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author | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
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committer | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
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tree | e3989f47a7994642eb325063d46e8f08ffa681dc /doc/rfc/rfc2647.txt | |
parent | ea76e11061bda059ae9f9ad130a9895cc85607db (diff) |
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diff --git a/doc/rfc/rfc2647.txt b/doc/rfc/rfc2647.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7dc05a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/rfc/rfc2647.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1459 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group D. Newman +Request for Comments: 2647 Data Communications +Category: Informational August 1999 + + + Benchmarking Terminology for Firewall Performance + +Status of this Memo + + This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does + not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this + memo is unlimited. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved. + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction...................................................2 + 2. Existing definitions...........................................2 + 3. Term definitions...............................................3 + 3.1 Allowed traffic...............................................3 + 3.2 Application proxy.............................................3 + 3.3 Authentication................................................4 + 3.4 Bit forwarding rate...........................................5 + 3.5 Circuit proxy.................................................6 + 3.6 Concurrent connections........................................6 + 3.7 Connection....................................................7 + 3.8 Connection establishment......................................9 + 3.9 Connection establishment time.................................9 + 3.10 Connection maintenance......................................10 + 3.11 Conection overhead..........................................11 + 3.12 Connection teardown.........................................11 + 3.13 Connection teardown time....................................12 + 3.14 Data source.................................................12 + 3.15 Demilitarized zone..........................................13 + 3.16 Firewall....................................................13 + 3.17 Goodput.....................................................14 + 3.18 Homed.......................................................15 + 3.19 Illegal traffic.............................................15 + 3.20 Logging.....................................................16 + 3.21 Network address translation.................................16 + 3.22 Packet filtering............................................17 + 3.23 Policy......................................................17 + 3.24 Protected network...........................................18 + 3.25 Proxy.......................................................19 + 3.26 Rejected traffic............................................19 + + + +Newman Informational [Page 1] + +RFC 2647 Firewall Performance Terminology August 1999 + + + 3.27 Rule set....................................................20 + 3.28 Security association........................................20 + 3.29 Stateful packet filtering...................................21 + 3.30 Tri-homed...................................................22 + 3.31 Unit of transfer............................................22 + 3.32 Unprotected network.........................................23 + 3.33 User........................................................23 + 4. Security considerations.......................................24 + 5. References....................................................25 + 6. Acknowledgments...............................................25 + 7. Contact Information...........................................25 + 8. Full Copyright Statement......................................26 + +1. Introduction + + This document defines terms used in measuring the performance of + firewalls. It extends the terminology already used for benchmarking + routers and switches with definitions specific to firewalls. + + Forwarding rate and connection-oriented measurements are the primary + metrics used in this document. + + Why do we need firewall performance measurements? First, despite the + rapid rise in firewall deployment, there is no standard method of + performance measurement. Second, implementations vary widely, making + it difficult to do direct performance comparisons. Finally, more and + more organizations are deploying firewalls on internal networks + operating at relatively high speeds, while most firewall + implementations remain optimized for use over relatively low-speed + wide-area connections. As a result, users are often unsure whether + the products they buy will stand up to relatively heavy loads. + +2. Existing definitions + + This document uses the conceptual framework established in RFCs 1242 + and 2544 (for routers) and RFC 2285 (for switches). The router and + switch documents contain discussions of several terms relevant to + benchmarking