From 4bfd864f10b68b71482b35c818559068ef8d5797 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Voss Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2024 20:54:24 +0100 Subject: doc: Add RFC documents --- doc/rfc/rfc8849.txt | 645 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 645 insertions(+) create mode 100644 doc/rfc/rfc8849.txt (limited to 'doc/rfc/rfc8849.txt') diff --git a/doc/rfc/rfc8849.txt b/doc/rfc/rfc8849.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..55e737d --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/rfc/rfc8849.txt @@ -0,0 +1,645 @@ + + + + +Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Even +Request for Comments: 8849 +Category: Standards Track J. Lennox +ISSN: 2070-1721 8x8 / Jitsi + January 2021 + + + Mapping RTP Streams to Controlling Multiple Streams for Telepresence + (CLUE) Media Captures + +Abstract + + This document describes how the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) is + used in the context of the Controlling Multiple Streams for + Telepresence (CLUE) protocol. It also describes the mechanisms and + recommended practice for mapping RTP media streams, as defined in the + Session Description Protocol (SDP), to CLUE Media Captures and + defines a new RTP header extension (CaptureID). + +Status of This Memo + + This is an Internet Standards Track document. + + This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force + (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has + received public review and has been approved for publication by the + Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on + Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841. + + Information about the current status of this document, any errata, + and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at + https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8849. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the + document authors. All rights reserved. + + This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal + Provisions Relating to IETF Documents + (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of + publication of this document. Please review these documents + carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect + to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must + include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of + the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as + described in the Simplified BSD License. + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction + 2. Terminology + 3. RTP Topologies for CLUE + 4. Mapping CLUE Capture Encodings to RTP Streams + 5. MCC Constituent CaptureID Definition + 5.1. RTCP CaptureID SDES Item + 5.2. RTP Header Extension + 6. Examples + 7. Communication Security + 8. IANA Considerations + 9. Security Considerations + 10. References + 10.1. Normative References + 10.2. Informative References + Acknowledgments + Authors' Addresses + +1. Introduction + + Telepresence systems can send and receive multiple media streams. + The CLUE Framework [RFC8845] defines Media Captures (MCs) as a source + of Media, from one or more Capture Devices. A Media Capture may also + be constructed from other Media streams. A middlebox can express + conceptual Media Captures that it constructs from Media streams it + receives. A Multiple Content Capture (MCC) is a special Media + Capture composed of multiple Media Captures. + + SIP Offer/Answer [RFC3264] uses SDP [RFC4566] to describe the RTP + media streams [RFC3550]. Each RTP stream has a unique + Synchronization Source (SSRC) within its RTP session. The content of + the RTP stream is created by an encoder in the endpoint. This may be + an original content from a camera or a content created by an + intermediary device like a Multipoint Control Unit (MCU). + + This document makes recommendations for the CLUE architecture about + how RTP and RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) streams should be encoded and + transmitted and how their relation to CLUE Media Captures should be + communicated. The proposed solution supports multiple RTP topologies + [RFC7667]. + + With regards to the media (audio, video, and timed text), systems + that support CLUE use RTP for the media, SDP for codec and media + transport negotiation (CLUE individual encodings), and the CLUE + protocol for Media Capture description and selection. In order to + associate the media in the different protocols, there are three + mappings that need to be specified: + + 1. CLUE individual