path: root/doc/rfc/rfc9397.txt

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                            M. Pei
Request for Comments: 9397                                      Broadcom
Category: Informational                                    H. Tschofenig
ISSN: 2070-1721                                                         
                                                               D. Thaler
                                                               Microsoft
                                                              D. Wheeler
                                                                  Amazon
                                                               July 2023


     Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) Architecture

Abstract

   A Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) is an environment that enforces
   the following: any code within the environment cannot be tampered
   with, and any data used by such code cannot be read or tampered with
   by any code outside the environment.  This architecture document
   discusses the motivation for designing and standardizing a protocol
   for managing the lifecycle of Trusted Applications running inside
   such a TEE.

Status of This Memo

   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
   published for informational purposes.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not all documents
   approved by the IESG are candidates for any level of Internet
   Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9397.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
   Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
   in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction
   2.  Terminology
   3.  Use Cases
     3.1.  Payment
     3.2.  Authentication
     3.3.  Internet of Things
     3.4.  Confidential Cloud Computing
   4.  Architecture
     4.1.  System Components
     4.2.  Multiple TEEs in a Device
     4.3.  Multiple TAMs and Relationship to TAs
     4.4.  Untrusted Apps, Trusted Apps, and Personalization Data
       4.4.1.  Example: Application Delivery Mechanisms in Intel SGX
       4.4.2.  Example: Application Delivery Mechanisms in Arm
               TrustZone
     4.5.  Entity Relations
   5.  Keys and Certificate Types
     5.1.  Trust Anchors in a TEEP Agent
     5.2.  Trust Anchors in a TEE
     5.3.  Trust Anchors in a TAM
     5.4.  Scalability
     5.5.  Message Security
   6.  TEEP Broker
     6.1.  Role of the TEEP Broker
     6.2.  TEEP Broker Implementation Consideration
       6.2.1.  TEEP Broker APIs
       6.2.2.  TEEP Broker Distribution
   7.  Attestation
   8.  Algorithm and Attestation Agility
   9.  Security Considerations
     9.1.  Broker Trust Model
     9.2.  Data Protection
     9.3.  Compromised REE
     9.4.  CA Compromise or Expiry of CA Certificate
     9.5.  Compromised TAM
     9.6.  Malicious TA Removal
     9.7.  TEE Certificate Expiry and Renewal
     9.8.  Keeping Secrets from the TAM
     9.9.  REE Privacy
   10. IANA Considerations
   11. Informative References
   Acknowledgments
   Contributors
   Authors' Addresses

1.  Introduction

   Applications executing in a device are exposed to many different
   attacks intended to compromise the execution of the application or
   reveal the data upon which those applications are operating.  These
   attacks increase with the number of other applications on the device,
   with such other applications coming from potentially untrustworthy
   sources.  The potential for attacks further increases with the
   complexity of features and applications on devices and the unintended
   interactions among those features and applications.  The risk of
   attacks on a system increases as the sensitivity of the applications
   or data on the device increases.  As an example, exposure of emails
   from a mail client is likely to be of concern to its owner, but a
   compromise of a banking application raises even greater concerns.

   The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) concept is designed to let
   applications execute in a protected environment that enforces that
   any code within that environment cannot be tampered with and that any
   data used by such code cannot be read or tampered with by any code
   outside that environment, including by a commodity operating system
   (if present).  In a system with multiple TEEs, this also means that
   code in one TEE cannot be read or tampered with by code in another
   TEE.

   This separation reduces the possibility of a successful attack on
   application components and the data contained inside the TEE.
   Typically, application components are chosen to execute inside a TEE
   because those application components perform security-sensitive
   operations or operate on sensitive data.  An application component
   running inside a TEE is commonly referred to (e.g., in [GPTEE] and
   [OP-TEE]) as a Trusted Application (TA), while an application running
   outside any TEE, i.e., in the Rich Execution Environment (REE), is
   referred to as an Untrusted Application (UA).  In the example of a
   banking application, code that relates to the authentication protocol
   could reside in a TA while the application logic including HTTP
   protocol parsing could be contained in the Untrusted Application.  In
   addition, processing of credit card numbers or account balances could
   be done in a TA as it is sensitive data.  The precise code split is
   ultimately a decision of the developer based on the assets the person
   wants to protect according to the threat model.

   TEEs are typically used in cases where software or data assets need
   to be protected from unauthorized access where threat actors may have
   physical or administrative access to a device.  This situation
   arises, for example, in gaming consoles where anti-cheat protection
   is a concern, devices such as ATMs or IoT devices placed in locations
   where attackers might have physical access, cell phones or other
   devices used for mobile payments, and hosted cloud environments.
   Such environments can be thought of as hybrid devices where one user
   or administrator controls the REE and a different (remote) user or
   administrator controls a TEE in the same physical device.  In some
   constrained devices, it may also be the case that there is no REE
   (only a TEE) and no local "user" per se, but only a remote TEE
   administrator.  For further discussion of such confidential computing
   use cases and threat model, see [CC-Overview] and
   [CC-Technical-Analysis].

   TEEs use hardware enforcement combined with software protection to
   secure TAs and their data.  TEEs typically offer a more limited set
   of services to TAs than what is normally available to Untrusted
   Applications.

   However, not all TEEs are the same.  Different vendors may have
   different implementations of TEEs with different security properties,
   features, and control mechanisms to operate on TAs.  Some vendors may
   market multiple different TEEs themselves, with different properties
   attuned to different markets.  A device vendor may integrate one or
   more TEEs into their devices depending on market needs.

   To simplify the life of TA developers interacting with TAs in a TEE,
   an interoperable protocol for managing TAs running in different TEEs
   of various devices is needed.  This software update protocol needs to
   make sure that compatible trusted and Untrusted Components (if any)
   of an application are installed on the correct device.  In this TEE
   ecosystem, the need often arises for an external trusted party to
   verify the identity, claims, and permissions of TA developers,
   devices, and their TEEs.  This external trusted party is the Trusted
   Application Manager (TAM).

   The Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) protocol
   addresses the following problems:

   *  An installer of an Untrusted Application that depends on a given
      TA wants to request installation of that TA in the device's TEE so
      that the installation of the Untrusted Application can complete,
      but the TEE needs to verify whether such a TA is actually
      authorized to run in the TEE and consume potentially scarce TEE
      resources.

   *  A TA developer providing a TA whose code itself is considered
      confidential wants to determine security-relevant information of a
      device before allowing their TA to be provisioned to the TEE
      within the device.  An example is the verification of the type of
      TEE included in a device and its capability of providing the
      security protections required.

   *  A TEE in a device needs to determine whether an entity that wants
      to manage a TA in the device is authorized to manage TAs in the
      TEE and what TAs the entity is permitted to manage.

   *  A Device Administrator wants to determine if a TA exists on a
      device (i.e., is installed in the TEE) and, if not, install the TA
      in the TEE.

   *  A Device Administrator wants to check whether a TA in a device's
      TEE is the most up-to-date version, and if not, update the TA in
      the TEE.

   *  A Device Administrator wants to remove a TA from a device's TEE if
      the TA developer is no longer maintaining that TA, when the TA has
      been revoked, or if the TA is not used for other reasons (e.g.,
      due to an expired subscription).

   For TEEs that simply verify and load signed TAs from an untrusted
   filesystem, classic application distribution protocols can be used
   without modification.  On the other hand, the problems listed in the
   bullets above require a new protocol -- the TEEP protocol.  The TEEP
   protocol is a solution for TEEs that can install and enumerate TAs in
   a TEE-secured location where another domain-specific protocol
   standard (e.g., [GSMA] and [OTRP]) that meets the needs is not
   already in use.

2.  Terminology

   The following terms are used:

   App Store:  An online location from which Untrusted Applications can
      be downloaded.

   Device:  A physical piece of hardware that hosts one or more TEEs,
      often along with an REE.

   Device Administrator:  An entity that is responsible for
      administration of a device, which could be the Device Owner.  A
      Device Administrator has privileges on the device to install and
      remove Untrusted Applications and TAs, approve or reject Trust
      Anchors, and approve or reject TA developers, among other possible
      privileges on the device.  A Device Administrator can manage the
      list of allowed TAMs by modifying the list of Trust Anchors on the
      device.  Although a Device Administrator may have privileges and
      device-specific controls to locally administer a device, the
      Device Administrator may choose to remotely administer a device
      through a TAM.

   Device Owner:  A device is always owned by someone.  In some cases,
      it is common for the (primary) device user to also own the device,
      making the device user/owner also the Device Administrator.  In
      enterprise environments, it is more common for the enterprise to
      own the device and for any device user to have no or limited
      administration rights.  In this case, the enterprise appoints a
      Device Administrator that is not the Device Owner.

   Device User:  A human being that uses a device.  Many devices have a
      single device user.  Some devices have a primary device user with
      other human beings as secondary device users (e.g., a parent
      allowing children to use their tablet or laptop).  Other devices
      are not used by a human being; hence, they have no device user.

