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author | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
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committer | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
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tree | e3989f47a7994642eb325063d46e8f08ffa681dc /doc/rfc/rfc3411.txt | |
parent | ea76e11061bda059ae9f9ad130a9895cc85607db (diff) |
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diff --git a/doc/rfc/rfc3411.txt b/doc/rfc/rfc3411.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d8e2e11 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/rfc/rfc3411.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3587 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group D. Harrington +Request for Comments: 3411 Enterasys Networks +STD: 62 R. Presuhn +Obsoletes: 2571 BMC Software, Inc. +Category: Standards Track B. Wijnen + Lucent Technologies + December 2002 + + + An Architecture for Describing + Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks + +Status of this Memo + + This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the + Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for + improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet + Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state + and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved. + +Abstract + + This document describes an architecture for describing Simple Network + Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks. The architecture + is designed to be modular to allow the evolution of the SNMP protocol + standards over time. The major portions of the architecture are an + SNMP engine containing a Message Processing Subsystem, a Security + Subsystem and an Access Control Subsystem, and possibly multiple SNMP + applications which provide specific functional processing of + management data. This document obsoletes RFC 2571. + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction ................................................ 4 + 1.1. Overview .................................................. 4 + 1.2. SNMP ...................................................... 5 + 1.3. Goals of this Architecture ................................ 6 + 1.4. Security Requirements of this Architecture ................ 6 + 1.5. Design Decisions .......................................... 8 + 2. Documentation Overview ...................................... 10 + 2.1. Document Roadmap .......................................... 11 + 2.2. Applicability Statement ................................... 11 + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 1] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + + 2.3. Coexistence and Transition ................................ 11 + 2.4. Transport Mappings ........................................ 12 + 2.5. Message Processing ........................................ 12 + 2.6. Security .................................................. 12 + 2.7. Access Control ............................................ 13 + 2.8. Protocol Operations ....................................... 13 + 2.9. Applications .............................................. 14 + 2.10. Structure of Management Information ...................... 15 + 2.11. Textual Conventions ...................................... 15 + 2.12. Conformance Statements ................................... 15 + 2.13. Management Information Base Modules ...................... 15 + 2.13.1. SNMP Instrumentation MIBs .............................. 15 + 2.14. SNMP Framework Documents ................................. 15 + 3. Elements of the Architecture ................................ 16 + 3.1. The Naming of Entities .................................... 17 + 3.1.1. SNMP engine ............................................. 18 + 3.1.1.1. snmpEngineID .......................................... 18 + 3.1.1.2. Dispatcher ............................................ 18 + 3.1.1.3. Message Processing Subsystem .......................... 19 + 3.1.1.3.1. Message Processing Model ............................ 19 + 3.1.1.4. Security Subsystem .................................... 20 + 3.1.1.4.1. Security Model ...................................... 20 + 3.1.1.4.2. Security Protocol ................................... 20 + 3.1.2. Access Control Subsystem ................................ 21 + 3.1.2.1. Access Control Model .................................. 21 + 3.1.3. Applications ............................................ 21 + 3.1.3.1. SNMP Manager .......................................... 22 + 3.1.3.2. SNMP Agent ............................................ 23 + 3.2. The Naming of Identities .................................. 25 + 3.2.1. Principal ............................................... 25 + 3.2.2. securityName ............................................ 25 + 3.2.3. Model-dependent security ID ............................. 26 + 3.3. The Naming of Management Information ...................... 26 + 3.3.1. An SNMP Context ......................................... 28 + 3.3.2. contextEngineID ......................................... 28 + 3.3.3. contextName ............................................. 29 + 3.3.4. scopedPDU ............................................... 29 + 3.4. Other Constructs .......................................... 29 + 3.4.1. maxSizeResponseScopedPDU ................................ 29 + 3.4.2. Local Configuration Datastore ........................... 29 + 3.4.3. securityLevel ........................................... 29 + 4. Abstract Service Interfaces ................................. 30 + 4.1. Dispatcher Primitives ..................................... 30 + 4.1.1. Generate Outgoing Request or Notification ............... 31 + 4.1.2. Process Incoming Request or Notification PDU ............ 31 + 4.1.3. Generate Outgoing Response .............................. 32 + 4.1.4. Process Incoming Response PDU ........................... 32 + 4.1.5. Registering Responsibility for Handling SNMP PDUs ....... 32 + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 2] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + + 4.2. Message Processing Subsystem Primitives ................... 33 + 4.2.1. Prepare Outgoing SNMP Request or Notification Message ... 33 + 4.2.2. Prepare an Outgoing SNMP Response Message ............... 34 + 4.2.3. Prepare Data Elements from an Incoming SNMP Message ..... 35 + 4.3. Access Control Subsystem Primitives ....................... 35 + 4.4. Security Subsystem Primitives ............................. 36 + 4.4.1. Generate a Request or Notification Message .............. 36 + 4.4.2. Process Incoming Message ................................ 36 + 4.4.3. Generate a Response Message ............................. 37 + 4.5. Common Primitives ......................................... 37 + 4.5.1. Release State Reference Information ..................... 37 + 4.6. Scenario Diagrams ......................................... 38 + 4.6.1. Command Generator or Notification Originator ............ 38 + 4.6.2. Scenario Diagram for a Command Responder Application .... 39 + 5. Managed Object Definitions for SNMP Management Frameworks ... 40 + 6. IANA Considerations ......................................... 51 + 6.1. Security Models ........................................... 51 + 6.2. Message Processing Models ................................. 51 + 6.3. SnmpEngineID Formats ...................................... 52 + 7. Intellectual Property ....................................... 52 + 8. Acknowledgements ............................................ 52 + 9. Security Considerations ..................................... 54 + 10. References ................................................. 54 + 10.1. Normative References ..................................... 54 + 10.2. Informative References ................................... 56 + A. Guidelines for Model Designers .............................. 57 + A.1. Security Model Design Requirements ........................ 57 + A.1.1. Threats ................................................. 57 + A.1.2. Security Processing ..................................... 58 + A.1.3. Validate the security-stamp in a received message ....... 59 + A.1.4. Security MIBs ........................................... 59 + A.1.5. Cached Security Data .................................... 59 + A.2. Message Processing Model Design Requirements .............. 60 + A.2.1. Receiving an SNMP Message from the Network .............. 60 + A.2.2. Sending an SNMP Message to the Network .................. 60 + A.3. Application Design Requirements ........................... 61 + A.3.1. Applications that Initiate Messages ..................... 61 + A.3.2. Applications that Receive Responses ..................... 62 + A.3.3. Applications that Receive Asynchronous Messages ......... 62 + A.3.4. Applications that Send Responses ........................ 62 + A.4. Access Control Model Design Requirements .................. 63 + Editors' Addresses ............................................. 63 + Full Copyright Statement ....................................... 64 + + + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 3] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +1. Introduction + +1.1. Overview + + This document defines a vocabulary for describing SNMP Management + Frameworks, and an architecture for describing the major portions of + SNMP Management Frameworks. + + This document does not provide a general introduction to SNMP. Other + documents and books can provide a much better introduction to SNMP. + Nor does this document provide a history of SNMP. That also can be + found in books and other documents. + + Section 1 describes the purpose, goals, and design decisions of this + architecture. + + Section 2 describes various types of documents which define (elements + of) SNMP Frameworks, and how they fit into this architecture. It + also provides a minimal road map to the documents which have + previously defined SNMP frameworks. + + Section 3 details the vocabulary of this architecture and its pieces. + This section is important for understanding the remaining sections, + and for understanding documents which are written to fit within this + architecture. + + Section 4 describes the primitives used for the abstract service + interfaces between the various subsystems, models and applications + within this architecture. + + Section 5 defines a collection of managed objects used to instrument + SNMP entities within this architecture. + + Sections 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 are administrative in nature. + + Appendix A contains guidelines for designers of Models which are + expected to fit within this architecture. + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this + document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. + + + + + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 4] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +1.2. SNMP + + An SNMP management system contains: + + - several (potentially many) nodes, each with an SNMP entity + containing command responder and notification originator + applications, which have access to management instrumentation + (traditionally called agents); + + - at least one SNMP entity containing command generator and/or + notification receiver applications (traditionally called a + manager) and, + + - a management protocol, used to convey management information + between the SNMP entities. + + SNMP entities executing command generator and notification receiver + applications monitor and control managed elements. Managed elements + are devices such as hosts, routers, terminal servers, etc., which are + monitored and controlled via access to their management information. + + It is the purpose of this document to define an architecture which + can evolve to realize effective management in a variety of + configurations and environments. The architecture has been designed + to meet the needs of implementations of: + + - minimal SNMP entities with command responder and/or + notification originator applications (traditionally called SNMP + agents), + + - SNMP entities with proxy forwarder applications (traditionally + called SNMP proxy agents), + + - command line driven SNMP entities with command generator and/or + notification receiver applications (traditionally called SNMP + command line managers), + + - SNMP entities with command generator and/or notification + receiver, plus command responder and/or notification originator + applications (traditionally called SNMP mid-level managers or + dual-role entities), + + - SNMP entities with command generator and/or notification + receiver and possibly other types of applications for managing + a potentially very large number of managed nodes (traditionally + called (network) management stations). + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 5] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +1.3. Goals of this Architecture + + This architecture was driven by the following goals: + + - Use existing materials as much as possible. It is heavily + based on previous work, informally known as SNMPv2u and + SNMPv2*, based in turn on SNMPv2p. + + - Address the need for secure SET support, which is considered + the most important deficiency in SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c. + + - Make it possible to move portions of the architecture forward + in the standards track, even if consensus has not been reached + on all pieces. + + - Define an architecture that allows for longevity of the SNMP + Frameworks that have been and will be defined. + + - Keep SNMP as simple as possible. + + - Make it relatively inexpensive to deploy a minimal conforming + implementation. + + - Make it possible to upgrade portions of SNMP as new approaches + become available, without disrupting an entire SNMP framework. + + - Make it possible to support features required in large + networks, but make the expense of supporting a feature directly + related to the support of the feature. + +1.4. Security Requirements of this Architecture + + Several of the classical threats to network protocols are applicable + to the management problem and therefore would be applicable to any + Security Model used in an SNMP Management Framework. Other threats + are not applicable to the management problem. This section discusses + principal threats, secondary threats, and threats which are of lesser + importance. + + The principal threats against which any Security Model used within + this architecture SHOULD provide protection are: + + Modification of Information + The modification threat is the danger that some unauthorized + entity may alter in-transit SNMP messages generated on behalf + of an authorized principal in such a way as to effect + unauthorized management operations, including falsifying the + value of an object. + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 6] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + + Masquerade + The masquerade threat is the danger that management operations + not authorized for some principal may be attempted by assuming + the identity of another principal that has the appropriate + authorizations. + + Secondary threats against which any Security Model used within this + architecture SHOULD provide protection are: + + Message Stream Modification + The SNMP protocol is typically based upon a connectionless + transport service which may operate over any subnetwork + service. The re-ordering, delay or replay of messages can and + does occur through the natural operation of many such + subnetwork services. The message stream modification threat is + the danger that messages may be maliciously re-ordered, delayed + or replayed to an extent which is greater than can occur + through the natural operation of a subnetwork service, in order + to effect unauthorized management operations. + + Disclosure + The disclosure threat is the danger of eavesdropping on the + exchanges between SNMP engines. Protecting against this threat + may be required as a matter of local policy. + + There are at least two threats against which a Security Model within + this architecture need not protect, since they are deemed to be of + lesser importance in this context: + + Denial of Service + A Security Model need not attempt to address the broad range of + attacks by which service on behalf of authorized users is + denied. Indeed, such denial-of-service attacks are in many + cases indistinguishable from the type of network failures with + which any viable management protocol must cope as a matter of + course. + + Traffic Analysis + A Security Model need not attempt to address traffic analysis + attacks. Many traffic patterns are predictable - entities may + be managed on a regular basis by a relatively small number of + management stations - and therefore there is no significant + advantage afforded by protecting against traffic analysis. + + + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 7] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +1.5. Design Decisions + + Various design decisions were made in support of the goals of the + architecture and the security requirements: + + - Architecture + An architecture should be defined which identifies the + conceptual boundaries between the documents. Subsystems should + be defined which describe the abstract services provided by + specific portions of an SNMP framework. Abstract service + interfaces, as described by service primitives, define the + abstract boundaries between documents, and the abstract + services that are provided by the conceptual subsystems of an + SNMP framework. + + - Self-contained Documents + Elements of procedure plus the MIB objects which are needed for + processing for a specific portion of an SNMP framework should + be defined in the same document, and as much as possible, + should not be referenced in other documents. This allows + pieces to be designed and documented as independent and self- + contained parts, which is consistent with the general SNMP MIB + module approach. As portions of SNMP change over time, the + documents describing other portions of SNMP are not directly + impacted. This modularity allows, for example, Security + Models, authentication and privacy mechanisms, and message + formats to be upgraded and supplemented as the need arises. + The self-contained documents can move along the standards track + on different time-lines. + + This modularity of specification is not meant to be interpreted + as imposing any specific requirements on implementation. + + - Threats + The Security Models in the Security Subsystem SHOULD protect + against the principal and secondary threats: modification of + information, masquerade, message stream modification and + disclosure. They do not need to protect against denial of + service and traffic analysis. + + - Remote Configuration + The Security and Access Control Subsystems add a whole new set + of SNMP configuration parameters. The Security Subsystem also + requires frequent changes of secrets at the various SNMP + entities. To make this deployable in a large operational + environment, these SNMP parameters must be remotely + configurable. + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 8] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + + - Controlled Complexity + It is recognized that producers of simple managed devices want + to keep the resources used by SNMP to a minimum. At the same + time, there is a need for more complex configurations which can + spend more resources for SNMP and thus provide more + functionality. The design tries to keep the competing + requirements of these two environments in balance and allows + the more complex environments to logically extend the simple + environment. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 9] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +2. Documentation Overview + + The following figure shows the set of documents that fit within the + SNMP Architecture. + + +------------------------- Document Set ----------------------------+ + | | + | +----------+ +-----------------+ +----------------+ | + | | Document | | Applicability | | Coexistence | | + | | Roadmap | | Statement | | & Transition | | + | +----------+ +-----------------+ +----------------+ | + | | + | +---------------------------------------------------------------+ | + | | Message Handling | | + | | +----------------+ +-----------------+ +-----------------+ | | + | | | Transport | | Message | | Security | | | + | | | Mappings | | Processing and | | | | | + | | | | | Dispatcher | | | | | + | | +----------------+ +-----------------+ +-----------------+ | | + | +---------------------------------------------------------------+ | + | | + | +---------------------------------------------------------------+ | + | | PDU Handling | | + | | +----------------+ +-----------------+ +-----------------+ | | + | | | Protocol | | Applications | | Access | | | + | | | Operations | | | | Control | | | + | | +----------------+ +-----------------+ +-----------------+ | | + | +---------------------------------------------------------------+ | + | | + | +---------------------------------------------------------------+ | + | | Information Model | | + | | +--------------+ +--------------+ +---------------+ | | + | | | Structure of | | Textual | | Conformance | | | + | | | Management | | Conventions | | Statements | | | + | | | Information | | | | | | | + | | +--------------+ +--------------+ +---------------+ | | + | +---------------------------------------------------------------+ | + | | + | +---------------------------------------------------------------+ | + | | MIB Modules written in various formats, e.g.: | | + | | +----------------+ +----------------+ | | + | | | SMIv1 (STD 18) | | SMIv2 (STD 58) | | | + | | | format | | format | | | + | | +----------------+ +----------------+ | | + | +---------------------------------------------------------------+ | + | | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 10] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + + Each of these documents may be replaced or supplemented. This + Architecture document specifically describes how new documents fit + into the set of documents in the area of Message and PDU handling. + +2.1. Document Roadmap + + One or more documents may be written to describe how sets of + documents taken together form specific Frameworks. The configuration + of document sets might change over time, so the "road map" should be + maintained in a document separate from the standards documents + themselves. + + An example of such a roadmap is "Introduction and Applicability + Statements for the Internet-Standard Management Framework" [RFC3410]. + +2.2. Applicability Statement + + SNMP is used in networks that vary widely in size and complexity, by + organizations that vary widely in their requirements of management. + Some models will be designed to address specific problems of + management, such as message security. + + One or more documents may be written to describe the environments to + which certain versions of SNMP or models within SNMP would be + appropriately applied, and those to which a given model might be + inappropriately applied. + +2.3. Coexistence and Transition + + The purpose of an evolutionary architecture is to permit new models + to replace or supplement existing models. The interactions between + models could result in incompatibilities, security "holes", and other + undesirable effects. + + The purpose of Coexistence documents is to detail recognized + anomalies and to describe required and recommended behaviors for + resolving the interactions between models within the architecture. + + Coexistence documents may be prepared separately from model + definition documents, to describe and resolve interaction anomalies + between a model definition and one or more other model definitions. + + Additionally, recommendations for transitions between models may also + be described, either in a coexistence document or in a separate + document. + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 11] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + + One such coexistence document is [RFC2576], "Coexistence between + Version 1, Version 2, and Version 3 of the Internet-Standard Network + Management Framework". + +2.4. Transport Mappings + + SNMP messages are sent over various transports. It is the purpose of + Transport Mapping documents to define how the mapping between SNMP + and the transport is done. + +2.5. Message Processing + + A Message Processing Model document defines a message format, which + is typically identified by a version field in an SNMP message header. + The document may also define a MIB module for use in message + processing and for instrumentation of version-specific interactions. + + An SNMP engine includes one or more Message Processing Models, and + thus may support sending and receiving multiple versions of SNMP + messages. + +2.6. Security + + Some environments require secure protocol interactions. Security is + normally applied at two different stages: + + - in the transmission/receipt of messages, and + + - in the processing of the contents of messages. + + For purposes of this document, "security" refers to message-level + security; "access control" refers to the security applied to protocol + operations. + + Authentication, encryption, and timeliness checking are common + functions of message level security. + + A security document describes a Security Model, the threats against + which the model protects, the goals of the Security Model, the + protocols which it uses to meet those goals, and it may define a MIB + module to describe the data used during processing, and to allow the + remote configuration of message-level security parameters, such as + keys. + + An SNMP engine may support multiple Security Models concurrently. + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 12] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +2.7. Access Control + + During processing, it may be required to control access to managed + objects for operations. + + An Access Control Model defines mechanisms to determine whether + access to a managed object should be allowed. An Access Control + Model may define a MIB module used during processing and to allow the + remote configuration of access control policies. + +2.8. Protocol Operations + + SNMP messages encapsulate an SNMP Protocol Data Unit (PDU). SNMP + PDUs define the operations performed by the receiving SNMP engine. + It is the purpose of a Protocol Operations document to define the + operations of the protocol with respect to the processing of the + PDUs. Every PDU belongs to one or more of the PDU classes defined + below: + + 1) Read Class: + + The Read Class contains protocol operations that retrieve + management information. For example, [RFC3416] defines the + following protocol operations for the Read Class: GetRequest- + PDU, GetNextRequest-PDU, and GetBulkRequest-PDU. + + 2) Write Class: + + The Write Class contains protocol operations which attempt to + modify management information. For example, [RFC3416] defines + the following protocol operation for the Write Class: + SetRequest-PDU. + + 3) Response Class: + + The Response Class contains protocol operations which are sent + in response to a previous request. For example, [RFC3416] + defines the following for the Response Class: Response-PDU, + Report-PDU. + + 4) Notification Class: + + The Notification Class contains protocol operations which send + a notification to a notification receiver application. For + example, [RFC3416] defines the following operations for the + Notification Class: Trapv2-PDU, InformRequest-PDU. + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 13] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + + 5) Internal Class: + + The Internal Class contains protocol operations which are + exchanged internally between SNMP engines. For example, + [RFC3416] defines the following operation for the Internal + Class: Report-PDU. + + The preceding five classifications are based on the functional + properties of a PDU. It is also useful to classify PDUs based on + whether a response is expected: + + 6) Confirmed Class: + + The Confirmed Class contains all protocol operations which + cause the receiving SNMP