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author | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
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committer | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
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tree | e3989f47a7994642eb325063d46e8f08ffa681dc /doc/rfc/rfc5720.txt | |
parent | ea76e11061bda059ae9f9ad130a9895cc85607db (diff) |
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diff --git a/doc/rfc/rfc5720.txt b/doc/rfc/rfc5720.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..75cfb32 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/rfc/rfc5720.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1459 @@ + + + + + + +Independent Submission F. Templin +Request for Comments: 5720 Boeing Phantom Works +Category: Informational February 2010 +ISSN: 2070-1721 + + + Routing and Addressing in Networks with + Global Enterprise Recursion (RANGER) + +Abstract + + RANGER is an architectural framework for scalable routing and + addressing in networks with global enterprise recursion. The term + "enterprise network" within this context extends to a wide variety of + use cases and deployment scenarios, where an "enterprise" can be as + small as a Small Office, Home Office (SOHO) network, as dynamic as a + Mobile Ad Hoc Network, as complex as a multi-organizational + corporation, or as large as the global Internet itself. Such + networks will require an architected solution for the coordination of + routing and addressing plans with accommodations for scalability, + provider-independence, mobility, multihoming, and security. These + considerations are particularly true for existing deployments, but + the same principles apply even for clean-slate approaches. The + RANGER architecture addresses these requirements and provides a + comprehensive framework for IPv6/IPv4 coexistence. + +Status of This Memo + + This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is + published for informational purposes. + + This is a contribution to the RFC Series, independently of any other + RFC stream. The RFC Editor has chosen to publish this document at + its discretion and makes no statement about its value for + implementation or deployment. Documents approved for publication by + the RFC Editor are not a candidate for any level of Internet + Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741. + + Information about the current status of this document, any errata, + and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at + http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5720. + + + + + + + + + + +Templin Informational [Page 1] + +RFC 5720 RANGER February 2010 + + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the + document authors. All rights reserved. + + This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal + Provisions Relating to IETF Documents + (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of + publication of this document. Please review these documents + carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect + to this document. + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction ....................................................3 + 2. Terminology .....................................................4 + 3. The RANGER Architecture .........................................7 + 3.1. Routing and Addressing .....................................7 + 3.2. The Enterprise-within-Enterprise Framework .................9 + 3.3. Virtual Enterprise Traversal (VET) ........................12 + 3.3.1. RANGER Organizational Principles ...................12 + 3.3.2. RANGER End-to-End Addressing Example ...............14 + 3.3.3. Dynamic Routing and On-Demand Mapping ..............14 + 3.3.4. Support for Legacy RLOC-Based Services .............16 + 3.4. Subnetwork Encapsulation and Adaptation Layer (SEAL) ......18 + 3.5. Mobility Management .......................................18 + 3.6. Multihoming ...............................................20 + 3.7. Implications for the Internet .............................20 + 4. Related Initiatives ............................................21 + 5. Security Considerations ........................................22 + 6. Acknowledgements ...............................................23 + 7. References .....................................................23 + 7.1. Normative References ......................................23 + 7.2. Informative References ....................................24 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Templin Informational [Page 2] + +RFC 5720 RANGER February 2010 + + +1. Introduction + + RANGER is an architectural framework for scalable routing and + addressing in networks with global enterprise recursion. The term + "enterprise network" within this context extends to a wide variety of + use cases and deployment scenarios, where an "enterprise" can be as + small as a SOHO network, as dynamic as a Mobile Ad Hoc Network, as + complex as a multi-organizational corporation, or as large as the + global Internet itself. Such networks will require an architected + solution for the coordination of routing and addressing plans with + accommodations for scalability, provider-independence, mobility, + multihoming, and security. These considerations are particularly + true for existing deployments, but the same principles apply even for + clean-slate approaches. The RANGER architecture addresses these + requirements and also provides a comprehensive framework for IPv6/ + IPv4 coexistence [COEXIST]. + + RANGER provides a unifying architecture for enterprises that contain + one or more distinct interior IP routing and addressing domains (or + "Routing LOCator (RLOC) space"), with each distinct RLOC space + containing one or more organizational groupings. Each RLOC space may + coordinate their own internal addressing plans independently of one + another, such that limited-scope addresses (e.g., [RFC1918] private- + use IPv4 addresses) may be reused with impunity to provide unlimited + scaling through spatial reuse. Each RLOC space therefore appears as + an enterprise unto itself, where organizational partitioning of the + enterprise into one or more "sub-enterprises" (or "sites") is also + possible and beneficial in many scenarios. Without an architected + approach, routing and addressing within such a framework would be + fragmented due to address/prefix reuse between disjoint enterprises. + With RANGER, however, multiple enterprises can be linked together to + provide a multi-hop transit for nodes attached to enterprise edge + networks that use Endpoint Interface iDentifier (EID) addresses taken + from an IP