   Personalization Data:  A set of configuration data that is specific
      to the device or user.  The Personalization Data may depend on the
      type of TEE, a particular TEE instance, the TA, and even the user
      of the device.  An example of Personalization Data might be a
      secret symmetric key used by a TA to communicate with some
      service.

   Raw Public Key:  A raw public key consists of only the algorithm
      identifier (type) of the key and the cryptographic public key
      material, such as the SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure of a PKIX
      certificate [RFC5280].  Other serialization formats that do not
      rely on ASN.1 may also be used.

   Rich Execution Environment (REE):  An environment that is provided
      and governed by a typical OS (e.g., Linux, Windows, Android, iOS),
      potentially in conjunction with other supporting operating systems
      and hypervisors; it is outside of the TEE(s) managed by the TEEP
      protocol.  This environment and applications running on it are
      considered untrusted (or more precisely, less trusted than a TEE).

   Trust Anchor:  As defined in [RFC6024] and [RFC9019], a Trust Anchor
      "represents an authoritative entity via a public key and
      associated data.  The public key is used to verify digital
      signatures, and the associated data is used to constrain the types
      of information for which the trust anchor is authoritative."  The
      Trust Anchor may be a certificate, a raw public key, or other
      structure, as appropriate.  It can be a non-root certificate when
      it is a certificate.

   Trust Anchor Store:  As defined in [RFC6024], a "trust anchor store
      is a set of one or more trust anchors stored in a device...  A
      device may have more than one trust anchor store, each of which
      may be used by one or more applications."  As noted in [RFC9019],
      "a trust anchor store must resist modification against
      unauthorized insertion, deletion, and modification."

   Trusted Application (TA):  An application (or, in some
      implementations, an application component) that runs in a TEE.

   Trusted Application Manager (TAM):  An entity that manages Trusted
      Applications and other Trusted Components running in TEEs of
      various devices.

   Trusted Component:  A set of code and/or data in a TEE managed as a
      unit by a Trusted Application Manager.  Trusted Applications and
      Personalization Data are thus managed by being included in Trusted
      Components.  Trusted OS code or trusted firmware can also be
      expressed as Trusted Components that a Trusted Component depends
      on.

   Trusted Component Developer:  An entity that develops one or more
      Trusted Components.

   Trusted Component Signer:  An entity that signs a Trusted Component
      with a key that a TEE will trust.  The signer might or might not
      be the same entity as the Trusted Component Developer.  For
      example, a Trusted Component might be signed (or re-signed) by a
      Device Administrator if the TEE will only trust the Device
      Administrator.  A Trusted Component might also be encrypted if the
      code is considered confidential, for example, when a developer
      wants to provide a TA without revealing its code to others.

   Trusted Execution Environment (TEE):  An execution environment that
      enforces that only authorized code can execute within the TEE and
      data used by that code cannot be read or tampered with by code
      outside the TEE.  A TEE also generally has a unique device
      credential that cannot be cloned.  There are multiple technologies
      that can be used to implement a TEE, and the level of security
      achieved varies accordingly.  In addition, TEEs typically use an
      isolation mechanism between Trusted Applications to ensure that
      one TA cannot read, modify, or delete the data and code of another
      TA.

   Untrusted Application (UA):  An application running in an REE.  An
      Untrusted Application might depend on one or more TAs.

3.  Use Cases

3.1.  Payment

   A payment application in a mobile device requires high security and
   trust in the hosting device.  Payments initiated from a mobile device
   can use a Trusted Application to provide strong identification and
   proof of transaction.

   For a mobile payment application, some biometric identification
   information could also be stored in a TEE.  The mobile payment
   application can use such information for unlocking the device and
   local identification of the user.

   A trusted user interface (UI) may be used in a mobile device or
   point-of-sale device to prevent malicious software from stealing
   sensitive user input data.  Such an implementation often relies on a
   TEE for providing access to peripherals, such as PIN input or a
   trusted display, so that the REE cannot observe or tamper with the
   user input or output.

3.2.  Authentication

   For better security of authentication, a device may store its keys
   and cryptographic libraries inside a TEE, limiting access to
   cryptographic functions via a well-defined interface and thereby
   reducing access to keying material.

3.3.  Internet of Things

   Weak security in Internet of Things (IoT) devices has been posing
   threats to critical infrastructure, i.e., assets that are essential
   for the functioning of a society and economy.  It is desirable that
   IoT devices can prevent malware from manipulating actuators (e.g.,
   unlocking a door) or stealing or modifying sensitive data, such as
   authentication credentials in the device.  A TEE can be one of the
   best ways to implement such IoT security functions.  For example,
   [GPTEE] uses the term "trusted peripheral" to refer to such things
   being accessible only from the TEE, and this concept is used in some
   GlobalPlatform-compliant devices today.

3.4.  Confidential Cloud Computing

   A tenant can store sensitive data, such as customer details or credit
   card numbers, in a TEE in a cloud computing server such that only the
   tenant can access the data, which prevents the cloud hosting provider
   from accessing the data.  A tenant can run TAs inside a server TEE
   for secure operation and enhanced data security.  This provides
   benefits not only to tenants with better data security but also to
   cloud hosting providers for reduced liability and increased cloud
   adoption.

4.  Architecture

4.1.  System Components

   Figure 1 shows the main components in a typical device with an REE
   and a TEE.  Full descriptions of components not previously defined
   are provided below.  Interactions of all components are further
   explained in the following paragraphs.

   +---------------------------------------------+
   | Device                                      |     Trusted Component
   |                          +--------+         |               Signer
   |    +---------------+     |        |--------------+              |
   |    | TEE-1         |     | TEEP   |-----------+  |              |
   |    | +--------+    |  +--| Broker |         | |  |   +-------+  |
   |    | | TEEP   |    |  |  |        |<-----+  | |  +-->|       |<-+
   |    | | Agent  |<------+  |        |      |  | |    +-| TAM-1 |
   |    | +--------+    |     |        |<---+ |  | +--->| |       |<-+
   |    |               |     +--------+    | |  |      | +-------+  |
   |    | +----+ +----+ |                   | |  |      | TAM-2 |    |
   |  +-->|TA-1| |TA-2| |        +-------+  | |  |      +-------+    |
   |  | | |    | |    |<---------| UA-2  |--+ |  |                   |
   |  | | +----+ +----+ |  +-------+     |    |  |               Device
   |  | +---------------+  | UA-1  |     |    |  |         Administrator
   |  |                    |       |     |    |  |
   |  +--------------------|       |-----+    |  |
   |                       |       |----------+  |
   |                       +-------+             |
   +---------------------------------------------+

                  Figure 1: Notional Architecture of TEEP

   Trusted Component Signer and Device Administrator:  Trusted Component
      Signers and Device Administrators utilize the services of a TAM to
      manage TAs on devices.  Trusted Component Signers do not directly
      interact with devices.  Device Administrators may elect to use a
      TAM for remote administration of TAs instead of managing each
      device directly.

   Trusted Application Manager (TAM):  A TAM is responsible for
      performing lifecycle management activity on Trusted Components on
      behalf of Trusted Component Signers and Device Administrators.
      This includes installation and deletion of Trusted Components and
      may include, for example, over-the-air updates to keep Trusted
      Components up-to-date and clean up when Trusted Components should
      be removed.  TAMs may provide services that make it easier for
      Trusted Component Signers or Device Administrators to use the
      TAM's service to manage multiple devices, although that is not
      required of a TAM.

      The TAM performs its management of Trusted Components on the
      device through interactions with a device's TEEP Broker, which
      relays messages between a TAM and a TEEP Agent running inside the
      TEE.  TEEP authentication is performed between a TAM and a TEEP
      Agent.

      When the TEEP Agent runs in a user or enterprise device, network
      and application firewalls normally protect user and enterprise
      devices from arbitrary connections from external network entities.
      In such a deployment, a TAM outside that network might not be able
      to directly contact a TEEP Agent but needs to wait for the TEEP
      Broker to contact it.  The architecture in Figure 1 accommodates
      this case as well as other less restrictive cases by leaving such
      details to an appropriate TEEP transport protocol (e.g.,
      [TEEP-HTTP], though other transport protocols can be defined under
      the TEEP protocol for other cases).

      A TAM may be publicly available for use by many Trusted Component
      Signers, or a TAM may be private and accessible by only one or a
      limited number of Trusted Component Signers.  It is expected that
      many enterprises, manufacturers, and network carriers will run
      their own private TAM.

      A Trusted Component Signer or Device Administrator chooses a
      particular TAM based on whether the TAM is trusted by a device or
      set of devices.  The TAM is trusted by a device if the TAM's
      public key is, or chains up to, an authorized Trust Anchor in the
      device and conforms with all constraints defined in the Trust
      Anchor.  A Trusted Component Signer or Device Administrator may
      run their own TAM, but the devices they wish to manage must
      include this TAM's public key or certificate, or a certificate it
      chains up to, in the Trust Anchor Store.

