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authorThomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100
committerThomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100
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+Network Working Group W. Marshall, Ed.
+Request for Comments: 3313 AT&T
+Category: Informational January 2003
+
+
+ Private Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Extensions
+ for Media Authorization
+
+Status of this Memo
+
+ This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
+ not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
+ memo is unlimited.
+
+Copyright Notice
+
+ Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.
+
+Abstract
+
+ This document describes the need for Quality of Service (QoS) and
+ media authorization and defines a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
+ extension that can be used to integrate QoS admission control with
+ call signaling and help guard against denial of service attacks. The
+ use of this extension is only applicable in administrative domains,
+ or among federations of administrative domains with previously
+ agreed-upon policies, where both the SIP proxy authorizing the QoS,
+ and the policy control of the underlying network providing the QoS,
+ belong to that administrative domain or federation of domains.
+
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+Marshall, Ed. Informational [Page 1]
+
+RFC 3313 SIP Extensions for Media Authorization January 2003
+
+
+Table of Contents
+
+ 1. Scope of Applicability......................................... 2
+ 2. Conventions Used in this Document.............................. 3
+ 3. Background and Motivation...................................... 3
+ 4. Overview....................................................... 4
+ 5. Changes to SIP to Support Media Authorization.................. 4
+ 5.1 SIP Header Extension....................................... 5
+ 5.2 SIP Procedures............................................. 5
+ 5.2.1 User Agent Client (UAC)................................ 6
+ 5.2.2 User Agent Server (UAS)................................ 6
+ 5.2.3 Originating Proxy (OP)................................. 7
+ 5.2.4 Destination Proxy (DP)................................. 7
+ 6. Examples....................................................... 8
+ 6.1 Requesting Bandwidth via RSVP Messaging.................... 8
+ 6.1.1 User Agent Client Side................................. 8
+ 6.1.2 User Agent Server Side................................. 10
+ 7. Advantages of the Proposed Approach............................ 12
+ 8. Security Considerations........................................ 13
+ 9. IANA Considerations............................................ 13
+ 10. Notice Regarding Intellectual Property Rights................. 13
+ 11. Normative References.......................................... 14
+ 12. Informative References........................................ 14
+ 13. Contributors.................................................. 15
+ 14. Acknowledgments............................................... 15
+ 15. Editor's Address.............................................. 15
+ 16. Full Copyright Statement...................................... 16
+
+1. Scope of Applicability
+
+ This document defines a SIP extension that can be used to integrate
+ QoS admission control with call signaling and help guard against
+ denial of service attacks. The use of this extension is only
+ applicable in administrative domains, or among federations of
+ administrative domains with previously agreed-upon policies, where
+ both the SIP proxy authorizing the QoS, and the policy control of the
+ underlying network providing the QoS, belong to that administrative
+ domain or federation of domains. Furthermore, the mechanism is
+ generally incompatible with end-to-end encryption of message bodies
+ that describe media sessions.
+
+ This is in contrast with general Internet principles, which separate
+ data transport from applications. Thus, the solution described in
+ this document is not applicable to the Internet at large. Despite
+ these limitations, there are sufficiently useful specialized
+ deployments that meet the assumptions described above, and can accept
+ the limitations that result, to warrant informational publication of
+ this mechanism. An example deployment would be a closed network,
+
+
+
+Marshall, Ed. Informational [Page 2]
+
+RFC 3313 SIP Extensions for Media Authorization January 2003
+
+
+ which emulates a traditional circuit switched telephone network.
+ This document specifies a private header, facilitating use in these
+ specialized configurations.
+
+2. Conventions Used in this Document
+
+ The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
+ "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
+ document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [2].
+
+3. Background and Motivation
+
+ Current IP telephony systems assume a perfect world in which there is
+ either an unlimited amount of bandwidth, or network layer Quality of
+ Service (QoS) is provided without any kind of policy control.
+ However, the reality is that end-to-end bandwidth is not unlimited
+ and uncontrolled access to QoS, in general, is unlikely. The primary
+ reason for this is that QoS provides preferential treatment of one
+ flow, at the expense of another. Consequently, it is important to
+ have policy control over whether a given flow should have access to
+ QoS. This will not only enable fairness in general, but can also
+ prevent denial of service attacks.
+
+ In this document, we are concerned with providing QoS for media
+ streams established via the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [3].
