path: root/doc/rfc/rfc9560.txt

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                     S. Hollenbeck
Request for Comments: 9560                                 Verisign Labs
Category: Standards Track                                     April 2024
ISSN: 2070-1721


   Federated Authentication for the Registration Data Access Protocol
                      (RDAP) Using OpenID Connect

Abstract

   The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides
   Representational State Transfer (RESTful) web services to retrieve
   registration metadata from domain name and regional internet
   registries.  RDAP allows a server to make access control decisions
   based on client identity, and as such, it includes support for client
   identification features provided by the Hypertext Transfer Protocol
   (HTTP).  Identification methods that require clients to obtain and
   manage credentials from every RDAP server operator present management
   challenges for both clients and servers, whereas a federated
   authentication system would make it easier to operate and use RDAP
   without the need to maintain server-specific client credentials.
   This document describes a federated authentication system for RDAP
   based on OpenID Connect.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9560.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
   Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
   in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction
     1.1.  Problem Statement
     1.2.  Approach
   2.  Conventions Used in This Document
   3.  Federated Authentication for RDAP
     3.1.  RDAP and OpenID Connect
       3.1.1.  Terminology
       3.1.2.  Client Considerations
       3.1.3.  Overview
       3.1.4.  RDAP Authentication and Authorization Steps
         3.1.4.1.  Provider Discovery
         3.1.4.2.  Authentication Request
         3.1.4.3.  End User Authorization
         3.1.4.4.  Authorization Response and Validation
         3.1.4.5.  Token Processing
         3.1.4.6.  Delivery of User Information
       3.1.5.  Specialized Claims and Authorization Scope for RDAP
         3.1.5.1.  Stated Purposes
         3.1.5.2.  Do Not Track
   4.  Common Protocol Features
     4.1.  OpenID Connect Configuration
     4.2.  RDAP Query Parameters
       4.2.1.  RDAP Query Purpose
       4.2.2.  RDAP Do Not Track
       4.2.3.  Parameter Processing
   5.  Protocol Features for Session-Oriented Clients
     5.1.  Data Structures
       5.1.1.  Session
       5.1.2.  Device Info
     5.2.  Client Login
       5.2.1.  End-User Identifier
       5.2.2.  OP Issuer Identifier
       5.2.3.  Login Response
       5.2.4.  Clients with Limited User Interfaces
         5.2.4.1.  UI-Constrained Client Login
         5.2.4.2.  UI-Constrained Client Login Polling
     5.3.  Session Status
     5.4.  Session Refresh
     5.5.  Client Logout
     5.6.  Request Sequencing
   6.  Protocol Features for Token-Oriented Clients
     6.1.  Client Login
     6.2.  Client Queries
     6.3.  Access Token Validation
     6.4.  Token Exchange
   7.  RDAP Query Processing
   8.  RDAP Conformance
   9.  IANA Considerations
     9.1.  RDAP Extensions Registry
     9.2.  JSON Web Token Claims Registry
     9.3.  RDAP Query Purpose Registry
   10. Security Considerations
     10.1.  Authentication and Access Control
   11. References
     11.1.  Normative References
     11.2.  Informative References
   Acknowledgments
   Author's Address

1.  Introduction

   The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides
   Representational State Transfer (RESTful) web services to retrieve
   registration metadata from domain name and regional internet
   registries.  RDAP allows a server to make access control decisions
   based on client identity, and as such, it includes support for client
   identification features provided by the Hypertext Transfer Protocol
   (HTTP) [RFC9110].

   RDAP is specified in multiple documents, including "HTTP Usage in the
   Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" [RFC7480], "Security
   Services for the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" [RFC7481],
   "Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) Query Format" [RFC9082],
   and "JSON Responses for the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)"
   [RFC9083].  [RFC7481] describes client identification and
   authentication services that can be used with RDAP, but it does not
   specify how any of these services can (or should) be used with RDAP.

1.1.  Problem Statement

   The conventional "username and password" authentication method does
   not scale well in the RDAP ecosystem.  Assuming that all domain name
   and address registries will eventually provide RDAP service, it is
   impractical and inefficient for users to secure login credentials
   from the hundreds of different server operators.  Authentication
   methods based on usernames and passwords do not provide information
   that describes the user in sufficient detail (while protecting the
   personal privacy of the user) for server operators to make fine-
   grained access control decisions based on the user's identity.  The
   authentication system used for RDAP needs to address all of these
   needs.

1.2.  Approach

   A basic level of RDAP service can be provided to users who possess an
   identifier issued by a recognized provider who can authenticate and
   validate the user.  For example, the identifiers issued by social
   media services can be used.  Users who require higher levels of
   service (and who are willing to share more information about
   themselves to gain access to that service) can secure identifiers
   from specialized providers who are or will be able to provide more
   detailed information about the user.  Server operators can then make
   access control decisions based on the identification information
   provided by the user.

   A federated authentication system in which an RDAP server outsources
   identification and authentication services to a trusted identity
   provider would make it easier to operate and use RDAP by reusing
   existing identifiers to provide a basic level of access.  It can also
   provide the ability to collect additional user identification
   information, and that information can be shared with the RDAP server
   operator with the consent of the user in order to help the server
   operator make access control decisions.  This type of system allows
   an RDAP server to make access control decisions based on the nature
   of a query and the identity, authentication, and authorization
   information that is received from the identity provider.  This
   document describes a federated authentication system for RDAP based
   on OpenID Connect [OIDC] that meets these needs.

2.  Conventions Used in This Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   All of the HTTP requests described in this document that are sent
   from an RDAP client to an RDAP server use the HTTP GET method as
   specified in [RFC9110].

   Long lines in examples are wrapped using "The Single Backslash
   Strategy" described in [RFC8792].

3.  Federated Authentication for RDAP

   RDAP itself does not include built-in security services.  Instead,
   RDAP relies on features that are available in other protocol layers
   to provide needed security services including access control,
   authentication, authorization, availability, data confidentiality,
   data integrity, and identification.  A description of each of these
   security services can be found in "Internet Security Glossary,
   Version 2" [RFC4949].  This document focuses on a federated
   authentication system for RDAP that provides services for
   authentication, authorization, and identification, allowing a server
   operator to make access control decisions.  Section 3 of [RFC7481]
   describes general considerations for RDAP access control,
   authentication, and authorization.

   The conventional client-server authentication model requires clients
   to maintain distinct credentials for every RDAP server.  This
   situation can become unwieldy as the number of RDAP servers
   increases.  Federated authentication mechanisms allow clients to use
   one credential to access multiple RDAP servers and reduce client
   credential management complexity.

3.1.  RDAP and OpenID Connect

   OpenID Connect 1.0 [OIDCC] is a decentralized, Single Sign-On (SSO)
   federated authentication system that allows users to access multiple
   web resources with one identifier instead of having to create
   multiple server-specific identifiers.  Users acquire identifiers from
   OpenID Providers (OPs).  Relying Parties (RPs) are applications (such
   as RDAP) that outsource their user authentication function to an OP.
   OpenID Connect is built on top of the authorization framework
   provided by the OAuth 2.0 protocol [RFC6749].

   The OAuth authorization framework describes a method for users to
   access protected web resources without having to hand out their
   credentials.  Instead, clients are issued access tokens by OPs with
   the permission of the resource owners.  Using OpenID Connect and
   OAuth, multiple RDAP servers can form a federation, and clients can
   access any server in the federation by providing one credential
   registered with any OP in that federation.  The OAuth authorization
   framework is designed for use with HTTP and thus can be used with
   RDAP.

3.1.1.  Terminology

   This document uses the following terminology.

   Terms defined by [RFC7480]:

   *  client

   *  server

   Terms defined by [RFC6749]:

   *  access token

   *  authorization code

   *  authorization endpoint

   *  authorization grant

   *  client authentication

   *  client identifier

   *  protected resource

   *  refresh token

   *  resource owner

   *  resource server

   *  token endpoint

   Terms defined by [RFC7519]:

   *  claim name

   *  claim value

   *  JSON Web Token (JWT)

   Terms defined by [OIDCC]:

   *  ID Token

   *  UserInfo Endpoint

   Term defined by [RFC9068]:

   *  JWT access token

   Additional terms from Section 1.2 of the OpenID Connect Core
   specification are incorporated by reference.

   This document uses the terms "remote" and "default" to describe the
   relationship between an RDAP server and the OPs that it interacts
   with.  A "remote" OP is one that is identified by the RDAP client by
   providing either an Issuer Identifier or an end-user identifier in a
   login request.  Whether an Issuer Identifier or end-user identifier
   can be provided in the login request for the purposes of selecting an
   OP can be determined by retrieving the RDAP server's OIDC
   configuration details (see Section 4.1).  A "default" OP is one that
   the RDAP server will use when the RDAP client does not provide an
   Issuer Identifier or an end-user identifier in the login request.

