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author | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
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committer | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
commit | 4bfd864f10b68b71482b35c818559068ef8d5797 (patch) | |
tree | e3989f47a7994642eb325063d46e8f08ffa681dc /doc/rfc/rfc2536.txt | |
parent | ea76e11061bda059ae9f9ad130a9895cc85607db (diff) |
doc: Add RFC documents
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diff --git a/doc/rfc/rfc2536.txt b/doc/rfc/rfc2536.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..88be242 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/rfc/rfc2536.txt @@ -0,0 +1,339 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group D. EastLake +Request for Comments: 2536 IBM +Category: Standards Track March 1999 + + + DSA KEYs and SIGs in the Domain Name System (DNS) + +Status of this Memo + + This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the + Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for + improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet + Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state + and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved. + +Abstract + + A standard method for storing US Government Digital Signature + Algorithm keys and signatures in the Domain Name System is described + which utilizes DNS KEY and SIG resource records. + +Table of Contents + + Abstract...................................................1 + 1. Introduction............................................1 + 2. DSA KEY Resource Records................................2 + 3. DSA SIG Resource Records................................3 + 4. Performance Considerations..............................3 + 5. Security Considerations.................................4 + 6. IANA Considerations.....................................4 + References.................................................5 + Author's Address...........................................5 + Full Copyright Statement...................................6 + +1. Introduction + + The Domain Name System (DNS) is the global hierarchical replicated + distributed database system for Internet addressing, mail proxy, and + other information. The DNS has been extended to include digital + signatures and cryptographic keys as described in [RFC 2535]. Thus + the DNS can now be secured and can be used for secure key + distribution. + + + + + +Eastlake Standards Track [Page 1] + +RFC 2536 DSA in the DNS March 1999 + + + This document describes how to store US Government Digital Signature + Algorithm (DSA) keys and signatures in the DNS. Familiarity with the + US Digital Signature Algorithm is assumed [Schneier]. Implementation + of DSA is mandatory for DNS security. + +2. DSA KEY Resource Records + + DSA public keys are stored in the DNS as KEY RRs using algorithm + number 3 [RFC 2535]. The structure of the algorithm specific portion + of the RDATA part of this RR is as shown below. These fields, from Q + through Y are the "public key" part of the DSA KEY RR. + + The period of key validity is not in the KEY RR but is indicated by + the SIG RR(s) which signs and authenticates the KEY RR(s) at that + domain name. + + Field Size + ----- ---- + T 1 octet + Q 20 octets + P 64 + T*8 octets + G 64 + T*8 octets + Y 64 + T*8 octets + + As described in [FIPS 186] and [Schneier]: T is a key size parameter + chosen such that 0 <= T <= 8. (The meaning for algorithm 3 if the T + octet is greater than 8 is reserved and the remainder of the RDATA + portion may have a different format in that case.) Q is a prime + number selected at key generation time such that 2**159 < Q < 2**160 + so Q is always 20 octets long and, as with all other fields, is + stored in "big-endian" network order. P, G, and Y are calculated as + directed by the FIPS 186 key generation algorithm [Schneier]. P is + in the range 2**(511+64T) < P < 2**(512+64T) and so is 64 + 8*T + octets long. G and Y are quantities modulus P and so can be up to + the same length as P and are allocated fixed size fields with the + same number of octets as P. + + During the key generation process, a random number X must be + generated such that 1 <= X <= Q-1. X is the private key and is used + in the final step of public key generation where Y is computed as + + Y = G**X mod P + + + + + + + + + +Eastlake Standards Track [Page 2] + +RFC 2536 DSA in the DNS March 1999 + + +3. DSA SIG Resource Records + + The signature portion of the SIG RR RDATA area, when using the US + Digital Signature Algorithm, is shown below with fields in the order + they occur. See [RFC 2535] for fields in the SIG RR RDATA which + precede the signature itself. + + Field Size + ----- ---- + T 1 octet + R 20 octets + S 20 octets + + The data signed is determined as specified in [RFC 2535]. Then the + following steps are taken, as specified in [FIPS 186], where Q, P, G, + and Y are as specified in the public key [Schneier]: + + hash = SHA-1 ( data ) + + Generate a random K such that 0 < K < Q. + + R = ( G**K mod P ) mod Q + + S = ( K**(-1) * (hash + X*R) ) mod Q + + Since Q is 160 bits long, R and S can not be larger than 20 octets, + which is the space allocated. + + T is copied from the public key. It is not logically necessary in + the SIG but is present so that values