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diff --git a/doc/rfc/rfc9399.txt b/doc/rfc/rfc9399.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..89277ec --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/rfc/rfc9399.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2202 @@ + + + + +Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Santesson +Request for Comments: 9399 IDsec Solutions +Obsoletes: 3709, 6170 R. Housley +Category: Standards Track Vigil Security +ISSN: 2070-1721 T. Freeman + Amazon Web Services + L. Rosenthol + Adobe + May 2023 + + + Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Logotypes in X.509 + Certificates + +Abstract + + This document specifies a certificate extension for including + logotypes in public key certificates and attribute certificates. + This document obsoletes RFCs 3709 and 6170. + +Status of This Memo + + This is an Internet Standards Track document. + + This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force + (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has + received public review and has been approved for publication by the + Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on + Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841. + + Information about the current status of this document, any errata, + and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at + https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9399. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the + document authors. All rights reserved. + + This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal + Provisions Relating to IETF Documents + (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of + publication of this document. Please review these documents + carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect + to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must + include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the + Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described + in the Revised BSD License. + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction + 1.1. Certificate-Based Identification + 1.2. Selection of Certificates + 1.3. Combination of Verification Techniques + 1.4. Requirements Language + 2. Different Types of Logotypes in Certificates + 3. Logotype Data + 4. Logotype Certificate Extension + 4.1. Extension Format + 4.2. Conventions for LogotypeImageInfo + 4.3. Embedded Images + 4.4. Other Logotypes + 4.4.1. Loyalty Logotype + 4.4.2. Certificate Background Logotype + 4.4.3. Certificate Image Logotype + 5. Type of Certificates + 6. Use in Clients + 7. Image Formats + 8. Audio Formats + 9. Security Considerations + 10. Privacy Considerations + 11. IANA Considerations + 12. References + 12.1. Normative References + 12.2. Informative References + Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules + A.1. ASN.1 Modules with 1988 Syntax + A.2. ASN.1 Module with 2002 Syntax + Appendix B. Examples + B.1. Example from RFC 3709 + B.2. Issuer Organization Logotype Example + B.3. Embedded Image Example + B.4. Embedded Certificate Image Example + B.5. Full Certificate Example + Appendix C. Changes since RFCs 3709 and 6170 + Acknowledgments + Authors' Addresses + +1. Introduction + + This specification supplements [RFC5280], which profiles public key + certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs) for use in the + Internet, and it supplements [RFC5755], which profiles attribute + certificates for use in the Internet. + + This document obsoletes [RFC3709] and [RFC6170]. Appendix C provides + a summary of the changes since the publication of [RFC3709] and + [RFC6170]. + + The basic function of a certificate is to bind a public key to the + identity of an entity (the subject). From a strictly technical + viewpoint, this goal could be achieved by signing the identity of the + subject together with its public key. However, the art of Public Key + Infrastructure (PKI) has developed certificates far beyond this + functionality in order to meet the needs of modern global networks + and heterogeneous information and operational technology structures. + + Certificate users must be able to determine certificate policies, + appropriate key usage, assurance level, and name form constraints. + Before a relying party can make an informed decision whether a + particular certificate is trustworthy and relevant for its intended + usage, a certificate may be examined from several different + perspectives. + + Systematic processing is necessary to determine whether a particular + certificate meets the predefined prerequisites for an intended usage. + Much of the information contained in certificates is appropriate and + effective for machine processing; however, this information is not + suitable for a corresponding human trust and recognition process. + + Humans prefer to structure information into categories and symbols. + Most humans associate complex structures of reality with easily + recognizable logotypes and marks. Humans tend to trust things that + they recognize from previous experiences. Humans may examine + information to confirm their initial reaction. Very few consumers + actually read all terms and conditions they agree to in accepting a + service; instead, they commonly act on trust derived from previous + experience and recognition. + + A big part of this process is branding. Service providers and + product vendors invest a lot of money and resources into creating a + strong relation between positive user experiences and easily + recognizable trademarks, servicemarks, and logotypes. + + Branding is also pervasive in identification instruments, including + identification cards, passports, driver's licenses, credit cards, + gasoline cards, and loyalty cards. Identification instruments are + intended to identify the holder as a particular person or as a member + of the community. The community may represent the subscribers of a + service or any other group. Identification instruments, in physical + form, commonly use logotypes and symbols, solely to enhance human + recognition and trust in the identification instrument itself. They + may also include a registered trademark to allow legal recourse for + unauthorized duplication. + + Since certificates play an equivalent role in electronic exchanges, + we examine the inclusion of logotypes in certificates. We consider + certificate-based identification and certificate selection. + +1.1. Certificate-Based Identification + + The need for human recognition depends on the manner in which + certificates are used and whether certificates need to be visible to + human users. If certificates are to be used in open environments and + in applications that bring the user in conscious contact with the + result of a certificate-based identification process, then human + recognition is highly relevant and may be a necessity. + + Examples of such applications include: + + * Web server identification where a user identifies the owner of the + website. + + * Peer email exchange in business-to-business (B2B), business-to- + consumer (B2C), and private communications. + + * Exchange of medical records and system for medical prescriptions. + + * Unstructured e-business applications (i.e., non-EDI applications). + + * Wireless client authenticating to a service provider. + + Most applications provide the human user with an opportunity to view + the results of a successful certificate-based identification process. + When the user takes the steps necessary to view these results, the + user is presented with a view of a certificate. This solution has + two major problems. First, the function to view a certificate is + often rather hard to find for a non-technical user. Second, the + presentation of the certificate is too technical and is not user + friendly. It contains no graphic symbols or logotypes to enhance + human recognition. + + Many investigations have shown that users of today's applications do + not take the steps necessary to view certificates. This could be due + to poor user interfaces. Further, many applications are structured + to hide certificates from users. The application designers do not + want to expose certificates to users at all. + +1.2. Selection of Certificates + + One situation where software applications must expose human users to + certificates is when the user must select a single certificate from a + portfolio of certificates. In some cases, the software application + can use information within the certificates to filter the list for + suitability; however, the user must be queried if more than one + certificate is suitable. The human user must select one of them. + + This situation is comparable to a person selecting a suitable plastic + card from their wallet. In this situation, substantial assistance is + provided by card color, location, and branding. + + In order to provide similar support for certificate selection, the + users need tools to easily recognize and distinguish certificates. + Introduction of logotypes into certificates provides the necessary + graphic. + +1.3. Combination of Verification Techniques + + The use of logotypes will, in many cases, affect the user's decision + to trust and use a certificate. It is therefore important that there + be a distinct and clear architectural and functional distinction + between the processes and objectives of the automated certificate + verification and human recognition. + + Since logotypes are only aimed for human interpretation and contain + data that is inappropriate for computer-based verification schemes, + the logotype certificate extension MUST NOT be an active component in + automated certification path validation, as specified in Section 6 of + [RFC5280]. + + Automated certification path verification determines whether the end + entity certificate can be verified according to defined policy. The + algorithm for this verification is specified in [RFC5280]. + + The automated processing provides assurance that the certificate is + valid. It does not indicate whether the subject is entitled to any + particular information or whether the subject ought to be trusted to + perform a particular service. These are authorization decisions. + Automatic processing will make some authorization decisions, but + others, depending on the application context, involve the human user. + + In some situations, where automated procedures have failed to + establish the suitability of the certificate to the task, the human + user is the final arbitrator of the post certificate verification + authorization decisions. In the end, the human will decide whether + or not to accept an executable email attachment, to release personal + information, or to follow the instructions displayed by a web + browser. This decision will often be based on recognition and + previous experience. + + The distinction between systematic processing and human processing is + rather straightforward. They can be complementary. While the + systematic process is focused on certification path construction and + verification, the human acceptance process is focused on recognition + and related previous experience. + + There are some situations where systematic processing and human + processing interfere with each other. These issues are discussed in + the Section 9. + +1.4. Requirements Language + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and + "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP + 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all + capitals, as shown here. + +2. Different Types of Logotypes in Certificates + + This specification defines the inclusion of three standard logotype + types: + + * community