path: root/doc/rfc/rfc5619.txt

Network Working Group                                        S. Yamamoto
Request for Comments: 5619                            NICT/KDDI R&D Labs
Category: Standards Track                                    C. Williams
                                                               H. Yokota
                                                           KDDI R&D Labs
                                                               F. Parent
                                                          Beon Solutions
                                                             August 2009


              Softwire Security Analysis and Requirements

Abstract

   This document describes security guidelines for the softwire "Hubs
   and Spokes" and "Mesh" solutions.  Together with discussion of the
   softwire deployment scenarios, the vulnerability to security attacks
   is analyzed to provide security protection mechanisms such as
   authentication, integrity, and confidentiality to the softwire
   control and data packets.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
   publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.

Status of This Memo

   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.












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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.1.  Abbreviations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.2.  Requirements Language  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Hubs and Spokes Security Guidelines  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.1.  Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.2.  Trust Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.3.  Softwire Security Threat Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.4.  Softwire Security Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       3.4.1.  Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       3.4.2.  Softwire Security Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     3.5.  Guidelines for Usage of IPsec in Softwire  . . . . . . . . 13
       3.5.1.  Authentication Issues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       3.5.2.  IPsec Pre-Shared Keys for Authentication . . . . . . . 15
       3.5.3.  Inter-Operability Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       3.5.4.  IPsec Filtering Details  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   4.  Mesh Security Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     4.1.  Deployment Scenario  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     4.2.  Trust Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     4.3.  Softwire Security Threat Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     4.4.  Applicability of Security Protection Mechanism . . . . . . 21
       4.4.1.  Security Protection Mechanism for Control Plane  . . . 21
       4.4.2.  Security Protection Mechanism for Data Plane . . . . . 22
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   6.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   7.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
     7.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
     7.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   Appendix A.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
     A.1.  IPv6-over-IPv4 Softwire with L2TPv2 Example for IKE  . . . 26
     A.2.  IPv4-over-IPv6 Softwire with Example for IKE . . . . . . . 26


















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1.  Introduction

   The Softwire Working Group specifies the standardization of
   discovery, control, and encapsulation methods for connecting IPv4
   networks across IPv6 networks and IPv6 networks across IPv4 networks.
   The softwire provides connectivity to enable the global reachability
   of both address families by reusing or extending existing technology.
   The Softwire Working Group is focusing on the two scenarios that
   emerged when discussing the traversal of networks composed of
   differing address families.  This document provides the security
   guidelines for two such softwire solution spaces: the "Hubs and
   Spokes" and "Mesh" scenarios.  The "Hubs and Spokes" and "Mesh"
   problems are described in [RFC4925] Sections 2 and 3, respectively.
   The protocols selected for softwire connectivity require security
   considerations on more specific deployment scenarios for each
   solution.  The scope of this document provides analysis on the
   security vulnerabilities for the deployment scenarios and specifies
   the proper usage of the security mechanisms that are applied to the
   softwire deployment.

   The Layer Two Tunneling Protocol (L2TPv2) is selected as the phase 1
   protocol to be deployed in the "Hubs and Spokes" solution space.  If
   L2TPv2 is used in the unprotected network, it will be vulnerable to
   various security attacks and MUST be protected by an appropriate
   security protocol, such as IPsec as described in [RFC3193].  The new
   implementation SHOULD use IKEv2 (Internet Key Exchange Protocol
   version 2) as the key management protocol for IPsec because it is a
   more reliable protocol than IKEv1 and integrates the required
   protocols into a single platform.  This document provides
   implementation guidance and specifies the proper usage of IPsec as
   the security protection mechanism by considering the security
   vulnerabilities in the "Hubs and Spokes" scenario.  The document also
   addresses cases where the security protocol is not necessarily
   mandated.

   The softwire "Mesh" solution MUST support various levels of security
   mechanisms to protect the data packets being transmitted on a
   softwire tunnel from the access networks with one address family
   across the transit core operating with a different address family
   [RFC4925].  The security mechanism for the control plane is also
   required to be protected from control-data modification, spoofing
   attacks, etc.  In the "Mesh" solution, BGP is used for distributing
   softwire routing information in the transit core; meanwhile, security
   issues for BGP are being discussed in other working groups.  This
   document provides the proper usage of security mechanisms for
   softwire mesh deployment scenarios.





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2.  Terminology

2.1.  Abbreviations

   The terminology is based on the "Softwire Problem Statement"
   [RFC4925].

   AF(i) - Address Family.  IPv4 or IPv6.  Notation used to indicate
   that prefixes, a node, or network only deal with a single IP AF.

   AF(i,j) - Notation used to indicate that a node is dual-stack or that
   a network is composed of dual-stack nodes.

   Address Family Border Router (AFBR) - A dual-stack router that
   interconnects two networks that use either the same or different
   address families.  An AFBR forms peering relationships with other
   AFBRs, adjacent core routers, and attached Customer Edge (CE)
   routers; performs softwire discovery and signaling; advertises client
   ASF(i) reachability information; and encapsulates/decapsulates
   customer packets in softwire transport headers.

   Customer Edge (CE) - A router located inside an AF access island that
   peers with other CE routers within the access island network and with
   one or more upstream AFBRs.

   Customer Premise Equipment (CPE) - An equipment, host or router,
   located at a subscriber's premises and connected with a carrier's
   access network.

   Provider Edge (PE) - A router located at the edge of a transit core
   network that interfaces with the CE in an access island.

   Softwire Concentrator (SC) - The node terminating the softwire in the
   service provider network.

   Softwire Initiator (SI) - The node initiating the softwire within the
   customer network.

   Softwire Encapsulation Set (SW-Encap) - A softwire encapsulation set
   contains tunnel header parameters, order of preference of the tunnel
   header types, and the expected payload types (e.g., IPv4) carried
   inside the softwire.

   Softwire Next_Hop (SW-NHOP) - This attribute accompanies client AF
   reachability advertisements and is used to reference a softwire on
   the ingress AFBR leading to the specific prefixes.  It contains a
   softwire identifier value and a softwire next_hop IP address denoted
   as <SW ID:SW-NHOP address>.  Its existence in the presence of client



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   AF prefixes (in advertisements or entries in a routing table) infers
   the use of softwire to reach that prefix.