engine to send back a response. For + example, [RFC3416] defines the following operations for the + Confirmed Class: GetRequest-PDU, GetNextRequest-PDU, + GetBulkRequest-PDU, SetRequest-PDU, and InformRequest-PDU. + + 7) Unconfirmed Class: + + The Unconfirmed Class contains all protocol operations which + are not acknowledged. For example, [RFC3416] defines the + following operations for the Unconfirmed Class: Report-PDU, + Trapv2-PDU, and GetResponse-PDU. + + An application document defines which Protocol Operations are + supported by the application. + +2.9. Applications + + An SNMP entity normally includes a number of applications. + Applications use the services of an SNMP engine to accomplish + specific tasks. They coordinate the processing of management + information operations, and may use SNMP messages to communicate with + other SNMP entities. + + An applications document describes the purpose of an application, the + services required of the associated SNMP engine, and the protocol + operations and informational model that the application uses to + perform management operations. + + An application document defines which set of documents are used to + specifically define the structure of management information, textual + conventions, conformance requirements, and operations supported by + the application. + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 14] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +2.10. Structure of Management Information + + Management information is viewed as a collection of managed objects, + residing in a virtual information store, termed the Management + Information Base (MIB). Collections of related objects are defined + in MIB modules. + + It is the purpose of a Structure of Management Information document + to establish the notation for defining objects, modules, and other + elements of managed information. + +2.11. Textual Conventions + + When designing a MIB module, it is often useful to define new types + similar to those defined in the SMI, but with more precise semantics, + or which have special semantics associated with them. These newly + defined types are termed textual conventions, and may be defined in + separate documents, or within a MIB module. + +2.12. Conformance Statements + + It may be useful to define the acceptable lower-bounds of + implementation, along with the actual level of implementation + achieved. It is the purpose of the Conformance Statements document + to define the notation used for these purposes. + +2.13. Management Information Base Modules + + MIB documents describe collections of managed objects which + instrument some aspect of a managed node. + +2.13.1. SNMP Instrumentation MIBs + + An SNMP MIB document may define a collection of managed objects which + instrument the SNMP protocol itself. In addition, MIB modules may be + defined within the documents which describe portions of the SNMP + architecture, such as the documents for Message processing Models, + Security Models, etc. for the purpose of instrumenting those Models, + and for the purpose of allowing their remote configuration. + +2.14. SNMP Framework Documents + + This architecture is designed to allow an orderly evolution of + portions of SNMP Frameworks. + + Throughout the rest of this document, the term "subsystem" refers to + an abstract and incomplete specification of a portion of a Framework, + that is further refined by a model specification. + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 15] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + + A "model" describes a specific design of a subsystem, defining + additional constraints and rules for conformance to the model. A + model is sufficiently detailed to make it possible to implement the + specification. + + An "implementation" is an instantiation of a subsystem, conforming to + one or more specific models. + + SNMP version 1 (SNMPv1), is the original Internet-Standard Network + Management Framework, as described in RFCs 1155, 1157, and 1212. + + SNMP version 2 (SNMPv2), is the SNMPv2 Framework as derived from the + SNMPv1 Framework. It is described in STD 58, RFCs 2578, 2579, 2580, + and STD 62, RFCs 3416, 3417, and 3418. SNMPv2 has no message + definition. + + The Community-based SNMP version 2 (SNMPv2c), is an experimental SNMP + Framework which supplements the SNMPv2 Framework, as described in + [RFC1901]. It adds the SNMPv2c message format, which is similar to + the SNMPv1 message format. + + SNMP version 3 (SNMPv3), is an extensible SNMP Framework which + supplements the SNMPv2 Framework, by supporting the following: + + - a new SNMP message format, + + - Security for Messages, + + - Access Control, and + + - Remote configuration of SNMP parameters. + + Other SNMP Frameworks, i.e., other configurations of implemented + subsystems, are expected to also be consistent with this + architecture. + +3. Elements of the Architecture + + This section describes the various elements of the architecture and + how they are named. There are three kinds of naming: + + 1) the naming of entities, + + 2) the naming of identities, and + + 3) the naming of management information. + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 16] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + + This architecture also defines some names for other constructs that + are used in the documentation. + +3.1. The Naming of Entities + + An SNMP entity is an implementation of this architecture. Each such + SNMP entity consists of an SNMP engine and one or more associated + applications. + + The following figure shows details about an SNMP entity and the + components within it. + + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | SNMP entity | + | | + | +-------------------------------------------------------------+ | + | | SNMP engine (identified by snmpEngineID) | | + | | | | + | | +------------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | + | | | Dispatcher | | Message | | Security | | Access | | | + | | | | | Processing | | Subsystem | | Control | | | + | | | | | Subsystem | | | | Subsystem | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | + | | +------------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ | | + | | | | + | +-------------------------------------------------------------+ | + | | + | +-------------------------------------------------------------+ | + | | Application(s) | | + | | | | + | | +-------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ | | + | | | Command | | Notification | | Proxy | | | + | | | Generator | | Receiver | | Forwarder | | | + | | +-------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ | | + | | | | + | | +-------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ | | + | | | Command | | Notification | | Other | | | + | | | Responder | | Originator | | | | | + | | +-------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ | | + | | | | + | +-------------------------------------------------------------+ | + | | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 17] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +3.1.1. SNMP engine + + An SNMP engine provides services for sending and receiving messages, + authenticating and encrypting messages, and controlling access to + managed objects. There is a one-to-one association between an SNMP + engine and the SNMP entity which contains it. + + The engine contains: + + 1) a Dispatcher, + + 2) a Message Processing Subsystem, + + 3) a Security Subsystem, and + + 4) an Access Control Subsystem. + +3.1.1.1. snmpEngineID + + Within an administrative domain, an snmpEngineID is the unique and + unambiguous identifier of an SNMP engine. Since there is a one-to- + one association between SNMP engines and SNMP entities, it also + uniquely and unambiguously identifies the SNMP entity within that + administrative domain. Note that it is possible for SNMP entities in + different administrative domains to have the same value for + snmpEngineID. Federation of administrative domains may necessitate + assignment of new values. + +3.1.1.2. Dispatcher + + There is only one Dispatcher in an SNMP engine. It allows for + concurrent support of multiple versions of SNMP messages in the SNMP + engine. It does so by: + + - sending and receiving SNMP messages to/from the network, + + - determining the version of an SNMP message and interacting with + the corresponding Message Processing Model, + + - providing an abstract interface to SNMP applications for + delivery of a PDU to an application. + + - providing an abstract interface for SNMP applications that + allows them to send a PDU to a remote SNMP entity. + + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 18] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +3.1.1.3. Message Processing Subsystem + + The Message Processing Subsystem is responsible for preparing + messages for sending, and extracting data from received messages. + + The Message Processing Subsystem potentially contains multiple + Message Processing Models as shown in the next figure. + + * One or more Message Processing Models may be present. + + +------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | | + | Message Processing Subsystem | + | | + | +------------+ +------------+ +------------+ +------------+ | + | | * | | * | | * | | * | | + | | SNMPv3 | | SNMPv1 | | SNMPv2c | | Other | | + | | Message | | Message | | Message | | Message | | + | | Processing | | Processing | | Processing | | Processing | | + | | Model | | Model | | Model | | Model | | + | | | | | | | | | | + | +------------+ +------------+ +------------+ +------------+ | + | | + +------------------------------------------------------------------+ + +3.1.1.3.1. Message Processing Model + + Each Message Processing Model defines the format of a particular + version of an SNMP message and coordinates the preparation and + extraction of each such version-specific message format. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 19] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +3.1.1.4. Security Subsystem + + The Security Subsystem provides security services such as the + authentication and privacy of messages and potentially contains + multiple Security Models as shown in the following figure + + * One or more Security Models may be present. + + +------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | | + | Security Subsystem | + | | + | +----------------+ +-----------------+ +-------------------+ | + | | * | | * | | * | | + | | User-Based | | Other | | Other | | + | | Security | | Security | | Security | | + | | Model | | Model | | Model | | + | | | | | | | | + | +----------------+ +-----------------+ +-------------------+ | + | | + +------------------------------------------------------------------+ + +3.1.1.4.1. Security Model + + A Security Model specifies the threats against which it protects, the + goals of its services, and the security protocols used to provide + security services such as authentication and privacy. + +3.1.1.4.2. Security Protocol + + A Security Protocol specifies the mechanisms, procedures, and MIB + objects used to provide a security service such as authentication or + privacy. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 20] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +3.1.2. Access Control Subsystem + + The Access Control Subsystem provides authorization services by means + of one or more (*) Access Control Models. + + +------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | | + | Access Control Subsystem | + | | + | +---------------+ +-----------------+ +------------------+ | + | | * | | * | | * | | + | | View-Based | | Other | | Other | | + | | Access | | Access | | Access | | + | | Control | | Control | | Control | | + | | Model | | Model | | Model | | + | | | | | | | | + | +---------------+ +-----------------+ +------------------+ | + | | + +------------------------------------------------------------------+ + +3.1.2.1. Access Control Model + + An Access Control Model defines a particular access decision function + in order to support decisions regarding access rights. + +3.1.3. Applications + + There are several types of applications, including: + + - command generators, which monitor and manipulate management + data, + + - command responders, which provide access to management data, + + - notification originators, which initiate asynchronous messages, + + - notification receivers, which process asynchronous messages, + + and + + - proxy forwarders, which forward messages between entities. + + These applications make use of the services provided by the SNMP + engine. + + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 21] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +3.1.3.1. SNMP Manager + + An SNMP entity containing one or more command generator and/or + notification receiver applications (along with their associated SNMP + engine) has traditionally been called an SNMP manager. + + (traditional SNMP manager) + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | +--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ SNMP entity | + | | NOTIFICATION | | NOTIFICATION | | COMMAND | | + | | ORIGINATOR | | RECEIVER | | GENERATOR | | + | | applications | | applications | | applications | | + | +--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ | + | ^ ^ ^ | + | | | | | + | v v v | + | +-------+--------+-----------------+ | + | ^ | + | | +---------------------+ +----------------+ | + | | | Message Processing | | Security | | + | Dispatcher v | Subsystem | | Subsystem | | + | +-------------------+ | +------------+ | | | | + | | PDU Dispatcher | | +->| v1MP * |<--->| +------------+ | | + | | | | | +------------+ | | | Other | | | + | | | | | +------------+ | | | Security | | | + | | | | +->| v2cMP * |<--->| | Model | | | + | | Message | | | +------------+ | | +------------+ | | + | | Dispatcher <--------->+ | | | | + | | | | | +------------+ | | +------------+ | | + | | | | +->| v3MP * |<--->| | User-based | | | + | | Transport | | | +------------+ | | | Security | | | + | | Mapping | | | +------------+ | | | Model | | | + | | (e.g., RFC 3417) | | +->| otherMP * |<--->| +------------+ | | + | +-------------------+ | +------------+ | | | | + | ^ +---------------------+ +----------------+ | + | | | + | v | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + +-----+ +-----+ +-------+ + | UDP | | IPX | . . . | other | + +-----+ +-----+ +-------+ + ^ ^ ^ + | | | * One or more models may be present. + v v v + +------------------------------+ + | Network | + +------------------------------+ + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 22] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +3.1.3.2. SNMP Agent + + An SNMP entity containing one or more command responder and/or + notification originator applications (along with their associated + SNMP engine) has traditionally been called an SNMP agent. