path: root/doc/rfc/rfc9629.txt

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                        R. Housley
Request for Comments: 9629                                Vigil Security
Updates: 5652                                                    J. Gray
Category: Standards Track                                        Entrust
ISSN: 2070-1721                                  大久保　智史 (T. Okubo)
                                            Penguin Securities Pte. Ltd.
                                                             August 2024


Using Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) Algorithms in the Cryptographic
                          Message Syntax (CMS)

Abstract

   The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) supports key transport and key
   agreement algorithms.  In recent years, cryptographers have been
   specifying Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) algorithms, including
   quantum-secure KEM algorithms.  This document defines conventions for
   the use of KEM algorithms by the originator and recipients to encrypt
   and decrypt CMS content.  This document updates RFC 5652.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9629.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
   Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
   in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction
     1.1.  Terminology
     1.2.  ASN.1
     1.3.  CMS Version Numbers
   2.  KEM Processing Overview
   3.  KEM Recipient Information
   4.  KEM Algorithm Identifier
   5.  Key Derivation
   6.  ASN.1 Modules
     6.1.  KEMAlgorithmInformation-2023 ASN.1 Module
     6.2.  CMS-KEMRecipientInfo-2023 ASN.1 Module
   7.  Security Considerations
   8.  IANA Considerations
   9.  References
     9.1.  Normative References
     9.2.  Informative References
   Acknowledgements
   Authors' Addresses

1.  Introduction

   This document updates "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)" [RFC5652].

   The CMS enveloped-data content type [RFC5652] and the CMS
   authenticated-enveloped-data content type [RFC5083] support both key
   transport and key agreement algorithms to establish the key used to
   encrypt and decrypt the content.  In recent years, cryptographers
   have been specifying Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) algorithms,
   including quantum-secure KEM algorithms.  This document defines
   conventions for the use of KEM algorithms for the CMS enveloped-data
   content type and the CMS authenticated-enveloped-data content type.

   A KEM algorithm is a one-pass (store-and-forward) mechanism for
   transporting random keying material to a recipient using the
   recipient's public key.  This means that the originator and the
   recipients do not need to be online at the same time.  The
   recipient's private key is needed to recover the random keying
   material, which is then treated as a pairwise shared secret (ss)
   between the originator and recipient.

   The KEMRecipientInfo structure defined in this document uses the
   pairwise shared secret as an input to a key derivation function (KDF)
   to produce a pairwise key-encryption key (KEK).  Then, the pairwise
   KEK is used to encrypt a content-encryption key (CEK) or a content-
   authenticated-encryption key (CAEK) for that recipient.  All of the
   recipients receive the same CEK or CAEK.

   In this environment, security depends on three things.  First, the
   KEM algorithm must be secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext
   attacks.  Second, the key-encryption algorithm must provide
   confidentiality and integrity protection.  Third, the choices of the
   KDF and the key-encryption algorithm need to provide the same level
   of security as the KEM algorithm.

   A KEM algorithm provides three functions:

   KeyGen() -> (pk, sk):
      Generate the public key (pk) and a private key (sk).

   Encapsulate(pk) -> (ct, ss):
      Given the recipient's public key (pk), produce a ciphertext (ct)
      to be passed to the recipient and shared secret (ss) for the
      originator.

   Decapsulate(sk, ct) -> ss:
      Given the private key (sk) and the ciphertext (ct), produce the
      shared secret (ss) for the recipient.

   To support a particular KEM algorithm, the CMS originator MUST
   implement the KEM Encapsulate() function.

   To support a particular KEM algorithm, the CMS recipient MUST
   implement the KEM KeyGen() function and the KEM Decapsulate()
   function.  The recipient's public key is usually carried in a
   certificate [RFC5280].

1.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

1.2.  ASN.1

   CMS values are generated using ASN.1 [X.680], which uses the Basic
   Encoding Rules (BER) and the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)
   [X.690].

1.3.  CMS Version Numbers

   As described in Section 1.3 of [RFC5652], the major data structures
   include a version number as the first item in the data structure.
   The version number is intended to avoid ASN.1 decode errors.  Some
   implementations do not check the version number prior to attempting a
   decode, and then if a decode error occurs, the version number is
   checked as part of the error-handling routine.  This is a reasonable
   approach; it places error processing outside of the fast path.  This
   approach is also forgiving when an incorrect version number is used
   by the originator.