+ We assume an architecture that integrates call signaling with media
+ authorization, as illustrated in the Figure below. The solid lines
+ (A and B) show interfaces, whereas the dotted line (C) illustrates
+ the QoS enabled media flow:
+
+ +---------+
+ | Proxy |
+ +--------->| |
+ | +---------+
+ | ^
+ A)| B) |
+ | { }
+ | |
+ | v
+ v +------+
+ +------+ C) | Edge |
+ | UA |........|router|......
+ +------+ +------+
+
+
+ Figure 1 - Basic Architecture
+
+
+
+
+
+Marshall, Ed. Informational [Page 3]
+
+RFC 3313 SIP Extensions for Media Authorization January 2003
+
+
+ In this architecture, we assume a SIP UA connected to a QoS enabled
+ network with an edge router acting as a Policy Enforcement Point
+ (PEP) [6]. We further assume that a SIP UA that wishes to obtain QoS
+ initiates sessions through a proxy which can interface with the QoS
+ policy control for the data network being used. We will refer to
+ such a proxy as a QoS enabled proxy. We assume that the SIP UA needs
+ to present an authorization token to the network in order to obtain
+ Quality of Service (C). The SIP UA obtains this authorization token
+ via SIP (A) from the QoS enabled proxy by means of an extension SIP
+ header, defined in this document. The proxy, in turn, communicates
+ either directly with the edge router or with a Policy Decision Point
+ (PDP - not shown) [6] in order to obtain a suitable authorization
+ token for the UA.
+
+ Examples of access data networks, where such a QoS enabled proxy
+ could be used, include DOCSIS based cable networks and 3rd generation
+ (3G) wireless networks.
+
+4. Overview
+
+ A session that needs to obtain QoS for the media streams in
+ accordance with our basic architecture described above goes through
+ the following steps.
+
+ The SIP UA sends an INVITE to the QoS enabled proxy, which for each
+ resulting dialog includes one or more media authorization tokens in
+ all unreliable provisional responses (except 100), the first reliable
+ 1xx or 2xx response, and all retransmissions of that reliable
+ response for the dialog. When the UA requests QoS, it includes the
+ media authorization tokens with the resource reservation.
+
+ A SIP UA may also receive an INVITE from its QoS enabled proxy which
+ includes one or more media authorization tokens. In that case, when
+ the UA requests QoS, it includes the media authorization tokens with
+ the resource reservation. The resource reservation mechanism is not
+ part of SIP and is not described within the scope of this document.
+
+5. Changes to SIP to Support Media Authorization
+
+ This document defines a private SIP header extension to support a
+ media authorization scheme. In this architecture, a QoS enabled SIP
+ proxy supplies the UA with one or more authorization tokens which are
+ to be used in QoS requests. The extension defined allows network QoS
+ resources to be authorized by the QoS enabled SIP proxy.
+
+
+
+
+
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+Marshall, Ed. Informational [Page 4]
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+RFC 3313 SIP Extensions for Media Authorization January 2003
+
+
+5.1 SIP Header Extension
+
+ A new P-Media-Authorization general header field is defined. The P-
+ Media-Authorization header field contains one or more media
+ authorization tokens which are to be included in subsequent resource
+ reservations for the media flows associated with the session, that
+ is, passed to an independent resource reservation mechanism, which is
+ not specified here. The media authorization tokens are used for
+ authorizing QoS for the media stream(s). The P-Media-Authorization
+ header field is described by the following ABNF [4]:
+
+ P-Media-Authorization = "P-Media-Authorization" HCOLON
+ P-Media-Authorization-Token
+ *(COMMA P-Media-Authorization-Token)
+
+ P-Media-Authorization-Token = 1*HEXDIG
+
+ Table 1 below is an extension of tables 2 and 3 in [3] for the new
+ header field defined here. For informational purposes, this table
+ also includes relevant entries for standards track extension methods
+ published at the time this document was published. The INFO, PRACK,
+ UPDATE, and SUBSCRIBE and NOTIFY methods are defined respectively in
+ [11], [9], [12], and [10].
+
+ Where proxy ACK BYE CAN INV OPT REG
+ P-Media-Authorization R ad o - - o - -
+ P-Media-Authorization 2xx ad - - - o - -
+ P-Media-Authorization 101-199 ad - - - o - -
+
+ Where proxy INF PRA UPD SUB NOT
+ P-Media-Authorization R ad - o o - -
+ P-Media-Authorization 2xx ad - o o - -
+
+ Table 1: Summary of header fields.