   This document uses the term "session" to describe a set of
   interactions between an RDAP client and an RDAP server during a given
   period of time.  For session-oriented clients (see Section 3.1.2),
   the RDAP session is a typical HTTP session starting with a
   farv1_session/login request and ending with either a farv1_session/
   logout request (see Section 5 for a description of both path
   segments) or a timeout.  For token-oriented clients (see Sections
   3.1.2 and 6), the RDAP session corresponds to the lifespan of an
   authorization obtained from an OP and the corresponding access token,
   including any refreshed access tokens.

3.1.2.  Client Considerations

   Clients that delegate OIDC authentication to an RDAP server as part
   of session-oriented interactions and can accept and process HTTP
   cookies [RFC6265] to maintain the session are known as "session-
   oriented" clients.  This type of RDAP client performs the role of a
   user agent [RFC9110].  An RDAP server performs the role of an OpenID
   Connect Core Relying Party (RP).  A web browser used to send queries
   directly to an RDAP server is an example of a session-oriented
   client.  Specifications for this type of client can be found in
   Section 5.

   Clients that perform OIDC authentication directly, taking the role of
   an RP in interactions with an OP and sending access tokens [RFC6749]
   to an RDAP server to authorize RDAP queries, are known as "token-
   oriented" clients.  An RDAP server performs resource server [RFC6749]
   functions to verify the tokens received from the client and RP
   functions to retrieve information from the OP as necessary to make
   access control decisions.  A web browser running JavaScript received
   from a web service that sends queries to an RDAP server directly or
   through its back-end web service is an example of a token-oriented
   client.  Specifications for this type of client can be found in
   Section 6.

   Clients MAY operate as either session-oriented or token-oriented
   clients, but they MUST do so consistently by not mixing token-
   oriented and session-oriented requests while interacting with an OP.
   Servers SHOULD support both types of client to maximize
   interoperability but MAY choose to support only one type of client as
   required by local policy or operating conditions.  A server that does
   not support a particular client type will not support the protocol
   features (the data structures, path segments, parameters, and
   interactions) specified for that client type.  Server signaling of
   supported client types is described in Section 4.1.

3.1.3.  Overview

   At a high level, RDAP authentication of a session-oriented client
   using OpenID Connect requires completion of the following steps:

   1.   An RDAP client sends an RDAP "help" query to an RDAP server to
        determine the types and capabilities of the OPs that are used by
        the RDAP server.  This information is returned in the
        "rdapConformance" section of the response.  A value of "farv1"
        indicates support for the extension described in this
        specification.  If one or more remote OPs are supported, the
        RDAP client SHOULD evaluate the additional information described
        in Section 4.1 in order to discover the capabilities of the RDAP
        server and optionally obtain the set of supported OPs unless
        that information is available from a trusted out-of-band source
        and has already been processed.

   2.   An RDAP client sends an RDAP "login" request to an RDAP server
        as described in Section 5.2.

   3.   The RDAP server prepares an Authentication Request containing
        the desired request parameters.

   4.   The RDAP server sends an Authentication Request to an OP
        authorization endpoint and redirects the RDAP client to the OP
        using an HTTP redirect.

   5.   The OP authenticates the end user.

   6.   The OP obtains end-user consent and authorization.

   7.   The OP sends the RDAP client back to the RDAP server with an
        authorization code using an HTTP redirect.

   8.   The RDAP server requests tokens using the authorization code at
        the OP's token endpoint.

   9.   The RDAP server receives a response that contains an ID Token
        and access token in the response body.

   10.  The RDAP server validates the tokens as described in [OIDCC] and
        retrieves the claims associated with the end user's identity
        from the OP's UserInfo Endpoint.

   The steps above can be described in a sequence diagram:

   End          OpenID         RDAP                 RDAP
   User        Provider       Client               Server
     |             |             |                    |
     |             |             |-----Help Query---->|
     |             |             |                    |
     |             |             |<---Help Response---|
     |             |             |                    |
     |-------Login Request------>|                    |
     |             |             |                    |
     |             |             |---Login Request--->|
     |             |             |                    |
     |             |<-----Authentication Request------|
     |             |             |                    |
     | Credential--|             |                    |
     |<--Request   |             |                    |
     |             |             |                    |
     |--Credential |             |                    |
     |   Response->|             |                    |
     |             |             |                    |
     |             |-----Authentication Response----->|
     |             |             |                    |
     |             |<----------Token Request----------|
     |             |             |                    |
     |             |-----------Token Response-------->|
     |             |             |                    |
     |             |<----------Claim Request----------|
     |             |             |                    |
     |             |-----------Claim Response-------->|
     |             |             |                    |
     |             |             |<--Login Response---|
     |             |             |                    |
     |<------Login Response------|                    |
     |             |             |                    |
     |----------RDAP Query------>|                    |
     |             |             |                    |
     |             |             |-----RDAP Query---->|
     |             |             |                    |
     |             |             |<---RDAP Response---|
     |             |             |                    |
     |<------RDAP Response-------|                    |

                                  Figure 1

   The RDAP server can then make identification, authorization, and
   access control decisions based on end-user identity information and
   local policies.  Note that OpenID Connect describes different process
   flows for other types of clients, such as script-based or command-
   line clients.

   RDAP authentication of a token-oriented client using OpenID Connect
   requires completion of the following steps:

   1.   An RDAP client sends an RDAP "help" query to an RDAP server to
        determine the type and capabilities of the OPs that are used by
        the RDAP server.  This information is returned in the
        "rdapConformance" section of the response.  A value of "farv1"
        indicates support for the extension described in this
        specification.  If one or more remote OPs are supported, the
        RDAP client SHOULD evaluate the additional information described
        in Section 4.1 in order to discover the capabilities of the RDAP
        server and optionally obtain the set of supported OPs.  Support
        for token-oriented clients requires a default OP.

   2.   The RDAP client determines the end user's OP and confirms that
        it's supported by the RDAP server.

   3.   The RDAP client sends an Authentication Request to the OP's
        authorization endpoint.

   4.   The OP authenticates the end user.

   5.   The OP obtains end-user consent or authorization.

   6.   The OP returns an authorization code to the RDAP client.

   7.   The RDAP client requests tokens using the authorization code at
        the OP's token endpoint.

   8.   The RDAP client receives a response that contains an ID Token
        and an access token in the response body.

   9.   The RDAP client monitors the token validity period and either
        refreshes the token or requests new tokens as necessary.

   10.  The RDAP client sends queries that require user identification,
        authentication, and authorization to an RDAP server that include
        an access token in an HTTP "authorization" header using the
        "bearer" authentication scheme described in [RFC6750].

   11.  The RDAP server validates the access token and retrieves the
        claims associated with the end user's identity from the OP's
        UserInfo Endpoint.

   12.  The RDAP server determines the end user's authorization level
        and processes the query in accordance with server policies.

   The steps above can be described in a sequence diagram:

   End          OpenID         RDAP                 RDAP
   User        Provider       Client               Server
     |             |             |                    |
     |             |             |-----Help Query---->|
     |             |             |                    |
     |             |             |<----Help Response--|
     |             |             |                    |
     |-------Login Request------>|                    |
     |             |             |                    |
     |             |<-Authentication                  |
     |             |   Request---|                    |
     |             |             |                    |
     |<-Credential |             |                    |
     |   Request---|             |                    |
     |             |             |                    |
     |--Credential |             |                    |
     |   Response->|             |                    |
     |             |             |                    |
     |             |--Authentication                  |
     |             | Response--->|                    |
     |             |             |                    |
     |             |<-Token      |                    |
     |             |  Request----|                    |
     |             |             |                    |
     |             |--Token      |                    |
     |             |  Response-->|                    |
     |             |             |                    |
     |<------Login Response------|                    |
     |             |             |                    |
     |-----RDAP Query----------->|                    |
     |             |             |                    |
     |             |             |----RDAP Query----->|
     |             |             |                    |
     |             |<------------Claim                |
     |             |            Request---------------|
     |             |             |                    |
     |             |-------------Claim                |
     |             |            Response------------->|
     |             |             |                    |
     |             |             |<---RDAP Response---|
     |             |             |                    |
     |<----RDAP Response---------|                    |

                                  Figure 2

3.1.4.  RDAP Authentication and Authorization Steps

   End users MAY present an identifier (an OpenID) issued by an OP to
   use OpenID Connect with RDAP.  If the RDAP server supports a default
   OP or if provider discovery is not supported, the end-user identifier
   MAY be omitted.  An OP SHOULD include support for the claims
   described in Section 3.1.5 to provide additional information needed
   for RDAP end-user authorization; in the absence of these claims,
   clients and servers MAY make authorization and access control
   decisions as appropriate given any other information returned from
   the OP.  OpenID Connect requires RPs to register with OPs to use
   OpenID Connect services for an end user.  The registration process is
   often completed using out-of-band methods, but it is also possible to
   use the automated method described by the OpenID Connect Dynamic
   Client Registration protocol [OIDCR].  The parties involved can use
   any method that is mutually acceptable.