   Whenever the structure is updated, a higher version number will be
   assigned.  However, to ensure maximum interoperability, the higher
   version number is only used when the new syntax feature is employed.
   That is, the lowest version number that supports the generated syntax
   is used.

2.  KEM Processing Overview

   KEM algorithms can be used with three CMS content types: the
   enveloped-data content type [RFC5652], the authenticated-data content
   type [RFC5652], or the authenticated-enveloped-data content type
   [RFC5083].  For simplicity, the terminology associated with the
   enveloped-data content type will be used in this overview.

   The originator randomly generates the CEK (or the CAEK), and then all
   recipients obtain that key as an encrypted object within the
   KEMRecipientInfo encryptedKey field explained in Section 3.  All
   recipients use the originator-generated symmetric key to decrypt the
   CMS message.

   A KEM algorithm and a key derivation function are used to securely
   establish a pairwise symmetric KEK, which is used to encrypt the
   originator-generated CEK (or the CAEK).

   In advance, each recipient uses the KEM KeyGen() function to create a
   key pair.  The recipient will often obtain a certificate [RFC5280]
   that includes the newly generated public key.  Whether the public key
   is certified or not, the newly generated public key is made available
   to potential originators.

   The originator establishes the CEK (or the CAEK) using these steps:

   1.  The CEK (or the CAEK) is generated at random.

   2.  For each recipient:

       *  The recipient's public key is used with the KEM Encapsulate()
          function to obtain a pairwise shared secret (ss) and the
          ciphertext for the recipient.

       *  The key derivation function is used to derive a pairwise
          symmetric KEK, from the pairwise ss and other data that is
          optionally sent in the ukm field.

       *  The KEK is used to encrypt the CEK for this recipient.

   3.  The CEK (or the CAEK) is used to encrypt the content for all
       recipients.

   The recipient obtains the CEK (or the CAEK) using these steps:

   1.  The recipient's private key and the ciphertext are used with the
       KEM Decapsulate() function to obtain a pairwise ss.

   2.  The key derivation function is used to derive a pairwise
       symmetric KEK, from the pairwise ss and other data that is
       optionally sent in the ukm field.

   3.  The KEK is used to decrypt the CEK (or the CAEK).

   4.  The CEK (or the CAEK) is used to decrypt the content.

3.  KEM Recipient Information

   This document defines KEMRecipientInfo for use with KEM algorithms.
   As specified in Section 6.2.5 of [RFC5652], recipient information for
   additional key management techniques is represented in the
   OtherRecipientInfo type.  Each key management technique is identified
   by a unique ASN.1 object identifier.

   The object identifier associated with KEMRecipientInfo is:

     id-ori OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
       rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) 13 }

     id-ori-kem OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ori 3 }

   The KEMRecipientInfo type is:

     KEMRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
       version CMSVersion,  -- always set to 0
       rid RecipientIdentifier,
       kem KEMAlgorithmIdentifier,
       kemct OCTET STRING,
       kdf KeyDerivationAlgorithmIdentifier,
       kekLength INTEGER (1..65535),
       ukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL,
       wrap KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
       encryptedKey EncryptedKey }

   The fields of the KEMRecipientInfo type have the following meanings:

      version is the syntax version number.  The version MUST be 0.  The
      CMSVersion type is described in Section 10.2.5 of [RFC5652].

      rid specifies the recipient's certificate or key that was used by
      the originator with the KEM Encapsulate() function.  The
      RecipientIdentifier provides two alternatives for specifying the
      recipient's certificate [RFC5280], and thereby the recipient's
      public key.  The recipient's certificate MUST contain a KEM public
      key.  Therefore, a recipient X.509 version 3 certificate that
      contains a key usage extension MUST assert the keyEncipherment
      bit.  The issuerAndSerialNumber alternative identifies the
      recipient's certificate by the issuer's distinguished name and the
      certificate serial number; the subjectKeyIdentifier alternative
      identifies the recipient's certificate by a key identifier.  When
      an X.509 certificate is referenced, the key identifier matches the
      X.509 subjectKeyIdentifier extension value.  When other
      certificate formats are referenced, the documents that specify the
      certificate format and their use with the CMS must include details
      on matching the key identifier to the appropriate certificate
      field.  For recipient processing, implementations MUST support
      both of these alternatives for specifying the recipient's
      certificate.  For originator processing, implementations MUST
      support at least one of these alternatives.