+
+ The P-Media-Authorization header field can be used only in SIP
+ requests or responses that can carry a SIP offer or answer. This
+ naturally keeps the scope of this header field narrow.
+
+5.2 SIP Procedures
+
+ This section defines SIP [3] procedures for usage in media
+ authorization compatible systems, from the point of view of the
+ authorizing QoS.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Marshall, Ed. Informational [Page 5]
+
+RFC 3313 SIP Extensions for Media Authorization January 2003
+
+
+5.2.1 User Agent Client (UAC)
+
+ The initial SIP INVITE message, mid-call messages that result in
+ network QoS resource changes, and mid-call changes in call
+ destination should be authorized. These SIP messages are sent
+ through the QoS enabled proxies to receive this authorization. In
+ order to authorize QoS, the QoS enabled SIP proxy MAY need to inspect
+ message bodies that describe the media streams (e.g., SDP). Hence,
+ it is recommended (as may be appropriate within the applicability
+ scope in Section 1 of this document) that such message bodies not be
+ encrypted end-to-end.
+
+ The P-Media-Authorization-Token, which is contained in the P-Media-
+ Authorization header, is included for each dialog in all unreliable
+ provisional responses (except 100), the first reliable 1xx or 2xx
+ response, and all retransmissions of that reliable response for the
+ dialog sent by the QoS enabled SIP proxy to the UAC.
+
+ The UAC should use all the P-Media-Authorization-Tokens from the most
+ recent request/response that contained the P-Media-Authorization
+ header when requesting QoS for the associated media stream(s). This
+ applies to both initial and subsequent refresh reservation messages
+ (for example, in an RSVP-based reservation system). A reservation
+ function within the UAC should convert each string of hex digits into
+ binary, and utilize each result as a Policy-Element, as defined in
+ RFC 2750 [5] (excluding Length, but including P-Type which is
+ included in each token). These Policy-Elements would typically
+ contain the authorizing entity and credentials, and be used in an
+ RSVP request for media data stream QoS resources.
+
+5.2.2 User Agent Server (UAS)
+
+ The User Agent Server receives the P-Media-Authorization-Token in an
+ INVITE (or other) message from the QoS enabled SIP proxy. If the
+ response contains a message body that describes media streams for
+ which the UA desires QoS, it is recommended (as may be appropriate
+ within the applicability scope in Section 1 of this document) that
+ this message body not be encrypted end-to-end.
+
+ The UAS should use all the P-Media-Authorization-Tokens from the most
+ recent request/response that contained the P-Media-Authorization
+ header when requesting QoS for the associated media stream(s). This
+ applies both to initial and subsequent refresh reservation messages
+ (for example, in an RSVP-based reservation system). A reservation
+ function within the UAS should convert each string of hex digits into
+ binary, and utilize each result as a Policy-Element, as defined in
+ RFC 2750 [5] (excluding Length, but including P-Type which is
+ included in each token). These Policy-Elements would typically
+
+
+
+Marshall, Ed. Informational [Page 6]
+
+RFC 3313 SIP Extensions for Media Authorization January 2003
+
+
+ contain the authorizing entity and credentials, and be used in an
+ RSVP request for media data stream QoS resources.
+
+5.2.3 Originating Proxy (OP)
+
+ When the originating QoS enabled proxy (OP) receives an INVITE (or
+ other) message from the UAC, the proxy authenticates the caller, and
+ verifies that the caller is authorized to receive QoS.
+
+ In cooperation with an originating Policy Decision Point (PDP-o), the
+ OP obtains and/or generates one or more media authorization tokens.
+ These contain sufficient information for the UAC to get the
+ authorized QoS for the media streams. Each media authorization token
+ is formatted as a Policy-Element, as defined in RFC 2750 [5]
+ (excluding Length, but including P-Type which is included in each
+ token), and then converted to a string of hex digits to form a P-
+ Media-Authorization-Token. The proxy's resource management function
+ may inspect message bodies that describe the media streams (e.g.,
+ SDP), in both requests and responses in order to decide what QoS to
+ authorize.
+
+ For each dialog that results from the INVITE (or other) message
+ received from the UAC, the originating proxy must add a P-Media-
+ Authorization header with the P-Media-Authorization-Token in all
+ unreliable provisional responses (except 100), the first reliable 1xx
+ or 2xx response, and all retransmissions of that reliable response
+ the proxy sends to the UAC, if that response may result in network
+ QoS changes. A response with an SDP may result in such changes.