2.2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3.  Hubs and Spokes Security Guidelines

3.1.  Deployment Scenarios

   To provide the security guidelines, discussion of the possible
   deployment scenario and the trust relationship in the network is
   important.

   The softwire initiator (SI) always resides in the customer network.
   The node in which the SI resides can be the CPE access device,
   another dedicated CPE router behind the original CPE access device,
   or any kind of host device, such as a PC, appliance, sensor, etc.

   However, the host device may not always have direct access to its
   home carrier network, to which the user has subscribed.  For example,
   the SI in the laptop PC can access various access networks such as
   Wi-Fi hot-spots, visited office networks, etc.  This is the nomadic
   case, which the softwire SHOULD support.

   As the softwire deployment model, the following three cases as shown
   in Figure 1 should be considered.  Cases 2 and 3 are typical for a
   nomadic node, but are also applicable to a stationary node.  In order
   to securely connect a legitimate SI and SC to each other, the
   authentication process between SI and SC is normally performed using
   Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) servers.

















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            visited network            visited network
            access provider            service provider
                   +---------------------------------+
                   |                                 |
            +......v......+    +.....................|......+
            .             .    .                     v      .
   +------+  .  (case 3)   .    .  +------+      +--------+  .
   |      |=====================.==|      |      |        |  .
   |  SI  |__.________     .    .  |  SC  |<---->|  AAAv  |  .
   |      |---------- \    .    .  |      |      |        |  .
   +------+  .        \\   .    .  +------+      +--------+  .
            .         \\  .    .                     ^      .
     ^      +..........\\.+    +.....................|......+
     |                  \\                           |
     |          (case 2) \\                          |
     |                    \\                         |
     |                     \\                        |
     |      +............+  \\ +.....................|......+
            .            .   \\.                     v      .
   +------+  .            .    \\__+------+      +--------+  .
   |      |  . (case 1)   .     ---|      |      |        |  .
   |  SI  |=====================.==|  SC  |<---->|  AAAh  |  .
   |      |  .            .     .  |      |      |        |  .
   +------+  .            .     .  +------+      +--------+  .
            .            .     .                            .
            +............+     +............................+
             home network                home network
            access provider            service provider

            Figure 1: Authentication Model for Hubs and Spokes

   The AAA server shown in Figure 1 interacts with the SC, which acts as
   a AAA client.  The AAA may consists of multiple AAA servers, and the
   proxy AAA may be intermediate between the SC and the AAA servers.
   This document refers to the AAA server in the home network service
   provider as the home AAA server (AAAh) and to that in the visited
   network service provider as the visited AAA server (AAAv).

   The "Softwire Problem Statement" [RFC4925] states that the softwire
   solution must be able to be integrated with commonly deployed AAA
   solutions.  L2TPv2 used in softwire supports PPP and L2TP
   authentications that can be integrated with common AAA servers.

   When the softwire is used in an unprotected network, a stronger
   authentication process is required (e.g., IKEv2).  The proper
   selection of the authentication processes is discussed in Section 3.4
   with respect to the various security threats.




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   Case 1: The SI connects to the SC that belongs to the home network
   service provider via the home access provider network that operates a
   different address family.  It is assumed that the home access
   provider network and the home network service provider for the SC are
   under the same administrative system.

   Note that the IP address of the host device, in which the SI resides,
   is static or dynamic depending on the subscribed service.  The
   discovery of the SC may be automatic.  But in this document, the
   information on the SC, e.g., the DNS name or IP address, is assumed
   to be configured by the user or the provider of the SI in advance.

   Case 2: The SI connects to the SC that belongs to the home network
   service provider via the visited access network.  For the nomadic
   case, the SI/user does not subscribe to the visited access provider.
   For network access through the public network, such as Wi-Fi hot-
   spots, the home network service provider does not have a trust
   relationship with the access network.

   Note that the IP address of the host device, in which the SI resides,
   may be changed periodically due to the home network service
   provider's policy.

   Case 3: The SI connects to the SC that belongs to the visited network
   service provider via the visited access network.  This is typical of
   the nomadic access case.  When the SI is mobile, it may roam from the
   home ISP providing the home access network to the visited access
   network, e.g., Wi-Fi hot-spot network provided by the different ISP.
   The SI does not connect to the SC in the home network, for example,
   due to geographical reasons.  The SI/user does not subscribe to the
   visited network service provider, but the visited network service
   provider has some roaming agreement with the home network service
   provider.

   Note that the IP address of the host, in which the SI resides, is
   provided with the visited network service provider's policy.

3.2.  Trust Relationship

   The establishment of a trust relationship between the SI and SC is
   different for three cases.  The security considerations must be taken
   into account for each case.

   In Case 1, the SC and the home AAA server in the same network service
   provider MUST have a trust relationship and communications between
   them MUST be secured.  When the SC authenticates the SI, the SC
   transmits the authentication request message to the home AAA server
   and obtains the accept message together with the Attribute Value Pair



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   for the SI authentication.  Since the SI is in the service provider
   network, the provider can take measures to protect the entities
   (e.g., SC, AAA servers) against a number of security threats,
   including the communication between them.

   In Case 2, when the SI is mobile, access to the home network service
   provider through the visited access network provider is allowed.  The
   trust relationship between the SI and the SC in the home network MUST
   be established.  When the visited access network is a public network,
   various security attacks must be considered.  Especially for SI to
   connect to the legitimate SC, the authentication from SI to SC MUST
   be performed together with that from SC to SI.

   In Case 3, if the SI roams into a different network service
   provider's administrative domain, the visited AAA server communicates
   with the home AAA server to obtain the information for SI
   authentication.  The visited AAA server MUST have a trust
   relationship with the home AAA server and the communication between
   them MUST be secured in order to properly perform the roaming
   services that have been agreed upon under specified conditions.

   Note that the path for the communications between the home AAA server
   and the visited AAA server may consist of several AAA proxies.  In
   this case, the AAA proxy threat model SHOULD be considered [RFC2607].
   A malicious AAA proxy may launch passive or active security attacks.
   The trustworthiness of proxies in AAA proxy chains will weaken when
   the hop counts of the proxy chain is longer.  For example, the
   accounting information exchanged among AAA proxies is attractive for
   an adversary.  The communication between a home AAA server and a
   visited AAA server MUST be protected.

3.3.  Softwire Security Threat Scenarios

   Softwire can be used to connect IPv6 networks across public IPv4
   networks and IPv4 networks across public IPv6 networks.  The control
   and data packets used during the softwire session are vulnerable to
   the security attacks.

