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+Network Working Group                                                IAB
+Request for Comments: 1984                                          IESG
+Category: Informational                                      August 1996
+
+
+  IAB and IESG Statement on Cryptographic Technology and the Internet
+
+Status of This Memo
+
+   This memo provides information for the Internet community.  This memo
+   does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of
+   this memo is unlimited.
+
+Copyright
+
+   (C) Internet Society 1996.  Reproduction or translation of the
+   complete document, but not of extracts, including this notice, is
+   freely permitted.
+
+July 24, 1996
+
+   The Internet Architecture Board (IAB) and the Internet Engineering
+   Steering Group (IESG), the bodies which oversee architecture and
+   standards for the Internet, are concerned by the need for increased
+   protection of international commercial transactions on the Internet,
+   and by the need to offer all Internet users an adequate degree of
+   privacy.
+
+   Security mechanisms being developed in the Internet Engineering Task
+   Force to meet these needs require and depend on the international use
+   of adequate cryptographic technology.  Ready access to such
+   technology is therefore a key factor in the future growth of the
+   Internet as a motor for international commerce and communication.
+
+   The IAB and IESG are therefore disturbed to note that various
+   governments have actual or proposed policies on access to
+   cryptographic technology that either:
+
+   (a) impose restrictions by implementing export controls; and/or
+
+   (b) restrict commercial and private users to weak and inadequate
+       mechanisms such as short cryptographic keys; and/or
+
+   (c) mandate that private decryption keys should be in the hands of
+       the government or of some other third party; and/or
+
+   (d) prohibit the use of cryptology entirely, or permit it only to
+       specially authorized organizations.
+
+
+
+IAB & IESG                   Informational                      [Page 1]
+
+RFC 1984                Cryptographic Technology             August 1996
+
+
+   We believe that such policies are against the interests of consumers
+   and the business community, are largely irrelevant to issues of
+   military security, and provide only a marginal or illusory benefit to
+   law enforcement agencies, as discussed below.
+
+   The IAB and IESG would like to encourage policies that allow ready
+   access to uniform strong cryptographic technology for all Internet
+   users in all countries.
+
+The IAB and IESG claim:
+
+   The Internet is becoming the predominant vehicle for electronic
+   commerce and information exchange. It is essential that the support
+   structure for these activities can be trusted.
+
+   Encryption is not a secret technology monopolized by any one country,
+   such that export controls can hope to contain its deployment. Any
+   hobbyist can program a PC to do powerful encryption. Many algorithms
+   are well documented, some with source code available in textbooks.
+
+   Export controls on encryption place companies in that country at a
+   competitive disadvantage. Their competitors from countries without
+   export restrictions can sell systems whose only design constraint is
+   being secure, and easy to use.
+
+   Usage controls on encryption will also place companies in that
+   country at a competitive disadvantage because these companies cannot
+   securely and easily engage in electronic commerce.
+
+   Escrow mechanisms inevitably weaken the security of the overall
+   cryptographic system, by creating new points of vulnerability that
+   can and will be attacked.
+
+   Export controls and usage controls are slowing the deployment of
+   security at the same time as the Internet is exponentially increasing
+   in size and attackers are increasing in sophistication. This puts
+   users in a dangerous position as they are forced to rely on insecure
+   electronic communication.
+
+TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
+
+KEY SIZE
+
+   It is not acceptable to restrict the use or export of cryptosystems
+   based on their key size.  Systems that are breakable by one country
+   will be breakable by others, possibly unfriendly ones.  Large
+   corporations and even criminal enterprises have the resources to
+   break many cryptosystems.  Furthermore, conversations often need to
+
+
+
+IAB & IESG                   Informational                      [Page 2]
+
+RFC 1984                Cryptographic Technology             August 1996
+
+
+   be protected for years to come; as computers increase in speed, key
+   sizes that were once out of reach of cryptanalysis will become
+   insecure.
+
+PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+   Use of public key cryptography often requires the existence of a
+   "certification authority".  That is, some third party must sign a
+   string containing the user's identity and public key.  In turn, the
+   third party's key is often signed by a higher-level certification
+   authority.
+
+   Such a structure is legitimate and necessary.  Indeed, many
+   governments will and should run their own CAs, if only to protect
+   citizens' transactions with their governments.  But certification
+   authorities should not be confused with escrow centers.  Escrow
+   centers are repositories for private keys, while certification
+   authorities deal with public keys. Indeed, sound cryptographic
+   practice dictates that users never reveal their private keys to
+   anyone, even the certification authority.
