path: root/doc/rfc/rfc6402.txt

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                         J. Schaad
Request for Comments: 6402                       Soaring Hawk Consulting
Updates: 5272, 5273, 5274                                  November 2011
Category: Standards Track
ISSN: 2070-1721


             Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) Updates

Abstract

   This document contains a set of updates to the base syntax for CMC, a
   Certificate Management protocol using the Cryptographic Message
   Syntax (CMS).  This document updates RFC 5272, RFC 5273, and RFC
   5274.

   The new items in this document are: new controls for future work in
   doing server side key generation, definition of a Subject Information
   Access value to identify CMC servers, and the registration of a port
   number for TCP/IP for the CMC service to run on.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6402.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must





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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.2.  Abbreviations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Updates to RFC 5272 - "Certificate Management over CMS
       (CMC)" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     2.1.  New Section 1.3 - "Updates Made by RFC 6402" . . . . . . .  3
     2.2.  Update Section 6 - "Controls"  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.3.  Replace Section 6.3 - "Linking Identity and POP
           Information" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.4.  Replace Section 6.3.3 - "Renewal and Rekey Messages" . . .  5
     2.5.  New Section 6.20 - "RA Identity Proof Witness Control" . .  5
     2.6.  New Section 6.21 - "Response Body Control" . . . . . . . .  7
     2.7.  New Section 7 - "Other Attributes" . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     2.8.  New Section 7.1 - "Change Subject Name Attribute"  . . . .  8
     2.9.  New Section 9 - "Certificate Requirements" . . . . . . . . 10
     2.10. New Section 9.1 - "Extended Key Usage" . . . . . . . . . . 10
     2.11. New Section 9.2 - "Subject Information Access" . . . . . . 11
     2.12. Update Section 8 - "Security Considerations" . . . . . . . 11
   3.  Updates to RFC 5273 - "Certificate Management over CMS
       (CMC): Transport Protocols"  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     3.1.  Update Section 5 - "TCP-Based Protocol"  . . . . . . . . . 12
     3.2.  New Section 6 - "IANA Considerations"  . . . . . . . . . . 12
   4.  Updates to RFC 5274 - "Certificate Management Message over
       CMS (CMC): Compliance Requirements"  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     4.1.  Update to Section 4.2 - "Controls" . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   7.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     7.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     7.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   Appendix A.  ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     A.1.  1988 ASN.1 Module  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     A.2.  2008 ASN.1 Module  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24












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1.  Introduction

   While dealing with the Suite B profile of CMC [RFC6403], a number of
   deficiencies were noted in the current base CMC specification.  This
   document has a set of updates to [RFC5272], [RFC5273], and [RFC5274]
   to deal with those issues.

1.1.  Requirements Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.2.  Abbreviations

   The following abbreviations are used in this document.  Terms are
   used as defined in Section 2.1 of RFC 5272.

      CA   - Certification Authority
      CRL  - Certificate Revocation List
      CRMF - Certificate Request Message Format
      EE   - End-Entity
      MAC  - Message Authentication Code
      PKI  - Public Key Infrastructure
      RA   - Registration Authority

2.  Updates to RFC 5272 - "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)"

2.1.  New Section 1.3 - "Updates Made by RFC 6402"

   Insert this section before the current Section 1.3.

   The following updates were made by RFC 6402.

   o  Add new controls:

      RA Identity Witness  allows for an RA to perform identity checking
         using the identity and shared-secret, and then tell any
         following servers that the identity check was successfully
         performed.

      Response Body  allows for an RA to identify a nested response for
         an EE to process.

   o  Create a new attribute, Change Subject Name, that allows a client
      to request a change in the subject name and subject alternate name
      fields in a certificate.




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   o  Add Extended Key Usages for CMC to distinguish server types.

   o  Define a new Subject Information Access type to hold locations to
      contact the CMC server.

   o  Clarify that the use of a pre-existing certificate is not limited
      to just renewal and rekey messages and is required for support.
      This formalizes a requirement for the ability to do renewal and
      rekey that previously was implicit.

2.2.  Update Section 6 - "Controls"

   Update Table 1 by adding the following rows:

   +--------------------------+-----------+-----------------+---------+
   | Identifier Description   | OID       | ASN.1 Structure | Section |
   +--------------------------+-----------+-----------------+---------+
   | id-cmc-raIdentityWitness | id-cmc 35 | BodyPartPath    | 6.20    |
   |                          |           |                 |         |
   | id-cmc-responseBody      | id-cmc 37 | BodyPartPath    | 6.21    |
   +--------------------------+-----------+-----------------+---------+

                Addition to Table 1: CMC Control Attributes

2.3.  Replace Section 6.3 - "Linking Identity and POP Information"

   Replace the text of the section with the following text.

   In a CMC Full PKI Request, identity proof information about the
   client is carried in the certificate associated with the signature of
   the SignedData containing the certification requests, one of the two
   identity proof controls or the MAC computed for the AuthenticatedData
   containing the certification requests.  Proof-of-possession (POP)
   information for key pairs, however, is carried separately for each
   PKCS #10 or CRMF certification request.  (For keys capable of
   generating a digital signature, the POP is provided by the signature
   on the PKCS #10 or CRMF request.  For encryption-only keys, the
   controls described in Section 6.7 are used.)  In order to prevent
   substitution-style attacks, the protocol must guarantee that the same
   entity supplied both the POP and proof-of-identity information.

   We describe three mechanisms for linking identity and POP
   information: witness values cryptographically derived from a shared-
   secret (Section 6.3.1), shared-secret/subject name matching (Section
   6.3.2), and subject name matching to an existing certificate (Section
   6.3.3).  Clients and servers MUST support the witness value and the
   certificate linking techniques.  Clients and servers MAY support
   shared-secret/name matching or MAY support other bilateral techniques



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   of similar strength.  The idea behind the first two mechanisms is to
   force the client to sign some data into each certification request
   that can be directly associated with the shared-secret; this will
   defeat attempts to include certification requests from different
   entities in a single Full PKI Request.

2.4.  Replace Section 6.3.3 - "Renewal and Rekey Messages"

   Make the new section title "Existing Certificate Linking".  Replace
   all text in this section with this text.