   A complete threat analysis of softwire requires examination of the
   protocols used for the softwire setup, the encapsulation method used
   to transport the payload, and other protocols used for configuration
   (e.g., router advertisements, DHCP).

   The softwire solution uses a subset of the Layer Two Tunneling
   Protocol (L2TPv2) functionality ([RFC2661], [RFC5571]).  In the
   softwire "Hubs and Spokes" model, L2TPv2 is used in a voluntary
   tunnel model only.  The SI acts as an L2TP Access Concentrator (LAC)
   and PPP endpoint.  The L2TPv2 tunnel is always initiated from the SI.



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   The generic threat analysis done for L2TP using IPsec [RFC3193] is
   applicable to softwire "Hubs and Spokes" deployment.  The threat
   analysis for other protocols such as MIPv6 (Mobile IPv6) [RFC4225],
   PANA (Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access)
   [RFC4016], NSIS (Next Steps in Signaling) [RFC4081], and Routing
   Protocols [RFC4593] are applicable here as well and should be used as
   references.

   First, the SI that resides in the customer network sends a Start-
   Control-Connection-Request (SCCRQ) packet to the SC for the
   initiation of the softwire.  L2TPv2 offers an optional tunnel
   authentication system (which is similar to CHAP -- the Challenge
   Handshake Authentication Protocol) during control connection
   establishment.  This requires a shared secret between the SI and SC
   and no key management is offered for this L2TPv2.

   When the L2TPv2 control connection is established, the SI and SC
   optionally enter the authentication phase after completing PPP Link
   Control Protocol (LCP) negotiation.  PPP authentication supports one-
   way or two-way CHAP authentication, and can leverage existing AAA
   infrastructure.  PPP authentication does not provide per-packet
   authentication.

   PPP encryption is defined but PPP Encryption Control Protocol (ECP)
   negotiation does not provide for a protected cipher suite
   negotiation.  PPP encryption provides a weak security solution
   [RFC3193].  PPP ECP implementation cannot be expected.  PPP
   authentication also does not provide scalable key management.

   Once the L2TPv2 tunnel and PPP configuration are successfully
   established, the SI is connected and can start using the connection.

   These steps are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (MITM), denial-of-
   service (DoS), and service-theft attacks, which are caused by the
   following adversary actions.

   Adversary attacks on softwire include:

   1.  An adversary may try to discover identities and other
       confidential information by snooping data packets.

   2.  An adversary may try to modify both control and data packets.
       This type of attack involves integrity violations.

   3.  An adversary may try to eavesdrop and collect control messages.
       By replaying these messages, an adversary may successfully hijack
       the L2TP tunnel or the PPP connection inside the tunnel.  An
       adversary might mount MITM, DoS, and theft-of-service attacks.



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   4.  An adversary can flood the softwire node with bogus signaling
       messages to cause DoS attacks by terminating L2TP tunnels or PPP
       connections.

   5.  An adversary may attempt to disrupt the softwire negotiation in
       order to weaken or remove confidentiality protection.

   6.  An adversary may wish to disrupt the PPP LCP authentication
       negotiation.

   When AAA servers are involved in softwire tunnel establishment, the
   security attacks can be mounted on the communication associated with
   AAA servers.  Specifically, for Case 3 stated in Section 3.2, an
   adversary may eavesdrop on the packets between AAA servers in the
   home and visited network and compromise the authentication data.  An
   adversary may also disrupt the communication between the AAA servers,
   causing a service denial.  Security of AAA server communications is
   out of scope of this document.

   In environments where the link is shared without cryptographic
   protection and weak authentication or one-way authentication is used,
   these security attacks can be mounted on softwire control and data
   packets.

   When there is no prior trust relationship between the SI and SC, any
   node can pretend to be a SC.  In this case, an adversary may
   impersonate the SC to intercept traffic (e.g., "rogue" softwire
   concentrator).

   The rogue SC can introduce a denial-of-service attack by blackholing
   packets from the SI.  The rogue SC can also eavesdrop on all packets
   sent from or to the SI.  Security threats of a rogue SC are similar
   to a compromised router.

   The deployment of ingress filtering is able to control malicious
   users' access [RFC4213].  Without specific ingress filtering checks
   in the decapsulator at the SC, it would be possible for an attacker
   to inject a false packet, leaving the system vulnerable to attacks
   such as DoS.  Using ingress filtering, invalid inner addresses can be
   rejected.  Without ingress filtering of inner addresses, another kind
   of attack can happen.  The malicious users from another ISP could
   start using its tunneling infrastructure to get free inner-address
   connectivity, effectively transforming the ISP into an inner-address
   transit provider.

   Ingress filtering does not provide complete protection in the case
   that address spoofing has happened.  In order to provide better
   protection against address spoofing, authentication with binding



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   between the legitimate address and the authenticated identity MUST be
   implemented.  This can be implemented between the SC and the SI using
   IPsec.

3.4.  Softwire Security Guidelines

   Based on the security threat analysis in Section 3.3 of this
   document, the softwire security protocol MUST support the following
   protections.

   1.  Softwire control messages between the SI and SC MUST be protected
       against eavesdropping and spoofing attacks.

   2.  The softwire security protocol MUST be able to protect itself
       against replay attacks.

   3.  The softwire security protocol MUST be able to protect the device
       identifier against the impersonation when it is exchanged between
       the SI and the SC.

   4.  The softwire security protocol MUST be able to securely bind the
       authenticated session to the device identifier of the client, to
       prevent service theft.

   5.  The softwire security protocol MUST be able to protect disconnect
       and revocation messages.

   The softwire security protocol requirement is comparable to
   [RFC3193].

   For softwire control packets, authentication, integrity, and replay
   protection MUST be supported, and confidentiality SHOULD be
   supported.

   For softwire data packets, authentication, integrity, and replay
   protection SHOULD be supported, and confidentiality MAY be supported.

   The "Softwire Problem Statement" [RFC4925] provides some requirements
   for the "Hubs and Spoke" solution that are taken into account in
   defining the security protection mechanisms.

   1.  The control and/or data plane MUST be able to provide full
       payload security when desired.

   2.  The deployed technology MUST be very strongly considered.

   This additional security protection must be separable from the
   softwire tunneling mechanism.