+
+KEYS SHOULD NOT BE REVEALABLE
+
+   The security of a modern cryptosystem rests entirely on the secrecy
+   of the keys.  Accordingly, it is a major principle of system design
+   that to the extent possible, secret keys should never leave their
+   user's secure environment.  Key escrow implies that keys must be
+   disclosed in some fashion, a flat-out contradiction of this
+   principle.  Any such disclosure weakens the total security of the
+   system.
+
+DATA RECOVERY
+
+   Sometimes escrow systems are touted as being good for the customer
+   because they allow data recovery in the case of lost keys. However,
+   it should be up to the customer to decide whether they would prefer
+   the more secure system in which lost keys mean lost data, or one in
+   which keys are escrowed to be recovered when necessary.  Similarly,
+   keys used only for conversations (as opposed to file storage) need
+   never be escrowed.  And a system in which the secret key is stored by
+   a government and not by the data owner is certainly not practical for
+   data recovery.
+
+SIGNATURE KEYS
+
+   Keys used for signatures and authentication must never be escrowed.
+   Any third party with access to such keys could impersonate the
+   legitimate owner, creating new opportunities for fraud and deceit.
+
+
+
+IAB & IESG                   Informational                      [Page 3]
+
+RFC 1984                Cryptographic Technology             August 1996
+
+
+   Indeed, a user who wished to repudiate a transaction could claim that
+   his or her escrowed key was used, putting the onus on that party.  If
+   a government escrowed the keys, a defendant could claim that the
+   evidence had been forged by the government, thereby making
+   prosecution much more difficult.  For electronic commerce, non-
+   repudiation is one of the most important uses for cryptography; and
+   non-repudiation depends on the assumption that only the user has
+   access to the private key.
+
+PROTECTION OF THE EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+   In some cases, it is technically feasible to use cryptographic
+   operations that do not involve secrecy.  While this may suffice in
+   some cases, much of the existing technical and commercial
+   infrastructure cannot be protected in this way.  For example,
+   conventional passwords, credit card numbers, and the like must be
+   protected by strong encryption, even though some day more
+   sophisticated techniques may replace them.  Encryption can be added
+   on quite easily; wholesale changes to diverse systems cannot.
+
+CONFLICTING INTERNATIONAL POLICIES
+
+   Conflicting restrictions on encryption often force an international
+   company to use a weak encryption system, in order to satisfy legal
+   requirements in two or more different countries.  Ironically, in such
+   cases either nation might consider the other an adversary against
+   whom commercial enterprises should use strong cryptography.  Clearly,
+   key escrow is not a suitable compromise, since neither country would
+   want to disclose keys to the other.
+
+MULTIPLE ENCRYPTION
+
+   Even if escrowed encryption schemes are used, there is nothing to
+   prevent someone from using another encryption scheme first.
+   Certainly, any serious malefactors would do this; the outer
+   encryption layer, which would use an escrowed scheme, would be used
+   to divert suspicion.
+
+ESCROW OF PRIVATE KEYS WON'T NECESSARILY ALLOW DATA DECRYPTION
+
+   A major threat to users of cryptographic systems is the theft of
+   long-term keys (perhaps by a hacker), either before or after a
+   sensitive conversation.  To counter this threat, schemes with
+   "perfect forward secrecy" are often employed.  If PFS is used, the
+   attacker must be in control of the machine during the actual
+   conversation.  But PFS is generally incompatible with schemes
+   involving escrow of private keys.  (This is an oversimplification,
+   but a full analysis would be too lengthy for this document.)
+
+
+
+IAB & IESG                   Informational                      [Page 4]
+
+RFC 1984                Cryptographic Technology             August 1996
+
+
+CONCLUSIONS
+
+   As more and more companies connect to the Internet, and as more and
+   more commerce takes place there, security is becoming more and more
+   critical.  Cryptography is the most powerful single tool that users
+   can use to secure the Internet. Knowingly making that tool weaker
+   threatens their ability to do so, and has no proven benefit.
+
+Security Considerations
+
+   Security issues are discussed throughout this memo.
+
+Authors' Addresses
+
+   Brian E. Carpenter
+   Chair of the IAB
+   CERN
+   European Laboratory for Particle Physics
+   1211 Geneva 23
+   Switzerland
+
+   Phone: +41 22 767-4967
+   EMail: brian@dxcoms.cern.ch
+
+
+   Fred Baker
+   Chair of the IETF
+   cisco Systems, Inc.
+   519 Lado Drive
+   Santa Barbara, CA 93111
+
+   Phone: +1-805-681-0115
+   EMail: fred@cisco.com
+
+
+   The Internet Society is described at http://www.isoc.org/
+
+   The Internet Architecture Board is described at
+   http://www.iab.org/iab
+
+   The Internet Engineering Task Force and the Internet Engineering
+   Steering Group are described at http://www.ietf.org
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+IAB & IESG                   Informational                      [Page 5]
+