path: root/doc/rfc/rfc4682.txt

Network Working Group                                       E. Nechamkin
Request for Comments: 4682                                Broadcom Corp.
Category: Standards Track                                      J-F. Mule
                                                               CableLabs
                                                           December 2006


     Multimedia Terminal Adapter (MTA) Management Information Base
           for PacketCable- and IPCablecom-Compliant Devices

Status of This Memo

   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2006).

Abstract

   This memo defines a portion of the Management Information Base (MIB)
   for use with network management protocols in the Internet community.
   In particular, it defines a basic set of managed objects for Simple
   Network Management Protocol (SNMP)-based management of PacketCable-
   and IPCablecom-compliant Multimedia Terminal Adapter devices.

Table of Contents

   1. The Internet-Standard Management Framework ......................2
   2. Terminology .....................................................2
   3. Introduction ....................................................4
      3.1. Structure of the MTA MIB ...................................5
      3.2. pktcMtaDevBase .............................................5
      3.3. pktcMtaDevServer ...........................................6
      3.4. pktcMtaDevSecurity .........................................6
      3.5. Relationship between MIB Objects in the MTA MIB ............7
      3.6. Secure Software Download ...................................8
      3.7. X.509 Certificates Dependencies ............................8
   4. Definitions .....................................................9
   5. Acknowledgements ...............................................52
   6. Security Considerations ........................................52
   7. IANA Considerations ............................................55
   8. Normative References ...........................................55
   9. Informative References .........................................57



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1.  The Internet-Standard Management Framework

   For a detailed overview of the documents that describe the current
   Internet-Standard Management Framework, please refer to section 7 of
   RFC 3410 [RFC3410].

   Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed
   the Management Information Base or MIB.  MIB objects are generally
   accessed through the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).
   Objects in the MIB are defined using the mechanisms defined in the
   Structure of Management Information (SMI).  This memo specifies a MIB
   module that is compliant to the SMIv2, which is described in STD 58,
   RFC 2578 [RFC2578], STD 58, RFC 2579 [RFC2579] and STD 58, RFC 2580
   [RFC2580].

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL", when used in the guidelines in this memo, are to be
   interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

   The terms "MIB module" and "information module" are used
   interchangeably in this memo.  As used here, both terms refer to any
   of the three types of information modules defined in Section 3 of RFC
   2578 [RFC2578].

   Some of the terms used in this memo are defined below.  Some
   additional terms are also defined in the PacketCable MTA Device
   Provisioning Specification [PKT-SP-PROV] and the PacketCable Security
   Specification [PKT-SP-SEC].

   DOCSIS
   The CableLabs(R) Certified(TM) Cable Modem project, also known as
   DOCSIS(R) (Data over Cable Service Interface Specification), defines
   interface requirements for cable modems involved in high-speed data
   distribution over cable television system networks.  DOCSIS also
   refers to the ITU-T J.112 recommendation, Annex B, for cable modem
   systems [ITU-T-J112].

   Cable Modem
   A Cable Modem (CM) acts as a data transport agent used to transfer
   call management and voice data packets over a DOCSIS-compliant cable
   system.

   Multimedia Terminal Adapter
   A Multimedia Terminal Adapter (MTA) is a PacketCable- or IPCablecom-
   compliant device providing telephony services over a cable or hybrid



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   system used to deliver video signals to a community.  It contains an
   interface to endpoints, a network interface, CODECs, and all
   signaling and encapsulation functions required for Voice over IP
   transport, call signaling, and Quality of Service signaling.  An MTA
   can be an embedded or a standalone device.  An Embedded MTA (E-MTA)
   is an MTA device containing an embedded DOCSIS Cable Modem.  A
   Standalone MTA (S-MTA) is an MTA device separated from the DOCSIS
   cable modem by non-DOCSIS Message Access Control (MAC) interface
   (e.g., Ethernet, USB).

   Endpoint
   An endpoint or MTA endpoint is a standard RJ-11 telephony physical
   port located on the MTA and used for attaching the telephone device
   to the MTA.

   X.509 Certificate
   A X.509 certificate is an Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
   certificate developed as part of the ITU-T X.500 Directory
   recommendations.  It is defined in RFC 3280 [RFC3280] and RFC 4630
   [RFC4630].

   Voice over IP
   Voice over IP (VoIP) is a technology providing the means to transfer
   digitized packets with voice information over IP networks.

   Public Key Certificate
   A Public Key Certificate (also known as a Digital Certificate) is a
   binding between an entity's public key and one or more attributes
   relating to its identity.

   DHCP
   The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) is defined by RFC 2131
   [RFC2131].  In addition, commonly used DHCP options are defined in
   RFC 2132 [RFC2132].  Additional DHCP options used by PacketCable and
   IPCablecom MTAs can be found in the CableLabs Client Configuration
   DHCP specifications, RFC 3495 [RFC3495] and RFC 3594 [RFC3594].

   TFTP
   The Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) is defined by RFC 1350
   [RFC1350].

   HTTP
   The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1) is defined by RFC 2616
   [RFC2616].

   Call Management Server
   A Call Management Server (CMS) is an element of the PacketCable
   network infrastructure that controls audio connections between MTAs.



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   CODEC, COder-DECoder
   A Coder-DECoder is a hardware or software component used in
   audio/video systems to convert an analog signal to digital, and then
   (possibly) to compress it so that lower bandwidth telecommunications
   channels can be used.  The signal is decompressed and converted
   (decoded) back to analog output by a compatible CODEC at the
   receiving end.

   Operations Systems Support
   An Operations Systems Support system (OSS) is a system of back office
   software components used for fault, configuration, accounting,
   performance, and security management working in interaction with each
   other and providing the operations support in deployed PacketCable
   systems.

   Key Distribution Center
   A Key Distribution Center (KDC) is an element of the OSS systems
   functioning as a Kerberos Security Server, providing mutual
   authentication of the various components of the PacketCable system
   (e.g., mutual authentication between an MTA and a CMS, or between an
   MTA and the Provisioning Server).

   Security Association
   A Security Association (SA) is a one-way relationship between a
   sender and a receiver offering security services on the communication
   flow.

3.  Introduction

   This MIB module provides a set of objects required for the management
   of PacketCable, ETSI, and ITU-T IPCablecom compliant MTA devices.
   The MTA MIB module is intended to supersede various MTA MIB modules
   from which it is partly derived:

   -  The PacketCable 1.0 MTA MIB Specification [PKT-SP-MIB-MTA].

   -  The ITU-T IPCablecom MTA MIB requirements [ITU-T-J168].

   -  The ETSI MTA MIB [ETSITS101909-8].  The ETSI MTA MIB requirements
      also refer to various signal characteristics defined in
      [EN300001], Chapter 3, titled 'Ringing Signal Characteristics',
      and [EN300659-1].

   Several normative and informative references are used to help define
   MTA MIB objects.  As a convention, wherever PacketCable and
   IPCablecom requirements are equivalent, the PacketCable reference is
   used in the object REFERENCE clause.  IPCablecom-compliant MTA
   devices MUST use the equivalent IPCablecom references.



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3.1.  Structure of the MTA MIB

   The MTA MIB module is identified by pktcIetfMtaMib and is structured
   in three object groups:

   -  pktcMtaDevBase defines the management information pertinent to the
      MTA device itself.

   -  pktcMtaDevServer defines the management information pertinent to
      the provisioning back office servers.

   -  pktcMtaDevSecurity defines the management information pertinent to
      the PacketCable and IPCablecom security mechanisms.

   The first two object groups, pktcMtaDevBase and pktcMtaDevServer,
   contain only scalar information objects describing the corresponding
   characteristics of the MTA device and back office servers.

   The third group, pktcMtaDevSecurity, contains two tables controlling
   the logical associations between KDC realms and Application Servers
   (CMS and Provisioning Server).  The rows in the various tables of the
   MTA MIB module can be created automatically (e.g., by the device
   according to the current state information), or they can be created
   by the management station, depending on the operational situation.
   The tables defined in the MTA MIB module may have a mixture of both
   types of rows.

3.2.  pktcMtaDevBase

   This object group contains the management information related to the
   MTA device itself.  It also contains some objects used to control the
   MTA state.  Some highlights are as follows:

   -  pktcMtaDevSerialNumber.  This object contains the MTA Serial
      Number.

   -  pktcMtaDevEndPntCount.  This object contains the number of
      endpoints present in the managed MTA.

   -  pktcMtaDevProvisioningState.  This object contains the information
      describing the completion state of the MTA initialization process.

   -  pktcMtaDevEnabled.  This object controls the administrative state
      of the MTA endpoints and allows operators to enable or disable
      telephony services on the device.

   -  pktcMtaDevResetNow.  This object is used to instruct the MTA to
      reset.



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3.3.  pktcMtaDevServer

   This object group contains the management information describing the
   back office servers and the parameters related to the communication
   timers.  It also includes some objects controlling the initial MTA
   interaction with the Provisioning Server.

   Some highlights are as follows:

   -  pktcMtaDevServerDhcp1.  This object contains the IP address of the
      primary DHCP server designated for the MTA provisioning.

   -  pktcMtaDevServerDhcp2.  This object contains the IP address of the
      secondary DHCP server designated for the MTA provisioning.

   -  pktcMtaDevServerDns1.  This object contains the IP address of the
      primary DNS used by the managed MTA to resolve the Fully Qualified
      Domain Name (FQDN) and IP addresses.

   -  pktcMtaDevServerDns2.  This object contains the IP address of the
      secondary DNS used by the managed MTA to resolve the FQDN and IP
      addresses.

   -  pktcMtaDevConfigFile.  This object contains the name of the
      provisioning configuration file the managed MTA must download from
      the Provisioning Server.

   -  pktcMtaDevProvConfigHash.  This object contains the hash value of
      the MTA configuration file calculated over its content.  When the
      managed MTA downloads the file, it authenticates the configuration
      file using the hash value provided in this object.

3.4.  pktcMtaDevSecurity

   This object group contains the management information describing the
   security-related characteristics of the managed MTA.  It contains two
   tables describing logical dependencies and parameters necessary to
   establish Security Associations between the MTA and other Application
   Servers (back office components and CMSes).  The CMS table
   (pktcMtaDevCmsTable) and the realm table (pktcMtaDevRealmTable) are
   used for managing the MTA signaling security.  The realm table
   defines the CMS domains.  The CMS table defines the CMS within the
   domains.  Each MTA endpoint is associated with one CMS at any given
   time.







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   The two tables in this object group are as follows:

   -  pktcMtaDevRealmTable.  This table is used in conjunction with any
      Application Server that communicates securely with the managed MTA
      (CMS or Provisioning Server).

   -  pktcMtaDevCmsTable.  This table contains the parameters describing
      the SA establishment between the MTA and CMSes.

3.5.  Relationship between MIB Objects in the MTA MIB

   This section clarifies the relationship between various MTA MIB
   objects with respect to the role they play in the process of
   establishing Security Associations.

   The process of Security Association establishment between an MTA and
   Application Servers is described in the PacketCable Security
   Specification [PKT-SP-SEC].  In particular, an MTA communicates with
   2 types of back office Application Servers: Call Management Servers
   and Provisioning Servers.

   The SA establishment process consists of two steps:

   a. Authentication Server Exchange (AS-exchange).  This step provides
      mutual authentication between the parties; i.e., between an MTA
      and an Authentication Server.  The process of AS-exchange is
      defined by a number of parameters grouped per each realm.  These
      parameters are gathered in the Realm Table (pktcMtaDevRealmTable).
      The Realm Table is indexed by the Index Counter and contains
      conceptual column with the Kerberos realm name.

   b. Application server exchange (AP-exchange).  This step allows for
      the establishment of Security Associations between authenticated
      parties.  The CMS table (pktcMtaDevCmsTable) contains the
      parameters for the AP-exchange process between an MTA and a CMS.
      The CMS table is indexed by the Index Counter and contains the CMS
      FQDN (the conceptual column pktcMtaDevCmsFqdn).  Each row contains
      the Kerberos realm name associated with each CMS FQDN.  This
      allows for each CMS to exist in a different Kerberos realm.

   The MTA MIB module also contains a group of scalar MIB objects in the
   server group (pktcMtaDevServer).  These objects define various
   parameters for the AP-exchange process between an MTA and the
   Provisioning Server.  These objects are:

      -  pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout,

      -  pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout,



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      -  pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries, and

      -  pktcMtaDevProvSolicitedKeyTimeout.

