path: root/doc/rfc/rfc4595.txt

Network Working Group                                           F. Maino
Request for Comments: 4595                                 Cisco Systems
Category: Informational                                         D. Black
                                                         EMC Corporation
                                                               July 2006


                          Use of IKEv2 in the
         Fibre Channel Security Association Management Protocol

Status of This Memo

   This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does
   not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this
   memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).

Abstract

   This document describes the use of IKEv2 to negotiate security
   protocols and transforms for Fibre Channel as part of the Fibre
   Channel Security Association Management Protocol.  This usage
   requires that IKEv2 be extended with Fibre-Channel-specific security
   protocols, transforms, and name types.  This document specifies these
   IKEv2 extensions and allocates identifiers for them.  Using new IKEv2
   identifiers for Fibre Channel security protocols avoids any possible
   confusion between IKEv2 negotiation for IP networks and IKEv2
   negotiation for Fibre Channel.




















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Table of Contents

   1. Introduction ....................................................3
      1.1. Requirements Notation ......................................3
   2. Overview ........................................................4
   3. Fibre Channel Security Protocols ................................5
      3.1. ESP_Header Protocol ........................................6
      3.2. CT_Authentication Protocol .................................7
   4. The FC SA Management Protocol ...................................9
      4.1. Fibre Channel Name Identifier ..............................9
      4.2. ESP_Header and CT_Authentication Protocol ID ...............9
      4.3. CT_Authentication Protocol Transform Identifiers ..........10
      4.4. Fibre Channel Traffic Selectors ...........................10
      4.5. Negotiating Security Associations for FC and IP ...........12
   5. Security Considerations ........................................12
   6. IANA Considerations ............................................13
   7. References .....................................................14
      7.1. Normative References ......................................14
      7.2. Informative References ....................................14
































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1.  Introduction

   Fibre Channel (FC) is a gigabit-speed network technology primarily
   used for Storage Networking.  Fibre Channel is standardized in the
   T11 [T11] Technical Committee of the InterNational Committee for
   Information Technology Standards (INCITS), an American National
   Standard Institute (ANSI) accredited standards committee.

   FC-SP (Fibre Channel Security Protocols) is a T11 Technical Committee
   working group that has developed the "Fibre Channel Security
   Protocols" standard [FC-SP], a security architecture for Fibre
   Channel networks.

   The FC-SP standard defines a set of protocols for Fibre Channel
   networks that provides:

   1.  device-to-device (hosts, disks, switches) authentication;

   2.  management and establishment of secrets and security
       associations;

   3.  data origin authentication, integrity, anti-replay protection,
       confidentiality; and

   4.  security policies distribution.

   Within this framework, a Fibre Channel device can verify the identity
   of another Fibre Channel device and establish a shared secret that
   will be used to negotiate security associations for security
   protocols applied to Fibre Channel frames and information units.  The
   same framework allows for distributions within a Fibre Channel fabric
   of policies that will be enforced by the fabric.

   FC-SP has adapted the IKEv2 protocol [RFC4306] to provide
   authentication of Fibre Channel entities and setup of security
   associations.

1.1.  Requirements Notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].









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2.  Overview

   Fibre Channel defines two security protocols that provide security
   services for different portions of Fibre Channel traffic: the
   ESP_Header defined in [FC-FS] and CT_Authentication defined in
   [FC-GS-4].

   The ESP_Header protocol is a transform applied to FC-2 Fibre Channel
   frames.  It is based on the IP Encapsulation Security Payload
   [RFC4303] to provide origin authentication, integrity, anti-replay
   protection, and optional confidentiality to generic fibre channel
   frames.  The CT_Authentication protocol is a transform that provides
   the same set of security services for Common Transport Information
   Units, which are used to convey control information.  As a result of
   the separation of Fibre Channel data traffic from control traffic,
   only one protocol (either ESP_Header or CT_Authentication) is
   applicable to any FC Security Association (SA).

   Security associations for the ESP_Header and CT_Authentication
   protocols between two Fibre Channel entities (hosts, disks, or
   switches) are negotiated by the Fibre Channel Security Association
   Management Protocol, a generic protocol based on IKEv2 [RFC4306].

