path: root/doc/rfc/rfc9456.txt

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                    K. Vaughn, Ed.
Request for Comments: 9456                                  Trevilon LLC
Updates: 6353                                              November 2023
Category: Standards Track                                               
ISSN: 2070-1721


              Updates to the TLS Transport Model for SNMP

Abstract

   This document updates RFC 6353 ("Transport Layer Security (TLS)
   Transport Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)")
   to reflect changes necessary to support Transport Layer Security
   version 1.3 (TLS 1.3) and Datagram Transport Layer Security version
   1.3 (DTLS 1.3), which are jointly known as "(D)TLS 1.3".  This
   document is compatible with (D)TLS 1.2 and is intended to be
   compatible with future versions of SNMP and (D)TLS.

   This document updates the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB as defined in RFC 6353.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9456.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
   Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
   in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction
     1.1.  The Internet-Standard Management Framework
     1.2.  Conventions
   2.  Changes from RFC 6353
     2.1.  TLSTM Fingerprint
     2.2.  Security Level
     2.3.  (D)TLS Version
   3.  Additional Rules for TLS 1.3
     3.1.  Zero Round-Trip Time Resumption (0-RTT)
     3.2.  TLS Cipher Suites, Extensions, and Protocol Invariants
   4.  MIB Module Definitions
   5.  Security Considerations
   6.  IANA Considerations
   7.  References
     7.1.  Normative References
     7.2.  Informative References
   Acknowledgements
   Author's Address

1.  Introduction

   This document updates and clarifies how the rules of [RFC6353] apply
   when using Transport Layer Security (TLS) or Datagram Transport Layer
   Security (DTLS) versions later than 1.2.  This document jointly
   refers to these two protocols as "(D)TLS".  The update also
   emphasizes the requirement in [RFC8996] prohibiting the use of TLS
   versions prior to TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] when using SNMP.  Although the
   text of this document specifically references SNMPv3 and (D)TLS 1.3,
   this document may be applicable to future versions of these protocols
   and is backwards compatible with (D)TLS 1.2.

1.1.  The Internet-Standard Management Framework

   For a detailed overview of the documents that describe the current
   Internet-Standard Management Framework, please refer to Section 7 of
   [RFC3410].

   Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed
   the Management Information Base or MIB.  MIB objects are generally
   accessed through the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).
   Objects in the MIB are defined using the mechanisms defined in the
   Structure of Management Information (SMI).  This memo specifies a MIB
   module that is compliant to the SMIv2, which is described in RFCs
   2578, 2579, and 2580 [STD58].

1.2.  Conventions

   Within this document, the terms "TLS", "DTLS", and "(D)TLS" apply to
   all versions of the indicated protocols.  The term "SNMP" means
   "SNMPv3" unless a specific version number is indicated.  Specific
   version numbers are used when the text needs to emphasize version
   numbers.

   For consistency with SNMP-related specifications, this document
   favors terminology as defined in [STD62], rather than favoring
   terminology that is consistent with non-SNMP specifications.  This is
   consistent with the IESG decision to not require that the SNMP
   terminology be modified to match the usage of other non-SNMP
   specifications when SNMP was advanced to an Internet Standard.
   "Authentication" in this document typically refers to the English
   meaning of "serving to prove the authenticity of" the message, not
   data source authentication or peer identity authentication.  The
   terms "manager" and "agent" are not used in this document because, in
   the architecture defined in RFC 3411 [STD62], all SNMP entities have
   the capability of acting as manager, agent, or both, depending on the
   SNMP application types supported in the implementation.  Where
   distinction is necessary, the application names of command generator,
   command responder, notification originator, notification receiver,
   and proxy forwarder are used.  See "An Architecture for Describing
   Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks" (RFC
   3411 [STD62]) for further information.

   Throughout this document, the terms "client" and "server" are used to
   refer to the two ends of the TLS transport connection.  The client
   actively opens the TLS connection, and the server passively listens
   for the incoming TLS connection.  An SNMP entity MAY act as a TLS
   client, TLS server, or both, depending on the SNMP applications
   supported.

   Throughout this document, the term "session" is used to refer to a
   secure association between two instances of the TLS Transport Model
   (TLSTM) that permits the transmission of one or more SNMP messages
   within the lifetime of the session.  The TLS protocol also has an
   internal notion of a session, and although these two concepts of a
   session are related, when the term "session" is used, this document
   is referring to the TLSTM's specific session and not directly to the
   TLS protocol's session.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  Changes from RFC 6353

   This document updates [RFC6353].  The changes from [RFC6353] are
   defined in the following subsections.

2.1.  TLSTM Fingerprint

   [RFC6353] defines the SnmpTLSFingerprint textual convention to
   include the one-octet TLS 1.2 hash algorithm identifier.  This one-
   octet algorithm identifier is only applicable to (D)TLS protocol
   versions prior to 1.3.  The TLS community does not plan to ever add
   additional values to the "TLS HashAlgorithm" registry [RFC5246],
   because some might incorrectly infer that using a new hash algorithm
   with TLS 1.2 would overcome the limitations of TLS 1.2.  However,
   there is still a need within TLSTM to support new values as they are
   developed.

   This document updates the definition of SnmpTLSFingerprint to clarify
   that the one-octet algorithm identifier uses the values in the IANA
   "SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithms" registry; this registry is consistent
   with the IANA "TLS HashAlgorithm" registry for its initial values but
   can be extended as needed to support new hashing algorithms without
   implying that the new values can be used by TLS version 1.2.  This
   change allows the reuse of the existing fingerprint textual
   convention and minimizes the impact to [RFC6353].

   A "Y" in the "Recommended" column (Table 1) indicates that the
   registered value has been recommended through a formal Standards
   Action [RFC8126].  Not all parameters defined in Standards Track
   documents are necessarily marked as "Recommended".

   An "N" in the "Recommended" column does not necessarily mean that the
   value is flawed; rather, it indicates that the item either has not
   been through the IETF consensus process, has limited applicability,
   or is intended only for specific use cases.

   The initial values for the "SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithms" registry are
   defined below:

     +=========+==========================+=============+============+
     |  Value  |       Description        | Recommended | References |
     +=========+==========================+=============+============+
     | 0       | none                     | N           | [RFC5246]  |
     +---------+--------------------------+-------------+------------+
     | 1       | md5                      | N           | [RFC5246]  |
     +---------+--------------------------+-------------+------------+
     | 2       | sha1                     | N           | [RFC5246]  |
     +---------+--------------------------+-------------+------------+
     | 3       | sha224                   | Y           | [RFC5246]  |
     +---------+--------------------------+-------------+------------+
     | 4       | sha256                   | Y           | [RFC5246]  |
     +---------+--------------------------+-------------+------------+
     | 5       | sha384                   | Y           | [RFC5246]  |
     +---------+--------------------------+-------------+------------+
     | 6       | sha512                   | Y           | [RFC5246]  |
     +---------+--------------------------+-------------+------------+
     | 7       | Reserved                 |             | [RFC8447]  |
     +---------+--------------------------+-------------+------------+
     | 8       | Intrinsic                | N           | [RFC8422]  |
     +---------+--------------------------+-------------+------------+
     | 9-223   | Unassigned               |             |            |
     +---------+--------------------------+-------------+------------+
     | 224-255 | Reserved for Private Use |             | [RFC5246]  |
     +---------+--------------------------+-------------+------------+

                    Table 1: SNMP-TLSTM Hash Algorithms

   Values 0 through 2 MUST NOT be used by implementations of this
   document but are listed for historical consistency.