encodings to SDP + + 2. RTP streams to SDP (this is not a CLUE-specific mapping) + + 3. RTP streams to MC to map the received RTP stream to the current + MC in the MCC. + +2. Terminology + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and + "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in + BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all + capitals, as shown here. + + Definitions from the CLUE Framework (see Section 3 of [RFC8845]) are + used by this document as well. + +3. RTP Topologies for CLUE + + The typical RTP topologies used by CLUE telepresence systems specify + different behaviors for RTP and RTCP distribution. A number of RTP + topologies are described in [RFC7667]. For CLUE telepresence, the + relevant topologies include Point-to-Point, as well as Media-Mixing + Mixers, Media-Switching Mixers, and Selective Forwarding Middleboxes. + + In the Point-to-Point topology, one peer communicates directly with a + single peer over unicast. There can be one or more RTP sessions, + each sent on a separate 5-tuple, that have a separate SSRC space, + with each RTP session carrying multiple RTP streams identified by + their SSRC. All SSRCs are recognized by the peers based on the + information in the RTCP Source description (SDES) report that + includes the Canonical Name (CNAME) and SSRC of the sent RTP streams. + There are different Point-to-Point use cases as specified in the CLUE + use case [RFC7205]. In some cases, a CLUE session that, at a high + level, is Point-to-Point may nonetheless have an RTP stream that is + best described by one of the mixer topologies. For example, a CLUE + endpoint can produce composite or switched captures for use by a + receiving system with fewer displays than the sender has cameras. + The Media Capture may be described using an MCC. + + For the media mixer topology [RFC7667], the peers communicate only + with the mixer. The mixer provides mixed or composited media + streams, using its own SSRC for the sent streams. If needed by the + CLUE endpoint, the conference roster information including conference + participants, endpoints, media, and media-id (SSRC) can be determined + using the conference event package [RFC4575] element. + + Media-Switching Mixers and Selective Forwarding Middleboxes behave as + described in [RFC7667]. + +4. Mapping CLUE Capture Encodings to RTP Streams + + The different topologies described in Section 3 create different SSRC + distribution models and RTP stream multiplexing points. + + Most video conferencing systems today can separate multiple RTP + sources by placing them into RTP sessions using the SDP description; + the video conferencing application can also have some knowledge about + the purpose of each RTP session. For example, video conferencing + applications that have a primary video source and a slides video + source can send each media source in a separate RTP session with a + content attribute [RFC4796], enabling different application behavior + for each received RTP media source. Demultiplexing is + straightforward because each Media Capture is sent as a single RTP + stream, with each RTP stream being sent in a separate RTP session, on + a distinct UDP 5-tuple. This will also be true for mapping the RTP + streams to Capture Encodings, if each Capture Encoding uses a + separate RTP session and the consumer can identify it based on the + receiving RTP port. In this case, SDP only needs to label the RTP + session with an identifier that can be used to identify the Media + Capture in the CLUE description. The SDP label attribute serves as + this identifier. + + Each Capture Encoding MUST be sent as a separate RTP stream. CLUE + endpoints MUST support sending each such RTP stream in a separate RTP + session signaled by an SDP "m=" line. They MAY also support sending + some or all of the RTP streams in a single RTP session, using the + mechanism described in [RFC8843] to relate RTP streams to SDP "m=" + lines. + + MCCs bring another mapping issue, in that an MCC represents multiple + Media Captures that can be sent as part of the MCC if configured by + the consumer. When receiving an RTP stream that is mapped to the + MCC, the consumer needs to know which original MC it is in order to + get the MC parameters from the advertisement. If a consumer + requested a MCC, the original MC does not have a Capture Encoding, so + it cannot be associated with an "m=" line using a label as described + in "CLUE Signaling" [RFC8848]. It is important, for example, to get + correct