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 23] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + + * One or more models may be present. + + +------------------------------+ + | Network | + +------------------------------+ + ^ ^ ^ + | | | + v v v + +-----+ +-----+ +-------+ + | UDP | | IPX | . . . | other | + +-----+ +-----+ +-------+ (traditional SNMP agent) + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | ^ | + | | +---------------------+ +----------------+ | + | | | Message Processing | | Security | | + | Dispatcher v | Subsystem | | Subsystem | | + | +-------------------+ | +------------+ | | | | + | | Transport | | +->| v1MP * |<--->| +------------+ | | + | | Mapping | | | +------------+ | | | Other | | | + | | (e.g., RFC 3417) | | | +------------+ | | | Security | | | + | | | | +->| v2cMP * |<--->| | Model | | | + | | Message | | | +------------+ | | +------------+ | | + | | Dispatcher <--------->| +------------+ | | +------------+ | | + | | | | +->| v3MP * |<--->| | User-based | | | + | | | | | +------------+ | | | Security | | | + | | PDU Dispatcher | | | +------------+ | | | Model | | | + | +-------------------+ | +->| otherMP * |<--->| +------------+ | | + | ^ | +------------+ | | | | + | | +---------------------+ +----------------+ | + | v | + | +-------+-------------------------+---------------+ | + | ^ ^ ^ | + | | | | | + | v v v | + | +-------------+ +---------+ +--------------+ +-------------+ | + | | COMMAND | | ACCESS | | NOTIFICATION | | PROXY | | + | | RESPONDER |<->| CONTROL |<->| ORIGINATOR | | FORWARDER | | + | | application | | | | applications | | application | | + | +-------------+ +---------+ +--------------+ +-------------+ | + | ^ ^ | + | | | | + | v v | + | +----------------------------------------------+ | + | | MIB instrumentation | SNMP entity | + +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 24] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +3.2. The Naming of Identities + + principal + ^ + | + | + +----------------------------|-------------+ + | SNMP engine v | + | +--------------+ | + | | | | + | +-----------------| securityName |---+ | + | | Security Model | | | | + | | +--------------+ | | + | | ^ | | + | | | | | + | | v | | + | | +------------------------------+ | | + | | | | | | + | | | Model | | | + | | | Dependent | | | + | | | Security ID | | | + | | | | | | + | | +------------------------------+ | | + | | ^ | | + | | | | | + | +-------------------------|----------+ | + | | | + | | | + +----------------------------|-------------+ + | + v + network + +3.2.1. Principal + + A principal is the "who" on whose behalf services are provided or + processing takes place. + + A principal can be, among other things, an individual acting in a + particular role; a set of individuals, with each acting in a + particular role; an application or a set of applications; and + combinations thereof. + +3.2.2. securityName + + A securityName is a human readable string representing a principal. + It has a model-independent format, and can be used outside a + particular Security Model. + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 25] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +3.2.3. Model-dependent security ID + + A model-dependent security ID is the model-specific representation of + a securityName within a particular Security Model. + + Model-dependent security IDs may or may not be human readable, and + have a model-dependent syntax. Examples include community names, and + user names. + + The transformation of model-dependent security IDs into securityNames + and vice versa is the responsibility of the relevant Security Model. + +3.3. The Naming of Management Information + + Management information resides at an SNMP entity where a Command + Responder Application has local access to potentially multiple + contexts. This application uses a contextEngineID equal to the + snmpEngineID of its associated SNMP engine. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 26] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + + +-----------------------------------------------------------------+ + | SNMP entity (identified by snmpEngineID, for example: | + | '800002b804616263'H (enterpise 696, string "abc") | + | | + | +------------------------------------------------------------+ | + | | SNMP engine (identified by snmpEngineID) | | + | | | | + | | +-------------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | + | | | Dispatcher | | Message | | Security | | Access | | | + | | | | | Processing | | Subsystem | | Control | | | + | | | | | Subsystem | | | | Subsystem | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | + | | +-------------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ | | + | | | | + | +------------------------------------------------------------+ | + | | + | +------------------------------------------------------------+ | + | | Command Responder Application | | + | | (contextEngineID, example: '800002b804616263'H) | | + | | | | + | | example contextNames: | | + | | | | + | | "bridge1" "bridge2" "" (default) | | + | | --------- --------- ------------ | | + | | | | | | | + | +------|------------------|-------------------|--------------+ | + | | | | | + | +------|------------------|-------------------|--------------+ | + | | MIB | instrumentation | | | | + | | +---v------------+ +---v------------+ +----v-----------+ | | + | | | context | | context | | context | | | + | | | | | | | | | | + | | | +------------+ | | +------------+ | | +------------+ | | | + | | | | bridge MIB | | | | bridge MIB | | | | some MIB | | | | + | | | +------------+ | | +------------+ | | +------------+ | | | + | | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | +------------+ | | | + | | | | | | | | other MIB | | | | + | | | | | | | +------------+ | | | + | | | | | | | | | | + +-----------------------------------------------------------------+ + + + + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 27] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +3.3.1. An SNMP Context + + An SNMP context, or just "context" for short, is a collection of + management information accessible by an SNMP entity. An item of + management information may exist in more than one context. An SNMP + entity potentially has access to many contexts. + + Typically, there are many instances of each managed object type + within a management domain. For simplicity, the method for + identifying instances specified by the MIB module does not allow each + instance to be distinguished amongst the set of all instances within + a management domain; rather, it allows each instance to be identified + only within some scope or "context", where there are multiple such + contexts within the management domain. Often, a context is a + physical device, or perhaps, a logical device, although a context can + also encompass multiple devices, or a subset of a single device, or + even a subset of multiple devices, but a context is always defined as + a subset of a single SNMP entity. Thus, in order to identify an + individual item of management information within the management + domain, its contextName and contextEngineID must be identified in + addition to its object type and its instance. + + For example, the managed object type ifDescr [RFC2863], is defined as + the description of a network interface. To identify the description + of device-X's first network interface, four pieces of information are + needed: the snmpEngineID of the SNMP entity which provides access to + the management information at device-X, the contextName (device-X), + the managed object type (ifDescr), and the instance ("1"). + + Each context has (at least) one unique identification within the + management domain. The same item of management information can exist + in multiple contexts. An item of management information may have + multiple unique identifications. This occurs when an item of + management information exists in multiple contexts, and this also + occurs when a context has multiple unique identifications. + + The combination of a contextEngineID and a contextName unambiguously + identifies a context within an administrative domain; note that there + may be multiple unique combinations of contextEngineID and + contextName that unambiguously identify the same context. + +3.3.2. contextEngineID + + Within an administrative domain, a contextEngineID uniquely + identifies an SNMP entity that may realize an instance of a context + with a particular contextName. + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 28] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +3.3.3. contextName + + A contextName is used to name a context. Each contextName MUST be + unique within an SNMP entity. + +3.3.4. scopedPDU + + A scopedPDU is a block of data containing a contextEngineID, a + contextName, and a PDU. + + The PDU is an SNMP Protocol Data Unit containing information named in + the context which is unambiguously identified within an + administrative domain by the combination of the contextEngineID and + the contextName. See, for example, RFC 3416 for more information + about SNMP PDUs. + +3.4. Other Constructs + +3.4.1. maxSizeResponseScopedPDU + + The maxSizeResponseScopedPDU is the maximum size of a scopedPDU that + a PDU's sender would be willing to accept. Note that the size of a + scopedPDU does not include the size of the SNMP message header. + +3.4.2. Local Configuration Datastore + + The subsystems, models, and applications within an SNMP entity may + need to retain their own sets of configuration information. + + Portions of the configuration information may be accessible as + managed objects. + + The collection of these sets of information is referred to as an + entity's Local Configuration Datastore (LCD). + +3.4.3. securityLevel + + This architecture recognizes three levels of security: + + - without authentication and without privacy (noAuthNoPriv) + + - with authentication but without privacy (authNoPriv) + + - with authentication and with privacy (authPriv) + + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 29] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + + These three values are ordered such that noAuthNoPriv is less than + authNoPriv and authNoPriv is less than authPriv. + + Every message has an associated securityLevel. All Subsystems + (Message Processing, Security, Access Control) and applications are + REQUIRED to either supply a value of securityLevel or to abide by the + supplied value of securityLevel while processing the message and its + contents. + +4. Abstract Service Interfaces + + Abstract service interfaces have been defined to describe the + conceptual interfaces between the various subsystems within an SNMP + entity. The abstract service interfaces are intended to help clarify + the externally observable behavior of SNMP entities, and are not + intended to constrain the structure or organization of + implementations in any way. Most specifically, they should not be + interpreted as APIs or as requirements statements for APIs. + + These abstract service interfaces are defined by a set of primitives + that define the services provided and the abstract data elements that + are to be passed when the services are invoked. This section lists + the primitives that have been defined for the various subsystems. + +4.1. Dispatcher Primitives + + The Dispatcher typically provides services to the SNMP applications + via its PDU Dispatcher. This section describes the primitives + provided by the PDU Dispatcher. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 30] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +4.1.1. Generate Outgoing Request or Notification + + The PDU Dispatcher provides the following primitive for an + application to send an SNMP Request or Notification to another SNMP + entity: + + statusInformation = -- sendPduHandle if success + -- errorIndication if failure + sendPdu( + IN transportDomain -- transport domain to be used + IN transportAddress -- transport address to be used + IN messageProcessingModel -- typically, SNMP version + IN securityModel -- Security Model to use + IN securityName -- on behalf of this principal + IN securityLevel -- Level of Security requested + IN contextEngineID -- data from/at this entity + IN contextName -- data from/in this context + IN pduVersion -- the version of the PDU + IN PDU -- SNMP Protocol Data Unit + IN expectResponse -- TRUE or FALSE + ) + +4.1.2. Process Incoming Request or Notification PDU + + The PDU Dispatcher provides the following primitive to pass an + incoming SNMP PDU to an application: + + processPdu( -- process Request/Notification PDU + IN messageProcessingModel -- typically, SNMP version + IN securityModel -- Security Model in use + IN securityName -- on behalf of this principal + IN securityLevel -- Level of Security + IN contextEngineID -- data from/at this SNMP entity + IN contextName -- data from/in this context + IN pduVersion -- the version of the PDU + IN PDU -- SNMP Protocol Data Unit + IN maxSizeResponseScopedPDU -- maximum size of the Response PDU + IN stateReference -- reference to state information + ) -- needed when sending a response + + + + + + + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 31] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +4.1.3. Generate Outgoing Response + + The PDU Dispatcher provides the following primitive for an + application to return an SNMP Response PDU to the PDU Dispatcher: + + result = -- SUCCESS or FAILURE + returnResponsePdu( + IN messageProcessingModel -- typically, SNMP version + IN securityModel -- Security Model in use + IN securityName -- on behalf of this principal + IN securityLevel -- same as on incoming request + IN contextEngineID -- data from/at this SNMP entity + IN contextName -- data from/in this context + IN pduVersion -- the version of the PDU + IN PDU -- SNMP Protocol Data Unit + IN maxSizeResponseScopedPDU -- maximum size sender can accept + IN stateReference -- reference to state information + -- as presented with the request + IN statusInformation -- success or errorIndication + ) -- error counter OID/value if error + +4.1.4. Process Incoming Response PDU + + The PDU Dispatcher provides the following primitive to pass an + incoming SNMP Response PDU to an application: + + processResponsePdu( -- process Response PDU + IN messageProcessingModel -- typically, SNMP version + IN securityModel -- Security Model in use + IN securityName -- on behalf of this principal + IN securityLevel -- Level of Security + IN contextEngineID -- data from/at this SNMP entity + IN contextName -- data from/in this context + IN pduVersion -- the version of the PDU + IN PDU -- SNMP Protocol Data Unit + IN statusInformation -- success or errorIndication + IN sendPduHandle -- handle from sendPdu + ) + +4.1.5. Registering Responsibility for Handling SNMP PDUs + + Applications can register/unregister responsibility for a specific + contextEngineID, for specific pduTypes, with the PDU Dispatcher + according to the following primitives. The list of particular + pduTypes that an application can register for is determined by the + Message Processing Model(s) supported by the SNMP entity that + contains the PDU Dispatcher. + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 32] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + + statusInformation = -- success or errorIndication + registerContextEngineID( + IN contextEngineID -- take responsibility for this one + IN pduType -- the pduType(s) to be registered + ) + + unregisterContextEngineID( + IN contextEngineID -- give up responsibility for this one + IN pduType -- the pduType(s) to be unregistered + ) + + Note that realizations of the registerContextEngineID and + unregisterContextEngineID abstract service interfaces may provide + implementation-specific ways for applications to register/deregister + responsibility for all possible values of the contextEngineID or + pduType parameters. + +4.2. Message Processing Subsystem Primitives + + The Dispatcher interacts with a Message Processing Model to process a + specific version of an SNMP Message. This section describes the + primitives provided by the Message Processing Subsystem. + +4.2.1. Prepare Outgoing SNMP Request or Notification Message + + The Message Processing Subsystem provides this service primitive for + preparing an outgoing SNMP Request or Notification Message: + + statusInformation = -- success or errorIndication + prepareOutgoingMessage( + IN transportDomain -- transport domain to be used + IN transportAddress -- transport address to be used + IN messageProcessingModel -- typically, SNMP version + IN securityModel -- Security Model to use + IN securityName -- on behalf of this principal + IN securityLevel -- Level of Security requested + IN contextEngineID -- data from/at this entity + IN contextName -- data from/in this context + IN pduVersion -- the version of the PDU + IN PDU -- SNMP Protocol Data Unit + IN expectResponse -- TRUE or FALSE + IN sendPduHandle -- the handle for matching + -- incoming responses + OUT destTransportDomain -- destination transport domain + OUT destTransportAddress -- destination transport address + OUT outgoingMessage -- the message to send + OUT outgoingMessageLength -- its length + ) + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 33] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +4.2.2. Prepare an Outgoing SNMP Response Message + + The Message Processing Subsystem provides this service primitive for + preparing an outgoing SNMP Response Message: + + result = -- SUCCESS or FAILURE + prepareResponseMessage( + IN messageProcessingModel -- typically, SNMP version + IN securityModel -- same as on incoming request + IN securityName -- same as on incoming request + IN securityLevel -- same as on incoming request + IN contextEngineID -- data from/at this SNMP entity + IN contextName -- data from/in this context + IN pduVersion -- the version of the PDU + IN PDU -- SNMP Protocol Data Unit + IN maxSizeResponseScopedPDU -- maximum size able to accept + IN stateReference -- reference to state information + -- as presented with the request + IN statusInformation -- success or errorIndication + -- error counter OID/value if error + OUT destTransportDomain -- destination transport domain + OUT destTransportAddress -- destination transport address + OUT outgoingMessage -- the message to send + OUT outgoingMessageLength -- its length + ) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 34] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +4.2.3. Prepare Data Elements from an Incoming SNMP Message + + The Message Processing Subsystem provides this service primitive for + preparing the abstract data elements from an incoming SNMP message: + + result = -- SUCCESS or errorIndication + prepareDataElements( + IN transportDomain -- origin transport domain + IN transportAddress -- origin transport address + IN wholeMsg -- as received from the network + IN wholeMsgLength -- as received from the network + OUT messageProcessingModel -- typically, SNMP version + OUT securityModel -- Security Model to use + OUT securityName -- on behalf of this principal + OUT securityLevel -- Level of Security requested + OUT contextEngineID -- data from/at this entity + OUT contextName -- data from/in this context + OUT pduVersion -- the version of the PDU + OUT PDU -- SNMP Protocol Data Unit + OUT pduType -- SNMP PDU type + OUT sendPduHandle -- handle for matched request + OUT maxSizeResponseScopedPDU -- maximum size sender can accept + OUT statusInformation -- success or errorIndication + -- error counter OID/value if error + OUT stateReference -- reference to state information + -- to be used for possible Response + ) + +4.3. Access Control Subsystem Primitives + + Applications are the typical clients of the service(s) of the Access + Control Subsystem. + + The following primitive is provided by the Access Control Subsystem + to check if access is allowed: + + statusInformation = -- success or errorIndication + isAccessAllowed( + IN securityModel -- Security Model in use + IN securityName -- principal who wants to access + IN securityLevel -- Level of Security + IN viewType -- read, write, or notify view + IN contextName -- context containing variableName + IN variableName -- OID for the managed object + ) + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 35] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +4.4. Security Subsystem Primitives + + The Message Processing Subsystem is the typical client of the + services of the Security Subsystem. + +4.4.1. Generate a Request or Notification Message + + The Security Subsystem provides the following primitive to generate a + Request or Notification message: + + statusInformation = + generateRequestMsg( + IN messageProcessingModel -- typically, SNMP version + IN globalData -- message header, admin data + IN maxMessageSize -- of the sending SNMP entity + IN securityModel -- for the outgoing message + IN securityEngineID -- authoritative SNMP entity + IN securityName -- on behalf of this principal + IN securityLevel -- Level of Security requested + IN scopedPDU -- message (plaintext) payload + OUT securityParameters -- filled in by Security Module + OUT wholeMsg -- complete generated message + OUT wholeMsgLength -- length of the generated message + ) + +4.4.2. Process Incoming Message + + The Security Subsystem provides the following primitive to process an + incoming message: + + statusInformation = -- errorIndication or success + -- error counter OID/value if error + processIncomingMsg( + IN messageProcessingModel -- typically, SNMP version + IN maxMessageSize -- of the sending SNMP entity + IN securityParameters -- for the received message + IN securityModel -- for the received message + IN securityLevel -- Level of Security + IN wholeMsg -- as received on the wire + IN wholeMsgLength -- length as received on the wire + OUT securityEngineID -- authoritative SNMP entity + OUT securityName -- identification of the principal + OUT scopedPDU, -- message (plaintext) payload + OUT maxSizeResponseScopedPDU -- maximum size sender can handle + OUT securityStateReference -- reference to security state + ) -- information, needed for response + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 36] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +4.4.3. Generate a Response Message + + The Security Subsystem provides the following primitive to generate a + Response message: + + statusInformation = + generateResponseMsg( + IN messageProcessingModel -- typically, SNMP version + IN globalData -- message header, admin data + IN maxMessageSize -- of the sending SNMP entity + IN securityModel -- for the outgoing message + IN securityEngineID -- authoritative SNMP entity + IN securityName -- on behalf of this principal + IN securityLevel -- for the outgoing message + IN scopedPDU -- message (plaintext) payload + IN securityStateReference -- reference to security state + -- information from original request + OUT securityParameters -- filled in by Security Module + OUT wholeMsg -- complete generated message + OUT wholeMsgLength -- length of the generated message + ) + +4.5. Common Primitives + + These primitive(s) are provided by multiple Subsystems. + +4.5.1. Release State Reference Information + + All Subsystems which pass stateReference information also provide a + primitive to release the memory that holds the referenced state + information: + + stateRelease( + IN stateReference -- handle of reference to be released + ) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 37] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +4.6. Scenario Diagrams + +4.6.1. Command Generator or Notification Originator + + This diagram shows how a Command Generator or Notification Originator + application requests that a PDU be sent, and how the response is + returned (asynchronously) to that application. + + Command Dispatcher Message Security + Generator | Processing Model + | | Model | + | sendPdu | | | + |------------------->| | | + | | prepareOutgoingMessage | | + : |----------------------->| | + : | | generateRequestMsg | + : | |-------------------->| + : | | | + : | |<--------------------| + : | | | + : |<-----------------------| | + : | | | + : |------------------+ | | + : | Send SNMP | | | + : | Request Message | | | + : | to Network | | | + : | v | | + : : : : : + : : : : : + : : : : : + : | | | | + : | Receive SNMP | | | + : | Response Message | | | + : | from Network | | | + : |<-----------------+ | | + : | | | + : | prepareDataElements | | + : |----------------------->| | + : | | processIncomingMsg | + : | |-------------------->| + : | | | + : | |<--------------------| + : | | | + : |<-----------------------| | + | processResponsePdu | | | + |<-------------------| | | + | | | | + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 38] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +4.6.2. Scenario Diagram for a Command Responder Application + + This diagram shows how a Command Responder or Notification Receiver + application registers for handling a pduType, how a PDU is dispatched + to the application after an SNMP message is received, and how the + Response is (asynchronously) send back to the network. + + Command Dispatcher Message Security + Responder | Processing Model + | | Model | + | | | | + | registerContextEngineID | | | + |------------------------>| | | + |<------------------------| | | | + | | Receive SNMP | | | + : | Message | | | + : | from Network | | | + : |<-------------+ | | + : | | | + : |prepareDataElements | | + : |------------------->| | + : | | processIncomingMsg | + : | |------------------->| + : | | | + : | |<-------------------| + : | | | + : |<-------------------| | + | processPdu | | | + |<------------------------| | | + | | | | + : : : : + : : : : + | returnResponsePdu | | | + |------------------------>| | | + : | prepareResponseMsg | | + : |------------------->| | + : | |generateResponseMsg | + : | |------------------->| + : | | | + : | |<-------------------| + : | | | + : |<-------------------| | + : | | | + : |--------------+ | | + : | Send SNMP | | | + : | Message | | | + : | to Network | | | + : | v | | + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 39] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +5. Managed Object Definitions for SNMP Management Frameworks + +SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN + +IMPORTS + MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE, + OBJECT-IDENTITY, + snmpModules FROM SNMPv2-SMI + TEXTUAL-CONVENTION FROM SNMPv2-TC + MODULE-COMPLIANCE, OBJECT-GROUP FROM SNMPv2-CONF; + +snmpFrameworkMIB MODULE-IDENTITY + LAST-UPDATED "200210140000Z" + ORGANIZATION "SNMPv3 Working Group" + CONTACT-INFO "WG-EMail: snmpv3@lists.tislabs.com + Subscribe: snmpv3-request@lists.tislabs.com + + Co-Chair: Russ Mundy + Network Associates Laboratories + postal: 15204 Omega Drive, Suite 300 + Rockville, MD 20850-4601 + USA + EMail: mundy@tislabs.com + phone: +1 301-947-7107 + + Co-Chair & + Co-editor: David Harrington + Enterasys Networks + postal: 35 Industrial Way + P. O. Box 5005 + Rochester, New Hampshire 03866-5005 + USA + EMail: dbh@enterasys.com + phone: +1 603-337-2614 + + Co-editor: Randy Presuhn + BMC Software, Inc. + postal: 2141 North First Street + San Jose, California 95131 + USA + EMail: randy_presuhn@bmc.com + phone: +1 408-546-1006 + + Co-editor: Bert Wijnen + Lucent Technologies + postal: Schagen 33 + 3461 GL Linschoten + Netherlands + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 40] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + + EMail: bwijnen@lucent.com + phone: +31 348-680-485 + " + DESCRIPTION "The SNMP Management Architecture MIB + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). This + version