      A Trusted Component Signer or Device Administrator is free to
      utilize multiple TAMs.  This may be required for managing Trusted
      Components on multiple different types of devices from different
      manufacturers or mobile devices on different network carriers,
      since the Trust Anchor Store on these different devices may
      contain keys for different TAMs.  To overcome this limitation,
      Device Administrator may be able to add their own TAM's public key
      or certificate, or a certificate it chains up to, to the Trust
      Anchor Store on all their devices.

      Any entity is free to operate a TAM.  For a TAM to be successful,
      it must have its public key or certificate installed in a device's
      Trust Anchor Store.  A TAM may set up a relationship with device
      manufacturers or network carriers to have them install the TAM's
      keys in their device's Trust Anchor Store.  Alternatively, a TAM
      may publish its certificate and allow Device Administrators to
      install the TAM's certificate in their devices as an aftermarket
      action.

   TEEP Broker:  A TEEP Broker is an application component running in a
      Rich Execution Environment (REE) that enables the message protocol
      exchange between a TAM and a TEE in a device.  A TEEP Broker does
      not process messages on behalf of a TEE but is merely responsible
      for relaying messages from the TAM to the TEE and for returning
      the TEE's responses to the TAM.  In devices with no REE (e.g., a
      microcontroller where all code runs in an environment that meets
      the definition of a Trusted Execution Environment in Section 2),
      the TEEP Broker would be absent, and the TEEP protocol transport
      would be implemented inside the TEE itself.

   TEEP Agent:  The TEEP Agent is a processing module running inside a
      TEE that receives TAM requests (typically relayed via a TEEP
      Broker that runs in an REE).  A TEEP Agent in the TEE may parse or
      forward requests to other processing modules in a TEE, which is up
      to a TEE provider's implementation.  A response message
      corresponding to a TAM request is sent back to the TAM, again
      typically relayed via a TEEP Broker.

   Certification Authority (CA):  A CA is an entity that issues digital
      certificates (especially X.509 certificates) and vouches for the
      binding between the data items in a certificate [RFC4949].
      Certificates are then used for authenticating a device, a TAM, or
      a Trusted Component Signer, as discussed in Section 5.  The CAs do
      not need to be the same; different CAs can be chosen by each TAM,
      and different device CAs can be used by different device
      manufacturers.

4.2.  Multiple TEEs in a Device

   Some devices might implement multiple TEEs.  In these cases, there
   might be one shared TEEP Broker that interacts with all the TEEs in
   the device.  However, some TEEs (for example, SGX [SGX]) present
   themselves as separate containers within memory without a controlling
   manager within the TEE.  As such, there might be multiple TEEP
   Brokers in the REE, where each TEEP Broker communicates with one or
   more TEEs associated with it.

   It is up to the REE and the Untrusted Applications how they select
   the correct TEEP Broker.  Verification that the correct TA has been
   reached then becomes a matter of properly verifying TA attestations,
   which are unforgeable.

   The multiple TEEP Broker approach is shown in the diagram below.  For
   brevity, TEEP Broker 2 is shown interacting with only one TAM,
   Untrusted Application, and TEE, but no such limitations are intended
   to be implied in the architecture.

   +-------------------------------------------+
   | Device                                    |     Trusted Component
   |                                           |               Signer
   |    +---------------+                      |                  |
   |    | TEE-1         |                      |                  |
   |    | +-------+     |     +--------+       |      +--------+  |
   |    | | TEEP  |     |     | TEEP   |------------->|        |<-+
   |    | | Agent |<----------| Broker |       |      |        | TA
   |    | | 1     |     |     | 1      |---------+    |        |
   |    | +-------+     |     |        |       | |    |        |
   |    |               |     |        |<---+  | |    |        |
   |    | +----+ +----+ |     |        |    |  | |  +-|  TAM-1 | Policy
   |    | |TA-1| |TA-2| |     |        |<-+ |  | +->| |        |<-+
   |  +-->|    | |    |<---+  +--------+  | |  |    | +--------+  |
   |  | | +----+ +----+ |  |              | |  |    | TAM-2  |    |
   |  | |               |  |   +-------+  | |  |    +--------+    |
   |  | +---------------+  +---| UA-2  |--+ |  |       ^          |
   |  |                    +-------+   |    |  |       |       Device
   |  +--------------------| UA-1  |   |    |  |       |   Administrator
   |                +------|       |   |    |  |       |
   |    +-----------|---+  |       |---+    |  |       |
   |    | TEE-2     |   |  |       |--------+  |       |
   |    | +------+  |   |  |       |-------+   |       |
   |    | | TEEP |  |   |  +-------+       |   |       |
   |    | | Agent|<-------+                |   |       |
   |    | | 2    |  |   | |                |   |       |
   |    | +------+  |   | |                |   |       |
   |    |           |   | |                |   |       |
   |    | +----+    |   | |                |   |       |
   |    | |TA-3|<---+   | |   +---------+  |   |       |
   |    | |    |        | |   | TEEP    |<-+   |       |
   |    | +----+        | +---| Broker  |      |       |
   |    |               |     | 2       |--------------+
   |    +---------------+     +---------+      |
   |                                           |
   +-------------------------------------------+

         Figure 2: Notional Architecture of TEEP with multiple TEEs

   In the diagram above, TEEP Broker 1 controls interactions with the
   TAs in TEE-1, and TEEP Broker 2 controls interactions with the TAs in
   TEE-2.  This presents some challenges for a TAM in completely
   managing the device, since a TAM may not interact with all the TEEP
   Brokers on a particular platform.  In addition, since TEEs may be
   physically separated, with wholly different resources, there may be
   no need for TEEP Brokers to share information on installed Trusted
   Components or resource usage.

4.3.  Multiple TAMs and Relationship to TAs

   As shown in Figure 2, a TEEP Broker provides communication between
   one or more TEEP Agents and one or more TAMs.  The selection of which
   TAM to interact with might be made with or without input from an
   Untrusted Application but is ultimately the decision of a TEEP Agent.

   For any given Trusted Component, a TEEP Agent is assumed to be able
   to determine whether that Trusted Component is installed (or
   minimally, is running) in a TEE with which the TEEP Agent is
   associated.

   Each Trusted Component is digitally signed, protecting its integrity
   and linking the Trusted Component back to the Trusted Component
   Signer.  The Trusted Component Signer is often the Trusted Component
   Developer but, in some cases, might be another party such as a Device
   Administrator or other party to whom the code has been licensed (in
   which case, the same code might be signed by multiple licensees and
   distributed as if it were different TAs).

   A Trusted Component Signer selects one or more TAMs and communicates
   the Trusted Component(s) to the TAM.  For example, the Trusted
   Component Signer might choose TAMs based upon the markets into which
   the TAM can provide access.  There may be TAMs that provide services
   to specific types of devices, device operating systems, specific
   geographical regions, or network carriers.  A Trusted Component
   Signer may be motivated to utilize multiple TAMs in order to maximize
   market penetration and availability on multiple types of devices.
   This means that the same Trusted Component will often be available
   through multiple TAMs.

   When the developer of an Untrusted Application that depends on a
   Trusted Component publishes the Untrusted Application to an app store
   or other app repository, the developer optionally binds the Untrusted
   Application with a manifest that identifies what TAMs can be
   contacted for the Trusted Component.  In some situations, a Trusted
   Component may only be available via a single TAM; this is likely the
   case for enterprise applications or Trusted Component Signers serving
   a closed community.  For broad public apps, there will likely be
   multiple TAMs in the Untrusted Application's manifest, one servicing
   one brand of mobile device and another servicing a different
   manufacturer, etc.  Because different devices and manufacturers trust
   different TAMs, the manifest can include multiple TAMs that support
   the required Trusted Component.

   When a TEEP Broker receives a request (see the RequestTA API in
   Section 6.2.1) from an Untrusted Application to install a Trusted
   Component, a list of TAM URIs may be provided for that Trusted
   Component, and the request is passed to the TEEP Agent.  If the TEEP
   Agent decides that the Trusted Component needs to be installed, the
   TEEP Agent selects a single TAM URI that is consistent with the list
   of trusted TAMs provisioned in the TEEP Agent, invokes the HTTP
   transport for TEEP to connect to the TAM URI, and begins a TEEP
   protocol exchange.  When the TEEP Agent subsequently receives the
   Trusted Component to install and the Trusted Component's manifest
   indicates dependencies on any other Trusted Components, each
   dependency can include a list of TAM URIs for the relevant
   dependency.  If such dependencies exist that are prerequisites to
   install the Trusted Component, then the TEEP Agent recursively
   follows the same procedure for each dependency that needs to be
   installed or updated, including selecting a TAM URI that is
   consistent with the list of trusted TAMs provisioned on the device
   and beginning a TEEP exchange.  If multiple TAM URIs are considered
   trusted, only one needs to be contacted, and they can be attempted in
   some order until one responds.