   Linking between the POP and an identity is easy when an existing
   certificate is used.  The client copies all of the naming information
   from the existing certificate (subject name and subject alternative
   name) into the new certification request.  The POP on the new public
   key is then performed by using the new key to sign the identity
   information (linking the POP to a specific identity).  The identity
   information is then tied to the POP information by signing the entire
   enrollment request with the private key of the existing certificate.

   Existing certificate linking can be used in the following
   circumstances:

      When replacing a certificate by doing a renewal or rekey
      certification request.

      Using an existing certificate to get a new certificate.  An
      example of this would be to get a key establishment certificate
      after having gotten a signature certificate.

      Using a third-party certificate to get a new certificate from a
      CA.  An example of this would be using a certificate and key pair
      distributed with a device to prove an identity.  This requires
      that the CA have an out-of-band channel to map the identity in the
      device certificate to the new EE identity.

2.5.  New Section 6.20 - "RA Identity Proof Witness Control"

   Insert this section.

   The RA Identity Proof Witness control allows an RA to indicate to
   subsequent control processors that all of the identity proof
   requirements have been met.  This permits the identity proof to be
   performed at a location closer to the end-entity.  For example, the
   identity proof could be done at multiple physical locations, while
   the CA could operate on a company-wide basis.  The RA performs the
   identity proof, and potentially other tasks that require the secret




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   to be used, while the CA is prevented from knowing the secret.  If
   the identity proof fails, then the RA returns an error to the client
   denoting that fact.

   The relevant ASN.1 for the RA Identity Proof Witness control is as
   follows:

      cmc-raIdentityWitness CMC-CONTROL ::=
         { BodyPartPath IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-raIdentityWitness }

      id-cmc-raIdentityWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 35}

   The above ASN.1 defines the following items:

   cmc-raIdentityWitness  is a CMC-CONTROL associating the object
      identifier id-cmc-raIdentityWitness and the type BodyPartPath.
      This object is omitted from the 1988 module.  The object is added
      to the object set Cmc-Control-Set.  The control is permitted to
      appear only in the control sequence of a PKIData object.  It MUST
      NOT appear in the control sequence of a PKIResponse.  The control
      is permitted to be used only by an RA.  The control may appear
      multiple times in a control sequence with each occurrence pointing
      to a different object.

   id-cmc-raIdentityWitness  is the object identifier used to identify
      this CMC control.

   BodyPartPath  is the type structure associated with the control.  The
      syntax of BodyPartPath is defined in Section 3.2.2.  The path
      contains a sequence of body part identifiers leading to one of the
      following items:

      Identity Proof control  if the RA verified the identity proof in
         this control.

      Identity Proof Version 2 control  if the RA verified the identity
         proof in this control.

      Full PKI Request  if the RA performed an out-of-band identity
         proof for this request.  The request SHOULD NOT contain either
         Identity Proof control.

      Simple PKI Request  if the RA performed an out-of-band identity
         proof for this request.

   The RA Identity Proof Witness control will frequently be associated
   with a Modify Certification Request control, which changes the name
   fields in the associated certification requests.  This is because the



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   RA knows the actual name to be assigned to the entity requesting the
   certificate, and the end-entity does not yet have the details of the
   name.  (The association would be set up by the operator at the time
   the shared-secret was generated by the RA.)

   When this control is placed in a message, it is RECOMMENDED that the
   Control Processed control be placed in the body sequence as well.
   Using the explicit new control, rather than implicitly relying on the
   Control Processed control is important due to the need to know
   explicitly which identity proofs have been performed.  The new
   control also allows an RA to state that out-of-band identity proofs
   have been performed.

   When the identity proof is performed by an RA, the RA also MUST
   validate the linking between the identity proof and the name
   information wrapped inside of the key proof-of-possession.

2.6.  New Section 6.21 - "Response Body Control"

   Insert this section.

   The Response Body Control is designed to enable an RA to inform an EE
   that there is an embedded response message that MUST be processed as
   part of the processing of this message.  This control is designed to
   be used in a couple of different cases where an RA has done some
   additional processing for the certification request, e.g., as key
   generation.  When an RA performs key generation on behalf of an EE,
   the RA MUST respond with both the original response message from the
   certificate issuer (containing the certificate issuance) as part of
   the response generated by the RA (containing the new key).  Another
   case where this is useful is when the secret is shared between the RA
   and the EE (rather than between the CA and the EE) and the RA returns
   the Publish Trust Anchors control (to populate the correct trust
   points).

   The relevant ASN.1 for the Response Body Control is as follows:

     cmc-responseBody CMC-CONTROL ::= {
        BodyPartPath IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-responseBody
     }

     id-cmc-responseBody OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 37}









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   The above ASN.1 defines the following items:

   cmc-responseBody  is a CMC-CONTROL associating the object identifier
      id-cmc-responseBody with the type BodyPartPath.  This object is
      omitted from the 1988 module.  The object is added to the object
      set Cmc-Control-Set.  The control is permitted to appear only in
      the control sequence of a PKIResponse.  The control MUST NOT
      appear in the control sequence of a PKIData.  It is expected that
      only an intermediary RA will use this control; a CA generally does
      not need the control as it is creating the original innermost
      message.

   id-cmc-responseBody  is the object identifier used to identify this
      CMC control.

   BodyPartPath  is the type structure associated with the control.  The
      syntax of BodyPartPath is defined in Section 3.2.2.  The path
      contains a sequence of body part identifiers leading to a
      cmsSequence item which contains a PKIResponse within it.

2.7.  New Section 7 - "Other Attributes"

   Insert this section before the current Section 7.

   There are a number of different locations where various types of
   attributes can be placed in either a CMC request or a CMC response
   message.  These places include the attribute sequence of a PKCS #10
   request, controls in CRMF (Section 6 of [RFC4211]), and the various
   CMS attribute sequences.

2.8.  New Section 7.1 - "Change Subject Name Attribute"

   Insert this section.

   The Client Name Change Request attribute is designed for a client to
   ask for a change in its name as part of a certification request.
   Because of security issues, this cannot be done in the simple way of
   just changing the requested subject name in the certificate template.
   The name in the certification request MUST match the name in the
   certificate used to verify the request, in order that identity and
   possession proofs are correctly applied.