3.6.  Secure Software Download

   E-MTAs are embedded with DOCSIS 1.1 cable modems.  E-MTAs have their
   software upgraded by the Cable Modem according to the DOCSIS
   requirements.

   Although E-MTAs have their software upgraded by the Cable Modem
   according to the DOCSIS requirements, S-MTAs implement a specific
   mechanism for Secure Software Download.  This provides a means to
   verify the code upgrade using Code Verification Certificates and is
   modeled after the DOCSIS mechanism implemented in Cable Modems.  This
   is the reason why the MTA MIB and the S-MTA compliance modules also
   rely on two MIB object groups:

   -  docsBpi2CodeDownloadGroup, defined in the IETF BPI Plus MIB module
      (DOCS-IETF-BPI2-MIB [RFC4131]).

   -  docsDevSoftwareGroupV2, defined in the IETF Cable Devicev2 MIB
      module (DOCS-CABLE-DEVICE-MIB [RFC4639]).

3.7.  X.509 Certificates Dependencies

   As specified in the PacketCable Security Specification [PKT-SP-SEC],
   E-MTAs must use the authentication mechanism based on the X.509
   Public Key Infrastructure Certificates, as defined in RFC 3280
   [RFC3280] and RFC 4630 [RFC4630].

   The value of the pktcMtaDevRealmOrgName MIB object should contain the
   X.509 organization name attribute of the Telephony Service Provider
   certificate (OrganizationName).  X.509 attributes are defined using
   UTF-8 string encoding [RFC3629, RFC3280, and RFC4630].

   Note that UTF-8 encoded characters can be encoded as sequences of 1
   to 6 octets, assuming that code points as high as 0x7ffffffff might
   be used ([RFC3629]).  Subsequent versions of Unicode and ISO 10646
   have limited the upper bound to 0x10ffff ([RFC3629]).  Consequently,
   the current version of UTF-8, defined in RFC 3629, does not require
   more than four octets to encode a valid code point.









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4.  Definitions

   The MIB module below makes references and citations to [RFC868],
   [RFC3280], [RFC4630], and [RFC3617].

   PKTC-IETF-MTA-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN

   IMPORTS
       MODULE-IDENTITY,
       OBJECT-TYPE,
       OBJECT-IDENTITY,
       Unsigned32,
       Counter32,
       NOTIFICATION-TYPE,
       mib-2
             FROM SNMPv2-SMI                    -- [RFC2578]
       TEXTUAL-CONVENTION,
       RowStatus,
       TruthValue
             FROM SNMPv2-TC                     -- [RFC2579]
       OBJECT-GROUP,
       MODULE-COMPLIANCE,
       NOTIFICATION-GROUP
             FROM SNMPv2-CONF                   -- [RFC2580]
       InetAddressType,
       InetAddress
             FROM INET-ADDRESS-MIB              -- [RFC4001]
       sysDescr
             FROM SNMPv2-MIB                    -- [RFC3418]
       SnmpAdminString
             FROM SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB            -- [RFC3411]
       docsDevSoftwareGroupV2
             FROM DOCS-CABLE-DEVICE-MIB         -- [RFC4639]
       DocsX509ASN1DEREncodedCertificate,
       docsBpi2CodeDownloadGroup
             FROM DOCS-IETF-BPI2-MIB            -- [RFC4131]
       LongUtf8String
             FROM SYSAPPL-MIB                   -- [RFC2287]
       ifPhysAddress
             FROM IF-MIB;                       -- [RFC2863]

       pktcIetfMtaMib MODULE-IDENTITY
       LAST-UPDATED "200609180000Z" -- September 18, 2006
       ORGANIZATION "IETF IP over Cable Data Network Working Group"
       CONTACT-INFO
           "Eugene Nechamkin
            Broadcom Corporation,
            200-13711 International Place,



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            Richmond, BC, V6V 2Z8
            CANADA
            Phone: +1 604 233 8500
            Email: enechamkin@broadcom.com

            Jean-Francois Mule
            Cable Television Laboratories, Inc.
            858 Coal Creek Circle
            Louisville, CO 80027-9750
            U.S.A.
            Phone: +1 303 661 9100
            Email: jf.mule@cablelabs.com

       IETF IPCDN Working Group
            General Discussion: ipcdn@ietf.org
            Subscribe: http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipcdn
            Archive: ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf-mail-archive/ipcdn
            Co-Chair: Jean-Francois Mule, jf.mule@cablelabs.com
            Co-Chair: Richard Woundy, Richard_Woundy@cable.comcast.com"

       DESCRIPTION
          "This MIB module defines the basic management object
           for the Multimedia Terminal Adapter devices compliant
           with PacketCable and IPCablecom requirements.

           Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2006).  This version of
           this MIB module is part of RFC 4682; see the RFC itself for
           full legal notices."

       REVISION    "200609180000Z"   -- September 18, 2006

       DESCRIPTION
          "Initial version, published as RFC 4682."

   ::=  { mib-2 140 }

      -- Textual Conventions

   PktcMtaDevProvEncryptAlg  ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This textual convention defines various types of the
             encryption algorithms used for the encryption of the MTA
             configuration file.  The description of the encryption
             algorithm for each enumerated value is as follows:

             'none(0)'            no encryption is used,
             'des64CbcMode(1)'    DES 64-bit key in CBC mode,



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             't3Des192CbcMode(2)' 3DES 192-bit key in CBC mode,
             'aes128CbcMode(3)'   AES 128-bit key in CBC mode,
             'aes256CbcMode(4)'   AES 256-bit key in CBC mode."
       SYNTAX      INTEGER  {
                   none             (0),
                   des64CbcMode     (1),
                   t3Des192CbcMode  (2),
                   aes128CbcMode    (3),
                   aes256CbcMode    (4)
       }

   --=================================================================
   -- The MTA MIB module only supports a single Provisioning Server.
   --=================================================================

   pktcMtaNotification OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pktcIetfMtaMib 0 }
   pktcMtaMibObjects  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pktcIetfMtaMib 1 }
   pktcMtaDevBase     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pktcMtaMibObjects 1 }
   pktcMtaDevServer   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pktcMtaMibObjects 2 }
   pktcMtaDevSecurity OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pktcMtaMibObjects 3 }
   pktcMtaDevErrors   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pktcMtaMibObjects 4 }
   pktcMtaConformance  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pktcIetfMtaMib 2 }

   --
   -- The following pktcMtaDevBase group describes the base MTA objects
   --

   pktcMtaDevResetNow  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      TruthValue
       MAX-ACCESS  read-write
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object controls the MTA software reset.
             Reading this object always returns 'false'.  Setting this
             object to 'true' causes the device to reset immediately
             and the following actions to occur:
                1.  All connections (if present) are flushed locally.
                2.  All current actions such as ringing immediately
                    terminate.
                3.  Requests for signaling notifications, such as
                    notification based on digit map recognition, are
                    flushed.
                4.  All endpoints are disabled.
                5.  The provisioning flow is started at step MTA-1.
             If a value is written into an instance of
             pktcMtaDevResetNow, the agent MUST NOT retain the supplied
             value across MTA re-initializations or reboots."
       REFERENCE



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           " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification."
       ::= { pktcMtaDevBase 1 }

   pktcMtaDevSerialNumber OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      SnmpAdminString
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object specifies the manufacturer's serial
             number of this MTA.  The value of this object MUST be
             identical to the value specified in DHCP option 43,
             sub-option 4.  The list of sub-options for DHCP option
             43 are defined in the PacketCable MTA Device
             Provisioning Specification."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification."
       ::= { pktcMtaDevBase 2 }

   pktcMtaDevSwCurrentVers OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      SnmpAdminString
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object identifies the software version currently
             operating in the MTA.
             The MTA MUST return a string descriptive of the current
             software load.  This object should use the syntax
             defined by the individual vendor to identify the software
             version.  The data presented in this object MUST be
             identical to the software version information contained
             in the 'sysDescr' MIB object of the MTA.  The value of
             this object MUST be identical to the value specified in
             DHCP option 43, sub-option 6.  The list of sub-options for
             DHCP option 43 are defined in the PacketCable MTA Device
             Provisioning Specification."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification."

   ::= { pktcMtaDevBase 3 }

   pktcMtaDevFQDN      OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      SnmpAdminString
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object contains the Fully Qualified Domain Name for
             this MTA.  The MTA FQDN is used to uniquely identify the
             device to the PacketCable back office elements."



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       ::= { pktcMtaDevBase 4 }

   pktcMtaDevEndPntCount     OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      Unsigned32 (1..255)
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object contains the number of physical endpoints for
             this MTA."
       ::= { pktcMtaDevBase 5 }

   pktcMtaDevEnabled     OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      TruthValue
       MAX-ACCESS  read-write
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
            " This object contains the MTA Admin Status of this device.
              If this object is set to 'true', the MTA is
              administratively enabled, and the MTA MUST be able to
              interact with the PacketCable entities, such as CMS,
              Provisioning Server, KDC, and other MTAs and MGs on all
              PacketCable interfaces.
              If this object is set to 'false', the MTA is
              administratively disabled, and the MTA MUST perform the
              following actions for all endpoints:
                  - Shut down all media sessions, if present.
                  - Shut down Network Control Signaling (NCS)
                  signaling by following the Restart in
                  Progress procedures in the PacketCable NCS
                  specification.
              The MTA must execute all actions required to
              enable or disable the telephony services for all
              endpoints immediately upon receipt of an SNMP SET
              operation.

              Additionally, the MTA MUST maintain the SNMP Interface
              for management and also the SNMP Key management interface.
              Also, the MTA MUST NOT continue Kerberized key management
              with CMSes until this object is set to 'true'.
              Note: MTAs MUST renew the CMS Kerberos tickets according
              to the PacketCable Security or IPCablecom Specification.
              If a value is written into an instance of
              pktcMtaDevEnabled, the agent MUST NOT retain the supplied
              value across MTA re-initializations or reboots."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification;
             PacketCable Security Specification;
             PacketCable Network-Based Call Signaling Protocol



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             Specification."
       ::= { pktcMtaDevBase 6 }

   pktcMtaDevTypeIdentifier     OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      SnmpAdminString
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object provides the MTA device type identifier.  The
             value of this object must be a copy of the DHCP option 60
             value exchanged between the MTA and the DHCP server.  The
             DHCP option 60 value contains an ASCII-encoded string
             identifying capabilities of the MTA as defined in the
             PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification."
       REFERENCE
           " RFC 2132, DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor Extensions;
             PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification."
       ::= { pktcMtaDevBase 7 }

   pktcMtaDevProvisioningState     OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      INTEGER {
                   pass                      (1),
                   inProgress                (2),
                   failConfigFileError       (3),
                   passWithWarnings          (4),
                   passWithIncompleteParsing (5),
                   failureInternalError      (6),
                   failureOtherReason        (7)
       }
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object indicates the completion state of the MTA
             device provisioning process.

             pass:
             If the configuration file could be parsed successfully
             and the MTA is able to reflect the same in its
             MIB, the MTA MUST return the value 'pass'.

             inProgress:
             If the MTA is in the process of being provisioned,
             the MTA MUST return the value 'inProgress'.

             failConfigFileError:
             If the configuration file was in error due to incorrect
             values in the mandatory parameters, the MTA MUST reject
             the configuration file, and the MTA MUST return the value



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             'failConfigFileError'.

             passWithWarnings:
             If the configuration file had proper values for all the
             mandatory parameters but has errors in any of the optional
             parameters (this includes any vendor-specific Object
             Identifiers (OIDs) that are incorrect or not known
             to the MTA), the MTA MUST return the value
             'passWithWarnings'.

             passWithIncompleteParsing:
             If the configuration file is valid but the MTA cannot
             reflect the same in its configuration (for example, too
             many entries caused memory exhaustion), it must accept
             the CMS configuration entries related, and the MTA MUST
             return the value 'passWithIncompleteParsing'.

             failureInternalError:
             If the configuration file cannot be parsed due to an
             Internal error, the MTA MUST return the value
             'failureInternalError'.

             failureOtherReason:
             If the MTA cannot accept the configuration file for any
             other reason than the ones stated above, the MTA MUST
             return the value 'failureOtherReason'.