   Separate from the Untrusted Application's manifest, this framework
   relies on the use of the manifest format in [SUIT-MANIFEST] for
   expressing how to install a Trusted Component, as well as any
   dependencies on other TEE components and versions.  That is,
   dependencies from Trusted Components on other Trusted Components can
   be expressed in a Software Update for the Internet of Things (SUIT)
   manifest, including dependencies on any other TAs, trusted OS code
   (if any), or trusted firmware.  Installation steps can also be
   expressed in a SUIT manifest.

   For example, TEEs compliant with GlobalPlatform [GPTEE] may have a
   notion of a "security domain" (which is a grouping of one or more TAs
   installed on a device that can share information within such a group)
   that must be created and into which one or more TAs can then be
   installed.  It is thus up to the SUIT manifest to express a
   dependency on having such a security domain existing or being created
   first, as appropriate.

   Updating a Trusted Component may cause compatibility issues with any
   Untrusted Applications or other components that depend on the updated
   Trusted Component, just like updating the OS or a shared library
   could impact an Untrusted Application.  Thus, an implementation needs
   to take such issues into account.

4.4.  Untrusted Apps, Trusted Apps, and Personalization Data

   In TEEP, there is an explicit relationship and dependence between an
   Untrusted Application in an REE and one or more TAs in a TEE, as
   shown in Figure 2.  For most purposes, an Untrusted Application that
   uses one or more TAs in a TEE appears no different from any other
   Untrusted Application in the REE.  However, the way the Untrusted
   Application and its corresponding TAs are packaged, delivered, and
   installed on the device can vary.  The variations depend on whether
   the Untrusted Application and TA are bundled together or provided
   separately, and this has implications to the management of the TAs in
   a TEE.  In addition to the Untrusted Application and TA(s), the TA(s)
   and/or TEE may also require additional data to personalize the TA to
   the device or a user.  Implementations of the TEEP protocol must
   support encryption to preserve the confidentiality of such
   Personalization Data, which may potentially contain sensitive data.
   The encryption is used to ensure that no personalization data is sent
   in the clear.  Implementations must also support mechanisms for
   integrity protection of such Personalization Data.  Other than the
   requirement to support confidentiality and integrity protection, the
   TEEP architecture places no limitations or requirements on the
   Personalization Data.

   There are multiple possible cases for bundling of an Untrusted
   Application, TA(s), and Personalization Data.  Such cases include
   (possibly among others):

   1.  The Untrusted Application, TA(s), and Personalization Data are
       all bundled together in a single package by a Trusted Component
       Signer and either provided to the TEEP Broker through the TAM or
       provided separately (with encrypted Personalization Data), with
       key material needed to decrypt and install the Personalization
       Data and TA provided by a TAM.

   2.  The Untrusted Application and the TA(s) are bundled together in a
       single package, which a TAM or a publicly accessible app store
       maintains, and the Personalization Data is separately provided by
       the Personalization Data provider's TAM.

   3.  All components are independent packages.  The Untrusted
       Application is installed through some independent or device-
       specific mechanism, and one or more TAMs provide (directly or
       indirectly by reference) the TA(s) and Personalization Data.

   4.  The TA(s) and Personalization Data are bundled together into a
       package provided by a TAM, while the Untrusted Application is
       installed through some independent or device-specific mechanism,
       such as an app store.

   5.  Encrypted Personalization Data is bundled into a package
       distributed with the Untrusted Application, while the TA(s) and
       key material needed to decrypt and install the Personalization
       Data are in a separate package provided by a TAM.
       Personalization Data is encrypted with a key unique to that
       specific TEE, as discussed in Section 5.

   The TEEP protocol can treat each TA, any dependencies the TA has, and
   Personalization Data as separate Trusted Components with separate
   installation steps that are expressed in SUIT manifests, and a SUIT
   manifest might contain or reference multiple binaries (see
   [SUIT-MANIFEST] for more details).  The TEEP Agent is responsible for
   handling any installation steps that need to be performed inside the
   TEE, such as decryption of private TA binaries or Personalization
   Data.

   In order to better understand these cases, it is helpful to review
   actual implementations of TEEs and their application delivery
   mechanisms.

4.4.1.  Example: Application Delivery Mechanisms in Intel SGX

   In Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX), the Untrusted Application
   and TA are typically bundled into the same package (Case 2).  The TA
   exists in the package as a shared library (.so or .dll).  The
   Untrusted Application loads the TA into an SGX enclave when the
   Untrusted Application needs the TA.  This organization makes it easy
   to maintain compatibility between the Untrusted Application and the
   TA, since they are updated together.  It is entirely possible to
   create an Untrusted Application that loads an external TA into an SGX
   enclave and use that TA (Cases 3-5).  In this case, the Untrusted
   Application would require a reference to an external file or download
   such a file dynamically, place the contents of the file into memory,
   and load that as a TA.  Obviously, such file or downloaded content
   must be properly formatted and signed for it to be accepted by the
   SGX TEE.

   In SGX, any Personalization Data is normally loaded into the SGX
   enclave (the TA) after the TA has started.  Although it is possible
   with SGX to include the Untrusted Application in an encrypted package
   along with Personalization Data (Cases 1 and 5), there are currently
   no known instances of this in use, since such a construction would
   require a special installation program and SGX TA (which might or
   might not be the TEEP Agent itself based on the implementation) to
   receive the encrypted package, decrypt it, separate it into the
   different elements, and then install each one.  This installation is
   complex because the Untrusted Application decrypted inside the TEE
   must be passed out of the TEE to an installer in the REE that would
   install the Untrusted Application.  Finally, the Personalization Data
   would need to be sent out of the TEE (encrypted in an SGX enclave-to-
   enclave manner) to the REE's installation app, which would pass this
   data to the installed Untrusted Application, which would in turn send
   this data to the SGX enclave (TA).  This complexity is due to the
   fact that each SGX enclave is separate and does not have direct
   communication to other SGX enclaves.

   As long as signed files (TAs and/or Personalization Data) are
   installed into an untrusted filesystem and trust is verified by the
   TEE at load time, classic distribution mechanisms can be used.
   However, some uses of SGX allow a model where a TA can be dynamically
   installed into an SGX enclave that provides a runtime platform.  The
   TEEP protocol can be used in such cases, where the runtime platform
   could include a TEEP Agent.

4.4.2.  Example: Application Delivery Mechanisms in Arm TrustZone

   In Arm TrustZone [TrustZone] for A-class devices, the Untrusted
   Application and TA may or may not be bundled together.  This differs
   from SGX since in TrustZone, the TA lifetime is not inherently tied
   to a specific Untrusted Application process lifetime as occurs in
   SGX.  A TA is loaded by a trusted OS running in the TEE, such as a
   TEE compliant with GlobalPlatform [GPTEE], where the trusted OS is
   separate from the OS in the REE.  Thus, Cases 2-4 are equally
   applicable.  In addition, it is possible for TAs to communicate with
   each other without involving any Untrusted Application; thus, the
   complexity of Cases 1 and 5 are lower than in the SGX example, though
   still more complex than Cases 2-4.

   A trusted OS running in the TEE (e.g., OP-TEE [OP-TEE]) that supports
   loading and verifying signed TAs from an untrusted filesystem can,
   like SGX, use classic file distribution mechanisms.  If secure TA
   storage is used (e.g., a Replay-Protected Memory Block device) on the
   other hand, the TEEP protocol can be used to manage such storage.

4.5.  Entity Relations

   This architecture leverages asymmetric cryptography to authenticate a
   device to a TAM.  Additionally, a TEEP Agent in a device
   authenticates a TAM.  The provisioning of Trust Anchors to a device
   may be different from one use case to the other.  A Device
   Administrator may want to have the capability to control what TAs are
   allowed.  A device manufacturer enables verification by one or more
   TAMs and by Trusted Component Signers; it may embed a list of default
   Trust Anchors into the TEEP Agent and TEE for TAM trust verification
   and TA signature verification.

    (App Developers)   (App Store)   (TAM)      (Device with TEE)  (CAs)
           |                   |       |                |            |
           |                   |       |      (Embedded TEE cert) <--|
           |                   |       |                |            |
           | <--- Get an app cert -----------------------------------|
           |                   |       |                |            |
           |                   |       | <-- Get a TAM cert ---------|
           |                   |       |                |            |
   1. Build two apps:          |       |                |            |
                               |       |                |            |
      (a) Untrusted            |       |                |            |
          App - 2a. Supply --> |       |                |            |
                               |       |                |            |
      (b) TA -- 2b. Supply ----------> |                |            |
                               |       |                |            |
                               | --- 3. Install ------> |            |
                               |       |                |            |
                               |       | 4. Messaging-->|            |

                   Figure 3: Example Developer Experience

   Figure 3 shows an example where the same developer builds and signs
   two applications: (a) an Untrusted Application and (b) a TA that
   provides some security functions to be run inside a TEE.  This
   example assumes that the developer, the TEE, and the TAM have
   previously been provisioned with certificates.