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   Note that the scope of this security is on the L2TP tunnel between
   the SI and SC.  If end-to-end security is required, a security
   protocol SHOULD be used in the payload packets.  But this is out of
   scope of this document.

3.4.1.  Authentication

   The softwire security protocol MUST support user authentication in
   the control plane in order to authorize access to the service and
   provide adequate logging of activity.  Although several
   authentication protocols are available, security threats must be
   considered to choose the protocol.

   For example, consider the SI/user using Password Authentication
   Protocol (PAP) access to the SC with a cleartext password.  In many
   circumstances, this represents a large security risk.  The adversary
   may spoof as a legitimate user by using the stolen password.  The
   Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP) [RFC1994] encrypts
   a password with a "challenge" sent from the SC.  The theft of
   password can be mitigated.  However, as CHAP only supports
   unidirectional authentication, the risk of a man-in-the-middle or
   rogue SC cannot be avoided.  Extensible Authentication Protocol-
   Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS) [RFC5216] mandates mutual
   authentication and avoids the rogue SC.

   When the SI established a connection to the SC through a public
   network, the SI may want proof of the SC identity.  Softwire MUST
   support mutual authentication to allow for such a scenario.

   In some circumstances, however, the service provider may decide to
   allow non-authenticated connection [RFC5571].  For example, when the
   customer is already authenticated by some other means, such as closed
   networks, cellular networks at Layer 2, etc., the service provider
   may decide to turn authentication off.  If no authentication is
   conducted on any layer, the SC acts as a gateway for anonymous
   connections.  Running such a service MUST be configurable by the SC
   administrator and the SC SHOULD take some security measures, such as
   ingress filtering and adequate logging of activity.  It should be
   noted that anonymous connection service cannot provide the security
   functionalities described in this document (e.g., integrity, replay
   protection, and confidentiality).

   L2TPv2 selected as the softwire phase 1 protocol supports PPP
   authentication and L2TPv2 authentication.  PPP authentication and
   L2TPv2 have various security threats, as stated in Section 3.3.  They
   will be used in the limited condition as described in the next
   subsections.




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3.4.1.1.  PPP Authentication

   PPP can provide mutual authentication between the SI and SC using
   CHAP [RFC1994] during the connection-establishment phase (via the
   Link Control Protocol, LCP).  PPP CHAP authentication can be used
   when the SI and SC are on a trusted, non-public IP network.

   Since CHAP does not provide per-packet authentication, integrity, or
   replay protection, PPP CHAP authentication MUST NOT be used
   unprotected on a public IP network.  If other appropriate protected
   mechanisms have been already applied, PPP CHAP authentication MAY be
   used.

   Optionally, other authentication methods such as PAP, MS-CHAP, and
   EAP MAY be supported.

3.4.1.2.  L2TPv2 Authentication

   L2TPv2 provides an optional CHAP-like tunnel authentication during
   the control connection establishment [RFC2661], Section 5.1.1.
   L2TPv2 authentication MUST NOT be used unprotected on a public IP
   network, similar to the same restriction applied to PPP CHAP
   authentication.

3.4.2.  Softwire Security Protocol

   To meet the above requirements, all softwire-security-compliant
   implementations MUST implement the following security protocols.

   IPsec ESP [RFC4303] in transport mode is used for securing softwire
   control and data packets.  The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol
   [RFC4306] MUST be supported for authentication, security association
   negotiation, and key management for IPsec.  The applicability of
   different versions of IKE is discussed in Section 3.5.

   The softwire security protocol MUST support NAT traversal.  UDP
   encapsulation of IPsec ESP packets[RFC3948] and negotiation of NAT-
   traversal in IKE [RFC3947] MUST be supported when IPsec is used.

3.5.  Guidelines for Usage of IPsec in Softwire

   When the softwire "Hubs and Spokes" solution implemented by L2TPv2 is
   used in an untrustworthy network, softwire MUST be protected by
   appropriate security protocols, such as IPsec.  This section provides
   guidelines for the usage of IPsec in L2TPv2-based softwire.

   [RFC3193] discusses how L2TP can use IKE [RFC2409] and IPsec
   [RFC2401] to provide tunnel authentication, privacy protection,



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   integrity checking, and replay protection.  Since the publication of
   [RFC3193], the revisions to IPsec protocols have been published
   (IKEv2 [RFC4306], ESP [RFC4303], NAT-traversal for IKE [RFC3947], and
   ESP [RFC3948]).

   Given that deployed technology must be very strongly considered
   [RFC4925] for the 'time-to-market' solution, [RFC3193] MUST be
   supported.  However, the new implementation SHOULD use IKEv2
   [RFC4306] for IPsec because of the numerous advantages it has over
   IKE [RFC2409].  In new deployments, IKEv2 SHOULD be used as well.

   Although [RFC3193] can be applied in the softwire "Hubs and Spokes"
   solution, softwire requirements such as NAT-traversal, NAT-traversal
   for IKE [RFC3947], and ESP [RFC3948] MUST be supported.

   Meanwhile, IKEv2 [RFC4306] integrates NAT-traversal.  IKEv2 also
   supports EAP authentication, with the authentication using shared
   secrets (pre-shared key) or a public key signature (certificate).

   The selection of pre-shared key or certificate depends on the scale
   of the network for which softwire is to be deployed, as described in
   Section 3.5.2.  However, pre-shared keys and certificates only
   support the machine authentication.  When both machine and user
   authentications are required as, for example, in the nomadic case,
   EAP SHOULD be used.

   Together with EAP, IKEv2 [RFC4306] supports legacy authentication
   methods that may be useful in environments where username- and
   password-based authentication is already deployed.

   IKEv2 is a more reliable protocol than IKE [RFC2409] in terms of
   replay-protection capability, DoS-protection-enabled mechanism, etc.
   Therefore, new implementations SHOULD use IKEv2 over IKE.

   The following sections will discuss using IPsec to protect L2TPv2 as
   applied in the softwire "Hubs and Spokes" model.  Unless otherwise
   stated, IKEv2 and the new IPsec architecture [RFC4301] is assumed.

3.5.1.  Authentication Issues

   IPsec implementation using IKE only supports machine authentication.
   There is no way to verify a user identity and to segregate the tunnel
   traffic among users in the multi-user machine environment.  IKEv2 can
   support user authentication with EAP payload by leveraging the
   existing authentication infrastructure and credential database.  This
   enables traffic segregation among users when user authentication is
   used by combining the legacy authentication.  The user identity
   asserted within IKEv2 will be verified on a per-packet basis.