addressing range that is distinct from any RLOC space. + + RANGER is recursive in that multiple enterprises can be joined + together in a nested "enterprise-within-enterprise" fashion, where + each enterprise also connects edge networks with nodes that configure + addresses taken from EID space to support edge/core separation. In + this way, the same RANGER principles that apply in lower levels of + recursion can extend upwards to parent enterprises and ultimately to + the core of the global Internet itself. Furthermore, it is also + worth considering whether today's global Internet represents a + limiting condition for recursion -- in particular, whether other + internets could be manifested as "parallel universes" and joined + together at still higher levels of recursion. + + + + + +Templin Informational [Page 3] + +RFC 5720 RANGER February 2010 + + + The RANGER architecture is manifested through composite technologies, + including Virtual Enterprise Traversal (VET) [VET], the Subnetwork + Encapsulation and Adaptation Layer (SEAL) [SEAL], and the Intra-Site + Automatic Tunnel Addressing Protocol (ISATAP) [RFC5214]. Other + mechanisms such as IPsec [RFC4301] are also in scope for use within + certain scenarios. + + Noting that combinations with still other technologies are also + possible, the issues addressed either in full or in part by RANGER + include: + + o scalable routing and addressing + + o provider-independent addressing and its relation to provider- + aggregated addressing + + o site mobility and multihoming + + o address and prefix autoconfiguration + + o border router discovery + + o router/host-to-router/host tunneling + + o neighbor discovery over tunnels + + o MTU determination for tunnels + + o IPv6/IPv4 coexistence and transition + + Note that while this document primarily uses the illustrative example + of IPv6 [RFC2460] as a virtual overlay over IPv4 [RFC0791] networks, + it is important to note that the same architectural principles apply + to any combination of IPvX virtual overlays over IPvY networks. + +2. Terminology + + Routing Locator (RLOC) + an IPv4 or IPv6 address assigned to an interface in an enterprise- + interior routing region. Note that private-use IP addresses are + local to each enterprise; hence, the same private-use addresses + may appear within disjoint enterprises. + + Endpoint Interface iDentifier (EID) + an IPv4 or IPv6 address assigned to an edge network interface of + an end system. Note that EID space must be separate and distinct + from any RLOC space. + + + + +Templin Informational [Page 4] + +RFC 5720 RANGER February 2010 + + + commons + an enterprise-interior routing region that provides a subnetwork + for cooperative peering between the border routers of diverse + organizations that may have competing interests. A prime example + of a commons is the Default-Free Zone (DFZ) of the global + Internet. The enterprise-interior routing region within the + commons uses an addressing plan taken from RLOC space. + + enterprise + the same as defined in [RFC4852], where the enterprise deploys a + unified RLOC space addressing plan within the commons but may also + contain partitions with disjoint RLOC spaces and/or organizational + groupings that can be considered as enterprises unto themselves. + An enterprise therefore need not be "one big happy family", but + instead provides a commons for the cooperative interconnection of + diverse organizations that may have competing interests (e.g., + such as the case within the global Internet DFZ). + + Enterprise networks are typically associated with large + corporations or academic campuses; however, the RANGER + architectural principles apply to any network that has some degree + of cooperative active management. This definition therefore + extends to home networks, small office networks, ISP networks, a + wide variety of Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs), and even to the + global Internet itself. + + site + a logical and/or physical grouping of interfaces within an + enterprise commons, where the topology of the site is a proper + subset of the topology of the enterprise. A site may contain many + interior sites, which may themselves contain many interior sites + in a recursive fashion. + + Throughout the remainder of this document, the term "enterprise" + refers to either enterprise or site, i.e., the RANGER principles + apply equally to enterprises and sites of any size or shape. At + the lowest level of recursive decomposition, a singleton + Enterprise Border Router can be considered as an enterprise unto + itself. + + Enterprise Border Router (EBR) + a router at the edge of an enterprise that is also configured as a + tunnel endpoint in an overlay network. EBRs connect their + directly attached networks to the overlay network, and connect to + other networks via IP-in-IP tunneling across the commons to other + EBRs. This definition is intended as an architectural equivalent + of the functional term "EBR" defined in [VET]. + + + + +Templin Informational [Page 5] + +RFC 5720 RANGER February 2010 + + + Enterprise Border Gateway (EBG) + an EBR that also connects the enterprise to provider networks + and/or to the global Internet. EBGs are typically configured as + default routers in the overlay and provide forwarding services for + accessing IP networks not reachable via an EBR within the commons. + This definition is intended as an architectural equivalent of the + functional term "EBG" defined in [VET], and is synonymous with the + term "default mapper" used in other contexts (e.g., [JEN]). + + Ingress Tunnel Endpoint (ITE) + a host or router interface that encapsulates inner IP packets + within an outer IP header for transmission over an enterprise- + interior routing region to the RLOC address of an Egress Tunnel + Endpoint (ETE). + + Egress Tunnel Endpoint (ETE) + a host or router interface that receives encapsulated packets sent + to its RLOC address, decapsulates the inner IP packets, then + delivers them to the EID address of the final destination. + + overlay network + a virtual network manifested by routing and addressing over + virtual links formed through automatic tunneling. An overlay + network may span many underlying enterprises. + + Provider-Independent (PI) prefix + an IPv6 or IPv4 EID prefix (e.g., 2001:DB8::/48, 192.0.2/24, etc.) + that is routable within a limited scope and may also appear in + enterprise mapping tables. PI prefixes that can appear in mapping + tables are typically delegated to a Border Router (BR) by a + registry but are not aggregated by a provider network. Local-use + IPv6 and IPv4 prefixes (e.g., FD00::/8, 192.168/16, etc.) are + another example