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   The relevant ASN.1 for the Client Name Change Request attribute is as
   follows:

      at-cmc-changeSubjectName ATTRIBUTE ::=
         { ChangeSubjectName IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-changeSubjectName }

      id-cmc-changeSubjectName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 36}

      ChangeSubjectName ::= SEQUENCE {
          subject             Name OPTIONAL,
          subjectAlt          SubjectAltName OPTIONAL
      }
      (WITH COMPONENTS {..., subject PRESENT} |
            COMPONENTS {..., subjectAlt PRESENT} )

   The attribute is designed to be used as an ATTRIBUTE object.  As
   such, the attribute is placed in one of the following two places:

      The attributes field in a CertificationRequest.

      The controls field of a CertRequest for a CRMF certification
      request.

   The control is identified by the Object Identifier
   id-cmc-changeSubjectName.

   The ASN.1 type associated with control is ChangeSubjectName.  The
   fields of the structure are configured as follows:

   subject  contains the requested subject name for the new certificate.

   subjectAlt  contains the requested subject alternative name for the
      new certificate.

   At least one of the fields in the sequence MUST be present when
   encoding the structure.

   When the CA processes this attribute in a certification request, it
   will do the following:

   1.  If present, the subject field is copied to the name field of the
       template.  If the subject field is absent, the name field of the
       template will be set to a empty sequence.

   2.  If present, the subjectAlt field is used as the content of a
       SubjectAltName extension in the certificate.  If the subjectAlt
       field is absent, the subjectAltName extension is removed from the
       certificate template.



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2.9.  New Section 9 - "Certificate Requirements"

   Insert this section before the current Section 8.

   Certificates for servers used in the CMC protocol SHOULD conform to
   the profile defined in [RFC5280].  This document defines some
   additional items that MAY appear in CMC server certificates.  Section
   9.1 defines some additional values for the Extended Key Usage
   extension.  Section 9.2 defines a new Subject Information Access
   value that allows for a CMC certificate to publish information on how
   to contact the services it provides.

2.10.  New Section 9.1 - "Extended Key Usage"

   Insert this section.

   The Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension is used to restrict the use of
   a certificate to specific applications.  We define three different
   EKUs in this document.  The ASN.1 to define these EKUs is:

      id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
      id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
      id-kp-cmcArchive OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 29 }

   The usage description for each of the EKUs is as follows:

   CMC Certification Authorities  are identified by the id-kp-cmcCA
      extended key usage.  The certificate may be the same as or
      different than the CA certificate.  If a different certificate is
      used, the certificates containing the id-kp-cmcCA extended key
      usage SHOULD have the same name as the certificate used for
      issuing the certificates.  (Using a separate key pair for CMC
      protocol operations and for issuing certificates and CRLs
      decreases the number of operations for which the private key used
      to sign certificates and CRLs would be used.)

   CMC Registration Authorities  are identified by the id-kp-cmcRA
      extended key usage.  This usage is placed into RA certificates.

   CMC Archive Servers  are identified by the id-kp-cmcArchive extended
      key usage.  CMC Archive Servers and the associated protocol are to
      be defined in a future document.









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2.11.  New Section 9.2 - "Subject Information Access"

   Insert this section.

   The subject information access extension indicates how to access
   information and services for the subject of the certificate.  We
   define a new value for use in this extension, to identify the
   different locations that CMC services will be available.  If this
   value is placed in a certificate, an appropriate extended key usage
   defined in Section 9.1 MUST be included in the certificate as well.

   The id-ad-cmc OID is used when the subject offers certification
   services using the CMC protocol.  If the CMC services are available
   via HTTP or FTP, accessLocation MUST be a uniformResourceIdentifier.
   If the CMC services are available via electronic mail, accessLocation
   MUST be an rfc822Name.  If CMC services are available using TCP/IP,
   the dNSName or iPAddress name forms MUST be used.  Since the
   GeneralName data structure does not permit the inclusion of a port
   number, in the absence of other external configuration information,
   the value of 5318 should be used.  (The port registration is in
   Section 3.2.)  The semantics of other name forms of accessLocation
   (when accessMethod is id-ad-cmc) are not defined by this
   specification.

   The ASN.1 type for this extension is GeneralName (see Section 4.2.1.8
   of [RFC5280]).

   id-ad-cmc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 12 }

2.12.  Update Section 8 - "Security Considerations"

   Add the following paragraphs to the end of Section 8.

   A number of controls such as the RA Identity Proof Witness control
   exist for an RA to either make assertions about or modify a
   certification request.  Any upstream request processor, such as a CA,
   MUST verify that the RA is fully identified and authorized to make
   the assertion or modification it is claiming.  If it is not
   identified or authorized, then any request MUST be rejected.

   CMC servers, both RAs and CAs, need to perform due diligence in
   checking the contents of a certification request.  At an absolute
   minimum, all fields should be checked to ensure that the policies of
   the CA/RA are correctly enforced.  While all fields need to be
   checked, special care should be taken with names, name forms,
   algorithm choices, and algorithm parameters.





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3.  Updates to RFC 5273 - "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC):
    Transport Protocols"

3.1.  Update Section 5 - "TCP-Based Protocol"

   Replace paragraph 3 in Section 5 with the following.

   CMC requires a registered port number to send and receive CMC
   messages over TCP.  The title of this IP Protocol number is
   "pkix-cmc".  The value of this TCP port is 5318.

   Prior to this update, CMC did not have a registered port number and
   used an externally configured port from the Private Port range.
   Client implementations MAY want to continue to allow for this to
   occur.  Servers SHOULD change to use the new port.  It is expected
   that HTTP will continue to be the primary transport method used by
   CMC installations.

3.2.  New Section 6 - "IANA Considerations"

   Insert this new section before the current Section 6.

   IANA has assigned a TCP port number in the Registered Port Number
   range for the use of CMC.

   Service name: pkix-cmc
   Port Number: 5318
   Transport protocol: TCP
   Description: PKIX Certificate Management using CMS (CMC)
   Reference: RFC 6402
   Assignee: iesg@ietf.org
   Contact: chair@ietf.org



















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4.  Updates to RFC 5274 - "Certificate Management Message over CMS
    (CMC): Compliance Requirements"

4.1.  Update to Section 4.2 - "Controls"

   Add the following lines to the end of Table 1.