   Since IP is transported over Fibre Channel [RFC4338] and Fibre
   Channel/SCSI are transported over IP [RFC3643], [RFC3821] there is
   the potential for confusion when IKEv2 is used for both IP and FC
   traffic.  This document specifies identifiers for IKEv2 over FC in a
   fashion that ensures that any mistaken usage of IKEv2/FC over IP will
   result in a negotiation failure due to the absence of an acceptable
   proposal (and likewise for IKEv2/IP over FC).  This document gives an
   overview of the security architecture defined by the FC-SP standard,
   including the security protocols used to protect frames and to
   negotiate SAs, and it specifies the entities for which new
   identifiers have been assigned.

















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3.  Fibre Channel Security Protocols

   The Fibre Channel protocol is described in [FC-FS] as a network
   architecture organized in 5 levels.  The FC-2 level defines the FC
   frame format (shown in Figure 1), the transport services, and control
   functions required for information transfer.

   +-----+-----------+-----------+--------//-------+-----+-----+
   |     |           |         Data Field          |     |     |
   | SOF | FC Header |<--------------------------->| CRC | EOF |
   |     |           | Optional  | Frame           |     |     |
   |     |           | Header(s) | Payload         |     |     |
   +-----+-----------+-----------+--------//-------+-----+-----+

                   Figure 1: Fibre Channel Frame Format

   Fibre Channel Generic Services share a Common Transport (CT) at the
   FC-4 level defined in [FC-GS-4].  The CT provides access to a Service
   (e.g., Directory Service) with a set of service parameters that
   facilitates the usage of Fibre Channel constructs.

   A Common Transport Information Unit (CT_IU) is the common Fibre
   Channel Sequence used to transfer all information between a Client
   and a Server.  The first part of the CT_IU, shown in Figure 2,
   contains a preamble with information common to all CT_IUs.  An
   optional Extended CT_IU Preamble carries the CT_Authentication
   protocol that provides authentication and, optionally,
   confidentiality to CT_IUs.  The CT_IU is completed by an optional
   Vendor-Specific Preamble and by additional information as defined by
   the preamble.





















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    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~                      Basic CT_IU Preamble                     ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~                 Extended CT_IU Preamble (optional)            ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~                Vendor Specific Preamble (optional)            ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~                     Additional Information                    ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                              Figure 2: CT_IU

   Two security protocols are defined for Fibre Channel: the ESP_Header
   protocol that protects the FC-2 level, and the CT_Authentication
   protocol that protects the Common Transport at the FC-4 level.

   Security Associations for the ESP_Header and CT_Authentication
   protocols are negotiated by the Fibre Channel Security Association
   Management Protocol.

3.1.  ESP_Header Protocol

   ESP_Header is a security protocol for FC-2 Fibre Channel frames that
   provides origin authentication, integrity, anti-replay protection,
   and confidentiality.  ESP_Header is carried as the first optional
   header in the FC-2 frame, and its presence is signaled by a flag in
   the DF_CTL field of the FC-2 header.

   Figure 3 shows the format of an FC-2 frame encapsulated with an
   ESP_Header.  The encapsulation format is equivalent to the IP
   Encapsulating Security Payload [RFC4303], but the scope of the
   authentication covers the entire FC-2 header.  The Destination and
   Source Fibre Channel addresses (D_ID and S_ID) and the CS_CTL/
   Priority field are normalized before computation of the Integrity
   Check value to allow for address translation.






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    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ---
   |   R_CTL       |////////////////D_ID///////////////////////////| ^
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
   |//CS_CTL/Pri.//|////////////////S_ID///////////////////////////| |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
   |      Type     |               F_CTL                           |Auth
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+Cov-
   |     SEQ_ID    |    DF_CTL     |        SEQ_CNT                |era-
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ge
   |             OX_ID             |             RX_ID             | |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
   |                           Parameter                           | |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
   |               Security Parameters Index (SPI)                 | |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
   |                      Sequence Number                          | |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |--
   |                    Payload Data  (variable)                   | |^
   ~                                                               ~ ||
   ~                                                               ~Conf
   |                                                               |Cov-
   +               +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+era-
   |               |     Padding (0-255 bytes)                     |ge
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+               +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ||
   |                               |  Pad Length   |   Reserved    | vv
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+----
   |                 Integrity Check Value (variable)              |
   ~                                                               ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                    Figure 3: ESP_Header Encapsulation

   All the security transforms that are defined for the IP Encapsulating
   Security Payload, such as AES-CBC [RFC3602], can be applied to the
   ESP_Header protocol.