3.1.4.1.  Provider Discovery

   An RDAP server acting as an RP needs to be able to map an end user's
   identifier to an OP.  This can be accomplished using the OPTIONAL
   OpenID Connect Discovery protocol [OIDCD], but that protocol is not
   widely implemented.  Out-of-band methods are also possible and can be
   more dependable.  For example, an RP can support a limited number of
   OPs and maintain internal associations of those identifiers with the
   OPs that issued them.

   Alternatively, if mapping an end user's identifier is not possible,
   or not supported by the RDAP server, the RDAP server SHOULD support
   explicit specification of a remote OP by the RDAP client in the form
   of a query parameter as described in Section 5.2.2 unless the remote
   OP has been identified using an out-of-band mechanism.  An RDAP
   server MUST provide information about its capabilities and supported
   OPs in the "help" query response in the "farv1_openidcConfiguration"
   data structure described in Section 4.1.  An RDAP server acting as an
   RP MUST support at least one of these methods of OP discovery.

3.1.4.2.  Authentication Request

   Once the OP is known, an RP MUST form an Authentication Request and
   send it to the OP as described in Section 3 of [OIDCC].  The
   authentication path followed (authorization, implicit, or hybrid)
   will depend on the Authentication Request response_type set by the
   RP.  The remainder of the processing steps described here assume that
   the authorization code flow is being used by setting
   "response_type=code" in the Authentication Request.

   The benefits of using the authorization code flow for authenticating
   a human user are described in Section 3.1 of [OIDCC].  The Implicit
   Flow is more commonly used by clients implemented in a web browser
   using a scripting language; it is described in Section 3.2 of
   [OIDCC].  At the time of this writing, the Implicit Flow is
   considered insecure and efforts are being made to deprecate the flow.
   The Hybrid Flow (described in Section 3.3 of [OIDCC]) combines
   elements of the authorization code and Implicit Flows by returning
   some tokens from the authorization endpoint and others from the token
   endpoint.

   An Authentication Request can contain several parameters.  REQUIRED
   parameters are specified in Section 3.1.2.1 of [OIDCC].  Apart from
   these parameters, it is RECOMMENDED that the RP include the optional
   "login_hint" parameter in the request, with the value being that of
   the "farv1_id" query parameter of the end user's RDAP "login"
   request, if provided.  Passing the "login_hint" parameter allows a
   client to pre-fill login form information, so logging in can be more
   convenient for users.  Other parameters MAY be included.

   The OP receives the Authentication Request and attempts to validate
   it as described in Section 3.1.2.2 of [OIDCC].  If the request is
   valid, the OP attempts to authenticate the end user as described in
   Section 3.1.2.3 of [OIDCC].  The OP returns an error response if the
   request is not valid or if any error is encountered.

3.1.4.3.  End User Authorization

   After the end user is authenticated, the OP MUST obtain consent from
   the end user to release authorization information to the RDAP server
   acting as an RP.  This process is described in Section 3.1.2.4 of
   [OIDCC].

3.1.4.4.  Authorization Response and Validation

   After obtaining an authorization result, the OP will send a response
   to the RP that provides the result of the authorization process using
   an authorization code.  The RP MUST validate the response.  This
   process is described in Sections 3.1.2.5 - 3.1.2.7 of [OIDCC].

3.1.4.5.  Token Processing

   The RP sends a token request using the authorization grant to a token
   endpoint to obtain a token response containing an access token, ID
   Token, and an OPTIONAL refresh token.  The RP MUST validate the token
   response.  This process is described in Section 3.1.3.5 [OIDCC].

3.1.4.6.  Delivery of User Information

   The set of claims can be retrieved by sending a request to a UserInfo
   Endpoint using the access token.  The claims are returned in the ID
   Token.  The process of retrieving claims from a UserInfo Endpoint is
   described in Section 5.3 of [OIDCC].

   OpenID Connect specifies a set of standard claims in Section 5.1 of
   [OIDCC].  Additional claims for RDAP are described in Section 3.1.5.

3.1.5.  Specialized Claims and Authorization Scope for RDAP

   OpenID Connect claims are pieces of information used to make
   assertions about an entity.  Section 5 of [OIDCC] describes a set of
   standard claims.  Section 5.1.2 of [OIDCC] notes that additional
   claims MAY be used, and it describes a method to create them.  The
   set of claims that are specific to RDAP are associated with an OAuth
   scope request parameter value (see Section 3.3 of [RFC6749]) of
   "rdap".

3.1.5.1.  Stated Purposes

   Communities of RDAP users and operators may wish to make and validate
   claims about a user's "need to know" when it comes to requesting
   access to a protected resource.  For example, a law enforcement agent
   or a trademark attorney may wish to be able to assert that they have
   a legal right to access a protected resource, and a server operator
   may need to be able to receive and validate that claim.  These needs
   can be met by defining and using an additional
   "rdap_allowed_purposes" claim.

   The "rdap_allowed_purposes" claim identifies the purposes for which
   access to a protected resource can be requested by an end user.  Use
   of the "rdap_allowed_purposes" claim is OPTIONAL; processing of this
   claim is subject to server acceptance of the purposes, the trust
   level assigned to this claim by the server, and successful
   authentication of the end user.  Unrecognized purpose values MUST be
   ignored, and the associated query MUST be processed as if the
   unrecognized purpose value was not present at all.  See Section 9.3
   for a description of the IANA considerations associated with this
   claim.

   The "rdap_allowed_purposes" claim is represented as an array of case-
   sensitive StringOrURI values as specified in Section 2 of [RFC7519].
   An example:

   "rdap_allowed_purposes": ["domainNameControl","dnsTransparency"]

   Purpose values are assigned to an end user's credential by an
   identity provider.  Identity providers MUST ensure that appropriate
   purpose values are only assigned to end user identities that are
   authorized to use them.

3.1.5.2.  Do Not Track

   Communities of RDAP users and operators may wish to make and validate
   claims about a user's wish to not have their queries logged, tracked,
   or recorded.  For example, a law enforcement agent may wish to assert
   that their queries are part of a criminal investigation and should
   not be tracked due to a risk of query exposure compromising the
   investigation, and a server operator may need to be able to receive
   and validate that claim.  These needs can be met by defining and
   using an additional "do not track" claim.

   The "do not track" ("rdap_dnt_allowed") claim can be used to identify
   an end user that is authorized to perform queries without the end
   user's association with those queries being logged, tracked, or
   recorded by the server.  Client use of the "rdap_dnt_allowed" claim
   is OPTIONAL.  Server operators MUST NOT log, track, or record any
   association of the query and the end user's identity if the end user
   is successfully identified and authorized, if the "rdap_dnt_allowed"
   claim is present, if the value of the claim is "true", and if
   accepting the claim complies with local regulations regarding logging
   and tracking.

   The "rdap_dnt_allowed" value is represented as a JSON boolean
   literal.  An example:

   rdap_dnt_allowed: true

   No special query tracking processing is required if this claim is not
   present or if the value of the claim is "false".  Use of this claim
   MUST be limited to end users who are granted "do not track"
   privileges in accordance with service policies and regulations.
   Specification of these policies and regulations is beyond the scope
   of this document.

4.  Common Protocol Features

   As described in Section 3.1.4.1, an RDAP server MUST provide
   information about its capabilities and supported OPs in a "help"
   query response.  This specification describes a new
   "farv1_openidcConfiguration" data structure that describes the OpenID
   Connect configuration and related extension features supported by the
   RDAP server.  This data structure is returned to all client types.

4.1.  OpenID Connect Configuration

   The "farv1_openidcConfiguration" data structure is an object with the
   following members:

   "sessionClientSupported":  (REQUIRED) a boolean value that describes
      RDAP server support for session-oriented clients (see
      Section 3.1.2).

   "tokenClientSupported":  (REQUIRED) a boolean value that describes
      RDAP server support for token-oriented clients (see
      Section 3.1.2).

   "dntSupported":  (REQUIRED) a boolean value that describes RDAP
      server support for the "farv1_dnt" query parameter (see
      Section 4.2.2).