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   If the AAA server is involved in security association establishment
   between the SI and SC, a session key can be derived from the
   authentication between the SI and the AAA server.  Successful EAP
   exchanges within IKEv2 run between the SI and the AAA server to
   create a session key, which is securely transferred to the SC from
   the AAA server.  The trust relationship between the involved entities
   follows Section 3.2 of this document.

3.5.2.  IPsec Pre-Shared Keys for Authentication

   With IPsec, when the identity asserted in IKE is authenticated, the
   resulting derived keys are used to provide per-packet authentication,
   integrity, and replay protection.  As a result, the identity verified
   in the IKE is subsequently verified on reception of each packet.

   Authentication using pre-shared keys can be used when the number of
   SI and SC is small.  As the number of SI and SC grows, pre-shared
   keys become increasingly difficult to manage.  A softwire security
   protocol MUST provide a scalable approach to key management.
   Whenever possible, authentication with certificates is preferred.

   When pre-shared keys are used, group pre-shared keys MUST NOT be used
   because of its vulnerability to man-in-the-middle attacks ([RFC3193],
   Section 5.1.4).

3.5.3.  Inter-Operability Guidelines

   The L2TPv2/IPsec inter-operability concerning tunnel teardown,
   fragmentation, and per-packet security checks given in [RFC3193],
   Section 3 must be taken into account.

   Although the L2TP specification allows the responder (SC in softwire)
   to use a new IP address or to change the port number when sending the
   Start-Control-Connection-Request-Reply (SCCRP), a softwire
   concentrator implementation SHOULD NOT do this ([RFC3193], Section
   4).

   However, for some reasons, for example, "load-balancing" between SCs,
   the IP address change is required.  To signal an IP address change,
   the SC sends a StopCCN message to the SI using the Result and Error
   Code AVP in an L2TPv2 message.  A new IKE_SA and CHILD_SA MUST be
   established to the new IP address.

   Since ESP transport mode is used, the UDP header carrying the L2TP
   packet will have an incorrect checksum due to the change of parts of
   the IP header during transit.  Section 3.1.2 of [RFC3948] defines 3
   procedures that can be used to fix the checksum.  A softwire
   implementation MUST NOT use the "incremental update of checksum"



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   (option 1 described in [RFC3948]) because IKEv2 does not have the
   information required (NAT-OA payload) to compute that checksum.
   Since ESP is already providing validation on the L2TP packet, a
   simple approach is to use the "do not check" approach (option 3 in
   [RFC3948]).

3.5.4.  IPsec Filtering Details

   If the old IPsec architecture [RFC2401] and IKE [RFC2409] are used,
   the security policy database (SPD) examples in [RFC3193], Appendix A
   can be applied to softwire model.  In that case, the initiator is
   always the client (SI), and the responder is the SC.  IPsec SPD
   examples for IKE [RFC2409] are also given in Appendix A of this
   document.

   The revised IPsec architecture [RFC4301] redefined the SPD entries to
   provide more flexibility (multiple selectors per entry, list of
   address range, peer authentication database (PAD), "populate from
   packet" (PFP) flag, etc.).  The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) has also
   been revised and simplified in IKEv2 [RFC4306].  The following
   sections provide the SPD examples for softwire to use the revised
   IPsec architecture and IKEv2.

3.5.4.1.  IPv6-over-IPv4 Softwire L2TPv2 Example for IKEv2

   If IKEv2 is used as the key management protocol, [RFC4301] provides
   the guidance of the SPD entries.  In IKEv2, we can use the PFP flag
   to specify the SA, and the port number can be selected with the TSr
   (Traffic Selector - Responder) payload during CREATE_CHILD_SA.  The
   following describes PAD entries on the SI and SC, respectively.  The
   PAD entries are only example configurations.  The PAD entry on the SC
   matches user identities to the L2TP SPD entry.  This is done using a
   symbolic name type specified in [RFC4301].

   SI PAD:
   - IF remote_identity = SI_identity
        Then authenticate (shared secret/certificate/)
        and authorize CHILD_SA for remote address SC_address

   SC PAD:
   - IF remote_identity = user_1
        Then authenticate (shared secret/certificate/EAP)
        and authorize CHILD_SAs for symbolic name "l2tp_spd_entry"

   The following describes the SPD entries for the SI and SC,
   respectively.  Note that IKEv2 and ESP traffic MUST be allowed
   (bypass).  These include IP protocol 50 and UDP port 500 and 4500.




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   The IPv4 packet format when ESP protects and L2TPv2 carries an IPv6
   packet is shown in Table 1, which is similar to Table 1 in [RFC4891].

   +----------------------------+------------------------------------+
   | Components (first to last) |              Contains              |
   +----------------------------+------------------------------------+
   |         IPv4 header        |   (src = IPv4-SI, dst = IPv4-SC)   |
   |         ESP header         |                                    |
   |         UDP header         |   (src port=1701, dst port=1701)   |
   |         L2TPv2 header      |                                    |
   |         PPP header         |                                    |
   |         IPv6 header        |                                    |
   |         (payload)          |                                    |
   |         ESP ICV            |                                    |
   +----------------------------+------------------------------------+

    Table 1: Packet Format for L2TPv2 with ESP Carrying IPv6 Packet

   SPD for Softwire Initiator:

   Softwire Initiator SPD-S
   - IF local_address=IPv4-SI
        remote_address=IPv4-SC
        Next Layer Protocol=UDP
        local_port=1701
        remote_port=ANY (PFP=1)
    Then use SA ESP transport mode
    Initiate using IDi = user_1 to address IPv4-SC

   SPD for Softwire Concentrator:

   Softwire Concentrator SPD-S
   - IF name="l2tp_spd_entry"
        local_address=IPv4-SC
        remote_address=ANY (PFP=1)
        Next Layer Protocol=UDP
        local_port=1701
        remote_port=ANY (PFP=1)
    Then use SA ESP transport mode

3.5.4.2.  IPv4-over-IPv6 Softwire L2TPv2 Example for IKEv2

   The PAD entries for SI and SC are shown as examples.  These example
   configurations are similar to those in Section 3.5.4.1 of this
   document.