      kem identifies the KEM algorithm, and any associated parameters,
      used by the originator.  The KEMAlgorithmIdentifier is described
      in Section 4.

      kemct is the ciphertext produced by the KEM Encapsulate() function
      for this recipient.

      kdf identifies the key derivation function, and any associated
      parameters, used by the originator to generate the KEK.  The
      KeyDerivationAlgorithmIdentifier is described in Section 10.1.6 of
      [RFC5652].

      kekLength is the size of the KEK in octets.  This value is one of
      the inputs to the key derivation function.  The upper bound on the
      integer value is provided to make it clear to implementers that
      support for very large integer values is not needed.
      Implementations MUST confirm that the value provided is consistent
      with the key-encryption algorithm identified in the wrap field
      below.

      ukm is optional user keying material.  When the ukm value is
      provided, it is used as part of the info structure described in
      Section 5 to provide a context input to the key derivation
      function.  For example, the ukm value could include a nonce,
      application-specific context information, or an identifier for the
      originator.  A KEM algorithm may place requirements on the ukm
      value.  Implementations that do not support the ukm field SHOULD
      gracefully discontinue processing when the ukm field is present.
      Note that this requirement expands the original purpose of the ukm
      described in Section 10.2.6 of [RFC5652]; it is not limited to
      being used with key agreement algorithms.

      wrap identifies a key-encryption algorithm used to encrypt the
      CEK.  The KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier is described in
      Section 10.1.3 of [RFC5652].

      encryptedKey is the result of encrypting the CEK or the CAEK (the
      content-authenticated-encryption key, as discussed in [RFC5083])
      with the KEK.  EncryptedKey is an OCTET STRING.

4.  KEM Algorithm Identifier

   The KEMAlgorithmIdentifier type identifies a KEM algorithm used to
   establish a pairwise ss.  The details of establishment depend on the
   KEM algorithm used.  A key derivation function is used to transform
   the pairwise ss value into a KEK.

  KEMAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ KEM-ALGORITHM, {...} }

5.  Key Derivation

   This section describes the conventions of using the KDF to compute
   the KEK for KEMRecipientInfo.  For simplicity, the terminology used
   in the HKDF specification [RFC5869] is used here.

   Many KDFs internally employ a one-way hash function.  When this is
   the case, the hash function that is used is indirectly indicated by
   the KeyDerivationAlgorithmIdentifier.  Other KDFs internally employ
   an encryption algorithm.  When this is the case, the encryption that
   is used is indirectly indicated by the
   KeyDerivationAlgorithmIdentifier.

   The KDF inputs are as follows:

      IKM is the input keying material.  It is a symmetric secret input
      to the KDF.  The KDF may use a hash function or an encryption
      algorithm to generate a pseudorandom key.  The algorithm used to
      derive the IKM is dependent on the algorithm identified in the
      KeyDerivationAlgorithmIdentifier.

      L is the length of the output keying material in octets.  L is
      identified in the kekLength of the KEMRecipientInfo.  The value is
      dependent on the key-encryption algorithm used; the key-encryption
      algorithm is identified in the KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier.

      info is contextual input to the KDF.  The DER-encoded
      CMSORIforKEMOtherInfo structure is created from elements of the
      KEMRecipientInfo structure.  CMSORIforKEMOtherInfo is defined as:

         CMSORIforKEMOtherInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
           wrap KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
           kekLength INTEGER (1..65535),
           ukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL }

   The CMSORIforKEMOtherInfo structure contains the following:

      wrap identifies a key-encryption algorithm; the output of the key
      derivation function will be used as a key for this algorithm.

      kekLength is the length of the KEK in octets; the output of the
      key derivation function will be exactly this size.

      ukm is optional user keying material; see Section 3.

   The KDF output is as follows:

      OKM is the output keying material with the exact length of L
      octets.  The OKM is the KEK that is used to encrypt the CEK or the
      CAEK.

   An acceptable KDF MUST accept an IKM, L, and info as inputs.  An
   acceptable KDF MAY also accept a salt input value, which is carried
   as a parameter to the KeyDerivationAlgorithmIdentifier if present.
   All of these inputs MUST influence the output of the KDF.