3.2.  CT_Authentication Protocol

   CT_Authentication is a security protocol for Common Transport FC-4
   Information Units that provides origin authentication, integrity, and
   anti-replay protection.  The CT_Authentication protocol is carried in
   the optional extended CT_IU preamble






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   The extended CT_IU preamble, shown in Figure 4, includes an
   Authentication Security Association Identifier (SAID), a transaction
   ID, the N_port name of the requesting node, a Time Stamp used to
   prevent replay attacks, and an Authentication Hash Block.

   The scope of the Authentication Hash Block Covers all data words of
   the CT_IU, with the exception of the frame_header, the IN_ID field in
   the basic CT_IU preamble, the Authentication Hash Block itself, and
   the frame CRC field.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                       Authentication SAID                     |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                          Transaction_id                       |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   +                    Requesting_CT N_Port Name                  +
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   +                            Time Stamp                         +
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~                     Authentication Hash Block                 ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                     Figure 4: Extended CT_IU Preamble

   The Authentication Hash Block is computed as an HMAC keyed hash of
   the CT_IU, as defined in [RFC2104].  The entire output of the HMAC
   computation is included in the Authentication Hash Block, without any
   truncation.  Two transforms are defined: HMAC-SHA1-160 that is based
   on the cryptographic hash function SHA1 [NIST.180-1.1995], and
   HMAC-MD5-128 that is based on the cryptographic hash function MD5
   [RFC1321].












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4.  The FC SA Management Protocol

   Fibre Channel entities negotiate security associations for the
   protocols described above by using the Fibre Channel Security
   Association Management protocol, as defined in [FC-SP].  The protocol
   is a modified subset of the IKEv2 protocol [RFC4306] that performs
   the same core operations, and it uses the Fibre Channel AUTH protocol
   to transport IKEv2 messages.

   The protocol supports only the basic features of IKEv2: initial
   exchange to create an IKE SA and the first child SA, the
   CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange to negotiate additional SAs, and the
   INFORMATIONAL exchange, including notification, delete, and vendor ID
   payloads.  IKEv2 features that are not supported for Fibre Channels
   include: negotiation of multiple protocols within the same proposal,
   capability to handle multiple outstanding requests, cookies,
   configuration payload, and the Extended Authentication Protocol (EAP)
   payload.

   The following subsections describe the additional IANA assigned
   values required by the Fibre Channel Security Association Management
   protocol, as defined in [FC-SP].  All the values have been allocated
   from the new registries created for the IKEv2 protocol [RFC4306].

4.1.  Fibre Channel Name Identifier

   Fibre Channels entities that negotiate security associations are
   identified by an 8-byte Name.  Support for this name format has been
   added to the IKEv2 Identification Payload, introducing a new ID type
   beyond the ones already defined in Section 3.5 of [RFC4306].  This ID
   Type MUST be supported by any implementation of the Fibre Channel
   Security Association Management Protocol.

   The FC_Name_Identifier is then defined as a single 8-octet Fibre
   Channel Name:

           ID Type                       Value
           -------                       -----
           ID_FC_NAME                    12

4.2.  ESP_Header and CT_Authentication Protocol ID

   Security protocols negotiated by IKEv2 are identified by the Protocol
   ID field contained in the proposal substructure of a Security
   Association Payload, as defined in Section 3.3.1 of [RFC4306].

   The following protocol IDs have been defined to identify the Fibre
   Channel ESP_Header and the CT_Authentication security protocols:



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           Protocol ID             Value
           -----------             -----
           FC_ESP_HEADER           4

           FC_CT_AUTHENTICATION    5

   The existing IKEv2 value for ESP (3) is deliberately not reused in
   order to avoid any possibility of confusion between IKEv2 proposals
   for IP security associations and IKEv2 proposals for FC security
   associations.