of this MIB module is part of RFC 3411; + see the RFC itself for full legal notices. + " + + REVISION "200210140000Z" -- 14 October 2002 + DESCRIPTION "Changes in this revision: + - Updated various administrative information. + - Corrected some typos. + - Corrected typo in description of SnmpEngineID + that led to range overlap for 127. + - Changed '255a' to '255t' in definition of + SnmpAdminString to align with current SMI. + - Reworded 'reserved' for value zero in + DESCRIPTION of SnmpSecurityModel. + - The algorithm for allocating security models + should give 256 per enterprise block, rather + than 255. + - The example engine ID of 'abcd' is not + legal. Replaced with '800002b804616263'H based + on example enterprise 696, string 'abc'. + - Added clarification that engineID should + persist across re-initializations. + This revision published as RFC 3411. + " + REVISION "199901190000Z" -- 19 January 1999 + DESCRIPTION "Updated editors' addresses, fixed typos. + Published as RFC 2571. + " + REVISION "199711200000Z" -- 20 November 1997 + DESCRIPTION "The initial version, published in RFC 2271. + " + ::= { snmpModules 10 } + + -- Textual Conventions used in the SNMP Management Architecture *** + +SnmpEngineID ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION + STATUS current + DESCRIPTION "An SNMP engine's administratively-unique identifier. + Objects of this type are for identification, not for + addressing, even though it is possible that an + address may have been used in the generation of + a specific value. + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 41] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + + The value for this object may not be all zeros or + all 'ff'H or the empty (zero length) string. + + The initial value for this object may be configured + via an operator console entry or via an algorithmic + function. In the latter case, the following + example algorithm is recommended. + + In cases where there are multiple engines on the + same system, the use of this algorithm is NOT + appropriate, as it would result in all of those + engines ending up with the same ID value. + + 1) The very first bit is used to indicate how the + rest of the data is composed. + + 0 - as defined by enterprise using former methods + that existed before SNMPv3. See item 2 below. + + 1 - as defined by this architecture, see item 3 + below. + + Note that this allows existing uses of the + engineID (also known as AgentID [RFC1910]) to + co-exist with any new uses. + + 2) The snmpEngineID has a length of 12 octets. + + The first four octets are set to the binary + equivalent of the agent's SNMP management + private enterprise number as assigned by the + Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). + For example, if Acme Networks has been assigned + { enterprises 696 }, the first four octets would + be assigned '000002b8'H. + + The remaining eight octets are determined via + one or more enterprise-specific methods. Such + methods must be designed so as to maximize the + possibility that the value of this object will + be unique in the agent's administrative domain. + For example, it may be the IP address of the SNMP + entity, or the MAC address of one of the + interfaces, with each address suitably padded + with random octets. If multiple methods are + defined, then it is recommended that the first + octet indicate the method being used and the + remaining octets be a function of the method. + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 42] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + + 3) The length of the octet string varies. + + The first four octets are set to the binary + equivalent of the agent's SNMP management + private enterprise number as assigned by the + Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). + For example, if Acme Networks has been assigned + { enterprises 696 }, the first four octets would + be assigned '000002b8'H. + + The very first bit is set to 1. For example, the + above value for Acme Networks now changes to be + '800002b8'H. + + The fifth octet indicates how the rest (6th and + following octets) are formatted. The values for + the fifth octet are: + + 0 - reserved, unused. + + 1 - IPv4 address (4 octets) + lowest non-special IP address + + 2 - IPv6 address (16 octets) + lowest non-special IP address + + 3 - MAC address (6 octets) + lowest IEEE MAC address, canonical + order + + 4 - Text, administratively assigned + Maximum remaining length 27 + + 5 - Octets, administratively assigned + Maximum remaining length 27 + + 6-127 - reserved, unused + + 128-255 - as defined by the enterprise + Maximum remaining length 27 + " + SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE(5..32)) + + + + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 43] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +SnmpSecurityModel ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION + STATUS current + DESCRIPTION "An identifier that uniquely identifies a + Security Model of the Security Subsystem within + this SNMP Management Architecture. + + The values for securityModel are allocated as + follows: + + - The zero value does not identify any particular + security model. + + - Values between 1 and 255, inclusive, are reserved + for standards-track Security Models and are + managed by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority + (IANA). + - Values greater than 255 are allocated to + enterprise-specific Security Models. An + enterprise-specific securityModel value is defined + to be: + + enterpriseID * 256 + security model within + enterprise + + For example, the fourth Security Model defined by + the enterprise whose enterpriseID is 1 would be + 259. + + This scheme for allocation of securityModel + values allows for a maximum of 255 standards- + based Security Models, and for a maximum of + 256 Security Models per enterprise. + + It is believed that the assignment of new + securityModel values will be rare in practice + because the larger the number of simultaneously + utilized Security Models, the larger the + chance that interoperability will suffer. + Consequently, it is believed that such a range + will be sufficient. In the unlikely event that + the standards committee finds this number to be + insufficient over time, an enterprise number + can be allocated to obtain an additional 256 + possible values. + + Note that the most significant bit must be zero; + hence, there are 23 bits allocated for various + organizations to design and define non-standard + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 44] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + + securityModels. This limits the ability to + define new proprietary implementations of Security + Models to the first 8,388,608 enterprises. + + It is worthwhile to note that, in its encoded + form, the securityModel value will normally + require only a single byte since, in practice, + the leftmost bits will be zero for most messages + and sign extension is suppressed by the encoding + rules. + + As of this writing, there are several values + of securityModel defined for use with SNMP or + reserved for use with supporting MIB objects. + They are as follows: + + 0 reserved for 'any' + 1 reserved for SNMPv1 + 2 reserved for SNMPv2c + 3 User-Based Security Model (USM) + " + SYNTAX INTEGER(0 .. 2147483647) + + +SnmpMessageProcessingModel ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION + STATUS current + DESCRIPTION "An identifier that uniquely identifies a Message + Processing Model of the Message Processing + Subsystem within this SNMP Management Architecture. + + The values for messageProcessingModel are + allocated as follows: + + - Values between 0 and 255, inclusive, are + reserved for standards-track Message Processing + Models and are managed by the Internet Assigned + Numbers Authority (IANA). + + - Values greater than 255 are allocated to + enterprise-specific Message Processing Models. + An enterprise messageProcessingModel value is + defined to be: + + enterpriseID * 256 + + messageProcessingModel within enterprise + + For example, the fourth Message Processing Model + defined by the enterprise whose enterpriseID + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 45] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + + is 1 would be 259. + + This scheme for allocating messageProcessingModel + values allows for a maximum of 255 standards- + based Message Processing Models, and for a + maximum of 256 Message Processing Models per + enterprise. + + It is believed that the assignment of new + messageProcessingModel values will be rare + in practice because the larger the number of + simultaneously utilized Message Processing Models, + the larger the chance that interoperability + will suffer. It is believed that such a range + will be sufficient. In the unlikely event that + the standards committee finds this number to be + insufficient over time, an enterprise number + can be allocated to obtain an additional 256 + possible values. + + Note that the most significant bit must be zero; + hence, there are 23 bits allocated for various + organizations to design and define non-standard + messageProcessingModels. This limits the ability + to define new proprietary implementations of + Message Processing Models to the first 8,388,608 + enterprises. + + It is worthwhile to note that, in its encoded + form, the messageProcessingModel value will + normally require only a single byte since, in + practice, the leftmost bits will be zero for + most messages and sign extension is suppressed + by the encoding rules. + + As of this writing, there are several values of + messageProcessingModel defined for use with SNMP. + They are as follows: + + 0 reserved for SNMPv1 + 1 reserved for SNMPv2c + 2 reserved for SNMPv2u and SNMPv2* + 3 reserved for SNMPv3 + " + SYNTAX INTEGER(0 .. 2147483647) + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 46] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +SnmpSecurityLevel ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION + STATUS current + DESCRIPTION "A Level of Security at which SNMP messages can be + sent or with which operations are being processed; + in particular, one of: + + noAuthNoPriv - without authentication and + without privacy, + authNoPriv - with authentication but + without privacy, + authPriv - with authentication and + with privacy. + + These three values are ordered such that + noAuthNoPriv is less than authNoPriv and + authNoPriv is less than authPriv. + " + SYNTAX INTEGER { noAuthNoPriv(1), + authNoPriv(2), + authPriv(3) + } + +SnmpAdminString ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION + DISPLAY-HINT "255t" + STATUS current + DESCRIPTION "An octet string containing administrative + information, preferably in human-readable form. + + To facilitate internationalization, this + information is represented using the ISO/IEC + IS 10646-1 character set, encoded as an octet + string using the UTF-8 transformation format + described in [RFC2279]. + + Since additional code points are added by + amendments to the 10646 standard from time + to time, implementations must be prepared to + encounter any code point from 0x00000000 to + 0x7fffffff. Byte sequences that do not + correspond to the valid UTF-8 encoding of a + code point or are outside this range are + prohibited. + + The use of control codes should be avoided. + + When it is necessary to represent a newline, + the control code sequence CR LF should be used. + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 47] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + + The use of leading or trailing white space should + be avoided. + + For code points not directly supported by user + interface hardware or software, an alternative + means of entry and display, such as hexadecimal, + may be provided. + + For information encoded in 7-bit US-ASCII, + the UTF-8 encoding is identical to the + US-ASCII encoding. + + UTF-8 may require multiple bytes to represent a + single character / code point; thus the length + of this object in octets may be different from + the number of characters encoded. Similarly, + size constraints refer to the number of encoded + octets, not the number of characters represented + by an encoding. + + Note that when this TC is used for an object that + is used or envisioned to be used as an index, then + a SIZE restriction MUST be specified so that the + number of sub-identifiers for any object instance + does not exceed the limit of 128, as defined by + [RFC3416]. + + Note that the size of an SnmpAdminString object is + measured in octets, not characters. + " + SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE (0..255)) + + +-- Administrative assignments *************************************** + +snmpFrameworkAdmin + OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpFrameworkMIB 1 } +snmpFrameworkMIBObjects + OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpFrameworkMIB 2 } +snmpFrameworkMIBConformance + OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpFrameworkMIB 3 } + +-- the snmpEngine Group ******************************************** + +snmpEngine OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpFrameworkMIBObjects 1 } + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 48] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +snmpEngineID OBJECT-TYPE + SYNTAX SnmpEngineID + MAX-ACCESS read-only + STATUS current + DESCRIPTION "An SNMP engine's administratively-unique identifier. + + This information SHOULD be stored in non-volatile + storage so that it remains constant across + re-initializations of the SNMP engine. + " + ::= { snmpEngine 1 } + +snmpEngineBoots OBJECT-TYPE + SYNTAX INTEGER (1..2147483647) + MAX-ACCESS read-only + STATUS current + DESCRIPTION "The number of times that the SNMP engine has + (re-)initialized itself since snmpEngineID + was last configured. + " + ::= { snmpEngine 2 } + +snmpEngineTime OBJECT-TYPE + SYNTAX INTEGER (0..2147483647) + UNITS "seconds" + MAX-ACCESS read-only + STATUS current + DESCRIPTION "The number of seconds since the value of + the snmpEngineBoots object last changed. + When incrementing this object's value would + cause it to exceed