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authorThomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100
committerThomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100
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+Network Working Group M. A. Padlipsky
+Request for Comments: 505 MIT-Multics
+NIC: 16156 25 June 1973
+
+
+ Two Solutions to a File Transfer Access Problem
+
+ In RFC #87, Bob Bressler raises the issue of how one can use the File
+ Transfer Protocol to send a file to a user on another system without
+ knowing that user's password. In RFC 501, Kan Pogran points out
+ certain objections to Bressler's solution of having a "daemon"
+ process do the job -- in particular, the fact that it would require
+ an interpretive access control mechanism in the daemon different from
+ most system's normal access control mechanisms. Because Ken felt
+ that it would be too much of a digression in RFC 501 for him to cover
+ the following points fully, I decided it might be of interest to deal
+ with them separately: There are at least two solutions to the problem
+ Bob raised in RFC 487 -- in regard to "my" sending "him" a file
+ without knowing his password -- which don't give rise to the problems
+ noted in RFC 501. One hinges on adding a convention to the FTP, the
+ other on adding a command.
+
+ The first solution is very straightforward. Instead of having me
+ push the file, he could pull it. That is, he uses his own "principal
+ identifies" (thus solving access permission problems at his end) and
+ his own User FTP to extract the file with the aid of my Server FTP.
+ All this requires is that 1) I give appropriate access permission on
+ my end, and 2) he have the ability to use my Server FTP. The second
+ condition is met by either a) his having an account on my system, or
+ b) my system's having a known account for "free" Server FTP use. (*)
+
+ So standing the model on its head solves the functional problem,
+ although he has to pay for the User FTP. But, then, it's he who
+ wants the file, so why shouldn't he? On the other hand, "he" might
+ not be logged in right now and I might be -- and by the time he can
+ get logged in my system might be scheduled to be down. Fortunately,
+ there's also a moderately straightforward solution to the problem as
+ originally posed. This goes back to the mechanism used to prevent
+ capricious and/or malicious card input on Multics: Instead of placing
+ input (card deck or transferred file) directly into the alleged
+ recipient's directory, place it in a "pool" directory and merely
+ inform the recipient of its arrival. If he really wanted it, he then
+ copies it into his own directory. That way, unauthorized people
+ can't freeload on somebody else's directory (and the pool is, of
+ course, periodically purged), nor can they clobber others' already-
+ existing files.
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+Padlipsky [Page 1]
+
+RFC 505 Two Solutions to a File Transfer 25 June 1973
+
+
+[1]
+
+ This second solution has the virtue of requiring fewer steps than the
+ first, and would work even when the first wouldn't; so even though it
+ would require another FTP command, I propose the addition of a new
+ FTP "POOL" command, which does what the last paragraph described.
+ Depending on the various Servers' protection mechanisms, the pooled
+ files could be made readable only by the declared recipients. This
+ would, for example, offer an easy way to get some privacy for "mail"
+ (which otherwise is likely to be readable by anybody who can write
+ it), although other solutions to that particular problem of course
+ exist. At any rate, the POOL command's syntax would be POOL id name
+ where id is a valid user identifier on the Server, and name is the
+ desired name to be placed on the about-to-be-transferred file in the
+ Server's pool directory. (*) (Servers must, of course, do whatever
+ pre- or post-fixing to name is necessary to make it unique within the
+ pool.) The transfer then takes place in the same manner as with
+ STOR, and on successful completion the Server sends a message to id
+ that he should pick up name (suitably) modified to look like a local
+ pathname) if he wants it. The message should also identify the
+ putative sender (even though it might have come in from a free
+ account). The id should, naturally, be validated before starting the
+ transfer.
+
+ The question has been raised locally as to why we don't simply take a
+ pooled view of STOR on Multics and forget about pushing for a new
+ command. To do so would have two drawbacks, I feel: first, I think
+ we'd be remiss in our duty as NWG participants if we failed to
+ attempt to offer solutions to protocol problems to the Network
+ community as a whole. Second, on a less pious but more practical
+ note, if we don't know the id we have to infer it from the pathname,
+ which rules out abbreviations and forces senders to have to know too
+ much about our internal structure. (The alternative of requiring an
+ additional argument to the STOR is subject to the same objection. It
+ is also subject to the objection that protocols really shouldn't be
+ unilaterally extended. Of course, we could go to "site-specific
+ parameters", but that's complicating life so much that the
+ alternative of no unsolicited files seems preferable.) Therefore, I
+ think that POOL would be worthwhile unless no other Servers have
+ enough access control for it to be necessary anywhere but on Multics.
+ At the very least, having the protocol specify an "access id"
+ optional argument to STOR seems desirable.
+
+[2]
+
+ Input as to whether any of the other Servers has file access control
+ abilities similar to those of Multics would be useful in clarifying
+ whether this whole area is one which needs specific treatment at the
+
+
+
+Padlipsky [Page 2]
+
+RFC 505 Two Solutions to a File Transfer 25 June 1973
+
+
+ Protocol level, or merely needs internally acceptable handling at our
+ end. In the meantime, if you're trying to send an unsolicited file
+ to us for free, you can use the NETML mechanism with no directory
+ qualification on the target pathname in the STOR, then MAIL the file
+ name to the intended recipient, who will copy the file into his own
+ directory (from, in our syntax, >udd>Cnet>anonymous). That's all
+ pretty complicated, but it sure does go to show that higher-level
+ protocols need to know an awful lot about the various operating
+ systems. At any rate, comment on either Bressler's Problem, POOL,
+ STOR, or other people's access control mechanisms would all be
+ appreciated.
+
+Endnotes
+
+ [1] (*) For b),I suggest that the USER NETML / PASS NETML discipline
+ of RFC 491 be extended. That is, Hosts which allow free use of their
+ FTP Servers should accept that pair of FTP commands as an indication
+ to commence free service. Whether this leads to a login of a dummy
+ user or a passoff to a daemon process is a matter of local
+ implementation preference, of course.
+
+ [2] (*) Note that this definition relieves the user of having to know
+ the Server's pathname for the pool directory.
+
+
+ [ This RFC was put into machine readable form for entry ]
+ [ into the online RFC archives by Thomas Farmer 11/98 ]
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+Padlipsky [Page 3]
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