of a PI prefix, but these typically do not appear + in mapping tables. + + Provider-Aggregated (PA) prefix + an IPv6 or IPv4 EID prefix that is either derived from a PI prefix + or delegated directly to a provider network by a registry. + Although not widely discussed, it bears specific mention that a + prefix taken from a delegating router's PI space becomes a PA + prefix from the perspective of the requesting router. + + Additionally, RANGER provides an informative consideration of + functional specifications and operational practices outlined in other + documents. These documents include: + + + + + + +Templin Informational [Page 6] + +RFC 5720 RANGER February 2010 + + + 6over4 + Transmission of IPv6 over IPv4 Domains without Explicit Tunnels + [RFC2529]; functional specifications and operational practices for + automatic tunneling of unicast/multicast IPv6 packets over + multicast-capable IPv4 enterprises. + + ISATAP + Intra-Site Automatic Tunnel Addressing Protocol (ISATAP) + [RFC5214]; functional specifications and operational practices for + automatic tunneling of unicast IPv6 packets over unicast-only IPv4 + enterprises. + + VET + Virtual Enterprise Traversal (VET) [VET]; functional + specifications and operational practices for automatic tunneling + of both unicast and multicast IP packets with provisions for + address/prefix autoconfiguration, provider-independent addressing, + mobility, multihoming, and security. VET is descended from both + 6over4 and ISATAP and is also known as "ISATAP version 2 + (ISATAPv2)". + + SEAL + Subnetwork Encapsulation and Adaptation Layer (SEAL) [SEAL]; an + encapsulation sublayer that provides an extended IP Identification + field and mechanisms for link MTU adaptation over tunnels. + +3. The RANGER Architecture + + The RANGER architecture enables scalable routing and addressing in + networks with global enterprise recursion while sustaining support + for legacy networks and services. Key to this approach is a + framework that accommodates interconnection of diverse organizations + across a commons that have a mutual spirit of cooperation but also + have the potential for competing interests. The following sections + outline the RANGER architecture within the context of anticipated use + cases: + +3.1. Routing and Addressing + + The Internet today is facing "growing pains", with indications that + core Routing Information Base (RIB) scaling may not be sustainable + over the long term and that the remaining space for IPv4 address + allocations may be depleted in the near future. Therefore, there is + an emerging need for scalable routing and addressing solutions. It + must further be noted that the same solutions selected to address + global Internet routing and addressing scaling can apply equally for + large enterprises -- or for any enterprise that would benefit from a + separation of core and edge addressing domains. + + + +Templin Informational [Page 7] + +RFC 5720 RANGER February 2010 + + + RANGER supports scalable routing through an approach that parallels + the "New Scheme for Internet Routing and Addressing" described in + [RFC1955]. This approach is also commonly known as "map-and-encaps". + In this approach, an Ingress Tunnel Endpoint (ITE) that must forward + an IP packet first consults a mapping system to discover a mapping + for the destination Endpoint Interface iDentifier (EID) to a Routing + LOCator (RLOC) assigned to an Egress Tunnel Endpoint (ETE). The + mapping system is typically maintained as a per-enterprise + distributed database that is synchronized among a limited set of + mapping agents. Distributed database management alternatives include + a routing protocol instance maintained by Enterprise Border Gateways + (EBGs), a DNS reverse zone distributed among a restricted set of + caching servers, etc. Mapping entries are inserted into the mapping + system through administrative configuration, automated prefix + registrations, etc. + + RANGER allows for an ITE to either consult the mapping system itself + (while delaying or dropping initial IP packets) or forward initial + packets to an EBG acting as a "default mapper". In either case, the + ITE receives a mapping reply that it can use to populate its + Forwarding Information Base (FIB). The choice of mapping approaches + must be considered with respect to the individual enterprise network + scenario, e.g., forwarding to an EBG may be more appropriate in some + scenarios while ITE self-discovery may be more appropriate in others. + Use of other mapping mechanisms is also possible according to the + specific enterprise scenario. + + After discovering the mapping, the ITE encapsulates inner IP packets + in an outer IP header for transmission across the commons to the RLOC + address of an ETE. The ETE in turn decapsulates the packets and + forwards them over the next hop toward the EID address of the final + destination. Therefore, the Routing Information Base (RIB) within + the commons only needs to maintain state regarding RLOCs and not + EIDs, while the synchronized EID-to-RLOC mapping state is maintained + by a smaller number of nodes and is not subject to oscillations due + to link state changes within the commons. Finally, EIDs are routable + only within a limited scope within edge networks (which may be as + small as node-local scope in the limiting case). + + RANGER supports scalable addressing by selecting a suitably large EID + addressing range that is distinct and kept separate from any + enterprise-interior RLOC addressing ranges. It should therefore come + as no surprise that taking EID space from the IPv6 addressing + architecture should lead to a viable, scalable addressing + alternative, while taking EID space from the (already exhausted) IPv4 + addressing architecture may not. + + + + + +Templin Informational [Page 8] + +RFC 5720 RANGER February 2010 + + +3.2. The Enterprise-within-Enterprise Framework + + Enterprise networks traditionally distribute routing information via + Interior Gateway Protocols (IGPs) such as Open Shortest Path First + (OSPF), while large enterprises may even use an Exterior Gateway + Protocol (EGP) internally in place of an IGP. Thus, it is becoming + increasingly commonplace for large enterprises to use the Border + Gateway Protocol (BGP) internally and independently from the BGP + instance that maintains the RIB within the global Internet DFZ. + + As such, large enterprises may run an internal instance of BGP across + many internal Autonomous Systems (ASs). Such a large enterprise can + therefore appear as an internet unto itself, albeit with default + routes leading to the true global Internet. Additionally, each + internal AS within such an enterprise may itself run BGP internally + in place of an IGP, and can therefore also appear as an independent, + lower-tier enterprise unto itself. This enterprise-within-enterprise + framework can be extended in a recursive fashion as broadly and as + deeply as desired to achieve scaling factors as well as + organizational and/or functional compartmentalization, e.g., as shown + in Figure 1. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Templin Informational [Page 9] + +RFC 5720 RANGER February 2010 + + + ,---------------. + ,-' Global `-. <--------+ + ( IPv6/IPv4 ) ,----|-----. + `-. Internet ,-' ( Enterprises) + `+--+..+--+ ...+--+ ( E2 thru EN ) + _.-|R1|--|R2+----|Rn|-._ `.---------/ + _.---'' +--+ +--+ ...+--+ -. + ,--'' ,---. `---. + ,-' X5 X6 .---.. `-. + ,' ,.X1-.. / \ ,' `. `. + ,' ,' `. .' E1.2 '. X8 E1.m \ `. + / / \ | ,--. | / _,.._ \ \ + / / E1.1 \ | Y3 `. | | / Y7 | \ + ; | ___ | | ` W Y4 |... | `Y6 ,' | : + | | ,-' `. X2 | `--' | | `'' | | + : | | V Y2 | \ _ / | | ; + \ | `-Y1,,' | \ .' Y5 / \ ,-Y8'`- / / + \ \ / \ \_' / X9 `. ,'/ / + `. \ X3 `.__,,' `._ Y9'',' ,' + ` `._ _,' ___.......X7_ `---' ,' + ` `---' ,-' `-. -' + `---. `. E1.3 Z _' _.--' + `-----. \---.......---' _.---'' + `----------------'' + + <---------------- Enterprise E1 ----------------> + + Figure 1: Enterprise-within-Enterprise Framework + + Figure 1 depicts an enterprise 'E1' connected to the global IPv6/IPv4 + Internet via routers 'R1' through 'Rn' and additional enterprises + 'E2' through 'EN' that also connect to the global Internet. Within + the 'E1' commons, there may be arbitrarily many hosts, routers, and + networks (not shown in the diagram) that use addresses taken from + RLOC space and over which both encapsulated and unencapsulated IP + packets can be forwarded. There may also be many lower-tier + enterprises, 'E1.1' through 'E1.m' (shown in the diagram), that + interconnect within the 'E1' commons via Enterprise Border Routers + (EBRs), depicted as 'X1' through 'X9' (where 'X1' through 'X9' see + 'R1' through 'Rn' as EBGs). Within each 'E1.*' enterprise, there may + also be arbitrarily many lower-tier enterprises that interconnect + within the 'E1.*' commons via EBRs, depicted as 'Y1' through 'Y9' in + the diagram (where 'Y1' through 'Y9' see 'X1' through 'X9' as EBGs). + This recursive decomposition can be nested as deeply as desired and + ultimately terminates at singleton nodes such as those depicted as + 'V', 'W', and 'Z' in the diagram. + + + + + +Templin Informational [Page 10] + +RFC 5720 RANGER February 2010 + + + It is important to note that nodes such as 'V', 'W', and 'Z' may be + simple hosts or they may be EBRs that attach arbitrarily complex edge + networks with addresses taken from EID space. Such edge networks + could be as simple as a home network behind a residential gateway or + as complex as a major corporate/academic campus, a large service + provider network, etc. + + Again, this enterprise-within-enterprise framework can be recursively + nested as broadly and deeply as desired. From the highest level of + the recursion, consider now that the global Internet itself can be + viewed as an "enterprise" that interconnects lower-tier enterprises + E1 through EN such that all RANGER architectural principles apply + equally within that context. Furthermore, the RANGER architecture + recognizes that the global Internet need not represent a limiting + condition for recursion, but rather allows that other internets could + be manifested as "parallel universes" and joined together at still + higher levels of recursion. + + As a specific case in point, the future global Aeronautical + Telecommunications Network (ATN), under consideration within the + civil aviation industry [BAUER], will take the form of a large + enterprise network that appears as an internet unto itself, i.e., + exactly as depicted for 'E1' in Figure 1. Within the ATN, there will + be many Air Communications Service Provider (ACSP) and Air Navigation + Service Provider (ANSP) networks organized as autonomous systems + internal to the ATN, i.e., exactly as depicted for 'E1.*' in the + diagram. The ACSP/ANSP network EBGs will participate in a BGP + instance internal to the ATN, and may themselves run independent BGP + instances internally that are further sub-divided into lower-tier + enterprises organized as regional, organizational, functional, etc. + compartments. It is important to note that, while ACSPs/ANSPs within + the ATN will share a common objective of safety-of-flight for civil + aviation services, there may be competing business/social/political + interests between them, such that the ATN is not necessarily "one big + happy family". Therefore, the model parallels that of the global + Internet itself. + + Such an operational framework may indeed be the case for many next- + generation enterprises. In particular, although the routing and + addressing arrangements of all enterprises will require a mutual + level of cooperative active management at a certain level, free + market forces, business objectives, political alliances, etc. may + drive internal competition. + + + + + + + + +Templin Informational [Page 11] + +RFC 5720 RANGER February 2010 + + +3.3. Virtual Enterprise Traversal (VET) + + Within the enterprise-within-enterprise framework outlined in Section + 3.2, the RANGER architecture is based on overlay networks manifested + through Virtual Enterprise Traversal (VET) ([VET], [RFC5214]). The + VET approach uses automatic IP-in-IP tunneling in which ITEs + encapsulate EID-based inner IP packets within RLOC-based, outer IP + headers for transmission across the commons to ETEs. + + For each enterprise they connect to, EBRs that use VET configure a + Non-Broadcast, Multiple Access (NBMA) interface known as a "VET + interface" that sees all other EBRs within the enterprise as + potential single-hop neighbors from the perspective of the inner IP + protocol. This means that, for many enterprise scenarios, standard + neighbor discovery mechanisms (e.g., router advertisements, + redirects, etc.) can be used between EBR pairs. This gives rise to a + data-driven model in which neighbor relationships are formed based on + traffic demand in the data plane, which in many cases can relax the + requirement for dynamic routing exchanges across the overlay in the + control plane. + + When multiple VET interfaces are linked together, end-to-end + traversal is seen as multiple VET hops from the perspective of the + inner IP protocol. In that case, transition between VET interfaces + entails a "re-encapsulation" approach in which a packet that exits + VET interface 'i' is decapsulated then re-encapsulated before