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   SI PAD:
   - IF remote_identity = SI_identity
        Then authenticate (shared secret/certificate/)
        and authorize CHILD_SA for remote address SC_address

   SC PAD:
   - IF remote_identity = user_2
        Then authenticate (shared secret/certificate/EAP)
        and authorize CHILD_SAs for symbolic name "l2tp_spd_entry"

   The following describes the SPD entries for the SI and SC,
   respectively.  In this example, the SI and SC are denoted with IPv6
   addresses IPv6-SI and IPv6-SC, respectively.  Note that IKEv2 and ESP
   traffic MUST be allowed (bypass).  These include IP protocol 50 and
   UDP port 500 and 4500.

   The IPv6 packet format when ESP protects and L2TPv2 carries an IPv4
   packet is shown in Table 2, which is similar to Table 1 in [RFC4891].

   +----------------------------+------------------------------------+
   | Components (first to last) |              Contains              |
   +----------------------------+------------------------------------+
   |         IPv6 header        |   (src = IPv6-SI, dst = IPv6-SC)   |
   |         ESP header         |                                    |
   |         UDP header         |   (src port=1701, dst port=1701)   |
   |         L2TPv2 header      |                                    |
   |         PPP header         |                                    |
   |         IPv4 header        |                                    |
   |         (payload)          |                                    |
   |         ESP ICV            |                                    |
   +----------------------------+------------------------------------+

    Table 2: Packet Format for L2TPv2 with ESP Carrying IPv4 Packet

   SPD for Softwire Initiator:

   Softwire Initiator SPD-S
   - IF local_address=IPv6-SI
        remote_address=IPv6-SC
        Next Layer Protocol=UDP
        local_port=1701
        remote_port=ANY (PFP=1)
    Then use SA ESP transport mode
    Initiate using IDi = user_2 to address IPv6-SC







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   SPD for Softwire Concentrator:

   Softwire Concentrator SPD-S
   - IF name="l2tp_spd_entry"
        local_address=IPv6-SC
        remote_address=ANY (PFP=1)
        Next Layer Protocol=UDP
        local_port=1701
        remote_port=ANY (PFP=1)
    Then use SA ESP transport mode

4.  Mesh Security Guidelines

4.1.  Deployment Scenario

   In the softwire "Mesh" solution ([RFC4925], [RFC5565]), it is
   required to establish connectivity to access network islands of one
   address family type across a transit core of a differing address
   family type.  To provide reachability across the transit core, AFBRs
   are installed between the access network island and transit core
   network.  These AFBRs can perform as Provider Edge routers (PE)
   within an autonomous system or perform peering across autonomous
   systems.  The AFBRs establish and encapsulate softwires in a mesh to
   the other islands across the transit core network.  The transit core
   network consists of one or more service providers.

   In the softwire "Mesh" solution, a pair of PE routers (AFBRs) use BGP
   to exchange routing information.  AFBR nodes in the transit network
   are Internal BGP speakers and will peer with each other directly or
   via a route reflector to exchange SW-encap sets, perform softwire
   signaling, and advertise AF access island reachability information
   and SW-NHOP information.  If such information is advertised within an
   autonomous system, the AFBR node receiving them from other AFBRs does
   not forward them to other AFBR nodes.  To exchange the information
   among AFBRs, the full mesh connectivity will be established.

   The connectivity between CE and PE routers includes dedicated
   physical circuits, logical circuits (such as Frame Relay and ATM),
   and shared medium access (such as Ethernet-based access).

   When AFBRs are PE routers located at the edge of the provider core
   networks, this architecture is similar to the L3VPN described in
   [RFC4364].  The connectivity between a CE router in an access island
   network and a PE router in a transit network is established
   statically.  The access islands are enterprise networks accommodated
   through PE routers in the provider's transit network.  In this case,
   the access island networks are administrated by the provider's
   autonomous system.



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   The AFBRs may have multiple connections to the core network, and also
   may have connections to multiple client access networks.  The client
   access networks may connect to each other through private networks or
   through the Internet.  When the client access networks have their own
   AS number, a CE router located inside access islands forms a private
   BGP peering with an AFBR.  Further, an AFBR may need to exchange full
   Internet routing information with each network to which it connects.

4.2.  Trust Relationship

   All AFBR nodes in the transit core MUST have a trust relationship or
   an agreement with each other to establish softwires.  When the
   transit core consists of a single administrative domain, it is
   assumed that all nodes (e.g., AFBR, PE, or Route Reflector, if
   applicable) are trusted by each other.

   If the transit core consists of multiple administrative domains,
   intermediate routers between AFBRs may not be trusted.

   There MUST be a trust relationship between the PE in the transit core
   and the CE in the corresponding island, although the link(s) between
   the PE and the CE may not be protected.

4.3.  Softwire Security Threat Scenarios

   As the architecture of the softwire mesh solution is very similar to
   that of the provider-provisioned VPN (PPVPN).  The security threat
   considerations on the PPVPN operation are applicable to those in the
   softwire mesh solution [RFC4111].

   Examples of attacks to data packets being transmitted on a softwire
   tunnel include:

   1.  An adversary may try to discover confidential information by
       sniffing softwire packets.

   2.  An adversary may try to modify the contents of softwire packets.

   3.  An adversary may try to spoof the softwire packets that do not
       belong to the authorized domains and to insert copies of once-
       legitimate packets that have been recorded and replayed.

   4.  An adversary can launch denial-of-service (DoS) attacks by
       deleting softwire data traffic.  DoS attacks of the resource
       exhaustion type can be mounted against the data plane by spoofing
       a large amount of non-authenticated data into the softwire from
       the outside of the softwire tunnel.




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   5.  An adversary may try to sniff softwire packets and to examine
       aspects or meta-aspects of them that may be visible even when the
       packets themselves are encrypted.  An attacker might gain useful
       information based on the amount and timing of traffic, packet
       sizes, source and destination addresses, etc.

   The security attacks can be mounted on the control plane as well.  In
   the softwire mesh solution, softwire encapsulation will be set up by
   using BGP.  As described in [RFC4272], BGP is vulnerable to various
   security threats such as confidentiality violation; replay attacks;
   insertion, deletion, and modification of BGP messages; man-in-the-
   middle attacks; and denial-of-service attacks.