   "providerDiscoverySupported":  (OPTIONAL) a boolean value that
      describes RDAP server support for discovery of providers of end-
      user identifiers.  The default value is "true".

   "issuerIdentifierSupported":  (OPTIONAL) a boolean value that
      describes RDAP server support for explicit client specification of
      an Issuer Identifier.  The default value is "true".

   "implicitTokenRefreshSupported":  (OPTIONAL) a boolean value that
      describes RDAP server support for implicit token refresh.  The
      default value is "false".

   "openidcProviders":  (OPTIONAL) a list of objects with the following
      members that describes the set of OPs that are supported by the
      RDAP server.  This data is RECOMMENDED if the value of
      issuerIdentifierSupported is "true":

      "iss":  (REQUIRED) a URI value that represents the Issuer
         Identifier of the OP as per the OpenID Connect Core
         specification [OIDCC].

      "name":  (REQUIRED) a string value representing the human-friendly
         name of the OP.

      "default":  (OPTIONAL) a boolean value that describes RDAP server
         support for an OPTIONAL default OP that will be used when a
         client omits the "farv1_id" and "farv1_iss" query parameters
         from a "farv1_session/login" request.  Only one member of this
         set can be identified as the default OP by setting a value of
         "true".  The default value is "false".

      "additionalAuthorizationQueryParams":  (OPTIONAL) an object where
         each member represents an OAuth authorization request parameter
         name-value pair supported by the OP.  The name represents an
         OAuth query parameter, and the value is the query parameter
         value.  A token-oriented RDAP client SHOULD add these query
         parameters and their corresponding values to the Authentication
         Request URL when requesting authorization by a specified OP
         through a proxy OP.

   An RDAP server MUST set either the "sessionClientSupported" or the
   "tokenClientSupported" value to "true".  Both values MAY be set to
   "true" if an RDAP server supports both types of clients.

   The "providerDiscoverySupported" value has a direct impact on the use
   of the "farv1_id" query parameter described in Sections 3.1.4.2 and
   5.2.1.  The value of "providerDiscoverySupported" MUST be "true" for
   an RDAP server to properly accept and process "farv1_id" query
   parameters.  Similarly, the "issuerIdentifierSupported" value has a
   direct impact on the use of the "farv1_iss" query parameter described
   in Section 5.2.2.  The value of "issuerIdentifierSupported" MUST be
   "true" for an RDAP server to properly accept and process "farv1_iss"
   query parameters.

   An example of a "farv1_openidcConfiguration" data structure:

   "farv1_openidcConfiguration": {
     "sessionClientSupported": true,
     "tokenClientSupported": true,
     "dntSupported": false,
     "providerDiscoverySupported": true,
     "issuerIdentifierSupported": true,
     "openidcProviders":
       [
         {
           "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
           "name": "Example IDP"
         },
         {
           "iss": "https://accounts.example.net",
           "name": "Login with EXAMPLE",
           "additionalAuthorizationQueryParams": {
             "kc_idp_hint": "examplePublicIDP"
           }
         },
         {
           "iss": "https://auth.nic.example/auth/realms/rdap",
           "name": "Default OP for the Example RDAP server",
           "default": true
         }
       ]
   }

                                  Figure 3

4.2.  RDAP Query Parameters

   This specification describes two OPTIONAL query parameters for use
   with RDAP queries that request access to information associated with
   protected resources:

   "farv1_qp":  A query parameter to identify the purpose of the query.

   "farv1_dnt":  A query parameter to request that the server not log or
      otherwise record information about the identity associated with a
      query.

   One or both parameters MAY be added to an RDAP request URI using the
   syntax described in Section "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" of
   [HTMLURL].

4.2.1.  RDAP Query Purpose

   This query is represented as a "key=value" pair using a key value of
   "farv1_qp" and a value component that contains a single query purpose
   string from the set of allowed purposes associated with the end
   user's identity (see Section 3.1.5.1).  If present, the server SHOULD
   compare the value of the parameter to the "rdap_allowed_purposes"
   claim values associated with the end user's identity and ensure that
   the requested purpose is present in the set of allowed purposes.  The
   RDAP server MAY choose to ignore both the requested purpose and the
   "rdap_allowed_purposes" claim values if they are inconsistent with
   local server policy.  The server MUST return an HTTP 403 (Forbidden)
   response if the requested purpose is not an allowed purpose.  If the
   "farv1_qp" parameter is not present, the server MUST process the
   query and make an access control decision based on any other
   information known to the server about the end user and the
   information they are requesting.  For example, a server MAY treat the
   request as one performed by an unidentified or unauthenticated user
   and return either an error or an appropriate subset of the available
   data.  An example domain query using the "farv1_qp" query parameter:

   https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com?farv1_qp=legalActions

                                  Figure 4

4.2.2.  RDAP Do Not Track

   This query is represented as a "key=value" pair using a key value of
   "farv1_dnt" and a value component that contains a single boolean
   value.  A value of "true" indicates that the end user is requesting
   that their query is not tracked or logged in accordance with server
   policy.  A value of "false" indicates that the end user is accepting
   that their query can be tracked or logged in accordance with server
   policy.  The server MUST return an HTTP 403 (Forbidden) response if
   the server is unable to perform the action requested by this query
   parameter.  An example domain query using the "farv1_dnt" query
   parameter:

   https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com?farv1_dnt=true

                                  Figure 5

4.2.3.  Parameter Processing

   Unrecognized query parameters MUST be ignored.  An RDAP server that
   processes an authenticated query MUST determine if the end-user
   identification information is associated with an OP that is
   recognized and supported by the server.  RDAP servers MUST reject
   queries that include identification information that is not
   associated with a supported OP by returning an HTTP 400 (Bad Request)
   response.  An RDAP server that receives a query containing
   identification information associated with a recognized OP MUST
   perform the steps required to authenticate the user with the OP,
   process the query, and return an RDAP response that is appropriate
   for the end user's level of authorization and access.

5.  Protocol Features for Session-Oriented Clients

   This specification adds the following features to RDAP that are
   commonly used by session-oriented clients:

   1.  Data structures to return information that describes an
       established session and the information needed to establish a
       session for a UI-constrained device.

   2.  A query parameter to request authentication for a specific end-
       user identity.

   3.  A query parameter to support authentication for a specific end-
       user identity on a device with a constrained user interface.

   4.  A query parameter to identify the purpose of the query.

   5.  A query parameter to request that the server not log or otherwise
       record information about the identity associated with a query.

   6.  Path segments to start, stop, refresh, and determine the status
       of an authenticated session for a specific end-user identity.

5.1.  Data Structures

   This specification describes two new data structures that are used to
   return information to a session-oriented client:

   "farv1_session":  A data structure that contains information that
      describes an established session.

   "farv1_deviceInfo":  A data structure that contains information that
      describes an active attempt to establish a session on a UI-
      constrained device.

5.1.1.  Session

   The "farv1_session" data structure is an object that contains the
   following members:

   "userID":  an OPTIONAL string value that represents the end-user
      identifier associated with the session.

   "iss":  an OPTIONAL URI value that represents the issuer of the end-
      user identifier associated with the session.

   "userClaims":  an OPTIONAL object that contains the set of claims
      associated with the end user's identity based on the user
      information provided by the OP as described in Section 3.1.4.6 and
      processed by the RDAP server in the authentication and
      authorization process.  The set of possible values is determined
      by OP policy and RDAP server policy.

   "sessionInfo":  an OPTIONAL object that contains two members:

      "tokenExpiration":  an integer value that represents the number of
         seconds that remain in the lifetime of the access token.

      "tokenRefresh":  a boolean value that indicates if the OP supports
         refresh tokens.  As described in [RFC6749], support for refresh
         tokens is OPTIONAL.

   Note that all of the members of the "farv1_session" data structure
   are OPTIONAL.  See Section 5.2.3 for instructions describing when to
   return the minimum set of members.

   An example of a "farv1_session" data structure:

     "farv1_session": {
       "userID": "user.idp.example",
       "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
       "userClaims": {
         "sub": "103892603076825016132",
         "name": "User Person",
         "given_name": "User",
         "family_name": "Person",
         "picture": "https://lh3.example.com/a-/AOh14=s96-c",
         "email": "user@example.com",
         "email_verified": true,
         "locale": "en",
         "rdap_allowed_purposes": [
           "domainNameControl",
           "personalDataProtection"
         ],
         "rdap_dnt_allowed": false
       },
       "sessionInfo": {
         "tokenExpiration": 3599,
         "tokenRefresh": true
       }
     }

                                  Figure 6

5.1.2.  Device Info

   The flow described in Section 3.1.4 requires an end user to interact
   with a server using a user interface that can process HTTP.  This
   will not work well in situations where the client is automated or an
   end user is using a command-line user interface such as curl
   (https://curl.se/) or wget (https://www.gnu.org/software/wget/).
   This limitation can be addressed using a web browser on a second
   device.  The information that needs to be entered using the web
   browser is contained in the "farv1_deviceInfo" data structure, an
   object that contains members as described in Section 3.2 of
   [RFC8628].