   At step 1, the developer authors the two applications.

   At step 2, the developer uploads the Untrusted Application (2a) to an
   Application Store.  In this example, the developer is also the
   Trusted Component Signer and thus generates a signed TA.  The
   developer can then either bundle the signed TA with the Untrusted
   Application or provide a signed Trusted Component containing the TA
   to a TAM that will be managing the TA in various devices.

   At step 3, a user will go to an Application Store to download the
   Untrusted Application (where the arrow indicates the direction of
   data transfer).

   At step 4, since the Untrusted Application depends on the TA,
   installing the Untrusted Application will trigger TA installation via
   communication with a TAM.  The TEEP Agent will interact with the TAM
   via a TEEP Broker that facilitates communications between the TAM and
   the TEEP Agent.

   Some implementations that install Trusted Components might ask for a
   user's consent.  In other implementations, a Device Administrator
   might choose the Untrusted Applications and related Trusted
   Components to be installed.  A user consent flow is out of scope of
   the TEEP architecture.

   The main components of the TEEP protocol consist of a set of standard
   messages created by a TAM to deliver Trusted Component management
   commands to a device and device attestation and response messages
   created by a TEE that responds to a TAM's message.

   It should be noted that network communication capability is generally
   not available in TAs in today's TEE-powered devices.  Consequently,
   Trusted Applications generally rely on a Broker in the REE to provide
   access to network functionality in the REE.  A Broker does not need
   to know the actual content of messages to facilitate such access.

   Similarly, since the TEEP Agent runs inside a TEE, the TEEP Agent
   generally relies on a TEEP Broker in the REE to provide network
   access, relay TAM requests to the TEEP Agent, and relay the responses
   back to the TAM.

5.  Keys and Certificate Types

   This architecture leverages the following credentials, which allow
   achieving end-to-end security between a TAM and a TEEP Agent.

   Table 1 summarizes the relationships between various keys and where
   they are stored.  Each public/private key identifies a Trusted
   Component Signer, TAM, or TEE and gets a certificate that chains up
   to some Trust Anchor.  A list of trusted certificates is used to
   check a presented certificate against.

   Different CAs can be used for different types of certificates.  TEEP
   messages are always signed, where the signer key is the message
   originator's private key, such as that of a TAM or a TEE.  In
   addition to the keys shown in Table 1, there may be additional keys
   used for attestation or encryption.  Refer to the RATS Architecture
   [RFC9334] for more discussion.

       +================+===============+===========+==============+
       | Purpose        | Cardinality & | Private   | Location of  |
       |                | Location of   | Key Signs | Trust Anchor |
       |                | Private Key   |           | Store        |
       +================+===============+===========+==============+
       | Authenticating | 1 per TEE     | TEEP      | TAM          |
       | TEEP Agent     |               | responses |              |
       +----------------+---------------+-----------+--------------+
       | Authenticating | 1 per TAM     | TEEP      | TEEP Agent   |
       | TAM            |               | requests  |              |
       +----------------+---------------+-----------+--------------+
       | Code Signing   | 1 per Trusted | TA binary | TEE          |
       |                | Component     |           |              |
       |                | Signer        |           |              |
       +----------------+---------------+-----------+--------------+

                          Table 1: Signature Keys

   Note that Personalization Data is not included in the table above.
   The use of Personalization Data is dependent on how TAs are used and
   what their security requirements are.

   TEEP requests from a TAM to a TEEP Agent are signed with the TAM
   private key (for authentication and integrity protection).
   Personalization Data and TA binaries can be encrypted with a key
   unique to that specific TEE.  Conversely, TEEP responses from a TEEP
   Agent to a TAM can be signed with the TEE private key.

   The TEE key pair and certificate are thus used for authenticating the
   TEE to a remote TAM and for sending private data to the TEE.  Often,
   the key pair is burned into the TEE by the TEE manufacturer, and the
   key pair and its certificate are valid for the expected lifetime of
   the TEE.  A TAM provider is responsible for configuring the TAM's
   Trust Anchor Store with the manufacturer certificates or CAs that are
   used to sign TEE keys.  This is discussed further in Section 5.3.
   Typically, the same TEE key pair is used for both signing and
   encryption, though separate key pairs might also be used in the
   future, as the joint security of encryption and signature with a
   single key remains, to some extent, an open question in academic
   cryptography.

   The TAM key pair and certificate are used for authenticating a TAM to
   a remote TEE and for sending private data to the TAM (separate key
   pairs for authentication vs. encryption could also be used in the
   future).  A TAM provider is responsible for acquiring a certificate
   from a CA that is trusted by the TEEs it manages.  This is discussed
   further in Section 5.1.

   The Trusted Component Signer key pair and certificate are used to
   sign Trusted Components that the TEE will consider authorized to
   execute.  TEEs must be configured with the certificates or keys that
   it considers authorized to sign TAs that it will execute.  This is
   discussed further in Section 5.2.

5.1.  Trust Anchors in a TEEP Agent

   A TEEP Agent's Trust Anchor Store contains a list of Trust Anchors,
   which are typically CA certificates that sign various TAM
   certificates.  The list is usually preloaded at manufacturing time
   and can be updated using the TEEP protocol if the TEE has some form
   of "Trust Anchor Manager TA" that has Trust Anchors in its
   configuration data.  Thus, Trust Anchors can be updated similarly to
   the Personalization Data for any other TA.

   When a Trust Anchor update is carried out, it is imperative that any
   update must maintain integrity where only an authentic Trust Anchor
   list from a device manufacturer or a Device Administrator is
   accepted.  Details are out of scope of this architecture document and
   can be addressed in a protocol document.

   Before a TAM can begin operation in the marketplace to support a
   device with a particular TEE, it must be able to get its raw public
   key, its certificate, or a certificate it chains up to listed in the
   Trust Anchor Store of the TEEP Agent.

5.2.  Trust Anchors in a TEE

   The Trust Anchor Store in a TEE contains a list of Trust Anchors (raw
   public keys or certificates) that are used to determine whether TA
   binaries are allowed to execute by checking if their signatures can
   be verified.  The list is typically preloaded at manufacturing time
   and can be updated using the TEEP protocol if the TEE has some form
   of "Trust Anchor Manager TA" that has Trust Anchors in its
   configuration data.  Thus, Trust Anchors can be updated similarly to
   the Personalization Data for any other TA, as discussed in
   Section 5.1.

5.3.  Trust Anchors in a TAM

   The Trust Anchor Store in a TAM consists of a list of Trust Anchors,
   which are certificates that sign various device TEE certificates.  A
   TAM will accept a device for Trusted Component management if the TEE
   in the device uses a TEE certificate that is chained to a certificate
   or raw public key that the TAM trusts, is contained in an allow list,
   is not found on a block list, and/or fulfills any other policy
   criteria.

5.4.  Scalability

   This architecture uses a PKI (including self-signed certificates).
   Trust Anchors exist on the devices to enable the TEEP Agent to
   authenticate TAMs and the TEE to authenticate Trusted Component
   Signers, and TAMs use Trust Anchors to authenticate TEEP Agents.
   When a PKI is used, many intermediate CA certificates can chain to a
   root certificate, each of which can issue many certificates.  This
   makes the protocol highly scalable.  New factories that produce TEEs
   can join the ecosystem.  In this case, such a factory can get an
   intermediate CA certificate from one of the existing roots without
   requiring that TAMs are updated with information about the new device
   factory.  Likewise, new TAMs can join the ecosystem, providing they
   are issued a TAM certificate that chains to an existing root whereby
   existing TAs in the TEE will be allowed to be personalized by the TAM
   without requiring changes to the TEE itself.  This enables the
   ecosystem to scale and avoids the need for centralized databases of
   all TEEs produced, all TAMs that exist, or all Trusted Component
   Signers that exist.

5.5.  Message Security

   Messages created by a TAM are used to deliver Trusted Component
   management commands to a device, and device attestation and messages
   are created by the device TEE to respond to TAM messages.

   These messages are signed end-to-end between a TEEP Agent and a TAM.
   Confidentiality is provided by encrypting sensitive payloads (such as
   Personalization Data and attestation evidence), rather than
   encrypting the messages themselves.  Using encrypted payloads is
   important to ensure that only the targeted device TEE or TAM is able
   to decrypt and view the actual content.

6.  TEEP Broker

   A TEE and TAs often do not have the capability to directly
   communicate outside of the hosting device.  For example,
   GlobalPlatform [GPTEE] specifies one such architecture.  This calls
   for a software module in the REE world to handle network
   communication with a TAM.

   A TEEP Broker is an application component running in the REE of the
   device or an SDK that facilitates communication between a TAM and a
   TEE.  It also provides interfaces for Untrusted Applications to query
   and trigger installation of Trusted Components that the application
   needs to use.