logotype + + * issuer organization logotype + + * subject organization logotype + + The community logotype is the general mark for a community. It + identifies a service concept for entity identification and + certificate issuance. Many issuers may use a community logotype to + co-brand with a global community in order to gain global recognition + of its local service provision. This type of community branding is + very common in the credit card business, where local independent card + issuers include a globally recognized brand (such as Visa and + Mastercard). Certificate issuers may include more than one community + logotype to indicate participation in more than one global community. + + The issuer organization logotype is a logotype representing the + organization identified as part of the issuer name in the + certificate. + + The subject organization logotype is a logotype representing the + organization identified in the subject name in the certificate. + + In addition to the standard logotype types, this specification + accommodates inclusion of other logotype types where each class of + logotype is defined by an object identifier. The object identifier + can be either locally defined or an identifier defined in Section 4.4 + of this document. + +3. Logotype Data + + This specification defines two types of logotype data: image data and + audio data. Implementations MUST support image data; however, + support for audio data is OPTIONAL. + + Image and audio data for logotypes can be provided by reference by + including a URI that identifies the location to the logotype data and + a one-way hash of the referenced data in the certificate. The + privacy-related properties for remote logotype data depend on four + parties: the certificate relying parties that use the information in + the certificate extension to fetch the logotype data, the certificate + issuers that populate the certificate extension, certificate + subscribers that request certificates that include the certificate + extension, and server operators that provide the logotype data. + + Alternatively, embedding the logotype data in the certificate with + direct addressing (as defined in Section 4.3) provides improved + privacy properties and depends upon fewer parties. However, this + approach can significantly increase the size of the certificate. + + Several image objects, representing the same visual content in + different formats, sizes, and color palates, may represent each + logotype image. At least one of the image objects representing a + logotype SHOULD contain an image with a width between 60 pixels and + 200 pixels and a height between 45 pixels and 150 pixels. + + Several instances of audio data may further represent the same audio + sequence in different formats, resolutions, and languages. At least + one of the audio objects representing a logotype SHOULD provide text- + based audio data suitable for processing by text-to-speech software. + + A typical use of text-based audio data is inclusion in web + applications where the audio text is placed as the "alt" attribute + value of an HTML image (img) element, and the language value obtained + from LogotypeAudioInfo is included as the "lang" attribute of that + image. + + If a logotype of a certain type (as defined in Section 2) is + represented by more than one image object, then each image object + MUST contain variants of roughly the same visual content. Likewise, + if a logotype of a certain type is represented by more than one audio + object, then the audio objects MUST contain variants of the same + audio information. A spoken message in different languages is + considered a variation of the same audio information. When more than + one image object or more than one audio object for the same logotype + type is included in the certificate, the certificate issuer is + responsible for ensuring that the objects contain roughly the same + content. Compliant applications MUST NOT display more than one of + the image objects and MUST NOT play more than one of the audio + objects for any logotype type (see Section 2) at the same time. + + A client MAY simultaneously display multiple logotypes of different + logotype types. For example, it may display one subject organization + logotype while also displaying a community logotype, but it MUST NOT + display multiple image variants of the same community logotype. + + Each logotype present in a certificate MUST be represented by at + least one image data object. + + Client applications SHOULD enhance processing and off-line + functionality by caching logotype data. + +4. Logotype Certificate Extension + + This section specifies the syntax and semantics of the logotype + certificate extension. + +4.1. Extension Format + + The logotype certificate extension MAY be included in public key + certificates [RFC5280] or attribute certificates [RFC5755]. The + logotype certificate extension MUST be identified by the following + object identifier: + + id-pe-logotype OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= + { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) + security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-pe(1) 12 } + + This extension MUST NOT be marked critical. + + Logotype data may be referenced through either direct or indirect + addressing. Client applications SHOULD support both direct and + indirect addressing. Certificate issuing applications MUST support + direct addressing, and certificate issuing applications SHOULD + support indirect addressing. + + The direct addressing includes information about each logotype in the + certificate, and URIs point to the image and audio data object. + Multiple URIs MAY be included for locations for obtaining the same + logotype object. Multiple hash values MAY be included, each computed + with a different one-way hash function. Direct addressing supports + cases where just one or a few alternative images and audio objects + are referenced. + + The indirect addressing includes one or more references to an + external hashed data structure that contains information on the type, + content, and location of each image and audio object. Indirect + addressing supports cases where each logotype is represented by many + alternative audio or image objects. + + Both direct and indirect addressing accommodate alternative URIs to + obtain exactly the same logotype data. This opportunity for + replication is intended to improve availability. Therefore, if a + client is unable to fetch the item from one URI, the client SHOULD + try another URI in the sequence. All direct addressing URIs SHOULD + use the HTTPS scheme (https://...), the HTTP scheme (http://...), or + the DATA scheme (data://...) [RFC3986]. However, the "data" URI + scheme MUST NOT be used with the indirect addressing. Clients MUST + support retrieval of the referenced LogotypeData with HTTP [RFC9110], + HTTP with TLS [RFC8446], or subsequent versions of these protocols. + Client applications SHOULD also support the "data" URI scheme + [RFC2397] for direct addressing with embedded logotype data within + the extension. + + Note that the HTTPS scheme (https://...) requires the validation of + other certificates to establish a secure connection. For this + reason, the HTTP scheme (http://...) may be easier for a client to + handle. Also, the hash of the logotype data provides data integrity. + + The logotype certificate extension MUST have the following syntax: + + LogotypeExtn ::= SEQUENCE { + communityLogos [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF LogotypeInfo OPTIONAL, + issuerLogo [1] EXPLICIT LogotypeInfo OPTIONAL, + subjectLogo [2] EXPLICIT LogotypeInfo OPTIONAL, + otherLogos [3] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF OtherLogotypeInfo + OPTIONAL } + + LogotypeInfo ::= CHOICE { + direct [0] LogotypeData, + indirect [1] LogotypeReference } + + LogotypeData ::= SEQUENCE { + image SEQUENCE OF LogotypeImage OPTIONAL, + audio [1] SEQUENCE OF LogotypeAudio OPTIONAL } + + LogotypeImage ::= SEQUENCE { + imageDetails LogotypeDetails, + imageInfo LogotypeImageInfo OPTIONAL } + + LogotypeAudio ::= SEQUENCE { + audioDetails LogotypeDetails, + audioInfo LogotypeAudioInfo OPTIONAL } + + LogotypeDetails ::= SEQUENCE { + mediaType IA5String, -- Media type name and optional + -- parameters + logotypeHash SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF HashAlgAndValue, + logotypeURI SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF IA5String } + + LogotypeImageInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + type [0] LogotypeImageType DEFAULT color, + fileSize INTEGER, -- In octets, 0=unspecified + xSize INTEGER, -- Horizontal size in pixels + ySize INTEGER, -- Vertical size in pixels + resolution LogotypeImageResolution OPTIONAL, + language [4] IA5String OPTIONAL } -- RFC 5646 Language Tag + + LogotypeImageType ::= INTEGER { grayScale(0), color(1) } + + LogotypeImageResolution ::= CHOICE { + numBits [1] INTEGER, -- Resolution in bits per pixel + tableSize [2] INTEGER } -- Number of colors or grey tones + + LogotypeAudioInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + fileSize INTEGER, -- In octets, 0=unspecified + playTime INTEGER, -- In milliseconds, 0=unspecified + channels INTEGER, -- 0=unspecified, + -- 1=mono, 2=stereo, 4=quad + sampleRate [3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- Samples per second + language [4] IA5String OPTIONAL } -- RFC 5646 Language Tag + + OtherLogotypeInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + logotypeType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + info LogotypeInfo } + + LogotypeReference ::= SEQUENCE { + refStructHash SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF HashAlgAndValue, + refStructURI SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF IA5String } + -- Places to get the same LogotypeData + -- image or audio object + + HashAlgAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { + hashAlg AlgorithmIdentifier, + hashValue OCTET STRING } + + When using indirect addressing, the URI (refStructURI) pointing to + the external data structure MUST point to a resource that contains + the DER-encoded data with the syntax LogotypeData. + + At least one of the optional elements in the LogotypeExtn structure + MUST be present. + + When using direct addressing, at least one of the optional elements + in the LogotypeData structure MUST be present. + + The LogotypeReference and LogotypeDetails structures explicitly + identify one or more one-way hash functions employed to authenticate + referenced image or audio objects. Certification Authorities (CAs) + MUST include a hash value for each referenced object, calculated on + the whole object. CAs MUST use the one-way hash function that is + associated with the certificate signature to compute one hash value, + and CAs MAY include other hash values. Clients MUST compute a one- + way hash value using one of the identified functions, and clients + MUST discard the logotype data if the computed hash value does not + match the hash value in the certificate extension. + + A media type is used to specify the format of the image or audio + object containing the logotype data. The mediaType field MUST + contain a string that is constructed according to the ABNF [RFC5234] + rule for media-type provided in Section 8.3.1 of [RFC9110]. Media + types MAY include parameters. To keep the mediaType field as small + as possible, optional whitespace SHOULD NOT be included. + + Image format requirements are specified in Section 7, and audio + format requirements are specified in Section 8. + + When language is specified, the language tag MUST use the syntax in + [RFC5646]. + + The following logotype