the performance of firewalls. Readers should consult the + router and switch documents before making use of this document. + + This document uses the definition format described in RFC 1242, + Section 2. The sections in each definition are: definition, + discussion, measurement units (optional), issues (optional), and + cross-references. + + + + + + + +Newman Informational [Page 2] + +RFC 2647 Firewall Performance Terminology August 1999 + + +3. Term definitions + +3.1 Allowed traffic + + Definition: + Packets forwarded as a result of the rule set of the device under + test/system under test (DUT/SUT). + + Discussion: + Firewalls typically are configured to forward only those packets + explicitly permitted in the rule set. Forwarded packets must be + included in calculating the bit forwarding rate or maximum bit + forwarding rate of the DUT/SUT. All other packets must not be + included in bit forwarding rate calculations. + + This document assumes 1:1 correspondence of allowed traffic offered + to the DUT/SUT and forwarded by the DUT/SUT. There are cases where + the DUT/SUT may forward more traffic than it is offered; for + example, the DUT/SUT may act as a mail exploder or a multicast + server. Any attempt to benchmark forwarding rates of such traffic + must include a description of how much traffic the tester expects + to be forwarded. + + Unit of measurement: + not applicable + + Issues: + + See also: + policy + rule set + +3.2 Application proxy + + Definition: + A proxy service that is set up and torn down in response to a + client request, rather than existing on a static basis. + + Discussion: + Circuit proxies always forward packets containing a given port + number if that port number is permitted by the rule set. + Application proxies, in contrast, forward packets only once a + connection has been established using some known protocol. When the + connection closes, a firewall using applicaton proxies rejects + individual packets, even if they contain port numbers allowed by a + rule set. + + + + + +Newman Informational [Page 3] + +RFC 2647 Firewall Performance Terminology August 1999 + + + Unit of measurement: + not applicable + + Issues: + circuit proxy + rule sets + + See also: + allowed traffic + circuit proxy + proxy + rejected traffic + rule set + +3.3 Authentication + + Definition: + The process of verifying that a user requesting a network resource + is who he, she, or it claims to be, and vice versa. + + Discussion: + Trust is a critical concept in network security. Any network + resource (such as a file server or printer) typically requires + authentication before granting access. + + Authentication takes many forms, including but not limited to IP + addresses; TCP or UDP port numbers; passwords; external token + authentication cards; and biometric identification such as + signature, speech, or retina recognition systems. + + The entity being authenticated might be the client machine (for + example, by proving that a given IP source address really is that + address, and not a rogue machine spoofing that address) or a user + (by proving that the user really is who he, she, or it claims to + be). Servers might also authenticate themselves to clients. + + Testers should be aware that in an increasingly mobile society, + authentication based on machine-specific criteria such as an IP + address or port number is not equivalent to verifying that a given + individual is making an access request. At this writing systems + that verify the identity of users are typically external to the + firewall, and may introduce additional latency to the overall SUT. + + Unit of measurement: + not applicable + + Issues: + + + + +Newman Informational [Page 4] + +RFC 2647 Firewall Performance Terminology August 1999 + + + See also: + user + +3.4 Bit forwarding rate + + Definition: + The number of bits per second of allowed traffic a DUT/SUT can be + observed to transmit to the correct destination interface(s) in + response to a specified offered load. + + Discussion: + This definition differs substantially from section 3.17 of RFC 1242 + and section 3.6.1 of RFC 2285. + + Unlike both RFCs 1242 and 2285, this definition introduces the + notion of different classes of traffic: allowed, illegal, and + rejected (see definitions for each term). For benchmarking + purposes, it is assumed that bit forwarding rate measurements + include only allowed traffic. + + Unlike RFC 1242, there is no reference to lost or retransmitted + data. Forwarding rate is assumed to be a goodput measurement, in + that only data successfully forwarded to the destination interface + is measured. Bit forwarding rate must be measured in relation to + the offered load. Bit forwarding rate may be measured with + differed load levels, traffic orientation, and traffic + distribution. + + Unlike RFC 2285, this measurement counts bits per second rather + than frames per second. Testers interested in frame (or frame-like) + measurements should use units of transfer. + + Unit of measurement: + bits per second + + Issues: + Allowed traffic vs. rejected traffic + + See also: + allowed traffic + goodput + illegal traffic + rejected traffic + unit of transfer + + + + + + + +Newman Informational [Page 5] + +RFC 2647 Firewall Performance Terminology August 1999 + + +3.5 Circuit proxy + + Definition: + A proxy service that statically defines which traffic will be + forwarded. + + Discussion: + The key difference between application and circuit proxies is that + the latter are static and thus will always set up a connection if + the DUT/SUT's rule set allows it. For example, if a firewall's rule + set permits ftp connections, a circuit proxy will always forward + traffic on TCP port 20 (ftp-data) even if no control connection was + first established on TCP port 21 (ftp-control). + + Unit of measurement: + not applicable + + Issues: + application proxy + rule sets + + See also: + allowed traffic + application proxy + proxy + rejected traffic + rule set + +3.6 Concurrent connections + + Definition: + The aggregate number of simultaneous connections between hosts + across the DUT/SUT, or between hosts and the DUT/SUT. + + Discussion: + The number of concurrent connections a firewall can support is just + as important a metric for some users as maximum bit forwarding + rate. + + While "connection" describes only a state and not necessarily the + transfer of data, concurrency assumes that all existing connections + are in fact capable of transferring data. If a data cannot be sent + over a connection, that connection should not be counted toward the + number of concurrent connections. + + Further, this definition assumes that the ability (or lack thereof) + to transfer data on a given connection is solely the responsibility + of the DUT/SUT. For example, a TCP connection that a DUT/SUT has + + + +Newman Informational [Page 6] + +RFC 2647 Firewall Performance Terminology August 1999 + + + left in a FIN_WAIT_2 state clearly should not be counted. But + another connection that has temporarily stopped transferring data + because some external device has restricted the flow of data is not + necessarily defunct. The tester should take measures to isolate + changes in connection state to those effected by the DUT/SUT. + + Unit of measurement: + Concurrent connections + Maximum number of concurrent connections + + Issues: + + See also: + connections + connection establishment time + connection overhead + +3.7 Connection + + Definition: + A state in which two hosts, or a host and the DUT/SUT, agree to + exchange data using a known protocol. + + Discussion: + A connection is an abstraction describing an agreement between two + nodes: One agrees to send data and the other agrees to receive it. + + Connections might use TCP, but they don't have to. Other protocols + such as ATM also might be used, either instead of or in addition to + TCP connections. + + What constitutes a connection depends on the application. For a + native ATM application, connections and virtual circuits may be + synonymous. For TCP/IP applications on ATM networks (where multiple + TCP connections may ride over a single ATM virtual circuit), the + number of TCP connections may be the most important consideration. + + Additionally, in some cases firewalls may handle a mixture of + native TCP and native ATM connections. In this situation, the + wrappers around user data will differ. The most meaningful metric + describes what an end-user will see. + + Data connections describe state, not data transfer. The existence + of a connection does not imply that data travels on that connection + at any given time, although if data cannot be forwarded on a + previously established connection that connection should not be + considered in any aggregrate connection count (see concurrent + connections). + + + +Newman Informational [Page 7] + +RFC 2647 Firewall Performance Terminology August 1999 + + + A firewall's architecture dictates where a connection terminates. + In the case of application or circuit proxy firewalls, a connection + terminates at the DUT/SUT. But firewalls using packet filtering or + stateful packet filtering designs act only as passthrough devices, + in that they reside between two connection endpoints. Regardless of + firewall architecture, the number of data connections is still + relevant, since all firewalls perform some form of connection + maintenance; at the very least, all check connection requests + against their rule sets. + + Further, note that connection is not an atomic unit of measurement + in that it does not describe the various steps involved in + connection setup, maintenance, and teardown. Testers may wish to + take separate measurements of each of these components. + + When benchmarking firewall performance, it's important to identify + the connection establishment and teardown procedures, as these must + not be included when measuring steady-state forwarding rates. + Further, forwarding rates must be measured only after any security + associations have been established. + + Though it seems paradoxical, connectionless protocols such as UDP + may also involve connections, at least for the purposes of firewall + performance measurement. For example, one host may send UDP packets + to another across a firewall. If the destination host is listening + on the correct UDP port, it receives the UDP packets. For the + purposes of firewall performance measurement, this is considered a + connection. + + Unit of measurement: + concurrent connections + connection + connection establishment time + maximum number of concurrent connections + connection teardown time + + Issues: + application proxy vs. stateful packet filtering + TCP/IP vs. ATM + + connection-oriented vs. connectionless + + See also: + data source + concurrent connections + connection establishment + + + + + +Newman Informational [Page 8] + +RFC 2647 Firewall Performance Terminology August 1999 + + + connection establishment time + connection teardown + connection teardown time + +3.8 Connection establishment + + Definition: + The data exchanged between hosts, or between a host and the + DUT/SUT, to initiate a connection. + + Discussion: + Connection-oriented protocols like TCP have a proscribed + handshaking procedure when launching a connection. When + benchmarking firewall performance, it is import to identify this + handshaking procedure so that it is not included in measurements of + bit forwarding rate or UOTs per second. + + Testers may also be interested in measurements of connection + establishment time through or with a given DUT/SUT. + + Unit of measurement: + not applicable + + See also: + connection + connection establishement time + connection maintenance + connection teardown + + Issues: + not applicable + +3.9 Connection establishment time + + Definition: + The length of time needed for two hosts, or a host and the DUT/SUT, + to agree to set up a connection using a known protocol. + + Discussion: + Each connection-oriented protocol has its own defined mechanisms + for setting up a connection. For purposes of benchmarking firewall + performance, this shall be the interval between receipt of the + first bit of the first octet of the packet carrying a connection + establishment request on a DUT/SUT interface until transmission of + the last bit of the last octet of the last packet of the connection + setup traffic headed in the opposite direction. + + + + + +Newman Informational [Page 9] + +RFC 2647 Firewall Performance Terminology August 1999 + + + This definition applies only to connection-oriented protocols such + as TCP. For connectionless protocols such as UDP, the notion of + connection establishment time is not meaningful. + + Unit of measurement: + Connection establishment time + + Issues: + + See also: + concurrent connections + connection + connection maintenance + +3.10 Connection maintenance + + Definition: + The data exchanged between hosts, or between a host and the + DUT/SUT, to ensure a connection is kept alive. + + Discussion: + Some implementations of TCP and other connection-oriented protocols + use "keep-alive" data to maintain a connection during periods where + no user data is exchanged. + + When benchmarking firewall performance, it is useful to identfy + connection maintenance traffic as distinct from UOTs per second. + Given that maintenance traffic may be characterized by short bursts + at periodical intervals, it may not be possible to describe a + steady-state forwarding rate for maintenance traffic. One possible + approach is to identify the quantity of maintenance traffic, in + bytes or bits, over a given interval, and divide through to derive + a measurement of maintenance traffic forwarding rate. + + Unit of measurement: + maintenance traffic + forwarding rate + + See also: + connection + connection establishment time + connection teardown + connection teardown time + + Issues: + not applicable + + + + + +Newman Informational [Page 10] + +RFC 2647 Firewall Performance Terminology August 1999 + + +3.11 Connection overhead + + Definition: + The degradation in bit forwarding rate, if any, observed as a + result of the addition of one connection between two hosts through + the DUT/SUT, or the addition of one connection from a host to the + DUT/SUT. + + Discussion: + The memory cost of connection establishment and maintenance is + highly implementation-specific. This metric is intended to describe + that cost in a method visible outside the firewall. + + It may also be desirable to invert this metric to show the + performance improvement as a result of tearing down one connection. + + Unit of measurement: + bit forwarding rate + + Issues: + +3.12 Connection teardown + + Definition: + The data exchanged between hosts, or between a host and the + DUT/SUT, to close a connection. + + Discussion: + Connection-oriented protocols like TCP follow a stated procedure + when ending a connection. When benchmarking firewall performance, + it is important to identify the teardown procedure so that it is + not included in measurements of bit forwarding rate or UOTs per + second. + + Testers may also be interested in measurements of connection + teardown time through or with a given DUT/SUT. + + Unit of measurement: + not applicable + + See also: + connection teardown time + + Issues: + not applicable + + + + + + +Newman Informational [Page 11] + +RFC 2647 Firewall Performance Terminology August 1999 + + +3.13 Connection teardown time + + Definition: + The length of time needed for two hosts, or a host and the DUT/SUT, + to agree to tear down a connection using a known protocol. + + Discussion: + Each connection-oriented protocol has its own defined mechanisms + for dropping a connection. For purposes of benchmarking firewall + performance, this shall be the interval between receipt of the + first bit of the first octet of the packet carrying a connection + teardown request on a DUT/SUT interface until transmission of