   An Untrusted Application might communicate with a TEEP Broker at
   runtime to trigger Trusted Component installation itself.
   Alternatively, an Untrusted Application might simply have a metadata
   file that describes the Trusted Components it depends on and the
   associated TAM(s) for each Trusted Component.  An REE Application
   Installer can inspect this application metadata file and invoke the
   TEEP Broker to trigger Trusted Component installation on behalf of
   the Untrusted Application without requiring the Untrusted Application
   to run first.

6.1.  Role of the TEEP Broker

   A TEEP Broker interacts with a TEEP Agent inside a TEE, relaying
   messages between the TEEP Agent and the TAM, and may also interact
   with one or more Untrusted Applications (see Section 6.2.1).  The
   Broker cannot parse encrypted TEEP messages exchanged between a TAM
   and a TEEP Agent but merely relays them.

   When a device has more than one TEE, one TEEP Broker per TEE could be
   present in the REE, or a common TEEP Broker could be used by multiple
   TEEs where the transport protocol (e.g., [TEEP-HTTP]) allows the TEEP
   Broker to distinguish which TEE is relevant for each message from a
   TAM.

   The Broker only needs to return an error message to the TAM if the
   TEE is not reachable for some reason.  Other errors are represented
   as TEEP response messages returned from the TEE, which will then be
   passed to the TAM.

6.2.  TEEP Broker Implementation Consideration

   As depicted in Figure 4, there are multiple ways in which a TEEP
   Broker can be implemented with more or fewer layers being inside the
   TEE.  For example, in model A (the model with the smallest TEE
   footprint), only the TEEP implementation is inside the TEE, whereas
   the TEEP/HTTP implementation is in the TEEP Broker outside the TEE.

                      Model:    A      B      C

                               TEE    TEE    TEE
   +----------------+           |      |      |
   |      TEEP      |     Agent |      |      | Agent
   | implementation |           |      |      |
   +----------------+           v      |      |
            |                          |      |
   +----------------+           ^      |      |
   |    TEEP/HTTP   |    Broker |      |      |
   | implementation |           |      |      |
   +----------------+           |      v      |
            |                   |             |
   +----------------+           |      ^      |
   |     HTTP(S)    |           |      |      |
   | implementation |           |      |      |
   +----------------+           |      |      v
            |                   |      |
   +----------------+           |      |      ^
   |   TCP or QUIC  |           |      |      | Broker
   | implementation |           |      |      |
   +----------------+           |      |      |
                               REE    REE    REE

                        Figure 4: TEEP Broker Models

   In other models, additional layers are moved into the TEE, increasing
   the TEE footprint, with the Broker either containing or calling the
   topmost protocol layer outside of the TEE.  An implementation is free
   to choose any of these models.

   TEEP Broker implementers should consider methods of distribution,
   scope, and concurrency on devices and runtime options.

6.2.1.  TEEP Broker APIs

   The following conceptual APIs exist from a TEEP Broker to a TEEP
   Agent:

   1.  RequestTA: A notification from an REE application (e.g., an
       installer or an Untrusted Application) that the application
       depends on a given Trusted Component, which may or may not
       already be installed in the TEE.

   2.  UnrequestTA: A notification from an REE application (e.g., an
       installer or an Untrusted Application) that the application no
       longer depends on a given Trusted Component, which may or may not
       already be installed in the TEE.  For example, if the Untrusted
       Application is uninstalled, the uninstaller might invoke this
       conceptual API.

   3.  ProcessTeepMessage: A message arriving from the network, to be
       delivered to the TEEP Agent for processing.

   4.  RequestPolicyCheck: A hint (e.g., based on a timer) that the TEEP
       Agent may wish to contact the TAM for any changes without the
       device itself needing any particular change.

   5.  ProcessError: A notification that the TEEP Broker could not
       deliver an outbound TEEP message to a TAM.

   For comparison, similar APIs may exist on the TAM side, where a
   Broker may or may not exist, depending on whether the TAM uses a TEE
   or not:

   1.  ProcessConnect: A notification that a new TEEP session is being
       requested by a TEEP Agent.

   2.  ProcessTeepMessage: A message arriving at an existing TEEP
       session, to be delivered to the TAM for processing.

   For further discussion on these APIs, see [TEEP-HTTP].

6.2.2.  TEEP Broker Distribution

   The Broker installation is commonly carried out at device
   manufacturing time.  A user may also dynamically download and install
   a Broker on demand.

7.  Attestation

   Attestation is the process through which one entity (an Attester)
   presents "evidence" in the form of a series of claims to another
   entity (a Verifier) and provides sufficient proof that the claims are
   true.  Different Verifiers may require different degrees of
   confidence in attestation proofs, and not all attestations are
   acceptable to every Verifier.  A third entity (a Relying Party) can
   then use "attestation results" in the form of another series of
   claims from a Verifier to make authorization decisions.  (See
   [RFC9334] for more discussion.)

   In TEEP, as depicted in Figure 5, the primary purpose of an
   attestation is to allow a device (the Attester) to prove to a TAM
   (the Relying Party) that a TEE in the device has particular
   properties, was built by a particular manufacturer, and/or is
   executing a particular TA.  Other claims are possible; TEEP does not
   limit the claims that may appear in evidence or attestation results,
   but it defines a minimal set of attestation result claims required
   for TEEP to operate properly.  Extensions to these claims are
   possible.  Other standards or groups may define the format and
   semantics of extended claims.

   +----------------+
   | Device         |            +----------+
   | +------------+ |  Evidence  |   TAM    |   Evidence    +----------+
   | |     TEE    |------------->| (Relying |-------------->| Verifier |
   | | (Attester) | |            |  Party)  |<--------------|          |
   | +------------+ |            +----------+  Attestation  +----------+
   +----------------+                             Result

                      Figure 5: TEEP Attestation Roles

   At the time of writing this specification, device and TEE
   attestations have not been standardized across the market.  Different
   devices, manufacturers, and TEEs support different attestation
   protocols.  In order for TEEP to be inclusive, it is agnostic to the
   format of evidence, allowing proprietary or standardized formats to
   be used between a TEE and a Verifier (which may or may not be
   colocated in the TAM), as long as the format supports encryption of
   any information that is considered sensitive.

   However, it should be recognized that not all Verifiers may be able
   to process all proprietary forms of attestation evidence.  Similarly,
   the TEEP protocol is agnostic as to the format of attestation results
   and the protocol (if any) used between the TAM and a Verifier, as
   long as they convey at least the required set of claims in some
   format.  Note that the respective attestation algorithms are not
   defined in the TEEP protocol itself; see [RFC9334] and [TEEP] for
   more discussion.

   Considerations when appraising evidence provided by a TEE include the
   following:

   *  What security measures a manufacturer takes when provisioning keys
      into devices/TEEs;

   *  What hardware and software components have access to the
      attestation keys of the TEE;

   *  The source or local verification of claims within an attestation
      prior to a TEE signing a set of claims;

   *  The level of protection afforded to attestation keys against
      exfiltration, modification, and side channel attacks;

   *  The limitations of use applied to TEE attestation keys;

   *  The processes in place to discover or detect TEE breaches; and

   *  The revocation and recovery process of TEE attestation keys.

   Some TAMs may require additional claims in order to properly
   authorize a device or TEE.  The specific format for these additional
   claims are outside the scope of this specification, but the TEEP
   protocol allows these additional claims to be included in the
   attestation messages.

   For more discussion of the attestation and appraisal process, see the
   RATS Architecture [RFC9334].

   The following information is required for TEEP attestation:

   *  Device Identifying Information: Attestation information may need
      to uniquely identify a device to the TAM.  Unique device
      identification allows the TAM to provide services to the device,
      such as managing installed TAs, providing subscriptions to
      services, and locating device-specific keying material to
      communicate with or authenticate the device.  In some use cases,
      it may be sufficient to identify only the model or class of the
      device, for example, a DAA Issuer's group public key ID when the
      attestation uses DAA; see [RATS-DAA].  Another example of models
      is the hwmodel (Hardware Model) as defined in [EAT].  The security
      and privacy requirements regarding device identification will vary
      with the type of TA provisioned to the TEE.

   *  TEE Identifying Information: The type of TEE that generated this
      attestation must be identified.  This includes version
      identification information for hardware, firmware, and software
      version of the TEE, as applicable by the TEE type.  TEE
      manufacturer information for the TEE is required in order to
      disambiguate the same TEE type created by different manufacturers
      and address considerations around manufacturer provisioning,
      keying, and support for the TEE.

   *  Freshness Proof: A claim that includes freshness information must
      be included, such as a nonce or timestamp.

8.  Algorithm and Attestation Agility

   [RFC7696] outlines the requirements to migrate from one mandatory-to-
   implement cryptographic algorithm suite to another over time.  This
   feature is also known as "crypto agility".  Protocol evolution is
   greatly simplified when crypto agility is considered during the
   design of the protocol.  In the case of the TEEP protocol, the
   diverse range of use cases (from trusted app updates for smartphones
   and tablets to updates of code on higher-end IoT devices) creates the
   need for different mandatory-to-implement algorithms from the start.