it is + forwarded into VET interface 'i+1'. For example, if an end-to-end + path between two EID-based peers crosses N distinct VET interfaces, a + traceroute would show N inner IP forwarding hops corresponding to the + portions of the path that traverse the VET interfaces. + + VET and its related works specify necessary mechanisms and + operational practices to manifest the RANGER architecture. The use + of VET in conjunction with SEAL (see Section 3.4) is essential in + certain deployments to avoid issues related to source address + spoofing and black holing due to path Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) + limitations. (The use of VET in conjunction with IPsec [RFC4301] may + also be necessary in some enterprise network scenarios.) The + following sections discuss operational considerations and use cases + within the VET approach. + +3.3.1. RANGER Organizational Principles + + Figure 2 below depicts a vertical slice (albeit represented + horizontally) from the enterprise-within-enterprise framework shown + in Figure 1: + + + + + +Templin Informational [Page 12] + +RFC 5720 RANGER February 2010 + + + +------+ + | IPv6 | + " " " " " " " "" " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " |Server| + " <----------------- 2001:DB8::/40 (PA) " | S1 | + " 2001:DB8:10::/56 (PI) ----------------> " +--+---+ + " . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " | + " . . . . . . " | + " . +----+ v +--- + v +----+ v +----+ +-----+-------+ + " . | V += e =+ Y1 += e =+ X2 += e =+ R2 +==+ Internet | + " . +-+--+ t +----+ t +----+ t +----+ +-----+-------+ + " . | 1 . . 2 . . 3 . " | + " . H . . . . . " | + " . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " +--+---+ + " <E1.1.1> <E1.1> <E1> " | IPv4 | + " 10/8 10/8 10/8 " |Server| + " " " " " " " " " " " " " " "" " " " " " " " | S2 | + <-- Enterprise E1 --> +------+ + + Figure 2: Virtual Enterprise Traversal + + Within this vertical slice, each enterprise within the 'E1' recursive + hierarchy is spanned by VET interfaces, represented as 'vet1' through + 'vet3'. Each VET interface within this framework is a Non-Broadcast, + Multiple Access (NBMA) interface that connects all EBRs within the + same enterprise. Each enterprise within the 'E1' hierarchy may + comprise a smaller topological region within a larger RLOC space, or + they may configure an independent RLOC space from a common (but + spatially reused) limited-scope prefix, e.g., depicted as multiple + disjoint instances of '10/8' in the diagram. + + In the RANGER approach, EBRs within lower-tier enterprises coordinate + their EID prefixes with EBGs that connect to an upper-tier + enterprise. EID prefixes could be either provider-independent (PI) + prefixes owned by the EBR or provider-aggregated (PA) prefixes + delegated by the EBG. In either case, EID prefixes must be + coordinated with the enterprise routing/mapping systems. + + When PA EID prefixes are used, the EBR for each 'E1*' enterprise + receives an EID prefix delegation from a delegating EBG in a parent + enterprise. In this example, when 'R2' is a delegating router for + the prefix '2001:DB8::/40', it may delegate '2001:DB8::/48' to 'X2', + which in turn delegates '2001:DB8::/52' to 'Y1', which in turn + delegates '2001:DB8::/56' to 'V'. The preferred mechanism for this + recursive PA prefix sub-delegation is DHCP Prefix Delegation + [RFC3633], which also arranges for publication of the prefixes in the + enterprise routing system. + + + + + +Templin Informational [Page 13] + +RFC 5720 RANGER February 2010 + + + When PI EID prefixes are used, individual EBRs (e.g., 'V') register + their PI prefixes (e.g., '2001:DB1:10::/56') by sending Router + Advertisement (RA) messages to EBGs within the enterprise to assert + prefix ownership. When stronger authentication is necessary, the + EBRs can digitally sign the messages using the mechanisms specified + for SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) [RFC3971]. EBGs that receive + the RAs (e.g., 'Y1') first verify the sender's credentials, then + register the prefixes in the enterprise mapping system. Next, they + forward a proxied version of the RA to EBGs within their parent + enterprises (e.g., 'X2'). This proxying process continues up the + recursive hierarchy until a default-free commons is reached. (In + this case, the proxying process ends at 'R2'). After the initial + registration, the EBR that owns the PI prefixes must periodically + send additional RAs to update prefix expiration timers. + +3.3.2. RANGER End-to-End Addressing Example + + In Figure 2, an IPv6 host 'H' that is deeply nested within Enterprise + 'E1' connects to IPv6 server 'S1', located somewhere on the IPv6 + Internet. 'H' is attached to a shared link with IPv6/IPv4 dual-stack + router 'V', which advertises the IPv6 prefixes '2001:DB8:0:0::/64' + and '2001:DB8:10:0::/64'. 'H' uses standard IPv6 neighbor discovery + mechanisms to discover 'V' as a default IPv6 router that can forward + its packets off the local link, and configures addresses from both of + the advertised prefixes. 'V' in turn sees node 'Y1' as an EBG that + is reachable via VET interface 'vet1' and that can forward packets + toward IPv6 server 'S1'. Similarly, node 'Y1' is an EBR on the + enterprise spanned by 'vet2' that sees 'X2' as an EBG, and node 'X2' + is an EBR on 'vet3' that sees 'R2' as an EBG. Ultimately, 'R2' is an + EBR that connects 'E1' to the global Internet. + +3.3.3. Dynamic Routing and On-Demand Mapping + + In the example shown in Figure 2, 'V', 'Y1', 'X2', and 'R2' configure + separate VET interfaces for each enterprise they connect to in order + to discover routes through a dynamic routing protocol and/or mapping + database lookups. After tunnels 'vet1' through 'vet3' are + established, the EBRs connected to a VET interface can run a dynamic + routing protocol such as OSPVFv3 [RFC5340] and exchange topology + information over the VET interface using the NBMA interface model. + In this way, each EBR can discover other EBRs on the link via routing + protocol control message exchanges. + + In a second example, Figure 3 depicts an instance of on-demand + discovery of more specific routes in which an IPv6 end system 'H' + connects to a peer end system 'J', located in a different + organizational entity within 'E1': + + + + +Templin Informational [Page 14] + +RFC 5720 RANGER February 2010 + + + +------+ + | IPv6 | + " " " " " " " "" " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " |Server| + " <----------------- 2001:DB8::/40 (PA) " | S1 | + " 2001:DB8:10::/56 (PI) ----------------> " +--+---+ + " . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " | + " . . . . . . " | + " . +----+ v +----+ v +----+ +----+ +-----+-------+ + " . | V += e =+ Y1 += e =+ X2 += =+ R2 +==+ Internet | + " . +-+--+ t +----+ t +----+ +----+ +-----+-------+ + " . | 1 . . 2 . . . " | + " . H . . . . v . " | + " . . . . . . . . . . . e . " +--+---+ + " . t . " | IPv4 | + " . . . . . . , . 3 . " |Server| + " . +----+ v +----+ . " | S2 | + " . | Z += e =+ X7 += . " +------+ + " . +-+--+ t +----+ . " + " . | 4 . . . " + " . J . . . . . " + " . . . . . . . " + " 2001:DB8:20::/56 (PI) --------> " + " " " " " " " " " " " " " " "" " " " " " " " + <-- Enterprise E1 --> + + Figure 3: On-Demand Discovery + + In this example, tunnel interfaces 'vet1' through 'vet4' as well as + IPv6 PI prefix registrations have been established through VET + enterprise autoconfiguration procedures. When IPv6 end system 'H' + with IPv6 address '2001:DB8:10::1' sends packets to a peer end system + 'J' with IPv6 address '2001:DB8:20::1', the packets will be conveyed + through 'V', 'Y1', and finally to 'X2' via default routes. Then, + unless 'X2' has an IPv6 FIB entry matching 'J', it must discover that + 'J' can be reached using a more direct route via 'X7' as the next-hop + across the 'E1' commons. + + In particular, when 'X2' receives a packet on the 'vet2' interface + with inner destination address 'J', it can perform an on-demand + mapping lookup by consulting the enterprise mapping service, e.g., by + consulting the DNS reverse zone. Alternatively, 'X2' can send the + packet to a default router (e.g., 'R2'), which in turn can forward + the packet to 'X7' and return an ICMPv6 redirect message. When 'X2' + receives the redirect, it can send an RA message to 'X7' to prove + that it is authorized to produce packets with a prefix that matches + source address 'J'. 'X2' can then forward subsequent packets + directly to 'X7' without involving 'R2'. + + + + +Templin Informational [Page 15] + +RFC 5720 RANGER February 2010 + + + In some enterprise scenarios, dynamic routing and on-demand mapping + can be combined as complementary functions. In other scenarios, it + may be preferable to use either dynamic routing only or on-demand + mapping only. + +3.3.4. Support for Legacy RLOC-Based Services + + Legacy hosts, routers, and networks that were already present in pre- + RANGER deployments and have already numbered their interfaces with + RLOC addresses must see continued support for RLOC-based services for + the long term, even as EID-based services are rolled out in new + deployments. For example, a legacy IPv4-only node behind an IPv4 + Network Address Translator (NAT) must still be able to reach legacy + IPv4-only Internet services (e.g., "http://example.com") long after + the RANGER architecture and EID-based services are widely deployed. + + Returning to the example diagrams, while virtual enterprise traversal + across 'E1' provides a fully connected routing and addressing + capability for EID-based services, legacy nodes will still require + access to RLOC-based services within connected or disjoint RLOC + spaces for an extended (and possibly indefinite) period. For + example, Figure 4 below depicts the applicable RLOC-based IPv4 + service-access scenarios for the RANGER architecture when VET + interfaces are used to link recursively nested enterprises together: + + +------+ + | IPv6 | + " " " " " " " "" " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " |Server| + " <----------------- 2001:DB8::/40 (PA) " | S1 | + " 2001:DB8:10::/56 (PI) -----------------> " +--+---+ + " . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " | + " . . . . . . " | + " . +----+ v +--- + v +----+ v +----+ +-----+-------+ + " . | V += e =+ Y1 += e =+ X2 += e =+ R2 +==+ Internet | + " . +-+--+ t +----+ t +----+ t +----+ +-----+-------+ + " . | 1 . . 2 . . 3 . " | + " . K L . . . . M . " | + " . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " +--+---+ + " <E1.1.1> <E1.1> <E1> " | IPv4 | + " " |Server| + " " " " " " " " " " " " " " "" " " " " " " " | S2 | + <-- Enterprise E1 --> +------+ + + Figure 4: Support for Legacy RLOC-Based Services + + In a first instance, a legacy RLOC-based IPv4 client 'K' within + enterprise 'E1.1.1' can access RLOC-based IPv4 service 'L' within the + same enterprise as normal and without the need for any encapsulation. + + + +Templin Informational [Page 16] + +RFC 5720 RANGER February 2010 + + + Instead, 'K' discovers a "mapping" for 'L' through a simple lookup + within the 'E1.1.1' enterprise-local name service, and conveys + packets to 'L' through unencapsulated RLOC-based IPv4 routing and + addressing within the 'E1.1.1' commons. In many instances, this may + indeed be the preferred service-access model, even when EID-based + IPv6 services are widely deployed due to factors such as inability to + replace legacy IPv4 applications, IPv6 header overhead avoidance, + etc. + + In a second instance, RLOC-based IPv4 client 'K' can access RLOC- + based IPv4 server 'S2' on the legacy global IPv4 Internet in a number + of ways, based on the way the recursively nested 'E1.*' enterprises + are provisioned: + + o if all of the recursively nested 'E1.*' enterprises are configured + within the same IPv4 RLOC space, normal IPv4 forwarding will + convey unencapsulated IPv4 packets from 'K' toward 'R2', which + then acts as an IPv4 Network Address Translator (NAT) and/or an + ordinary IPv4 Enterprise Border Router. + + o if the recursively nested 'E1.*' enterprises are configured within + disjoint RLOC spaces, all EBGs 'Y1', 'X2', and 'R2' can be + configured to provide an IPv4 NAT capability (i.e., a recursive + nesting of NATs within NATs). However, this approach places + multiple instances of stateful NAT devices on the path, which can + lead to an overall degree of brittleness and intolerance to + routing changes. Instead, 'R2' can act as a "Carrier-Grade NAT + (CGN)", and 'V' can convey packets from 'K' to the CGN using + IPv4-in-IPv6-in-IPv4 tunneling. The CGN can then decapsulate the + inner, RLOC-based IPv4 packets and translate the IPv4 source + addresses into global IPv4 source addresses before sending the + packets on to 'S2'. + + o 'K' could be configured as an EID-based, IPv6-capable node and use + standard IPv6 routing to reach an IPv6/IPv4 translator located at + an EBR for the enterprise in which 'S2' resides. The translator + would then use IPv6-to-IPv4 translation before sending packets + onwards toward 'S2'. These and other alternatives are discussed + in [WING]. + + In a final instance, RLOC-based IPv4 client 'K' can access an RLOC- + based IPv4 server 'M' in a different enterprise within E1 as long as + both enterprises are configured over the same IPv4 RLOC space. If + the enterprises are configured over disjoint IPv4 RLOC spaces, + however, 'K' would still be able to access 'M' by using EID-based + IPv6 services, by using EID-based IPv4 services if an EID-based IPv4 + overlay were deployed, or by using some form of RLOC-based IPv4 NAT + traversal. 