   An example of a "farv1_deviceInfo" data structure:

     "farv1_deviceInfo": {
       "device_code": "AH-1ng2ezu",
       "user_code": "NJJQ-GJFC",
       "verification_uri": "https://www.example.com/device",
       "verification_uri_complete":
          "https://www.example.com/device?user_code=NJJQ-GJFC",
       "expires_in": 1800,
       "interval": 5
     }

                                  Figure 7

5.2.  Client Login

   Client authentication is requested by sending a "farv1_session/login"
   request to an RDAP server.  If the RDAP server supports only remote
   OPs, the "farv1_session/login" request MUST include at least one end-
   user identifier or OP Issuer Identifier.

   The server sets an HTTP cookie as described in [RFC6265] when the
   "farv1_session/login" request is received and processed successfully.
   The client MUST include the session cookie received from the server
   in any RDAP request within the scope of that session, including
   "farv1_session/refresh", "farv1_session/status", and "farv1_session/
   logout".  A "farv1_session/login" followed by another "farv1_session/
   login" that does not include an HTTP cookie MUST start a new session
   on the server that includes a new cookie.  A server that receives a
   "farv1_session/login" followed by another "farv1_session/login" that
   includes an HTTP cookie MUST return an HTTP 409 (Conflict) response.

   To help reduce the risk of resource starvation, a server MAY reject a
   "farv1_session/login" request and refuse to start a new session by
   returning an HTTP 409 (Conflict) response if a server-side maximum
   number of concurrent sessions per user exists and the client exceeds
   that limit.  Additionally, an active session MAY be removed by the
   server due to timeout expiration or because a maximum session
   lifetime has been exceeded.  Clients SHOULD proactively monitor the
   "tokenExpiration" value associated with an active session and refresh
   the session as appropriate to provide a positive user experience.

5.2.1.  End-User Identifier

   The end-user identifier is delivered using one of two methods: by
   adding a query component to an RDAP request URI using the syntax
   described in Section "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" of [HTMLURL]
   or by including an HTTP "authorization" request header for the Basic
   authentication scheme as described in [RFC7617].  Clients can use
   either of these methods to deliver the end-user identifier to a
   server that supports remote OPs and provider discovery.  Servers that
   support remote OPs and provider discovery MUST accept both methods.
   If the RDAP server supports a default OP or if provider discovery is
   not supported, the end-user identifier MAY be omitted.

   The query parameter used to deliver the end-user identifier is
   represented as an OPTIONAL "key=value" pair using a key value of
   "farv1_id" and a value component that contains the client identifier
   issued by an OP.  An example for client identifier
   "user.idp.example":

   ========== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ===========
   https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/\
   login?farv1_id=user.idp.example

                                  Figure 8

   The authorization header for the Basic authentication scheme contains
   a base64-encoded representation of the client identifier issued by an
   OP.  No password is provided.  An example for client identifier
   "user.idp.example":

   https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/login
   Authorization: Basic dXNlci5pZHAuZXhhbXBsZQ==

                                  Figure 9

   An example for use with a default OP:

   https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/login

                                 Figure 10

5.2.2.  OP Issuer Identifier

   The OP's Issuer Identifier is delivered by adding a query component
   to an RDAP request URI using the syntax described in Section 
   "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" of [HTMLURL].  If the RDAP server
   supports a default OP, the Issuer Identifier MAY be omitted.

   The query parameter used to deliver the OP's Issuer Identifier is
   represented as an OPTIONAL "key=value" pair using a key value of
   "farv1_iss" and a value component that contains the Issuer Identifier
   associated with an OP.  An RDAP server MAY accept Issuer Identifiers
   not specified in the "farv1_openidcConfiguration" data structure and
   MAY also decide to accept specific Issuer Identifiers only from
   specific clients.  An example for Issuer Identifier
   "https://idp.example.com":

   ========== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ===========
   https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/\
   login?farv1_iss=https://idp.example.com

                                 Figure 11

5.2.3.  Login Response

   The response to this request MUST be a valid RDAP response per
   [RFC9083].  It MUST NOT include any members that relate to a specific
   RDAP object type (e.g., "events" or "status").  In addition, the
   response MAY include an indication of the requested operation's
   success or failure in the "notices" data structure.  If successful,
   the response MUST include a "farv1_session" data structure that
   includes a "sessionInfo" object and an OPTIONAL "userClaims" object.
   If unsuccessful, the response MUST include a "farv1_session" data
   structure that omits the "userClaims" and "sessionInfo" objects.

   An example of a successful "farv1_session/login" response:

       {
         "rdapConformance": [
           "farv1"
         ],
         "lang": "en-US",
         "notices": [
           {
             "title": "Login Result",
             "description": [
               "Login succeeded"
             ]
           }
         ],
         "farv1_session": {
           "userID": "user.idp.example",
           "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
           "userClaims": {
             "sub": "103892603076825016132",
             "name": "User Person",
             "given_name": "User",
             "family_name": "Person",
             "picture": "https://lh3.example.com/a-/AOh14=s96-c",
             "email": "user@example.com",
             "email_verified": true,
             "locale": "en",
             "rdap_allowed_purposes": [
               "domainNameControl",
               "personalDataProtection"
             ],
             "rdap_dnt_allowed": false
           },
           "sessionInfo": {
             "tokenExpiration": 3599,
             "tokenRefresh": true
           }
         }
       }

                                 Figure 12

   An example of a failed "farv1_session/login" response:

       {
         "rdapConformance": [
           "farv1"
         ],
         "lang": "en-US",
         "notices": [
           {
             "title": "Login Result",
             "description": [
               "Login failed"
             ]
           }
         ],
         "farv1_session": {
           "userID": "user.idp.example",
           "iss": "https://idp.example.com"
         }
       }

                                 Figure 13

5.2.4.  Clients with Limited User Interfaces

   "OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant" [RFC8628] provides an OPTIONAL
   method to request user authorization from devices that have an
   Internet connection but lack a suitable browser for a more
   conventional OAuth flow.  This method requires an end user to use a
   second device (such as a smartphone) that has access to a web browser
   for entry of a code sequence that is presented on the UI-constrained
   device.

5.2.4.1.  UI-Constrained Client Login

   Client authentication is requested by sending a "farv1_session/
   device" request to an RDAP server.  If the RDAP server supports only
   remote OPs, the "farv1_session/device" request MUST include either an
   end-user identifier as described in Section 5.2.1 or an OP Issuer
   Identifier as described in Section 5.2.2.

   An example using wget for client identifier "user.idp.example":

   ========== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ===========
      wget -qO- "https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/device\
      ?farv1_id=user.idp.example"

                                 Figure 14

   The authorization header for the Basic authentication scheme contains
   a base64-encoded representation of the client identifier issued by an
   OP.  No password is provided.

   An example using curl and an authorization header:

   ========== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ===========
      curl -H "Authorization: Basic dXNlci5pZHAuZXhhbXBsZQ=="\
      "https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/device"

                                 Figure 15

   The response to this request MUST be a valid RDAP response per
   [RFC9083].  It MUST NOT include any members that relate to a specific
   RDAP object type (e.g., "events" or "status").  In addition, the
   response MAY include an indication of the requested operation's
   success or failure in the "notices" data structure and, if
   successful, a "farv1_deviceInfo" data structure.

   An example of a "farv1_session/device" response:

     {
       "rdapConformance": [
         "farv1"
       ],
       "lang": "en-US",
       "notices": [
         {
           "title": "Device Login Result",
           "description": [
             "Login succeeded"
           ]
         }
       ],
       "farv1_deviceInfo": {
         "device_code": "AH-1ng2ezu",
         "user_code": "NJJQ-GJFC",
         "verification_uri": "https://www.example.com/device",
         "verification_uri_complete":
                 "https://www.example.com/device?user_code=NJJQ-GJFC",
         "expires_in": 1800,
             "interval": 5
       }
     }

                                 Figure 16

5.2.4.2.  UI-Constrained Client Login Polling

   After successful processing of the "farv1_session/device" request,
   the client MUST send a "farv1_session/devicepoll" request to the RDAP
   server to continue the login process.  This request initiates the
   polling function described in [RFC8628] on the RDAP server.  The RDAP
   server polls the OP as described in Section 3.4 of [RFC8628],
   allowing the RDAP server to wait for the end user to enter the
   information returned from the "farv1_session/device" request using
   the interface on their second device.  After the end user has
   completed that process, or if the process fails or times out, the OP
   will respond to the polling requests with an indication of success or
   failure.  If the RDAP server supports only remote OPs, the
   "farv1_session/devicepoll" request MUST include either an end-user
   identifier as described in Section 5.2.1 or an OP Issuer Identifier
   as described in Section 5.2.2.