   Crypto agility in TEEP concerns the use of symmetric as well as
   asymmetric algorithms.  In the context of TEEP, symmetric algorithms
   are used for encryption and integrity protection of TA binaries and
   Personalization Data, whereas the asymmetric algorithms are used for
   signing messages and managing symmetric keys.

   In addition to the use of cryptographic algorithms in TEEP, there is
   also the need to make use of different attestation technologies.  A
   device must provide techniques to inform a TAM about the attestation
   technology it supports.  For many deployment cases, it is more likely
   for the TAM to support one or more attestation techniques, whereas
   the device may only support one.

9.  Security Considerations

9.1.  Broker Trust Model

   The architecture enables the TAM to communicate, via a TEEP Broker,
   with the device's TEE to manage Trusted Components.  However, since
   the TEEP Broker runs in a potentially vulnerable REE, the TEEP Broker
   could be malware or be infected by malware.  As such, all TAM
   messages are signed and sensitive data is encrypted such that the
   TEEP Broker cannot modify or capture sensitive data, but the TEEP
   Broker can still conduct DoS attacks as discussed in Section 9.3.

   A TEEP Agent in a TEE is responsible for protecting against potential
   attacks from a compromised TEEP Broker or rogue malware in the REE.
   A rogue TEEP Broker might send corrupted data to the TEEP Agent,
   launch a DoS attack by sending a flood of TEEP protocol requests, or
   simply drop or delay notifications to a TEE.  The TEEP Agent
   validates the signature of each TEEP protocol request and checks the
   signing certificate against its Trust Anchors.  To mitigate DoS
   attacks, it might also add some protection scheme such as a threshold
   on repeated requests or the number of TAs that can be installed.

   Due to the lack of any available alternative, some implementations
   might rely on the use of an untrusted timer or other event to call
   the RequestPolicyCheck API (Section 6.2.1), which means that a
   compromised REE can cause a TEE to not receive policy changes and
   thus be out of date with respect to policy.  The same can potentially
   be done by any other manipulator-in-the-middle simply by blocking
   communication with a TAM.  Ultimately, such outdated compliance could
   be addressed by using attestation in secure communication, where the
   attestation evidence reveals what state the TEE is in, so that
   communication (other than remediation such as via TEEP) from an out-
   of-compliance TEE can be rejected.

   Similarly, in most implementations, the REE is involved in the
   mechanics of installing new TAs.  However, the authority for what TAs
   are running in a given TEE is between the TEEP Agent and the TAM.
   While a TEEP Broker can, in effect, make suggestions as discussed in
   Section 6.2.1, it cannot decide or enforce what runs where.  The TEEP
   Broker can also control which TEE a given installation request is
   directed at, but a TEEP Agent will only accept TAs that are actually
   applicable to it and where installation instructions are received by
   a TAM that it trusts.

   The authorization model for the UnrequestTA operation is, however,
   weaker in that it expresses the removal of a dependency from an
   application that was untrusted to begin with.  This means that a
   compromised REE could remove a valid dependency from an Untrusted
   Application on a TA.  Normal REE security mechanisms should be used
   to protect the REE and Untrusted Applications.

9.2.  Data Protection

   It is the responsibility of the TAM to protect data on its servers.
   Similarly, it is the responsibility of the TEE implementation to
   provide protection of data against integrity and confidentiality
   attacks from outside the TEE.  TEEs that provide isolation among TAs
   within the TEE are likewise responsible for protecting TA data
   against the REE and other TAs.  For example, this can be used to
   protect the data of one user or tenant from compromise by another
   user or tenant, even if the attacker has TAs.

   The protocol between TEEP Agents and TAMs is similarly responsible
   for securely providing integrity and confidentiality protection
   against adversaries between them.  The layers at which to best
   provide protection against network adversaries is a design choice.
   As discussed in Section 6, the transport protocol and any security
   mechanism associated with it (e.g., the Transport Layer Security
   protocol) under the TEEP protocol may terminate outside a TEE.  If it
   does, the TEEP protocol itself must provide integrity and
   confidentiality protection to secure data end-to-end.  For example,
   confidentiality protection for payloads may be provided by utilizing
   encrypted TA binaries and encrypted attestation information.  See
   [TEEP] for how a specific solution addresses the design question of
   how to provide integrity and confidentiality protection.

9.3.  Compromised REE

   It is possible that the REE of a device is compromised.  We have
   already seen examples of attacks on the public Internet with a large
   number of compromised devices being used to mount DDoS attacks.  A
   compromised REE can be used for such an attack, but it cannot tamper
   with the TEE's code or data in doing so.  A compromised REE can,
   however, launch DoS attacks against the TEE.

   The compromised REE may terminate the TEEP Broker such that TEEP
   transactions cannot reach the TEE or might drop, replay, or delay
   messages between a TAM and a TEEP Agent.  However, while a DoS attack
   cannot be prevented, the REE cannot access anything in the TEE if the
   TEE is implemented correctly.  Some TEEs may have some watchdog
   scheme to observe REE state and mitigate DoS attacks against it, but
   most TEEs don't have such a capability.

   In some other scenarios, the compromised REE may ask a TEEP Broker to
   make repeated requests to a TEEP Agent in a TEE to install or
   uninstall a Trusted Component.  An installation or uninstallation
   request constructed by the TEEP Broker or REE will be rejected by the
   TEEP Agent because the request won't have the correct signature from
   a TAM to pass the request signature validation.

   This can become a DoS attack by exhausting resources in a TEE with
   repeated requests.  In general, a DoS attack threat exists when the
   REE is compromised and a DoS attack can happen to other resources.
   The TEEP architecture doesn't change this.

   A compromised REE might also request initiating the full flow of
   installation of Trusted Components that are not necessary.  It may
   also repeat a prior legitimate Trusted Component installation
   request.  A TEEP Agent implementation is responsible for ensuring
   that it can recognize and decline such repeated requests.  It is also
   responsible for protecting the resource usage allocated for Trusted
   Component management.

9.4.  CA Compromise or Expiry of CA Certificate

   A root CA for TAM certificates might get compromised, its certificate
   might expire, or a Trust Anchor other than a root CA certificate may
   also expire or be compromised.  TEEs are responsible for validating
   the entire TAM certification path, including the TAM certificate and
   any intermediate certificates up to the root certificate.  See
   Section 6 of [RFC5280] for details.  Such validation generally
   includes checking for certificate revocation, but certificate status
   check protocols may not scale down to constrained devices that use
   TEEP.

   To address the above issues, a certification path update mechanism is
   expected from TAM operators, so that the TAM can get a new
   certification path that can be validated by a TEEP Agent.  In
   addition, the Trust Anchor in the TEEP Agent's Trust Anchor Store may
   need to be updated.  To address this, a TEE Trust Anchor update
   mechanism is expected from device equipment manufacturers (OEMs),
   such as using the TEEP protocol to distribute new Trust Anchors.

   Similarly, a root CA for TEE certificates might get compromised, its
   certificate might expire, or a Trust Anchor other than a root CA
   certificate may also expire or be compromised.  TAMs are responsible
   for validating the entire TEE certification path, including the TEE
   certificate and any intermediate certificates up to the root
   certificate.  Such validation includes checking for certificate
   revocation.

   If a TEE certification path validation fails, the TEE might be
   rejected by a TAM, subject to the TAM's policy.  To address this, a
   certification path update mechanism is expected from device OEMs, so
   that the TEE can get a new certification path that can be validated
   by a TAM.  In addition, the Trust Anchor in the TAM's Trust Anchor
   Store may need to be updated.

9.5.  Compromised TAM

   Device TEEs are responsible for validating the supplied TAM
   certificates.  A compromised TAM may bring multiple threats and
   damage to user devices that it can manage and thus to the Device
   Owners.  Information on devices that the TAM manages may be leaked to
   a bad actor.  A compromised TAM can also install many TAs to launch a
   DoS attack on devices, for example, by filling up a device's TEE
   resources reserved for TAs such that other TAs may not get resources
   to be installed or properly function.  It may also install malicious
   TAs to potentially many devices under the condition that it also has
   a Trusted Component signer key that is trusted by the TEEs.  This
   makes TAMs high-value targets.  A TAM could be compromised without
   impacting its certificate or raising concern from the TAM's operator.

   To mitigate this threat, TEEP Agents and Device Owners have several
   options for detecting and mitigating a compromised TAM, including but
   potentially not limited to the following:

   1.  Apply an ACL to the TAM key, limiting which Trusted Components
       the TAM is permitted to install or update.

   2.  Use a transparency log to expose a TAM compromise.  TAMs publish
       an out-of-band record of Trusted Component releases, allowing a
       TEE to cross-check the Trusted Components delivered against the
       Trusted Components installed in order to detect a TAM compromise.

   3.  Use remote attestation of the TAM to prove trustworthiness.

9.6.  Malicious TA Removal

   It is possible that a rogue developer distributes a malicious
   Untrusted Application and intends to have a malicious TA installed.
   Such a TA might be able to escape from malware detection by the REE
   or access trusted resources within the TEE (but could not access
   other TEEs or other TAs if the TEE provides isolation between TAs).