scaling information for the original MC, which may be + different for the various MCs that are contributing to the MCC. + +5. MCC Constituent CaptureID Definition + + For an MCC that can represent multiple switched MCs, there is a need + to know which MC is represented in the current RTP stream at any + given time. This requires a mapping from the SSRC of the RTP stream + conveying a particular MCC to the constituent MC. In order to + address this mapping, this document defines an RTP header extension + and SDES item that includes the captureID of the original MC, + allowing the consumer to use the MC's original source attributes like + the spatial information. + + This mapping temporarily associates the SSRC of the RTP stream + conveying a particular MCC with the captureID of the single original + MC that is currently switched into the MCC. This mapping cannot be + used for a composed case where more than one original MC is composed + into the MCC simultaneously. + + If there is only one MC in the MCC, then the media provider MUST send + the captureID of the current constituent MC in the RTP header + extension and as an RTCP CaptureID SDES item. When the media + provider switches the MC it sends within an MCC, it MUST send the + captureID value for the MC that just switched into the MCC in an RTP + header extension and as an RTCP CaptureID SDES item as specified in + [RFC7941]. + + If there is more than one MC composed into the MCC, then the media + provider MUST NOT send any of the MCs' captureIDs using this + mechanism. However, if an MCC is sending Contributing Source (CSRC) + information in the RTP header for a composed capture, it MAY send the + captureID values in the RTCP SDES packets giving source information + for the SSRC values sent as CSRCs. + + If the media provider sends the captureID of a single MC switched + into an MCC, then later sends one composed stream of multiple MCs in + the same MCC, it MUST send the special value "-", a single-dash + character, as the captureID RTP header extension and RTCP CaptureID + SDES item. The single-dash character indicates there is no + applicable value for the MCC constituent CaptureID. The media + consumer interprets this as meaning that any previous CaptureID value + associated with this SSRC no longer applies. As [RFC8846] defines + the captureID syntax as "xs:ID", the single-dash character is not a + legal captureID value, so there is no possibility of confusing it + with an actual captureID. + +5.1. RTCP CaptureID SDES Item + + This document specifies a new RTCP SDES item. + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | CaptId=14 | length | CaptureID | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | .... | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + This CaptureID is a variable-length UTF-8 string corresponding to + either a CaptureID negotiated in the CLUE protocol or the single + character "-". + + This SDES item MUST be sent in an SDES packet within a compound RTCP + packet unless support for Reduced-Size RTCP has been negotiated as + specified in RFC 5506 [RFC5506], in which case it can be sent as an + SDES packet in a noncompound RTCP packet. + +5.2. RTP Header Extension + + The CaptureID is also carried in an RTP header extension [RFC8285], + using the mechanism defined in [RFC7941]. + + Support is negotiated within SDP using the URN "urn:ietf:params:rtp- + hdrext:sdes:CaptureID". + + The CaptureID is sent in an RTP header extension because for switched + captures, receivers need to know which original MC corresponds to the + media being sent for an MCC, in order to correctly apply geometric + adjustments to the received media. + + As discussed in [RFC7941], there is no need to send the CaptId Header + Extension with all RTP packets. Senders MAY choose to send it only + when a new MC is sent. If such a mode is being used, the header + extension SHOULD be sent in the first few RTP packets to reduce the + risk of losing it due to packet loss. See [RFC7941] for further + discussion. + +6. Examples + + In this partial advertisement, the media provider advertises a + composed capture VC7 made of a big picture representing the current + speaker (VC3) and two picture-in-picture boxes representing the + previous speakers (the previous one -- VC5 -- and the oldest one -- + VC6). + + + CS1 + true + + VC3 + VC5 + VC6 + + 3 + false + big picture of the current + speaker pips about previous speakers + 1 + it + static + individual + + + In this case, the media provider will send capture IDs