6.  ASN.1 Modules

   This section provides two ASN.1 modules [X.680].  The first ASN.1
   module is an extension to the AlgorithmInformation-2009 module
   discussed in [RFC5912]; it defines the KEM-ALGORITHM CLASS.  The
   second ASN.1 module defines the structures needed to use KEM
   algorithms with CMS [RFC5652].

   The first ASN.1 module uses EXPLICIT tagging, and the second ASN.1
   module uses IMPLICIT tagging.

   Both ASN.1 modules follow the conventions established in [RFC5911],
   [RFC5912], and [RFC6268].

6.1.  KEMAlgorithmInformation-2023 ASN.1 Module

   <CODE BEGINS>
     KEMAlgorithmInformation-2023
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
             id-mod-kemAlgorithmInformation-2023(109) }

     DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
     BEGIN
     -- EXPORTS ALL;
     IMPORTS
       ParamOptions, PUBLIC-KEY, SMIME-CAPS
       FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
         { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
           security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
           id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) } ;

     -- KEM-ALGORITHM
     --
     -- Describes the basic properties of a KEM algorithm
     --
     -- Suggested prefix for KEM algorithm objects is: kema-
     --
     --  &id - contains the OID identifying the KEM algorithm
     --  &Value - if present, contains a type definition for the kemct;
     --               if absent, implies that no ASN.1 encoding is
     --               performed on the kemct value
     --  &Params - if present, contains the type for the algorithm
     --               parameters; if absent, implies no parameters
     --  &paramPresence - parameter presence requirement
     --  &PublicKeySet - specifies which public keys are used with
     --               this algorithm
     --  &Ukm - if absent, type for user keying material
     --  &ukmPresence - specifies the requirements to define the UKM
     --               field
     --  &smimeCaps - contains the object describing how the S/MIME
     --               capabilities are presented.
     --
     -- Example:
     -- kema-kem-rsa KEM-ALGORITHM ::= {
     --    IDENTIFIER id-kem-rsa
     --    PARAMS TYPE RsaKemParameters ARE optional
     --    PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsa-kem }
     --    UKM ARE optional
     --    SMIME-CAPS { TYPE GenericHybridParameters
     --        IDENTIFIED BY id-rsa-kem }
     -- }

     KEM-ALGORITHM ::= CLASS {
       &id             OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
       &Value          OPTIONAL,
       &Params         OPTIONAL,
       &paramPresence  ParamOptions DEFAULT absent,
       &PublicKeySet   PUBLIC-KEY OPTIONAL,
       &Ukm            OPTIONAL,
       &ukmPresence    ParamOptions DEFAULT absent,
       &smimeCaps      SMIME-CAPS OPTIONAL
     } WITH SYNTAX {
       IDENTIFIER &id
       [VALUE &Value]
       [PARAMS [TYPE &Params] ARE &paramPresence]
       [PUBLIC-KEYS &PublicKeySet]
       [UKM [TYPE &Ukm] ARE &ukmPresence]
       [SMIME-CAPS &smimeCaps]
     }

     END
   <CODE ENDS>

6.2.  CMS-KEMRecipientInfo-2023 ASN.1 Module

   <CODE BEGINS>
     CMS-KEMRecipientInfo-2023
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
         pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0)
         id-mod-cms-kemri-2023(77) }

     DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
     BEGIN
     -- EXPORTS ALL;
     IMPORTS
       OTHER-RECIPIENT, CMSVersion, RecipientIdentifier,
       EncryptedKey, KeyDerivationAlgorithmIdentifier,
       KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier, UserKeyingMaterial
         FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010  -- RFC 6268
           { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
             pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0)
             id-mod-cms-2009(58) }
       KEM-ALGORITHM
         FROM KEMAlgorithmInformation-2023  -- RFC 9629
           { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
             security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
             id-mod-kemAlgorithmInformation-2023(109) }
       AlgorithmIdentifier{}
         FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009  -- RFC 5912
           { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
             security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
             id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) } ;