   The following table lists the name and level of support required for
   each control.

             +---------------------------+-----+------+-----+
             | Control                   | EE  | RA   | CA  |
             +---------------------------+-----+------+-----+
             | RA Identity Proof Witness | N/A | MUST | (2) |
             |                           |     |      |     |
             | Response Body             | (6) | (6)  | N/A |
             +---------------------------+-----+------+-----+

                Addition to Table 1: CMC Control Attributes

   The following note should be added.

   6. EE's SHOULD implement if designed to work with RAs and MUST
      implement if intended to be used in environments where RAs are
      used for identity validation or key generation.  RAs SHOULD
      implement and validate responses for consistency.

5.  IANA Considerations

   This document contains a new IANA Considerations section to be added
   to [RFC5273] as part of this update.

6.  Security Considerations

   No changes are made to the existing security considerations of RFC
   5273 and RFC 5274.  The security considerations for RFC 5272 have
   been slightly modified (Section 2.12).

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]     Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
                 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC5272]     Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over
                 CMS (CMC)", RFC 5272, June 2008.




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   [RFC5273]     Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over
                 CMS (CMC): Transport Protocols", RFC 5273, June 2008.

   [RFC5274]     Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management
                 Messages over CMS (CMC): Compliance Requirements",
                 RFC 5274, June 2008.

   [RFC5280]     Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
                 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
                 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
                 List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

7.2.  Informative References

   [CMS]         Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
                 STD 70, RFC 5652, September 2009.

   [RFC6403]     Zieglar, L., Turner, S., and M. Peck, "Suite B Profile
                 of Certificate Management over CMS", RFC 6403, November
                 2011.

   [RFC4211]     Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
                 Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
                 September 2005.

   [RFC5912]     Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
                 Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)",
                 RFC 5912, June 2010.























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Appendix A.  ASN.1 Modules

A.1.  1988 ASN.1 Module

   This section contains the updated ASN.1 module for [RFC5272].  This
   module replaces the module in Appendix A of that document.  Although
   a 2008 ASN.1 module is provided, this remains the normative module as
   per the policy of the PKIX working group.

   EnrollmentMessageSyntax-2011-v88
    { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
      security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
      id-mod-enrollMsgSyntax-2011-88(76) }

   DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
   BEGIN

    -- EXPORTS All --
    -- The types and values defined in this module are exported for use
    -- in the other ASN.1 modules.  Other applications may use them for
    -- their own purposes.

    IMPORTS

      -- PKIX Part 1 - Implicit    From [RFC5280]
         GeneralName, CRLReason, ReasonFlags, GeneralNames
         FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
                 internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
                 id-pkix1-implicit(19)}

      -- PKIX Part 1 - Explicit    From [RFC5280]
         AlgorithmIdentifier, Extension, Name, CertificateSerialNumber,
         id-ad, id-kp
         FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
                 internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
                 id-pkix1-explicit(18)}

      -- Cryptographic Message Syntax   FROM [CMS]
         ContentInfo, Attribute, IssuerAndSerialNumber
           FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 { iso(1) member-body(2)
                us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
                modules(0) cms-2004(24)}

    -- CRMF                         FROM [RFC4211]
       CertReqMsg, PKIPublicationInfo, CertTemplate
       FROM PKIXCRMF-2005 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
              internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
              id-mod-crmf2005(36)};



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      -- Global Types
         -- UTF8String ::= [UNIVERSAL 12] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING
           -- The content of this type conforms to RFC 3629.

     id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
         dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) }

    id-cmc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 7}   -- CMC controls
    id-cct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 12}  -- CMC content types

    -- The following controls have the type OCTET STRING

    id-cmc-identityProof OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 3}
    id-cmc-dataReturn OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 4}
    id-cmc-regInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 18}
    id-cmc-responseInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 19}
    id-cmc-queryPending OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 21}
    id-cmc-popLinkRandom OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 22}
    id-cmc-popLinkWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 23}

    -- The following controls have the type UTF8String

    id-cmc-identification OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 2}

    -- The following controls have the type INTEGER

    id-cmc-transactionId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 5}

    -- The following controls have the type OCTET STRING

    id-cmc-senderNonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 6}
    id-cmc-recipientNonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 7}

    -- This is the content type used for a request message
    --     in the protocol

    id-cct-PKIData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cct 2 }

    PKIData ::= SEQUENCE {
        controlSequence    SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedAttribute,
        reqSequence        SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedRequest,
        cmsSequence        SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedContentInfo,
        otherMsgSequence   SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF OtherMsg
    }

     bodyIdMax INTEGER ::= 4294967295

     BodyPartID ::= INTEGER(0..bodyIdMax)



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    TaggedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
        bodyPartID         BodyPartID,
        attrType           OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
        attrValues         SET OF AttributeValue
    }

     AttributeValue ::= ANY

     TaggedRequest ::= CHOICE {
         tcr               [0] TaggedCertificationRequest,
         crm               [1] CertReqMsg,
         orm               [2] SEQUENCE {
             bodyPartID            BodyPartID,
             requestMessageType    OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
             requestMessageValue   ANY DEFINED BY requestMessageType
         }
     }

     TaggedCertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
         bodyPartID            BodyPartID,
         certificationRequest  CertificationRequest
     }

     CertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
       certificationRequestInfo  SEQUENCE {
         version                   INTEGER,
         subject                   Name,
         subjectPublicKeyInfo      SEQUENCE {
           algorithm                 AlgorithmIdentifier,
           subjectPublicKey          BIT STRING },
         attributes                [0] IMPLICIT SET OF Attribute },
       signatureAlgorithm        AlgorithmIdentifier,
       signature                 BIT STRING
     }

    TaggedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
        bodyPartID              BodyPartID,
        contentInfo             ContentInfo
    }

    OtherMsg ::= SEQUENCE {
        bodyPartID        BodyPartID,
        otherMsgType      OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
        otherMsgValue     ANY DEFINED BY otherMsgType }

    --  This defines the response message in the protocol
    id-cct-PKIResponse OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cct 3 }




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    ResponseBody ::= PKIResponse

    PKIResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
        controlSequence   SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedAttribute,
        cmsSequence       SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedContentInfo,
        otherMsgSequence  SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF OtherMsg

    }

    -- Used to return status state in a response

    id-cmc-statusInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 1}

    CMCStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
        cMCStatus       CMCStatus,
        bodyList        SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartID,
        statusString    UTF8String OPTIONAL,
        otherInfo        CHOICE {
          failInfo         CMCFailInfo,
          pendInfo         PendInfo } OPTIONAL
    }

    PendInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
        pendToken        OCTET STRING,
        pendTime         GeneralizedTime
    }

    CMCStatus ::= INTEGER {
        success         (0),
        failed          (2),
        pending         (3),
        noSupport       (4),
        confirmRequired (5),
        popRequired     (6),
        partial                (7)
    }















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    -- Note:
    -- The spelling of unsupportedExt is corrected in this version.
    -- In RFC 2797, it was unsuportedExt.