'K' could also access server 'M' if both 'V' and 'X2' + + + +Templin Informational [Page 17] + +RFC 5720 RANGER February 2010 + + + implemented an IPv6/IPv4 protocol translation capability. Finally, + 'K' and/or 'M' could implement a bump-in-the-wire or bump-in-the-api + IPv6/IPv4 protocol translation capability. + +3.4. Subnetwork Encapsulation and Adaptation Layer (SEAL) + + Tunnel endpoints that depend on ICMP feedback from routers within the + enterprise commons may be susceptible to undetected black holes due + to ICMP filtering gateways and/or off-path ICMP spoofing attacks from + a node pretending to be a router. Furthermore, rogue nodes within + enterprises that do not correctly implement ingress filtering can + send spoofed packets of any kind, e.g., for the purpose of mounting + denial-of-service and/or traffic amplification attacks targeting + underprivileged links. + + The Subnetwork Encapsulation and Adaptation Layer (SEAL) provisions + each encapsulated packet with a monotonically incrementing, extended + Identification field (i.e., the 32-bit SEAL_ID) that tunnel endpoints + can use as a nonce to detect off-path spoofing. Moreover, tunnel + endpoints that use SEAL can continue to operate correctly even if + some/many ICMPs are lost. Finally, tunnel endpoints that use SEAL + can adapt to subnetworks containing links with diverse MTUs + properties. + +3.5. Mobility Management + + Enterprise mobility use cases must be considered along several + different vectors: + + o nomadic enterprises and end systems may be satisfied to incur + address renumbering events as they move between new enterprise + network attachment points. + + o mobile enterprises with PI prefixes may be satisfied by dynamic + updates to the mapping system as long as they do not impart + unacceptable churn. + + o mobile enterprises and end systems with PA addresses/prefixes may + require additional supporting mechanisms that can accommodate + address/prefix renumbering. + + Nomadic enterprise mobility is already satisfied by currently + deployed technologies. For example, transporting a laptop computer + from a wireless-access hot spot to a home network LAN would allow the + nomadic device to re-establish connectivity at the expense of address + renumbering. Such renumbering may be acceptable, especially for + + + + + +Templin Informational [Page 18] + +RFC 5720 RANGER February 2010 + + + devices that do not require session persistence across mobility + events and do not configure servers with addresses published in the + global DNS. + + Mobile enterprises with PI prefixes that use VET and SEAL can move + between parent enterprise attachment points as long as they withdraw + the prefixes from the mapping systems of departed enterprises and + inject them into the mapping systems of new enterprises. When moving + between the lower recursive tiers of a common parent enterprise, such + a localized event mobility may result in no changes to the parent + enterprise's mapping system. Hence, the organizational structure of + a carefully arranged enterprise-within-enterprise framework may be + able to dampen mobility-related churn. For enterprises that require + in-the-network confidentiality, IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming + (MOBIKE) [RFC4555] may also be useful within this context. + + Mobile enterprises and end systems that move quickly between + disparate parent enterprise attachment points should not use PI + prefixes if withdrawing and announcing the prefixes would impart + unacceptable mapping/routing churn and packet loss. They should + instead use PA addresses/prefixes that can be coordinated via a + rendezvous service. Mobility management mechanisms such as Mobile + IPv6 [RFC3775] and the Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [RFC4423] can be + used to maintain a stable identifier for fast moving devices even as + they move quickly between visited enterprise attachment points. + + As a use case in point, consider an aircraft with a mobile router + moving between ground station points of attachment. If the ground + stations are located within the same enterprise, or within lower-tier + sites of the same parent enterprise, it should suffice for the + aircraft to announce its PI prefixes at its new point of attachment + and withdraw them from the old. This would avoid excessive mapping + system churn, since the prefixes need not be announced/withdrawn + within the parent enterprise, i.e., the churn is isolated to lower + layers of the recursive hierarchy. Note also that such movement + would not entail an aircraft-wide readdressing event. + + As a second example, consider a wireless handset moving between + service coverage areas maintained by independent providers with + peering arrangements. Since the coverage range of terrestrial + cellular wireless technologies is limited, mobility events may occur + on a much more aggressive timescale than some other examples. In + this case, the handset may expect to incur a readdressing event for + its access interface at least, and may be obliged to arrange for a + rendezvous service linkage. + + + + + + +Templin Informational [Page 19] + +RFC 5720 RANGER February 2010 + + + It should specifically be noted that the contingency of mobility + management solutions is not necessarily mutually exclusive and must + be considered in relation to specific use cases. The RANGER + architecture is therefore naturally inclusive in this regard. In + particular, RANGER could benefit from mechanisms that could support + rapid dynamic updates of PI prefix mappings without causing excessive + churn. + +3.6. Multihoming + + As with mobility management, multihoming use cases must be considered + along multiple vectors. Within an enterprise, EBRs can discover + multiple EBGs and use them in a fault-tolerant and load-balancing + fashion as long as they register their PI prefixes with each such + EBG, as described in Section 3.3.1. These registrations are created + through the transmission of Router Advertisement messages that + percolate up through the recursive enterprise-within-enterprise + hierarchy. + + As a first case in point, consider the enterprise network of a major + corporation that obtains services from a number of ISPs. The + corporation should be able to register its PI prefixes with all of + its ISPs, and use any of the ISPs for its Internet access services. + + As a second use case, consider