             When a final SNMP INFORM is sent as part of Step 25 of the
             MTA Provisioning process, this parameter is also included
             in the final INFORM message."
          REFERENCE
           " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification."
       ::= { pktcMtaDevBase 8 }

   pktcMtaDevHttpAccess  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      TruthValue
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object indicates whether the HTTP protocol is
             supported for the MTA configuration file transfer."
       ::= { pktcMtaDevBase 9 }

   pktcMtaDevProvisioningTimer  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      Unsigned32 (0..30)
       UNITS       "minutes"
       MAX-ACCESS  read-write
       STATUS      current



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       DESCRIPTION
           " This object defines the time interval for the provisioning
             flow to complete.  The MTA MUST finish all provisioning
             operations starting from the moment when an MTA receives
             its DHCP ACK and ending at the moment when the MTA
             downloads its configuration file (e.g., MTA5 to MTA23)
             within the period of time set by this object.
             Failure to comply with this condition constitutes
             a provisioning flow failure.  If the object is set to 0,
             the MTA MUST ignore the provisioning timer condition.
             If a value is written into an instance of
             pktcMtaDevProvisioningTimer, the agent MUST NOT retain the
             supplied value across MTA re-initializations or reboots."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification."
       DEFVAL {10}
       ::=  {pktcMtaDevBase 10}

   pktcMtaDevProvisioningCounter  OBJECT-TYPE
         SYNTAX      Counter32
         MAX-ACCESS  read-only
         STATUS      current
         DESCRIPTION
               "This object counts the number of times the
               provisioning cycle has looped through step MTA-1."
         ::= {pktcMtaDevBase 11}

    pktcMtaDevErrorOidsTable  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF PktcMtaDevErrorOidsEntry
       MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
       STATUS current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This table contains the list of configuration errors or
             warnings the MTA encountered when parsing the
             configuration file it received from the Provisioning
             Server.
             For each error, an entry is created in this table,
             containing the configuration parameters the MTA rejected
             and the associated reason (e.g., wrong or unknown OID,
             inappropriate object values).  If the MTA
             did not report a provisioning state of 'pass(1)' in
             the pktcMtaDevProvisioningState object, this table MUST be
             populated for each error or warning instance.  Even if
             different parameters share the same error type (e.g., all
             realm name configuration parameters are invalid), all
             observed errors or warnings must be reported as
             different instances.  Errors are placed into the table in
             no particular order.  The table MUST be cleared each time



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             the MTA reboots."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification."
       ::= {pktcMtaDevBase 12 }

   pktcMtaDevErrorOidsEntry  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX PktcMtaDevErrorOidsEntry
       MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
       STATUS current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This entry contains the necessary information the MTA MUST
             attempt to provide in case of configuration file errors or
             warnings."
       INDEX { pktcMtaDevErrorOidIndex }
                ::= {pktcMtaDevErrorOidsTable 1}

   PktcMtaDevErrorOidsEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
       pktcMtaDevErrorOidIndex Unsigned32,
       pktcMtaDevErrorOid      SnmpAdminString,
       pktcMtaDevErrorValue    SnmpAdminString,
       pktcMtaDevErrorReason   SnmpAdminString
       }

   pktcMtaDevErrorOidIndex  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      Unsigned32 (1..1024)
       MAX-ACCESS  not-accessible
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object is the index of the MTA configuration error
             table.  It is an integer value that starts at value '1'
             and is incremented for each encountered configuration
             file error or warning.

             The maximum number of errors or warnings that can be
             recorded in the pktcMtaDevErrorOidsTable is set to 1024 as
             a configuration file is usually validated by operators
             before deployment.  Given the possible number of
             configuration parameter assignments in the MTA
             configuration file, 1024 is perceived as a sufficient
             limit even with future extensions.

             If the number of the errors in the configuration file
             exceeds 1024, all errors beyond the 1024th one MUST
             be ignored and not be reflected in the
             pktcMtaDevErrorOidsTable."

       ::= {pktcMtaDevErrorOidsEntry 1}




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   pktcMtaDevErrorOid  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      SnmpAdminString
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object contains a human readable representation
             (character string) of the OID corresponding to the
             configuration file parameter that caused the particular
             error.
             For example, if the value of the pktcMtaDevEnabled object
             in the configuration file caused an error, then this
             object instance will contain the human-readable string of
             '1.3.6.1.2.1.140.1.1.6.0'.
             If the MTA generated an error because it was not able
             to recognize a particular OID, then this object
             instance would contain an empty value (zero-length
             string).
             For example, if the value of an OID in the configuration
             file was interpreted by the MTA as being 1.2.3.4.5, and if
             the MTA was not able to recognize this OID as a valid one,
             this object instance will contain a zero-length string.

             If the number of errors in the configuration file exceeds
             1024, then for all subsequent errors, the
             pktcMtaDevErrorOid of the table's 1024th entry MUST
             contain a human-readable representation of the
             pktcMtaDevErrorsTooManyErrors object; i.e., the string
             '1.3.6.1.2.1.140.1.1.4.1.0'.
             Note that the syntax of this object is SnmpAdminString
             instead of OBJECT IDENTIFIER because the object value may
             not be a valid OID due to human or configuration tool
             encoding errors."

       ::= {pktcMtaDevErrorOidsEntry 2}

   pktcMtaDevErrorValue  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      SnmpAdminString
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object contains the value of the OID corresponding to
             the configuration file parameter that caused the error.
             If the MTA cannot recognize the OID of the
             configuration parameter causing the error, then this
             object instance contains the OID itself as interpreted
             by the MTA in human-readable representation.
             If the MTA can recognize the OID but generate an error due
             to a wrong value of the parameter, then the object



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             instance contains the erroneous value of the parameter as
             read from the configuration file.
             In both cases, the value of this object must be
             represented in human-readable form as a character string.
             For example, if the value of the pktcMtaDevEnabled object
             in the configuration file was 3 (invalid value), then the
             pktcMtaDevErrorValue object instance will contain the
             human-readable (string) representation of value '3'.
             Similarly, if the OID in the configuration file has been
             interpreted by the MTA as being 1.2.3.4.5 and the MTA
             cannot recognize this OID as a valid one, then this
             pktcMtaDevErrorValue object instance will contain human
             readable (string) representation of value '1.2.3.4.5'.

             If the number of errors in the configuration file exceeds
             1024, then for all subsequent errors, the
             pktcMtaDevErrorValue of the table's 1024th entry MUST
             contain a human-readable representation of the
             pktcMtaDevErrorsTooManyErrors object; i.e., the string
             '1.3.6.1.2.1.140.1.1.4.1.0'."

       ::= {pktcMtaDevErrorOidsEntry 3}

   pktcMtaDevErrorReason  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      SnmpAdminString
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object indicates the reason for the error or warning,
             as per the MTA's interpretation, in human-readable form.
             For example:
             'VALUE NOT IN RANGE', 'VALUE DOES NOT MATCH TYPE',
             'UNSUPPORTED VALUE', 'LAST 4 BITS MUST BE SET TO ZERO',
             'OUT OF MEMORY - CANNOT STORE'.
             This object may also contain vendor specific errors for
             private vendor OIDs and any proprietary error codes or
             messages that can help diagnose configuration errors.

             If the number of errors in the configuration file exceeds
             1024, then for all subsequent errors, the
             pktcMtaDevErrorReason of the table's 1024th entry MUST
             contain a human-readable string indicating the reason
             for an error; for example,
             'Too many errors in the configuration file'."
       ::= {pktcMtaDevErrorOidsEntry 4}

   --
   -- The following group describes server access and parameters used



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   -- for the initial MTA provisioning and bootstrapping phases.
   --

   pktcMtaDevDhcpServerAddressType  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      InetAddressType
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object contains the Internet address type for the
             PacketCable DHCP servers specified in MTA MIB."
       DEFVAL { ipv4 }
       ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 1}

   pktcMtaDevServerDhcp1   OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      InetAddress
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object contains the Internet Address of the primary
             DHCP server the MTA uses during provisioning.
             The type of this address is determined by the value of
             the pktcMtaDevDhcpServerAddressType object.
             When the latter has the value 'ipv4(1)', this object
             contains the IP address of the primary DHCP
             server.  It is provided by the CM to the MTA via the DHCP
             option code 122, sub-option 1, as defined in RFC 3495.

             The behavior of this object when the value of
             pktcMtaDevDhcpServerAddressType is other than 'ipv4(1)'
             is not presently specified, but it may be specified
             in future versions of this MIB module.
             If this object is of value
             0.0.0.0, the MTA MUST stop all provisioning
             attempts, as well as all other activities.
             If this object is of value 255.255.255.255, it means
             that there was no preference given for the primary
             DHCP server, and, the MTA must follow the logic of
             RFC2131, and the value of DHCP option 122,
             sub-option 2, must be ignored."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification;
             RFC 2131, Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol;
             RFC 3495, DHCP Option for CableLabs Client Configuration."
       ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 2 }

   pktcMtaDevServerDhcp2  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      InetAddress
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only



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       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object contains the Internet Address of the secondary
             DHCP server the MTA uses during provisioning.
             The type of this address is determined by the value of
             the pktcMtaDevDhcpServerAddressType object.
             When the latter has the value 'ipv4(1)', this object
             contains the IP address of the secondary DHCP
             server.  It is provided by the CM to the MTA via the DHCP
             option code 122, sub-option 2, as defined in RFC 3495.

             The behavior of this object when the value of
             pktcMtaDevDhcpServerAddressType is other than 'ipv4(1)'
             is not presently specified, but it may be specified
             in future versions of this MIB module.
             If there was no secondary DHCP server provided in DHCP
             Option 122, sub-option 2, this object must return the value
             0.0.0.0."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification;
             RFC 3495, DHCP Option for CableLabs Client Configuration."
             ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 3 }

   pktcMtaDevDnsServerAddressType  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      InetAddressType
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object contains the Internet address type for the
             PacketCable DNS servers specified in MTA MIB."
       DEFVAL { ipv4 }
       ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 4}

   pktcMtaDevServerDns1  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      InetAddress
       MAX-ACCESS  read-write
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object contains the IP Address of the primary
             DNS server to be used by the MTA.  The type of this address
             is determined by the value of the
             pktcMtaDevDnsServerAddressType object.
             When the latter has the value 'ipv4(1)', this object
             contains the IP address of the primary DNS server.
             As defined in RFC 2132, PacketCable-compliant MTAs receive
             the IP addresses of the DNS Servers in DHCP option 6.
             The behavior of this object when the value of
             pktcMtaDevDnsServerAddressType is other than 'ipv4(1)'



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             is not presently specified, but it may be specified
             in future versions of this MIB module.
             If a value is written into an instance of
             pktcMtaDevServerDns1, the agent MUST NOT retain the
             supplied value across MTA re-initializations or reboots."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification;
             RFC 2132, DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor Extensions."
       ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 5 }

   pktcMtaDevServerDns2  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      InetAddress
       MAX-ACCESS  read-write
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object contains the IP Address of the secondary
             DNS server to be used by the MTA.  The type of this address
             is determined by the value of the
             pktcMtaDevDnsServerAddressType object.
             When the latter has the value 'ipv4(1)', this object
             contains the IP address of the secondary DNS
             server.  As defined in RFC 2132, PacketCable-compliant MTAs
             receive the IP addresses of the DNS Servers in DHCP
             option 6.
             The behavior of this object when the value of
             pktcMtaDevDnsServerAddressType is other than 'ipv4(1)'
             is not presently specified, but it may be specified
             in future versions of this MIB module.
             If a value is written into an instance of
             pktcMtaDevServerDns2, the agent MUST NOT retain the
             supplied value across MTA re-initializations or reboots."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification;
             RFC 2132, DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor Extensions."
       ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 6 }

   pktcMtaDevTimeServerAddressType  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      InetAddressType
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object contains the Internet address type for the
             PacketCable Time servers specified in MTA MIB."
       DEFVAL { ipv4 }
       ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 7}

   pktcMtaDevTimeServer   OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      InetAddress