2.2.  Security Level

   The architecture defined in RFC 3411 [STD62] recognizes three levels
   of security:

   *  without authentication and without privacy (noAuthNoPriv)

   *  with authentication but without privacy (authNoPriv)

   *  with authentication and with privacy (authPriv)

   Cipher suites for (D)TLS 1.3 defined in [RFC8446] provide both
   authentication and privacy.  Cipher suites defined in [RFC9150] for
   (D)TLS 1.3 provide only authentication, without any privacy
   protection.  Implementations MAY choose to force (D)TLS 1.3 to only
   allow cipher suites that provide both authentication and privacy.

2.3.  (D)TLS Version

   [RFC6353] states that TLSTM clients and servers MUST NOT request,
   offer, or use SSL 2.0.  [RFC8996] prohibits the use of (D)TLS
   versions prior to version 1.2.  TLSTM MUST only be used with (D)TLS
   versions 1.2 and later.

3.  Additional Rules for TLS 1.3

   This document specifies additional rules and clarifications for the
   use of TLS 1.3.  These rules may additionally apply to future
   versions of TLS.

3.1.  Zero Round-Trip Time Resumption (0-RTT)

   TLS 1.3 implementations for SNMP MUST NOT enable the 0-RTT mode of
   session resumption (either sending or accepting) and MUST NOT
   automatically resend 0-RTT data if it is rejected by the server.
   0-RTT is disallowed because there are no "safe" SNMP messages that,
   if replayed, will be guaranteed to cause no harm at the server side:
   all incoming notifications or command responses are meant to be acted
   upon only once.  See Section 5 ("Security Considerations") for
   further details.

   TLSTM clients and servers MUST NOT request, offer, or use the 0-RTT
   mode of TLS 1.3.  [RFC8446] removed the renegotiation supported in
   TLS 1.2 [RFC5246]; for session resumption, it introduced a zero-RTT
   (0-RTT) mode, saving a round trip at connection setup at the cost of
   increased risk of replay attacks (it is possible for servers to guard
   against this attack by keeping track of all the messages received).
   [RFC8446] requires that a profile be written for any application that
   wants to use 0-RTT, specifying which messages are "safe to use" with
   this mode.  Within SNMP, there are no messages that are "safe to use"
   with this mode.

   Renegotiation of sessions is not supported, as it is not supported by
   TLS 1.3.  If a future version of TLS supports renegotiation, this RFC
   should be updated to indicate whether there are any additional
   requirements related to its use.

3.2.  TLS Cipher Suites, Extensions, and Protocol Invariants

   Section 9 of [RFC8446] requires that, in the absence of application
   profiles, certain cipher suites, TLS extensions, and TLS protocol
   invariants be mandatory to implement.  This document does not specify
   an application profile; hence, all the compliance requirements in
   [RFC8446] apply.

4.  MIB Module Definitions

   This SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB module imports items from RFCs 2578, 2579, and
   2580 [STD58], as well as RFCs 3411 and 3413 [STD62].  It also
   references [RFC1123], [RFC5246], [RFC5280], [RFC5591], [RFC5890],
   [RFC5952], [RFC5953], [RFC6353], and RFC 2579 [STD58].

   <CODE BEGINS> file "SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB"
   SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN

   IMPORTS
       MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE,
       OBJECT-IDENTITY, mib-2, snmpDomains,
       Counter32, Unsigned32, Gauge32, NOTIFICATION-TYPE
         FROM SNMPv2-SMI            -- RFC 2578 or any update thereof
       TEXTUAL-CONVENTION, TimeStamp, RowStatus, StorageType,
       AutonomousType
         FROM SNMPv2-TC             -- RFC 2579 or any update thereof
       MODULE-COMPLIANCE, OBJECT-GROUP, NOTIFICATION-GROUP
         FROM SNMPv2-CONF           -- RFC 2580 or any update thereof
       SnmpAdminString
         FROM SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB    -- RFC 3411 or any update thereof
       snmpTargetParamsName, snmpTargetAddrName
         FROM SNMP-TARGET-MIB       -- RFC 3413 or any update thereof
       ;

   snmpTlstmMIB MODULE-IDENTITY
       LAST-UPDATED "202311080000Z"

       ORGANIZATION "Operations and Management Area Working Group
                     <mailto:opsawg@ietf.org>"
       CONTACT-INFO
               "Author: Kenneth Vaughn
                        <mailto:kvaughn@trevilon.com>"
       DESCRIPTION
          "This is the MIB module for the TLS Transport Model
           (TLSTM).

           Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified
           as authors of the code.  All rights reserved.

           Redistribution and use in source and binary forms,
           with or without modification, is permitted pursuant
           to, and subject to the license terms contained in,
           the Revised BSD License set forth in Section 4.c
           of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF
           Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

           The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
           'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
           'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
           are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119)
           (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all
           capitals, as shown here."

           REVISION    "202311080000Z"
           DESCRIPTION
              "This version of this MIB module is part of
               RFC 9456; see the RFC itself for full legal
               notices.  This version does the following:

                  1) Updates the definition of SnmpTLSFingerprint
                     to clarify the registry used for the one-octet
                     hash algorithm identifier.

                  2) Capitalizes key words in conformance with
                     BCP 14.

                  3) Replaces 'may not' with 'MUST NOT' to clarify
                     intent in several locations.

                  4) Replaces 'may not' with a clarification within
                     the definition of SnmpTLSAddress.

                  5) Applies cosmetic grammar improvements and
                     reformatting causing whitespace changes."

          REVISION     "201107190000Z"
          DESCRIPTION
             "This version of this MIB module is part of
              RFC 6353; see the RFC itself for full legal
              notices.  The only change was to introduce
              new wording to reflect required changes for
              Internationalized Domain Names for Applications
              (IDNA) addresses in the SnmpTLSAddress textual
              convention (TC)."