VC3, VC5, or + VC6 as an RTP header extension and RTCP SDES message for the RTP + stream associated with the MC. + + Note that this is part of the full advertisement message example from + the CLUE data model example [RFC8846] and is not a valid XML + document. + +7. Communication Security + + CLUE endpoints MUST support RTP/SAVPF profiles and the Secure Real- + time Transport Protocol (SRTP) [RFC3711]. CLUE endpoints MUST + support DTLS [RFC6347] and DTLS-SRTP [RFC5763] [RFC5764] for SRTP + keying. + + All media channels SHOULD be secure via SRTP and the RTP/SAVPF + profile unless the RTP media and its associated RTCP are secure by + other means (see [RFC7201] and [RFC7202]). + + All CLUE implementations MUST support DTLS 1.2 with the + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 cipher suite and the P-256 + curve [FIPS186]. The DTLS-SRTP protection profile + SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80 MUST be supported for SRTP. + Implementations MUST favor cipher suites that support Perfect Forward + Secrecy (PFS) over non-PFS cipher suites and SHOULD favor + Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) over non-AEAD + cipher suites. Encrypted SRTP Header extensions [RFC6904] MUST be + supported. + + Implementations SHOULD implement DTLS 1.2 with the + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 cipher suite. + Implementations MUST favor cipher suites that support Perfect Forward + Secrecy (PFS) over non- PFS cipher suites and SHOULD favor + Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) over non-AEAD + cipher suites. + + NULL Protection profiles MUST NOT be used for RTP or RTCP. + + CLUE endpoints MUST generate short-term persistent RTCP CNAMEs, as + specified in [RFC7022], and thus can't be used for long-term tracking + of the users. + +8. IANA Considerations + + This document defines a new extension URI in the "RTP SDES Compact + Header Extensions" subregistry of the "Real-Time Transport Protocol + (RTP) Parameters" registry, according to the following data: + + Extension URI: urn:ietf:params:rtp-hdrext:sdes:CaptId + + Description: CLUE CaptId + + Contact: Roni Even + + Reference: RFC 8849 + + The IANA has registered one new RTCP SDES items in the "RTCP SDES + Item Types" registry, as follows: + + +=======+========+=============+===========+ + | Value | Abbrev | Name | Reference | + +=======+========+=============+===========+ + | 14 | CCID | CLUE CaptId | RFC 8849 | + +-------+--------+-------------+-----------+ + + Table 1 + +9. Security Considerations + + The security considerations of the RTP specification, the RTP/SAVPF + profile, and the various RTP/RTCP extensions and RTP payload formats + that form the complete protocol suite described in this memo apply. + It is believed that there are no new security considerations + resulting from the combination of these various protocol extensions. + + The "Extended Secure RTP Profile for Real-time Transport Control + Protocol (RTCP)-Based Feedback (RTP/SAVPF)" document [RFC5124] + provides the handling of fundamental issues by offering + confidentiality, integrity, and partial source authentication. A + mandatory-to-implement and use media security solution is created by + combining this secured RTP profile and DTLS-SRTP keying [RFC5764] as + defined in the communication security section of this memo + (Section 7). + + RTCP packets convey a CNAME identifier that is used to associate RTP + packet streams that need to be synchronized across related RTP + sessions. Inappropriate choice of CNAME values can be a privacy + concern, since long-term persistent CNAME identifiers can be used to + track users across multiple calls. The communication security + section of this memo (Section 7) mandates the generation of short- + term persistent RTCP CNAMEs, as specified in [RFC7022], so they can't + be used for long-term tracking of the users. + + Some potential denial-of-service attacks exist if the RTCP reporting + interval is configured to an inappropriate value. This could be done + by configuring the RTCP bandwidth fraction to an excessively large or + small value using the SDP "b=RR:" or "b=RS:" lines [RFC3556], or some + similar mechanism, or by choosing an excessively large or small value + for the RTP/AVPF minimal receiver report interval (if using SDP, this + is the "a=rtcp-fb:... trr-int" parameter) [RFC4585]. The risks are + as follows: + + 1. The RTCP bandwidth could be configured to make the regular + reporting interval so large that effective congestion control + cannot be maintained, potentially leading to denial of service + due to congestion caused by the media traffic; + + 2. The RTCP interval could be configured to a very small value, + causing endpoints to generate high-rate RTCP traffic, which + potentially leads to denial of service due to the non-congestion- + controlled RTCP traffic; and + + 3. RTCP parameters could be configured differently for each + endpoint, with some of the endpoints using a large reporting + interval and some using a smaller interval, leading to denial of + service due to premature participant timeouts, which are due to + mismatched timeout periods that are based on the reporting + interval (this is a particular concern if endpoints use a small + but non-zero value for the RTP/AVPF minimal receiver report + interval (trr-int) [RFC4585], as discussed in [RFC8108]). + + Premature participant timeout can be avoided by using the fixed (non- + reduced) minimum interval when calculating the participant timeout + [RFC8108]. To address the other concerns, endpoints SHOULD ignore + parameters that configure the RTCP reporting interval to be + significantly longer than the default five-second interval specified + in [RFC3550] (unless the media data rate is so low that the longer + reporting interval roughly corresponds to 5% of the media data rate) + or that configure the RTCP reporting interval small enough that the + RTCP bandwidth would exceed the media bandwidth. + + The guidelines in [RFC6562] apply when using variable bit rate (VBR) + audio codecs such as Opus. + + Encryption of the header extensions is RECOMMENDED, unless there are + known reasons, like RTP middleboxes performing voice-activity-based + source selection or third-party monitoring that will greatly benefit + from the information, and this has been expressed using API or + signaling. If further evidence is produced to show that information + leakage is significant from audio level indications, then the use of + encryption needs to be mandated at that time. + + In multi-party communication scenarios using RTP middleboxes, the + middleboxes are REQUIRED, by this protocol, to not weaken the + sessions' security. The middlebox SHOULD maintain confidentiality, + maintain integrity, and perform source authentication. The middlebox + MAY perform checks that prevent any endpoint participating in a + conference to impersonate another. Some additional security + considerations regarding multi-party topologies can be found in + [RFC7667]. + + The CaptureID is created as part of the CLUE protocol. The CaptId + SDES item is used to convey the same CaptureID value in the SDES + item. When sending the SDES item, the security considerations + specified in Section 6 of [RFC7941] and in the communication security + section of this memo (see Section 7) are applicable. Note that since + the CaptureID is also carried in CLUE protocol messages, it is + RECOMMENDED that this SDES item use at least similar protection + profiles as the CLUE protocol messages carried in the CLUE data + channel. + +10. References + +10.1. Normative References + + [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, + DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, + . + + [RFC3711] Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K. + Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", + RFC 3711, DOI 10.17487/RFC3711, March 2004, + . + + [RFC5763] Fischl, J., Tschofenig, H., and E. Rescorla, "Framework + for Establishing a Secure Real-time Transport Protocol + (SRTP) Security Context Using Datagram Transport Layer + Security (DTLS)", RFC 5763, DOI 10.17487/RFC5763, May + 2010, . + + [RFC5764] McGrew, D. and E. Rescorla, "Datagram Transport Layer + Security (DTLS) Extension to Establish Keys for the Secure + Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", RFC 5764, + DOI 10.17487/RFC5764, May 2010, + . + + [RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer + Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347, + January 2012, . + + [RFC6904] Lennox, J., "Encryption of Header Extensions in the Secure + Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", RFC 6904, + DOI 10.17487/RFC6904, April 2013, + . + + [RFC7941] Westerlund, M., Burman, B., Even, R., and M. Zanaty, "RTP + Header Extension for the RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) + Source Description Items", RFC 7941, DOI 10.17487/RFC7941, + August 2016, . + + [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC + 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, + May 