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       MAX-ACCESS  read-write
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object contains the Internet Address of the Time
             Server used by an S-MTA for Time Synchronization.  The type
             of this address is determined by the value of the
             pktcMtaDevTimeServerAddressType object.
             When the latter has the value 'ipv4(1)', this object
             contains the IP address of the Time Server used for Time
             Synchronization.
             In the case of an S-MTA, this object must be
             populated with a value other than 0.0.0.0 as obtained
             from DHCP option 4.  The protocol by which the time of day
             MUST be retrieved is defined in RFC 868.
             In the case of an E-MTA, this object must contain a
             value of 0.0.0.0 if the address type is 'ipv4(1)' since
             an E-MTA does not use the Time Protocol for time
             synchronization (an E-MTA uses the time retrieved by the
             DOCSIS cable modem).
             The behavior of this object when the value of
             pktcMtaDevTimeServerAddressType is other than 'ipv4(1)'
             is not presently specified, but it may be specified in
             future versions of this MIB module.
             If a value is written into an instance of
             pktcMtaDevTimeServer, the agent MUST NOT retain the
             supplied value across MTA re-initializations or reboots."
       REFERENCE
           " RFC 868, Time Protocol;
             RFC 2131, Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol;
             RFC 2132, DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor Extensions."
       ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 8}

   pktcMtaDevConfigFile  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      SnmpAdminString
       MAX-ACCESS  read-write
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object specifies the MTA device configuration file
             information, including the access method, the server name,
             and the configuration file name.  The value of this object
             is the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) of the configuration
             file for TFTP or HTTP download.
             If this object value is a TFTP URL, it must be formatted
             as defined in RFC 3617.
             If this object value is an HTTP URL, it must be formatted
             as defined in RFC 2616.
             If the MTA SNMP Enrollment mechanism is used, then the MTA
             must download the file provided by the Provisioning Server



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             during provisioning via an SNMP SET on this object.
             If the MTA SNMP Enrollment mechanism is not used, this
             object MUST contain the URL value corresponding to the
             'siaddr' and 'file' fields received in the DHCP ACK to
             locate the configuration file: the 'siaddr' and 'file'
             fields represent the host and file of the TFTP URL,
             respectively.  In this case, the MTA MUST return an
             'inconsistentValue' error in response to SNMP SET
             operations.
             The MTA MUST return a zero-length string if the server
             address (host part of the URL) is unknown.
             If a value is written into an instance of
             pktcMtaDevConfigFile, the agent MUST NOT retain the
             supplied value across MTA re-initializations or reboots."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification;
             RFC 3617, URI Scheme for TFTP; RFC 2616, HTTP 1.1"
       ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 9 }

   pktcMtaDevSnmpEntity  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      SnmpAdminString
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object contains the FQDN of the SNMP entity of the
             Provisioning Server.  When the MTA SNMP Enrollment
             Mechanism is used, this object represents the server that
             the MTA communicates with, that it receives the
             configuration file URL from, and that it sends the
             enrollment notification to.  The SNMP entity is also the
             destination entity for all the provisioning
             notifications.  It may be used for post-provisioning
             SNMP operations.  During the provisioning phase, this
             SNMP entity FQDN is supplied to the MTA via DHCP option
             122, sub-option 3, as defined in RFC 3495.  The MTA must
             resolve the FQDN value before its very first network
             interaction with the SNMP entity during the provisioning
             phase."

       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification;
             RFC 3495, DHCP Option for CableLabs Client Configuration."
       ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 10 }

   pktcMtaDevProvConfigHash  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      OCTET STRING (SIZE(20))
       MAX-ACCESS  read-write
       STATUS      current



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       DESCRIPTION
           " This object contains the hash value of the contents of the
             configuration file.
             The authentication algorithm is Secure Hashing Algorithm
             1 (SHA-1), and the length is 160 bits.  The hash
             calculation MUST follow the requirements defined in the
             PacketCable Security Specification.  When the MTA SNMP
             Enrollment mechanism is used, this hash value is
             calculated and sent to the MTA prior to sending the
             config file.  This object value is then provided by the
             Provisioning server via an SNMP SET operation.
             When the MTA SNMP Enrollment mechanism is not in use, the
             hash value is provided in the configuration file itself,
             and it is also calculated by the MTA.  This object value
             MUST represent the hash value calculated by the MTA.
             When the MTA SNMP Enrollment mechanism is not in use, the
             MTA must reject all SNMP SET operations on this object and
             return an 'inconsistentValue' error.
             If a value is written into an instance of
             pktcMtaDevProvConfigHash, the agent MUST NOT retain the
             supplied value across MTA re-initializations or reboots."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification;
             PacketCable Security Specification."
       ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 11 }

   pktcMtaDevProvConfigKey  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      OCTET STRING (SIZE(32))
       MAX-ACCESS  read-write
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object contains the key used to encrypt/decrypt
             the configuration file when secure SNMPv3 provisioning
             is used.
             The value of this object is provided along with the
             configuration file information (pktcMtaDevConfigFile)
             and hash (pktcMtaDevProvConfigHash) by the Provisioning
             Server via SNMP SET once the configuration file has been
             created, as defined by the PacketCable Security
             specification.

             The privacy algorithm is defined by the
             pktcMtaDevProvConfigEncryptAlg MIB object.  The
             MTA requirements related to the privacy algorithm are
             defined in the PacketCable Security Specification.

             If this object is set at any other provisioning step than
             that allowed by the PacketCable MTA Device



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             Provisioning Specification, the MTA SHOULD return
             an 'inconsistentValue' error.
             This object must not be used in non secure provisioning
             mode.  In non-secure provisioning modes, the MTA SHOULD
             return an 'inconsistentValue' in response to SNMP SET
             operations, and the MTA SHOULD return a zero-length
             string in response to SNMP GET operations.
             If a value is written into an instance of
             pktcMtaDevProvConfigKey, the agent MUST NOT retain the
             supplied value across MTA re-initializations or reboots."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification;
             PacketCable Security Specification."
       ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 12 }

   pktcMtaDevProvConfigEncryptAlg   OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      PktcMtaDevProvEncryptAlg
       MAX-ACCESS  read-write
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object defines the encryption algorithm used for
             privacy protection of the MTA Configuration File content."
       DEFVAL { des64CbcMode }
       ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 13 }

   pktcMtaDevProvSolicitedKeyTimeout  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      Unsigned32 (0..180)
       UNITS       "seconds"
       MAX-ACCESS  read-write
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object defines a Kerberos Key Management timer on the
             MTA.  It is the time period during which the MTA saves the
             nonce and Server Kerberos Principal Identifier to match an
             AP Request and its associated AP Reply response from the
             Provisioning Server.
             After the timeout has been exceeded, the client discards
             this (nonce, Server Kerberos Principal Identifier) pair,
             after which it will no longer accept a matching AP Reply.
             This timer only applies when the Provisioning Server
             initiated key management for SNMPv3 (with a
             Wake Up message).
             If this object is set to a zero value, the MTA MUST return
             an 'inconsistentValue' in response to SNMP SET operations.
             This object should not be used in non-secure provisioning
             modes.  In non-secure provisioning modes, the MTA MUST
             return an 'inconsistentValue' in response to SNMP SET
             operations, and the MTA MUST return a zero value in



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             response to SNMP GET operations.
             If a value is written into an instance of
             pktcMtaDevProvSolicitedKeyTimeout, the agent MUST NOT
             retain the supplied value across MTA re-initializations
             or reboots."
       DEFVAL { 3 }
       ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 14 }

   --=================================================================
   --
   --  Unsolicited key updates are retransmitted according to an
   --  exponential back-off mechanism using two timers and a maximum
   --  retry counter for AS replies.
   --  The initial retransmission timer value is the nominal timer
   --  value (pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout).  The
   --  retransmissions occur with an exponentially increasing interval
   --  that caps at the maximum timeout value
   --  (pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout).
   --  Retransmissions stop when the maximum retry counter is reached
   --  (pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries).
   --  For example, with values of 3 seconds for the nominal
   --  timer, 100 seconds for the maximum timeout, and 8 retries max,
   --  and with an exponential value of 2, this results in
   --  retransmission intervals will be 3 s, 6 s, 12 s, 24 s, 48 s,
   --  96 s, 100 s, and 100 s;
   --  retransmissions then stop because the maximum number of
   --  retries (8) has been reached.
   --
   --=================================================================
   --
   --  Timeouts for unsolicited key management updates are only
   --  pertinent before the first SNMPv3 message is sent between the
   --  MTA and the Provisioning Server and before the configuration
   --  file is loaded.
   --
   --=================================================================

   pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      Unsigned32 (0..600)
       UNITS       "seconds"
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object defines the timeout value that applies to
             an MTA-initiated AP-REQ/REP key management exchange with
             the Provisioning Server in SNMPv3 provisioning.
             It is the maximum timeout value, and it may not be exceeded
             in the exponential back-off algorithm.  If the DHCP option



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             code 122, sub-option 5, is provided to the MTA, it
             overwrites this value.
             In non-secure provisioning modes, the MTA MUST
             return a zero value in response to SNMP GET
             operations."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable Security Specification."
       DEFVAL {600}
       ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 15 }

   pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      Unsigned32 (0..600)
       UNITS       "seconds"
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object defines the starting value of the timeout
             for the AP-REQ/REP Backoff and Retry mechanism
             with exponential timeout in SNMPv3 provisioning.
             If the DHCP option code 122, sub-option 5, is provided
             the MTA, it overwrites this value.
             In non-secure provisioning modes, the MTA MUST
             return a zero value in response to SNMP GET
             operations."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable Security Specification."
       DEFVAL {3}
       ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 16}

   pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      Unsigned32 (0..32)
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object contains a retry counter that applies to
             an MTA-initiated AP-REQ/REP key management exchange with
             the Provisioning Server in secure SNMPv3 provisioning.
             It is the maximum number of retries before the MTA stops
             attempting to establish a Security Association with
             Provisioning Server.
             If the DHCP option code 122, sub-option 5, is provided to
             the MTA, it overwrites this value.
             If this object is set to a zero value, the MTA MUST return
             an 'inconsistentValue' in response to SNMP SET operations.
             In non-secure provisioning modes, the MTA MUST
             return a zero value in response to SNMP GET
             operations."
       REFERENCE



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           " PacketCable Security Specification."
       DEFVAL {8}
       ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 17 }

   pktcMtaDevProvKerbRealmName  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      SnmpAdminString (SIZE(1..255))
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object contains the name of the associated
             provisioning Kerberos realm acquired during the MTA4
             provisioning step (DHCP Ack) for SNMPv3 provisioning.
             The uppercase ASCII representation of the associated
             Kerberos realm name MUST be used by both the Manager (SNMP
             entity) and the MTA.
             The Kerberos realm name for the Provisioning Server is
             supplied to the MTA via DHCP option code 122, sub-option 6,
             as defined in RFC 3495.  In secure SNMP provisioning mode,
             the value of the Kerberos realm name for the Provisioning
             Server supplied in the MTA configuration file must match
             the value supplied in the DHCP option code 122,
             sub-option 6.  Otherwise, the value of this object must
             contain the value supplied in DHCP Option 122,
             sub-option 6."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification;
             RFC 3495, DHCP Option for CableLabs Client Configuration."
       ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 18 }

   pktcMtaDevProvState  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      INTEGER  {
                   operational                (1),
                   waitingForSnmpSetInfo      (2),
                   waitingForTftpAddrResponse (3),
                   waitingForConfigFile       (4)
       }
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object defines the MTA provisioning state.
             If the state is:

               'operational(1)', the device has completed the loading
                and processing of the initialization parameters.

               'waitingForSnmpSetInfo(2)', the device is waiting on
                its configuration file download access information.
                Note that this state is only reported when the MTA



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                SNMP enrollment mechanism is used.

               'waitingForTftpAddrResponse(3)', the device has sent a
                DNS request to resolve the server providing the
                configuration file, and it is awaiting for a response.
                Note that this state is only reported when the MTA
                SNMP enrollment mechanism is used.

               'waitingForConfigFile(4)', the device has sent a
               request via TFTP or HTTP for the download of its
               configuration file, and it is awaiting for a response or
               the file download is in progress."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification,
             PacketCable Security Specification."
       ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 19 }

       --
       -- The following object group describes the security objects.
       --

   pktcMtaDevManufacturerCertificate  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      DocsX509ASN1DEREncodedCertificate
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object contains the MTA Manufacturer Certificate.
             The object value must be the ASN.1 DER encoding of the MTA
             manufacturer's X.509 public key certificate.  The MTA
             Manufacturer Certificate is issued to each MTA
             manufacturer and is installed into each MTA at the time of
             manufacture or with a secure code download.  The specific
             requirements related to this certificate are defined in
             the PacketCable or IPCablecom Security specifications."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable Security Specification."