    CMCFailInfo ::= INTEGER {
        badAlg          (0),
        badMessageCheck (1),
        badRequest      (2),
        badTime         (3),
        badCertId       (4),
        unsupportedExt  (5),
        mustArchiveKeys (6),
        badIdentity     (7),
        popRequired     (8),
        popFailed       (9),
        noKeyReuse      (10),
        internalCAError (11),
        tryLater        (12),
        authDataFail    (13)
    }

    -- Used for RAs to add extensions to certification requests
    id-cmc-addExtensions OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 8}

    AddExtensions ::= SEQUENCE {
        pkiDataReference    BodyPartID,
        certReferences      SEQUENCE OF BodyPartID,
        extensions          SEQUENCE OF Extension
    }


    id-cmc-encryptedPOP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 9}
    id-cmc-decryptedPOP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 10}

    EncryptedPOP ::= SEQUENCE {
        request       TaggedRequest,
        cms             ContentInfo,
        thePOPAlgID     AlgorithmIdentifier,
        witnessAlgID    AlgorithmIdentifier,
        witness         OCTET STRING
    }

    DecryptedPOP ::= SEQUENCE {
        bodyPartID      BodyPartID,
        thePOPAlgID     AlgorithmIdentifier,
        thePOP          OCTET STRING
    }




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     id-cmc-lraPOPWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 11}

     LraPopWitness ::= SEQUENCE {
         pkiDataBodyid   BodyPartID,
         bodyIds         SEQUENCE OF BodyPartID
     }

    --
    id-cmc-getCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 15}

    GetCert ::= SEQUENCE {
        issuerName      GeneralName,
        serialNumber    INTEGER }

    id-cmc-getCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 16}

    GetCRL ::= SEQUENCE {
        issuerName    Name,
        cRLName       GeneralName OPTIONAL,
        time          GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
        reasons       ReasonFlags OPTIONAL }

    id-cmc-revokeRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 17}

    RevokeRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
        issuerName            Name,
        serialNumber          INTEGER,
        reason                CRLReason,
        invalidityDate        GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
        passphrase            OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
        comment               UTF8String OPTIONAL }

    id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 24}

    CMCCertId ::= IssuerAndSerialNumber

    -- The following is used to request V3 extensions be added to a
    -- certificate

    id-ExtensionReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2)
         us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 14}

    ExtensionReq ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension

    -- The following exists to allow Diffie-Hellman Certification
    -- Request Messages to be well-formed

    id-alg-noSignature OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix id-alg(6) 2}



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    NoSignatureValue ::= OCTET STRING

    --  Unauthenticated attribute to carry removable data.
    --    This could be used in an update of "CMC Extensions: Server
    --    Side Key Generation and Key Escrow" (February 2005) and in
    --    other documents.

    id-aa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
          rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2)}
    id-aa-cmc-unsignedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-aa 34}

    CMCUnsignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
        bodyPartPath        BodyPartPath,
        identifier          OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
        content             ANY DEFINED BY identifier
    }

    --  Replaces CMC Status Info
    --

    id-cmc-statusInfoV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 25}

    CMCStatusInfoV2 ::= SEQUENCE {
       cMCStatus             CMCStatus,
       bodyList              SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                      BodyPartReference,
       statusString          UTF8String OPTIONAL,
       otherInfo             CHOICE {
         failInfo               CMCFailInfo,
         pendInfo               PendInfo,
         extendedFailInfo       SEQUENCE {
            failInfoOID            OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
            failInfoValue          AttributeValue
         }
       } OPTIONAL
    }

    BodyPartReference ::= CHOICE {
       bodyPartID           BodyPartID,
       bodyPartPath         BodyPartPath
    }

    BodyPartPath ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartID

    --  Allow for distribution of trust anchors
    --

    id-cmc-trustedAnchors OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 26}



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    PublishTrustAnchors ::= SEQUENCE {
        seqNumber      INTEGER,
        hashAlgorithm  AlgorithmIdentifier,
        anchorHashes     SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING
    }

    id-cmc-authData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 27}

    AuthPublish ::= BodyPartID

    --   These two items use BodyPartList
    id-cmc-batchRequests OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 28}
    id-cmc-batchResponses OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 29}

    BodyPartList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartID

    --
    id-cmc-publishCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 30}

    CMCPublicationInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
        hashAlg                      AlgorithmIdentifier,
        certHashes                   SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING,
        pubInfo                          PKIPublicationInfo
    }

    id-cmc-modCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 31}

    ModCertTemplate ::= SEQUENCE {
        pkiDataReference             BodyPartPath,
        certReferences               BodyPartList,
        replace                      BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
        certTemplate                 CertTemplate
    }

    -- Inform follow-on servers that one or more controls have already
    -- been processed

    id-cmc-controlProcessed OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 32}

    ControlsProcessed ::= SEQUENCE {
        bodyList        SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF BodyPartReference
    }

    --  Identity Proof control w/ algorithm agility

    id-cmc-identityProofV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cmc 34 }





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    IdentifyProofV2 ::= SEQUENCE {
        proofAlgID       AlgorithmIdentifier,
        macAlgId         AlgorithmIdentifier,
        witness          OCTET STRING
    }

    id-cmc-popLinkWitnessV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cmc 33 }
    PopLinkWitnessV2 ::= SEQUENCE {
        keyGenAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
        macAlgorithm      AlgorithmIdentifier,
        witness           OCTET STRING
    }