2017, . + + [RFC8843] Holmberg, C., Alvestrand, H., and C. Jennings, + "Negotiating Media Multiplexing Using the Session + Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 8843, + DOI 10.17487/RFC8843, January 2021, + . + + [RFC8845] Duckworth, M., Ed., Pepperell, A., and S. Wenger, + "Framework for Telepresence Multi-Streams", RFC 8845, + DOI 10.17487/RFC8845, January 2021, + . + + [RFC8846] Presta, R. and S P. Romano, "An XML Schema for the + Controlling Multiple Streams for Telepresence (CLUE) Data + Model", RFC 8846, DOI 10.17487/RFC8846, January 2021, + . + +10.2. Informative References + + [FIPS186] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), + "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS, PUB 186-4, + DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4, July 2013, + . + + [RFC3264] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "An Offer/Answer Model + with Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 3264, + DOI 10.17487/RFC3264, June 2002, + . + + [RFC3550] Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V. + Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time + Applications", STD 64, RFC 3550, DOI 10.17487/RFC3550, + July 2003, . + + [RFC3556] Casner, S., "Session Description Protocol (SDP) Bandwidth + Modifiers for RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) Bandwidth", + RFC 3556, DOI 10.17487/RFC3556, July 2003, + . + + [RFC4566] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session + Description Protocol", RFC 4566, DOI 10.17487/RFC4566, + July 2006, . + + [RFC4575] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., and O. Levin, Ed., "A + Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Event Package for + Conference State", RFC 4575, DOI 10.17487/RFC4575, August + 2006, . + + [RFC4585] Ott, J., Wenger, S., Sato, N., Burmeister, C., and J. Rey, + "Extended RTP Profile for Real-time Transport Control + Protocol (RTCP)-Based Feedback (RTP/AVPF)", RFC 4585, + DOI 10.17487/RFC4585, July 2006, + . + + [RFC4796] Hautakorpi, J. and G. Camarillo, "The Session Description + Protocol (SDP) Content Attribute", RFC 4796, + DOI 10.17487/RFC4796, February 2007, + . + + [RFC5124] Ott, J. and E. Carrara, "Extended Secure RTP Profile for + Real-time Transport Control Protocol (RTCP)-Based Feedback + (RTP/SAVPF)", RFC 5124, DOI 10.17487/RFC5124, February + 2008, . + + [RFC5506] Johansson, I. and M. Westerlund, "Support for Reduced-Size + Real-Time Transport Control Protocol (RTCP): Opportunities + and Consequences", RFC 5506, DOI 10.17487/RFC5506, April + 2009, . + + [RFC6562] Perkins, C. and JM. Valin, "Guidelines for the Use of + Variable Bit Rate Audio with Secure RTP", RFC 6562, + DOI 10.17487/RFC6562, March 2012, + . + + [RFC7022] Begen, A., Perkins, C., Wing, D., and E. Rescorla, + "Guidelines for Choosing RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) + Canonical Names (CNAMEs)", RFC 7022, DOI 10.17487/RFC7022, + September 2013, . + + [RFC7201] Westerlund, M. and C. Perkins, "Options for Securing RTP + Sessions", RFC 7201, DOI 10.17487/RFC7201, April 2014, + . + + [RFC7202] Perkins, C. and M. Westerlund, "Securing the RTP + Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single Media + Security Solution", RFC 7202, DOI 10.17487/RFC7202, April + 2014, . + + [RFC7205] Romanow, A., Botzko, S., Duckworth, M., and R. Even, Ed., + "Use Cases for Telepresence Multistreams", RFC 7205, + DOI 10.17487/RFC7205, April 2014, + . + + [RFC7667] Westerlund, M. and S. Wenger, "RTP Topologies", RFC 7667, + DOI 10.17487/RFC7667, November 2015, + . + + [RFC8108] Lennox, J., Westerlund, M., Wu, Q., and C. Perkins, + "Sending Multiple RTP Streams in a Single RTP Session", + RFC 8108, DOI 10.17487/RFC8108, March 2017, + . + + [RFC8285] Singer, D., Desineni, H., and R. Even, Ed., "A General + Mechanism for RTP Header Extensions", RFC 8285, + DOI 10.17487/RFC8285, October 2017, + . + + [RFC8848] Hanton, R., Kyzivat, P., Xiao, L., and C. Groves, "Session + Signaling for Controlling Multiple Streams for + Telepresence (CLUE)", RFC 8848, DOI 10.17487/RFC8848, + January 2021, . + +Acknowledgments + + The authors would like to thank Allyn Romanow and Paul Witty for + contributing text to this work. Magnus Westerlund helped draft the + security section. + +Authors' Addresses + + Roni Even + Tel Aviv + Israel + + Email: ron.even.tlv@gmail.com + + + Jonathan Lennox + 8x8, Inc. / Jitsi + Jersey City, NJ 07302 + United States of America + + Email: jonathan.lennox@8x8.com -- cgit v1.2.3