       ::= {pktcMtaDevSecurity 1}

   pktcMtaDevCertificate  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      DocsX509ASN1DEREncodedCertificate
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object contains the MTA Device Certificate.
             The object value must be the ASN.1 DER encoding of the
             MTA's X.509 public-key certificate issued by the
             manufacturer and installed into the MTA at the time of



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             manufacture or with a secure code download.
             This certificate contains the MTA MAC address.  The
             specific requirements related to this certificate are
             defined in the PacketCable or IPCablecom Security
             specifications."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable Security Specification."
       ::= { pktcMtaDevSecurity 2 }

   pktcMtaDevCorrelationId  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      Unsigned32
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object contains a correlation ID, an arbitrary value
             generated by the MTA that will be exchanged as part of the
             device capability data to the Provisioning Application.
             This random value is used as an identifier to correlate
             related events in the MTA provisioning sequence.
             This value is intended for use only during the MTA
             initialization and configuration file download."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification."
       ::= { pktcMtaDevSecurity 3 }

   pktcMtaDevTelephonyRootCertificate  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      DocsX509ASN1DEREncodedCertificate
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object contains the telephony Service Provider Root
             certificate.  The object value is the ASN.1 DER encoding of
             the IP Telephony Service Provider Root X.509 public key
             certificate.  This certification is stored in the MTA
             non-volatile memory and can be updated with a secure code
             download.  This certificate is used to validate the initial
             AS Reply received by the MTA from the Key Distribution
             Center (KDC) during the MTA initialization.  The specific
             requirements related to this certificate are defined in
             the PacketCable or IPCablecom Security specifications."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable Security Specification."
       ::= { pktcMtaDevSecurity 4 }

   --=================================================================
   --
   --   Informative Procedures for Setting up Security Associations
   --



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   --   A Security Association may be set up either via configuration or
   --   via NCS signaling.
   --
   --   I.   Security association setup via configuration.
   --
   --   The realm must be configured first.  Associated with the realm
   --   is a KDC.  The realm table (pktcMtaDevRealmTable) indicates
   --   information about the realm (e.g., name, organization name) and
   --   parameters associated with KDC communications (e.g., grace
   --   periods, AS Request/AS Reply adaptive back-off parameters).
   --
   --   Once the realm is established, one or more CMS(es) may be
   --   defined in the realm.  Associated with each CMS
   --   entry in the pktcMtaDevCmsTable is an explicit reference
   --   to a Realm via the realm name (pktcMtaDevCmsKerbRealmName),
   --   the FQDN of the CMS, and parameters associated with IPSec
   --   key management with the CMS (e.g., clock skew, AP Request/
   --   AP Reply adaptive back-off parameters).
   --
   --   II.  Security association setup via NCS signaling.
   --
   --   The procedure of establishing the Security Associations
   --   for NCS signaling is described in the PacketCable Security
   --   specification.
   --   It involves the analysis of the pktcNcsEndPntConfigTable row
   --   for the corresponding endpoint number and the correlation of
   --   the CMS FQDN from this row with the CMS Table and
   --   consequently, with the Realm Table.  Both of these tables
   --   are defined below.  The pktcNcsEndPntConfigTable is defined in
   --   the IP over Cable Data Network (IPCDN)
   --   NCS Signaling MIB [NCSSIGMIB].
   --
   --   III.  When the MTA receives wake-up or re-key messages from a
   --   CMS, it performs key management based on the corresponding
   --   entry in the CMS table.  If the matching CMS entry does not
   --   exist, it must ignore the wake-up or re-key messages.
   --
   --=================================================================
   --=================================================================
   --
   --   pktcMtaDevRealmTable
   --
   --   The pktcMtaDevRealmTable shows the KDC realms.  The table is
   --   indexed with pktcMtaDevRealmIndex.  The Realm Table contains the
   --   pktcMtaDevRealmName in conjunction with any server that needs
   --   a Security Association with the MTA.  Uppercase must be used
   --   to compare the pktcMtaDevRealmName content.
   --



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   --=================================================================

   pktcMtaDevRealmAvailSlot   OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      Unsigned32 (0..64)
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object contains the index number of the first
             available entry in the realm table (pktcMtaDevRealmTable).
             If all the entries in the realm table have been assigned,
             this object contains the value of zero.
             A management station should create new entries in the
             realm table, using the following procedure:

             First, issue a management protocol retrieval operation
             to determine the value of the first available index in the
             realm table (pktcMtaDevRealmAvailSlot).

             Second, issue a management protocol SET operation
             to create an instance of the pktcMtaDevRealmStatus
             object by setting its value to 'createAndWait(5)'.

             Third, if the SET operation succeeded, continue
             modifying the object instances corresponding to the newly
             created conceptual row, without fear of collision with
             other management stations.  When all necessary conceptual
             columns of the row are properly populated (via SET
             operations or default values), the management station may
             SET the pktcMtaDevRealmStatus object to 'active(1)'."
       ::= {  pktcMtaDevSecurity 5 }

   pktcMtaDevRealmTable  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      SEQUENCE OF PktcMtaDevRealmEntry
       MAX-ACCESS  not-accessible
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object contains the realm table.
             The CMS table (pktcMtaDevCmsTable) and the realm table
             (pktcMtaDevRealmTable) are used for managing the MTA-CMS
             Security Associations.  The realm table defines the
             Kerberos realms for the Application Servers (CMSes and the
             Provisioning Server)."
       ::= {  pktcMtaDevSecurity 6 }

   pktcMtaDevRealmEntry  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      PktcMtaDevRealmEntry
       MAX-ACCESS  not-accessible
       STATUS      current



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       DESCRIPTION
           " This table entry object lists the MTA security parameters
             for a single Kerberos realm.  The conceptual rows MUST NOT
             persist across MTA reboots."
       INDEX { pktcMtaDevRealmIndex }
   ::= { pktcMtaDevRealmTable 1 }

   PktcMtaDevRealmEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
       pktcMtaDevRealmIndex                    Unsigned32,
       pktcMtaDevRealmName                     SnmpAdminString,
       pktcMtaDevRealmPkinitGracePeriod        Unsigned32,
       pktcMtaDevRealmTgsGracePeriod           Unsigned32,
       pktcMtaDevRealmOrgName                  LongUtf8String,
       pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout Unsigned32,
       pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout Unsigned32,
       pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries Unsigned32,
       pktcMtaDevRealmStatus                   RowStatus
       }

   pktcMtaDevRealmIndex  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      Unsigned32 (1..64)
       MAX-ACCESS  not-accessible
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object defines the realm table index."
       ::= { pktcMtaDevRealmEntry 1}

   pktcMtaDevRealmName  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      SnmpAdminString (SIZE(1..255))
       MAX-ACCESS  read-create
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object identifies the Kerberos realm name in all
             capitals.  The MTA MUST prohibit the instantiation of any
             two rows with identical Kerberos realm names.  The MTA MUST
             also verify that any search operation involving Kerberos
             realm names is done using the uppercase ASCII
             representation of the characters."
       ::= { pktcMtaDevRealmEntry 2 }

   pktcMtaDevRealmPkinitGracePeriod  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      Unsigned32 (15..600)
       UNITS       "minutes"
       MAX-ACCESS  read-create
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object contains the PKINIT Grace Period.  For the
            purpose of key management with Application Servers (CMSes



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            or the Provisioning Server), the MTA must utilize the
            PKINIT exchange to obtain Application Server tickets.  The
            MTA may utilize the PKINIT exchange to obtain Ticket
            Granting Tickets (TGTs), which are then used to obtain
            Application Server tickets in a TGS exchange.
            The PKINIT exchange occurs according to the current Ticket
            Expiration Time (TicketEXP) and on the PKINIT Grace Period
            (PKINITGP).  The MTA MUST initiate the PKINIT exchange at
            the time: TicketEXP - PKINITGP."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable Security Specification."
       DEFVAL { 15 }
       ::= { pktcMtaDevRealmEntry 3 }

   pktcMtaDevRealmTgsGracePeriod  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      Unsigned32 (1..600)
       UNITS       "minutes"
       MAX-ACCESS  read-create
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object contains the Ticket Granting Server Grace
             Period (TGSGP).  The Ticket Granting Server (TGS)
             Request/Reply exchange may be performed by the MTA
             on demand whenever an Application Server ticket is
             needed to establish security parameters.  If the MTA
             possesses a ticket that corresponds to the Provisioning
             Server or a CMS that currently exists in the CMS table,
             the MTA MUST initiate the TGS Request/Reply exchange
             at the time: TicketEXP - TGSGP."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable Security Specification."
       DEFVAL { 10 }
       ::= { pktcMtaDevRealmEntry 4 }

   pktcMtaDevRealmOrgName  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      LongUtf8String
       MAX-ACCESS  read-create
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object contains the X.500 organization name attribute
             as defined in the subject name of the service provider
             certificate."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable Security Specification;
             RFCs 3280 and 4630, Internet X.509 Public Key
             Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
             (CRL) Profile"
       ::= { pktcMtaDevRealmEntry 5 }



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   pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      Unsigned32 (1..600)
       UNITS       "seconds"
       MAX-ACCESS  read-create
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object specifies the maximum time the MTA will
             attempt to perform the exponential back-off algorithm.
             This timer only applies when the MTA initiated key
             management.  If the DHCP option code 122, sub-option 4, is
             provided to the MTA, it overwrites this value.

             Unsolicited key updates are retransmitted according to an
             exponential back-off mechanism using two timers and a
             maximum retry counter for AS replies.
             The initial retransmission timer value is the nominal
             timer value (pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout).  The
             retransmissions occur with an exponentially increasing
             interval that caps at the maximum timeout value
             (pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout).
             Retransmissions stop when the maximum retry counter is
             reached (pktcMatDevRealmUnsolicitedMaxRetries).

             For example, with values of 3 seconds for the nominal
             timer, 20 seconds for the maximum timeout, and 5 retries
             max, retransmission intervals will be 3 s, 6 s,
             12 s, 20 s, and 20 s, and retransmissions then stop because
             the maximum number of retries has been reached."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable Security Specification."
       DEFVAL { 100 }
       ::= { pktcMtaDevRealmEntry 6 }

   pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      Unsigned32 (100..600000)
       UNITS       "milliseconds"
       MAX-ACCESS  read-create
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object specifies the initial timeout value
             for the AS-REQ/AS-REP exponential back-off and retry
             mechanism.  If the DHCP option code 122, sub-option 4, is
             provided to the MTA, it overwrites this value.
             This value should account for the average roundtrip
             time between the MTA and the KDC, as well as the
             processing delay on the KDC.




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             Unsolicited key updates are retransmitted according to an
             exponential back-off mechanism using two timers and a
             maximum retry counter for AS replies.
             The initial retransmission timer value is the nominal
             timer value (pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout).  The
             retransmissions occur with an exponentially increasing
             interval that caps at the maximum timeout value
             (pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout).
             Retransmissions stop when the maximum retry counter is
             reached (pktcMatDevRealmUnsolicitedMaxRetries).

             For example, with values of 3 seconds for the nominal
             timer, 20 seconds for the maximum timeout, and 5 retries
             max, in retransmission intervals will be 3 s, 6 s,
             12 s, 20 s, and 20 s; retransmissions then stop because
             the maximum number of retries has been reached."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable Security Specification."
       DEFVAL { 3000 }
       ::= { pktcMtaDevRealmEntry 7 }

   pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      Unsigned32 (0..1024)
       MAX-ACCESS  read-create
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object specifies the maximum number of retries the
             MTA attempts to obtain a ticket from the KDC.

             Unsolicited key updates are retransmitted according to an
             exponential back-off mechanism using two timers and a
             maximum retry counter for AS replies.
             The initial retransmission timer value is the nominal
             timer value (pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout).  The
             retransmissions occur with an exponentially increasing
             interval that caps at the maximum timeout value
             (pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout).
             Retransmissions stop when the maximum retry counter is
             reached (pktcMatDevRealmUnsolicitedMaxRetries).