   The "farv1_session/devicepoll" request MUST also include a "farv1_dc"
   query parameter.  The query parameter is represented as an OPTIONAL
   "key=value" pair using a key value of "farv1_dc" and a value
   component that contains the value of the device_code that was
   returned in the response to the "farv1_session/device" request.

   An example using wget:

   ========== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ===========
      wget -qO- --keep-session-cookies --save-cookies cookie.txt\
      "https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/devicepoll\
      ?farv1_id=user.idp.example&farv1_dc=AH-1ng2ezu"

                                 Figure 17

   An example using curl:

   ========== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ===========
      curl -c cookie.txt "https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/\
      devicepoll?farv1_id=user.idp.example&farv1_dc=AH-1ng2ezu"

                                 Figure 18

   The response to this request MUST use the response structures
   described in Section 5.2.  RDAP query processing can continue
   normally on the UI-constrained device once the device polling process
   has been completed successfully.

5.3.  Session Status

   Clients MAY send a query to an RDAP server to determine the status of
   an existing login session using a "farv1_session/status" path
   segment.  An example "farv1_session/status" request:

   https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/status

                                 Figure 19

   The response to this request MUST be a valid RDAP response per
   [RFC9083].  It MUST NOT include any members that relate to a specific
   RDAP object type (e.g., "events" or "status").  In addition, the
   response MAY include an indication of the requested operation's
   success or failure in the "notices" data structure.  If the operation
   is successful and an active session exists, the response MUST include
   a "farv1_session" data structure that includes a "sessionInfo" object
   and an OPTIONAL "userClaims" object.  If the operation is
   unsuccessful or if no active session exists, the response MUST NOT
   include a "farv1_session" object.

   An example of a "farv1_session/status" response for an active
   session:

     {
       "rdapConformance": [
         "farv1"
       ],
       "lang": "en-US",
       "notices": [
         {
           "title": "Session Status Result",
           "description": [
             "Session status succeeded"
           ]
         }
       ],
       "farv1_session": {
         "userID": "user.idp.example",
         "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
         "userClaims": {
           "sub": "103892603076825016132",
           "name": "User Person",
           "given_name": "User",
           "family_name": "Person",
           "picture": "https://lh3.example.com/a-/AOh14=s96-c",
           "email": "user@example.com",
           "email_verified": true,
           "locale": "en",
           "rdap_allowed_purposes": [
             "domainNameControl",
             "personalDataProtection"
           ],
           "rdap_dnt_allowed": false
         },
         "sessionInfo": {
           "tokenExpiration": 3490,
           "tokenRefresh": true
         }
       }
     }

                                 Figure 20

   If the operation is successful and an active session does not exist,
   the response MAY note the lack of an active session in the "notices"
   data structure.  The "farv1_session" data structure MUST be omitted.

   An example of a "farv1_session/status" response with no active
   session:

     {
       "rdapConformance": [
         "farv1"
       ],
       "lang": "en-US",
       "notices": [
         {
           "title": "Session Status Result",
           "description": [
             "Session status succeeded",
             "No active session"
           ]
         }
       ]
     }

                                 Figure 21

5.4.  Session Refresh

   Clients MAY send a request to an RDAP server to refresh or extend an
   existing login session using a "farv1_session/refresh" path segment.
   The RDAP server MAY attempt to refresh the access token associated
   with the current session as part of extending the session for a
   period of time determined by the RDAP server.  As described in
   [RFC6749], OP support for refresh tokens is OPTIONAL.  An RDAP server
   MUST determine if the OP supports token refresh and process the
   refresh request by either requesting refresh of the access token or
   returning a response that indicates that token refresh is not
   supported by the OP in the "notices" data structure.  An example
   "farv1_session/refresh" request:

   https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/refresh

                                 Figure 22

   The response to this request MUST be a valid RDAP response per
   [RFC9083].  It MUST NOT include any members that relate to a specific
   RDAP object type (e.g., "events" or "status").  In addition, the
   response MAY include an indication of the requested operation's
   success or failure in the "notices" data structure.  The response
   MUST include a "farv1_session" data structure that includes a
   "sessionInfo" object and an OPTIONAL "userClaims" object.  If
   unsuccessful but an active session exists, the response MUST include
   a "farv1_session" data structure that includes a "sessionInfo" object
   and an OPTIONAL "userClaims" object.  If unsuccessful and no active
   session exists, the response MUST omit the "farv1_session" data
   structure.

   An example of a successful "farv1_session/refresh" response:

     {
       "rdapConformance": [
         "farv1"
       ],
       "lang": "en-US",
       "notices": [
         {
           "title": "Session Refresh Result",
           "description": [
             "Session refresh succeeded",
             "Token refresh succeeded."
           ]
         }
       ],
       "farv1_session": {
         "userID": "user.idp.example",
         "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
         "userClaims": {
           "sub": "103892603076825016132",
           "name": "User Person",
           "given_name": "User",
           "family_name": "Person",
           "picture": "https://lh3.example.com/a-/AOh14=s96-c",
           "email": "user@example.com",
           "email_verified": true,
           "locale": "en",
           "rdap_allowed_purposes": [
             "domainNameControl",
             "personalDataProtection"
           ],
           "rdap_dnt_allowed": false
         },
         "sessionInfo": {
           "tokenExpiration": 3599,
           "tokenRefresh": true
         }
       }
     }

                                 Figure 23

   Alternatively, an RDAP server MAY attempt to refresh an access token
   upon receipt of a query if the access token associated with an
   existing session has expired and the corresponding OP supports token
   refresh.  The default RDAP server behavior is described in the
   "implicitTokenRefreshSupported" value that's included in the
   "farv1_openidcConfiguration" data structure (see Section 4.1).

   If the value of "implicitTokenRefreshSupported" is "true", the client
   MAY either explicitly attempt to refresh the session using the
   "farv1_session/refresh" query or depend on the RDAP server to attempt
   to refresh the session as necessary when an RDAP query is received by
   the server.  In this case, a server MUST attempt to refresh the
   access token upon receipt of a query if the access token associated
   with an existing session has expired and the corresponding OP
   supports token refresh.  Servers MUST return an HTTP 401
   (Unauthorized) response to a query if an attempt to implicitly
   refresh an existing session fails.

   If the value of "implicitTokenRefreshSupported" is "false", the
   client MUST explicitly attempt to refresh the session using the
   "farv1_session/refresh" query to extend an existing session.  If a
   session cannot be extended for any reason, the client MUST establish
   a new session to continue authenticated query processing by
   submitting a "farv1_session/login" query.  If the OP does not support
   token refresh, the client MUST submit a new "farv1_session/login"
   request to establish a new session once an access token has expired.

   Clients SHOULD NOT send a "farv1_session/refresh" request in the
   absence of an active login session because the request conflicts with
   the current state of the server.  Servers MUST return an HTTP 409
   (Conflict) response if a "farv1_session/refresh" request is received
   in the absence of a session cookie.

5.5.  Client Logout

   Clients MAY send a request to an RDAP server to terminate an existing
   login session.  Termination of a session is requested using a
   "farv1_session/logout" path segment.  Access and refresh tokens can
   be revoked during the "farv1_session/logout" process as described in
   [RFC7009] if supported by the OP (token revocation endpoint support
   is OPTIONAL per [RFC8414]).  If supported, this feature SHOULD be
   used to ensure that the tokens are not mistakenly associated with a
   future RDAP session.  Alternatively, an RDAP server MAY attempt to
   log out from the OP using the OpenID Connect RP-Initiated Logout
   protocol [OIDCL] if that protocol is supported by the OP.  In any
   case, to prevent abuse before the cookie times out, an RDAP server
   SHOULD invalidate the HTTP cookie associated with the session as part
   of terminating the session.

   An example "farv1_session/logout" request:

   https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/logout

                                 Figure 24

   The response to this request MUST be a valid RDAP response per
   [RFC9083].  It MUST NOT include any members that relate to a specific
   RDAP object type (e.g., "events" or "status").  In addition, the
   response MAY include an indication of the requested operation's
   success or failure in the "notices" data structure.  The "notices"
   data structure MAY include an indication of the success or failure of
   any attempt to logout from the OP or to revoke the tokens issued by
   the OP.