+
+5.2.4 Destination Proxy (DP)
+
+ The Destination QoS Enabled Proxy (DP) verifies that the called party
+ is authorized to receive QoS.
+
+ In cooperation with a terminating Policy Decision Point (PDP-t), the
+ DP obtains and/or generates a media authorization token that contains
+ sufficient information for the UAS to get the authorized QoS for the
+ media streams. The media authorization token is formatted as a
+ Policy-Element, as defined in RFC 2750 [5] (excluding Length, but
+ including P-Type which is included in each token), and then converted
+ to a string of hex digits to form a P-Media-Authorization-Token. The
+ proxy's resource management function may inspect message bodies that
+ describe the media streams (e.g., SDP), in both requests and
+ responses in order to decide what QoS to authorize.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Marshall, Ed. Informational [Page 7]
+
+RFC 3313 SIP Extensions for Media Authorization January 2003
+
+
+ The Destination Proxy must add the P-Media-Authorization header with
+ the P-Media-Authorization-Token in the INVITE (or other) request that
+ it sends to the UAS if that message may result in network QoS
+ changes. A message with an SDP body may result in such changes.
+
+6. Examples
+
+6.1 Requesting Bandwidth via RSVP Messaging
+
+ Below we provide an example of how the P-Media-Authorization header
+ field can be used in conjunction with the Resource Reservation
+ Protocol (RSVP) [7]. The example assumes that an offer arrives in
+ the initial INVITE and an answer arrives in a reliable provisional
+ response [9], which contains an SDP description of the media flow.
+
+6.1.1 User Agent Client Side
+
+ Figure 2 presents a high-level overview of a basic call flow with
+ media authorization from the viewpoint of the UAC. Some policy
+ interactions have been omitted for brevity.
+
+ When a user goes off-hook and dials a telephone number, the UAC
+ collects the dialed digits and sends the initial (1)INVITE message to
+ the originating SIP proxy.
+
+ The originating SIP proxy (OP) authenticates the user/UAC and
+ forwards the (2)INVITE message to the proper SIP proxy.
+
+ Assuming the call is not forwarded, the terminating end-point sends a
+ (3)18x response to the initial INVITE via OP. Included in this
+ response is an indication of the negotiated bandwidth requirement for
+ the connection (in the form of an SDP description [8]).
+
+ When OP receives the (3)18x, it has sufficient information regarding
+ the end-points, bandwidth and characteristics of the media exchange.
+ It initiates a Policy-Setup message to PDP-o, (4)AuthProfile.
+
+ The PDP-o stores the authorized media description in its local store,
+ generates an authorization token that points to this description, and
+ returns the authorization token to the OP, (5)AuthToken.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Marshall, Ed. Informational [Page 8]
+
+RFC 3313 SIP Extensions for Media Authorization January 2003
+
+
+ UAC ER-o PDP-o OP
+ |(1)INVITE | | | Client Authentication
+ |------------------------------------------->| and Call Authoriz.
+ | | | | (2)INVITE
+ | | | |-------------->
+ | | | | (3)18x
+ | | |(4)AuthProfile |<--------------
+ | | |<--------------|
+ | | |(5)AuthToken |
+ | | |-------------->| Auth. Token put into
+ | | | (6)18x | P-Media-Authorization
+ |<-------------------------------------------| header extension.
+ |---(7)PRACK-------------------------------->|
+ | |--(8)PRACK---->
+ | |<-(9)200 (PRACK)
+ |<--(10)200 (PRACK)--------------------------|
+ | | | |
+ |Copies the RSVP policy object |
+ |from the P-Media-Authorization |
+ |(11)RSVP-PATH | |
+ |----------->| (12)REQ | |
+ | |-------------->| Using the Auth-Token and Authorized
+ | | (13)DEC | Profile that is set by the SIP Proxy
+ | |<--------------| the PDP makes the decision
+ | | | |(14)RSVP-PATH
+ | |------------------------------------------------>
+ | | | |(15)RSVP-PATH
+ |<--------------------------------------------------------------
+ |Copies the RSVP policy object |
+ |from the P-Media-Authorization |
+ |(16)RSVP-RESV | |
+ |----------->| (17)REQ | |
+ | |-------------->| Using the Auth-Token and Authorized
+ | | (18)DEC | Profile that is set by the SIP Proxy
+ | |<--------------| the PDP makes the decision
+ | | | |(19)RSVP-RESV
+ | |--------------------------------------------------->
+ | | | |(20)RSVP-RESV
+ |<----------------------------------------------------------------
+ | | | |
+
+ Figure 2 - Media Authorization with RSVP (UAC)
+
+ The OP includes the authorization token in the P-Media-Authorization
+ header extension of the (6)18x message.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Marshall, Ed. Informational [Page 9]
+
+RFC 3313 SIP Extensions for Media Authorization January 2003
+
+
+ Upon receipt of the (6)18x message, the UAC stores the media
+ authorization token from the P-Media-Authorization header. Also, the
+ UAC acknowledges the 18x message by sending a (7)PRACK message, which
+ is responded to with (10) 200.