             For example, with values of 3 seconds for the nominal
             timer, 20 seconds for the maximum timeout, and 5 retries
             max, retransmission intervals will be 3 s, 6 s,
             12 s, 20 s, and 20 s; retransmissions then stop because
             the maximum number of retries has been reached."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable Security Specification."
       DEFVAL { 5 }



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       ::= { pktcMtaDevRealmEntry 8 }

   pktcMtaDevRealmStatus     OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      RowStatus
       MAX-ACCESS  read-create
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object defines the row status of this realm in the
             realm table (pktcMtaDevRealmTable).

             An entry in this table is not qualified for activation
             until the object instances of all corresponding columns
             have been initialized, either by default values, or via
             explicit SET operations.  Until all object instances in
             this row are initialized, the status value for this realm
             must be 'notReady(3)'.
             In particular, two columnar objects must be explicitly
             SET: the realm name (pktcMtaDevRealmName) and the
             organization name (pktcMtaDevRealmOrgName).  Once these 2
             objects have been set and the row status is SET to
             'active(1)', the MTA MUST NOT allow any modification of
             these 2 object values.
             The value of this object has no effect on whether other
             columnar objects in this row can be modified."
       ::= { pktcMtaDevRealmEntry 9 }

   --=================================================================
   --
   --  The CMS table, pktcMtaDevCmsTable
   --
   -- The CMS table and the realm table (pktcMtaDevRealmTable) are used
   -- for managing the MTA signaling security.  The CMS table defines
   -- the CMSes the MTA is allowed to communicate with and contains
   -- the parameters describing the SA establishment between the MTA
   -- and a CMS.
   -- The CMS table is indexed by pktcMtaDevCmsIndex.  The table
   -- contains the CMS FQDN (pktcMtaDevCmsFQDN) and the associated
   -- Kerberos realm name (pktcMtaDevCmsKerbRealmName) so that the MTA
   -- can find the corresponding Kerberos realm name in the
   -- pktcMtaDevRealmTable.
   --
   --=================================================================

   pktcMtaDevCmsAvailSlot   OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      Unsigned32 (0..128)
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION



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           " This object contains the index number of the first
             available entry in the CMS table (pktcMtaDevCmsTable).
             If all the entries in the CMS table have been assigned,
             this object contains the value of zero.
             A management station should create new entries in the
             CMS table, using the following procedure:

             First, issue a management protocol retrieval operation
             to determine the value of the first available index in the
             CMS table (pktcMtaDevCmsAvailSlot).

             Second, issue a management protocol SET operation
             to create an instance of the pktcMtaDevCmsStatus
             object by setting its value to 'createAndWait(5)'.

             Third, if the SET operation succeeded, continue
             modifying the object instances corresponding to the newly
             created conceptual row, without fear of collision with
             other management stations.  When all necessary conceptual
             columns of the row are properly populated (via SET
             operations or default values), the management station may
             SET the pktcMtaDevCmsStatus object to 'active(1)'."
       ::= {  pktcMtaDevSecurity 7 }

   pktcMtaDevCmsTable  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      SEQUENCE OF PktcMtaDevCmsEntry
       MAX-ACCESS  not-accessible
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object defines the CMS table.
             The CMS table (pktcMtaDevCmsTable) and the realm table
             (pktcMtaDevRealmTable) are used for managing security
             between the MTA and CMSes.  Each CMS table entry defines
             a CMS the managed MTA is allowed to communicate with
             and contains security parameters for key management with
             that CMS."
       ::= {  pktcMtaDevSecurity 8 }

   pktcMtaDevCmsEntry  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      PktcMtaDevCmsEntry
       MAX-ACCESS  not-accessible
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This table entry object lists the MTA key management
             parameters used when establishing Security Associations
             with a CMS.  The conceptual rows MUST NOT persist across
             MTA reboots."
       INDEX { pktcMtaDevCmsIndex }



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       ::= { pktcMtaDevCmsTable 1 }

   PktcMtaDevCmsEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
       pktcMtaDevCmsIndex                        Unsigned32,
       pktcMtaDevCmsFqdn                         SnmpAdminString,
       pktcMtaDevCmsKerbRealmName                SnmpAdminString,
       pktcMtaDevCmsMaxClockSkew                 Unsigned32,
       pktcMtaDevCmsSolicitedKeyTimeout          Unsigned32,
       pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout     Unsigned32,
       pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout     Unsigned32,
       pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries     Unsigned32,
       pktcMtaDevCmsIpsecCtrl                    TruthValue,
       pktcMtaDevCmsStatus                       RowStatus
       }

   pktcMtaDevCmsIndex  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      Unsigned32 (1..128)
       MAX-ACCESS  not-accessible
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object defines the CMS table index."
       ::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 1 }

   pktcMtaDevCmsFqdn  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      SnmpAdminString (SIZE(1..255))
       MAX-ACCESS  read-create
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object specifies the CMS FQDN.  The MTA must
             prohibit the instantiation of any two rows with identical
             FQDNs.  The MTA must also verify that any search and/or
             comparison operation involving a CMS FQDN is case
             insensitive.  The MTA must resolve the CMS FQDN as required
              by the corresponding PacketCable Specifications."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification;
             PacketCable Security Specification;
             PacketCable Network-Based Call Signaling Protocol
             Specification."
       ::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 2 }

   pktcMtaDevCmsKerbRealmName  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      SnmpAdminString (SIZE(1..255))
       MAX-ACCESS  read-create
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object identifies the Kerberos realm name in uppercase
             characters associated with the CMS defined in this



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             conceptual row.  The object value is a reference
             point to the corresponding Kerberos realm name in the
             realm table (pktcMtaDevRealmTable)."
       ::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 3 }

   pktcMtaDevCmsMaxClockSkew    OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      Unsigned32 (1..1800)
       UNITS       "seconds"
       MAX-ACCESS  read-create
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object specifies the maximum allowable clock skew
             between the MTA and the CMS defined in this row."
       DEFVAL { 300 }
       ::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 4 }

   pktcMtaDevCmsSolicitedKeyTimeout  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      Unsigned32 (100..30000)
       UNITS       "milliseconds"
       MAX-ACCESS  read-create
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object defines a Kerberos Key Management timer on the
             MTA.  It is the time period during which the MTA saves the
             nonce and Server Kerberos Principal Identifier to match an
             AP Request and its associated AP Reply response from the
             CMS.  This timer only applies when the CMS initiated key
             management (with a Wake Up message or a Rekey message)."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable Security Specification."
       DEFVAL { 1000 }
       ::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 5 }

   --=================================================================
   --
   --  Unsolicited key updates are retransmitted according to an
   --  exponential back-off mechanism using two timers and a maximum
   --  retry counter for AS replies.
   --  The initial retransmission timer value is the nominal timer
   --  value (pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout).  The
   --  retransmissions occur with an exponentially increasing interval
   --  that caps at the maximum timeout value
   --  (pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout).
   --  Retransmissions stop when the maximum retry counter is reached
   --  (pktcMatDevCmsUnsolicitedMaxRetries).
   --  For example, with values of 3 seconds for the nominal
   --  timer, 20 seconds for the maximum timeout, and 5 retries max,
   --  retransmission intervals will be 3 s, 6 s, 12 s,



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   --  20 s, and 20 s; retransmissions then stop due to the
   --  maximum number of retries reached.
   --
   --=================================================================

   pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      Unsigned32 (1..600)
       UNITS       "seconds"
       MAX-ACCESS  read-create
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object defines the timeout value that only applies
             to an MTA-initiated key management exchange.  It is the
             maximum timeout, and it may not be exceeded in the
             exponential back-off algorithm."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable Security Specification."
       DEFVAL { 600 }
       ::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 6 }

   pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      Unsigned32 (100..30000)
       UNITS       "milliseconds"
       MAX-ACCESS  read-create
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object defines the starting value of the timeout
             for an MTA-initiated key management.  It should account for
             the average roundtrip time between the MTA and the CMS and
             the processing time on the CMS."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable Security Specification."
       DEFVAL { 500 }
       ::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 7 }

   pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      Unsigned32 (0..1024)
       MAX-ACCESS  read-create
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object contains the maximum number of retries before
             the MTA stops attempting to establish a Security
             Association with the CMS."
       REFERENCE
           " PacketCable Security Specification."
       DEFVAL { 5 }
       ::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 8 }




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   pktcMtaDevCmsIpsecCtrl     OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX        TruthValue
       MAX-ACCESS    read-only
       STATUS        current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object specifies the MTA IPSec control flag.
             If the object value is 'true', the MTA must use Kerberos
             Key Management and IPsec to communicate with this CMS.  If
             it is 'false', IPSec Signaling Security and Kerberos key
             management are disabled for this specific CMS."
       DEFVAL { true }
       ::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 9 }

   pktcMtaDevCmsStatus     OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      RowStatus
       MAX-ACCESS  read-create
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object defines the row status associated with this
             particular CMS in the CMS table (pktcMtaDevCmsTable).

             An entry in this table is not qualified for activation
             until the object instances of all corresponding columns
             have been initialized, either by default values or via
             explicit SET operations.  Until all object instances in
             this row are initialized, the status value for this realm
             must be 'notReady(3)'.
             In particular, two columnar objects must be SET: the
             CMS FQDN (pktcMtaDevCmsFqdn) and the Kerberos realm name
             (pktcMtaDevCmsKerbRealmName).  Once these 2 objects have
             been set and the row status is SET to 'active(1)', the MTA
             MUST NOT allow any modification of these 2 object values.

             The value of this object has no effect on
             whether other columnar objects in this row can be
             modified."
       ::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 10 }

   pktcMtaDevResetKrbTickets   OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      BITS {
                            invalidateProvOnReboot   (0),
                            invalidateAllCmsOnReboot (1)
                   }
       MAX-ACCESS   read-write
       STATUS    current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This object defines a Kerberos Ticket Control Mask that
             instructs the MTA to invalidate the specific Application



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             Server Kerberos ticket(s) that are stored locally in the
             MTA NVRAM (non-volatile or persistent memory).
             If the MTA does not store Kerberos tickets in NVRAM, it
             MUST ignore setting of this object and MUST report a BITS
             value of zero when the object is read.
             If the MTA supports Kerberos tickets storage in NVRAM, the
             object value is encoded as follows:
             - Setting the invalidateProvOnReboot bit (bit 0) to 1
               means that the MTA MUST invalidate the Kerberos
               Application Ticket(s) for the Provisioning Application
               at the next MTA reboot if secure SNMP provisioning mode
               is used.  In non-secure provisioning modes, the MTA MUST
               return an 'inconsistentValue' in response to SNMP SET
               operations with a bit 0 set to 1.
             - Setting the invalidateAllCmsOnReboot bit (bit 1) to 1
               means that the MTA MUST invalidate the Kerberos
               Application Ticket(s) for all CMSes currently assigned
               to the MTA endpoints.
             If a value is written into an instance of
             pktcMtaDevResetKrbTickets, the agent MUST retain the
             supplied value across an MTA re-initialization or
             reboot."
       REFERENCE
           "PacketCable Security Specification."
       DEFVAL { {   } }
       ::= {  pktcMtaDevSecurity 9 }

   --
   -- The following group, pktcMtaDevErrors, defines an OID
   -- corresponding to error conditions encountered during the MTA
   -- provisioning.
   --

   pktcMtaDevErrorsTooManyErrors OBJECT-IDENTITY
       STATUS     current
       DESCRIPTION
           "This object defines the OID corresponding to the error
            condition when too many errors are encountered in the
            MTA configuration file during provisioning."
          ::= { pktcMtaDevErrors  1 }

   pktcMtaDevProvisioningEnrollment  NOTIFICATION-TYPE
       OBJECTS {
               sysDescr,
               pktcMtaDevSwCurrentVers,
               pktcMtaDevTypeIdentifier,
               ifPhysAddress,
               pktcMtaDevCorrelationId



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       }
       STATUS   current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This INFORM notification is issued by the MTA to initiate
             the PacketCable provisioning process when the MTA SNMP
             enrollment mechanism is used.
             It contains the system description, the current software
             version, the MTA device type identifier, the MTA MAC
             address (obtained in the MTA ifTable in the ifPhysAddress
             object that corresponds to the ifIndex 1), and a
             correlation ID."
       ::= { pktcMtaNotification 1 }

   pktcMtaDevProvisioningStatus  NOTIFICATION-TYPE
       OBJECTS {
               ifPhysAddress,
               pktcMtaDevCorrelationId,
               pktcMtaDevProvisioningState
       }
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " This INFORM notification may be issued by the MTA to
             confirm the completion of the PacketCable provisioning
             process, and to report its provisioning completion
             status.
             It contains the MTA MAC address (obtained in the MTA
             ifTable in the ifPhysAddress object that corresponds
             to the ifIndex 1), a correlation ID and the MTA
             provisioning state as defined in
             pktcMtaDevProvisioningState."
       ::= { pktcMtaNotification 2 }

   --
   -- Compliance Statements
   --

   pktcMtaCompliances  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pktcMtaConformance 1 }
   pktcMtaGroups       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pktcMtaConformance 2 }

   pktcMtaBasicCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " The compliance statement for MTA devices that implement
             PacketCable or IPCablecom requirements.