types are defined in this specification: + + * community logotype: If communityLogos is present, the logotypes + MUST represent one or more communities with which the certificate + issuer is affiliated. The communityLogos MAY be present in an end + entity certificate, a CA certificate, or an attribute certificate. + The communityLogos contains a sequence of community logotypes, + each representing a different community. If more than one + community logotype is present, they MUST be placed in order of + preferred appearance. Some clients MAY choose to display a subset + of the present community logos; therefore, the placement within + the sequence aids the client selection. The most preferred + logotype MUST be first in the sequence, and the least preferred + logotype MUST be last in the sequence. + + * issuer organization logotype: If issuerLogo is present, the + logotype MUST represent the issuer's organization. The logotype + MUST be consistent with, and require the presence of, an + organization name stored in the organization attribute in the + issuer field (for either a public key certificate or attribute + certificate). The issuerLogo MAY be present in an end entity + certificate, a CA certificate, or an attribute certificate. + + * subject organization logotype: If subjectLogo is present, the + logotype MUST represent the subject's organization. The logotype + MUST be consistent with, and require the presence of, an + organization name stored in the organization attribute in the + subject field (for either a public key certificate or attribute + certificate). The subjectLogo MAY be present in an end entity + certificate, a CA certificate, or an attribute certificate. + + The relationship between the subject organization and the subject + organization logotype, and the relationship between the issuer and + either the issuer organization logotype or the community logotype, + are relationships asserted by the issuer. The policies and practices + employed by the issuer that check subject organization logotypes or + claims about its issuer and community logotypes are outside the scope + of this document. + +4.2. Conventions for LogotypeImageInfo + + When the optional LogotypeImageInfo is included with a logotype + image, the parameters MUST be used with the following semantics and + restrictions. + + The xSize and ySize fields represent the recommended display size for + the logotype image. When a value of 0 (zero) is present, no + recommended display size is specified. When non-zero values are + present and these values differ from corresponding size values in the + referenced image object, then the referenced image SHOULD be scaled + to fit within the size parameters of LogotypeImageInfo while + preserving the x and y ratio. Dithering may produce a more + appropriate image than linear scaling. + + The resolution field is redundant for all logotype image formats + listed in Section 7. The optional resolution field SHOULD be omitted + when the image format already contains this information. + +4.3. Embedded Images + + If the logotype image is provided through direct addressing, then the + image MAY be stored within the logotype certificate extension using + the "data" scheme [RFC2397]. The syntax of the "data" URI scheme is + shown below, which incorporates Errata ID 2045 and uses modern ABNF + [RFC5234]: + + dataurl = "data:" [ media-type ] [ ";base64" ] "," data + data = *(reserved / unreserved / escaped) + reserved = ";" / "/" / "?" / ":" / "@" / "&" / "=" / "+" / + "$" / "," + unreserved = alphanum / mark + alphanum = ALPHA / DIGIT + mark = "-" / "_" / "." / "!" / "~" / "*" / "'" / "(" / ")" + escaped = "%" hex hex + hex = HEXDIG / "a" / "b" / "c" / "d" / "e" / "f" + + where media-type is defined in Section 8.3.1 of [RFC9110] and ALPHA, + DIGIT, and HEXDIG are defined in Appendix B.1 of [RFC5234]. + + When including the image data in the logotype certificate extension + using the "data" URI scheme, the following conventions apply: + + * The value of mediaType in LogotypeDetails MUST be identical to the + media type value in the "data" URL. + + * The hash of the image MUST be included in logotypeHash and MUST be + calculated over the same data as it would have been if the image + had been referenced through a link to an external resource. + + | NOTE: As the "data" URI scheme is processed as a data source + | rather than as a URL, the image data is typically not limited + | by any URL length limit settings that otherwise apply to URLs + | in general. + | + | NOTE: Implementations need to be cautious about the size of + | images included in a certificate in order to ensure that the + | size of the certificate does not prevent the certificate from + | being used as intended. + +4.4. Other Logotypes + + Logotypes identified by otherLogos (as defined in Section 4.1) can be + used to enhance the display of logotypes and marks that represent + partners, products, services, or any other characteristic associated + with the certificate or its intended application environment when the + standard logotype types are insufficient. + + The conditions and contexts of the intended use of these logotypes + are defined at the discretion of the local client application. + + Three other logotype types are defined in the follow subsections. + +4.4.1. Loyalty Logotype + + When a loyalty logotype appears in otherLogos, it MUST be identified + by the id-logo-loyalty object identifier. + + id-logo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 20 } + + id-logo-loyalty OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-logo 1 } + + A loyalty logotype, if present, MUST contain a logotype associated + with a loyalty program related to the certificate or its use. The + relation between the certificate and the identified loyalty program + is beyond the scope of this document. The logotype certificate + extension MAY contain more than one loyalty logotype. + + If more than one loyalty logotype is present, they MUST be placed in + order of preferred appearance. Some clients MAY choose to display a + subset of the present loyalty logotype data; therefore, the placement + within the sequence aids the client selection. The most preferred + loyalty logotype data MUST be first in the sequence, and the least + preferred loyalty logotype data MUST be last in the sequence. + +4.4.2. Certificate Background Logotype + + When a certificate background logotype appears in otherLogos, it MUST + be identified by the id-logo-background object identifier. + + id-logo-background OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-logo 2 } + + The certificate background logotype, if present, MUST contain a + graphical image intended as a background image for the certificate + and/or a general audio sequence for the certificate. The background + image MUST allow black text to be clearly read when placed on top of + the background image. The logotype certificate extension MUST NOT + contain more than one certificate background logotype. + +4.4.3. Certificate Image Logotype + + When a certificate image logotype appears in otherLogos, it MUST be + identified by the id-logo-certImage object identifier. + + id-logo-certImage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-logo 3 } + + The certificate image logotype, if present, aids human interpretation + of a certificate by providing meaningful visual information to the + user interface (UI). The logotype certificate extension MUST NOT + contain more than one certificate image logotype. + + Typical situations when a human needs to examine the visual + representation of a certificate are: + + * A person establishes a secured channel with an authenticated + service. The person needs to determine the identity of the + service based on the authenticated credentials. + + * A person validates the signature on critical information, such as + signed executable code, and needs to determine the identity of the + signer based on the signer's certificate. + + * A person is required to select an appropriate certificate to be + used when authenticating to a service or identity management + infrastructure. The person needs to see the available + certificates in order to distinguish between them in the selection + process. + + The display of certificate information to humans is challenging due + to lack of well-defined semantics for critical identity attributes. + Unless the application has out-of-band knowledge about a particular + certificate, the application will not know the exact nature of the + data stored in common identification attributes, such as + serialNumber, organizationName, country, etc. Consequently, the + application can display the actual data but faces the problem of + labeling that data in the UI and informing the human about the exact + nature (semantics) of that data. It is also challenging for the + application to determine which identification attributes are + important to display and how to organize them in a logical order. + + When present, the certificate image MUST be a complete visual + representation of the certificate. This means that the display of + this certificate image represents all information about the + certificate that the issuer subjectively defines as relevant to show + to a typical human user within the typical intended use of the + certificate, giving adequate information about at least the following + three aspects of the certificate: + + * certificate context + + * certificate issuer + + * certificate subject + + Certificate context information is visual marks and/or textual + information that helps the typical user to understand the typical + usage and/or purpose of the certificate. + + It is up to the issuer to decide what information -- in the form of + text, graphical symbols, and elements -- represents a complete visual + representation of the certificate. However, the visual + representation of certificate subject and certificate issuer + information from the certificate MUST have the same meaning as the + textual representation of that information in the certificate itself. + + Applications providing a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to the + certificate user MAY present a certificate image as the only visual + representation of a certificate; however, the certificate user SHOULD + be able to easily obtain the details of the certificate content. + +5. Type of Certificates + + Logotypes MAY be included in public key certificates and attribute + certificates at the discretion of the certificate issuer; however, + the relying party MUST NOT use the logotypes as part of certification + path validation or automated trust decisions. The sole purpose of + logotypes is to enhance the display of a particular certificate, + regardless of its position in a certification path. + +6. Use in Clients + + All PKI implementations require relying party software to have some + mechanism to determine whether a trusted CA issues a particular + certificate. This is an issue for certification path validation, + including consistent policy and name checking. + + After a certification path is successfully validated, the replying + party trusts the information that the CA includes in the certificate, + including any certificate extensions. The client software can choose + to make use of such information, or the client software can ignore + it. If the client is unable to support a provided logotype, the + client MUST NOT report an error; instead, the client MUST behave as + though no logotype certificate extension was included in the + certificate. Current standards do not provide any mechanism for + cross-certifying CAs to constrain subordinate CAs from including + private extensions (see Section 9). + + Consequently, if relying party software accepts a CA, then it should + be prepared to (unquestioningly) display the associated logotypes to + its human user, given that it is configured to do so. Information + about the logotypes is provided so that the replying party software + can select the one that will best meet the needs of the human user. + This choice depends on the abilities of the human user, as well as + the capabilities of the platform on which the replaying party + software is running. If none of the provided logotypes meets the + needs of the human user or matches the capabilities of the platform, + then the logotypes can be ignored. + + A client MAY, subject to local policy, choose to display none, one, + or any number of the logotypes in the logotype certificate extension. + In many cases, a client will be used in an environment with a good + network connection and also used in an environment with little or no + network connectivity. For example, a laptop computer can be docked + with a high-speed LAN connection, or it can be disconnected from the + network altogether. In recognition of this situation, the client + MUST include the ability to disable the fetching of logotypes. + However, locally cached logotypes can still be displayed when the + user disables the fetching of additional logotypes. + + A client MAY, subject to local policy, choose any combination of + audio and image presentation for each logotype. That is, the client + MAY display an image with or without playing a sound, and it MAY play + a sound with or without displaying an image. A client MUST NOT play + more than one logotype audio sequence at the same time. + + The logotype is to be displayed in conjunction with other identity + information contained in the certificate. The logotype is not a + replacement for this identity information. + + Care is needed when designing replying party software to ensure that + an appropriate context of logotype information is provided. This is + especially difficult with audio logotypes. It is important that the + human user be able to recognize the context of the logotype, even if + other audio streams are being played. + + If the relying party software is unable to successfully validate a + particular certificate, then it MUST NOT display any logotype data + associated with that certificate. + +7. Image Formats + + Animated images SHOULD NOT be used. + + The following table lists common image formats and the corresponding + media type. The table also indicates the support requirements for + these image formats. The file name extensions commonly used for each + of these formats is also provided. Implementations MAY support other + image formats. + + +========+==============+===========+============+============+ + | Format | Media Type | Extension | References | Implement? | + +========+==============+===========+============+============+ + | JPEG | image/jpeg | .jpg | [JPEG] | MUST | + | | | .jpeg | [RFC2046] | support | + +--------+--------------+-----------+------------+------------+ + | GIF | image/gif | .gif | [GIF] | MUST | + | | | | [RFC2046] | support | + +--------+--------------+-----------+------------+------------+ + | SVG | image/ | .svg | [SVGT] | SHOULD | + | | svg+xml | | [SVGR] | support | + +--------+--------------+-----------+------------+------------+ + | SVG + | image/ | .svgz | [SVGT] | MUST | + | GZIP | svg+xml+gzip | .svg.gz | [SVGZR] | support | + +--------+--------------+-----------+------------+------------+ + | PNG | image/png | .png | [ISO15948] | SHOULD | + | | | | [PNGR] | support | + +--------+--------------+-----------+------------+------------+ + | PDF | application/ | .pdf | [ISO32000] | MAY | + | | pdf | | [ISO19005] | support | + | | | | [RFC8118] | | + +--------+--------------+-----------+------------+------------+ + + Table 1: Image Formats + + | NOTE: The image/svg+xml-compressed media type is widely + | implemented, but it has not yet been registered with IANA. + + When a Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG) image is used, whether the + image is compressed or not, the SVG Tiny profile [SVGT] MUST be + followed, with these additional restrictions: + + * The SVG image MUST NOT contain any Internationalized Resource + Identifier (IRI) references to information stored outside of the + SVG image of type B, C, or D, according to Section 14.1.4 of + [SVGT]. + + * The SVG image MUST NOT contain any script element, according to + Section 15.2 of [SVGT]. + + * The XML structure in the SVG file MUST use linefeed (0x0A) as the + end-of-line (EOL) character when calculating a hash over the SVG + image. + + When a GZIP-compressed SVG image is fetched with HTTP, the client + will receive a response that includes these headers: + + Content-Type: image/svg+xml + Content-Encoding: gzip + + In this case, the octet stream of type image/svg+xml is compressed + with GZIP [RFC1952], as specified in [SVGR]. + + When an uncompressed SVG image is fetched with HTTP, the client will + receive a response with the same Content-Type header but no Content- + Encoding header. + + Whether the SVG image is GZIP-compressed or uncompressed, the hash + value for the SVG image is calculated over the uncompressed SVG + content with canonicalized EOL characters, as specified above. + + When an SVG image is embedded in the certificate extension using the + "data" URL scheme, the SVG image data MUST be provided in GZIP- + compressed form, and the XML structure, prior to compression, SHOULD + use linefeed (0x0A) as the end-of-line (EOL) character. + + When a bitmap image is used, the PNG [ISO15948] format SHOULD be + used. + + According to [ISO32000], when a Portable Document Format (PDF) + document is used, it MUST also be formatted according to the profile + PDF/A [ISO19005]. + +8. Audio Formats + + Implementations that support audio MUST support the MP3 audio format + [MP3] with a media type of "audio/mpeg" [RFC3003]. Implementations + SHOULD support text-based audio data with a media type of "text/ + plain;charset=UTF-8". Implementations MAY support other audio + formats. + + Text-based audio data using the media type of "text/ + plain;charset=UTF-8" is intended to be used by text-to-speech + software. When this audio type is used, the following requirements + apply: + + * LogotypeAudioInfo MUST be present and specify the language of the + text. + + * The fileSize, playTime, and channels elements of LogotypeAudioInfo + MUST have the value of 0. + + * The sampleRate element of LogotypeAudioInfo MUST be absent. + +9. Security Considerations + + Implementations that simultaneously display multiple logotype types + (subject organization, issuer organization, community, or other) MUST + ensure that there is no ambiguity as to the binding between the image + and the type of logotype that the image represents. "Logotype type" + is defined in Section 1.1, and it refers to the type of entity or + affiliation represented by the logotype, not the of binary format of + the image or audio. + + Logotypes are very difficult to securely and accurately define. + Names are also difficult in this regard, but logotypes are even + worse. It is quite difficult to specify what is, and what is not, a + legitimate logotype of an organization. There is an entire legal + structure around this issue, and it will not be repeated here. + However, issuers should be aware of the implications of including + images associated with a trademark or servicemark before doing so. + As logotypes can be difficult (and sometimes expensive) to verify, + the possibility of errors related to assigning wrong logotypes to + organizations is increased. + + This is not a new issue for electronic identification instruments. + It is already dealt with in a number of similar situations in the + physical world, including physical employee identification cards. In + addition, there are situations where identification of logotypes is + rather simple and straightforward, such as logotypes for well-known + industries and institutes. These issues should not stop those + service providers who want to issue logotypes from doing so, where + relevant. + + It is impossible to prevent fraudulent creation of certificates by + dishonest or badly performing issuers, containing names and logotypes + that the issuer has no claim to or has failed to check correctly. + Such certificates could be created in an attempt to socially engineer + a user into accepting a certificate. The premise used for the + logotype work is thus that logotype graphics in a certificate are + trusted only if the certificate is successfully validated within a + valid path. It is thus imperative that the representation of any + certificate that fails to validate is not enhanced in any way by + using the logotype data. + + This underlines the necessity for CAs to provide reliable services + and the relying party's responsibility and need to carefully select + which CAs are trusted to provide public key certificates. + + This also underlines the general necessity for relying parties to use + up-to-date software libraries to render or dereference data from + external sources, including logotype data in certificates, to + minimize risks related to processing potentially malicious data + before it has been adequately verified and validated. Implementers + should review the guidance in Section 7 of [RFC3986]. + + Referenced image objects are hashed in order to bind the image to the + signature of the certificate. Some image types, such as SVG, allow + part of the image to be collected from an external source by + incorporating a reference to an external file that contains the + image. If this feature were used within a logotype image, the hash + of the image would only cover the URI reference to the external image + file but not the referenced image data. Clients SHOULD verify that + SVG images meet all requirements listed in Section 7 and reject + images that contain references to external data. + + CAs issuing certificates with embedded logotype images should be + cautious when accepting graphics from the certificate requester for + inclusion in the certificate if the hash algorithm used to sign the + certificate is vulnerable to collision attacks, as described in + [RFC6151]. In such a case, the accepted image may contain data that + could help an attacker to obtain colliding certificates with + identical certificate signatures. + + Certification paths may also impose name constraints that are + systematically checked during certification path processing, which, + in theory, may be circumvented by logotypes. + + Certificate path processing, as defined in [RFC5280], does not + constrain the inclusion of logotype data in certificates. A parent + CA can constrain certification path validation such that subordinate + CAs cannot issue valid certificates to end entities outside a limited + name space or outside specific certificate policies. A malicious CA + can comply with these name and policy requirements and still include + inappropriate logotypes in the certificates that it issues. These + certificates will pass the certification path validation algorithm, + which means the client will trust the logotypes in the certificates. + Since there is no technical mechanism to prevent or control + subordinate CAs from including the logotype certificate extension or + its contents, where appropriate, a parent CA could employ a legal + agreement to impose a suitable restriction on the subordinate CA. + This situation is not unique to the logotype certificate extension. + + When a relying party fetches remote logotype data, a mismatch between + the media type provided in the