the + last bit of the last octet of the last packet of the connection + teardown traffic headed in the opposite direction. + + This definition applies only to connection-oriented protocols such + as TCP. For connectionless protocols such as UDP, the notion of + connection teardown time is not meaningful. + + Unit of measurement: + Connection teardown time + + Issues: + + See also: + concurrent connections + connection + connection maintenance + +3.14 Data source + + Definition: + A host capable of generating traffic to the DUT/SUT. + + Discussion: + One data source may emulate multiple users or hosts. In addition, + one data source may offer traffic to multiple network interfaces on + the DUT/SUT. + + The term "data source" is deliberately independent of any number of + users. It is useful to think of data sources simply as traffic + generators, without any correlation to any given number of users. + + Unit of measurement: + not applicable + + Issues: + user + + + +Newman Informational [Page 12] + +RFC 2647 Firewall Performance Terminology August 1999 + + + See also: + connection + user + +3.15 Demilitarized zone + + Definition: + A network segment or segments located between protected and + unprotected networks. + + Discussion: + As an extra security measure, networks may be designed such that + protected and unprotected segments are never directly connected. + Instead, firewalls (and possibly public resources such as HTTP or + FTP servers) reside on a so-called DMZ network. + + DMZ networks are sometimes called perimeter networks. + + Unit of measurement: + not applicable + + Issues: + Homed + + See also: + protected network + unprotected network + +3.16 Firewall + + Definition: + A device or group of devices that enforces an access control policy + between networks. + + Discussion: + While there are many different ways to accomplish it, all firewalls + do the same thing: control access between networks. + + The most common configuration involves a firewall connecting two + segments (one protected and one unprotected), but this is not the + only possible configuration. Many firewalls support tri-homing, + allowing use of a DMZ network. It is possible for a firewall to + accommodate more than three interfaces, each attached to a + different network segment. + + The criteria by which access are controlled are not specified here. + Typically this has been done using network- or transport-layer + criteria (such as IP subnet or TCP port number), but there is no + + + +Newman Informational [Page 13] + +RFC 2647 Firewall Performance Terminology August 1999 + + + reason this must always be so. A growing number of firewalls are + controlling access at the application layer, using user + identification as the criterion. And firewalls for ATM networks may + control access based on data link-layer criteria. + + Unit of measurement: + not applicable + + Issues: + + See also: + DMZ + tri-homed + user + +3.17 Goodput + + Definition: + The number of bits per unit of time forwarded to the correct + destination interface of the DUT/SUT, minus any bits lost or + retransmitted. + + Discussion: + Firewalls are generally insensitive to packet loss in the network. + As such, measurements of gross bit forwarding rates are not + meaningful since (in the case of proxy-based and stateful packet + filtering firewalls) a receiving endpoint directly attached to a + DUT/SUT would not receive any data dropped by the DUT/SUT. + + The type of traffic lost or retransmitted is protocol-dependent. + TCP and ATM, for example, request different types of + retransmissions. Testers must observe retransmitted data for the + protocol in use, and subtract this quantity from measurements of + gross bit forwarding rate. + + Unit of measurement: + bits per second + + Issues: + allowed vs. rejected traffic + + See also: + allowed traffic + bit forwarding rate + rejected traffic + + + + + + +Newman Informational [Page 14] + +RFC 2647 Firewall Performance Terminology August 1999 + + +3.18 Homed + + Definition: + The number of logical interfaces a DUT/SUT contains. + + Discussion: + Firewalls typically contain at least two logical interfaces. In + network topologies where a DMZ is used, the firewall usually + contains at least three interfaces and is said to be tri-homed. + Additional interfaces would make a firewall quad-homed, quint- + homed, and so on. + + It is theoretically possible for a firewall to contain one physical + interface and multiple logical interfaces. This configuration is + discouraged for testing purposes because of the difficulty in + verifying that no leakage occurs between protected and unprotected + segments. + + Unit of measurement: + not applicable + + Issues: + + See also: + tri-homed + +3.19 Illegal traffic + + Definition: + Packets specified for rejection in the rule set of the DUT/SUT. + + Discussion: + A buggy or misconfigured firewall might forward packets even though + its rule set specifies that these packets be dropped. Illegal + traffic differs from rejected traffic in that it describes all + traffic specified for rejection by the rule set, while rejected + traffic specifies only those packets actually dropped by the + DUT/SUT. + + Unit of measurement: + not applicable + + Issues: + + + + + + + + +Newman Informational [Page 15] + +RFC 2647 Firewall Performance