its maximum, + snmpEngineBoots is incremented as if a + re-initialization had occurred, and this + object's value consequently reverts to zero. + " + ::= { snmpEngine 3 } + +snmpEngineMaxMessageSize OBJECT-TYPE + SYNTAX INTEGER (484..2147483647) + MAX-ACCESS read-only + STATUS current + DESCRIPTION "The maximum length in octets of an SNMP message + which this SNMP engine can send or receive and + process, determined as the minimum of the maximum + message size values supported among all of the + transports available to and supported by the engine. + " + ::= { snmpEngine 4 } + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 49] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +-- Registration Points for Authentication and Privacy Protocols ** + +snmpAuthProtocols OBJECT-IDENTITY + STATUS current + DESCRIPTION "Registration point for standards-track + authentication protocols used in SNMP Management + Frameworks. + " + ::= { snmpFrameworkAdmin 1 } + +snmpPrivProtocols OBJECT-IDENTITY + STATUS current + DESCRIPTION "Registration point for standards-track privacy + protocols used in SNMP Management Frameworks. + " + ::= { snmpFrameworkAdmin 2 } + +-- Conformance information ****************************************** + +snmpFrameworkMIBCompliances + OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {snmpFrameworkMIBConformance 1} +snmpFrameworkMIBGroups + OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {snmpFrameworkMIBConformance 2} + +-- compliance statements + +snmpFrameworkMIBCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE + STATUS current + DESCRIPTION "The compliance statement for SNMP engines which + implement the SNMP Management Framework MIB. + " + MODULE -- this module + MANDATORY-GROUPS { snmpEngineGroup } + + ::= { snmpFrameworkMIBCompliances 1 } + +-- units of conformance + +snmpEngineGroup OBJECT-GROUP + OBJECTS { + snmpEngineID, + snmpEngineBoots, + snmpEngineTime, + snmpEngineMaxMessageSize + } + STATUS current + DESCRIPTION "A collection of objects for identifying and + determining the configuration and current timeliness + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 50] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + + values of an SNMP engine. + " + ::= { snmpFrameworkMIBGroups 1 } + +END + +6. IANA Considerations + + This document defines three number spaces administered by IANA, one + for security models, another for message processing models, and a + third for SnmpEngineID formats. + +6.1. Security Models + + The SnmpSecurityModel TEXTUAL-CONVENTION values managed by IANA are + in the range from 0 to 255 inclusive, and are reserved for + standards-track Security Models. If this range should in the future + prove insufficient, an enterprise number can be allocated to obtain + an additional 256 possible values. + + As of this writing, there are several values of securityModel defined + for use with SNMP or reserved for use with supporting MIB objects. + They are as follows: + + 0 reserved for 'any' + 1 reserved for SNMPv1 + 2 reserved for SNMPv2c + 3 User-Based Security Model (USM) + +6.2. Message Processing Models + + The SnmpMessageProcessingModel TEXTUAL-CONVENTION values managed by + IANA are in the range 0 to 255, inclusive. Each value uniquely + identifies a standards-track Message Processing Model of the Message + Processing Subsystem within the SNMP Management Architecture. + + Should this range prove insufficient in the future, an enterprise + number may be obtained for the standards committee to get an + additional 256 possible values. + + As of this writing, there are several values of + messageProcessingModel defined for use with SNMP. They are as + follows: + + 0 reserved for SNMPv1 + 1 reserved for SNMPv2c + 2 reserved for SNMPv2u and SNMPv2* + 3 reserved for SNMPv3 + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 51] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +6.3. SnmpEngineID Formats + + The SnmpEngineID TEXTUAL-CONVENTION's fifth octet contains a format + identifier. The values managed by IANA are in the range 6 to 127, + inclusive. Each value uniquely identifies a standards-track + SnmpEngineID format. + +7. Intellectual Property + + The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any + intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to + pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in + this document or the extent to which any license under such rights + might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it + has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the + IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and + standards-related documentation can be found in RFC 2028. Copies of + claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of + licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to + obtain a general license or permission for the use of such + proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can + be obtained from the IETF Secretariat. + + The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any + copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary + rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice + this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive + Director. + +8. Acknowledgements + + This document is the result of the efforts of the SNMPv3 Working + Group. Some special thanks are in order to the following SNMPv3 WG + members: + + Harald Tveit Alvestrand (Maxware) + Dave Battle (SNMP Research, Inc.) + Alan Beard (Disney Worldwide Services) + Paul Berrevoets (SWI Systemware/Halcyon Inc.) + Martin Bjorklund (Ericsson) + Uri Blumenthal (IBM T.J. Watson Research Center) + Jeff Case (SNMP Research, Inc.) + John Curran (BBN) + Mike Daniele (Compaq Computer Corporation) + T. Max Devlin (Eltrax Systems) + John Flick (Hewlett Packard) + Rob Frye (MCI) + Wes Hardaker (U.C.Davis, Information Technology - D.C.A.S.) + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 52] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + + David Harrington (Cabletron Systems Inc.) + Lauren Heintz (BMC Software, Inc.) + N.C. Hien (IBM T.J. Watson Research Center) + Michael Kirkham (InterWorking Labs, Inc.) + Dave Levi (SNMP Research, Inc.) + Louis A Mamakos (UUNET Technologies Inc.) + Joe Marzot (Nortel Networks) + Paul Meyer (Secure Computing Corporation) + Keith McCloghrie (Cisco Systems) + Bob Moore (IBM) + Russ Mundy (TIS Labs at Network Associates) + Bob Natale (ACE*COMM Corporation) + Mike O'Dell (UUNET Technologies Inc.) + Dave Perkins (DeskTalk) + Peter Polkinghorne (Brunel University) + Randy Presuhn (BMC Software, Inc.) + David Reeder (TIS Labs at Network Associates) + David Reid (SNMP Research, Inc.) + Aleksey Romanov (Quality Quorum) + Shawn Routhier (Epilogue) + Juergen Schoenwaelder (TU Braunschweig) + Bob Stewart (Cisco Systems) + Mike Thatcher (Independent Consultant) + Bert Wijnen (IBM T.J. Watson Research Center) + + The document is based on recommendations of the IETF Security and + Administrative Framework Evolution for SNMP Advisory Team. Members + of that Advisory Team were: + + David Harrington (Cabletron Systems Inc.) + Jeff Johnson (Cisco Systems) + David Levi (SNMP Research Inc.) + John Linn (Openvision) + Russ Mundy (Trusted Information Systems) chair + Shawn Routhier (Epilogue) + Glenn Waters (Nortel) + Bert Wijnen (IBM T. J. Watson Research Center) + + As recommended by the Advisory Team and the SNMPv3 Working Group + Charter, the design incorporates as much as practical from previous + RFCs and drafts. As a result, special thanks are due to the authors + of previous designs known as SNMPv2u and SNMPv2*: + + Jeff Case (SNMP Research, Inc.) + David Harrington (Cabletron Systems Inc.) + David Levi (SNMP Research, Inc.) + Keith McCloghrie (Cisco Systems) + Brian O'Keefe (Hewlett Packard) + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 53] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + + Marshall T. Rose (Dover Beach Consulting) + Jon Saperia (BGS Systems Inc.) + Steve Waldbusser (International Network Services) + Glenn W. Waters (Bell-Northern Research Ltd.) + +9. Security Considerations + + This document describes how an implementation can include a Security + Model to protect management messages and an Access Control Model to + control access to management information. + + The level of security provided is determined by the specific Security + Model implementation(s) and the specific Access Control Model + implementation(s) used. + + Applications have access to data which is not secured. Applications + SHOULD take reasonable steps to protect the data from disclosure. + + It is the responsibility of the purchaser of an implementation to + ensure that: + + 1) an implementation complies with the rules defined by this + architecture, + + 2) the Security and Access Control Models utilized satisfy the + security and access control needs of the organization, + + 3) the implementations of the Models and Applications comply with + the model and application specifications, + + 4) and the implementation protects configuration secrets from + inadvertent disclosure. + + This document also contains a MIB definition module. None of the + objects defined is writable, and the information they represent is + not deemed to be particularly sensitive. However, if they are deemed + sensitive in a particular environment, access to them should be + restricted through the use of appropriately configured Security and + Access Control models. + +10. References + +10.1. Normative References + + [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 54] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + + [RFC2279] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO + 10646", RFC 2279, January 1998. + + [RFC2578] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J., + Rose, M. and S. Waldbusser, "Structure of Management + Information Version 2 (SMIv2)", STD 58, RFC 2578, April + 1999. + + [RFC2579] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J., + Rose, M. and S. Waldbusser, "Textual Conventions for + SMIv2", STD 58, RFC 2579, April 1999. + + [RFC2580] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J., + Rose, M. and S. Waldbusser, "Conformance Statements for + SMIv2", STD 58, RFC 2580, April 1999. + + [RFC3412] Case, J., Harrington, D., Presuhn, R. and B. Wijnen, + "Message Processing and Dispatching for the Simple + Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62, RFC 3412, + December 2002. + + [RFC3413] Levi, D., Meyer, P. and B. Stewart, "Simple Network + Management Protocol (SNMP) Applications", STD 62, RFC + 3413, December 2002. + + [RFC3414] Blumenthal, U. and B. Wijnen, "User-Based Security Model + (USM) for Version 3 of the Simple Network Management + Protocol (SNMPv3)", STD 62, RFC 3414, December 2002. + + [RFC3415] Wijnen, B., Presuhn, R. and K. McCloghrie, "View-based + Access Control Model (VACM) for the Simple Network + Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62, RFC 3415, December + 2002. + + [RFC3416] Presuhn, R., Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M. and S. + Waldbusser, "Protocol Operations for the Simple Network + Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62, RFC 3416, December + 2002. + + [RFC3417] Presuhn, R., Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M. and S. + Waldbusser, "Transport Mappings for the Simple Network + Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62, RFC 3417, December + 2002. + + [RFC3418] Presuhn, R., Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M. and S. + Waldbusser, "Management Information Base (MIB) for the + Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62, RFC + 3418, December 2002. + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 55] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +10.2. Informative References + + [RFC1155] Rose, M. and K. McCloghrie, "Structure and Identification + of Management Information for TCP/IP-based internets", + STD 16, RFC 1155, May 1990. + + [RFC1157] Case, J., Fedor, M., Schoffstall, M. and J. Davin, "The + Simple Network Management Protocol", STD 15, RFC 1157, + May 1990. + + [RFC1212] Rose, M. and K. McCloghrie, "Concise MIB Definitions", + STD 16, RFC 1212, March 1991. + + [RFC1901] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M. and S. Waldbusser, + "Introduction to Community-based SNMPv2", RFC 1901, + January 1996. + + [RFC1909] McCloghrie, K., Editor, "An Administrative Infrastructure + for SNMPv2", RFC 1909, February 1996. + + [RFC1910] Waters, G., Editor, "User-based Security Model for + SNMPv2", RFC 1910, February 1996. + + [RFC2028] Hovey, R. and S. Bradner, "The Organizations Involved in + the IETF Standards Process", BCP 11, RFC 2028, October + 1996. + + [RFC2576] Frye, R., Levi, D., Routhier, S. and B. Wijnen, + "Coexistence between Version 1, Version 2, and Version 3 + of the Internet-Standard Network Management Framework", + RFC 2576, March 2000. + + [RFC2863] McCloghrie, K. and F. Kastenholz, "The Interfaces Group + MIB", RFC 2863, June 2000. + + [RFC3410] Case, J., Mundy, R., Partain, D. and B. Stewart, + "Introduction and Applicability Statements for Internet- + Standard Management Framework", RFC 3410, December 2002. + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 56] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +Appendix A + +A. Guidelines for Model Designers + + This appendix describes guidelines for designers of models which are + expected to fit into the architecture defined in this document. + + SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c are two SNMP frameworks which use communities to + provide trivial authentication and access control. SNMPv1 and + SNMPv2c Frameworks can coexist with Frameworks designed according to + this architecture, and modified versions of SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c + Frameworks could be designed to meet the requirements of this + architecture, but this document does not provide guidelines for that + coexistence. + + Within any subsystem model, there should be no reference to any + specific model of another subsystem, or to data defined by a specific + model of another subsystem. + + Transfer of data between the subsystems is deliberately