          REVISION     "201005070000Z"
          DESCRIPTION
             "This version of this MIB module is part of
              RFC 5953; see the RFC itself for full legal
              notices."
       ::= { mib-2 198 }

   -- ************************************************
   -- subtrees of the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB
   -- ************************************************

   snmpTlstmNotifications OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmMIB 0 }
   snmpTlstmIdentities    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmMIB 1 }
   snmpTlstmObjects       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmMIB 2 }
   snmpTlstmConformance   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmMIB 3 }
   snmpTlstmHashAlgorithms OBJECT-IDENTITY
       STATUS        current
       DESCRIPTION
          "A node used to register hashing algorithm identifiers
           recorded in the IANA 'SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithms' registry."
       ::= { snmpTlstmMIB 4 }

   -- ************************************************
   -- snmpTlstmObjects - Objects
   -- ************************************************

   snmpTLSTCPDomain OBJECT-IDENTITY
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The OBJECT IDENTIFIER representing the TDomain for the
           SNMP over TLS via TCP transport domain.  The
           corresponding transport address is of type SnmpTLSAddress.

           The securityName prefix to be associated with the
           snmpTLSTCPDomain is 'tls'.  This prefix MAY be used by
           security models or other components to identify which secure
           transport infrastructure authenticated a securityName."
       REFERENCE
         "TDomain, as defined in RFC 2579: Textual Conventions
          for SMIv2"
       ::= { snmpDomains 8 }

   snmpDTLSUDPDomain OBJECT-IDENTITY
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The OBJECT IDENTIFIER representing the TDomain for the
           SNMP over DTLS via UDP transport domain.  The
           corresponding transport address is of type SnmpTLSAddress.

           The securityName prefix to be associated with the
           snmpDTLSUDPDomain is 'dtls'.  This prefix MAY be used by
           security models or other components to identify which secure
           transport infrastructure authenticated a securityName."
       REFERENCE
         "TDomain, as defined in RFC 2579: Textual Conventions
          for SMIv2"
       ::= { snmpDomains 9 }

   SnmpTLSAddress ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
       DISPLAY-HINT "1a"
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "Represents an IPv4 address, an IPv6 address, or an
           ASCII-encoded host name and port number.

           An IPv4 address MUST be in dotted decimal format followed
           by a colon ':' (ASCII character 0x3A) and a decimal
           port number in ASCII.

           An IPv6 address MUST be a colon-separated format (as
           described in RFC 5952), surrounded by square brackets
           ('[', ASCII character 0x5B, and ']', ASCII character
           0x5D), followed by a colon ':' (ASCII character 0x3A)
           and a decimal port number in ASCII.

           A host name MUST be in ASCII (as per RFC 1123);
           internationalized host names MUST be encoded as A-labels as
           specified in RFC 5890.  The host name is followed by a
           colon ':' (ASCII character 0x3A) and a decimal port
           number in ASCII.  The name SHOULD be fully qualified
           whenever possible.

           Values of this textual convention are not guaranteed to be
           directly usable as transport-layer addressing information,
           potentially requiring additional processing, such as
           run-time resolution.  As such, applications that write
           them MUST be prepared for handling errors if such values
           are not supported or cannot be resolved (if resolution
           occurs at the time of the management operation).

           The DESCRIPTION clause of TransportAddress objects that
           may have SnmpTLSAddress values MUST fully describe how
           (and when) such names are to be resolved to IP addresses
           and vice versa.

           This textual convention SHOULD NOT be used directly in
           object definitions, since it restricts addresses to a
           specific format.  However, if it is used, it MAY be used
           either on its own or in conjunction with
           TransportAddressType or TransportDomain as a pair.

           When this textual convention is used as a syntax of an
           index object, there may be issues with the limit of 128
           sub-identifiers specified in SMIv2 (STD 58).  It is
           RECOMMENDED that all MIB documents using this textual
           convention make explicit any limitations on index
           component lengths that management software MUST observe.
           This MAY be done by either 1) including SIZE constraints
           on the index components or 2) specifying applicable
           constraints in the conceptual row's DESCRIPTION clause or
           in the surrounding documentation."
       REFERENCE
         "RFC 1123: Requirements for Internet Hosts - Application and
                    Support
          RFC 5890: Internationalized Domain Names for Applications
                    (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework
          RFC 5952: A Recommendation for IPv6 Address Text
                    Representation"
       SYNTAX       OCTET STRING (SIZE (1..255))

   SnmpTLSFingerprint ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
       DISPLAY-HINT "1x:1x"
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "A fingerprint value that can be used to uniquely reference
           other data of potentially arbitrary length.

           An SnmpTLSFingerprint value is composed of a one-octet
           hashing algorithm identifier followed by the fingerprint
           value.  The one-octet identifier value encoded is taken
           from the IANA 'SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithms' registry.  The
           remaining octets of the SnmpTLSFingerprint value are
           filled using the results of the hashing algorithm.

           Historically, the one-octet hashing algorithm identifier
           was based on the IANA 'TLS HashAlgorithm' registry
           (RFC 5246); however, this registry is no longer in use for
           TLS 1.3 and above and is not expected to have any new
           registrations added to it.  To allow the fingerprint
           algorithm to support additional hashing algorithms that
           might be used by later versions of (D)TLS, the octet value
           encoded is now taken from the IANA
           'SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithms' registry.  The initial values
           within this registry are identical to the values in the
           'TLS HashAlgorithm' registry but can be extended to
           support new hashing algorithms as needed.

           This textual convention allows for a zero-length (blank)
           SnmpTLSFingerprint value for use in tables where the
           fingerprint value MAY be optional.  MIB definitions or
           implementations MAY refuse to accept a zero-length value
           as appropriate."
       REFERENCE
         "RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
                    Version 1.2
          https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/"
       SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE (0..255))

   -- Identities for use in the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable

   snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
                                 { snmpTlstmIdentities 1 }

   snmpTlstmCertSpecified OBJECT-IDENTITY
       STATUS        current
       DESCRIPTION
          "Directly specifies the tmSecurityName to be used for this
           certificate.  The value of the tmSecurityName to use is
           specified in the 'snmpTlstmCertToTSNData' column.  The
           'snmpTlstmCertToTSNData' column MUST contain a
           non-zero-length SnmpAdminString-compliant value, or the
           mapping described in this row MUST be considered a
           failure."
       ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 1 }

   snmpTlstmCertSANRFC822Name OBJECT-IDENTITY
       STATUS        current
       DESCRIPTION
          "Maps a subjectAltName's rfc822Name to a tmSecurityName.
           The local-part of the rfc822Name is passed unaltered, but
           the domain of the name MUST be passed in lowercase.
           This mapping results in a 1:1 correspondence between
           equivalent subjectAltName rfc822Name values and
           tmSecurityName values, except that the domain of the
           name MUST be passed in lowercase.

           Example rfc822Name field:  FooBar@Example.COM is mapped to
           tmSecurityName: FooBar@example.com."
       ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 2 }

   snmpTlstmCertSANDNSName OBJECT-IDENTITY
       STATUS        current
       DESCRIPTION
          "Maps a subjectAltName's dNSName to a tmSecurityName after
           first converting it to all lowercase (RFC 5280 does not
           specify converting to lowercase, so this involves an extra
           step).  This mapping results in a 1:1 correspondence
           between subjectAltName dNSName values and the
           tmSecurityName values."
       REFERENCE
         "RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
                    Certificate and Certificate Revocation
                    List (CRL) Profile"
       ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 3 }

   snmpTlstmCertSANIpAddress OBJECT-IDENTITY
       STATUS        current
       DESCRIPTION
          "Maps a subjectAltName's iPAddress to a tmSecurityName by
           transforming the binary-encoded address as follows:

              1) For IPv4, the value is converted into a
                 decimal-dotted quad address (e.g., '192.0.2.1').