     --
     -- OtherRecipientInfo Types (ori-)
     --

     SupportedOtherRecipInfo OTHER-RECIPIENT ::= { ori-KEM, ... }

     ori-KEM OTHER-RECIPIENT ::= {
       KEMRecipientInfo IDENTIFIED BY id-ori-kem }

     id-ori OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
       rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) 13 }

     id-ori-kem OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ori 3 }

     --
     -- KEMRecipientInfo
     --

     KEMRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
       version CMSVersion,  -- always set to 0
       rid RecipientIdentifier,
       kem KEMAlgorithmIdentifier,
       kemct OCTET STRING,
       kdf KeyDerivationAlgorithmIdentifier,
       kekLength INTEGER (1..65535),
       ukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL,
       wrap KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
       encryptedKey EncryptedKey }

     KEMAlgSet KEM-ALGORITHM ::= { ... }

     KEMAlgorithmIdentifier ::=
       AlgorithmIdentifier{ KEM-ALGORITHM, {KEMAlgSet} }

     --
     -- CMSORIforKEMOtherInfo
     --

     CMSORIforKEMOtherInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
       wrap KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
       kekLength INTEGER (1..65535),
       ukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL }

     END
   <CODE ENDS>

7.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations discussed in [RFC5652] are applicable to
   this document.

   To be appropriate for use with this specification, the KEM algorithm
   MUST explicitly be designed to be secure when the public key is used
   many times.  For example, a KEM algorithm with a single-use public
   key is not appropriate, because the public key is expected to be
   carried in a long-lived certificate [RFC5280] and used over and over.
   Thus, KEM algorithms that offer indistinguishability under adaptive
   chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2) security are appropriate.  A
   common design pattern for obtaining IND-CCA2 security with public key
   reuse is to apply the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transform [FO] or a
   variant of the FO transform [HHK].

   The KDF SHOULD offer at least the security level of the KEM.

   The choice of the key-encryption algorithm and the size of the KEK
   SHOULD be made based on the security level provided by the KEM.  The
   key-encryption algorithm and the KEK SHOULD offer at least the
   security level of the KEM.

   KEM algorithms do not provide data origin authentication; therefore,
   when a KEM algorithm is used with the authenticated-data content
   type, the contents are delivered with integrity from an unknown
   source.

   Implementations MUST protect the KEM private key, the KEK, and the
   CEK (or the CAEK).  Compromise of the KEM private key may result in
   the disclosure of all contents protected with that KEM private key.
   However, compromise of the KEK, the CEK, or the CAEK may result in
   disclosure of the encrypted content of a single message.

   The KEM produces the IKM input value for the KDF.  This IKM value
   MUST NOT be reused for any other purpose.  Likewise, any random value
   used by the KEM algorithm to produce the shared secret or its
   encapsulation MUST NOT be reused for any other purpose.  That is, the
   originator MUST generate a fresh KEM shared secret for each recipient
   in the KEMRecipientInfo structure, including any random value used by
   the KEM algorithm to produce the KEM shared secret.  In addition, the
   originator MUST discard the KEM shared secret, including any random
   value used by the KEM algorithm to produce the KEM shared secret,
   after constructing the entry in the KEMRecipientInfo structure for
   the corresponding recipient.  Similarly, the recipient MUST discard
   the KEM shared secret, including any random value used by the KEM
   algorithm to produce the KEM shared secret, after constructing the
   KEK from the KEMRecipientInfo structure.

   Implementations MUST randomly generate content-encryption keys,
   content-authenticated-encryption keys, and message-authentication
   keys.  Also, the generation of KEM key pairs relies on random
   numbers.  The use of inadequate pseudorandom number generators
   (PRNGs) to generate these keys can result in little or no security.
   An attacker may find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment
   that produced the keys, searching the resulting small set of
   possibilities, rather than brute-force searching the whole key space.
   The generation of quality random numbers is difficult.  [RFC4086]
   offers important guidance in this area.

   If the cipher and key sizes used for the key-encryption algorithm and
   the content-encryption algorithm are different, the effective
   security is determined by the weaker of the two algorithms.  If, for
   example, the content is encrypted with AES-CBC using a 128-bit CEK
   and the CEK is wrapped with AES-KEYWRAP using a 256-bit KEK, then at
   most 128 bits of protection is provided.

   If the cipher and key sizes used for the key-encryption algorithm and
   the content-authenticated-encryption algorithm are different, the
   effective security is determined by the weaker of the two algorithms.
   If, for example, the content is encrypted with AES-GCM using a
   128-bit CAEK and the CAEK is wrapped with AES-KEYWRAP using a 192-bit
   KEK, then at most 128 bits of protection is provided.