+
+ Before sending any media, the UAC requests QoS by sending an
+ (11)RSVP-PATH message, which includes the previously stored P-Media-
+ Authorization-Token as a Policy-Element.
+
+ ER-o, upon receipt of the (11)RSVP-PATH message, checks the
+ authorization through a PDP-o COPS message exchange, (12)REQ. PDP-o
+ checks the authorization using the stored authorized media
+ description that was linked to the authorization token it returned to
+ OP. If authorization is successful, PDP-o returns an "install"
+ Decision, (13)DEC.
+
+ ER-o checks the admissibility for the request, and if admission
+ succeeds, it forwards the (14)RSVP-PATH message.
+
+ Once UAC receives the (15)RSVP-PATH message from UAS, it sends the
+ (16)RSVP-RESV message to reserve the network resources.
+
+ ER-o, upon receiving the (16)RSVP-RESV message checks the
+ authorization through a PDP-o COPS message exchange, (17)REQ. PDP-o
+ checks the authorization using the stored authorized media
+ description that was linked to the authorization token it returned to
+ OP. If authorization is successful, PDP-o returns an "install"
+ Decision, (18)DEC.
+
+ ER-o checks the admissibility for the request, and if admission
+ succeeds, it forwards the (19)RSVP-RESV message.
+
+ Upon receiving the (20)RSVP-RESV message, network resources have been
+ reserved in both directions.
+
+6.1.2 User Agent Server Side
+
+ Figure 3 presents a high-level overview of a call flow with media
+ authorization from the viewpoint of the UAS. Some policy
+ interactions have been omitted for brevity.
+
+ Since the destination SIP proxy (DP) has sufficient information
+ regarding the endpoints, bandwidth, and characteristics of the media
+ exchange, it initiates a Policy-Setup message to the terminating
+ Policy Decision Point (PDP-t) on receipt of the (1)INVITE.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Marshall, Ed. Informational [Page 10]
+
+RFC 3313 SIP Extensions for Media Authorization January 2003
+
+
+ UAS ER-t PDP-t DP
+ | | | | (1)INVITE
+ | | | |<--------------
+ | | | | Proxy Authentication
+ | | | (2)AuthProfile| and Call Authoriz.
+ | | |<--------------|
+ | | | (3)AuthToken |
+ | | |-------------->| Auth. Token put into
+ | | | (4)INVITE | P-Media-Authorization
+ |<------------------------------------------| header extension
+ | (5)18x | | |
+ |------------------------------------------>| (6)18x
+ |Copies the RSVP policy object |-------------->
+ |from the P-Media-Authorization |
+ |(7)RSVP-PATH | |
+ |---------->| (8)REQ | |
+ | |-------------->| Using the Auth-Token and Authorized
+ | | (9)DEC | Profile that is set by the SIP Proxy
+ | |<--------------| the PDP makes the decision
+ | | | |(10)RSVP-PATH
+ | |-------------------------------------------------->
+ | | | |(11)RSVP-PATH
+ |<--------------------------------------------------------------
+ |Copies the RSVP policy object |
+ |from the P-Media-Authorization |
+ | (12)RSVP-RESV | |
+ |---------->| | |
+ | | (13)REQ | |
+ | |-------------->| Using the Auth-Token and Authorized
+ | | (14)DEC | Profile that is set by the SIP Proxy
+ | |<--------------| the PDP makes the decision
+ | | | |(15)RSVP-RESV
+ | |--------------------------------------------------->
+ | | | |(16)RSVP-RESV
+ |<---------------------------------------------------------------
+ | | | |<-(17)PRACK---------
+ |<--(18)PRACK ------------------------------|
+ |---(19)200 (PRACK) ----------------------->|
+ | | | |--(20)200 (PRACK)-->
+ | | | |
+
+ Figure 3 - Media Authorization with RSVP (UAS)
+
+ PDP-t stores the authorized media description in its local store,
+ generates an authorization token that points to this description, and
+ returns the authorization token to DP. The token is placed in the
+ (4)INVITE message and forwarded to the UAS.