   The number and type of transforms that accompany an SA payload are
   dependent on the protocol in the SA itself.  An SA payload proposing
   the establishment of a Fibre Channel SA has the following mandatory
   and optional transform types.

           Protocol              Mandatory Types   Optional Types
           --------              ---------------   --------------
           FC_ESP_HEADER            Integrity      Encryption, DH Groups

           FC_CT_AUTHENTICATION     Integrity      Encryption, DH Groups

4.3.  CT_Authentication Protocol Transform Identifiers

   The CT_Authentication Transform IDs defined for Transform Type 3
   (Integrity Algorithm) are:

           Name                   Number                    Defined in
           ----                   ------                    ----------
           AUTH_HMAC_MD5_128      6                         FC-SP

           AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_160     7                         FC-SP

   These transforms differ from the corresponding _96 transforms used in
   IPsec solely in the omission of the truncation of the HMAC output to
   96 bits; instead, the entire output (128 bits for MD5, 160 bits for
   SHA-1) is transmitted.  MD5 support is required due to existing usage
   of MD5 in CT_Authentication; SHA-1 is RECOMMENDED in all new
   implementations.

4.4.  Fibre Channel Traffic Selectors

   Fibre Channel Traffic Selectors allow peers to identify packet flows
   for processing by Fibre Channel security services.  A new Traffic
   Selector Type has been added to the IKEv2 Traffic Selector Types
   Registry defined in Section 3.13.1 of [RFC4306].  This Traffic
   Selector Type MUST be supported by any implementation of the Fibre
   Channel Security Association Management Protocol.



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   Fibre Channel traffic selectors are defined in [FC-SP] as a list of
   FC address and protocol ranges, as shown in Figure 5.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    TS TYPE    |   Reserved    |       Selector Length         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    Reserved   |               Starting Address                |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    Reserved   |                Ending Address                 |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Starting R_CTL| Ending R_CTL  | Starting Type | Ending Type   |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                 Figure 5: Fibre Channel Traffic Selector

   The following table lists the assigned value for the Fibre Channel
   Traffic Selector Type field:

           TS Type                Value
           -------                -----
           TS_FC_ADDR_RANGE       9

   The Starting and Ending Address fields are 24-bit addresses assigned
   to Fibre Channel names as part of initializing Fibre Channel
   communications (e.g., for a switched Fibre Channel Fabric, end nodes
   acquire these identifiers from Fabric Login, FLOGI).

   The Starting and Ending R_CTL fields are the 8-bit Routing Control
   identifiers that define the category and, in some cases, the function
   of the FC frame; see [FC-FS] for details.

   As a result of the separation of Fibre Channel data traffic from
   control traffic, only one protocol (either ESP_Header or
   CT_Authentication) is applicable to any FC Security Association.
   When the Fibre Channel Traffic Selector is defined for the ESP_Header
   protocol, the Starting Type and Ending Type fields identify the range
   of FC-2 protocols to be selected.  When the Fibre Channel Traffic
   Selector is defined for the CT_Authentication protocol, the FC-2 Type
   is implicitly set to the value '20h', which identifies
   CT_Authentication information units, and the Starting Type and Ending
   Type fields identify the range of Generic Service subtypes
   (GS_Subtype) to be selected.  See [FC-FS] and [FC-GS-4] for details.







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4.5.  Negotiating Security Associations for FC and IP

   The ESP_header and CT_Authentication protocols are Fibre-Channel-
   specific security protocols that apply to Fibre Channel frames only.
   The values identifying security protocols, transforms, selectors, and
   name types defined in this document MUST NOT be used during IKEv2
   negotiation for IPsec protocols.

5.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations in IKEv2 [RFC4306] apply, with the
   exception of those related to NAT traversal, EAP, and IP
   fragmentation.  NAT traversal and EAP, in fact, are not supported by
   the Fibre Channel Security Association Management Protocol (which is
   based on IKEv2), and IP fragmentation cannot occur because IP is not
   used to carry the Fibre Channel Security Association Management
   Protocol messages.