Terminology August 1999 + + + See also: + accepted traffic + policy + rejected traffic + rule set + +3.20 Logging + + Definition: + The recording of user requests made to the firewall. + + Discussion: + Firewalls typically log all requests they handle, both allowed and + rejected. For many firewall designs, logging requires a significant + amount of processing overhead, especially when complex rule sets + are in use. + + The type and amount of data logged varies by implementation. + Testers may find it desirable to log equivalent data when comparing + different DUT/SUTs. + + Some systems allow logging to take place on systems other than the + DUT/SUT. + + Unit of measurement: + not applicable + + Issues: + rule sets + + See also: + allowed traffic + connection + rejected traffic + +3.21 Network address translation + + Definition: + A method of mapping one or more private, reserved IP addresses to + one or more public IP addresses. + + Discussion: + In the interest of conserving the IPv4 address space, RFC 1918 + proposed the use of certain private (reserved) blocks of IP + addresses. Connections to public networks are made by use of a + device that translates one or more RFC 1918 addresses to one or + more public addresses--a network address translator (NAT). + + + + +Newman Informational [Page 16] + +RFC 2647 Firewall Performance Terminology August 1999 + + + The use of private addressing also introduces a security benefit in + that RFC 1918 addresses are not visible to hosts on the public + Internet. + + Some NAT implementations are computationally intensive, and may + affect bit forwarding rate. + + Unit of measurement: + not applicable + + Issues: + + See also: + +3.22 Packet filtering + + Definition: + The process of controlling access by examining packets based on the + content of packet headers. + + Discussion: + Packet-filtering devices forward or deny packets based on + information in each packet's header, such as IP address or TCP port + number. A packet-filtering firewall uses a rule set to determine + which traffic should be forwarded and which should be blocked. + + Unit of measurement: + not applicable + + Issues: + static vs. stateful packet filtering + + See also: + application proxy + circuit proxy + proxy + rule set + stateful packet filtering + +3.23 Policy + + Definition: + A document defining acceptable access to protected, DMZ, and + unprotected networks. + + + + + + + +Newman Informational [Page 17] + +RFC 2647 Firewall Performance Terminology August 1999 + + + Discussion: + Security policies generally do not spell out specific + configurations for firewalls; rather, they set general guidelines + for what is and is not acceptable network access. + + The actual mechanism for controlling access is usually the rule set + implemented in the DUT/SUT. + + Unit of measurement: + not applicable + + Issues: + + See also: + rule set + +3.24 Protected network + + Definition: + A network segment or segments to which access is controlled by the + DUT/SUT. + + Discussion: + Firewalls are intended to prevent unauthorized access either to or + from the protected network. Depending on the configuration + specified by the policy and rule set, the DUT/SUT may allow hosts + on the protected segment to act as clients for servers on either + the DMZ or the unprotected network, or both. + + Protected networks are often called "internal networks." That term + is not used here because firewalls increasingly are deployed within + an organization, where all segments are by definition internal. + + Unit of measurement: + + not applicable + + Issues: + + See also: + demilitarized zone (DMZ) + unprotected network + policy + rule set + unprotected network + + + + + + +Newman Informational [Page 18] + +RFC 2647 Firewall Performance Terminology August 1999 + + +3.25 Proxy + + Definition: + A request for a connection made on behalf of a host. + + Discussion: + Proxy-based firewalls do not allow direct connections between + hosts. Instead, two connections are established: one between the + client host and the DUT/SUT, and another between the DUT/SUT and + server host. + + As with packet-filtering firewalls, proxy-based devices use a rule + set to determine which traffic should be forwarded and which should + be rejected. + + There are two types of proxies: application proxies and circuit + proxies. + + Unit of measurement: + not applicable + + Issues: + application + + See also: + application proxy + circuit proxy + packet filtering + stateful packet filtering + +3.26 Rejected traffic + + Definition: + Packets dropped as a result of the rule set of the DUT/SUT. + + Discussion: + For purposes of benchmarking firewall performance, it is expected + that firewalls will reject all traffic not explicitly permitted in + the rule set. Dropped packets must not be included in calculating + the bit forwarding rate or maximum bit forwarding rate of the + DUT/SUT. + + Unit of measurement: + not applicable + + Issues: + + + + + +Newman Informational [Page 19] + +RFC 2647 Firewall Performance Terminology August 1999 + + + See also: + allowed traffic + illegal traffic + policy + rule set + +3.27 Rule set + + Definition: + The collection of access control rules that determines which + packets the DUT/SUT will forward and which it will reject. + + Discussion: + Rule