   It is the responsibility of the TAM to not install malicious TAs in
   the first place.  The TEEP architecture allows a TEEP Agent to decide
   which TAMs it trusts via Trust Anchors and delegate the TA
   authenticity check to the TAMs it trusts.

   A TA that was previously considered trustworthy may later be found to
   be buggy or compromised.  In this case, the TAM can initiate the
   removal of the TA by notifying devices to remove the TA (and
   potentially notify the REE or Device Owner to remove any Untrusted
   Application that depend on the TA).  If the TAM does not currently
   have a connection to the TEEP Agent on a device, such a notification
   would occur the next time connectivity does exist.  That is, to
   recover, the TEEP Agent must be able to reach out to the TAM, for
   example, whenever the RequestPolicyCheck API (Section 6.2.1) is
   invoked by a timer or other event.

   Furthermore, the policy in the Verifier in an attestation process can
   be updated so that any evidence that includes the malicious TA would
   result in an attestation failure.  There is, however, a time window
   during which a malicious TA might be able to operate successfully,
   which is the validity time of the previous attestation result.  For
   example, if the Verifier in Figure 5 is updated to treat a previously
   valid TA as no longer trustworthy, any attestation result it
   previously generated saying that the TA is valid will continue to be
   used until the attestation result expires.  As such, the TAM's
   Verifier should take into account the acceptable time window when
   generating attestation results.  See [RFC9334] for further
   discussion.

9.7.  TEE Certificate Expiry and Renewal

   TEE device certificates are expected to be long-lived, longer than
   the lifetime of a device.  A TAM certificate usually has a moderate
   lifetime of 1 to 5 years.  A TAM should get renewed or rekeyed
   certificates.  The root CA certificates for a TAM, which are embedded
   into the Trust Anchor Store in a device, should have long lifetimes
   that don't require device Trust Anchor updates.  On the other hand,
   it is imperative that OEMs or device providers plan for support of a
   Trust Anchor update in their shipped devices.

   For those cases where TEE devices are given certificates for which no
   good expiration date can be assigned, the recommendations in
   Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC5280] are applicable.

9.8.  Keeping Secrets from the TAM

   In some scenarios, it is desirable to protect the TA binary or
   Personalization Data from being disclosed to the TAM that distributes
   them.  In such a scenario, the files can be encrypted end-to-end
   between a Trusted Component Signer and a TEE.  However, there must be
   some means of provisioning the decryption key into the TEE and/or
   some means of the Trusted Component Signer securely learning a public
   key of the TEE that it can use to encrypt.  The Trusted Component
   Signer cannot necessarily even trust the TAM to report the correct
   public key of a TEE for use with encryption, since the TAM might
   instead provide the public key of a TEE that it controls.

   One way to solve this is for the Trusted Component Signer to run its
   own TAM that is only used to distribute the decryption key via the
   TEEP protocol and the key file can be a dependency in the manifest of
   the encrypted TA.  Thus, the TEEP Agent would look at the Trusted
   Component manifest to determine if there is a dependency with a TAM
   URI of the Trusted Component Signer's TAM.  The Agent would then
   install the dependency and continue with the Trusted Component
   installation steps, including decrypting the TA binary with the
   relevant key.

9.9.  REE Privacy

   The TEEP architecture is applicable to cases where devices have a TEE
   that protects data and code from the REE administrator.  In such
   cases, the TAM administrator, not the REE administrator, controls the
   TEE in the devices.  Examples include:

   *  A cloud hoster may be the REE administrator where a customer
      administrator controls the TEE hosted in the cloud.

   *  A device manufacturer might control the TEE in a device purchased
      by a customer.

   The privacy risk is that data in the REE might be susceptible to
   disclosure to the TEE administrator.  This risk is not introduced by
   the TEEP architecture, but it is inherent in most uses of TEEs.  This
   risk can be mitigated by making sure the REE administrator explicitly
   chooses to have a TEE that is managed by another party.  In the cloud
   hoster example, this choice is made by explicitly offering a service
   to customers to provide TEEs for them to administer.  In the device
   manufacturer example, this choice is made by the customer choosing to
   buy a device made by a given manufacturer.

10.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

11.  Informative References

   [CC-Overview]
              Confidential Computing Consortium, "Confidential
              Computing: Hardware-Based Trusted Execution for
              Applications and Data", November 2022,
              <https://confidentialcomputing.io/wp-
              content/uploads/sites/85/2021/03/
              confidentialcomputing_outreach_whitepaper-8-5x11-1.pdf>.

   [CC-Technical-Analysis]
              Confidential Computing Consortium, "A Technical Analysis
              of Confidential Computing", v1.3, November 2022,
              <https://confidentialcomputing.io/wp-
              content/uploads/sites/10/2023/03/CCC-A-Technical-Analysis-
              of-Confidential-Computing-v1.3_unlocked.pdf>.

   [EAT]      Lundblade, L., Mandyam, G., O'Donoghue, J., and C.
              Wallace, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-eat-21, 30 June
              2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
              rats-eat-21>.

   [GPTEE]    GlobalPlatform, "TEE System Architecture v1.3",
              GlobalPlatform GPD_SPE_009, May 2022,
              <https://globalplatform.org/specs-library/tee-system-
              architecture/>.

   [GSMA]     GSM Association, "SGP.22 RSP Technical Specification",
              Version 2.2.2, June 2020, <https://www.gsma.com/esim/wp-
              content/uploads/2020/06/SGP.22-v2.2.2.pdf>.

   [OP-TEE]   TrustedFirmware.org, "OP-TEE Documentation",
              <https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/>.

   [OTRP]     GlobalPlatform, "TEE Management Framework: Open Trust
              Protocol (OTrP) Profile v1.1", GlobalPlatform GPD_SPE_123,
              July 2020, <https://globalplatform.org/specs-library/tee-
              management-framework-open-trust-protocol/>.

   [RATS-DAA] Birkholz, H., Newton, C., Chen, L., and D. Thaler, "Direct
              Anonymous Attestation for the Remote Attestation
              Procedures Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-ietf-rats-daa-03, 10 March 2023,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-
              daa-03>.

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
              FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC6024]  Reddy, R. and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor Management
              Requirements", RFC 6024, DOI 10.17487/RFC6024, October
              2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6024>.

   [RFC7696]  Housley, R., "Guidelines for Cryptographic Algorithm
              Agility and Selecting Mandatory-to-Implement Algorithms",
              BCP 201, RFC 7696, DOI 10.17487/RFC7696, November 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7696>.

   [RFC9019]  Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., Brown, D., and M. Meriac, "A
              Firmware Update Architecture for Internet of Things",
              RFC 9019, DOI 10.17487/RFC9019, April 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9019>.

   [RFC9334]  Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and
              W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS)
              Architecture", RFC 9334, DOI 10.17487/RFC9334, January
              2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9334>.

   [SGX]      Intel, "Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions (Intel (R)
              SGX)", <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/
              architecture-and-technology/software-guard-
              extensions.html>.

   [SUIT-MANIFEST]
              Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., Birkholz, H., Zandberg, K., and
              O. Rønningstad, "A Concise Binary Object Representation
              (CBOR)-based Serialization Format for the Software Updates
              for Internet of Things (SUIT) Manifest", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-suit-manifest-22, 27 February
              2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
              suit-manifest-22>.

   [TEEP]     Tschofenig, H., Pei, M., Wheeler, D. M., Thaler, D., and
              A. Tsukamoto, "Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning
              (TEEP) Protocol", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-teep-protocol-15, 3 July 2023,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-teep-
              protocol-15>.

   [TEEP-HTTP]
              Thaler, D., "HTTP Transport for Trusted Execution
              Environment Provisioning: Agent Initiated Communication",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-teep-otrp-
              over-http-15, 27 March 2023,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-teep-
              otrp-over-http-15>.

   [TrustZone]
              Arm, "TrustZone for Cortex-A",
              <https://www.arm.com/technologies/trustzone-for-cortex-a>.

Acknowledgments

   We would like to thank Nick Cook, Minho Yoo, Brian Witten, Tyler Kim,
   Alin Mutu, Juergen Schoenwaelder, Nicolae Paladi, Sorin Faibish, Ned
   Smith, Russ Housley, Jeremy O'Donoghue, Anders Rundgren, and Brendan
   Moran for their feedback.

Contributors

   Andrew Atyeo
   Intercede
   Email: andrew.atyeo@intercede.com


   Liu Dapeng
   Alibaba Group
   Email: maxpassion@gmail.com


Authors' Addresses

   Mingliang Pei
   Broadcom
   Email: mingliang.pei@broadcom.com


   Hannes Tschofenig
   Email: hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net


   Dave Thaler
   Microsoft
   Email: dthaler@microsoft.com


   David Wheeler
   Amazon
   Email: davewhee@amazon.com