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diff --git a/doc/rfc/rfc2410.txt b/doc/rfc/rfc2410.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dfcad93 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/rfc/rfc2410.txt @@ -0,0 +1,339 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group R. Glenn +Request for Comments: 2410 NIST +Category: Standards Track S. Kent + BBN Corp + November 1998 + + + The NULL Encryption Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec + +Status of this Memo + + This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the + Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for + improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet + Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state + and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved. + +Abstract + + This memo defines the NULL encryption algorithm and its use with the + IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). NULL does nothing to + alter plaintext data. In fact, NULL, by itself, does nothing. NULL + provides the means for ESP to provide authentication and integrity + without confidentiality. + + Further information on the other components necessary for ESP + implementations is provided by [ESP] and [ROAD]. + +1. Introduction + + This memo defines the NULL encryption algorithm and its use with the + IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload [ESP] to provide authentication + and integrity without confidentiality. + + NULL is a block cipher the origins of which appear to be lost in + antiquity. Despite rumors that the National Security Agency + suppressed publication of this algorithm, there is no evidence of + such action on their part. Rather, recent archaeological evidence + suggests that the NULL algorithm was developed in Roman times, as an + exportable alternative to Ceaser ciphers. However, because Roman + numerals lack a symbol for zero, written records of the algorithm's + development were lost to historians for over two millennia. + + + + + +Glenn & Kent Standards Track [Page 1] + +RFC 2410 NULL and IPsec November 1998 + + + [ESP] specifies the use of an optional encryption algorithm to + provide confidentiality and the use of an optional authentication + algorithm to provide authentication and integrity. The NULL + encryption algorithm is a convenient way to represent the option of + not applying encryption. This is referred to as ESP_NULL in [DOI]. + + The IPsec Authentication Header [AH] specification provides a similar + service, by computing authentication data which covers the data + portion of a packet as well as the immutable in transit portions of + the IP header. ESP_NULL does not include the IP header in + calculating the authentication data. This can be useful in providing + IPsec services through non-IP network devices. The discussion on how + ESP_NULL might be used with non-IP network devices is outside the + scope of this document. + + In this memo, NULL is used within the context of ESP. For further + information on how the various pieces of ESP fit together to provide + security services, refer to [ESP] and [ROAD]. + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this + document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119]. + +2. Algorithm Definition + + NULL is defined mathematically by the use of the Identity function I + applied to a block of data b such that: + + NULL(b) = I(b) = b + +2.1 Keying Material + + Like other modern ciphers, e.g., RC5 [RFC-2040], the NULL encryption + algorithm can make use of keys of varying lengths. However, no + measurable increase in security is afforded by the use of longer key + lengths. + +2.2 Cryptographic Synchronization + + Because of the stateless nature of the NULL encryption algorithm, it + is not necessary to transmit an IV or similar cryptographic + synchronization data on a per packet (or even a per SA) basis. The + NULL encryption algorithm combines many of the best features of both + block and stream ciphers, while still not requiring the transmission + of an IV or analogous cryptographic synchronization data. + + + + + + +Glenn & Kent Standards Track [Page 2] + +RFC 2410 NULL and IPsec November 1998 + + +2.3 Padding + + NULL has a block size of 1 byte, thus padding is not necessary. + +2.4. Performance + + The NULL encryption algorithm is significantly faster than other + commonly used symmetric encryption algorithms and implementations of + the base algorithm are available for all commonly used hardware and + OS platforms. + +2.5 Test Vectors + + The following is a set of test vectors to facilitate in the + development of interoperable NULL implementations. + +test_case = 1 +data = 0x123456789abcdef +data_len = 8 +NULL_data = 0x123456789abcdef + +test_case = 2 +data = "Network Security People Have A Strange Sense Of Humor" +data_len = 53 +NULL_data = "Network Security People Have A Strange Sense Of Humor" + +3. ESP_NULL Operational Requirements + + ESP_NULL is defined by using NULL within the context of ESP. This + section further defines ESP_NULL by pointing out particular + operational parameter requirements. + + For purposes