mediaType field of the LogotypeDetails + and the Content-Type HTTP header of the retrieved object MUST be + treated as a failure, and the fetched logotype data should not be + presented to the user. However, if more than one location for the + remote logotype data is provided in the certificate extension, the + relying party MAY try to fetch the remote logotype data from an + alternate location to resolve the failure. + + When a subscriber requests the inclusion of remote logotype data in a + certificate, the CA cannot be sure that any logotype data will be + available at the provided URI for the entire validity period of the + certificate. To mitigate this concern, the CA may provide the + logotype data from a server under its control, rather than a + subscriber-controlled server. + + The controls available to a parent CA to protect itself from rogue + subordinate CAs are non-technical. They include: + + * Contractual agreements of suitable behavior, including terms of + liability in case of material breach. + + * Control mechanisms and procedures to monitor and follow the + behavior of subordinate CAs, including Certificate Transparency + [RFC9162]. + + * Use of certificate policies to declare an assurance level of + logotype data, as well as to guide applications on how to treat + and display logotypes. + + * Use of revocation functions to revoke any misbehaving CA. + + There is not a simple, straightforward, and absolute technical + solution. Rather, involved parties must settle some aspects of PKI + outside the scope of technical controls. As such, issuers need to + clearly identify and communicate the associated risks. + +10. Privacy Considerations + + Certificates are commonly public objects, so the inclusion of + privacy-sensitive information in certificates should be avoided. The + more information that is included in a certificate, the greater the + likelihood that the certificate will reveal privacy-sensitive + information. The inclusion of logotype data needs to be considered + in this context. + + Logotype data might be fetched from a server when it is needed. By + watching activity on the network, an observer can determine which + clients are making use of certificates that contain particular + logotype data. Since clients are expected to locally cache logotype + data, network traffic to the server containing the logotype data will + not be generated every time the certificate is used. Further, when + logotype data is not cached, activity on the network might reveal + certificate usage frequency. Even when logotype data is cached, + regardless of whether direct or indirect addressing is employed, + network traffic monitoring could reveal when logotype data is fetched + for the first time. Implementations MAY encrypt fetches of logotype + data using HTTPS, padding the data to a common size to reduce + visibility into the data that is being fetched. Likewise, servers + MAY reduce visibility into the data that is being returned by + encrypting with HTTPS and padding to a few common sizes. + + Similarly, when fetching logotype data from a server, the server + operator can determine which clients are making use of certificates + that contain particular logotype data. As above, locally caching + logotype data will eliminate the need to fetch the logotype data each + time the certificate is used, and lack of caching would reveal usage + frequency. Even when implementations cache logotype data, regardless + of whether direct or indirect addressing is employed, the server + operator could observe when logotype data is fetched for the first + time. + + In addition, the use of an encrypted DNS mechanism, such as DNS over + TLS (DoT) [RFC7858] or DNS over HTTPS (DoH) [RFC9230], hides the name + resolution traffic, which is usually a first step in fetching remote + logotype objects. + + When the "data" URI scheme is used with direct addressing, there is + no network traffic to fetch logotype data, which avoids the + observations of network traffic or server operations described above. + To obtain this benefit, the certificate will be larger than one that + contains a URL. Due to the improved privacy posture, the "data" URI + scheme with direct addressing will be the only one that is supported + by some CAs. Privacy-aware certificate subscribers MAY wish to + insist that logotype data is embedded in the certificate with the + "data" URI scheme with direct addressing. + + In cases where logotype data is cached by the relying party, the + cache index should include the hash values of the associated logotype + data with the goal of fetching the logotype data only once, even when + it is referenced by multiple URIs. The index should include hash + values for all supported hash algorithms. The cached data should + include the media type as well as the logotype data. Implementations + should give preference to logotype data that is already in the cache + when multiple alternatives are offered in the LogotypeExtn + certificate extension. + + When the "data" URI scheme is used, the relying party MAY add the + embedded logotype data to the local cache, which could avoid the need + to fetch the logotype data if it is referenced by a URL in another + certificate. + + When fetching remote logotype data, relying parties should use the + most privacy-preserving options that are available to minimize the + opportunities for servers to "fingerprint" clients. For example, + avoid cookies, ETags, and client certificates. + + When a relying party encounters a new certificate, the lack of + network traffic to fetch logotype data might indicate that a + certificate with references to the same logotype data has been + previously processed and cached. + + TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] includes the ability to encrypt the server's + certificate in the TLS handshake, which helps hide the server's + identity from anyone that is watching activity on the network. If + the server's certificate includes remote logotype data, the client + fetching that data might disclose the otherwise protected server + identity. + +11. IANA Considerations + + For the new ASN.1 module in Appendix A.2, IANA has assigned the + following OID in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" + registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0): + + +=========+======================+============+ + | Decimal | Description | References | + +=========+======================+============+ + | 107 | id-mod-logotype-2022 | RFC 9399 | + +---------+----------------------+------------+ + + Table 2 + + IANA has updated the entries in the "Structure of Management + Information (SMI) Numbers" registry that referred to [RFC3709] or + [RFC6170] to refer to this document. These entries are noted in the + tables below. + + From the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry + (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0): + + +=========+===========================+============+ + | Decimal | Description | References | + +=========+===========================+============+ + | 22 | id-mod-logotype | RFC 9399 | + +---------+---------------------------+------------+ + | 68 | id-mod-logotype-certimage | RFC 9399 | + +---------+---------------------------+------------+ + + Table 3 + + From the "SMI Security for PKIX Certificate Extension" registry + (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1): + + +=========+================+============+ + | Decimal | Description | References | + +=========+================+============+ + | 12 | id-pe-logotype | RFC 9399 | + +---------+----------------+------------+ + + Table 4 + + From the "SMI Security for PKIX Other Logotype Identifiers" registry + (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.20): + + +=========+====================+============+ + | Decimal | Description | References | + +=========+====================+============+ + | 1 | id-logo-loyalty | RFC 9399 | + +---------+--------------------+------------+ + | 2 | id-logo-background | RFC 9399 | + +---------+--------------------+------------+ + | 3 | id-logo-certImage | RFC 9399 | + +---------+--------------------+------------+ + + Table 5 + +12. References + +12.1. Normative References + + [GIF] CompuServe Incorporated, "Graphics Interchange Format", + Version 89a, July 1990, + <https://www.w3.org/Graphics/GIF/spec-gif89a.txt>. + + [ISO15948] ISO/IEC, "Information technology -- Computer graphics and + image processing -- Portable Network Graphics (PNG): + Functional specification", ISO/IEC 15948:2004, March 2004. + + [JPEG] ITU-T, "Information technology -- Digital compression and + coding of continuous-tone still images: JPEG File + Interchange Format (JFIF)", ITU-T Recommendation T.871, + ISO/IEC 10918-5:2013, May 2013. + + [MP3] ISO/IEC, "Information technology -- Generic coding of + moving pictures and associated audio information -- Part + 3: Audio", ISO/IEC 13818-3:1998, April 1998. + + [NEW-ASN1] ITU-T, "Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation + One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", ITU-T + Recommendation X.680, ISO/IEC 8824-1:2021, February 2021, + <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680>. + + [RFC1952] Deutsch, P., "GZIP file format specification version 4.3", + RFC 1952, DOI 10.17487/RFC1952, May 1996, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1952>. + + [RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail + Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046, + DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>. + + [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, + DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. + + [RFC2397] Masinter, L., "The "data" URL scheme", RFC 2397, + DOI 10.17487/RFC2397, August 1998, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2397>. + + [RFC3003] Nilsson, M., "The audio/mpeg Media Type", RFC 3003, + DOI 10.17487/RFC3003, November 2000, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3003>. + + [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform + Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, + RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>. + + [RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax + Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, + DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>. + + [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., + Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key + Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List + (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>. + + [RFC5646] Phillips, A., Ed. and M. Davis, Ed., "Tags for Identifying + Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, DOI 10.17487/RFC5646, + September 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5646>. + + [RFC5755] Farrell, S., Housley, R., and S. Turner, "An Internet + Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization", + RFC 5755, DOI 10.17487/RFC5755, January 2010, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5755>. + + [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC + 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, + May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. + + [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol + Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>. + + [RFC9110] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, + Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110, + DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9110>. + + [SVGT] World Wide Web Consortium, "Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG) + Tiny 1.2 Specification", W3C REC-SVGTiny12-20081222, + December 