+
+
+
+
+Marshall, Ed. Informational [Page 11]
+
+RFC 3313 SIP Extensions for Media Authorization January 2003
+
+
+ Assuming that the call is not forwarded, the UAS sends a (5)18x
+ response to the initial INVITE message, which is forwarded back to
+ UAC. At the same time, the UAS sends a (7)RSVP-PATH message which
+ includes the previously stored P-Media-Authorization-Token as a
+ Policy-Element.
+
+ ER-t, upon receiving the (7)RSVP-PATH message checks the
+ authorization through a PDP-t COPS message exchange. PDP-t checks
+ the authorization using the stored authorized media description that
+ was linked to the authorization token it returned to DP. If
+ authorization is successful, PDP-t returns an "install" Decision,
+ (9)DEC.
+
+ ER-t checks the admissibility for the request, and if admission
+ succeeds, it forwards the (10)RSVP-PATH message.
+
+ Once the UAS receives the (11)RSVP-PATH message, it sends the
+ (12)RSVP-RESV message to reserve the network resources.
+
+ ER-t, upon reception of the (12)RSVP-RESV message, checks the
+ authorization through a PDP-t COPS message exchange. PDP-t checks
+ the authorization using the stored authorized media description that
+ was linked to the authorization token that it returned to DP. If
+ authorization is successful, PDP-t returns an "install" Decision,
+ (14)DEC.
+
+ ER-t checks the admissibility for the request and if admission
+ succeeds, it forwards the (15)RSVP-RESV message.
+
+ Upon receiving the (16)RSVP-RESV message, network resources have been
+ reserved in both directions.
+
+ For completeness, we show the (17)PRACK message for the (5) 18x
+ response and the resulting (19) 200 response acknowledging the PRACK.
+
+7. Advantages of the Proposed Approach
+
+ The use of media authorization makes it possible to control the usage
+ of network resources. In turn, this makes IP Telephony more robust
+ against denial of service attacks and various kinds of service
+ frauds. By using the authorization capability, the number of flows,
+ and the amount of network resources reserved can be controlled,
+ thereby making the IP Telephony system dependable in the presence of
+ scarce resources.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Marshall, Ed. Informational [Page 12]
+
+RFC 3313 SIP Extensions for Media Authorization January 2003
+
+
+8. Security Considerations
+
+ In order to control access to QoS, a QoS enabled proxy should
+ authenticate the UA before providing it with a media authorization
+ token. Both the method and policy associated with such
+ authentication are outside the scope of this document, however it
+ could, for example, be done by using standard SIP authentication
+ mechanisms, as described in [3].
+
+ Media authorization tokens sent in the P-Media-Authorization header
+ from a QoS enabled proxy to a UA MUST be protected from eavesdropping
+ and tampering. This can, for example, be done through a mechanism
+ such as IPSec or TLS. However, this will only provide hop-by-hop
+ security. If there is one or more intermediaries (e.g., proxies),
+ between the UA and the QoS enabled proxy, these intermediaries will
+ have access to the P-Media-Authorization header field value, thereby
+ compromising confidentiality and integrity. This will enable both
+ theft-of-service and denial-of-service attacks against the UA.
+ Consequently, the P-Media-Authorization header field MUST NOT be
+ available to any untrusted intermediary in the clear or without
+ integrity protection. There is currently no mechanism defined in SIP
+ that would satisfy these requirements. Until such a mechanism
+ exists, proxies MUST NOT send P-Media-Authorization headers through
+ untrusted intermediaries, which might reveal or modify the contents
+ of this header. (Note that S/MIME-based encryption in SIP is not
+ available to proxy servers, as proxies are not allowed to add message
+ bodies.)
+
+ QoS enabled proxies may need to inspect message bodies describing
+ media streams (e.g., SDP). Consequently, such message bodies should
+ not be encrypted. In turn, this will prevent end-to-end
+ confidentiality of the said message bodies, which lowers the overall
+ security possible.
