever an implementation + encounters a fatal error condition, it MUST send an appropriate TLS + Error alert. + + Figure 4 shows an example message flow where the EAP-TLS server + rejects the ClientHello with an error alert. The EAP-TLS server can + also partly reject the ClientHello with a HelloRetryRequest; see + Section 2.1.6. + + EAP-TLS Peer EAP-TLS Server + + EAP-Request/ + <-------- Identity + EAP-Response/ + Identity (Privacy-Friendly) --------> + EAP-Request/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + <-------- (TLS Start) + EAP-Response/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + (TLS ClientHello) --------> + EAP-Request/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + <-------- (TLS Error Alert) + EAP-Response/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS --------> + <-------- EAP-Failure + + Figure 4: EAP-TLS Server Rejection of ClientHello + + Figure 5 shows an example message flow where EAP-TLS server + authentication is unsuccessful and the EAP-TLS peer sends a TLS Error + alert. + + EAP-TLS Peer EAP-TLS Server + + EAP-Request/ + <-------- Identity + EAP-Response/ + Identity (Privacy-Friendly) --------> + EAP-Request/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + <-------- (TLS Start) + EAP-Response/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + (TLS ClientHello) --------> + EAP-Request/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + (TLS ServerHello, + TLS EncryptedExtensions, + TLS CertificateRequest, + TLS Certificate, + TLS CertificateVerify, + <-------- TLS Finished) + EAP-Response/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + (TLS Error Alert) + --------> + <-------- EAP-Failure + + Figure 5: EAP-TLS Unsuccessful EAP-TLS Server Authentication + + Figure 6 shows an example message flow where the EAP-TLS server + authenticates to the EAP-TLS peer successfully, but the EAP-TLS peer + fails to authenticate to the EAP-TLS server and the server sends a + TLS Error alert. + + EAP-TLS Peer EAP-TLS Server + + EAP-Request/ + <-------- Identity + EAP-Response/ + Identity (Privacy-Friendly) --------> + EAP-Request/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + <-------- (TLS Start) + EAP-Response/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + (TLS ClientHello) --------> + EAP-Request/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + (TLS ServerHello, + TLS EncryptedExtensions, + TLS CertificateRequest, + TLS Certificate, + TLS CertificateVerify, + <-------- TLS Finished) + EAP-Response/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + (TLS Certificate, + TLS CertificateVerify, + TLS Finished) --------> + EAP-Request/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + <-------- (TLS Error Alert) + EAP-Response/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS --------> + <-------- EAP-Failure + + Figure 6: EAP-TLS Unsuccessful Client Authentication + +2.1.5. No Peer Authentication + + This is a new section when compared to [RFC5216]. + + Figure 7 shows an example message flow for a successful EAP-TLS full + handshake without peer authentication (e.g., emergency services, as + described in [RFC7406]). + + EAP-TLS Peer EAP-TLS Server + + EAP-Request/ + <-------- Identity + EAP-Response/ + Identity (Privacy-Friendly) --------> + EAP-Request/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + <-------- (TLS Start) + EAP-Response/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + (TLS ClientHello) --------> + EAP-Request/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + (TLS ServerHello, + TLS EncryptedExtensions, + TLS Certificate, + TLS CertificateVerify, + <-------- TLS Finished) + EAP-Response/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + (TLS Finished) --------> + EAP-Request/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + <-------- (TLS Application Data 0x00) + EAP-Response/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS --------> + <-------- EAP-Success + + Figure 7: EAP-TLS without Peer Authentication + +2.1.6. Hello Retry Request + + This is a new section when compared to [RFC5216]. + + As defined in TLS 1.3 [RFC8446], EAP-TLS servers can send a + HelloRetryRequest message in response to a ClientHello if the EAP-TLS + server finds an acceptable set of parameters but the initial + ClientHello does not contain all the needed information to continue + the handshake. One use case is if the EAP-TLS server does not + support the groups in the "key_share" extension (or there is no + "key_share" extension) but supports one of the groups in the + "supported_groups" extension. In this case, the client should send a + new ClientHello with a "key_share" that the EAP-TLS server supports. + + Figure 8 shows an example message flow for a successful EAP-TLS full + handshake with mutual authentication and HelloRetryRequest. Note the + extra round trip as a result of the HelloRetryRequest. + + EAP-TLS Peer EAP-TLS Server + + EAP-Request/ + <-------- Identity + EAP-Response/ + Identity (Privacy-Friendly) --------> + EAP-Request/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + <-------- (TLS Start) + EAP-Response/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + (TLS ClientHello) --------> + EAP-Request/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + (TLS HelloRetryRequest) + <-------- + EAP-Response/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + (TLS ClientHello) --------> + EAP-Request/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + (TLS ServerHello, + TLS EncryptedExtensions, + TLS CertificateRequest, + TLS Certificate, + TLS CertificateVerify, + TLS Finished) + EAP-Response/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + (TLS Certificate, + TLS CertificateVerify, + TLS Finished) --------> + EAP-Request/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS + <-------- (TLS Application Data 0x00) + EAP-Response/ + EAP-Type=EAP-TLS --------> + <-------- EAP-Success + + Figure 8: EAP-TLS with Hello Retry Request + +2.1.7. Identity + + This is a new section when compared to [RFC5216]. + + It is RECOMMENDED to use anonymous NAIs [RFC7542] in the Identity + Response as such identities are routable and privacy-friendly. While + opaque blobs are allowed by [RFC3748], such identities are NOT + RECOMMENDED as they are not routable and should only be considered in + local deployments where the EAP-TLS peer, EAP authenticator, and EAP- + TLS server all belong to the same network. Many client certificates + contain an identity such as an email address, which is already in NAI + format. When the client certificate contains an NAI as subject