2008, + <http://www.w3.org/TR/2008/REC-SVGTiny12-20081222/>. + +12.2. Informative References + + [ISO19005] ISO, "Document management -- Electronic document file + format for long-term preservation -- Part 1: Use of PDF + 1.4 (PDF/A-1)", ISO 19005-1:2005, October 2005. + + [ISO32000] ISO, "Document management -- Portable document format -- + Part 1: PDF 1.7", ISO 32000-1:2008, July 2008. + + [OLD-ASN1] CCITT, "Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation One + (ASN.1)", CCITT Recommendation X.208, November 1988, + <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.208/en>. + + [PNGR] World Wide Web Consortium, "Media Type Registration for + image/png", + <https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types/image/png>. + + [RFC3709] Santesson, S., Housley, R., and T. Freeman, "Internet + X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Logotypes in X.509 + Certificates", RFC 3709, DOI 10.17487/RFC3709, February + 2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3709>. + + [RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the + Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912, + DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>. + + [RFC6151] Turner, S. and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations + for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms", + RFC 6151, DOI 10.17487/RFC6151, March 2011, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6151>. + + [RFC6170] Santesson, S., Housley, R., Bajaj, S., and L. Rosenthol, + "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- Certificate + Image", RFC 6170, DOI 10.17487/RFC6170, May 2011, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6170>. + + [RFC6268] Schaad, J. and S. Turner, "Additional New ASN.1 Modules + for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public + Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 6268, + DOI 10.17487/RFC6268, July 2011, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6268>. + + [RFC7858] Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D., + and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport + Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May + 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>. + + [RFC8118] Hardy, M., Masinter, L., Markovic, D., Johnson, D., and M. + Bailey, "The application/pdf Media Type", RFC 8118, + DOI 10.17487/RFC8118, March 2017, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8118>. + + [RFC9162] Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate + Transparency Version 2.0", RFC 9162, DOI 10.17487/RFC9162, + December 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9162>. + + [RFC9216] Gillmor, D. K., Ed., "S/MIME Example Keys and + Certificates", RFC 9216, DOI 10.17487/RFC9216, April 2022, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9216>. + + [RFC9230] Kinnear, E., McManus, P., Pauly, T., Verma, T., and C.A. + Wood, "Oblivious DNS over HTTPS", RFC 9230, + DOI 10.17487/RFC9230, June 2022, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9230>. + + [SVGR] World Wide Web Consortium, "Media Type Registration for + image/svg+xml", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/media- + types/image/svg+xml>. + + [SVGZR] "A separate MIME type for svgz files is needed", + <https://github.com/w3c/svgwg/issues/701>. + +Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules + +A.1. ASN.1 Modules with 1988 Syntax + + This appendix contains two ASN.1 modules, both using the old syntax + [OLD-ASN1]. + + The first ASN.1 module provides the syntax for the logotype + certificate extension. Only comments have changed in the module from + [RFC3709] and the IMPORTS now come from [RFC5280]. + + The second ASN.1 module provides the certificate image object + identifier. The module is unchanged from [RFC6170]. + + <CODE BEGINS> + LogotypeCertExtn + { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) + security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) + id-mod-logotype(22) } + + DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= + BEGIN + + IMPORTS + AlgorithmIdentifier FROM PKIX1Explicit88 -- RFC 5280 + { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) + security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) + id-pkix1-explicit(18) }; + + -- Logotype Certificate Extension OID + + id-pe-logotype OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= + { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) + security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-pe(1) 12 } + + + -- Logotype Certificate Extension Syntax + + LogotypeExtn ::= SEQUENCE { + communityLogos [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF LogotypeInfo OPTIONAL, + issuerLogo [1] EXPLICIT LogotypeInfo OPTIONAL, + subjectLogo [2] EXPLICIT LogotypeInfo OPTIONAL, + otherLogos [3] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF OtherLogotypeInfo + OPTIONAL } + + -- Note: At least one of the OPTIONAL components MUST be present + + LogotypeInfo ::= CHOICE { + direct [0] LogotypeData, + indirect [1] LogotypeReference } + + LogotypeData ::= SEQUENCE { + image SEQUENCE OF LogotypeImage OPTIONAL, + audio [1] SEQUENCE OF LogotypeAudio OPTIONAL } + + -- Note: At least one of the OPTIONAL components MUST be present + + LogotypeImage ::= SEQUENCE { + imageDetails LogotypeDetails, + imageInfo LogotypeImageInfo OPTIONAL } + + LogotypeAudio ::= SEQUENCE { + audioDetails LogotypeDetails, + audioInfo LogotypeAudioInfo OPTIONAL } + + LogotypeDetails ::= SEQUENCE { + mediaType IA5String, -- Media type name and optional + -- parameters + logotypeHash SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF HashAlgAndValue, + logotypeURI SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF IA5String } + + LogotypeImageInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + type [0] LogotypeImageType DEFAULT color, + fileSize INTEGER, -- In octets, 0=unspecified + xSize INTEGER, -- Horizontal size in pixels + ySize INTEGER, -- Vertical size in pixels + resolution LogotypeImageResolution OPTIONAL, + language [4] IA5String OPTIONAL } -- RFC 5646 Language Tag + + LogotypeImageType ::= INTEGER { grayScale(0), color(1) } + + LogotypeImageResolution ::= CHOICE { + numBits [1] INTEGER, -- Resolution in bits per pixel + tableSize [2] INTEGER } -- Number of colors or grey tones + + LogotypeAudioInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + fileSize INTEGER, -- In octets, 0=unspecified + playTime INTEGER, -- In milliseconds, 0=unspecified + channels INTEGER, -- 0=unspecified, + -- 1=mono, 2=stereo, 4=quad + sampleRate [3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- Samples per second + language [4] IA5String OPTIONAL } -- RFC 5646 Language Tag + + OtherLogotypeInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + logotypeType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + info LogotypeInfo } + + LogotypeReference ::= SEQUENCE { + refStructHash SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF HashAlgAndValue, + refStructURI SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF IA5String } + -- Places to get the same LogotypeData + -- image or audio object + + -- Note: The referenced LogotypeData binary file contains a + -- DER-encoded LogotypeData type + + HashAlgAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { + hashAlg AlgorithmIdentifier, + hashValue OCTET STRING } + + -- Other logotype type OIDs + + id-logo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) + dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) 20 } + + id-logo-loyalty OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-logo 1 } + + id-logo-background OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-logo 2 } + + END + + + CERT-IMAGE-MODULE { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) + internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) + id-mod-logotype-certimage(68) } + + DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= + BEGIN + + EXPORTS ALL; -- export all items from this module + + id-logo-certImage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= + { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) + security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-logo(20) 3 } + + END + <CODE ENDS> + +A.2. ASN.1 Module with 2002 Syntax + + Some developers like to use the latest version of ASN.1 standards. + This appendix provides an ASN.1 module to assist in that goal. It + uses the ASN.1 syntax defined in [NEW-ASN1], and it follows the + conventions established in [RFC5912] and [RFC6268]. + + This ASN.1 module incorporates the module from [RFC3709] and the + module from [RFC6170]. + + Note that [NEW-ASN1] was published in 2021, and all of the features + used in this module are backward compatible with the specification + that was published in 2002. + + <CODE BEGINS> + LogotypeCertExtn-2022 + { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) + security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) + id-mod-logotype-2022(107) } + + DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= + BEGIN + + IMPORTS + EXTENSION + FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- RFC 5912 + { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) + security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) + id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) } + + AlgorithmIdentifier{}, DIGEST-ALGORITHM + FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 + { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) + security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) + id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) } ; + + + -- Logotype Certificate Extension + + ext-logotype EXTENSION ::= { + SYNTAX LogotypeExtn + IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-logotype } + + -- Logotype Certificate Extension OID + + id-pe-logotype OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= + { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) + security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-pe(1) 12 } + + -- Logotype Certificate Extension Syntax + + LogotypeExtn ::= SEQUENCE { + communityLogos [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF LogotypeInfo OPTIONAL, + issuerLogo [1] EXPLICIT LogotypeInfo OPTIONAL, + subjectLogo [2] EXPLICIT LogotypeInfo OPTIONAL, + otherLogos [3] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF OtherLogotypeInfo + OPTIONAL } + -- At least one of the OPTIONAL components MUST be present + ( WITH COMPONENTS { ..., communityLogos PRESENT } | + WITH COMPONENTS { ..., issuerLogo PRESENT } | + WITH COMPONENTS { ..., subjectLogo PRESENT } | + WITH COMPONENTS { ..., otherLogos PRESENT } ) + + LogotypeInfo ::= CHOICE { + direct [0] LogotypeData, + indirect [1] LogotypeReference } + + LogotypeData ::= SEQUENCE { + image SEQUENCE OF LogotypeImage OPTIONAL, + audio [1] SEQUENCE OF LogotypeAudio OPTIONAL } + -- At least one image component MUST be present + ( WITH COMPONENTS { ..., image PRESENT } ) + + LogotypeImage ::= SEQUENCE { + imageDetails LogotypeDetails, + imageInfo LogotypeImageInfo OPTIONAL } + + LogotypeAudio ::= SEQUENCE { + audioDetails LogotypeDetails, + audioInfo LogotypeAudioInfo OPTIONAL } + + LogotypeDetails ::= SEQUENCE { + mediaType IA5String, -- Media type name and optional + -- parameters + logotypeHash SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF HashAlgAndValue, + logotypeURI SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF IA5String } + + LogotypeImageInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + type [0] LogotypeImageType DEFAULT color, + fileSize INTEGER, -- In octets, 0=unspecified + xSize INTEGER, -- Horizontal size in pixels + ySize INTEGER, -- Vertical size in pixels + resolution