              2) For IPv6 addresses, the value is converted into a
                 32-character all-lowercase hexadecimal string
                 without any colon separators.

           This mapping results in a 1:1 correspondence between
           subjectAltName iPAddress values and the tmSecurityName
           values.

           The resulting length of an encoded IPv6 address is the
           maximum length supported by the View-based Access Control
           Model (VACM).  Using an IPv6 address while the value of
           snmpTsmConfigurationUsePrefix is 'true' (see the
           SNMP-TSM-MIB, as defined in RFC 5591) will result in
           securityName lengths that exceed what the VACM can handle."
          REFERENCE
            "RFC 5591: Transport Security Model for the Simple Network
                       Management Protocol (SNMP)"
       ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 4 }

   snmpTlstmCertSANAny OBJECT-IDENTITY
       STATUS        current
       DESCRIPTION
          "Maps any of the following fields using the corresponding
           mapping algorithms:

           |------------+----------------------------|
           | Type       | Algorithm                  |
           |------------+----------------------------|
           | rfc822Name | snmpTlstmCertSANRFC822Name |
           | dNSName    | snmpTlstmCertSANDNSName    |
           | iPAddress  | snmpTlstmCertSANIpAddress  |
           |------------+----------------------------|

           The first subjectAltName value contained in the certificate
           that matches any of the above types MUST be used when
           deriving the tmSecurityName.  The mapping algorithm
           specified in the 'Algorithm' column of the corresponding
           row MUST be used to derive the tmSecurityName.

           This mapping results in a 1:1 correspondence between
           subjectAltName values and tmSecurityName values.  The
           three sub-mapping algorithms produced by this combined
           algorithm cannot produce conflicting results between
           themselves."
       ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 5 }

   snmpTlstmCertCommonName OBJECT-IDENTITY
       STATUS        current
       DESCRIPTION
          "Maps a certificate's CommonName to a tmSecurityName after
           converting it to a UTF-8 encoding.  The usage of
           CommonNames is deprecated, and users are encouraged to use
           subjectAltName mapping methods instead.  This mapping
           results in a 1:1 correspondence between certificate
           CommonName values and tmSecurityName values."
       ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 6 }

   -- The snmpTlstmSession Group

   snmpTlstmSession         OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmObjects 1 }

   snmpTlstmSessionOpens  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       Counter32
       MAX-ACCESS   read-only
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The number of times an openSession() request has been
           executed as a (D)TLS client, regardless of whether it
           succeeded or failed."
       ::= { snmpTlstmSession 1 }

   snmpTlstmSessionClientCloses  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       Counter32
       MAX-ACCESS   read-only
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The number of times a closeSession() request has been
           executed as a (D)TLS client, regardless of whether it
           succeeded or failed."
       ::= { snmpTlstmSession 2 }

   snmpTlstmSessionOpenErrors  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       Counter32
       MAX-ACCESS   read-only
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The number of times an openSession() request failed to
           open a session as a (D)TLS client, for any reason."
       ::= { snmpTlstmSession 3 }

   snmpTlstmSessionAccepts  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       Counter32
       MAX-ACCESS   read-only
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The number of times a (D)TLS server has accepted a new
           connection from a client and has received at least one
           SNMP message through it."
       ::= { snmpTlstmSession 4 }

   snmpTlstmSessionServerCloses  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       Counter32
       MAX-ACCESS   read-only
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The number of times a closeSession() request has been
           executed as a (D)TLS server, regardless of whether it
           succeeded or failed."
       ::= { snmpTlstmSession 5 }

   snmpTlstmSessionNoSessions  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       Counter32
       MAX-ACCESS   read-only
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The number of times an outgoing message was dropped
           because the session associated with the passed
           tmStateReference was no longer (or never) available."
       ::= { snmpTlstmSession 6 }

   snmpTlstmSessionInvalidClientCertificates OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       Counter32
       MAX-ACCESS   read-only
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The number of times an incoming session was not
           established on a (D)TLS server because the presented
           client certificate was invalid.  Reasons for invalidation
           include, but are not limited to, cryptographic validation
           failures or lack of a suitable mapping row in the
           snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable."
       ::= { snmpTlstmSession 7 }

   snmpTlstmSessionUnknownServerCertificate OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       Counter32
       MAX-ACCESS   read-only
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The number of times an outgoing session was not
           established on a (D)TLS client because the server
           certificate presented by an SNMP over (D)TLS server was
           invalid because no configured fingerprint or Certification
           Authority (CA) was acceptable to validate it.  This may
           result because there was no entry in the
           snmpTlstmAddrTable or because no path to a known CA could
           be found."
       ::= { snmpTlstmSession 8 }

   snmpTlstmSessionInvalidServerCertificates OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       Counter32
       MAX-ACCESS   read-only
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The number of times an outgoing session was not
           established on a (D)TLS client because the server
           certificate presented by an SNMP over (D)TLS server could
           not be validated even if the fingerprint or expected
           validation path was known.  That is, a cryptographic
           validation error occurred during certificate validation
           processing.

           Reasons for invalidation include, but are not limited to,
           cryptographic validation failures."
       ::= { snmpTlstmSession 9 }

   snmpTlstmSessionInvalidCaches OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       Counter32
       MAX-ACCESS   read-only
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The number of outgoing messages dropped because the
           tmStateReference referred to an invalid cache."
       ::= { snmpTlstmSession 10 }

   -- Configuration Objects

   snmpTlstmConfig          OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmObjects 2 }

   -- Certificate mapping

   snmpTlstmCertificateMapping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
                               { snmpTlstmConfig 1 }

   snmpTlstmCertToTSNCount OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      Gauge32
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
          "A count of the number of entries in the
           snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable."
       ::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 1 }

   snmpTlstmCertToTSNTableLastChanged OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      TimeStamp
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The value of sysUpTime.0 when the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable
           was last modified through any means, or 0 if it has not
           been modified since the command responder was started."
       ::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 2 }

   snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      SEQUENCE OF SnmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry
       MAX-ACCESS  not-accessible
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
          "This table is used by a (D)TLS server to map the (D)TLS
           client's presented X.509 certificate to a tmSecurityName.

           On an incoming (D)TLS/SNMP connection, the client's
           presented certificate either MUST be validated based on an
           established trust anchor or MUST directly match a
           fingerprint in this table.  This table does not provide
           any mechanisms for configuring the trust anchors; the
           transfer of any needed trusted certificates for path
           validation is expected to occur through an out-of-band
           transfer.