   Fibre Channel Security Association Management Protocol messages are
   mapped over Fibre Channel Sequences.  A Sequence is able to carry up
   to 4 GB of data; there are no theoretical limitations to the size of
   IKEv2 messages.  However, some Fibre Channel endpoint implementations
   have limited sequencing capabilities for the particular frames used
   to map IKEv2 messages over Fibre Channel.  To address these
   limitations, the Fibre Channel Security Association Management
   Protocol supports fragmentation of IKEv2 messages (see Section 5.9 of
   [FC-SP]).  If the IKEv2 messages are long enough to trigger
   fragmentation, it is possible that attackers could prevent the IKEv2
   exchange from completing by exhausting the reassembly buffers.  The
   chances of this can be minimized by using the Hash and URL encodings
   instead of sending certificates (see Section 3.6 of [RFC4306]).




















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6.  IANA Considerations

   The standards action of this document establishes the following
   values allocated by IANA in the registries created for IKEv2
   [RFC4306].

   Allocated the following value for the IKEv2 Identification Payload ID
   Types Registry (Section 3.5 of [RFC4306]):

           ID Type                 Value
           -------                 -----
           ID_FC_NAME              12

   Allocated the following values for the IKEv2 Security Protocol
   Identifiers Registry (Section 3.3.1 of [RFC4306]):

           Protocol ID             Value
           -----------             -----
           FC_ESP_HEADER           4

           FC_CT_AUTHENTICATION    5

   Allocated the following values for Transform Type 3 (Integrity
   Algorithm) for the IKEv2 Integrity Algorithm Transform IDs Registry
   (Section 3.3.2 of [RFC4306]):

           Name                    Number
           ----                    ------
           AUTH_HMAC_MD5_128       6

           AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_160      7

   Allocated the following value for the IKEv2 Traffic Selector Types
   Registry (Section 3.13.1 of [RFC4306]):

           TS Type                 Value
           -------                 -----
           TS_FC_ADDR_RANGE        9













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7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [NIST.180-1.1995]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
              Hash Standard", NIST 180-1, April 1995.

   [RFC1321]  Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
              April 1992.

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC:  Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February
              1997.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3602]  Frankel, S., Glenn, R., and S. Kelly, "The AES-CBC Cipher
              Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec", RFC 3602,
              September 2003.

   [RFC3643]  Weber, R., Rajagopal, M., Travostino, F., O'Donnell, M.,
              Monia, C., and M. Merhar, "Fibre Channel (FC) Frame
              Encapsulation", RFC 3643, December 2003.

   [RFC3821]  Rajagopal, M., E. Rodriguez, E., and R. Weber, "Fibre
              Channel Over TCP/IP (FCIP)", RFC 3602, July 2004.

   [RFC4303]  Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC
              4303, December 2005.

   [RFC4306]  Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", RFC
              4306, December 2005.

   [RFC4338]  DeSanti, C., Carlson, C., and R. Nixon, "Transmission of
              IPv6, IPv4, and Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) Packets
              over Fibre Channel", RFC 4338, January 2006.

7.2.  Informative References

   [FC-FS]    INCITS Technical Committee T11, ANSI INCITS 373-2003,
              "Fibre Channel - Framing and Signaling (FC-FS)".

   [FC-GS-4]  INCITS Technical Committee T11, ANSI INCITS 387-2004,
              "Fibre Channel - Generic Services 4 (FC-GS-4)".





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   [FC-SP]    INCITS Technical Committee T11, ANSI INCITS xxx-200x,
              "Fibre Channel - Security Protocols (FC-SP)".

   [T11]      INCITS Technical Commitee T11, "Home Page of the INCITS
              Technical Committee T11", <http://www.t11.org>.

Authors' Addresses

   Fabio Maino
   Cisco Systems
   375 East Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA  95134
   US

   Phone: +1 408 853 7530
   EMail: fmaino@cisco.com
   URI:   http://www.cisco.com/


   David L. Black
   EMC Corporation
   176 South Street
   Hopkinton, MA  01748
   US

   Phone: +1 508 293-7953
   EMail: black_david@emc.com
   URI:   http://www.emc.com/























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Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
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Maino & Black                Informational                     [Page 16]
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