LogotypeImageResolution OPTIONAL, + language [4] IA5String OPTIONAL } -- RFC 5646 Language Tag + + LogotypeImageType ::= INTEGER { grayScale(0), color(1) } + + LogotypeImageResolution ::= CHOICE { + numBits [1] INTEGER, -- Resolution in bits + tableSize [2] INTEGER } -- Number of colors or grey tones + + LogotypeAudioInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + fileSize INTEGER, -- In octets, 0=unspecified + playTime INTEGER, -- In milliseconds, 0=unspecified + channels INTEGER, -- 0=unspecified + -- 1=mono, 2=stereo, 4=quad + sampleRate [3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- Samples per second + language [4] IA5String OPTIONAL } -- RFC 5646 Language Tag + + OtherLogotypeInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + logotypeType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + info LogotypeInfo } + + LogotypeReference ::= SEQUENCE { + refStructHash SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF HashAlgAndValue, + refStructURI SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF IA5String } + -- Places to get the same LogotypeData + -- image or audio object + + -- Note: The referenced LogotypeData binary file contains a + -- DER-encoded LogotypeData type + + HashAlgAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { + hashAlg AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}, + hashValue OCTET STRING } + + -- Other logotype type OIDs + + id-logo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) + dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) 20 } + + id-logo-loyalty OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-logo 1 } + + id-logo-background OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-logo 2 } + + id-logo-certImage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-logo 3 } + + END + <CODE ENDS> + +Appendix B. Examples + +B.1. Example from RFC 3709 + + The following example displays a logotype certificate extension + containing one issuer organization logotype using direct addressing. + The issuer organization logotype image is of the type image/gif. The + logotype image is referenced through one URI, and the image is hashed + with SHA-256. This example is changed from [RFC3709] to use SHA-256 + instead of SHA-1. + + The values on the left are the ASN.1 tag (in hexadecimal) and the + length (in decimal). + + 30 122: SEQUENCE { + 06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER logotype (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 12) + 04 110: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { + 30 108: SEQUENCE { + A1 106: [1] { + A0 104: [0] { + 30 102: SEQUENCE { + 30 100: SEQUENCE { + 30 98: SEQUENCE { + 16 9: IA5String 'image/gif' + 30 49: SEQUENCE { + 30 47: SEQUENCE { + 30 11: SEQUENCE { + 06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER + : sha-256 (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 1) + : } + 04 32: OCTET STRING + : 6A 58 50 2E 59 67 F9 DD D1 8A FE BD 0D B1 FE 60 + : A5 13 1B DF 0F B2 BE F0 B5 73 45 50 BA 1B BF 19 + : } + : } + 30 34: SEQUENCE { + 16 32: IA5String 'http://logo.example.com/logo.gif' + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + +B.2. Issuer Organization Logotype Example + + The following example displays a logotype certificate extension + containing one issuer organization logotype using direct addressing. + The issuer organization logotype image is of the type image/jpeg. + The logotype image is referenced through one URI, and the image is + hashed with SHA-256. + + The values on the left are the ASN.1 tag (in hexadecimal) and the + length (in decimal). + + 30 124: SEQUENCE { + 06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER logotype (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 12) + 04 112: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { + 30 110: SEQUENCE { + A1 108: [1] { + A0 106: [0] { + 30 104: SEQUENCE { + 30 102: SEQUENCE { + 30 100: SEQUENCE { + 16 10: IA5String 'image/jpeg' + 30 49: SEQUENCE { + 30 47: SEQUENCE { + 30 11: SEQUENCE { + 06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER + : sha-256 (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 1) + : } + 04 32: OCTET STRING + : 1E 8F 96 FD D3 50 53 EF C6 1C 9F FC F0 00 2E 53 + : B4 9C 24 9A 32 C5 E9 0C 2C 39 39 D3 AD 6D A9 09 + : } + : } + 30 35: SEQUENCE { + 16 33: IA5String 'http://logo.example.com/logo.jpeg' + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + +B.3. Embedded Image Example + + The following example displays a logotype certificate extension + containing one subject organization logotype using direct addressing. + The subject organization logotype image uses image/svg+xml+gzip. The + logotype image is embedded in the certificate extension with a + "data:" URI, and the image is hashed by SHA-256. This technique + produces a large certificate extension but offers reduced latency and + improved privacy. + + The values on the left are the ASN.1 tag (in hexadecimal) and the + length (in decimal). + + 30 2148: SEQUENCE { + 06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER logotype (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 12) + 04 2134: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { + 30 2130: SEQUENCE { + A2 2126: [2] { + A0 2122: [0] { + 30 2118: SEQUENCE { + 30 2114: SEQUENCE { + 30 2110: SEQUENCE { + 16 18: IA5String 'image/svg+xml+gzip' + 30 49: SEQUENCE { + 30 47: SEQUENCE { + 30 11: SEQUENCE { + 06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER + : sha-256 (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 1) + : } + 04 32: OCTET STRING + : C5 AC 94 1A 0A 25 1F B3 16 6F 97 C5 52 40 9B 49 + : 9E 7B 92 61 5A B0 A2 6C 19 BF B9 D8 09 C5 D9 E7 + : } + : } + 30 2035: SEQUENCE { + 16 2031: IA5String + : '' + : '28tY29weS5zdmcApVbbbhs3EH3nV0y3Lw2Q9fK2JLewHDROU' + : 'BRo2iBxW+RRlTa2UFkypIWV5ut7zlB2UqF9cuLlUktyLmfOz' + : 'PD8xafbtdyPu/1qu5k17sw2sp/mm+V8vd2Ms2azbV5cmPNvX' + : 'v16efXh7WvZ31/L299e/vzTpTRt1/0RLrvu1dUref/7j+Ktd' + : 'Xawsete/9IYaW6m6e77rjscDmeHcLbdXXdX7zpu6t69vmxxo' + : 'n08AREdRDt7tpyWDRRSz7+tgp2b/ew/hEKI5WGoPKyW082s8' + : 'SmeWf13NzVyM66ub6ZZk+xXH+9X4+Hl9tOssWLly3553ARpd' + : '7txP+7uxx/2d+NiejefVttZ8+nNavkBj9yO40RLb8dpvpxP8' + : 'wtzuRvn07iUP/+Wu+20my9GcWfOPpfDbjVN44YLb8dp3Mn7c' + : 'b3aXGNCAICCc+a8+yLo/FpwfLP/uN3dzhqdriH5uwfbnj9a+' + : 'Uz2i/maK66utA+zZ435uFqvZ823R38Q1t32Lw3pZqThd/PpR' + : 'paz5o2LNkocvCzaIm0vrQvSpog359lLy3my0ga+e3Hp+B4In' + : 'jVFPD9awdhnrGEFW30Sl/Pnpvta2QBVxUEVxFbJ2VUFfYC01' + : 'pUs+O4GK84V/k6CHUFyhvhiDVQF8Y5aPDbmnsrXbS74DANjg' + : 'uwgENZLPwjUYVTRJQgEpiLR0ctiWj+Ig8rCvZAArxKExEEWM' + : 'JLqMA1F+ggnsQDXgpQeomJPCVhtCRycNrAWxgAI+g1Qsr6IU' + : 'xlomBswjydYBEgOeVCDoRreBjiFjX2SdSA60BP5DgQM63xoP' + : 'lWHbNq+egAEeAzxyNAdCQz+sDEMOhaGisKJdSlS6gtWWm4M1' + : 'rQwP0egEBIhhFLoXuCJhR4mT5RJBaiLKqqFROUEzYr1idG0g' + : 'ahwCzEnk+AMJLdp0FevQQ6VZ+SKOwGlOIJOh1MVjo0eB6DRA' + : '10SRpSY6il/eFFKAm+MKSIWNFqSo4OFnORfwH5wJHCMNM0ql' + : 'DRlcIwUEkDlgiSBhiEpBgMKOx5FdAYqI3KYewKKkAItTABTk' + : 'p5khI86kgbOgRywEBR0VGcwAjf8t9wqvdUMG6gLAbI0QQ8Cb' + : 'zCTtCSn/DEhCbm++duQaiRG1mQkdWHnminHA+r5wpLvsJbCA' + : 'LUKsDW5NAj43J+AD5vpfamUzJqiRJACmCWwIMhQq4HmYGKai' + : 'iJPmIvpS80UzTtAjdSraApQZogslgFcJHw0y5WoEXDYr/aTq' + : 'fxk2qhcg3z6ETQL+S18llvHOZQvlEOVEVpzqCozE9V6JZhh/' + : 'lCslg7mUFY4AR7IlcApmgV6gz3DCSDe56fQ0SRS7el0NJWO8' + : 'mQ6mkc6ylPpaL7QUZ5IR/M/dEwoJiEp+L6iT4cdSyIp4ljDk' + : 'oaZpQlgMoz0ApahjTiTWbZYu9v+MUqVjY61j2Bxr68bPF3uS' + : '1232qAyAQDMhr4MRyVZq5l2QcuwgY/oTozbgoIKycH+yQxhz' + : 'QsPJQ/ne9OmRKvYH1AeKA/EQRtzrmaYUiHUhpJOW4breSaxZ' + : '/TVc3ZAQJKOagAJiw6pRHVkBMIBa5E+SUMWi0ZNW1Rfn/xQX' + : 'ywHXyMHN5G8WF6gZ2IVjANHMIJQ1lAJQE8MJjZHJiUtQZAWz' + : 'mkisDywTVWSqLkkQG2NNB3wwyaerqRGLNKpvwUOhaQFiYcqv' + : 'iSjvp1n8WnRRzXFs9IXDxiiDd8HU/ROoAGn9+QgTPEVu6HaN' + : '6i0VPuv1SCzwyZeHwBA1EjFYoAk2jJ3OFeJ5Gp1E+3Dlf3Aj' + : '70bbvmag5oyKHunVyGPq6+EnvTua/JUn3iadMHlqUapsK2T8' + : 'SwCBJUF1JnEmhu0ntBthJoQpZqumsBk5mA1hRc0LR5ZFerdj' + : 'ksaCqt3IUWXcXW16vb6xdWyHLTgCaKXWKUKK1kOp9HK5B3EL' + : 'jSdXb0loB5RYtS01L6h9yTPW51Wpqwgosr5I927aw6401+Yf' + : 'wDria4WoQwAAA==' + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + +B.4. Embedded Certificate Image Example + + The following example displays a logotype certificate extension + containing one certificate image logotype using direct addressing. + The certificate image logotype uses image/svg+xml+gzip. The logotype + image is embedded in the certificate extension with a "data:" URI, + and the image is hashed by SHA-256. This example contains the image + from Appendix B of [RFC6170]; however, the media type used here is + explicit about the use of GZIP compression [RFC1952]. + + The values on the left are the ASN.1 tag (in hexadecimal) and the + length (in decimal). + + 30 2902: SEQUENCE { + 06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER logotype (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 12) + 04 2888: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { + 30 2884: SEQUENCE { + A3 2880: [3] { + 30 2876: SEQUENCE { + 30 2872: SEQUENCE { + 06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 5 5 7 20 3' + A0 2858: [0] { + 30 2854: SEQUENCE { + 30 2850: SEQUENCE { + 30 2846: SEQUENCE { + 16 18: IA5String 'image/svg+xml+gzip' + 30 49: SEQUENCE { + 30 47: SEQUENCE { + 30 11: SEQUENCE { + 06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER + : sha-256 (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 1) + : } + 04 32: OCTET STRING + : 83 14 B3 26 9B D3 8B 0B 2A E6 6E 42 74 E2 A7 57 + : 7A 40 B7 E1 2E 53 42 44 CC 7C AE 14 68 1B 0E B6 + : } + : } + 30 2771: SEQUENCE { + 16 2767: IA5String + : '' + : 'nRJbWFnZURlbW8uc3ZnANVaW2/bOBZ+n19BqBigwdoS7xK9j' + : 'meapB0EWHQHzez2WZZoR1tZMiQ5jvvr95CSL7Gl1Em8C9d9i' + : 'ERSPOd85+O5EB3+9jhL0YMuyiTPLh3iYgfpLMrjJJteOv/66' + : '1M/cFBZhVkcpnmmL50sd34b/TIsH6YoiS+da11UySSJwkqj2' + : '1k41Q6CDbNyUMSTS+e+quYDz1sul+6SuXkx9YhSysPUo7QPK' + : '/rlKqvCx35Wvmu+a/uGYow9EOigh0Qvr/LHSwcjjDjGiGHQ9' + : '14n0/sKlMf4Vwctk7i6X7/sGEYdNA5L/WeRT5IUDKmSbLVWN' + : 'oo2cqNCh1XyoKN8Nsuz0iqwVW8Qb1fOF0Vqp+PI06me6awqP' + : 'eISzxn9goYzXYVxWIUWpfWLCMwcGoLpgy83n8wzGkbR4Gtef' + : 'ENmMBznC7DEroKpOBpM8mIWVqPEYGtA+BvoMfS2E5uF1Wqu7' + : 'R6FLvNFEelWReNolpiV3l2VpGntMW9nk6RKdf0+9BrFrMbeV' + : 'uWhtzbHvMR6UlobPyVpBWjXBk7six2vH5nCwY6nXCo5xb7Yu' + : 'svFVPqCOGh16fSxSxglmPkScLfvmDDmC4FlDc1wov8IF2WZh' + : 'NlVumgEPRliimDD3PhGPyTgUUMC6lKqKAjxaptq1boUJvQFs' + : 'vi+LOJyxZkPE/vCwHuAmXmoj1AarnRBatzqkbv7cK5Ls2ORf' + : 'wM/vsOG5lURZqXxOnDXPKZw5t5jVzIhFKO0B6D6hARSXDR6F' + : 'zqq7H7mQeJAOQiUSPvFIrUHOfuui3zrFI5dYVeAmpcOcOb9u' + : '63vLjae4kYX4yRifYPrTa2SlMigYdO+cEWeGADMLZLH96SH4' + : 'R9xRYApl6q3Y02f+NzlRAl+cZSKhB6qSIVa80fsqMnWOqZJp' + : 'msXwAPoyNaQ95uNIGasKPwhxGzQzOXzMIIzBKabmLIil470z' + : 'fSjWWn+kvpvLQ9g1l3yRIc8gukz0uysEcakcDfy3KMk+l0SO' + : 'XlOopltJL7EPtUlzZfP4tnM70k8xkKCySt92MwfIXPoTe0pn' + : 'u4dYbp7hJ/kxWySN0ey0o/1qbiCsxDXJMWWo37QekBcAUFPS' + : 'GkPCnUJF5wwBacDK5cGlEp4BC2lYoJcrNNGVc7DzIqxT4CKs' + : 'PlrAG8mL8whRejiQe9EmImIAoz3sds9NxP4RZEzugqzb7c3Q' + : '89u3WQKY9aegbsA/AUJB/bJs6pfJt9BHFEuk5DWITzOH5uZS' + : 'ThLUsDjQ5GE6RMsyihMTaQLfA6BIiAQMAhnHHN1sd61WtUhD' + : 'VJiuhkrdBXd740+hLB9Vm1HjQe4ywLOBLWOMMiyQAXNB8sm9' + : 'Gx2qdGgGkMG6wY8aLfqgH4dfnmrVc+pPrE/Z/QnZOs8C1Okb' + : '2/ggwLdxlDC1D6DFPZDD98txv8xQf5TEc7Ax6ZyaDf6BC4Sy' + : 'lWKCMqtizp80+UMchATal63qHq0M3ZTs83Ob/XO6LYsFzpGV' + : 'Y5+iLxdWvwY+NaKoR/0iJIXL3dBjT2hG+wO+NXm53XStSh1e' + : 'ogfeojV35BTOaqh/cmPUe2Mdp91pQp2CjWOO2k7OamhjU1HB' + : '3DLGm66n6iajz4bqn2oICmNFxDR/x2mC5s+rKhlkUA3Ne3P8' + : 'lgP0qJfjf9uvu+HWXSfFwNoH4uqGUmTadYMtOc7yjEEd9EUh' + : 'kwEEOcDSHKQ+yhnSvUYRH8miQo2FK5TCjWZZGWKB8iHPud16' + : 'wApnCvTOzjIFAj9TQdCxa+ddOTizaa1xJvD0qMrKx+Ydaj6i' + : 'wJQG0vaSdYWpTv4HwVRAP3Z6ONjOJunEIeKRVmhujpA2+wPm' + : 'QR9WFQAFhh9bGQzFEXX+WwOnXq8pV35P2Acdn0pGebcMg7Og' + : 'QKaEdOKEAkFlk/9HuEKGBVwucc4AjnJ/LBYU09hVwWY1F0Hl' + : 