    --

    id-cmc-raIdentityWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 35}


    --
    --  Allow for an End-Entity to request a change in name.
    --  This item is added to RegControlSet in CRMF.
    --

    id-cmc-changeSubjectName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 36}

    ChangeSubjectName ::= SEQUENCE {
        subject             Name OPTIONAL,
        subjectAlt          GeneralNames OPTIONAL
    }
    -- (WITH COMPONENTS {..., subject PRESENT} |
    --  WITH COMPONENTS {..., subjectAlt PRESENT} )

    --
    --  Embedded response from a third party for processing
    --

    id-cmc-responseBody OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 37}

    --
    --  Key purpose identifiers are in the Extended Key Usage extension
    --

    id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
    id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
    id-kp-cmcArchive OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }






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    --
    --  Subject Information Access identifier
    --

    id-ad-cmc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 12 }

   END

A.2.  2008 ASN.1 Module

   An updated 2008 ASN.1 module has been provided as part of this
   update.  The module contains those changes that were done to update
   the current ASN.1 standards (done for [RFC5912]) as well as changes
   made for this document.

EnrollmentMessageSyntax-2011-v08
    {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
    security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
    id-mod-enrollMsgSyntax-2011-08(76)}
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
  EXPORTS ALL;
  IMPORTS

  AttributeSet{}, Extension{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE
  FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
      {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)}

  AlgorithmIdentifier{}, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, KEY-WRAP, KEY-DERIVATION,
      MAC-ALGORITHM, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, PUBLIC-KEY
  FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
      {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
      id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)}

  CertificateSerialNumber, GeneralName, CRLReason, ReasonFlags,
      CertExtensions, GeneralNames
  FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009
      {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)}

  Name, id-pkix, PublicKeyAlgorithms, SignatureAlgorithms, id-ad, id-kp
  FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
      {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)}





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  ContentInfo, IssuerAndSerialNumber, CONTENT-TYPE
  FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010
    { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
       pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) }

  CertReqMsg, PKIPublicationInfo, CertTemplate
  FROM PKIXCRMF-2009
      {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005-02(55)}

  mda-sha1
  FROM PKIXAlgs-2009
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
       internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
       id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56)}

  kda-PBKDF2, maca-hMAC-SHA1
  FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms-2009
      { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
      smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cmsalg-2001-02(37) }

  mda-sha256
  FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms-2009
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
         internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
         id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs-02(54) } ;

  --  CMS content types defined in this document

  CMC-ContentTypes CONTENT-TYPE ::= { ct-PKIData | ct-PKIResponse, ... }

  --  Signature Algorithms defined in this document

  SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { sa-noSignature }

  --  CMS Unsigned Attributes

  CMC-UnsignedAtts ATTRIBUTE ::= { aa-cmc-unsignedData }

  --
  --

  id-cmc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 7}   -- CMC controls
  id-cct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 12}  -- CMC content types







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  -- This is the content type for a request message in the protocol

  ct-PKIData CONTENT-TYPE ::=
      { TYPE PKIData IDENTIFIED BY id-cct-PKIData }
  id-cct-PKIData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cct 2 }

  PKIData ::= SEQUENCE {
      controlSequence    SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedAttribute,
      reqSequence        SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedRequest,
      cmsSequence        SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedContentInfo,
      otherMsgSequence   SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF OtherMsg
  }

  BodyPartID ::= INTEGER(0..4294967295)

  TaggedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
      bodyPartID         BodyPartID,
      attrType           CMC-CONTROL.&id({Cmc-Control-Set}),
      attrValues         SET OF CMC-CONTROL.
                             &Type({Cmc-Control-Set}{@attrType})
  }

  Cmc-Control-Set CMC-CONTROL ::= {
      cmc-identityProof | cmc-dataReturn | cmc-regInfo |
      cmc-responseInfo | cmc-queryPending | cmc-popLinkRandom |
      cmc-popLinkWitness | cmc-identification | cmc-transactionId |
      cmc-senderNonce | cmc-recipientNonce | cmc-statusInfo |
      cmc-addExtensions | cmc-encryptedPOP | cmc-decryptedPOP |
      cmc-lraPOPWitness | cmc-getCert | cmc-getCRL |
      cmc-revokeRequest | cmc-confirmCertAcceptance |
      cmc-statusInfoV2 | cmc-trustedAnchors | cmc-authData |
      cmc-batchRequests | cmc-batchResponses | cmc-publishCert |
      cmc-modCertTemplate | cmc-controlProcessed |
      cmc-identityProofV2 | cmc-popLinkWitnessV2, ...,
      cmc-raIdentityWitness | cmc-responseBody }

  OTHER-REQUEST ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER

  --  We do not define any other requests in this document.
  --     Examples might be attribute certification requests.

  OtherRequests OTHER-REQUEST ::= {...}









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  TaggedRequest ::= CHOICE {
      tcr               [0] TaggedCertificationRequest,
      crm               [1] CertReqMsg,
      orm               [2] SEQUENCE {
          bodyPartID            BodyPartID,
          requestMessageType    OTHER-REQUEST.&id({OtherRequests}),
          requestMessageValue   OTHER-REQUEST.&Type({OtherRequests}
                                    {@.requestMessageType})
      }
  }

  TaggedCertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
      bodyPartID            BodyPartID,
      certificationRequest  CertificationRequest
  }

  AttributeList ATTRIBUTE ::= {at-extension-req, ...,
      at-cmc-changeSubjectName}

  CertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
     certificationRequestInfo  SEQUENCE {
         version                   INTEGER,
         subject                   Name,
         subjectPublicKeyInfo      SEQUENCE {
             algorithm                 AlgorithmIdentifier{PUBLIC-KEY,
                                           {PublicKeyAlgorithms}},
             subjectPublicKey          BIT STRING
         },
         attributes                [0] IMPLICIT SET OF
                                       AttributeSet{{AttributeList}}
      },
      signatureAlgorithm        AlgorithmIdentifier
                                    {SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM,
                                        {SignatureAlgorithms}},
      signature                 BIT STRING
  }

  TaggedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
      bodyPartID              BodyPartID,
      contentInfo             ContentInfo
  }

  OTHER-MSG ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER

  --  No other messages currently defined

  OtherMsgSet OTHER-MSG ::= {...}




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  OtherMsg ::= SEQUENCE {
      bodyPartID        BodyPartID,
      otherMsgType      OTHER-MSG.&id({OtherMsgSet}),
      otherMsgValue     OTHER-MSG.&Type({OtherMsgSet}{@otherMsgType}) }

  --  This defines the response message in the protocol

  ct-PKIResponse CONTENT-TYPE ::=
      { TYPE PKIResponse IDENTIFIED BY id-cct-PKIResponse }
  id-cct-PKIResponse OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cct 3 }

  ResponseBody ::= PKIResponse

  PKIResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
      controlSequence   SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedAttribute,
      cmsSequence       SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedContentInfo,
      otherMsgSequence  SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF OtherMsg
  }

  CMC-CONTROL ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER

  -- The following controls have the type OCTET STRING

  cmc-identityProof CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-identityProof }
  id-cmc-identityProof OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 3}

  cmc-dataReturn CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-dataReturn }
  id-cmc-dataReturn OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 4}

  cmc-regInfo CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-regInfo }
  id-cmc-regInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 18}

  cmc-responseInfo CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-responseInfo }
  id-cmc-responseInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 19}

  cmc-queryPending CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-queryPending }
  id-cmc-queryPending OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 21}

  cmc-popLinkRandom CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-popLinkRandom }
  id-cmc-popLinkRandom OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 22}





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  cmc-popLinkWitness CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-popLinkWitness }
  id-cmc-popLinkWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 23}

  -- The following controls have the type UTF8String

  cmc-identification CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { UTF8String IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-identification }
  id-cmc-identification OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 2}

  -- The following controls have the type INTEGER

  cmc-transactionId CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { INTEGER IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-transactionId }
  id-cmc-transactionId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 5}

  -- The following controls have the type OCTET STRING

  cmc-senderNonce CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-senderNonce }
  id-cmc-senderNonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 6}

  cmc-recipientNonce CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-recipientNonce }

  id-cmc-recipientNonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 7}

  -- Used to return status in a response

  cmc-statusInfo CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { CMCStatusInfo IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-statusInfo }
  id-cmc-statusInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 1}

  CMCStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
      cMCStatus       CMCStatus,
      bodyList        SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartID,
      statusString    UTF8String OPTIONAL,
      otherInfo       CHOICE {
         failInfo         CMCFailInfo,
         pendInfo         PendInfo
      } OPTIONAL
  }

  PendInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
      pendToken        OCTET STRING,
      pendTime         GeneralizedTime
  }




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  CMCStatus ::= INTEGER {
      success         (0),
      failed          (2),
      pending         (3),
      noSupport       (4),
      confirmRequired (5),
      popRequired     (6),
      partial         (7)
  }

  CMCFailInfo ::= INTEGER {
      badAlg          (0),
      badMessageCheck (1),
      badRequest      (2),
      badTime         (3),
      badCertId       (4),
      unsuportedExt   (5),
      mustArchiveKeys (6),
      badIdentity     (7),
      popRequired     (8),
      popFailed       (9),
      noKeyReuse      (10),
      internalCAError (11),
      tryLater        (12),
      authDataFail    (13)
  }

  -- Used for RAs to add extensions to certification requests

  cmc-addExtensions CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { AddExtensions IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-addExtensions }
  id-cmc-addExtensions OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 8}

  AddExtensions ::= SEQUENCE {
      pkiDataReference    BodyPartID,
      certReferences      SEQUENCE OF BodyPartID,
      extensions          SEQUENCE OF Extension{{CertExtensions}}
  }

  cmc-encryptedPOP CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { EncryptedPOP IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-encryptedPOP }
  cmc-decryptedPOP CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { DecryptedPOP IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-decryptedPOP }
  id-cmc-encryptedPOP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 9}
  id-cmc-decryptedPOP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 10}






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  EncryptedPOP ::= SEQUENCE {
      request       TaggedRequest,
      cms             ContentInfo,
      thePOPAlgID     AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {POPAlgs}},
      witnessAlgID    AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM,
                          {WitnessAlgs}},
      witness         OCTET STRING
  }

  POPAlgs MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {maca-hMAC-SHA1, ...}
  WitnessAlgs DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {mda-sha1, ...}

  DecryptedPOP ::= SEQUENCE {
      bodyPartID      BodyPartID,
      thePOPAlgID     AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {POPAlgs}},
      thePOP          OCTET STRING
  }

  cmc-lraPOPWitness CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { LraPopWitness IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-lraPOPWitness }

  id-cmc-lraPOPWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 11}

  LraPopWitness ::= SEQUENCE {
      pkiDataBodyid   BodyPartID,
      bodyIds         SEQUENCE OF BodyPartID
  }

  --

  cmc-getCert CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { GetCert IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-getCert }
  id-cmc-getCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 15}

  GetCert ::= SEQUENCE {
      issuerName      GeneralName,
      serialNumber    INTEGER }


  cmc-getCRL CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { GetCRL IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-getCRL }
  id-cmc-getCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 16}

  GetCRL ::= SEQUENCE {
      issuerName    Name,
      cRLName       GeneralName OPTIONAL,
      time          GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
      reasons       ReasonFlags OPTIONAL }



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  cmc-revokeRequest CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { RevokeRequest IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-revokeRequest}
  id-cmc-revokeRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 17}

  RevokeRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
      issuerName            Name,
      serialNumber          INTEGER,
      reason                CRLReason,
      invalidityDate         GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
      passphrase            OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
      comment               UTF8String OPTIONAL }


  cmc-confirmCertAcceptance CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { CMCCertId IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance }
  id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 24}

  CMCCertId ::= IssuerAndSerialNumber

  -- The following is used to request V3 extensions be added
  --     to a certificate

  at-extension-req ATTRIBUTE ::=
      { TYPE ExtensionReq IDENTIFIED BY id-ExtensionReq }
  id-ExtensionReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
      rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 14}

  ExtensionReq ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
      Extension{{CertExtensions}}