   An example of a "farv1_session/logout" response:

     {
       "rdapConformance": [
         "farv1"
       ],
       "lang": "en-US",
       "notices": [
         {
           "title": "Logout Result",
           "description": [
             "Logout succeeded"
             "Provider logout failed: Not supported by provider.",
             "Token revocation successful."
           ]
         }
       ]
     }

                                 Figure 25

   In the absence of a "logout" request, an RDAP session MUST be
   terminated by the RDAP server after a server-defined period of time.
   The server SHOULD also take appropriate steps to ensure that the
   tokens associated with the terminated session cannot be reused.  This
   SHOULD include revoking the tokens or logging out from the OP if
   either operation is supported by the OP.

5.6.  Request Sequencing

   The requests described in this document are typically performed in a
   specific sequence:

   1.  "farv1_session/login" (or the related "farv1_session/device" and
       "farv1_session/devicepoll" requests) to start a session,

   2.  "farv1_session/status" and/or "farv1_session/refresh" to manage a
       session,

   3.  and "farv1_session/logout" to end a session.

   If a client sends a "farv1_session/status", "farv1_session/refresh",
   or "farv1_session/logout" request in the absence of a session cookie,
   the server MUST return an HTTP 409 (Conflict) error.

   A client can end a session explicitly by sending a "farv1_session/
   logout" request to the RDAP server.  A session can also be ended
   implicitly by the server after a server-defined period of time.  The
   status of a session can be determined at any time by sending a
   "farv1_session/status" query to the RDAP server.

   An RDAP server MUST maintain session state information for the
   duration of an active session.  This is commonly done using HTTP
   cookies as described in [RFC6265].  Doing so allows end users to
   submit queries without having to explicitly identify and authenticate
   themselves for every query.

   An RDAP server can receive queries that include a session cookie
   where the associated session has expired or is otherwise unavailable
   (e.g., due to the user requesting explicit logout for the associated
   session).  The server MUST return an HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) error in
   response to such queries.

6.  Protocol Features for Token-Oriented Clients

   This specification adds additional processing steps for token-
   oriented clients as described in this section and Section 3.1.3.  It
   does not define additional data structures or RDAP-specific protocol
   parameters specifically for token-oriented clients.

6.1.  Client Login

   Clients identify and authenticate end users by exchanging information
   with an OP that is recognized by the RDAP server as described in
   Sections 3.1.4.2, 3.1.4.3, and 3.1.4.4.  A client SHOULD append the
   "additionalAuthorizationQueryParams" values retrieved from the
   "openidcProviders" array described in Section 4.1 to the
   authorization endpoint URL when requesting authorization from the OP.
   Once these processes are completed successfully, the client can
   request tokens from the OP as described in Section 3.1.4.5.  The OP
   SHOULD include the RDAP server's client_id in the "aud" claim value
   of an issued ID Token.  The RDAP server MAY choose to ignore the
   value of the "aud" claim or exchange the token as described in
   Section 6.4.  With these steps completed, the access token received
   from the OP can be passed to an RDAP server in an HTTP
   "authorization" request header [RFC6750] for RDAP queries that
   require end-user identification, authentication, and authorization.

6.2.  Client Queries

   An RDAP server that receives a bearer token in an HTTP
   "authorization" request header as part of an RDAP object query MUST
   validate the token in accordance with local policy and confirm that
   the token is a legitimate access token.  Once validated, the access
   token MAY be used to retrieve the claims associated with the end
   user's identity, including claims associated with the "rdap" scope
   that are not already included in the access token, as described in
   Section 3.1.4.6.  The RDAP server can then evaluate the end user's
   identity information to determine the end user's authorization level
   and process the query in accordance with server policies.  A client
   MUST include the "farv1_iss" query parameter and Issuer Identifier
   value with an RDAP query if the token was issued by a remote OP.

6.3.  Access Token Validation

   An RDAP server MUST validate a received access token prior to using
   that token for access control purposes.  Validation MAY include token
   introspection [RFC7662] using the issuing OP or analysis of the
   values included in a JWT access token.  Once an access token is
   validated, an RDAP server MAY use that token to request user claims
   from the issuing OP.

   There are performance considerations associated with the process of
   validating a token and requesting user claims as part of processing
   every received RDAP query.  An RDAP server MAY cache validated
   information and use that cached information to reduce the amount of
   time needed to process subsequent RDAP queries associated with the
   same access token as long as the token has not expired.  The client
   SHOULD monitor the token expiration time and refresh the token as
   needed.

6.4.  Token Exchange

   Tokens can include an "aud" (audience) claim that contains the OAuth
   2.0 client_id of the RP as an audience value.  In some operational
   scenarios (such as a client that is providing a proxy service), an RP
   can receive tokens with an "aud" claim value that does not include
   the RP's client_id.  These tokens might not be trusted by the RP, and
   the RP might refuse to accept the tokens.  This situation can be
   remedied by having the RP exchange the access token with the OP for a
   set of trusted tokens that reset the "aud" claim.  The token exchange
   protocol is described in [RFC8693].

7.  RDAP Query Processing

   Once an RDAP session is active, an RDAP server MUST determine if the
   end user is authorized to perform any queries that are received
   during the duration of the session.  This MAY include rejecting
   queries outright, and it MAY include omitting or otherwise redacting
   information that the end user is not authorized to receive.  Specific
   processing requirements are beyond the scope of this document.

8.  RDAP Conformance

   RDAP responses that contain values described in this document MUST
   indicate conformance with this specification by including an
   rdapConformance [RFC9083] value of "farv1" (federated authentication
   method for RDAP version 1).  The information needed to register this
   value in the "RDAP Extensions" registry is described in Section 9.1.

   Example rdapConformance structure with extension specified:

      "rdapConformance" :
        [
          "rdap_level_0",
          "farv1"
        ]

                                 Figure 26

9.  IANA Considerations

9.1.  RDAP Extensions Registry

   IANA has registered the following value in the "RDAP Extensions"
   registry:

   Extension Identifier:  farv1
   Registry Operator:  Any
   Specification:  RFC 9560
   Contact:  IETF <iesg@ietf.org>
   Intended Usage:  This extension describes federated authentication
      method for RDAP version 1 using OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect.

9.2.  JSON Web Token Claims Registry

   IANA has registered the following values in the "JSON Web Token
   Claims" registry:

   Claim Name:  rdap_allowed_purposes
   Claim Description:  This claim describes the set of RDAP query
      purposes that are available to an identity that is presented for
      access to a protected RDAP resource.
   Change Controller:  IETF
   Reference:  Section 3.1.5.1 of RFC 9560.

   Claim Name:  rdap_dnt_allowed
   Claim Description:  This claim contains a JSON boolean literal that
      describes a "do not track" request for server-side tracking,
      logging, or recording of an identity that is presented for access
      to a protected RDAP resource.
   Change Controller:  IETF
   Reference:  Section 3.1.5.2 of RFC 9560.

9.3.  RDAP Query Purpose Registry

   IANA has created a new protocol registry to manage RDAP query purpose
   values.

   Section at https://www.iana.org/protocols:  Registration Data Access
      Protocol (RDAP)
   Registry Name:  Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) Query
      Purpose Values
   Registration Procedure(s):  This registry is operated under the
      "Specification Required" policy defined in [RFC8126].  The
      designated expert must ensure that requests to add values to this
      registry meet the syntax, value, and description requirements
      described in this section.
   Required Information:  Registration requests are described in a
      specification that's consistent with the "Specification Required"
      policy defined in [RFC8126].  The specification must include one
      or more purpose values as described below.

   Individual purpose values are registered with IANA.  Each entry in
   the registry contains the following fields:

   Value:  The purpose string value being registered.  Value strings can
      contain uppercase ASCII characters from "A" to "Z", lowercase
      ASCII characters from "a" to "z", and the underscore ("_")
      character.  Value strings contain at least one character and no
      more than 64 characters.
   Description:  One or two sentences in English describing the meaning
      of the purpose value, how it might be used, and/or how it should
      be interpreted by clients and servers.
   Reference:  RFC 9560

   The set of initial values used to populate the registry as described
   below are derived from the final report produced by the Expert
   Working Group on gTLD Directory Services chartered by the Internet
   Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) [gTLD].