           Once the certificate has been found acceptable (either via
           path validation or by directly matching a fingerprint in
           this table), this table is consulted to determine the
           appropriate tmSecurityName to identify with the remote
           connection.  This is done by considering each active row
           from this table in prioritized order according to its
           snmpTlstmCertToTSNID value.  Each row's
           snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint value determines whether the
           row is a match for the incoming connection:

              1) If the row's snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint value
                 identifies the presented certificate, then consider
                 the row as a successful match.

              2) If the row's snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint value
                 identifies a locally held copy of a trusted CA
                 certificate and that CA certificate was used to
                 validate the path to the presented certificate, then
                 consider the row as a successful match.

           Once a matching row has been found, the
           snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType value can be used to determine
           how the tmSecurityName to associate with the session
           should be determined.  See the 'snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType'
           column's DESCRIPTION clause for details on determining the
           tmSecurityName value.  If it is impossible to determine a
           tmSecurityName from the row's data combined with the data
           presented in the certificate, then additional rows MUST be
           searched to look for another potential match.  If a
           resulting tmSecurityName mapped from a given row is not
           compatible with the needed requirements of a
           tmSecurityName (e.g., the VACM imposes a 32-octet-maximum
           length and the certificate-derived securityName could be
           longer), then it MUST be considered an invalid match and
           additional rows MUST be searched to look for another
           potential match.

           If no matching and valid row can be found, the connection
           MUST be closed and SNMP messages MUST NOT be accepted over
           it.

           Missing values of snmpTlstmCertToTSNID are acceptable, and
           implementations SHOULD continue to the
           next-highest-numbered row.  It is RECOMMENDED that
           administrators skip index values to leave room for the
           insertion of future rows (for example, use values of 10
           and 20 when creating initial rows).

           Users are encouraged to make use of certificates with
           subjectAltName fields that can be used as tmSecurityNames.
           This allows all child certificates of a single root CA
           certificate to include a subjectAltName that maps directly
           to a tmSecurityName via a 1:1 transformation.  However,
           this table is flexible, to allow for situations where
           existing deployed certificate infrastructures do not provide
           adequate subjectAltName values for use as tmSecurityNames.
           Certificates MAY also be mapped to tmSecurityNames using
           the CommonName portion of the Subject field.  However, the
           usage of the CommonName field is deprecated, and thus this
           usage is NOT RECOMMENDED.  Direct mapping from each
           individual certificate fingerprint to a tmSecurityName is
           also possible but requires one entry in the table per
           tmSecurityName and requires more management operations to
           completely configure a device."
       ::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 3 }

   snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      SnmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry
       MAX-ACCESS  not-accessible
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
          "A row in the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable that specifies a
           mapping for an incoming (D)TLS certificate to a
           tmSecurityName to use for a connection."
       INDEX   { snmpTlstmCertToTSNID }
       ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable 1 }

   SnmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
       snmpTlstmCertToTSNID           Unsigned32,
       snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint  SnmpTLSFingerprint,
       snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType      AutonomousType,
       snmpTlstmCertToTSNData         OCTET STRING,
       snmpTlstmCertToTSNStorageType  StorageType,
       snmpTlstmCertToTSNRowStatus    RowStatus
   }

   snmpTlstmCertToTSNID OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      Unsigned32 (1..4294967295)
       MAX-ACCESS  not-accessible
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
          "A unique, prioritized index for the given entry.  Lower
           numbers indicate a higher priority."
       ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 1 }

   snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      SnmpTLSFingerprint (SIZE (1..255))
       MAX-ACCESS  read-create
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
          "A cryptographic hash of an X.509 certificate.  The results
           of a successful matching fingerprint to either the trusted
           CA in the certificate validation path or the certificate
           itself is dictated by the 'snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType'
           column."
       ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 2 }

   snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      AutonomousType
       MAX-ACCESS  read-create
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
          "Specifies the mapping type for deriving a tmSecurityName
           from a certificate.  Details for mapping of a particular
           type SHALL be specified in the DESCRIPTION clause of the
           OBJECT-IDENTITY that describes the mapping.  If a mapping
           succeeds, it will return a tmSecurityName for use by the
           TLSTM and processing will stop.

           If the resulting mapped value is not compatible with the
           needed requirements of a tmSecurityName (e.g., the VACM
           imposes a 32-octet-maximum length and the
           certificate-derived securityName could be longer), then
           future rows MUST be searched for additional
           snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint matches to look for a
           mapping that succeeds.

           Suitable values for assigning to this object that are
           defined within the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB can be found in the
           snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities portion of the MIB tree."
       DEFVAL { snmpTlstmCertSpecified }
       ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 3 }

   snmpTlstmCertToTSNData OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      OCTET STRING (SIZE (0..1024))
       MAX-ACCESS  read-create
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
          "Auxiliary data used as optional configuration information
           for a given mapping specified by the
           'snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType' column.  Only some mapping
           systems will make use of this column.  The value in this
           column MUST be ignored for any mapping type that does not
           require that data be present in this column."
       DEFVAL { "" }
       ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 4 }

   snmpTlstmCertToTSNStorageType OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       StorageType
       MAX-ACCESS   read-create
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The storage type for this conceptual row.  Conceptual rows
           having the value 'permanent' need not allow write-access
           to any columnar objects in the row."
       DEFVAL      { nonVolatile }
       ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 5 }

   snmpTlstmCertToTSNRowStatus OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      RowStatus
       MAX-ACCESS  read-create
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The status of this conceptual row.  This object MAY be
           used to create or remove rows from this table.

           To create a row in this table, an administrator MUST set
           this object to either createAndGo(4) or createAndWait(5).

           Until instances of all corresponding columns are
           appropriately configured, the value of the corresponding
           instance of the 'snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus' column is
           notReady(3).

           In particular, a newly created row cannot be made active
           until the corresponding 'snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint',
           'snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType', and 'snmpTlstmCertToTSNData'
           columns have been set.