+
+9. IANA Considerations
+
+ This document defines a new private SIP header for media
+ authorization, "P-Media-Authorization". This header has been
+ registered by the IANA in the SIP header registry, using the RFC
+ number of this document as its reference.
+
+10. Notice Regarding Intellectual Property Rights
+
+ The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights claimed in
+ regard to some or all of the specification contained in this
+ document. For more information consult the online list of claimed
+ rights.
+
+
+
+
+Marshall, Ed. Informational [Page 13]
+
+RFC 3313 SIP Extensions for Media Authorization January 2003
+
+
+11. Normative References
+
+ [1] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3", BCP
+ 9, RFC 2026, October 1996.
+
+ [2] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
+ Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
+
+ [3] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A.,
+ Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M. and E. Schooler, "SIP:
+ Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002.
+
+ [4] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
+ Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997.
+
+ [5] Herzog, S., "RSVP Extensions for Policy Control", RFC 2750,
+ January 2000.
+
+12. Informative References
+
+ [6] Yavatkar, R., Pendarakis, D. and R. Guerin, "A Framework for
+ Policy-based Admission Control", RFC 2753, January 2000.
+
+ [7] Braden, R., Zhang, L., Berson, S., Herzog, S. and S. Jamin,
+ "Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP) -- Version 1 Functional
+ Specification", RFC 2205, September 1997.
+
+ [8] Handley, M. and V. Jacobson, "SDP: Session Description
+ Protocol", RFC 2327, April 1998.
+
+ [9] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "Reliability of Provisional
+ Responses in Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 3262, June
+ 2002.
+
+ [10] Roach, A. B., "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)-Specific Event
+ Notification", RFC 3265, June 2002.
+
+ [11] Donovan, S., "The SIP INFO Method", RFC 2976, October 2000.
+
+ [12] Rosenberg, J., "The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) UPDATE
+ Method", RFC 3311, September 2002.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Marshall, Ed. Informational [Page 14]
+
+RFC 3313 SIP Extensions for Media Authorization January 2003
+
+
+13. Contributors
+
+ The following people contributed significantly and were co-authors on
+ earlier versions of this document:
+
+ Bill Marshall (AT&T), K. K. Ramakrishnan (AT&T), Ed Miller
+ (Terayon), Glenn Russell (CableLabs), Burcak Beser (Juniper
+ Networks), Mike Mannette (3Com), Kurt Steinbrenner (3Com), Dave
+ Oran (Cisco), Flemming Andreasen (Cisco), John Pickens (Com21),
+ Poornima Lalwaney (Nokia), Jon Fellows (Copper Mountain Networks),
+ Doc Evans (Arris), and Keith Kelly (NetSpeak).
+
+14. Acknowledgments
+
+ The Distributed Call Signaling work in the PacketCable project is the
+ work of a large number of people, representing many different
+ companies. The contributors would like to recognize and thank the
+ following for their assistance: John Wheeler, Motorola; David
+ Boardman, Daniel Paul, Arris Interactive; Bill Blum, Jay Strater,
+ Jeff Ollis, Clive Holborow, Motorola; Doug Newlin, Guido Schuster,
+ Ikhlaq Sidhu, 3Com; Jiri Matousek, Bay Networks; Farzi Khazai,
+ Nortel; John Chapman, Bill Guckel, Michael Ramalho, Cisco; Chuck
+ Kalmanek, Doug Nortz, John Lawser, James Cheng, Tung-Hai Hsiao,
+ Partho Mishra, AT&T; Telcordia Technologies; and Lucent Cable
+ Communications. Dean Willis and Rohan Mahy provided valuable
+ feedback as well.
+
+15. Editor's Address
+
+ Bill Marshall
+ AT&T
+ Florham Park, NJ 07932
+
+ EMail: wtm@research.att.com
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Marshall, Ed. Informational [Page 15]
+
+RFC 3313 SIP Extensions for Media Authorization January 2003
+
+
+16. Full Copyright Statement
+
+ Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.
+
+ This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
+ others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
+ or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
+ and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
+ kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
+ included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
+ document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
+ the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
+ Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
+ developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
+ copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
+ followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
+ English.
+
+ The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
+ revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
+
+ This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
+ "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
+ TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
+ BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
+ HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+
+Acknowledgement
+
+ Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
+ Internet Society.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Marshall, Ed. Informational [Page 16]
+