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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Arkko
Request for Comments: 5872 Ericsson
Updates: 5191 A. Yegin
Category: Standards Track Samsung
ISSN: 2070-1721 May 2010
IANA Rules for the
Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)
Abstract
This document relaxes the IANA rules for the Protocol for Carrying
Authentication for Network Access (PANA).
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5872.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Arkko & Yegin Standards Track [Page 1]
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RFC 5872 PANA IANA Rules May 2010
1. Introduction
This document relaxes the IANA rules for the Protocol for Carrying
Authentication for Network Access (PANA) [RFC5191]. Rules for the
following protocol fields, all defined in [RFC5191], are affected:
o Message Types
o Message Flags
o Attribute-Value Pair (AVP) Flags
o Result-Code AVP Values
o Termination-Cause AVP Values
The rationale for this update is that there can be situations in
which it makes sense to grant an allocation under special
circumstances. At the time of this writing, the IETF is in the
process of approving one such allocation. By changing the current
IANA rules to allow for IESG Approval [RFC5226] as well, it has
become possible for the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) to
consider an allocation request, even if it does not fulfill the
default rule. For instance, an experimental protocol extension could
perhaps deserve an allocation from a field of reserved bits, as long
as a sufficient number of bits still remain for other purposes, and
the PANA community is happy with such allocation.
2. IANA Considerations
IANA has updated the registries related to PANA Message Types,
Message Flags, AVP Flags, Result-Code AVP Values, and Termination-
Cause AVP Values, as specified below. All other PANA IANA registries
are to remain unchanged.
2.1. Message Types
The Message Types namespace is used to identify PANA messages. Value
0 is not used and is not assigned by IANA. The range of values from
1 - 65,519 are for permanent, standard Message Types, allocated by
IETF Review or IESG Approval [RFC5226]. Previously, the rule for
this range was allocation by IETF Review only. [RFC5191] defined the
range of values from 1 - 4. The same Message Type is used for both
the request and the answer messages, except for type 1. The Request
bit distinguishes requests from answers.
Arkko & Yegin Standards Track [Page 2]
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RFC 5872 PANA IANA Rules May 2010
The range of values from 65,520 - 65,535 (hexadecimal values 0xfff0 -
0xffff) is reserved for experimental messages. As these codes are
only for experimental and testing purposes, no guarantee is made for
interoperability between the communicating PANA Client (PaC) and PANA
Authentication Agent (PAA) using experimental commands, as outlined
in [RFC3692].
2.2. Message Flags
There are 16 bits in the Flags field of the PANA message header.
Section 6.2 of [RFC5191] assigned bit 0 ('R'), 1 ('S'), 2 ('C'), 3
('A'), 4 ('P'), and 5 ('I'). Allocations from the remaining free
bits in the PANA header Flag field are made via Standards Action or
IESG Approval [RFC5226]. Previously, the rule for these bits was
allocation by Standards Action only.
2.3. AVP Flags
There are 16 bits in the AVP Flags field of the AVP header, defined
in Section 6.3 of [RFC5191]. That RFC also assigned bit 0 ('V').
The remaining bits are assigned via Standards Action or IESG Approval
[RFC5226]. Previously, the rule for these bits was allocation by
Standards Action only.
2.4. Result-Code AVP Values
As defined in Section 8.7 of [RFC5191], the Result-Code AVP (AVP
Code 7) defines the values from 0 - 2.
All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Review or
IESG Approval [RFC5226]. Previously, the rule for these values was
allocation by IETF Review only.
2.5. Termination-Cause AVP Values
As defined in Section 8.9 of [RFC5191], the Termination-Cause AVP
(AVP Code 9) defines the values 1, 4, and 8.
All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Review or
IESG Approval [RFC5226]. Previously, the rule for these values was
allocation by IETF Review only.
Arkko & Yegin Standards Track [Page 3]
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RFC 5872 PANA IANA Rules May 2010
3. Security Considerations
This specification does not change the security properties of PANA.
However, a few words are necessary about the use of the experimental
code points defined in Section 2.1. Potentially harmful side effects
from the use of the experimental values need to be carefully
evaluated before deploying any experiment across networks that the
owner of the experiment does not entirely control. Guidance given in
[RFC3692] about the use of experimental values needs to be followed.
4. References
4.1. Normative References
[RFC5191] Forsberg, D., Ohba, Y., Patil, B., Tschofenig, H., and A.
Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network
Access (PANA)", RFC 5191, May 2008.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008.
4.2. Informative References
[RFC3692] Narten, T., "Assigning Experimental and Testing Numbers
Considered Useful", BCP 82, RFC 3692, January 2004.
Arkko & Yegin Standards Track [Page 4]
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RFC 5872 PANA IANA Rules May 2010
Appendix A. Changes from RFC 5191
This document changes the IANA rules for: Message Types, Message
Flags, AVP Flags, Result-Code AVP Values, and Termination-Cause AVP
Values.
Appendix B. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Yoshihiro Ohba, Ralph Droms,
Magnus Westerlund, and Alfred Hoenes for reviews and comments on this
topic.
Authors' Addresses
Jari Arkko
Ericsson
Jorvas 02420
Finland
EMail: jari.arkko@piuha.net
Alper Yegin
Samsung
Istanbul
Turkey
EMail: alper.yegin@yegin.org
Arkko & Yegin Standards Track [Page 5]
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