4.4.  Applicability of Security Protection Mechanism

   Given that security is generally a compromise between expense and
   risk, it is also useful to consider the likelihood of different
   attacks.  There is at least a perceived difference in the likelihood
   of most types of attacks being successfully mounted in different
   deployment.

   The trust relationship among users in access networks, transit core
   providers, and other parts of networks described in Section 4.2 is a
   key element in determining the applicability of the security
   protection mechanism for the specific softwire mesh deployment.

4.4.1.  Security Protection Mechanism for Control Plane

   The "Softwire Problem Statement" [RFC4925] states that the softwire
   mesh setup mechanism to advertise the softwire encapsulation MUST
   support authentication, but the transit core provider may decide to
   turn it off in some circumstances.

   The BGP authentication mechanism is specified in [RFC2385].  The
   mechanism defined in [RFC2385] is based on a one-way hash function
   (MD5) and use of a secret key.  The key is shared between a pair of
   peer routers and is used to generate 16-byte message authentication
   code values that are not readily computed by an attacker who does not
   have access to the key.

   However, the security mechanism for BGP transport (e.g., TCP-MD5) is
   inadequate in some circumstances and also requires operator
   interaction to maintain a respectable level of security.  The current
   deployments of TCP-MD5 exhibit some shortcomings with respect to key
   management as described in [RFC3562].

   Key management can be especially cumbersome for operators.  The
   number of keys required and the maintenance of keys (issue/revoke/



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   renew) has had an additive effect as a barrier to deployment.  Thus,
   automated means of managing keys, to reduce operational burdens, is
   available in the BGP security system ([BGP-SEC], [RFC4107]).

   Use of IPsec counters the message insertion, deletion, and
   modification attacks, as well as man-in-the-middle attacks by
   outsiders.  If routing data confidentiality is desired, the use of
   IPsec ESP could provide that service.  If eavesdropping attacks are
   identified as a threat, ESP can be used to provide confidentiality
   (encryption), integrity, and authentication for the BGP session.

4.4.2.  Security Protection Mechanism for Data Plane

   To transport data packets across the transit core, the mesh solution
   defines multiple encapsulations: L2TPv3, IP-in-IP, MPLS (LDP-based
   and RSVP-TE based), and GRE.  To securely transport such data
   packets, the softwire MUST support IPsec tunnel.

   IPsec can provide authentication and integrity.  The implementation
   MUST support ESP with null encryption [RFC4303] or else AH (IP
   Authentication Header) [RFC4302].  If some part of the transit core
   network is not trusted, ESP with encryption MAY be applied.

   Since the softwires are created dynamically by BGP, the automated key
   distribution MUST be performed by IKEv2 [RFC4306] with either pre-
   shared key or public key management.  For dynamic softwire IPsec
   tunnel creation, the pre-shared key will be the same in all routers.
   Namely, pre-shared key indicates here "group key" instead of
   "pairwise-shared" key.

   If security policy requires a stronger key management, the public key
   SHOULD be used.  If a public key infrastructure is not available, the
   IPsec Tunnel Authentication sub-TLV specified in [RFC5566] MUST be
   used before SA is established.

   If the link(s) between the user's site and the provider's PE is not
   trusted, then encryption MAY be used on the PE-CE link(s).

   Together with the cryptographic security protection, the access-
   control technique reduces exposure to attacks from outside the
   service provider networks (transit networks).  The access-control
   technique includes packet-by-packet or packet-flow-by-packet-flow
   access control by means of filters as well as by means of admitting a
   session for a control/signaling/management protocol that is being
   used to implement softwire mesh.

   The access-control technique is an important protection against
   security attacks of DoS, etc., and a necessary adjunct to



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   cryptographic strength in encapsulation.  Packets that match the
   criteria associated with a particular filter may be either discarded
   or given special treatment to prevent an attack or to mitigate the
   effect of a possible future attack.

5.  Security Considerations

   This document discusses various security threats for the softwire
   control and data packets in the "Hubs and Spokes" and "Mesh" time-to-
   market solutions.  With these discussions, the softwire security
   protocol implementations are provided by referencing "Softwire
   Problem Statement" [RFC4925], "Securing L2TP using IPsec" [RFC3193],
   "Security Framework for PPVPNs" [RFC4111], and "Guidelines for
   Specifying the Use of IPsec" [RFC5406].  The guidelines for the
   security protocol employment are also given considering the specific
   deployment context.

   Note that this document discusses softwire tunnel security protection
   and does not address end-to-end protection.

6.  Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank Tero Kivinen for reviewing the
   document and Francis Dupont for substantive suggestions.
   Acknowledgments to Jordi Palet Martinez, Shin Miyakawa, Yasuhiro
   Shirasaki, and Bruno Stevant for their feedback.

   We would like also to thank the authors of the Softwire Hub & Spoke
   Deployment Framework document [RFC5571] for providing the text
   concerning security.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC1994]  Simpson, W., "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication
              Protocol (CHAP)", RFC 1994, August 1996.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2385]  Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5
              Signature Option", RFC 2385, August 1998.

   [RFC2661]  Townsley, W., Valencia, A., Rubens, A., Pall, G., Zorn,
              G., and B. Palter, "Layer Two Tunneling Protocol "L2TP"",
              RFC 2661, August 1999.




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   [RFC3193]  Patel, B., Aboba, B., Dixon, W., Zorn, G., and S. Booth,
              "Securing L2TP using IPsec", RFC 3193, November 2001.

   [RFC3947]  Kivinen, T., Swander, B., Huttunen, A., and V. Volpe,
              "Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE", RFC 3947,
              January 2005.

   [RFC3948]  Huttunen, A., Swander, B., Volpe, V., DiBurro, L., and M.
              Stenberg, "UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP Packets",
              RFC 3948, January 2005.

   [RFC4107]  Bellovin, S. and R. Housley, "Guidelines for Cryptographic
              Key Management", BCP 107, RFC 4107, June 2005.

   [RFC4301]  Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.

   [RFC4302]  Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
              December 2005.

   [RFC4303]  Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4303, December 2005.

   [RFC4306]  Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
              RFC 4306, December 2005.

7.2.  Informative References

   [BGP-SEC]  Christian, B. and T. Tauber, "BGP Security Requirements",
              Work in Progress, November 2008.

   [RFC2401]  Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.

   [RFC2409]  Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
              (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.