'BUC2lbyIuYF58O8p+adMwUt9YAoX/IwRtAC9NAdBAyGuEB3V' + : 'R59u8/TGYx9/Xjz8bPB/Z/F9B0SghBK+4xxfiwtr0GXECqed' + : 'QQ9PRVpEAQ+26MidbGSmPm8RwRzcQsT17EPSmoorH3+av4Jc' + : 'j78O/vIp/uzMEkHKAE6/F7VHHSj8HddR0Q3ymcGZfRVjwfmO' + : 'nNn3GuWR+FzhcPmPqiptHcayacT28T8j3Cs0/LQCwo6J2iYx' + : 'P4R58AsobjFegusoJhuq7VNS2evRPcqASvQki+gbkBYwETNP' + : 't/1A2pT6UErR1zMzUITZRvF5Lp5basO1fk2U4aBSjkji8quL' + : '3cDyW7TpI3unxezMcSTNhQJhfpGctKgKN2Amo7/7ShSev4oX' + : 'icPSYS+6GkCm9a1Qw3VEchCUA+z5HtTcbQhK6F14YFUp+Yn7' + : 'WgmzwpZCDf5DDiXT9B7U6RdHAHpdb7IqmLVjqZSLnTW61zjQ' + : '7/G7D3hm9E846uTDZoNMADmLlm7IG2ieXfUtu1US9TeNGUHi' + : 'bE9Nv//2jRJGZfQmK3v7ykJJOv1IXjBsDCPpmgWppe6sHxR3' + : 'KVSQKqp+WIqammuJbtqkxZmMHry4oS/9pLhdCXKq8uR0R+LD' + : 'EqCKRxqc5VXdvPvIP+ggwR0RkyBfO9iKZvrWGAKVdz31cuoc' + : 'voO/qemClFMYEFEH7oI+vpkek4s4bCMBqK+5mHQUlDpE/oyl' + : 'py+2/6pWXK31PEYagP04epV1cE50UMy6IQZeQM7+Ol74Z+eH' + : 'fpHNc7OjffQ/HeV0X8BopoDkGEkAAA=' + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + +B.5. Full Certificate Example + + The following example contains a certificate for Alice; it is + essentially a renewal of the certificate that appears in [RFC9216]. + Of course, the serial number and issue dates are different. In + addition, Alice's certificate now has a logotype certificate + extension. The extension contains URLs for two community logotype + images, both at fictional URLs. The extension also contains URLs for + two subject organization logotype images, both at fictional URLs. An + implementation would display at most three of these images, both of + the community logotype images and one of the subject organization + logotype images. Direct addressing is used for all of the images, + and the images are hashed by SHA-256. + + -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- + MIIFpTCCBI2gAwIBAgITN0EFee11f0Kpolw69Phqzpqx1zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQ0F + ADBVMQ0wCwYDVQQKEwRJRVRGMREwDwYDVQQLEwhMQU1QUyBXRzExMC8GA1UEAxMo + U2FtcGxlIExBTVBTIFJTQSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eTAgFw0yMjA2 + MTUxODE4MThaGA8yMDUyMDkyNzA2NTQxOFowOzENMAsGA1UEChMESUVURjERMA8G + A1UECxMITEFNUFMgV0cxFzAVBgNVBAMTDkFsaWNlIExvdmVsYWNlMIIBIjANBgkq + hkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAtPSJ6Fg4Fj5Nmn9PkrYo0jTkfCv4TfA/ + pdO/KLpZbJOAEr0sI7AjaO7B1GuMUFJeSTulamNfCwDcDkY63PQWl+DILs7GxVwX + urhYdZlaV5hcUqVAckPvedDBc/3rz4D/esFfs+E7QMFtmd+K04s+A8TCNO12DRVB + DpbP4JFD9hsc8prDtpGmFk7rd0q8gqnhxBW2RZAeLqzJOMayCQtws1q7ktkNBR2w + ZX5ICjecF1YJFhX4jrnHwp/iELGqqaNXd3/Y0pG7QFecN7836IPPdfTMSiPR+peC + rhJZwLSewbWXLJe3VMvbvQjoBMpEYlaJBUIKkO1zQ1Pq90njlsJLOwIDAQABo4IC + hDCCAoAwDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAXBgNVHSAEEDAOMAwGCmCGSAFlAwIBMAEwHgYD + VR0RBBcwFYETYWxpY2VAc21pbWUuZXhhbXBsZTATBgNVHSUEDDAKBggrBgEFBQcD + BDAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCBsAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFLv2zLItHQYSHJeuKWqQENMgZmZz + MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFJEwjnwHFwyn8QkoZTYaZxxodvRZMIIB0AYIKwYBBQUHAQwE + ggHCMIIBvqCB4zCB4KBvMG0wazBpFgppbWFnZS9qcGVnMDEwLzALBglghkgBZQME + AgEEIK/8EBZGy1YltJl95Yk+rjqEb1oC04LW2o7U7vh8vR3tMCgWJmh0dHA6Ly93 + d3cuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvaW1hZ2VzL2xvZ28uanBnoG0wazBpMGcWCWltYWdlL2dp + ZjAxMC8wCwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBCCIkIGBrftmri9m0EmgTY6g7E6oZEI4WzZKvyyL + 0unpZjAnFiVodHRwOi8vd3d3LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL2xvZ28taW1hZ2UuZ2lmooHV + oIHSMIHPMGUwYxYJaW1hZ2UvZ2lmMDEwLzALBglghkgBZQMEAgEEIGpYUC5ZZ/nd + 0Yr+vQ2x/mClExvfD7K+8LVzRVC6G78ZMCMWIWh0dHA6Ly93d3cuc21pbWUuZXhh + bXBsZS9sb2dvLmdpZjBmMGQWCmltYWdlL2pwZWcwMTAvMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAQQg + vct7dXJtjBszpCzerHly2krZ8nmEClhYas4vAoDq16UwIxYhaHR0cDovL3d3dy5z + bWltZS5leGFtcGxlL2xvZ28uanBnMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBDQUAA4IBAQBbjdCNVFA/ + emCc5uKX5WSPrdvRFZSs57SEhE0odxvhTrOs13VM8Om0TxhNJ0Pl6d9CJdbUxtFw + SSnSu9fnghDO7OZDJnPiIYLNY5eTTzY6sx85mde9TLaBTE7RZf0W7NV0hqDqcfM+ + 9HnQrU4TtPSvtPS5rr5SvqkaMM0k89bpbkgZlh9HH14+x+DIeT0dLythiXJvkVod + qEfyZTcdplQHQ4szWO7lsjmvHrUIbS1tdAJnah8AZRZfqiJEFeiUp06hvAWnPc3y + 1TMwYI8onfwPIVzyT6YLgjiT6PuLwSB/wtlhI+vWfdINaHdotegjawLm/3jZ+ceN + tu39FvbV0uKJ + -----END CERTIFICATE----- + + The following displays the logotype certificate extension from + Alice's certificate. The values on the left are the ASN.1 tag (in + hexadecimal) and the length (in decimal). + + 30 464: SEQUENCE { + 06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER logotype (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 12) + 04 450: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { + 30 446: SEQUENCE { + A0 227: [0] { + 30 224: SEQUENCE { + A0 111: [0] { + 30 109: SEQUENCE { + 30 107: SEQUENCE { + 30 105: SEQUENCE { + 16 10: IA5String 'image/jpeg' + 30 49: SEQUENCE { + 30 47: SEQUENCE { + 30 11: SEQUENCE { + 06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER + : sha-256 (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 1) + : } + 04 32: OCTET STRING + : AF FC 10 16 46 CB 56 25 B4 99 7D E5 89 3E AE 3A + : 84 6F 5A 02 D3 82 D6 DA 8E D4 EE F8 7C BD 1D ED + : } + : } + 30 40: SEQUENCE { + 16 38: IA5String 'http://www.example.net/images/logo.jpg' + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + A0 109: [0] { + 30 107: SEQUENCE { + 30 105: SEQUENCE { + 30 103: SEQUENCE { + 16 9: IA5String 'image/gif' + 30 49: SEQUENCE { + 30 47: SEQUENCE { + 30 11: SEQUENCE { + 06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER + : sha-256 (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 1) + : } + 04 32: OCTET STRING + : 88 90 81 81 AD FB 66 AE 2F 66 D0 49 A0 4D 8E A0 + : EC 4E A8 64 42 38 5B 36 4A BF 2C 8B D2 E9 E9 66 + : } + : } + 30 39: SEQUENCE { + 16 37: IA5String 'http://www.example.org/logo-image.gif' + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + A2 213: [2] { + A0 210: [0] { + 30 207: SEQUENCE { + 30 101: SEQUENCE { + 30 99: SEQUENCE { + 16 9: IA5String 'image/gif' + 30 49: SEQUENCE { + 30 47: SEQUENCE { + 30 11: SEQUENCE { + 06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER + : sha-256 (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 1) + : } + 04 32: OCTET STRING + : 6A 58 50 2E 59 67 F9 DD D1 8A FE BD 0D B1 FE 60 + : A5 13 1B DF 0F B2 BE F0 B5 73 45 50 BA 1B BF 19 + : } + : } + 30 35: SEQUENCE { + 16 33: IA5String 'http://www.smime.example/logo.gif' + : } + : } + : } + 30 102: SEQUENCE { + 30 100: SEQUENCE { + 16 10: IA5String 'image/jpeg' + 30 49: SEQUENCE { + 30 47: SEQUENCE { + 30 11: SEQUENCE { + 06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER + : sha-256 (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 1) + : } + 04 32: OCTET STRING + : BD CB 7B 75 72 6D 8C 1B 33 A4 2C DE AC 79 72 DA + : 4A D9 F2 79 84 0A 58 58 6A CE 2F 02 80 EA D7 A5 + : } + : } + 30 35: SEQUENCE { + 16 33: IA5String 'http://www.smime.example/logo.jpg' + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + : } + +Appendix C. Changes since RFCs 3709 and 6170 + + This appendix summarizes the changes since [RFC3709]. The changes + are: + + * Combine RFCs 3709 and 6170 into one document, and encourage + implementers to support the "data" URI scheme (data:...) that was + originally specified in RFC 6170. Merging RFCs 3709 and 6170 led + to many editorial changes throughout the document. + + * Drop SHA-1 as the mandatory-to-implement hash algorithm, and + encourage use of the one-way hash function that is employed by the + certificate signature algorithm. + + * RFC 3709 required client applications to support both direct and + indirect addressing. This requirement is changed to SHOULD + support both direct and indirect addressing to allow + implementations to be more privacy preserving. + + * Update the reference for language tags to be RFC 5646 instead of + the now obsolete RFC 3066. + + * Update the reference for the URI Generic Syntax to be RFC 3986 + instead of the now obsolete RFC 2396. + + * Update the reference for the application/pdf media type to be RFC + 8118 instead of the now obsolete RFC 3778. + + * No longer require support for the FTP scheme (ftp://...) URI. + + * Require support for the HTTP scheme (http://...) URI and the HTTPS + scheme (https://...) URI. + + * Provide syntax of the "data" URI scheme using modern ABNF. + + * Require support for the compressed SVG image format with the + image/svg+xml+gzip media type. + + * Media types MUST follow the ABNF [RFC5234] that is provided in + Section 8.3.1 of [RFC9110]. This change resolves Errata ID 2679. + + * Remove the requirement that the LogotypeData file name have a file + extension of ".LTD". This change resolves Errata ID 2325. + + * Encourage, instead of requiring, each logotype to be represented + by at least one image. + + * Encourage the inclusion of text-based audio data suitable for + processing by a text-to-speech software using the media type of + "text/plain;charset=UTF-8". + + * Encourage the use of dithering if an image needs to be scaled. + + * Require that the logotype certificate extension not contain more + than one certificate image logotype. + + * Privacy-related topics that were previously discussed in the + Security Considerations section are now covered in a separate + Privacy Considerations section. Additional topics are covered in + both sections. + + * Provide ASN.1 modules for both the older syntax [OLD-ASN1] and the + most recent ASN.1 syntax [NEW-ASN1]. + + * Provide additional references. + + * Provide additional examples. + + * Several editorial changes to improve clarity. + + * The example in Appendix B.1 was changed to use SHA-256 instead of + SHA-1. + +Acknowledgments + + * Acknowledgments from RFC 3709 + + This document is the result of contributions from many + professionals. The authors appreciate contributions from all + members of the IETF PKIX Working Group. We extend a special + thanks to Al Arsenault, David Cross, Tim Polk, Russel Weiser, + Terry Hayes, Alex Deacon, Andrew Hoag, Randy Sabett, Denis Pinkas, + Magnus Nystrom, Ryan Hurst, and Phil Griffin for their efforts and + support. + + Russ Housley thanks the management at RSA Laboratories, especially + Burt Kaliski, who supported the development of this specification. + The vast majority of the work on this specification was done while + Russ was employed at RSA Laboratories. + + * Acknowledgments from RFC 6170 + + The authors recognize valuable contributions from members of the + PKIX working group, the CA Browser Forum, and James Manger, for + their review and sample data. + + * Additional Acknowledgments + + Combining RFCs 3709 and 6170 has produced an improved + specification. The authors appreciate contributions from all + members of the IETF LAMPS Working Group. We extend a special + thanks to Alexey Melnikov for his guidance on media types. We + extend a special thanks to Tim Geiser for his careful checking of + the new examples in Appendices B.4 and B.5. We extend a special + thanks to Corey Bonnell, Daniel Kahn Gillmor, Roman Danyliw, Paul + Wouters, Paul Kyzivat, Shuping Peng, Sheng Jiang, Rob Wilton, Éric + Vyncke, Donald Eastlake 3rd, and Dan Harkins for their careful + review and helpful comments. + +Authors' Addresses + + Stefan Santesson + IDsec Solutions AB + Forskningsbyn Ideon + SE-223 70 Lund + Sweden + Email: sts@aaa-sec.com + + + Russ Housley + Vigil Security, LLC + 516 Dranesville Road + Herndon, VA 20170 + United States of America + Email: housley@vigilsec.com + + + Trevor Freeman + Amazon Web Services + 1918 8th Ave + Seattle, WA 98101 + United States of America + Email: frtrevor@amazon.com + + + Leonard Rosenthol + Adobe + 345 Park Avenue + San Jose, CA 95110 + United States of America + Email: lrosenth@adobe.com |