of T > 8 can more conveniently + be used as an escape for extended versions of DSA or other algorithms + as later specified. + +4. Performance Considerations + + General signature generation speeds are roughly the same for RSA [RFC + 2537] and DSA. With sufficient pre-computation, signature generation + with DSA is faster than RSA. Key generation is also faster for DSA. + However, signature verification is an order of magnitude slower than + RSA when the RSA public exponent is chosen to be small as is + recommended for KEY RRs used in domain name system (DNS) data + authentication. + + Current DNS implementations are optimized for small transfers, + typically less than 512 bytes including overhead. While larger + transfers will perform correctly and work is underway to make larger + transfers more efficient, it is still advisable at this time to make + reasonable efforts to minimize the size of KEY RR sets stored within + + + +Eastlake Standards Track [Page 3] + +RFC 2536 DSA in the DNS March 1999 + + + the DNS consistent with adequate security. Keep in mind that in a + secure zone, at least one authenticating SIG RR will also be + returned. + +5. Security Considerations + + Many of the general security consideration in [RFC 2535] apply. Keys + retrieved from the DNS should not be trusted unless (1) they have + been securely obtained from a secure resolver or independently + verified by the user and (2) this secure resolver and secure + obtainment or independent verification conform to security policies + acceptable to the user. As with all cryptographic algorithms, + evaluating the necessary strength of the key is essential and + dependent on local policy. + + The key size limitation of a maximum of 1024 bits ( T = 8 ) in the + current DSA standard may limit the security of DSA. For particularly + critical applications, implementors are encouraged to consider the + range of available algorithms and key sizes. + + DSA assumes the ability to frequently generate high quality random + numbers. See [RFC 1750] for guidance. DSA is designed so that if + manipulated rather than random numbers are used, very high bandwidth + covert channels are possible. See [Schneier] and more recent + research. The leakage of an entire DSA private key in only two DSA + signatures has been demonstrated. DSA provides security only if + trusted implementations, including trusted random number generation, + are used. + +6. IANA Considerations + + Allocation of meaning to values of the T parameter that are not + defined herein requires an IETF standards actions. It is intended + that values unallocated herein be used to cover future extensions of + the DSS standard. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Eastlake Standards Track [Page 4] + +RFC 2536 DSA in the DNS March 1999 + + +References + + [FIPS 186] U.S. Federal Information Processing Standard: Digital + Signature Standard. + + [RFC 1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain Names - Concepts and + Facilities", STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987. + + [RFC 1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain Names - Implementation and + Specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987. + + [RFC 1750] Eastlake, D., Crocker, S. and J. Schiller, "Randomness + Recommendations for Security", RFC 1750, December 1994. + + [RFC 2535] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", + RFC 2535, March 1999. + + [RFC 2537] Eastlake, D., "RSA/MD5 KEYs and SIGs in the Domain Name + System (DNS)", RFC 2537, March 1999. + + [Schneier] Schneier, B., "Applied Cryptography Second Edition: + protocols, algorithms, and source code in C", 1996. + +Author's Address + + Donald E. Eastlake 3rd + IBM + 65 Shindegan Hill Road, RR #1 + Carmel, NY 10512 + + Phone: +1-914-276-2668(h) + +1-914-784-7913(w) + Fax: +1-914-784-3833(w) + EMail: dee3@us.ibm.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Eastlake Standards Track [Page 5] + +RFC 2536 DSA in the DNS March 1999 + + +Full Copyright Statement + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved. + + This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to + others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it + or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published + and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any + kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are + included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this + document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing + the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other + Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of + developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for + copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be + followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than + English. + + The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be + revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. + + This document and the information contained herein is provided on an + "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING + TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING + BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION + HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Eastlake Standards Track [Page 6] + |