of IKE [IKE] key extraction, the key size for this + algorithm MUST be zero (0) bits, to facilitate interoperability and + to avoid any potential export control problems. + + To facilitate interoperability, the IV size for this algorithm MUST + be zero (0) bits. + + Padding MAY be included on outgoing packets as specified in [ESP]. + +4. Security Considerations + + The NULL encryption algorithm offers no confidentiality nor does it + offer any other security service. It is simply a convenient way to + represent the optional use of applying encryption within ESP. ESP + can then be used to provide authentication and integrity without + confidentiality. Unlike AH these services are not applied to any + + + +Glenn & Kent Standards Track [Page 3] + +RFC 2410 NULL and IPsec November 1998 + + + part of the IP header. At the time of this writing there is no + evidence to support that ESP_NULL is any less secure than AH when + using the same authentication algorithm (i.e. a packet secured using + ESP_NULL with some authentication algorithm is as cryptographically + secure as a packet secured using AH with the same authentication + algorithm). + + As stated in [ESP], while the use of encryption algorithms and + authentication algorithms are optional in ESP, it is imperative that + an ESP SA specifies the use of at least one cryptographically strong + encryption algorithm or one cryptographically strong authentication + algorithm or one of each. + + At the time of this writing there are no known laws preventing the + exportation of NULL with a zero (0) bit key length. + +5. Intellectual Property Rights + + Pursuant to the provisions of [RFC-2026], the authors represent that + they have disclosed the existence of any proprietary or intellectual + property rights in the contribution that are reasonably and + personally known to the authors. The authors do not represent that + they personally know of all potentially pertinent proprietary and + intellectual property rights owned or claimed by the organizations + they represent or third parties. + +6. Acknowledgments + + Steve Bellovin suggested and provided the text for the Intellectual + Property Rights section. + + Credit also needs to be given to the participants of the Cisco/ICSA + IPsec & IKE March 1998 Interoperability Workshop since it was there + that the need for this document became apparent. + +7. References + + [ESP] Kent, S., and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security + Payload", RFC 2406, November 1998. + + [AH] Kent, S., and R. Atkinson, "IP Authentication Header", + RFC 2402, November 1998. + + [ROAD] Thayer, R., Doraswamy, N., and R. Glenn, "IP Security + Document Roadmap", RFC 2411, November 1998. + + [DOI] Piper, D., "The Internet IP Security Domain of + Interpretation for ISAKMP", RFC 2408, November 1998. + + + +Glenn & Kent Standards Track [Page 4] + +RFC 2410 NULL and IPsec November 1998 + + + [IKE] Harkins, D., and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange + (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998. + + [RFC-2026] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision + 3", BCP 9, RFC 2026, October 1996. + + [RFC-2040] Baldwin, R., and R. Rivest, "The RC5, RC5-CBC, RC5-CBC- + Pad, and RC5-CTS Algorithms", RFC 2040, October 1996 + + [RFC-2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. + +6. Editors' Addresses + + Rob Glenn + NIST + + EMail: rob.glenn@nist.gov + + + Stephen Kent + BBN Corporation + + EMail: kent@bbn.com + + The IPsec working group can be contacted through the chairs: + + Robert Moskowitz + ICSA + + EMail: rgm@icsa.net + + + Ted T'so + Massachusetts Institute of Technology + + EMail: tytso@mit.edu + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Glenn & Kent Standards Track [Page 5] + +RFC 2410 NULL and IPsec November 1998 + + +7. Full Copyright Statement + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved. + + This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to + others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it + or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published + and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any + kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are + included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this + document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing + the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other + Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of + developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for + copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be + followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than + English. + + The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be + revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. + + This document and the information contained herein is provided on an + "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING + TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING + BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION + HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Glenn & Kent Standards Track [Page 6] + |