             This compliance statement applies to MTA implementations
             that support PacketCable 1.0 or IPCablecom requirements,
             which are not IPv6-capable at the time of this



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             RFC publication."

       MODULE  -- Unconditionally mandatory groups for MTAs

           MANDATORY-GROUPS {
               pktcMtaGroup,
               pktcMtaNotificationGroup
           }

           OBJECT  pktcMtaDevDhcpServerAddressType
               SYNTAX      InetAddressType { ipv4(1) }
               DESCRIPTION
                   " Support for address types other than 'ipv4(1)'
               is not presently specified and therefore is not
               required.  It may be defined in future versions of
               this MIB module."

           OBJECT  pktcMtaDevDnsServerAddressType
               SYNTAX      InetAddressType { ipv4(1) }
               DESCRIPTION
                   " Support for address types other than 'ipv4(1)'
               is not presently specified and therefore is not
               required.  It may be defined in future versions of
               this MIB module."

           OBJECT  pktcMtaDevTimeServerAddressType
               SYNTAX      InetAddressType { ipv4(1) }
               DESCRIPTION
                   " Support for address types other than 'ipv4(1)'
               is not presently specified and therefore is not
               required.  It may be defined in future versions of
               this MIB module."

           OBJECT    pktcMtaDevServerDhcp1
               SYNTAX  InetAddress (SIZE(4))
               DESCRIPTION
                    "An implementation is only required to support IPv4
               addresses.  Other address types support may be defined in
               future versions of this MIB module."

           OBJECT    pktcMtaDevServerDhcp2
               SYNTAX  InetAddress (SIZE(4))
               DESCRIPTION
                    "An implementation is only required to support IPv4
               addresses.  Other address types support may be defined in
               future versions of this MIB module."

           OBJECT    pktcMtaDevServerDns1



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               SYNTAX  InetAddress (SIZE(4))
               DESCRIPTION
                    "An implementation is only required to support IPv4
               addresses.  Other address types support may be defined in
               future versions of this MIB module."

           OBJECT    pktcMtaDevServerDns2
               SYNTAX  InetAddress (SIZE(4))
               DESCRIPTION
                    "An implementation is only required to support IPv4
               addresses.  Other address types support may be defined in
               future versions of this MIB module."

           OBJECT    pktcMtaDevTimeServer
               SYNTAX  InetAddress (SIZE(4))
               DESCRIPTION
                    "An implementation is only required to support IPv4
               addresses.  Other address types support may be defined in
               future versions of this MIB module."

           OBJECT    pktcMtaDevProvConfigEncryptAlg
               SYNTAX  PktcMtaDevProvEncryptAlg
               DESCRIPTION
                    "An implementation is only required to support
               values of none(0) and des64Cbcmode(1).
               An IV of zero is used to encrypt in des64Cbcmode, and
               the length of pktcMtaDevProvConfigKey is 64 bits, as
               defined in the PacketCable Security specification.
               Other encryption types may be defined in future
               versions of this MIB module."

           OBJECT pktcMtaDevRealmOrgName
               SYNTAX LongUtf8String (SIZE (1..384))
               DESCRIPTION
                    "The Organization Name field in X.509 certificates
               can contain up to 64 UTF-8 encoded characters,
               as defined in RFCs 3280 and 4630.  Therefore, compliant
               devices are only required to support Organization
               Name values of up to 64 UTF-8 encoded characters.
               Given that RFCs 3280 and 4630 define the UTF-8 encoding,
               compliant devices must support a maximum size of 384
               octets for pktcMtaDevRealmOrgName.  The calculation of
               384 octets comes from the RFC 3629 UTF-8 encoding
               definition whereby the UTF-8 encoded characters
               are encoded as sequences of 1 to 6 octets,
               assuming that code points as high as 0x7ffffffff
               might be used.  Subsequent versions of Unicode and ISO
               10646 have limited the upper bound to 0x10ffff.



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               Consequently, the current version of UTF-8, defined in
               RFC 3629, does not require more than four octets to
               encode a valid code point."

       ::= { pktcMtaCompliances 1 }

   pktcMtaGroup OBJECT-GROUP
       OBJECTS {
               pktcMtaDevResetNow,
               pktcMtaDevSerialNumber,
               pktcMtaDevSwCurrentVers,
               pktcMtaDevFQDN,
               pktcMtaDevEndPntCount,
               pktcMtaDevEnabled,
               pktcMtaDevProvisioningCounter,
               pktcMtaDevErrorOid,
               pktcMtaDevErrorValue,
               pktcMtaDevErrorReason,
               pktcMtaDevTypeIdentifier,
               pktcMtaDevProvisioningState,
               pktcMtaDevHttpAccess,
               pktcMtaDevCertificate,
               pktcMtaDevCorrelationId,
               pktcMtaDevManufacturerCertificate,
               pktcMtaDevDhcpServerAddressType,
               pktcMtaDevDnsServerAddressType,
               pktcMtaDevTimeServerAddressType,
               pktcMtaDevProvConfigEncryptAlg,
               pktcMtaDevServerDhcp1,
               pktcMtaDevServerDhcp2,
               pktcMtaDevServerDns1,
               pktcMtaDevServerDns2,
               pktcMtaDevTimeServer,
               pktcMtaDevConfigFile,
               pktcMtaDevSnmpEntity,
               pktcMtaDevRealmPkinitGracePeriod,
               pktcMtaDevRealmTgsGracePeriod,
               pktcMtaDevRealmAvailSlot,
               pktcMtaDevRealmName,
               pktcMtaDevRealmOrgName,
               pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout,
               pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout,
               pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries,
               pktcMtaDevRealmStatus,
               pktcMtaDevCmsAvailSlot,
               pktcMtaDevCmsFqdn,
               pktcMtaDevCmsKerbRealmName,
               pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout,



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               pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout,
               pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries,
               pktcMtaDevCmsSolicitedKeyTimeout,
               pktcMtaDevCmsMaxClockSkew,
               pktcMtaDevCmsIpsecCtrl,
               pktcMtaDevCmsStatus,
               pktcMtaDevResetKrbTickets,
               pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout,
               pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout,
               pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries,
               pktcMtaDevProvKerbRealmName,
               pktcMtaDevProvSolicitedKeyTimeout,
               pktcMtaDevProvConfigHash,
               pktcMtaDevProvConfigKey,
               pktcMtaDevProvState,
               pktcMtaDevProvisioningTimer,
               pktcMtaDevTelephonyRootCertificate
       }
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " A collection of objects for managing PacketCable or
             IPCablecom MTA implementations."
       ::= { pktcMtaGroups 1 }

   pktcMtaNotificationGroup          NOTIFICATION-GROUP
       NOTIFICATIONS {
                     pktcMtaDevProvisioningStatus,
                     pktcMtaDevProvisioningEnrollment
       }
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " A collection of notifications dealing with the change of
             MTA provisioning status."
       ::= { pktcMtaGroups 2 }

   pktcMtaBasicSmtaCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
           " The compliance statement for S-MTA devices
             that implement PacketCable or IPCablecom requirements.

             This compliance statement applies to S-MTA implementations
             that support PacketCable or IPCablecom requirements,
             which are not IPv6-capable at the time of this
             RFC publication."

      MODULE -- Unconditionally Mandatory Groups for S-MTA devices
           MANDATORY-GROUPS {



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               pktcMtaGroup,
               pktcMtaNotificationGroup
           }

           OBJECT  pktcMtaDevDhcpServerAddressType
               SYNTAX      InetAddressType { ipv4(1) }
               DESCRIPTION
                   " Support for address types other than 'ipv4(1)'
               is not presently specified and therefore is not
               required.  It may be defined in future versions of
               this MIB module."

           OBJECT  pktcMtaDevDnsServerAddressType
               SYNTAX      InetAddressType { ipv4(1) }
               DESCRIPTION
                   " Support for address types other than 'ipv4(1)'
               is not presently specified and therefore is not
               required.  It may be defined in future versions of
               this MIB module."

           OBJECT  pktcMtaDevTimeServerAddressType
               SYNTAX      InetAddressType { ipv4(1) }
               DESCRIPTION
                   " Support for address types other than 'ipv4(1)'
               is not presently specified and therefore is not
               required.  It may be defined in future versions of
               this MIB module."

           OBJECT    pktcMtaDevServerDhcp1
               SYNTAX  InetAddress (SIZE(4))
               DESCRIPTION
                    "An implementation is only required to support IPv4
               addresses.  Other address types support may be defined in
               future versions of this MIB module."

           OBJECT    pktcMtaDevServerDhcp2
               SYNTAX  InetAddress (SIZE(4))
               DESCRIPTION
                    "An implementation is only required to support IPv4
               addresses.  Other address types support may be defined in
               future versions of this MIB module."

           OBJECT    pktcMtaDevServerDns1
               SYNTAX  InetAddress (SIZE(4))
               DESCRIPTION
                    "An implementation is only required to support IPv4
               addresses.  Other address types support may be defined in
               future versions of this MIB module."



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           OBJECT    pktcMtaDevServerDns2
               SYNTAX  InetAddress (SIZE(4))
               DESCRIPTION
                    "An implementation is only required to support IPv4
               addresses.  Other address types support may be defined in
               future versions of this MIB module."

           OBJECT    pktcMtaDevTimeServer
               SYNTAX  InetAddress (SIZE(4))
               DESCRIPTION
                    "An implementation is only required to support IPv4
               addresses.  Other address types support may be defined in
               future versions of this MIB module."

           OBJECT    pktcMtaDevProvConfigEncryptAlg
               SYNTAX  PktcMtaDevProvEncryptAlg
               DESCRIPTION
                    "An implementation is only required to support
               values of none(0) and des64Cbcmode(1).
               An IV of zero is used to encrypt in des64Cbcmode, and
               the length of pktcMtaDevProvConfigKey is 64 bits, as
               defined in the PacketCable Security specification.
               Other encryption types may be defined in future
               versions of this MIB module."

           OBJECT pktcMtaDevRealmOrgName
               SYNTAX LongUtf8String (SIZE (1..384))
               DESCRIPTION
                    "The Organization Name field in X.509 certificates
               can contain up to 64 UTF-8 encoded characters, as
               defined in RFCs 3280 and 4630.  Therefore, compliant
               devices are only required to support Organization
               Name values of up to 64 UTF-8 encoded characters.
               Given that RFCs 3280 and 4630 define the UTF-8 encoding,
               compliant devices must support a maximum size of 384
               octets for pktcMtaDevRealmOrgName.  The calculation of
               384 octets comes from the RFC 3629 UTF-8 encoding
               definition whereby the UTF-8 encoded characters
               are encoded as sequences of 1 to 6 octets,
               assuming that code points as high as 0x7ffffffff
               might be used.  Subsequent versions of Unicode and ISO
               10646 have limited the upper bound to 0x10ffff.
               Consequently, the current version of UTF-8, defined in
               RFC 3629 does not require more than four octets to
               encode a valid code point."
       MODULE DOCS-CABLE-DEVICE-MIB
           MANDATORY-GROUPS {



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               docsDevSoftwareGroupV2
           }

       MODULE DOCS-IETF-BPI2-MIB
           MANDATORY-GROUPS {
               docsBpi2CodeDownloadGroup
           }

        ::= { pktcMtaCompliances 2 }

   END

5.  Acknowledgements

   The current editors would like to thank the members of the IETF IPCDN
   working group and the CableLabs PacketCable Provisioning and OSS
   focus team for their comments and suggestions.  In particular, we
   wish to express our gratitude for the contributions made by the
   following individuals (in no particular order): Angela Lyda,Sumanth
   Channabasappa, Matt A. Osman, Klaus Hermanns, Paul Duffy, Rick
   Vetter, Sasha Medvinsky, Roy Spitzer, Itay Sherman, Satish Kumar and
   Eric Rosenfeld.  Finally, special thanks to our area director Bert
   Wijnen, Rich Woundy, Randy Presuhn, Mike Heard, and Dave Thaler.