           The following objects MUST NOT be modified while the
           value of this object is active(1):

              - snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint
              - snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType
              - snmpTlstmCertToTSNData

           An attempt to set these objects while the value of
           snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus is active(1) will result in
           an inconsistentValue error."
       ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 6 }

   -- Maps tmSecurityNames to certificates for use by the
   -- SNMP-TARGET-MIB

   snmpTlstmParamsCount OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      Gauge32
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
          "A count of the number of entries in the
           snmpTlstmParamsTable."
       ::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 4 }

   snmpTlstmParamsTableLastChanged OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      TimeStamp
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The value of sysUpTime.0 when the snmpTlstmParamsTable
           was last modified through any means, or 0 if it has not
           been modified since the command responder was started."
       ::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 5 }

   snmpTlstmParamsTable OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      SEQUENCE OF SnmpTlstmParamsEntry
       MAX-ACCESS  not-accessible
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
          "This table is used by a (D)TLS client when a (D)TLS
           connection is being set up using an entry in the
           SNMP-TARGET-MIB.  It extends the SNMP-TARGET-MIB's
           snmpTargetParamsTable with a fingerprint of a certificate
           to use when establishing such a (D)TLS connection."
       ::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 6 }

   snmpTlstmParamsEntry OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      SnmpTlstmParamsEntry
       MAX-ACCESS  not-accessible
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
          "A conceptual row containing a fingerprint hash of a
           locally held certificate for a given
           snmpTargetParamsEntry.  The values in this row SHOULD be
           ignored if the connection that needs to be established, as
           indicated by the SNMP-TARGET-MIB infrastructure, is not a
           certificate-based and (D)TLS-based connection.  The
           connection SHOULD NOT be established if the certificate
           fingerprint stored in this entry does not point to a valid
           locally held certificate or if it points to an unusable
           certificate (such as might happen when the certificate's
           expiration date has been reached)."
       INDEX    { IMPLIED snmpTargetParamsName }
       ::= { snmpTlstmParamsTable 1 }

   SnmpTlstmParamsEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
       snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint SnmpTLSFingerprint,
       snmpTlstmParamsStorageType       StorageType,
       snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus         RowStatus
   }

   snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      SnmpTLSFingerprint
       MAX-ACCESS  read-create
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
          "This object stores the hash of the public portion of a
           locally held X.509 certificate.  The X.509 certificate,
           its public key, and the corresponding private key will be
           used when initiating a (D)TLS connection as a (D)TLS
           client."
       ::= { snmpTlstmParamsEntry 1 }

   snmpTlstmParamsStorageType OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       StorageType
       MAX-ACCESS   read-create
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The storage type for this conceptual row.  Conceptual rows
           having the value 'permanent' need not allow write-access
           to any columnar objects in the row."
       DEFVAL      { nonVolatile }
       ::= { snmpTlstmParamsEntry 2 }

   snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      RowStatus
       MAX-ACCESS  read-create
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The status of this conceptual row.  This object MAY be
           used to create or remove rows from this table.

           To create a row in this table, an administrator MUST set
           this object to either createAndGo(4) or createAndWait(5).

           Until instances of all corresponding columns are
           appropriately configured, the value of the corresponding
           instance of the 'snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus' column is
           notReady(3).

           In particular, a newly created row cannot be made active
           until the corresponding 'snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint'
           column has been set.

           The snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint object MUST NOT be
           modified while the value of this object is active(1).

           An attempt to set these objects while the value of
           snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus is active(1) will result in
           an inconsistentValue error."
       ::= { snmpTlstmParamsEntry 3 }

   snmpTlstmAddrCount OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      Gauge32
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
          "A count of the number of entries in the
           snmpTlstmAddrTable."
       ::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 7 }

   snmpTlstmAddrTableLastChanged OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      TimeStamp
       MAX-ACCESS  read-only
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The value of sysUpTime.0 when the snmpTlstmAddrTable
           was last modified through any means, or 0 if it has not
           been modified since the command responder was started."
       ::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 8 }

   snmpTlstmAddrTable OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      SEQUENCE OF SnmpTlstmAddrEntry
       MAX-ACCESS  not-accessible
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
          "This table is used by a (D)TLS client when a (D)TLS
           connection is being set up using an entry in the
           SNMP-TARGET-MIB.  It extends the SNMP-TARGET-MIB's
           snmpTargetAddrTable so that the client can verify that the
           correct server has been reached.  This verification can
           use either 1) a certificate fingerprint or 2) an
           identity authenticated via certification path validation.

           If there is an active row in this table corresponding to
           the entry in the SNMP-TARGET-MIB that was used to
           establish the connection and the row's
           'snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint' column has a non-empty
           value, then the server's presented certificate is compared
           with the snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint value (and the
           'snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity' column is ignored).  If the
           fingerprint matches, the verification has succeeded.  If
           the fingerprint does not match, then the connection MUST
           be closed.

           If the server's presented certificate has passed
           certification path validation (RFC 5280) to a configured
           trust anchor and an active row exists with a zero-length
           snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint value, then the
           'snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity' column contains the expected
           host name.  This expected host name is then compared
           against the server's certificate as follows:

              - Implementations MUST support matching the expected
                host name against a dNSName in the subjectAltName
                extension field and MAY support checking the name
                against the CommonName portion of the subject
                distinguished name.

              - The '*' (ASCII 0x2A) wildcard character is allowed in
                the dNSName of the subjectAltName extension (and in
                CommonName, if used to store the host name), but
                only as the leftmost (least significant) DNS label
                in that value.  This wildcard matches any leftmost
                DNS label in the server name.  That is, the subject
                *.example.com matches the server names a.example.com
                and b.example.com but does not match example.com or
                a.b.example.com.  Implementations MUST support
                wildcards in certificates as specified above but MAY
                provide a configuration option to disable them.

              - If the locally configured name is an
                internationalized domain name, conforming
                implementations MUST convert it to the ASCII
                Compatible Encoding (ACE) format for performing
                comparisons, as specified in Section 7 of RFC 5280.

           If the expected host name fails these conditions, then the
           connection MUST be closed.

           If there is no row in this table corresponding to the
           entry in the SNMP-TARGET-MIB and the server can be
           authorized by another, implementation-dependent means,
           then the connection MAY still proceed."
       ::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 9 }

   snmpTlstmAddrEntry OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      SnmpTlstmAddrEntry
       MAX-ACCESS  not-accessible
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
          "A conceptual row containing a copy of a certificate's
           fingerprint for a given snmpTargetAddrEntry.  The values
           in this row SHOULD be ignored if the connection that needs
           to be established, as indicated by the SNMP-TARGET-MIB
           infrastructure, is not a (D)TLS-based connection.  If an
           snmpTlstmAddrEntry exists for a given snmpTargetAddrEntry,
           then the presented server certificate MUST match or the
           connection MUST NOT be established.  If a row in this
           table does not exist to match an snmpTargetAddrEntry row,
           then the connection SHOULD still proceed if some other
           certification path validation algorithm (e.g., RFC 5280)
           can be used."
       INDEX    { IMPLIED snmpTargetAddrName }
       ::= { snmpTlstmAddrTable 1 }

   SnmpTlstmAddrEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
       snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint    SnmpTLSFingerprint,
       snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity       SnmpAdminString,
       snmpTlstmAddrStorageType          StorageType,
       snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus            RowStatus
   }

   snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      SnmpTLSFingerprint
       MAX-ACCESS  read-create
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
          "A cryptographic hash of a public X.509 certificate.  This
           object should store the hash of the public X.509
           certificate that the remote server should present during
           the (D)TLS connection setup.  The fingerprint of the
           presented certificate and this hash value MUST match
           exactly, or the connection MUST NOT be established."
       DEFVAL { "" }
       ::= { snmpTlstmAddrEntry 1 }

   snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      SnmpAdminString
       MAX-ACCESS  read-create
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The reference identity to check against the identity
           presented by the remote system."
       DEFVAL { "" }
       ::= { snmpTlstmAddrEntry 2 }

   snmpTlstmAddrStorageType OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       StorageType
       MAX-ACCESS   read-create
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The storage type for this conceptual row.  Conceptual rows
           having the value 'permanent' need not allow write-access
           to any columnar objects in the row."
       DEFVAL      { nonVolatile }
       ::= { snmpTlstmAddrEntry 3 }

   snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX      RowStatus
       MAX-ACCESS  read-create
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The status of this conceptual row.  This object may be
           used to create or remove rows from this table.