  -- The following allows Diffie-Hellman Certification Request
  --     Messages to be well-formed

  sa-noSignature SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
      IDENTIFIER id-alg-noSignature
      VALUE NoSignatureValue
      PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE required
      HASHES { mda-sha1 }
  }
  id-alg-noSignature OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix id-alg(6) 2}

  NoSignatureValue ::= OCTET STRING

  --  Unauthenticated attribute to carry removable data.

  id-aa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
      rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2)}




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RFC 6402                      CMC: Updates                 November 2011


  aa-cmc-unsignedData ATTRIBUTE ::=
      { TYPE CMCUnsignedData IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-cmc-unsignedData }
  id-aa-cmc-unsignedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-aa 34}

  CMCUnsignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
      bodyPartPath        BodyPartPath,
      identifier          TYPE-IDENTIFIER.&id,
      content             TYPE-IDENTIFIER.&Type
  }

  --  Replaces CMC Status Info
  --

  cmc-statusInfoV2 CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { CMCStatusInfoV2 IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-statusInfoV2 }
  id-cmc-statusInfoV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 25}


  EXTENDED-FAILURE-INFO ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER

  ExtendedFailures EXTENDED-FAILURE-INFO ::= {...}

  CMCStatusInfoV2 ::= SEQUENCE {
     cMCStatus             CMCStatus,
     bodyList              SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                    BodyPartReference,
     statusString          UTF8String OPTIONAL,
     otherInfo             CHOICE {
         failInfo               CMCFailInfo,
         pendInfo               PendInfo,
         extendedFailInfo       [1] SEQUENCE {
            failInfoOID            TYPE-IDENTIFIER.&id
                                       ({ExtendedFailures}),
            failInfoValue          TYPE-IDENTIFIER.&Type
                                       ({ExtendedFailures}
                                           {@.failInfoOID})
         }
      } OPTIONAL
  }

  BodyPartReference ::= CHOICE {
     bodyPartID           BodyPartID,
     bodyPartPath         BodyPartPath
  }

  BodyPartPath ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartID





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  --  Allow for distribution of trust anchors
  --

  cmc-trustedAnchors CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { PublishTrustAnchors IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-trustedAnchors }
  id-cmc-trustedAnchors OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 26}

  PublishTrustAnchors ::= SEQUENCE {
      seqNumber      INTEGER,
      hashAlgorithm  AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM,
                         {HashAlgorithms}},
      anchorHashes   SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING
  }

  HashAlgorithms DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
     mda-sha1 | mda-sha256, ...
  }

  cmc-authData CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { AuthPublish IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-authData }
  id-cmc-authData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 27}

  AuthPublish ::= BodyPartID

  --   These two items use BodyPartList

  cmc-batchRequests CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { BodyPartList IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-batchRequests }

  id-cmc-batchRequests OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 28}

  cmc-batchResponses CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { BodyPartList IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-batchResponses }
  id-cmc-batchResponses OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 29}

  BodyPartList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartID

  cmc-publishCert CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { CMCPublicationInfo IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-publishCert }
  id-cmc-publishCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 30}

  CMCPublicationInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
      hashAlg        AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM,
                           {HashAlgorithms}},
      certHashes     SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING,
      pubInfo        PKIPublicationInfo
  }




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RFC 6402                      CMC: Updates                 November 2011


  cmc-modCertTemplate CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { ModCertTemplate IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-modCertTemplate }

  id-cmc-modCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 31}

  ModCertTemplate ::= SEQUENCE {
      pkiDataReference             BodyPartPath,
      certReferences               BodyPartList,
      replace                      BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
      certTemplate                 CertTemplate
  }

  -- Inform follow-on servers that one or more controls have
  --     already been processed

  cmc-controlProcessed CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { ControlsProcessed IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-controlProcessed }
  id-cmc-controlProcessed OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 32}

  ControlsProcessed ::= SEQUENCE {
      bodyList              SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF BodyPartReference
  }

  --  Identity Proof control w/ algorithm agility

  cmc-identityProofV2 CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { IdentityProofV2 IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-identityProofV2 }
  id-cmc-identityProofV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cmc 33 }

  IdentityProofV2 ::= SEQUENCE {
      proofAlgID       AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM,
                           {WitnessAlgs}},
      macAlgId         AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {POPAlgs}},
      witness          OCTET STRING
  }

  cmc-popLinkWitnessV2 CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { PopLinkWitnessV2 IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-popLinkWitnessV2 }
  id-cmc-popLinkWitnessV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cmc 34 }

  PopLinkWitnessV2 ::= SEQUENCE {
      keyGenAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier{KEY-DERIVATION,
                            {KeyDevAlgs}},
      macAlgorithm      AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {POPAlgs}},
      witness           OCTET STRING
  }

  KeyDevAlgs KEY-DERIVATION ::= {kda-PBKDF2, ...}



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  cmc-raIdentityWitness CMC-CONTROL ::=
     { BodyPartPath IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-raIdentityWitness }

  id-cmc-raIdentityWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 35}


  --
  --  Allow for an End-Entity to request a change in name.
  --  This item is added to RegControlSet in CRMF.
  --
  at-cmc-changeSubjectName ATTRIBUTE ::=
     { TYPE ChangeSubjectName IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-changeSubjectName }

  id-cmc-changeSubjectName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 36}

  ChangeSubjectName ::= SEQUENCE {
      subject             Name OPTIONAL,
      subjectAlt          GeneralNames OPTIONAL
  }
  (WITH COMPONENTS {..., subject PRESENT} |
   WITH COMPONENTS {..., subjectAlt PRESENT} )

  --
  --  Embedded response from a third party for processing
  --

  cmc-responseBody CMC-CONTROL ::= {
     BodyPartPath IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-responseBody
  }

  id-cmc-responseBody OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 37}

  --
  --  Key purpose identifiers are in the Extended Key Usage extension
  --

  id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
  id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
  id-kp-cmcArchive OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 29 }

  --
  --  Subject Information Access identifier
  --

  id-ad-cmc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 12 }

END




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RFC 6402                      CMC: Updates                 November 2011


Author's Address

   Jim Schaad
   Soaring Hawk Consulting

   EMail: jimsch@augustcellars.com













































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