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diff --git a/doc/rfc/rfc1038.txt b/doc/rfc/rfc1038.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0d6c60c --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/rfc/rfc1038.txt @@ -0,0 +1,395 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group M. St. Johns +Request for Comments: 1038 IETF + January 1988 + + + Draft Revised IP Security Option + + +Status of this Memo + + This RFC is a pre-publication draft of the revised Internet Protocol + Security Option. This draft reflects the version as approved by + the Protocol Standards Steering Group. It is provided for + informational purposes only. The final version of this document will + be available from Navy Publications and should not differ from + this document in any major fashion. + + This document will be published as a change to the MIL-STD 1777, + "Internet Protocol". Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +9.3.13.1 Internet Options Defined. + + The following internet options are defined: + + CLASS NUMBER LENGTH DESCRIPTION + _____ ______ ______ ___________ + + 0 00000 - End of Option list: This option occupies + only 1 octet; it has no length octet. + 0 00001 - No Operation: This option occupies only 1 + octet; it has no length octet. + 0 00010 var. Basic Security: Used to carry security + level and accrediting authority flags. + 0 00011 var. Loose Source Routing: Used to route the + datagram based on information supplied by + the source. + 0 00101 var. Extended Security: Used to carry additional + security information as required by + registered authorities. + 0 01001 var. Strict Source Routing: Used to route the + datagram based on information supplied by + the source. + 0 00111 var. Record Route: Used to trace the route a + datagram takes. + 0 01000 4 Stream ID: Used to carry the stream + identifier. + 2 00100 var. Internet Timestamp: Used to accumulate + timing information in transit. + + + +St. Johns [Page 1] + +RFC 1038 Draft Revised IP Security Option January 1988 + + +9.3.15.3 DoD Basic Security. + + Option type: 130 Option length: variable; minimum length: 4 + + The option identifies the U.S. security level to which the datagram + is to be protected, and the accrediting authorities whose protection + rules apply to each datagram. + + The option is used by accredited trusted components of an internet + to: + + a. Validate the datagram as appropriate for transmission from the + source. + + b. Guarantee that the route taken by the datagram (including the + destination) is protected to the level required by all + indicated accrediting authorities. + + c. Supply common label information required by computer security + models. + + This option must be copied on fragmentation. This option appears + at most once in a datagram. + + The format of this option is as follows: + + + +--------------+-----------+-------------+-------------//----------+ + | 10000010 | XXXXXXXX | SSSSSSSS | AAAAAAA[1] AAAAAAA0 | + | | | | [0] | + +--------------+-----------+-------------+-------------//----------+ + TYPE = 130 LENGTH CLASSIFICATION PROTECTION + VARIABLE PROTECTION AUTHORITY + LEVEL FLAGS + + FIGURE 10-A. SECURITY OPTION FORMAT + +9.3.15.3.1 Length. + + The length of the option is variable. The minimum length option is + 4. + +9.3.15.3.2 Classification Protection Level. + + This field specifies the U.S. classification level to which the + datagram should be protected. The information in the datagram should + be assumed to be at this level until and unless it is regraded in + accordance with the procedures of all indicated protecting + + + +St. Johns [Page 2] + +RFC 1038 Draft Revised IP Security Option January 1988 + + + authorities. This field specifies one of the four U.S. + classification levels, and is encoded as follows: + + 11011110 - Top Secret + 10101101 - Secret + 01111010 - Confidential + 01010101 - Unclassified + +9.3.15.3.3 Protection Authorities Flags. + + This field indicates the National Access Program(s) with accrediting + authority whose rules apply to the protection of the datagram. + + a. Field Length: This field is variable in length. The low- + order bit (Bit 7) of each octet is encoded as "zero" if it is the + final octet in the field, or as "one" if there are additional + octets. Currently, only one octet is needed for this field + (because there are less than seven authorities), and the final bit + of the first octet is coded as "zero". + + b. Source Flags: The first seven bits (Bits 0 through 6) in each + octet are source flags which are each associated with an authority + as indicated below. The bit corresponding to an authority is + "one" if the datagram is to be protected in accordance with the + rules of that authority. + +9.3.15.3.4 Usage Rules. + + Use of the option requires that a host be aware of 1) the + classification level, or levels, at which it is permitted to operate, + and 2) the protection authorities responsible for its certification. + The achievement of this is implementation dependent. Rules for use + of the option for different types of hosts are given below. + +9.3.15.3.4.1 Unclassified Hosts, including gateways. + + a. Output: Unclassified hosts may either use or not use the + option. If it is used, classification level must be unclassified, + bit 0 of the accreditation field (GENSER) must be one, and all + other bits of the accreditation field must be 0. While use of the + option is permitted, it is recommended that unclassified hosts + interested in maximizing interoperability with existing non- + compliant implementations not use the option. + + b. Input: Unclassified hosts should accept for further + processing IP datagrams without the option. If the option is + present on an incoming IP datagram, then the datagram is accepted + for further processing only if the classification level is + + + +St. Johns [Page 3] + +RFC 1038 Draft Revised IP Security Option January 1988 + + + unclassified, bit 0 of the accreditation field (GENSER) is one, + and all other bits of the accreditation field are zero. + Otherwise, the out-of-range procedure is followed. + +9.3.15.3.4.2 Hosts accredited in the Dedicated, System-High, or +Compartmented Modes at a classification level higher than unclassified. + + a. Output. The use of the option is mandatory. The + classification level should be the dedicated level for dedicated + hosts and the system-high level for system-high and compartmented + hosts. The accrediting authority flags should be one for all + authorities which have accredited the