described as + a fixed set of abstract data elements and primitive functions which + can be overloaded to satisfy the needs of multiple model definitions. + + Documents which define models to be used within this architecture + SHOULD use the standard primitives between subsystems, possibly + defining specific mechanisms for converting the abstract data + elements into model-usable formats. This constraint exists to allow + subsystem and model documents to be written recognizing common + borders of the subsystem and model. Vendors are not constrained to + recognize these borders in their implementations. + + The architecture defines certain standard services to be provided + between subsystems, and the architecture defines abstract service + interfaces to request these services. + + Each model definition for a subsystem SHOULD support the standard + service interfaces, but whether, or how, or how well, it performs the + service is dependent on the model definition. + +A.1. Security Model Design Requirements + +A.1.1. Threats + + A document describing a Security Model MUST describe how the model + protects against the threats described under "Security Requirements + of this Architecture", section 1.4. + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 57] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +A.1.2. Security Processing + + Received messages MUST be validated by a Model of the Security + Subsystem. Validation includes authentication and privacy processing + if needed, but it is explicitly allowed to send messages which do not + require authentication or privacy. + + A received message contains a specified securityLevel to be used + during processing. All messages requiring privacy MUST also require + authentication. + + A Security Model specifies rules by which authentication and privacy + are to be done. A model may define mechanisms to provide additional + security features, but the model definition is constrained to using + (possibly a subset of) the abstract data elements defined in this + document for transferring data between subsystems. + + Each Security Model may allow multiple security protocols to be used + concurrently within an implementation of the model. Each Security + Model defines how to determine which protocol to use, given the + securityLevel and the security parameters relevant to the message. + Each Security Model, with its associated protocol(s) defines how the + sending/receiving entities are identified, and how secrets are + configured. + + Authentication and Privacy protocols supported by Security Models are + uniquely identified using Object Identifiers. IETF standard + protocols for authentication or privacy should have an identifier + defined within the snmpAuthProtocols or the snmpPrivProtocols + subtrees. Enterprise specific protocol identifiers should be defined + within the enterprise subtree. + + For privacy, the Security Model defines what portion of the message + is encrypted. + + The persistent data used for security should be SNMP-manageable, but + the Security Model defines whether an instantiation of the MIB is a + conformance requirement. + + Security Models are replaceable within the Security Subsystem. + Multiple Security Model implementations may exist concurrently within + an SNMP engine. The number of Security Models defined by the SNMP + community should remain small to promote interoperability. + + + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 58] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +A.1.3. Validate the security-stamp in a received message + + A Message Processing Model requests that a Security Model: + + - verifies that the message has not been altered, + + - authenticates the identification of the principal for whom the + message was generated. + + - decrypts the message if it was encrypted. + + Additional requirements may be defined by the model, and additional + services may be provided by the model, but the model is constrained + to use the following primitives for transferring data between + subsystems. Implementations are not so constrained. + + A Message Processing Model uses the processIncomingMsg primitive as + described in section 4.4.2. + +A.1.4. Security MIBs + + Each Security Model defines the MIB module(s) required for security + processing, including any MIB module(s) required for the security + protocol(s) supported. The MIB module(s) SHOULD be defined + concurrently with the procedures which use the MIB module(s). The + MIB module(s) are subject to normal access control rules. + + The mapping between the model-dependent security ID and the + securityName MUST be able to be determined using SNMP, if the model- + dependent MIB is instantiated and if access control policy allows + access. + +A.1.5. Cached Security Data + + For each message received, the Security Model caches the state + information such that a Response message can be generated using the + same security information, even if the Local Configuration Datastore + is altered between the time of the incoming request and the outgoing + response. + + A Message Processing Model has the responsibility for explicitly + releasing the cached data if such data is no longer needed. To + enable this, an abstract securityStateReference data element is + passed from the Security Model to the Message Processing Model. + + The cached security data may be implicitly released via the + generation of a response, or explicitly released by using the + stateRelease primitive, as described in section 4.5.1. + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 59] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +A.2. Message Processing Model Design Requirements + + An SNMP engine contains a Message Processing Subsystem which may + contain multiple Message Processing Models. + + The Message Processing Model MUST always (conceptually) pass the + complete PDU, i.e., it never forwards less than the complete list of + varBinds. + +A.2.1. Receiving an SNMP Message from the Network + + Upon receipt of a message from the network, the Dispatcher in the + SNMP engine determines the version of the SNMP message and interacts + with the corresponding Message Processing Model to determine the + abstract data elements. + + A Message Processing Model specifies the SNMP Message format it + supports and describes how to determine the values of the abstract + data elements (like msgID, msgMaxSize, msgFlags, + msgSecurityParameters, securityModel, securityLevel etc). A Message + Processing Model interacts with a Security Model to provide security + processing for the message using the processIncomingMsg primitive, as + described in section 4.4.2. + +A.2.2. Sending an SNMP Message to the Network + + The Dispatcher in the SNMP engine interacts with a Message Processing + Model to prepare an outgoing message. For that it uses the following + primitives: + + - for requests and notifications: prepareOutgoingMessage, as + described in section 4.2.1. + + - for response messages: prepareResponseMessage, as described in + section 4.2.2. + + A Message Processing Model, when preparing an Outgoing SNMP Message, + interacts with a Security Model to secure the message. For that it + uses the following primitives: + + - for requests and notifications: generateRequestMsg, as + described in section 4.4.1. + + - for response messages: generateResponseMsg as described in + section 4.4.3. + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 60] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + + Once the SNMP message is prepared by a Message Processing Model, the + Dispatcher sends the message to the desired address using the + appropriate transport. + +A.3. Application Design Requirements + + Within an application, there may be an explicit binding to a specific + SNMP message version, i.e., a specific Message Processing Model, and + to a specific Access Control Model, but there should be no reference + to any data defined by a specific Message Processing Model or Access + Control Model. + + Within an application, there should be no reference to any specific + Security Model, or any data defined by a specific Security Model. + + An application determines whether explicit or implicit access control + should be applied to the operation, and, if access control is needed, + which Access Control Model should be used. + + An application has the responsibility to define any MIB module(s) + used to provide application-specific services. + + Applications interact with the SNMP engine to initiate messages, + receive responses, receive asynchronous messages, and send responses. + +A.3.1. Applications that Initiate Messages + + Applications may request that the SNMP engine send messages + containing SNMP commands or notifications using the sendPdu primitive + as described in section 4.1.1. + + If it is desired that a message be sent to multiple targets, it is + the responsibility of the application to provide the iteration. + + The SNMP engine assumes necessary access control has been applied to + the PDU, and provides no access control services. + + The SNMP engine looks at the "expectResponse" parameter, and if a + response is expected, then the appropriate information is cached such + that a later response can be associated to this message, and can then + be returned to the application. A sendPduHandle is returned to the + application so it can later correspond the response with this message + as well. + + + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 61] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +A.3.2. Applications that Receive Responses + + The SNMP engine matches the incoming response messages to outstanding + messages sent by this SNMP engine, and forwards the response to the + associated application using the processResponsePdu primitive, as + described in section 4.1.4. + +A.3.3. Applications that Receive Asynchronous Messages + + When an SNMP engine receives a message that is not the response to a + request from this SNMP engine, it must determine to which application + the message should be given. + + An Application that wishes to receive asynchronous messages registers + itself with the engine using the primitive registerContextEngineID as + described in section 4.1.5. + + An Application that wishes to stop receiving asynchronous messages + should unregister itself with the SNMP engine using the primitive + unregisterContextEngineID as described in section 4.1.5. + + Only one registration per combination of PDU type and contextEngineID + is permitted at the same time. Duplicate registrations are ignored. + An errorIndication will be returned to the application that attempts + to duplicate a registration. + + All asynchronously received messages containing a registered + combination of PDU type and contextEngineID are sent to the + application which registered to support that combination. + + The engine forwards the PDU to the registered application, using the + processPdu primitive, as described in section 4.1.2. + +A.3.4. Applications that Send Responses + + Request operations require responses. An application sends a + response via the returnResponsePdu primitive, as described in section + 4.1.3. + + The contextEngineID, contextName, securityModel, securityName, + securityLevel, and stateReference parameters are from the initial + processPdu primitive. The PDU and statusInformation are the results + of processing. + + + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 62] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +A.4. Access Control Model Design Requirements + + An Access Control Model determines whether the specified securityName + is allowed to perform the requested operation on a specified managed + object. The Access Control Model specifies the rules by which access + control is determined. + + The persistent data used for access control should be manageable + using SNMP, but the Access Control Model defines whether an + instantiation of the MIB is a conformance requirement. + + The Access Control Model must provide the primitive isAccessAllowed. + +Editors' Addresses + + Bert Wijnen + Lucent Technologies + Schagen 33 + 3461 GL Linschoten + Netherlands + + Phone: +31 348-680-485 + EMail: bwijnen@lucent.com + + + David Harrington + Enterasys Networks + Post Office Box 5005 + 35 Industrial Way + Rochester, New Hampshire 03866-5005 + USA + + Phone: +1 603-337-2614 + EMail: dbh@enterasys.com + + + Randy Presuhn + BMC Software, Inc. + 2141 North First Street + San Jose, California 95131 + USA + + Phone: +1 408-546-1006 + Fax: +1 408-965-0359 + EMail: randy_presuhn@bmc.com + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 63] + +RFC 3411 Architecture for SNMP Management Frameworks December 2002 + + +Full Copyright Statement + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved. + + This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to + others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it + or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published + and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any + kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are + included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this + document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing + the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other + Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of + developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for + copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be + followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than + English. + + The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be + revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. + + This document and the information contained herein is provided on an + "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING + TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING + BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION + HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +Acknowledgement + + Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the + Internet Society. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Harrington, et al. Standards Track [Page 64] + |