   Value:  domainNameControl
   Description:  Tasks within the scope of this purpose include, for a
      registrant's own domain name, creating the domain name, updating
      information about the domain name, transferring the domain name,
      renewing the domain name, deleting the domain name, maintaining a
      domain name portfolio, and detecting fraudulent use of the
      registrant's own contact information.
   Reference:  RFC 9560

   Value:  personalDataProtection
   Description:  Tasks within the scope of this purpose include
      identifying the accredited privacy or proxy provider associated
      with a domain name, reporting abuse, requesting reveal, or
      otherwise contacting the provider.
   Reference:  RFC 9560

   Value:  technicalIssueResolution
   Description:  Tasks within the scope of this purpose include (but are
      not limited to) working to resolve technical issues, including
      email delivery issues, DNS resolution failures, and website
      functionality issues.
   Reference:  RFC 9560

   Value:  domainNameCertification
   Description:  Tasks within the scope of this purpose include a
      Certification Authority (CA) issuing an X.509 certificate to a
      subject identified by a domain name.
   Reference:  RFC 9560

   Value:  individualInternetUse
   Description:  Tasks within the scope of this purpose include
      identifying the organization using a domain name to instill
      consumer trust or contacting that organization to raise a customer
      complaint to them or file a complaint about them.
   Reference:  RFC 9560

   Value:  businessDomainNamePurchaseOrSale
   Description:  Tasks within the scope of this purpose include making
      purchase queries about a domain name, acquiring a domain name from
      a registrant, and enabling due diligence research.
   Reference:  RFC 9560

   Value:  academicPublicInterestDNSResearch
   Description:  Tasks within the scope of this purpose include academic
      public interest research studies about domain names published in
      the registration data service, including public information about
      the registrant and designated contacts, the domain name's history
      and status, and domain names registered by a given registrant
      (reverse query).
   Reference:  RFC 9560

   Value:  legalActions
   Description:  Tasks within the scope of this purpose include
      investigating possible fraudulent use of a registrant's name or
      address by other domain names, investigating possible trademark
      infringement, contacting a registrant's or licensee's legal
      representative prior to taking legal action, and then taking a
      legal action if the concern is not satisfactorily addressed.
   Reference:  RFC 9560

   Value:  regulatoryAndContractEnforcement
   Description:  Tasks within the scope of this purpose include
      investigating the tax authority of businesses with online
      presences, investigating Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution
      Policy (UDRP), investigating contractual compliance, and
      registering data escrow audits.
   Reference:  RFC 9560

   Value:  criminalInvestigationAndDNSAbuseMitigation
   Description:  Tasks within the scope of this purpose include
      reporting abuse to someone who can investigate and address that
      abuse or contacting entities associated with a domain name during
      an offline criminal investigation.
   Reference:  RFC 9560

   Value:  dnsTransparency
   Description:  Tasks within the scope of this purpose involve querying
      the registration data made public by registrants to satisfy a wide
      variety of use cases around informing the public.
   Reference:  RFC 9560

10.  Security Considerations

   Security considerations for RDAP can be found in [RFC7481].  Security
   considerations for OpenID Connect Core [OIDCC] and OAuth 2.0
   [RFC6749] can be found in their reference specifications; best
   current security practice for OAuth 2.0 can be found in
   [OAUTH-SECURITY].  Additionally, the practices described in [RFC9325]
   MUST be followed when the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is
   used.

   As described in Section 3.1.4.2, the OAuth 2.0 Implicit Flow
   [RFC6749] is considered insecure, and efforts are being made to
   deprecate the flow.  It MUST NOT be used.

   Some of the responses described in this specification return
   information to a client from an RDAP server that is intended to help
   the client match responses to queries and manage sessions.  Some of
   that information, such as the "userClaims" described in
   Section 5.1.1, can be personally identifiable and considered
   sensitive if disclosed to unauthorized parties.  An RDAP server
   operator must develop policies for information disclosure to ensure
   that personally identifiable information is disclosed only to clients
   that are authorized to process that information.

   The "do not track" claim relies on the good will of the RDAP server
   and associated proxies.  As such, using and processing this claim
   depends on out-of-band trust relationships that need to be
   established before the claim is used in practice.  If used and
   accepted by the RDAP server, there is a risk of information loss that
   could seriously impair audit capabilities.

10.1.  Authentication and Access Control

   Having completed the client identification, authorization, and
   validation process, an RDAP server can make access control decisions
   based on a comparison of client-provided information (such as the set
   of "userClaims" described in Section 5.1.1) and local policy.  For
   example, a client who provides an email address (and nothing more)
   might be entitled to receive a subset of the information that would
   be available to a client who provides an email address, a full name,
   and a stated purpose.  Development of these access control policies
   is beyond the scope of this document.

11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [HTMLURL]  WHATWG, "URL (Living Standard)", March 2024,
              <https://url.spec.whatwg.org/>.

   [OIDCC]    Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
              C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating
              errata set 2", December 2023,
              <https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.

   [OIDCD]    Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and E. Jay, "OpenID
              Connect Discovery 1.0 incorporating errata set 2",
              December 2023, <https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-
              discovery-1_0.html>.

   [OIDCL]    Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Agarwal, N., Sakimura, N., and
              J. Bradley, "OpenID Connect RP-Initiated Logout 1.0",
              September 2022, <https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-
              rpinitiated-1_0.html>.

   [OIDCR]    Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, "OpenID Connect
              Dynamic Client Registration 1.0 incorporating errata set
              2", December 2023, <https://openid.net/specs/openid-
              connect-registration-1_0.html>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC6265]  Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6265, April 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6265>.

   [RFC6749]  Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
              RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.

   [RFC6750]  Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
              Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.

   [RFC7009]  Lodderstedt, T., Ed., Dronia, S., and M. Scurtescu, "OAuth
              2.0 Token Revocation", RFC 7009, DOI 10.17487/RFC7009,
              August 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7009>.

   [RFC7480]  Newton, A., Ellacott, B., and N. Kong, "HTTP Usage in the
              Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95,
              RFC 7480, DOI 10.17487/RFC7480, March 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7480>.

   [RFC7481]  Hollenbeck, S. and N. Kong, "Security Services for the
              Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95,
              RFC 7481, DOI 10.17487/RFC7481, March 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7481>.

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.

   [RFC7617]  Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme",
              RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7617>.

   [RFC7662]  Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection",
              RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7662>.

   [RFC8126]  Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
              Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
              RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8628]  Denniss, W., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and H. Tschofenig,
              "OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant", RFC 8628,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8628, August 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8628>.

   [RFC8693]  Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J.,
              and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, January 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8693>.

   [RFC9068]  Bertocci, V., "JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0
              Access Tokens", RFC 9068, DOI 10.17487/RFC9068, October
              2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9068>.

   [RFC9082]  Hollenbeck, S. and A. Newton, "Registration Data Access
              Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", STD 95, RFC 9082,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9082, June 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9082>.

   [RFC9083]  Hollenbeck, S. and A. Newton, "JSON Responses for the
              Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95,
              RFC 9083, DOI 10.17487/RFC9083, June 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9083>.

   [RFC9110]  Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
              Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9110>.

   [RFC9325]  Sheffer, Y., Saint-Andre, P., and T. Fossati,
              "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
              (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 9325, DOI 10.17487/RFC9325, November
              2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9325>.

11.2.  Informative References

   [gTLD]     Expert Working Group on gTLD Directory Services (EWG),
              "Final Report from the Expert Working Group on gTLD
              Directory Services: A Next-Generation Registration
              Directory Service (RDS)", June 2014,
              <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/final-report-
              06jun14-en.pdf>.

   [OAUTH-SECURITY]
              Lodderstedt, T., Bradley, J., Labunets, A., and D. Fett,
              "OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-security-
              topics-26, 21 April 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-
              security-topics-26>.

   [OIDC]     OpenID, "What is OpenID Connect",
              <https://openid.net/developers/how-connect-works/>.

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
              FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.

   [RFC8414]  Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0
              Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8414>.

   [RFC8792]  Watsen, K., Auerswald, E., Farrel, A., and Q. Wu,
              "Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and
              RFCs", RFC 8792, DOI 10.17487/RFC8792, June 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8792>.

Acknowledgments

   The author would like to acknowledge the following individuals for
   their contributions to the development of this document: Julien
   Bernard, Marc Blanchet, Tom Harrison, Russ Housley, Jasdip Singh,
   Rhys Smith, Jaromir Talir, Rick Wilhelm, and Alessandro Vesely.  In
   addition, the Verisign Registry Services Lab development team of
   Joseph Harvey, Andrew Kaizer, Sai Mogali, Anurag Saxena, Swapneel
   Sheth, Nitin Singh, and Zhao Zhao provided critical "proof of
   concept" implementation experience that helped demonstrate the
   validity of the concepts described in this document.

   Pawel Kowalik and Mario Loffredo provided significant text
   contributions that led to welcome improvements in several sections of
   this document.  Their contributions are greatly appreciated.

Author's Address

   Scott Hollenbeck
   Verisign Labs
   12061 Bluemont Way
   Reston, VA 20190
   United States of America
   Email: shollenbeck@verisign.com
   URI:   https://www.verisignlabs.com/