           To create a row in this table, an administrator MUST set
           this object to either createAndGo(4) or createAndWait(5).

           Until instances of all corresponding columns are
           appropriately configured, the value of the corresponding
           instance of the 'snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus' column is
           notReady(3).

           In particular, a newly created row cannot be made active
           until the corresponding 'snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint'
           column has been set.

           Rows MUST NOT be active if the
           'snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint' column is blank and the
           snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity is set to '*', since this
           would insecurely accept any presented certificate.

           The snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint object MUST NOT be
           modified while the value of this object is active(1).

           An attempt to set these objects while the value of
           snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus is active(1) will result in
           an inconsistentValue error."
       ::= { snmpTlstmAddrEntry 4 }

   -- ************************************************
   --  snmpTlstmNotifications - Notifications Information
   -- ************************************************

   snmpTlstmServerCertificateUnknown NOTIFICATION-TYPE
       OBJECTS { snmpTlstmSessionUnknownServerCertificate }
       STATUS  current
       DESCRIPTION
          "Notification that the server certificate presented by an
           SNMP over (D)TLS server was invalid because no configured
           fingerprint or CA was acceptable to validate it.  This may
           be because there was no entry in the snmpTlstmAddrTable or
           because no path to a known CA could be found.

           To avoid notification loops, this notification MUST NOT be
           sent to servers that themselves have triggered the
           notification."
       ::= { snmpTlstmNotifications 1 }

   snmpTlstmServerInvalidCertificate NOTIFICATION-TYPE
       OBJECTS {
           snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint,
           snmpTlstmSessionInvalidServerCertificates
       }
       STATUS  current
       DESCRIPTION
          "Notification that the server certificate presented by an
           SNMP over (D)TLS server could not be validated even if the
           fingerprint or expected validation path was known.
           That is, a cryptographic validation error occurred during
           certificate validation processing.

           To avoid notification loops, this notification MUST NOT be
           sent to servers that themselves have triggered the
           notification."
       ::= { snmpTlstmNotifications 2 }

   -- ************************************************
   -- snmpTlstmCompliances - Conformance Information
   -- ************************************************

   snmpTlstmCompliances OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmConformance 1 }

   snmpTlstmGroups OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmConformance 2 }

   -- ************************************************
   -- Compliance statements
   -- ************************************************

   snmpTlstmCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The compliance statement for SNMP engines that support the
           SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB."
       MODULE
           MANDATORY-GROUPS { snmpTlstmStatsGroup,
                              snmpTlstmIncomingGroup,
                              snmpTlstmOutgoingGroup,
                              snmpTlstmNotificationGroup }
       ::= { snmpTlstmCompliances 1 }

   -- ************************************************
   -- Units of conformance
   -- ************************************************

   snmpTlstmStatsGroup OBJECT-GROUP
       OBJECTS {
           snmpTlstmSessionOpens,
           snmpTlstmSessionClientCloses,
           snmpTlstmSessionOpenErrors,
           snmpTlstmSessionAccepts,
           snmpTlstmSessionServerCloses,
           snmpTlstmSessionNoSessions,
           snmpTlstmSessionInvalidClientCertificates,
           snmpTlstmSessionUnknownServerCertificate,
           snmpTlstmSessionInvalidServerCertificates,
           snmpTlstmSessionInvalidCaches
       }
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
          "A collection of objects for maintaining statistical
           information of an SNMP engine that implements the SNMP
           TLSTM."
       ::= { snmpTlstmGroups 1 }

   snmpTlstmIncomingGroup OBJECT-GROUP
       OBJECTS {
           snmpTlstmCertToTSNCount,
           snmpTlstmCertToTSNTableLastChanged,
           snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint,
           snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType,
           snmpTlstmCertToTSNData,
           snmpTlstmCertToTSNStorageType,
           snmpTlstmCertToTSNRowStatus
       }
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
          "A collection of objects for maintaining incoming
           connection certificate mappings to tmSecurityNames of an
           SNMP engine that implements the SNMP TLSTM."
       ::= { snmpTlstmGroups 2 }

   snmpTlstmOutgoingGroup OBJECT-GROUP
       OBJECTS {
           snmpTlstmParamsCount,
           snmpTlstmParamsTableLastChanged,
           snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint,
           snmpTlstmParamsStorageType,
           snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus,
           snmpTlstmAddrCount,
           snmpTlstmAddrTableLastChanged,
           snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint,
           snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity,
           snmpTlstmAddrStorageType,
           snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus
       }
       STATUS      current
       DESCRIPTION
          "A collection of objects for maintaining outgoing
           connection certificates to use when opening connections as
           a result of SNMP-TARGET-MIB settings."
       ::= { snmpTlstmGroups 3 }

   snmpTlstmNotificationGroup NOTIFICATION-GROUP
       NOTIFICATIONS {
           snmpTlstmServerCertificateUnknown,
           snmpTlstmServerInvalidCertificate
       }
       STATUS current
       DESCRIPTION
          "Notifications."
       ::= { snmpTlstmGroups 4 }

   END
   <CODE ENDS>

5.  Security Considerations

   This document updates a transport model that permits SNMP to utilize
   (D)TLS security services.  The security threats and how the TLSTM
   mitigates these threats are covered throughout this document and in
   [RFC6353].  Security considerations for TLS are described in
   Section 10 and Appendix E of TLS 1.3 [RFC8446].  Security
   considerations for DTLS are described in Section 11 of DTLS 1.3
   [RFC9147].

   Implementations should consider the latest recommendations on the use
   of (DTLS), such as those documented in [RFC9325].

   SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 did not include adequate security.
   Even if the network itself is secure (for example, by using IPsec),
   there is no control as to who on the secure network is allowed to
   access and GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the objects in this
   MIB module.

   It is RECOMMENDED that only SNMPv3 messages using the Transport
   Security Model (TSM) or another secure-transport-aware security model
   be sent over the TLSTM transport.

6.  IANA Considerations

   IANA has created a new registry called "SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithms"
   within the "Structure of Management Information (SMI) Numbers (MIB
   Module Registrations)" group.  The description of this registry is
   "iso.org.dod.internet.mgmt.mib-2.snmpTlstmMIB.snmpTlstmHashAlgorithms
   (1.3.6.1.2.1.198.4)".