name + or alternative subject name, an anonymous NAI SHOULD be derived from + the NAI in the certificate; see Section 2.1.8. More details on + identities are described in Sections 2.1.3, 2.1.8, 2.2, and 5.8. + +2.1.8. Privacy + + This section updates Section 2.1.4 of [RFC5216] by amending it in + accordance with the following discussion. + + EAP-TLS 1.3 significantly improves privacy when compared to earlier + versions of EAP-TLS. EAP-TLS 1.3 forbids cipher suites without + confidentiality, which means that TLS 1.3 is always encrypting large + parts of the TLS handshake including the certificate messages. + + EAP-TLS peer and server implementations supporting TLS 1.3 MUST + support anonymous Network Access Identifiers (NAIs) (Section 2.4 of + [RFC7542]). A client supporting TLS 1.3 MUST NOT send its username + (or any other permanent identifiers) in cleartext in the Identity + Response (or any message used instead of the Identity Response). + Following [RFC7542], it is RECOMMENDED to omit the username (i.e., + the NAI is @realm), but other constructions such as a fixed username + (e.g., anonymous@realm) or an encrypted username (e.g., + xCZINCPTK5+7y81CrSYbPg+RKPE3OTrYLn4AQc4AC2U=@realm) are allowed. + Note that the NAI MUST be a UTF-8 string as defined by the grammar in + Section 2.2 of [RFC7542]. + + The HelloRequest message used for privacy in EAP-TLS 1.2 does not + exist in TLS 1.3 but as the certificate messages in TLS 1.3 are + encrypted, there is no need to send an empty certificate_list and + perform a second handshake for privacy (as needed by EAP-TLS with + earlier versions of TLS). When EAP-TLS is used with TLS version 1.3, + the EAP-TLS peer and EAP-TLS server SHALL follow the processing + specified by version 1.3 of TLS. This means that the EAP-TLS peer + only sends an empty certificate_list if it does not have an + appropriate certificate to send, and the EAP-TLS server MAY treat an + empty certificate_list as a terminal condition. + + EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 is always used with privacy. This does not add + any extra round trips and the message flow with privacy is just the + normal message flow as shown in Figure 1. + +2.1.9. Fragmentation + + This section updates Section 2.1.5 of [RFC5216] by amending it in + accordance with the following discussion. + + Including ContentType (1 byte), ProtocolVersion (2 bytes), and length + (2 bytes) headers, a single TLS record may be up to 16645 octets in + length. EAP-TLS fragmentation support is provided through addition + of a flags octet within the EAP-Response and EAP-Request packets, as + well as a (conditional) TLS Message Length field of four octets. + Implementations MUST NOT set the L bit in unfragmented messages, but + they MUST accept unfragmented messages with and without the L bit + set. + + Some EAP implementations and access networks may limit the number of + EAP packet exchanges that can be handled. To avoid fragmentation, it + is RECOMMENDED to keep the sizes of EAP-TLS peer, EAP-TLS server, and + trust anchor certificates small and the length of the certificate + chains short. In addition, it is RECOMMENDED to use mechanisms that + reduce the sizes of Certificate messages. For a detailed discussion + on reducing message sizes to prevent fragmentation, see [RFC9191]. + +2.2. Identity Verification + + This section replaces Section 2.2 of [RFC5216] with the following + discussion. The guidance in this section is relevant for EAP-TLS in + general (regardless of the underlying TLS version used). + + The EAP peer identity provided in the EAP-Response/Identity is not + authenticated by EAP-TLS. Unauthenticated information MUST NOT be + used for accounting purposes or to give authorization. The + authenticator and the EAP-TLS server MAY examine the identity + presented in EAP-Response/Identity for purposes such as routing and + EAP method selection. EAP-TLS servers MAY reject conversations if + the identity does not match their policy. Note that this also + applies to resumption; see Sections 2.1.3, 5.6, and 5.7. + + The EAP server identity in the TLS server certificate is typically a + fully qualified domain name (FQDN) in the SubjectAltName (SAN) + extension. Since EAP-TLS deployments may use more than one EAP + server, each with a different certificate, EAP peer implementations + SHOULD allow for the configuration of one or more trusted root + certificates (CA certificate) to authenticate the server certificate + and one or more server names to match against the SubjectAltName + (SAN) extension in the server certificate. If any of the configured + names match any of the names in the SAN extension, then the name + check passes. To simplify name matching, an EAP-TLS deployment can + assign a name to represent an authorized EAP server and EAP Server + certificates can include this name in the list of SANs for each + certificate that represents an EAP-TLS server. If server name + matching is not used, then it degrades the confidence that the EAP + server with which it is interacting is authoritative for the given + network. If name matching is not used with a public root CA, then + effectively any server can obtain a certificate that will be trusted + for EAP authentication by the peer. While this guidance to verify + domain names is new, and was not mentioned in [RFC5216], it has been + widely implemented in EAP-TLS peers. As such, it is believed that + this section contains minimal new interoperability or implementation + requirements on EAP-TLS peers and can be applied to earlier versions + of TLS. + + The process of configuring a root CA certificate and a server name is + non-trivial; therefore, automated methods of provisioning are + RECOMMENDED. For example, the eduroam federation [RFC7593] provides + a Configuration Assistant Tool (CAT) to automate the configuration + process. In the absence of a trusted root CA certificate (user + configured or system-wide), EAP peers MAY implement a trust on first + use (TOFU) mechanism where the peer trusts and stores the server + certificate during the first connection attempt. The EAP peer + ensures that the server presents the same stored certificate on + subsequent interactions. Use of a TOFU mechanism does not allow for + the server certificate to change without out-of-band validation of + the certificate and is therefore not suitable for many deployments + including ones where multiple EAP servers are deployed for high + availability. TOFU mechanisms increase the susceptibility to traffic + interception attacks and should only be used if there are adequate + controls in place to mitigate this risk. + +2.3. Key Hierarchy + + This section updates Section 2.3 of [RFC5216] by replacing it in + accordance with the following discussion. + + TLS 1.3 replaces the TLS pseudorandom function (PRF) used in earlier + versions of TLS with the HMAC-based Key Derivation Function (HKDF) + and completely changes the key schedule. The key hierarchies shown + in Section 2.3 of [RFC5216] are therefore not correct when EAP-TLS is + used with TLS version 1.3. For TLS 1.3 the key schedule is described + in Section 7.1 of [RFC8446]. + + When EAP-TLS is used with TLS version 1.3, the Key_Material and + Method-Id SHALL be derived from the exporter_secret using the TLS + exporter interface [RFC5705] (for TLS 1.3, this is defined in + Section 7.5 of [RFC8446]). Type is the value of the EAP Type field + defined in Section 2 of [RFC3748]. For EAP-TLS, the Type field has + value 0x0D. + + Type = 0x0D + Key_Material = TLS-Exporter("EXPORTER_EAP_TLS_Key_Material", + Type, 128) + Method-Id = TLS-Exporter("EXPORTER_EAP_TLS_Method-Id", + Type, 64) + Session-Id = Type || Method-Id + + The MSK and EMSK are derived from the Key_Material in the same manner + as with EAP-TLS [RFC5216], Section 2.3. The definitions are repeated + below for simplicity: + + MSK = Key_Material(0, 63) + EMSK = Key_Material(64, 127) + + Other TLS-based EAP methods can use the TLS exporter in a similar + fashion; see [TLS-EAP-TYPES]. + + [RFC5247] deprecates the use of an Initialization Vector (IV). Thus, + RECV-IV and SEND-IV are not exported in EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3. As + noted in [RFC5247], lower layers use the MSK in a lower-layer- + dependent manner. EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 exports the MSK and does not + specify how it is used by lower layers. + + Note that the key derivation MUST use the length values given above. + While in TLS 1.2 and earlier it was possible to truncate the output + by requesting less data from the TLS-Exporter function, this practice + is not possible with TLS 1.3. If an implementation intends to use + only a part of the output of the TLS-Exporter function, then it MUST + ask for the full output and then only use the desired part. Failure + to do so will result in incorrect values being calculated for the + above keying material. + + By using the TLS exporter, EAP-TLS can use any TLS 1.3 implementation + that provides a public API for the exporter. Note that when TLS 1.2 + is used with the EAP-TLS exporter [RFC5705] it generates the same key + material as in EAP-TLS [RFC5216]. + +2.4. Parameter Negotiation and Compliance Requirements + + This section updates Section 2.4 of [RFC5216] by amending it in + accordance with the following discussion. + + TLS 1.3 cipher suites are defined differently than in earlier + versions of TLS (see Appendix B.4 of [RFC8446]), and the cipher + suites discussed in Section 2.4 of [RFC5216] can therefore not be + used when EAP-TLS is used with TLS version 1.3. + + When EAP-TLS is used with TLS version 1.3, the EAP-TLS peers and EAP- + TLS servers MUST comply with the compliance requirements (mandatory- + to-implement cipher suites, signature algorithms, key exchange + algorithms, extensions, etc.) defined in Section 9 of [RFC8446]. In + EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3, only cipher suites with confidentiality SHALL + be supported. + + While EAP-TLS does not protect any application data except for the + 0x00 byte that serves as protected success indication, the negotiated + cipher suites and algorithms MAY be used to secure data as done in + other TLS-based EAP methods. + +2.5. EAP State Machines + + This is a new section when compared to [RFC5216] and only applies to + TLS 1.3. [RFC4137] offers a proposed state machine for EAP. + + TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] introduces post-handshake messages. These post- + handshake messages use the handshake content type and can be sent + after the main handshake. Examples of post-handshake messages are + NewSessionTicket, which is used for resumption and KeyUpdate, which + is not useful and not expected in EAP-TLS. After sending TLS + Finished, the EAP-TLS server may send any number of post-handshake + messages in one or more EAP-Requests. + + To provide a protected success result indication and to decrease the + uncertainty for the EAP-TLS peer, the following procedure MUST be + followed: + + When an EAP-TLS server has successfully processed the TLS client + Finished and sent its last handshake message (Finished or a post- + handshake message), it sends an encrypted TLS record with application + data 0x00. The encrypted TLS record with application data 0x00 is a + protected success result indication, as defined in [RFC3748]. After + sending an EAP-Request that contains the protected success result + indication, the EAP-TLS server must not send any more EAP-Requests + and may only send an EAP-Success. The EAP-TLS server MUST NOT send + an encrypted TLS record with application data 0x00 before it has + successfully processed the client Finished and sent its last + handshake message. + + TLS Error alerts SHOULD be considered a failure result indication, as + defined in [RFC3748]. Implementations following [RFC4137] set the + alternate indication of failure variable altReject after sending or + receiving an error alert. After sending or receiving a TLS Error + alert, the EAP-TLS server may only send an EAP-Failure. Protected + TLS Error alerts are protected failure result indications, and + unprotected TLS Error alerts are not. + + The keying material can be derived after the TLS server Finished has + been sent or received. Implementations following [RFC4137] can then + set the eapKeyData and aaaEapKeyData variables. + + The keying material can be made available to lower layers and the + authenticator after the authenticated success result indication has + been sent or received. Implementations following [RFC4137] can set + the eapKeyAvailable and aaaEapKeyAvailable variables. + +3. Detailed Description of the EAP-TLS Protocol + + There are no updates to Section 3 of [RFC5216]. + +4. IANA Considerations + + This section provides guidance to the Internet Assigned Numbers + Authority (IANA) regarding registration of values related to EAP-TLS + 1.3 in accordance with [RFC8126]. + + Per this document, IANA has added the following labels to the "TLS + Exporter Labels" registry defined by [RFC5705]. These labels are + used in derivation of Key_Material and Method-Id as defined in + Section 2.3: + + +===============================+=========+=============+======+ + | Value | DTLS-OK | Recommended | Note | + +===============================+=========+=============+======+ + | EXPORTER_EAP_TLS_Key_Material | N | Y | | + +-------------------------------+---------+-------------+------+ + | EXPORTER_EAP_TLS_Method-Id | N | Y | | + +-------------------------------+---------+-------------+------+ + + Table 1: TLS Exporter Labels + +5. Security Considerations + + The security considerations of TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] apply to EAP-TLS + 1.3. + +5.1. Security Claims + + Using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 does not change the security claims for + EAP-TLS as given in Section 5.1 of [RFC5216]. However, it + strengthens several of the claims as described in the following + updates to the notes given in Section 5.1 of [RFC5216]. + + [1] Mutual authentication: By mandating revocation checking of + certificates, the authentication in EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 is + stronger as authentication with revoked certificates will always + fail. + + [2] Confidentiality: The TLS 1.3 handshake offers much better + confidentiality than earlier versions of TLS. EAP-TLS with TLS + 1.3 mandates use of cipher suites that ensure confidentiality. + TLS 1.3 also encrypts certificates and some of the extensions. + When using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3, the use of privacy is mandatory + and does not cause any additional round trips. + + [3] Cryptographic strength: TLS 1.3 only defines strong algorithms + without major weaknesses and EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 always provides + forward secrecy; see [RFC8446]. Weak algorithms such as 3DES, + CBC mode, RC4, SHA-1, MD5, P-192, and RSA-1024 have not been + registered for use in TLS 1.3. + + [4] Cryptographic negotiation: The TLS layer handles the negotiation + of cryptographic parameters. When EAP-TLS is used with TLS 1.3, + EAP-TLS inherits the cryptographic negotiation of the AEAD + algorithm, HKDF hash algorithm, key exchange groups, and + signature algorithm; see Section 4.1.1 of [RFC8446]. + +5.2. Peer and Server Identities + + No updates to Section 5.2 of [RFC5216]. Note that Section 2.2 has + additional discussion on identities. + +5.3. Certificate Validation + + No updates to Section 5.3 of [RFC5216]. In addition to Section 5.3 + of [RFC5216], guidance on server certificate validation can be found + in [RFC6125]. + +5.4. Certificate Revocation + + This section updates Section 5.4 of [RFC5216] by amending it in + accordance with the following discussion. + + There are a number of reasons (e.g., key compromise, CA compromise, + privilege withdrawn, etc.) why EAP-TLS peer, EAP-TLS server, or sub- + CA certificates have to be revoked before their expiry date. + Revocation of the EAP-TLS server's certificate is complicated by the + fact that the EAP-TLS peer may not have Internet connectivity until + authentication completes. + + When EAP-TLS is used with TLS 1.3, the revocation status of all the + certificates in the certificate chains MUST be checked (except the + trust anchor). An implementation may use the Certificate Revocation + List (CRL), Online Certificate Status Protocol (OSCP), or other + standardized/proprietary methods for revocation checking. Examples + of proprietary methods are non-standard formats for distribution of + revocation lists as well as certificates with very short lifetime. + + EAP-TLS servers supporting TLS 1.3 MUST implement Certificate Status + Requests (OCSP stapling) as specified in [RFC6066] and + Section 4.4.2.1 of [RFC8446]. It is RECOMMENDED that EAP-TLS peers + and EAP-TLS servers use OCSP stapling for verifying the status of the + EAP-TLS server's certificate chain. When an EAP-TLS peer uses + Certificate Status Requests to check the revocation status of the + EAP-TLS server's certificate chain, it MUST treat a CertificateEntry + (but not the trust anchor) without a valid CertificateStatus + extension as invalid and abort the handshake with an appropriate + alert. The OCSP status handling in TLS 1.3 is different from earlier + versions of TLS; see Section 4.4.2.1 of [RFC8446]. In TLS 1.3, the + OCSP information is carried in the CertificateEntry containing the + associated certificate instead of a separate CertificateStatus + message as in [RFC6066]. This enables sending OCSP information for + all certificates in the certificate chain (except the trust anchor). + + To enable revocation checking in situations where EAP-TLS peers do + not implement or use OCSP stapling, and where network connectivity is + not available prior to authentication completion, EAP-TLS peer + implementations MUST also support checking for certificate revocation + after authentication completes and network connectivity is available. + An EAP peer implementation SHOULD NOT trust the network (and any + services) until it has verified the revocation status of the server + certificate after receiving network connectivity. An EAP peer MUST + use a secure transport to verify the revocation status of the server + certificate. An EAP peer SHOULD NOT send any other traffic before + revocation checking for the server certificate is complete. + +5.5. Packet Modification Attacks + + This section updates Section 5.5 of [RFC5216] by amending it in + accordance with the following discussion. + + As described in [RFC3748] and Section 5.5 of [RFC5216], the only + information that is integrity and replay protected in EAP-TLS are the + parts of the TLS Data that TLS protects. All other information in + the EAP-TLS message exchange including EAP-Request and EAP-Response + headers, the identity in the Identity Response, EAP-TLS packet header + fields, Type, Flags, EAP-Success, and EAP-Failure can be modified, + spoofed, or replayed. + + Protected TLS Error alerts are protected failure result indications + and enable the EAP-TLS peer and EAP-TLS server to determine that the + failure result was not spoofed by an attacker. Protected failure + result indications provide integrity and replay protection but MAY be + unauthenticated. Protected failure results do not significantly + improve availability as TLS 1.3 treats most malformed data as a fatal + error. + +5.6. Authorization + + This is a new section when compared to [RFC5216]. The guidance in + this section is relevant for EAP-TLS in general (regardless of the + underlying TLS version used). + + EAP servers will usually require the EAP peer to provide a valid + certificate and will fail the connection if one is not