hosts, and zero for all + other authorities. + + b. Input. If 1) the option is present, 2) the classification + level matches the host classification level, and 3) the + accrediting authority flags for all accrediting authorities of the + receiving host are one, and all others are zero, the IP datagram + should be accepted for further processing. Otherwise, the out- + of-range procedure is followed. + +9.3.15.3.4.3 Hosts accredited in the Multi-Level or Controlled Mode for +network transmission. + + a. Output. The use of the option is mandatory. The + classification level of an IP datagram should be within the range + of levels for which the host is accredited. The protection + authorities flags should be one for all authorities under whose + rules the datagram should be protected. + + b. Input. In the specific case where a multi-level or controlled + host is accredited to directly interface with an unclassified + environment, the host may accept IP datagrams without a basic + security option. Such datagrams should be assumed to be + implicitly labelled unclassified, GENSER, and should be so + labelled explicitly if they are later output. In all other cases, + the IP datagrams should have the basic security option on input, + and the out-of-range procedure should be followed if it is not. + + There are two cases to be considered where the option is present. + The first case is where the system environment permits the values in + the option to be trusted to be correct for some range of values; the + second is where the values cannot be trusted to be correct. For each + multi-level or controlled host, every input channel for IP datagrams + must be considered and classed appropriately. If a channel does have + a trusted range, then the values of both the classification level and + the protection authorities are checked to insure that they fall + within that range and the range of accredited values for the + + + +St. Johns [Page 4] + +RFC 1038 Draft Revised IP Security Option January 1988 + + + receiving host. If within both ranges, the IP datagram is accepted + for further processing; otherwise the out-of-range procedure is + followed. If the label cannot be trusted, then the receiving host + must possess some accredited means of knowing what the correct + marking should be (e.g., a trusted channel to a system-high host at a + known level). On receipt of an IP datagram, the host compares the + actual values in the option to the correct values. If the values + match, the datagram is accepted for further processing; otherwise, + the out-of-range procedure is followed. + +9.3.15.3.4.4 Out-Of-Range Procedure. + + If an IP datagram is received which does not meet the input + requirements, then: + + a) The data field should be overwritten with ones. + + b) If the problem is a missing required Basic or Extended security + option, an ICMP "parameter problem" message is sent to the + originating host with the code field set to 1 (one) to indicate + "missing required option" and the pointer field set to the option + type of the missing option. Otherwise, an ICMP "parameter + problem" message is sent to the originating host with code field + set to 0 (zero) and with the pointer field pointing to the + position of the out-of-range security option. + + c) If the receiving host has an interface to a local security + officer or equivalent, the problem should be identified across + that interface in an appropriate way. + +9.3.15.3.4.5 Trusted Intermediary Procedure. + + Certain devices in the internet may act as intermediaries to validate + that communications between two hosts are authorized, based on a + combination of knowledge of the hosts and the values in the IP + security option. These devices may receive IP datagrams which are in + range for the intermediate device, but are either not within the + acceptable range for the sender, or for the ultimate receiver. In + the former case, the datagram should be treated as described above + for an out-of-range option. In the latter case, a "destination + unreachable" ICMP message should be sent, with the code value of 10 + (ten), indicating "Communication with Destination Host + Administratively Prohibited". + + + + + + + + +St. Johns [Page 5] + +RFC 1038 Draft Revised IP Security Option January 1988 + + +9.3.15.4 DoD Extended Security Option + + Option type: 133 Option length: variable + + This option permits additional security related information, beyond + that present in the Basic Security Option, to be supplied in an IP + datagram to meet the needs of registered authorities. If this option + is required by an authority for a specific system, it must be + specified explicitly in any Request for Proposal. It is not + otherwise required. This option must be copied on fragmentation. + This option may appear multiple times within a datagram. + + The format for this option is as follows: + + +------------+-------------+-------------+--------//-------+ + | 10000101 | 000LLLLL | AAAAAAAA | add sec info | + +------------+-------------+-------------+--------//-------+ + type = 133 LENGTH = Var. ADDITIONAL ADDITIONAL + SECURITY SECURITY + INFO INFO + AUTHORITY + CODE + + FIGURE 10-B. + +9.3.15.4.1 Additional Security Info Authority Code. + + length = 8 bits + + The values of this field are assigned by DCA Code R130, Washington, + D.C. 20305-2000. Each value corresponds to a requestor who, once + assigned, becomes the authority for the remainder of the option + definition for that value. + +9.3.15.4.2 Additional Security Information. + + length - variable + + This field contains any additional security information as specified + by the authority. + + + + + + + + + + + +St. Johns [Page 6] + +RFC 1038 Draft Revised IP Security Option January 1988 + + + BIT + NUMBER AUTHORITY + + 0 GENSER + + 1 SIOP + + 2 DSCCS-SPINTCOM + + 3 DSCCS-CRITICOM + + 4-7 Unassigned + + AUTHORITY SOURCE OF ANNEX DESCRIBING + CURRENT CODING OF ADDITIONAL + SECURITY INFORMATION + + GENSER + National Access Program, less SIOP Defense Communications + Agency + ATTN: Code R130 + Washington, DC 20305 + + SIOP + National Access Program Department of Defense + Organization of the + Joint Chiefs of Staff + Attn: J6T + Washington, DC + + DSCCS-SPINTCOM + National Access Program Defense Intelligence Agency + Attn: DSE4 + Bolling AFB, MD + + DSCCS-CRITICOM + National Access Program National Security Agency + 9800 Savage Road + Attn: T03 + Ft. Meade, MD 20755-6000 + + + + + + + + + + + +St. Johns [Page 7] +
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