6.  Security Considerations

   There are a number of management objects defined in this MIB module
   with a MAX-ACCESS clause of read-write and/or read-create.  Such
   objects may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network
   environments.  The support for SET operations in a non-secure
   environment without proper protection can have a negative effect on
   network operations.  Improper manipulation of the objects defined in
   this MIB may result in random behavior of MTA devices and may result
   in service disruption.  These are the tables and objects and their
   sensitivity/vulnerability:

   -  The following objects, if SET maliciously, would cause the MTA
      device to reset and/or stop its service:

         pktcMtaDevResetNow.
         pktcMtaDevEnabled.

   -  All writable objects in the pktcMtaDevServer group and some in the
      pktcMtaDevRealmTable share the potential, if SET maliciously, to
      prevent the MTA from provisioning properly.  Thus, they are
      considered very sensitive for service delivery.  The objects in
      question are:




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         pktcMtaDevProvisioningTimer,
         pktcMtaDevDhcpServerAddressType,
         pktcMtaDevDnsServerAddressType,
         pktcMtaDevTimeServerAddressType,
         pktcMtaDevProvConfigEncryptAlg,
         pktcMtaDevServerDns1,
         pktcMtaDevServerDns2,
         pktcMtaDevTimeServer,
         pktcMtaDevConfigFile,
         pktcMtaDevProvConfigHash,
         pktcMtaDevProvConfigKey,
         pktcMtaDevProvSolicitedKeyTimeout,
         pktcMtaDevRealmName,
         pktcMtaDevRealmOrgName,
         pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout,
         pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout,
         pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries, and
         pktcMtaDevRealmStatus.

   Certain of the above objects have additional specific
   vulnerabilities:

      o  pktcMtaDevServerDns1 and pktcMtaDevServerDns2, if SET
         maliciously, could prevent the MTA from being authenticated and
         consequently from getting telephony services.

      o  pktcMtaDevRealmStatus, if SET maliciously, could cause the
         whole row of the table to be deleted, which may prevent MTA
         from getting telephony services.

   -  All writable objects in the pktcMtaDevCmsTable table share the
      potential, if SET maliciously, to disrupt the telephony service by
      altering which Call Management Server the MTA must send signaling
      registration to; in particular:

         pktcMtaDevCmsFqdn,
         pktcMtaDevCmsKerbRealmName,
         pktcMtaDevCmsMaxClockSkew,
         pktcMtaDevCmsSolicitedKeyTimeout,
         pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout,
         pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout,
         pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries (this object, if set to a
         zero value '0', may prevent the MTA from retrying its attempt
         to establish a Security Association with the CMS), and
         pktcMtaDevCmsStatus.






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   -  Some writable objects in the pktcMtaDevRealmTable table will not
      have an immediate effect on service, if SET maliciously.  However,
      they may impact the service performance and cause avalanche
      attacks on provisioning and Kerberos KDC servers, especially after
      massive device reboots occur.  The objects in question are as
      follows:

      pktcMtaDevResetKrbTickets:  This object, if set to 'true', will
      cause the MTA to request a new Kerberos ticket at reboot.

      pktcMtaDevRealmPkinitGracePeriod, pktcMtaDevRealmTgsGracePeriod:
      These 2 objects, if set to short time periods, will cause the MTA
      to renew its tickets more frequently.

   Some of the readable objects in this MIB module (i.e., objects with a
   MAX-ACCESS other than not-accessible) may be considered sensitive or
   vulnerable in some network environments.  Some of these objects may
   contain information that may be sensitive from a business or customer
   perspective.  It is thus important to control even GET and/or NOTIFY
   access to these objects and possibly to even encrypt the values of
   these objects when sending them over the network via SNMP.

   These are the tables and objects and their sensitivity and
   vulnerability:

   -  Some readable objects in the pktcMtaDevBase, pktcMtaDevServer, and
      pktcMtaDevSecurity groups share the potential, if read
      maliciously, to facilitate Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks against
      provisioning or Kerberos servers.  The object in question are as
      follows:

      pktcMtaDevServerDhcp1, pktcMtaDevServerDhcp2, and
      pktcMtaDevSnmpEntity.  The values of these objects may be used to
      launch DoS attacks on the Telephony Service Provider DHCP or
      Provisioning servers.

      pktcMtaDevProvKerbRealmName, pktcMtaDevManufacturerCertificate,
      pktcMtaDevCertificate and pktcMtaDevTelephonyRootCertificate.  The
      values of these objects may be used by attackers to launch DoS
      attacks against Kerberos servers.

   -  One additional readable object may expose some security threats:
      pktcMtaDevFQDN.  This object may include sensitive information
      about the domain name, and potentially, the domain topology.

   SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 did not include adequate security.
   Even if the network itself is secure (for example by using IPSec),
   even then, there is no control as to who on the secure network is



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   allowed to access and GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the objects
   in this MIB module.

   It is RECOMMENDED that implementers consider the security features as
   provided by the SNMPv3 framework (see Section 8 in [RFC3410]),
   including full support for the SNMPv3 cryptographic mechanisms (for
   authentication and privacy).

   Further, deployment of SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 is NOT
   RECOMMENDED.  Instead, it is RECOMMENDED to deploy SNMPv3 and to
   enable cryptographic security.  It is then a customer/operator
   responsibility to ensure that the SNMP entity giving access to an
   instance of this MIB module is properly configured to give access to
   the objects only to those principals (users) that have legitimate
   rights to indeed GET or SET (change/create/delete) them.

7.  IANA Considerations

   The MIB module defined in this document uses the following IANA-
   assigned OBJECT IDENTIFIER values, recorded in the SMI Numbers
   registry:

   Descriptor        OBJECT IDENTIFIER value
   ----------        -----------------------
   pktcIetfMtaMib        { mib-2 140 }

8.  Normative References

   [RFC868]         Postel, J. and K. Harrenstien, "Time Protocol", STD
                    26, RFC 868, May 1983.

   [RFC1350]        Sollins, K., "The TFTP Protocol (Revision 2)", STD
                    33, RFC 1350, July 1992.

   [RFC2119]        Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
                    Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2131]        Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
                    RFC 2131, March 1997.

   [RFC2132]        Alexander, S. and R. Droms, "DHCP Options and BOOTP
                    Vendor Extensions", RFC 2132, March 1997.

   [RFC2287]        Krupczak, C. and J. Saperia, "Definitions of
                    System-Level Managed Objects for Applications", RFC
                    2287, February 1998.





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   [RFC2578]        McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder J., Case,
                    J. Rose, M. and S. Waldbusser, "Structure of
                    Management Information Version 2 (SMIv2)", STD 58,
                    RFC 2578, April 1999.

   [RFC2579]        McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J. Case,
                    J. Rose, M. and S. Waldbusser, "Textual Conventions
                    for SMIv2", STD 58, RFC 2579, April 1999.

   [RFC2580]        McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder J., Case,
                    J., Rose, M. and S. Waldbusser, "Conformance
                    Statements for SMIv2", STD 58, RFC 2580, April 1999.

   [RFC2616]        Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
                    Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee,
                    "Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616,
                    June 1999.

   [RFC2863]        McCloghrie, K. and F. Kastenholz, "The Interfaces
                    Group MIB", RFC 2863, June 2000.

   [RFC3280]        Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo,
                    "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
                    Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
                    Profile", RFC 3280, April 2002.

   [RFC3411]        Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen, "An
                    Architecture for Describing Simple Network
                    Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks",
                    STD 62, RFC 3411, December 2002.

   [RFC3418]        Presuhn, R., "Management Information Base (MIB) for
                    the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD
                    62, RFC 3418, December 2002.

   [RFC3495]        Beser, B. and P. Duffy, "Dynamic Host Configuration
                    Protocol (DHCP) Option for CableLabs Client
                    Configuration", RFC 3495, March 2003.

   [RFC3594]        Duffy, P., "PacketCable Security Ticket Control
                    Sub-Option for the DHCP CableLabs Client
                    Configuration (CCC) Option", RFC 3594, September
                    2003.

   [RFC4001]        Daniele, M., Haberman, B., Routhier, S., and J.
                    Schoenwaelder, "Textual Conventions for Internet
                    Network Addresses", RFC 4001, February 2005.




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   [RFC4131]        Green, S., Ozawa, K., Cardona, E., and A.
                    Katsnelson, "Management Information Base for Data
                    Over Cable Service Interface Specification (DOCSIS)
                    Cable Modems and Cable Modem Termination Systems for
                    Baseline Privacy Plus", RFC 4131, September 2005.

   [RFC4630]        Housley, R. and S. Santesson, "Update to
                    DirectoryString Processing in the Internet X.509
                    Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
                    Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC
                    4630, August 2006.

   [RFC4639]        Woundy, R. and K. Marez, "Cable Device Management
                    Information Base for Data-Over-Cable Service
                    Interface Specification (DOCSIS) Compliant Cable
                    Modems and Cable Modem Termination Systems", RFC
                    4639, December 2006.

   [PKT-SP-PROV]    Packetcable MTA Device Provisioning Specification,
                    Issued, PKT-SP-PROV-I11-050812, August 2005.
                    http://www.packetcable.com/specifications/
                    http://www.cablelabs.com/specifications/archives/

   [PKT-SP-SEC]     PacketCable Security Specification, Issued, PKT-SP-
                    SEC-I12-050812, August 2005.
                    http://www.packetcable.com/specifications/
                    http://www.cablelabs.com/specifications/archives/

   [ITU-T-J112]     Transmission Systems for Interactive Cable
                    Television Services, Annex B, J.112, ITU-T, March,
                    1998.

   [ITU-T-J168]     IPCablecom Multimedia Terminal Adapter (MTA) MIB
                    requirements, J.168, ITU-T, March, 2001.

9.  Informative References

   [RFC3410]        Case, J., Mundy, R., Partain, D., and B. Stewart,
                    "Introduction and Applicability Statements for
                    Internet-Standard Management Framework", RFC 3410,
                    December 2002.

   [RFC3617]        Lear, E., "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) Scheme
                    and Applicability Statement for the Trivial File
                    Transfer Protocol (TFTP)", RFC 3617, October 2003.






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   [RFC3629]        Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
                    10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.

   [PKT-SP-MIB-MTA] Packetcable MTA MIB Specification, Issued, PKT-SP-
                    MIB-MTA-I10-050812, August 2005.
                    http://www.packetcable.com/specifications/
                    http://www.cablelabs.com/specifications/archives/

   [ETSITS101909-8] ETSI TS 101 909-8: "Access and Terminals (AT);
                    Digital Broadband Cable Access to the Public
                    Telecommunications Network; IP Multimedia Time
                    Critical Services; Part 8: Media Terminal Adaptor
                    (MTA) Management Information Base (MIB)".

   [EN300001]       EN 300 001 V1.5.1 (1998-10):"European Standard
                    (Telecommunications series) Attachments to Public
                    Switched Telephone Network (PSTN); General technical
                    requirements for equipment connected to an analogue
                    subscriber interface in the PSTN".

   [EN300659-1]     EN 300 659-1: "Public Switched Telephone Network
                    (PSTN); Subscriber line protocol over the local loop
                    for display (and related) services; Part 1: On hook
                    data transmission".

   [NCSSIGMIB]      Beacham G., Kumar S., Channabasappa S., "Network
                    Control Signaling (NCS) Signaling MIB for
                    PacketCable and IPCablecom Multimedia Terminal
                    Adapters (MTAs)", Work in Progress, June 2006.






















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Authors' Addresses

   Eugene Nechamkin
   Broadcom Corporation,
   200 - 13711 International Place
   Richmond, BC, V6V 2Z8
   CANADA

   Phone: +1 604 233 8500
   EMail: enechamkin@broadcom.com


   Jean-Francois Mule
   Cable Television Laboratories, Inc.
   858 Coal Creek Circle
   Louisville, Colorado 80027-9750
   U.S.A.

   Phone: +1 303 661 9100
   EMail: jf.mule@cablelabs.com































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Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2006).

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
   retain all their rights.

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST,
   AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES,
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Acknowledgement

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.






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