   The registry has the following fields: Value, Description,
   Recommended, and References.  The range of values is zero to 255,
   with initial assignments shown in Section 2.1.  The "Recommended"
   column indicates "Y" for hashing algorithms that are Standards Track
   and are deemed to be acceptable for widely applicable current use and
   "N" for hashing algorithms that reflect meanings that are not
   recommended (e.g., they do not provide sufficient security for modern
   systems, they are not Standards Track, and they have limited
   applicability).  A blank field indicates that no recommendation is
   made (e.g., because the value is unassigned or left for private use).

   This registry is expected to be updated infrequently; as such, its
   values are limited to one octet.

   The policy for updates to the "SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithms" registry is
   Expert Review [RFC8126].  Registry requests should be sent to the
   <mailto:snmp-tlstm-reg-review@ietf.org> mailing list.  Registration
   requests sent to the mailing list for review SHOULD use an
   appropriate subject (e.g., 'Request to register value in "SNMP-TLSTM
   HashAlgorithms" registry').  In addition, designated experts should
   consult with the <mailto:tls-reg-review@ietf.org> mailing list to
   make sure that any new hash algorithms are considered for inclusion
   in this registry.

   Designated experts SHOULD ascertain the existence of suitable
   documentation that defines a hash algorithm and SHOULD also verify
   that the request does not conflict with or duplicate other entries in
   the registry.  The experts should also provide a recommendation as to
   how the "Recommended" column of the registry should be updated.  Only
   publicly available specifications that represent current industry-
   accepted practices should receive an assignment of "Y" in the
   "Recommended" column; all other specific assignments in the registry
   should receive an assignment of "N".  Assignments that are
   nonspecific (e.g., reserved values) SHOULD NOT receive an assigned
   value for the "Recommended" column.

   Within the three-week review period, the designated experts will
   either approve or deny the registration request, communicating this
   decision to the review list and IANA.  Denials SHOULD include an
   explanation and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the
   request successful.  Registration requests that are undetermined for
   a period longer than three weeks can be brought to the IESG's
   attention (using the <mailto:iesg@ietf.org> mailing list) for
   resolution.

   IANA MUST only accept registry updates from the designated experts
   and SHOULD direct all requests for registration to the review mailing
   list.  While future additions to the "TLS HashAlgorithm" registry
   (i.e., the registry from which the "SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithms"
   registry was spawned) are not expected, any future additions to the
   "TLS HashAlgorithm" registry MUST be consistent with the values
   assigned in the "SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithms" registry.

   It is suggested that multiple designated experts be appointed who are
   able to represent the perspectives of different applications using
   this specification, in order to enable broadly informed reviews of
   registration decisions.  In cases where a registration decision could
   be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular
   expert, that expert SHOULD defer to the judgment of the other
   experts.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC1123]  Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
              Application and Support", STD 3, RFC 1123,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1123, October 1989,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1123>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3410]  Case, J., Mundy, R., Partain, D., and B. Stewart,
              "Introduction and Applicability Statements for Internet-
              Standard Management Framework", RFC 3410,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3410, December 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3410>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC5890]  Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for
              Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework",
              RFC 5890, DOI 10.17487/RFC5890, August 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5890>.

   [RFC5952]  Kawamura, S. and M. Kawashima, "A Recommendation for IPv6
              Address Text Representation", RFC 5952,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5952, August 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5952>.

   [RFC6353]  Hardaker, W., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport
              Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
              STD 78, RFC 6353, DOI 10.17487/RFC6353, July 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6353>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

   [STD58]    McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
              Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Structure of Management Information
              Version 2 (SMIv2)", STD 58, RFC 2578, April 1999.

              McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
              Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Textual Conventions for SMIv2",
              STD 58, RFC 2579, April 1999.

              McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
              Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Conformance Statements for SMIv2",
              STD 58, RFC 2580, April 1999.

              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/std58>

   [STD62]    Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen, "An
              Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management
              Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks", STD 62, RFC 3411,
              December 2002.

              Case, J., Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen,
              "Message Processing and Dispatching for the Simple Network
              Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62, RFC 3412, December
              2002.

              Levi, D., Meyer, P., and B. Stewart, "Simple Network
              Management Protocol (SNMP) Applications", STD 62,
              RFC 3413, December 2002.

              Blumenthal, U. and B. Wijnen, "User-based Security Model
              (USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management
              Protocol (SNMPv3)", STD 62, RFC 3414, December 2002.

              Wijnen, B., Presuhn, R., and K. McCloghrie, "View-based
              Access Control Model (VACM) for the Simple Network
              Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62, RFC 3415, December
              2002.

              Presuhn, R., Ed., "Version 2 of the Protocol Operations
              for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
              STD 62, RFC 3416, December 2002.

              Presuhn, R., Ed., "Transport Mappings for the Simple
              Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62, RFC 3417,
              December 2002.

              Presuhn, R., Ed., "Management Information Base (MIB) for
              the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62,
              RFC 3418, December 2002.

              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/std62>

7.2.  Informative References

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.

   [RFC5591]  Harrington, D. and W. Hardaker, "Transport Security Model
              for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
              STD 78, RFC 5591, DOI 10.17487/RFC5591, June 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5591>.

   [RFC5953]  Hardaker, W., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport
              Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
              RFC 5953, DOI 10.17487/RFC5953, August 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5953>.

   [RFC8126]  Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
              Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
              RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.

   [RFC8422]  Nir, Y., Josefsson, S., and M. Pegourie-Gonnard, "Elliptic
              Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
              Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier", RFC 8422,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8422, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8422>.

   [RFC8447]  Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for TLS
              and DTLS", RFC 8447, DOI 10.17487/RFC8447, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8447>.

   [RFC8996]  Moriarty, K. and S. Farrell, "Deprecating TLS 1.0 and TLS
              1.1", BCP 195, RFC 8996, DOI 10.17487/RFC8996, March 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8996>.

   [RFC9147]  Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
              Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
              1.3", RFC 9147, DOI 10.17487/RFC9147, April 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9147>.

   [RFC9150]  Cam-Winget, N. and J. Visoky, "TLS 1.3 Authentication and
              Integrity-Only Cipher Suites", RFC 9150,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9150, April 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9150>.

   [RFC9325]  Sheffer, Y., Saint-Andre, P., and T. Fossati,
              "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
              (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 9325, DOI 10.17487/RFC9325, November
              2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9325>.

Acknowledgements

   This document is based on [RFC6353].  This document was reviewed by
   the following people, who helped provide useful comments: Michaela
   Vanderveen, Joe Clarke, Jürgen Schönwälder, and Tom Petch.

Author's Address

   Kenneth Vaughn (editor)
   Trevilon LLC
   1060 Highway 107 South
   Del Rio, TN 37727
   United States of America
   Phone: +1 571 331 5670
   Email: kvaughn@trevilon.com