sets control access to and from the network interfaces of the + + DUT/SUT. By definition, rule sets do not apply equally to all + network interfaces; otherwise there would be no need for the + firewall. For benchmarking purposes, a specific rule set is + typically applied to each network interface in the DUT/SUT. + + The tester must describe the complete contents of the rule set of + each DUT/SUT. + + To ensure measurements reflect only traffic forwarded by the + DUT/SUT, testers are encouraged to include a rule denying all + access except for those packets allowed by the rule set. + + Unit of measurement: + not applicable + + Issues: + + See also: + allowed traffic + demilitarized zone (DMZ) + illegal traffic + policy + protected network + rejected traffic + unprotected network + +3.28 Security association + + Definition: + The set of security information relating to a given network + connection or set of connections. + + + + + +Newman Informational [Page 20] + +RFC 2647 Firewall Performance Terminology August 1999 + + + Discussion: + This definition covers the relationship between policy and + connections. Security associations (SAs) are typically set up + during connection establishment, and they may be reiterated or + revoked during a connection. + + For purposes of benchmarking firewall performance, measurements of + bit forwarding rate or UOTs per second must be taken after all + security associations have been established. + + Unit of measurement: + not applicable + + See also: + connection + connection establishment + policy + rule set + +3.29 Stateful packet filtering + + Definition: + The process of forwarding or rejecting traffic based on the + contents of a state table maintained by a firewall. + + Discussion: + Packet filtering and proxy firewalls are essentially static, in + that they always forward or reject packets based on the contents of + the rule set. + + In contrast, devices using stateful packet filtering will only + forward packets if they correspond with state information + maintained by the device about each connection. For example, a + stateful packet filtering device will reject a packet on port 20 + (ftp-data) if no connection has been established over the ftp + control port (usually port 21). + + Unit of measurement: + not applicable + + Issues: + + See also: + applicaton proxy + packet filtering + proxy + + + + + +Newman Informational [Page 21] + +RFC 2647 Firewall Performance Terminology August 1999 + + +3.30 Tri-homed + + Definition: + A firewall with three network interfaces. + + Discussion: + Tri-homed firewalls connect three network segments with different + network addresses. Typically, these would be protected, DMZ, and + unprotected segments. + + A tri-homed firewall may offer some security advantages over + firewalls with two interfaces. An attacker on an unprotected + network may compromise hosts on the DMZ but still not reach any + hosts on the protected network. + + Unit of measurement: + not applicable + + Issues: + Usually the differentiator between one segment and another is its + IP address. However, firewalls may connect different networks of + other types, such as ATM or Netware segments. + + See also: + homed + +3.31 Unit of transfer + + Definition: + A discrete collection of bytes comprising at least one header and + optional user data. + + Discussion: + This metric is intended for use in describing steady-state + forwarding rate of the DUT/SUT. + + The unit of transfer (UOT) definition is deliberately left open to + interpretation, allowing the broadest possible application. + Examples of UOTs include TCP segments, IP packets, Ethernet frames, + and ATM cells. + + While the definition is deliberately broad, its interpretation must + not be. The tester must describe what type of UOT will be offered + to the DUT/SUT, and must offer these UOTs at a consistent rate. + Traffic measurement must begin after all connection establishment + routines complete and before any connection completion routine + begins. Further, measurements must begin after any security + associations (SAs) are established and before any SA is revoked. + + + +Newman Informational [Page 22] + +RFC 2647 Firewall Performance Terminology August 1999 + + + Testers also must compare only like UOTs. It is not appropriate, + for example, to compare forwarding rates by offering 1,500-byte + Ethernet UOTs to one DUT/SUT and 53-byte ATM cells to another. + + Unit of measurement: + Units of transfer + Units of transfer per second + + Issues: + + See also: + bit forwarding rate + connection + +3.32 Unprotected network + + Definition: + A network segment or segments to which access is not controlled by + the DUT/SUT. + + Discussion: + Firewalls are deployed between protected and unprotected segments. + The unprotected network is not protected by the DUT/SUT. + + Note that a DUT/SUT's policy may specify hosts on an unprotected + network. For example, a user on a protected network may be + permitted to access an FTP server on an unprotected network. But + the DUT/SUT cannot control access between hosts on the unprotected + network. + + Unit of measurement: + not applicable + + Issues: + + See also: + demilitarized zone (DMZ) + policy + protected network + rule set + +3.33 User + + Definition: + A person or process requesting access to resources