   If the cipher and key sizes used for the key-encryption algorithm and
   the message-authentication algorithm are different, the effective
   security is determined by the weaker of the two algorithms.  If, for
   example, the content is authenticated with HMAC-SHA256 using a
   512-bit message-authentication key and the message-authentication key
   is wrapped with AES-KEYWRAP using a 256-bit KEK, then at most 256
   bits of protection is provided.

   Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms, including
   KEM algorithms, become weaker with time.  As new cryptoanalysis
   techniques are developed and computing capabilities advance, the work
   factor to break a particular cryptographic algorithm will be reduced.
   As a result, cryptographic algorithm implementations should be
   modular, allowing new algorithms to be readily inserted.  That is,
   implementers should be prepared for the set of supported algorithms
   to change over time.

8.  IANA Considerations

   For KEMRecipientInfo as defined in Section 3, IANA has assigned the
   following OID in the "SMI Security for S/MIME Other Recipient Info
   Identifiers (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.13)" registry:

   +=========+=============+============+
   | Decimal | Description | References |
   +=========+=============+============+
   | 3       | id-ori-kem  | RFC 9629   |
   +---------+-------------+------------+

                  Table 1

   For the ASN.1 module defined in Section 6.1, IANA has assigned the
   following OID in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier"
   registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0):

   +=========+=====================================+============+
   | Decimal | Description                         | References |
   +=========+=====================================+============+
   | 109     | id-mod-kemAlgorithmInformation-2023 | RFC 9629   |
   +---------+-------------------------------------+------------+

                              Table 2

   For the ASN.1 module defined in Section 6.2, IANA has assigned the
   following OID in the "SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier
   (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)" registry:

   +=========+=======================+============+
   | Decimal | Description           | References |
   +=========+=======================+============+
   | 77      | id-mod-cms-kemri-2023 | RFC 9629   |
   +---------+-----------------------+------------+

                       Table 3

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC5083]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
              Authenticated-Enveloped-Data Content Type", RFC 5083,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5083, November 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5083>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.

   [RFC5911]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for
              Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and S/MIME", RFC 5911,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5911, June 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5911>.

   [RFC5912]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
              Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [X.680]    ITU-T, "Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation
              One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", ITU-T
              Recommendation X.680, ISO/IEC 8824-1:2021, February 2021,
              <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680>.

   [X.690]    ITU-T, "Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
              Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
              Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
              (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, ISO/IEC 8825-1:2021,
              February 2021, <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690>.

9.2.  Informative References

   [FO]       Fujisaki, E. and T. Okamoto, "Secure Integration of
              Asymmetric and Symmetric Encryption Schemes", Springer
              Science and Business Media LLC, Journal of Cryptology,
              vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 80-101, DOI 10.1007/s00145-011-9114-1,
              December 2011,
              <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-011-9114-1>.

   [HHK]      Hofheinz, D., Hövelmanns, K., and E. Kiltz, "A Modular
              Analysis of the Fujisaki-Okamoto Transformation", Springer
              International Publishing, Theory of Cryptography, TCC
              2017, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 10677, pp.
              341-371, Print ISBN 9783319704999, Online ISBN
              9783319705002, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-70500-2_12, November
              2017, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70500-2_12>.

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
              "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.

   [RFC5869]  Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
              Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.

   [RFC6268]  Schaad, J. and S. Turner, "Additional New ASN.1 Modules
              for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public
              Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 6268,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6268, July 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6268>.

Acknowledgements

   Our thanks to Burt Kaliski for his guidance and design review.

   Our thanks to Carl Wallace for his careful review of the ASN.1
   modules.

   Our thanks to Hendrik Brockhaus, Jonathan Hammell, Mike Jenkins,
   David von Oheimb, Francois Rousseau, and Linda Dunbar for their
   careful reviews and thoughtful comments.

Authors' Addresses

   Russ Housley
   Vigil Security, LLC
   Herndon, VA
   United States of America
   Email: housley@vigilsec.com


   John Gray
   Entrust
   Minneapolis, MN
   United States of America
   Email: john.gray@entrust.com


   Tomofumi Okubo
   Penguin Securities Pte. Ltd.
   Singapore
   Email: tomofumi.okubo+ietf@gmail.com

   Additional contact information:

      大久保　智史
      Penguin Securities Pte. Ltd.
      Singapore