   [RFC2607]  Aboba, B. and J. Vollbrecht, "Proxy Chaining and Policy
              Implementation in Roaming", RFC 2607, June 1999.

   [RFC3562]  Leech, M., "Key Management Considerations for the TCP MD5
              Signature Option", RFC 3562, July 2003.

   [RFC4016]  Parthasarathy, M., "Protocol for Carrying Authentication
              and Network Access (PANA) Threat Analysis and Security
              Requirements", RFC 4016, March 2005.





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   [RFC4081]  Tschofenig, H. and D. Kroeselberg, "Security Threats for
              Next Steps in Signaling (NSIS)", RFC 4081, June 2005.

   [RFC4111]  Fang, L., "Security Framework for Provider-Provisioned
              Virtual Private Networks (PPVPNs)", RFC 4111, July 2005.

   [RFC4213]  Nordmark, E. and R. Gilligan, "Basic Transition Mechanisms
              for IPv6 Hosts and Routers", RFC 4213, October 2005.

   [RFC4225]  Nikander, P., Arkko, J., Aura, T., Montenegro, G., and E.
              Nordmark, "Mobile IP Version 6 Route Optimization Security
              Design Background", RFC 4225, December 2005.

   [RFC4272]  Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis",
              RFC 4272, January 2006.

   [RFC4364]  Rosen, E. and Y. Rekhter, "BGP/MPLS IP Virtual Private
              Networks (VPNs)", RFC 4364, February 2006.

   [RFC4593]  Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y. Yang, "Generic Threats to
              Routing Protocols", RFC 4593, October 2006.

   [RFC4891]  Graveman, R., Parthasarathy, M., Savola, P., and H.
              Tschofenig, "Using IPsec to Secure IPv6-in-IPv4 Tunnels",
              RFC 4891, May 2007.

   [RFC4925]  Li, X., Dawkins, S., Ward, D., and A. Durand, "Softwire
              Problem Statement", RFC 4925, July 2007.

   [RFC5216]  Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS
              Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, March 2008.

   [RFC5406]  Bellovin, S., "Guidelines for Specifying the Use of IPsec
              Version 2", BCP 146, RFC 5406, February 2009.

   [RFC5565]  Wu, J., Cui, Y., Metz, C., and E. Rosen, "Softwire Mesh
              Framework", RFC 5565, June 2009.

   [RFC5566]  Berger, L., White, R., and E. Rosen, "BGP IPsec Tunnel
              Encapsulation Attribute", RFC 5566, June 2009.

   [RFC5571]  Storer, B., Pignataro, C., Dos Santos, M., Stevant, B.,
              Toutain, L., and J. Tremblay, "Softwire Hub and Spoke
              Deployment Framework with Layer Two Tunneling Protocol
              Version 2 (L2TPv2)", RFC 5571, June 2009.






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Appendix A.  Examples

   If the old IPsec architecture [RFC2401] and IKE [RFC2409] are used,
   the SPD examples in [RFC3193] are applicable to the "Hub & Spokes"
   model.  In this model, the initiator is always the client (SI), and
   the responder is the SC.

A.1.  IPv6-over-IPv4 Softwire with L2TPv2 Example for IKE

   IPv4 addresses of the softwire initiator and concentrator are denoted
   by IPv4-SI and IPv4-SC, respectively.  If NAT traversal is used in
   IKE, UDP source and destination ports are 4500.  In this SPD entry,
   IKE refers to UDP port 500. * denotes wildcard and indicates ANY port
   or address.

      Local     Remote     Protocol                  Action
      -----     ------     --------                  ------
      IPV4-SI   IPV4-SC      ESP                     BYPASS
      IPV4-SI   IPV4-SC      IKE                     BYPASS
      IPv4-SI   IPV4-SC      UDP, src 1701, dst 1701 PROTECT(ESP,
                                                     transport)
      IPv4-SC   IPv4-SI      UDP, src   * , dst 1701 PROTECT(ESP,
                                                     transport)


                          Softwire Initiator SPD

       Remote   Local      Protocol                  Action
       ------   ------     --------                  ------
         *      IPV4-SC      ESP                     BYPASS
         *      IPV4-SC      IKE                     BYPASS
         *      IPV4-SC      UDP, src * , dst 1701   PROTECT(ESP,
                                                     transport)

                         Softwire Concentrator SPD

A.2.  IPv4-over-IPv6 Softwire with Example for IKE

   IPv6 addresses of the softwire initiator and concentrator are denoted
   by IPv6-SI and IPv6-SC, respectively.  If NAT traversal is used in
   IKE, UDP source and destination ports are 4500.  In this SPD entry,
   IKE refers to UDP port 500. * denotes wildcard and indicates ANY port
   or address.








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      Local     Remote     Protocol                   Action
      -----     ------     --------                   ------
      IPV6-SI   IPV6-SC      ESP                      BYPASS
      IPV6-SI   IPV6-SC      IKE                      BYPASS
      IPv6-SI   IPV6-SC      UDP, src 1701, dst 1701  PROTECT(ESP,
                                                      transport)
      IPv6-SC   IPv6-SI      UDP, src * , dst 1701    PROTECT(ESP,
                                                      transport)

                          Softwire Initiator SPD


       Remote   Local      Protocol                   Action
       ------   ------     --------                   ------
         *      IPV6-SC      ESP                      BYPASS
         *      IPV6-SC      IKE                      BYPASS
         *      IPV6-SC      UDP, src * , dst 1701    PROTECT(ESP,
                                                      transport)

                         Softwire Concentrator SPD































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RFC 5619            Softwire Security Considerations         August 2009


Authors' Addresses

   Shu Yamamoto
   NICT/KDDI R&D Labs
   1-13-16 Hakusan, Bunkyo-ku
   Tokyo  113-0001
   Japan

   Phone: +81-3-3868-6913
   EMail: shu@nict.go.jp


   Carl Williams
   KDDI R&D Labs
   Palo Alto, CA  94301
   USA

   Phone: +1-650-279-5903
   EMail: carlw@mcsr-labs.org


   Hidetoshi Yokota
   KDDI R&D Labs
   2-1-15 Ohara
   Fujimino, Saitama  356-8502
   Japan

   Phone: +81-49-278-7894
   EMail: yokota@kddilabs.jp


   Florent Parent
   Beon Solutions
   Quebec, QC
   Canada

   EMail: Florent.Parent@beon.ca














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