protected by the + DUT/SUT. + + + + + +Newman Informational [Page 23] + +RFC 2647 Firewall Performance Terminology August 1999 + + + Discussion: + "User" is a problematic term in the context of firewall performance + testing, for several reasons. First, a user may in fact be a + process or processes requesting services through the DUT/SUT. + Second, different "user" requests may require radically different + amounts of DUT/SUT resources. Third, traffic profiles vary widely + from one organization to another, making it difficult to + characterize the load offered by a typical user. + + For these reasons, testers should not attempt to measure DUT/SUT + performance in terms of users supported. Instead, testers should + describe performance in terms of maximum bit forwarding rate and + maximum number of connections sustained. Further, testers should + use the term "data source" rather than user to describe traffic + generator(s). + + Unit of measurement: + not applicable + + Issues: + + See also: + data source + +4. Security Considerations + + The primary goal of this memo is to describe terms used in + benchmarking firewall performance. However, readers should be aware + that there is some overlap between performance and security issues. + Specifically, the optimal configuration for firewall performance may + not be the most secure, and vice-versa. + + Further, certain forms of attack may degrade performance. One common + form of denial-of-service (DoS) attack bombards a firewall with so + much rejected traffic that it cannot forward allowed traffic. DoS + attacks do not always involve heavy loads; by definition, DoS + describes any state in which a firewall is offered rejected traffic + that prohibits it from forwarding some or all allowed traffic. Even a + small amount of traffic may significantly degrade firewall + performance, or stop the firewall altogether. Further, the safeguards + in firewalls to guard against such attacks may have a significant + negative impact on performance. + + Since the library of attacks is constantly expanding, no attempt is + made here to define specific attacks that may affect performance. + Nonetheless, any reasonable performance benchmark should take into + + + + + +Newman Informational [Page 24] + +RFC 2647 Firewall Performance Terminology August 1999 + + + consideration safeguards against such attacks. Specifically, the same + safeguards should be in place when comparing performance of different + firewall implementations. + +5. References + + Bradner, S., Ed., "Benchmarking Terminology for Network + Interconnection Devices", RFC 1242, July 1991. + + Bradner, S. and J. McQuaid, "Benchmarking Methodology for Network + Interconnect Devices", RFC 2544, March 1999. + + Mandeville, R., "Benchmarking Terminology for LAN Switching Devices", + RFC 2285, February 1998. + + Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G. and E. Lear, + "Address Allocation for Private Internets", BCP 5, RFC 1918, + February 1996. + +6. Acknowledgments + + The author wishes to thank the IETF Benchmarking Working Group for + agreeing to review this document. Several other persons offered + valuable contributions and critiques during this project: Ted Doty + (Internet Security Systems), Kevin Dubray (Ironbridge Networks), + Helen Holzbaur, Dale Lancaster, Robert Mandeville, Brent Melson + (NSTL), Steve Platt (NSTL), Marcus Ranum (Network Flight Recorder), + Greg Shannon, Christoph Schuba (Sun Microsystems), Rick Siebenaler, + and Greg Smith (Check Point Software Technologies). + +7. Contact Information + + David Newman + Data Communications magazine + 3 Park Ave. + 31st Floor + New York, NY 10016 + USA + + Phone: 212-592-8256 + Fax: 212-592-8265 + EMail: dnewman@data.com + + + + + + + + + +Newman Informational [Page 25] + +RFC 2647 Firewall Performance Terminology August 1999 + + +8. Full Copyright Statement + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved. + + This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to + others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it + or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published + and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any + kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are + included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this + document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing + the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other + Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of + developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for + copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be + followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than + English. + + The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be + revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. + + This document and the information contained herein is provided on an + "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING + TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING + BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION + HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +Acknowledgement + + Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the + Internet Society. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Newman Informational [Page 26] + |