provided. + Some deployments may permit no peer authentication for some or all + connections. When peer authentication is not used, EAP-TLS server + implementations MUST take care to limit network access appropriately + for unauthenticated peers, and implementations MUST use resumption + with caution to ensure that a resumed session is not granted more + privilege than was intended for the original session. An example of + limiting network access would be to invoke a vendor's walled garden + or quarantine network functionality. + + EAP-TLS is typically encapsulated in other protocols such as PPP + [RFC1661], RADIUS [RFC2865], Diameter [RFC6733], or the Protocol for + Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA) [RFC5191]. The + encapsulating protocols can also provide additional, non-EAP + information to an EAP-TLS server. This information can include, but + is not limited to, information about the authenticator, information + about the EAP-TLS peer, or information about the protocol layers + above or below EAP (MAC addresses, IP addresses, port numbers, Wi-Fi + Service Set Identifiers (SSIDs), etc.). EAP-TLS servers implementing + EAP-TLS inside those protocols can make policy decisions and enforce + authorization based on a combination of information from the EAP-TLS + exchange and non-EAP information. + + As noted in Section 2.2, the identity presented in EAP-Response/ + Identity is not authenticated by EAP-TLS and is therefore trivial for + an attacker to forge, modify, or replay. Authorization and + accounting MUST be based on authenticated information such as + information in the certificate or the PSK identity and cached data + provisioned for resumption as described in Section 5.7. Note that + the requirements for Network Access Identifiers (NAIs) specified in + Section 4 of [RFC7542] still apply and MUST be followed. + + EAP-TLS servers MAY reject conversations based on non-EAP information + provided by the encapsulating protocol, for example if the MAC + address of the authenticator does not match the expected policy. + + In addition to allowing configuration of one or more trusted root + certificates (CA certificate) to authenticate the server certificate + and one or more server names to match against the SubjectAltName + (SAN) extension, EAP peer implementations MAY allow binding the + configured acceptable SAN to a specific CA (or CAs) that should have + issued the server certificate to prevent attacks from rogue or + compromised CAs. + +5.7. Resumption + + This is a new section when compared to [RFC5216]. The guidance in + this section is relevant for EAP-TLS in general (regardless of the + underlying TLS version used). + + There are a number of security issues related to resumption that are + not described in [RFC5216]. The problems, guidelines, and + requirements in this section therefore apply to EAP-TLS when it is + used with any version of TLS. + + When resumption occurs, it is based on cached information at the TLS + layer. To perform resumption securely, the EAP-TLS peer and EAP-TLS + server need to be able to securely retrieve authorization information + such as certificate chains from the initial full handshake. This + document uses the term "cached data" to describe such information. + Authorization during resumption MUST be based on such cached data. + The EAP-TLS peer and EAP-TLS server MAY perform fresh revocation + checks on the cached certificate data. Any security policies for + authorization MUST be followed also for resumption. The certificates + may have been revoked since the initial full handshake and the + authorizations of the other party may have been reduced. If the + cached revocation data is not sufficiently current, the EAP-TLS peer + or EAP-TLS server MAY force a full TLS handshake. + + There are two ways to retrieve the cached data from the original full + handshake. The first method is that the EAP-TLS server and client + cache the information locally. The cached information is identified + by an identifier. For TLS versions before 1.3, the identifier can be + the session ID; for TLS 1.3, the identifier is the PSK identity. The + second method for retrieving cached information is via [RFC5077] or + [RFC8446], where the EAP-TLS server avoids storing information + locally and instead encapsulates the information into a ticket that + is sent to the client for storage. This ticket is encrypted using a + key that only the EAP-TLS server knows. Note that the client still + needs to cache the original handshake information locally and will + obtain it while determining the session ID or PSK identity to use for + resumption. However, the EAP-TLS server is able to decrypt the + ticket or PSK to obtain the original handshake information. + + The EAP-TLS server or EAP client MUST cache data during the initial + full handshake sufficient to allow authorization decisions to be made + during resumption. If cached data cannot be retrieved securely, + resumption MUST NOT be done. + + The above requirements also apply if the EAP-TLS server expects some + system to perform accounting for the session. Since accounting must + be tied to an authenticated identity, and resumption does not supply + such an identity, accounting is impossible without access to cached + data. Therefore, systems that expect to perform accounting for the + session SHOULD cache an identifier that can be used in subsequent + accounting. + + As suggested in [RFC8446], EAP-TLS peers MUST NOT store resumption + PSKs or tickets (and associated cached data) for longer than 604800 + seconds (7 days) regardless of the PSK or ticket lifetime. The EAP- + TLS peer MAY delete them earlier based on local policy. The cached + data MAY also be removed on the EAP-TLS server or EAP-TLS peer if any + certificate in the certificate chain has been revoked or has expired. + In all such cases, an attempt at resumption results in a full TLS + handshake instead. + + Information from the EAP-TLS exchange (e.g., the identity provided in + EAP-Response/Identity) as well as non-EAP information (e.g., IP + addresses) may change between the initial full handshake and + resumption. This change creates a "time-of-check time-of-use" + (TOCTOU) security vulnerability. A malicious or compromised user + could supply one set of data during the initial authentication, and a + different set of data during resumption, potentially allowing them to + obtain access that they should not have. + + If any authorization, accounting, or policy decisions were made with + information that has changed between the initial full handshake and + resumption, and if change may lead to a different decision, such + decisions MUST be reevaluated. It is RECOMMENDED that authorization, + accounting, and policy decisions are reevaluated based on the + information given in the resumption. EAP-TLS servers MAY reject + resumption where the information supplied during resumption does not + match the information supplied during the original authentication. + If a safe decision is not possible, EAP-TLS servers SHOULD reject the + resumption and continue with a full handshake. + + Sections 2.2 and 4.2.11 of [RFC8446] provide security considerations + for TLS 1.3 resumption. + +5.8. Privacy Considerations + + This is a new section when compared to [RFC5216]. + + TLS 1.3 offers much better privacy than earlier versions of TLS as + discussed in Section 2.1.8. In this section, we only discuss the + privacy properties of EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3. For privacy properties + of TLS 1.3 itself, see [RFC8446]. + + EAP-TLS sends the standard TLS 1.3 handshake messages encapsulated in + EAP packets. Additionally, the EAP-TLS peer sends an identity in the + first EAP-Response. The other fields in the EAP-TLS Request and the + EAP-TLS Response packets do not contain any cleartext privacy- + sensitive information. + + Tracking of users by eavesdropping on Identity Responses or + certificates is a well-known problem in many EAP methods. When EAP- + TLS is used with TLS 1.3, all certificates are encrypted, and the + username part of the Identity Response is not revealed (e.g., using + anonymous NAIs). Note that even though all certificates are + encrypted, the server's identity is only protected against passive + attackers while the client's identity is protected against both + passive and active attackers. As with other EAP methods, even when + privacy-friendly identifiers or EAP tunneling is used, the domain + name (i.e., the realm) in the NAI is still typically visible. How + much privacy-sensitive information the domain name leaks is highly + dependent on how many other users are using the same domain name in + the particular access network. If all EAP-TLS peers have the same + domain, no additional information is leaked. If a domain name is + used by a small subset of the EAP-TLS peers, it may aid an attacker + in tracking or identifying the user. + + Without padding, information about the size of the client certificate + is leaked from the size of the EAP-TLS packets. The EAP-TLS packets + sizes may therefore leak information that can be used to track or + identify the user. If all client certificates have the same length, + no information is leaked. EAP-TLS peers SHOULD use record padding; + see Section 5.4 of [RFC8446] to reduce information leakage of + certificate sizes. + + If anonymous NAIs are not used, the privacy-friendly identifiers need + to be generated with care. The identities MUST be generated in a + cryptographically secure way so that it is computationally infeasible + for an attacker to differentiate two identities belonging to the same + user from two identities belonging to different users in the same + realm. This can be achieved, for instance, by using random or + pseudo-random usernames such as random byte strings or ciphertexts + and only using the pseudo-random usernames a single time. Note that + the privacy-friendly usernames also MUST NOT include substrings that + can be used to relate the identity to a specific user. Similarly, + privacy-friendly usernames MUST NOT be formed by a fixed mapping that + stays the same across multiple different authentications. + + An EAP-TLS peer with a policy allowing communication with EAP-TLS + servers supporting only TLS 1.2 without privacy and with a static RSA + key exchange is vulnerable to disclosure of the EAP-TLS peer + username. An active attacker can in this case make the EAP-TLS peer + believe that an EAP-TLS server supporting TLS 1.3 only supports TLS + 1.2 without privacy. The attacker can simply impersonate the EAP-TLS + server and negotiate TLS 1.2 with static RSA key exchange and send a + TLS alert message when the EAP-TLS peer tries to use privacy by + sending an empty certificate message. Since the attacker + (impersonating the EAP-TLS server) does not provide a proof-of- + possession of the private key until the Finished message when a + static RSA key exchange is used, an EAP-TLS peer may inadvertently + disclose its identity (username) to an attacker. Therefore, it is + RECOMMENDED for EAP-TLS peers to not use EAP-TLS with TLS 1.2 and + static RSA-based cipher suites without privacy. This implies that an + EAP-TLS peer SHOULD NOT continue the EAP authentication attempt if a + TLS 1.2 EAP-TLS server sends an EAP-TLS/Request with a TLS alert + message in response to an empty certificate message from the peer. + +5.9. Pervasive Monitoring + + This is a new section when compared to [RFC5216]. + + Pervasive monitoring refers to widespread surveillance of users. In + the context of EAP-TLS, pervasive monitoring attacks can target EAP- + TLS peer devices for tracking them (and their users) when they join a + network. By encrypting more information, mandating the use of + privacy, and always providing forward secrecy, EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 + offers much better protection against pervasive monitoring. In + addition to the privacy attacks discussed above, surveillance on a + large scale may enable tracking of a user over a wide geographical + area and across different access networks. Using information from + EAP-TLS together with information gathered from other protocols + increases the risk of identifying individual users. + + In TLS 1.3, the post-handshake key update mechanism provides forward + secrecy for the traffic secrets. EAP-TLS 1.3 does not provide a + similar mechanism for MSK and EMSK. Implementation using the + exported MSK and EMSK can achieve forward secrecy by frequently + deriving new keys in a similar way as described in Section 7.2 of + [RFC8446]. + +5.10. Discovered Vulnerabilities + + This is a new section when compared to [RFC5216]. + + Over the years, there have been several serious attacks on earlier + versions of Transport Layer Security (TLS), including attacks on its + most commonly used ciphers and modes of operation. [RFC7457] + summarizes the attacks that were known at the time of publishing, and + BCP 195 [RFC7525] [RFC8996] provides recommendations and requirements + for improving the security of deployed services that use TLS. + However, many of the attacks are less serious for EAP-TLS as EAP-TLS + only uses the TLS handshake and does not protect any application + data. EAP-TLS implementations MUST mitigate known attacks. EAP-TLS + implementations need to monitor and follow new EAP- and TLS-related + security guidance and requirements such as [RFC8447] and [RFC9155]. + +5.11. Cross-Protocol Attacks + + This is a new section when compared to [RFC5216]. + + Allowing the same certificate to be used in multiple protocols can + potentially allow an attacker to authenticate via one protocol and + then "resume" that session in another protocol. Section 2.2 suggests + that certificates typically have one or more FQDNs in the SAN + extension. However, those fields are for EAP validation only and do + not indicate that the certificates are suitable for use with HTTPS or + other protocols on the named host. + + Section 2.1.3 suggests that authorization rules should be reapplied + on resumption but does not mandate this behavior. As a result, this + cross-protocol resumption could allow the attacker to bypass + authorization policies and to obtain undesired access to secured + systems. Along with making sure that appropriate authorization + information is available and used during resumption, using different + certificates and resumption caches for different protocols is + RECOMMENDED to help keep different protocol usages separate. + +6. References + +6.1. Normative References + + [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, + DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. + + [RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H. + Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol + (EAP)", RFC 3748, DOI 10.17487/RFC3748, June 2004, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3748>. + + [RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS + Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, DOI 10.17487/RFC5216, + March 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5216>. + + [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., + Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key + Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List + (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>. + + [RFC5705] Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport + Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705, + March 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705>. + + [RFC6066] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) + Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066, + DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6066>. + + [RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., + Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key + Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", + RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>. + + [RFC7542] DeKok, A., "The Network Access Identifier", RFC 7542, + DOI 10.17487/RFC7542, May 2015, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7542>. + + [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC + 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, + May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. + + [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol + Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>. + +6.2. Informative references + + [IEEE-802.11] + IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Information technology- + Telecommunications and information exchange between + systems Local and metropolitan area networks-Specific + requirements - Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control + (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications", IEEE + Std. 802.11-2020, DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2016.7786995, + February 2021, + <https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEESTD.2016.7786995>. + + [IEEE-802.1AE] + IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area + networks -- Media Access Control (MAC) Security", IEEE + Std. 802.1AE-2018, DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2018.8585421, + December 2018, + <https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEESTD.2018.8585421>. + + [IEEE-802.1X] + IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area + Networks--Port-Based Network Access Control", IEEE Std. + 802.1X-2020, DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2020.9018454, February + 2020, <https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEESTD.2020.9018454>. + + [MulteFire] + MulteFire Alliance, "MulteFire Release 1.1 Specification", + 2019. + + [PEAP] Microsoft Corporation, "[MS-PEAP]: Protected Extensible + Authentication Protocol (PEAP)", June 2021. + + [RFC1661] Simpson, W., Ed., "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)", + STD 51, RFC 1661, DOI 10.17487/RFC1661, July 1994, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1661>. + + [RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", + RFC 2246, DOI 10.17487/RFC2246, January 1999, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2246>. + + [RFC2560] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C. + Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online + Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560, + DOI 10.17487/RFC2560, June 1999, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2560>. + + [RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson, + "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", + RFC 2865, DOI 10.17487/RFC2865, June 2000, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2865>. + + [RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet + X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and + Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, + DOI 10.17487/RFC3280, April 2002, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3280>. + + [RFC4137] Vollbrecht, J., Eronen, P., Petroni, N., and Y. Ohba, + "State Machines for Extensible Authentication Protocol + (EAP) Peer and Authenticator", RFC 4137, + DOI 10.17487/RFC4137, August 2005, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4137>. + + [RFC4282] Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen, "The + Network Access Identifier", RFC 4282, + DOI 10.17487/RFC4282, December 2005, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4282>. + + [RFC4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security + (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, + DOI 10.17487/RFC4346, April 2006, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4346>. + + [RFC4851] Cam-Winget, N., McGrew, D., Salowey, J., and H. Zhou, "The + Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling Extensible + Authentication Protocol Method (EAP-FAST)", RFC 4851, + DOI 10.17487/RFC4851, May 2007, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4851>. + + [RFC5077] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig, + "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without + Server-Side State", RFC 5077, DOI 10.17487/RFC5077, + January 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5077>. + + [RFC5191] Forsberg, D., Ohba, Y., Ed., Patil, B., Tschofenig, H., + and A. Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for + Network Access (PANA)", RFC 5191, DOI 10.17487/RFC5191, + May 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5191>. + + [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security + (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, + DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>. + + [RFC5247] Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible + Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework", + RFC 5247, DOI 10.17487/RFC5247, August 2008, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5247>. + + [RFC5281] Funk, P. and S. Blake-Wilson, "Extensible Authentication + Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer Security Authenticated + Protocol Version 0 (EAP-TTLSv0)", RFC 5281, + DOI 10.17487/RFC5281, August 2008, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5281>. + + [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and + Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity + within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 + (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer + Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March + 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>. + + [RFC6733] Fajardo, V., Ed., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn, + Ed., "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 6733, + DOI 10.17487/RFC6733, October 2012, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6733>. + + [RFC7170] Zhou, H., Cam-Winget, N., Salowey, J., and S. Hanna, + "Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol (TEAP) Version + 1", RFC 7170, DOI 10.17487/RFC7170, May 2014, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7170>. + + [RFC7406] Schulzrinne, H., McCann, S., Bajko, G., Tschofenig, H., + and D. Kroeselberg, "Extensions to the Emergency Services + Architecture for Dealing With Unauthenticated and + Unauthorized Devices", RFC 7406, DOI 10.17487/RFC7406, + December 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7406>. + + [RFC7457] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, "Summarizing + Known Attacks on Transport Layer Security (TLS) and + Datagram TLS (DTLS)", RFC 7457, DOI 10.17487/RFC7457, + February 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7457>. + + [RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, + "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer + Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security + (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May + 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>. + + [RFC7593] Wierenga, K., Winter, S., and T. Wolniewicz, "The eduroam + Architecture for Network Roaming", RFC 7593, + DOI 10.17487/RFC7593, September 2015, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7593>. + + [RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for + Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, + RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>. + + [RFC8447] Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for TLS + and DTLS", RFC 8447, DOI 10.17487/RFC8447, August 2018, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8447>. + + [RFC8996] Moriarty, K. and S. Farrell, "Deprecating TLS 1.0 and TLS + 1.1", BCP 195, RFC 8996, DOI 10.17487/RFC8996, March 2021, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8996>. + + [RFC9155] Velvindron, L., Moriarty, K., and A. Ghedini, "Deprecating + MD5 and SHA-1 Signature Hashes in TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2", + RFC 9155, DOI 10.17487/RFC9155, December 2021, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9155>. + + [RFC9191] Sethi, M., Preuß Mattsson, J., and S. Turner, "Handling + Large Certificates and Long Certificate Chains in TLS- + Based EAP Methods", RFC 9191, DOI 10.17487/RFC9191, + February 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9191>. + + [TICKET-REQUESTS] + Pauly, T., Schinazi, D., and C. A. Wood, "TLS Ticket + Requests", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf- + tls-ticketrequests-07, 3 December 2020, + <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls- + ticketrequests-07>. + + [TLS-bis] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol + Version 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- + ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-03, 25 October 2021, + <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls- + rfc8446bis-03>. + + [TLS-EAP-TYPES] + DeKok, A., "TLS-based EAP types and TLS 1.3", Work in + Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-emu-tls-eap-types-04, + 21 January 2022, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/ + draft-ietf-emu-tls-eap-types-04>. + + [TS.33.501] + 3GPP, "Security architecture and procedures for 5G + system", Release 17, TS 33.501, January 2022. + +Appendix A. Updated References + + The following references in [RFC5216] are updated as specified below + when EAP-TLS is used with TLS 1.3. + + * All references to [RFC2560] are updated to refer to [RFC6960]. + + * All references to [RFC3280] are updated to refer to [RFC5280]. + References to Section 4.2.1.13 of [RFC3280] are updated to refer + to Section 4.2.1.12 of [RFC5280]. + + * All references to [RFC4282] are updated to refer to [RFC7542]. + References to Section 2.1 of [RFC4282] are updated to refer to + Section 2.2 of [RFC7542]. + +Acknowledgments + + The authors want to thank Bernard Aboba, Jari Arkko, Terry Burton, + Alan DeKok, Ari Keränen, Benjamin Kaduk, Jouni Malinen, Oleg Pekar, + Eric Rescorla, Jim Schaad, Joseph Salowey, Martin Thomson, Vesa + Torvinen, Hannes Tschofenig, and Heikki Vatiainen for comments and + suggestions on this document. Special thanks to the Document + Shepherd Joseph Salowey. + +Contributors + + Alan DeKok, FreeRADIUS + +Authors' Addresses + + John Preuß Mattsson + Ericsson + SE-164 40 Kista + Sweden + + Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com + + + Mohit Sethi + Ericsson + FI-02420 Jorvas + Finland + + Email: mohit@iki.fi |