an aircraft with a diverse set of + wireless links (e.g., VHF, 802.16, directional, SATCOM, etc.). The + aircraft should be able to select and utilize the most appropriate + link(s) based on the phase of flight and to change seamlessly between + links as necessary. Other examples include a nomadic laptop with + both 802.11 and Ethernet links, a wireless handset with both CDMA + wireless and 802.11, etc. + + As with mobility management, the contingency of solutions is not + necessarily mutually exclusive and can combine to suit use cases + within the scope of the RANGER architecture. + +3.7. Implications for the Internet + + Selection of mapping alternatives may have significant implications + for applications, server selection, route determination, security, + etc. In particular, applications that expect all packets (including + initial ones) to experience similar delays may be adversely affected + by a scheme that imposes non-negligible delays when initial packets + are queued while a look-aside mapping table is consulted. Still + other applications may experience significant startup delays when its + initial packets are dropped during a mapping lookup event. These + + + + + +Templin Informational [Page 20] + +RFC 5720 RANGER February 2010 + + + factors would seem to favor a scheme that is able to forward initial + packets along a path with sub-optimal delay while a mapping lookup is + performed in parallel, e.g., such as when a "default mapper" is used. + + Generally speaking, proactive mapping-maintenance mechanisms may have + scaling issues with the amount of updates they generate, while + reactive mechanisms may involve effects to the delay of initial + packets before the cached state is updated. Also to be considered + are attacks against the mapping mechanism, which may result in denial + of service of the mapping cache. + + Encapsulation of packets in automatically created tunnels involves a + number of issues as well. There are obvious interactions between + encapsulation overhead and the effective tunnel MTU, which can be + addressed by SEAL and (when necessary) careful operational link + arrangements. Moreover, it is important to minimize the impact to + the global routing table without at the same time impacting the + ability of legacy Internet networks to connect to those employing + RANGER. As long as other nodes in the Internet need to connect to + networks implementing RANGER, EID routes need to appear both in the + mapping system and the global BGP routing tables. This can be + accommodated by keeping the number of prefixes aggregated by RANGER + to the bare minimum through efficient aggregation (e.g., one or a few + [PREF]::/4 IPv6 prefixes instead of millions of [PREF]::/32 + prefixes). + +4. Related Initiatives + + The origins of the RANGER architectural principles can be traced to + the "Catenet model for internetworking" ([CATENET], [IEN48], + [RFC2775]) beginning as early as the mid-1970's. Subsequently, + deliberations of the ROAD group [RFC1380] and related efforts such as + NIMROD [RFC1753] provided a sustained evolution of the concepts. + [RFC1955], "New Scheme for Internet Routing and Addressing (ENCAPS) + for IPNG", captures the high-level architectural aspects of the ROAD + group deliberations. + + These foundational works significantly influenced more recent + developments, including the X-Bone initiative [XBONE], which explored + virtual topologies manifested through tunneling. Various tunneling + approaches including IP-in-IP ([RFC2003], [RFC4213]), 6over4 + [RFC2529], and ISATAP [RFC5214] have evolved from the mid-1990's + until the present day and are used in common, operational practice. + Tunnel-mode IPsec [RFC4301] is also commonly used for separation of + security domains within enterprises. + + + + + + +Templin Informational [Page 21] + +RFC 5720 RANGER February 2010 + + + Currently, initiatives with similar properties to RANGER are under + development within the IRTF Routing Research Group (RRG) and within + IETF working groups such as LISP, SOFTWIRE, V6OPS, and others. + Numerous proposals have been offered within the RRG, including the + Locator-Identifier Split Protocol (LISP) [LISP], Six-One [VOGT], ILNP + [ILNP], Internet vastly improved plumbing (Ivip) [WHITTLE], A + Practical Transit-Mapping Service (APT) [JEN], and Virtual + Aggregation [VA]. Still other similar initiatives almost certainly + exist. + + While RANGER shares many properties with these earlier works, it + uniquely provides a top-to-bottom articulation of how the various + pieces fit together within a recursively nested "enterprise-within- + enterprise" (or "network-of-networks") framework. In this way, it + bears striking resemblance to the network-of-networks model + envisioned by CATENET. RANGER further provides a detailed + consideration of challenging issues such as autoconfiguration, + provider-independent addressing, border router discovery, tunnel MTU, + multihoming, etc. that many other approaches have either overlooked + or left for future work. A detailed analysis of RANGER applicability + in various use case scenarios is provided in "RANGER Scenarios + (RANGERS)" [RUSSERT]. + +5. Security Considerations + + Communications between endpoints within different sites inside an + enterprise are carried across a commons that joins organizational + entities with a mutual spirit of cooperation, but between which there + may be competing business/sociological/political interests. As a + result, mechanisms that rely on feedback from routers on the path may + become brittle or susceptible to spoofing attacks. This is due to + the fact that IP packets can be lost due to congestion or packet- + filtering gateways and that the source addresses of IP packets can be + forged. Moreover, IP packets in general can be generated by + anonymous attackers, e.g., from a rogue node within a third-party + enterprise that has malicious intent toward a victim. + + Path MTU Discovery is an example of a mechanism that relies on ICMP + feedback from routers on the path and, as such, is susceptible to + these issues. For IPv4, a common workaround is to disable Path MTU + Discovery and let fragmentation occur in the network if necessary. + For IPv6, lack of fragmentation support in the network precludes this + option such that the mitigation typically recommended is to discard + ICMP messages that contain insufficient information and/or to operate + with the minimum IPv6 path MTU. This example extends also to other + mechanisms that either rely on or are enhanced by feedback from + network devices; however, attack vectors based on non-ICMP messages + are also subject for concern. + + + +Templin Informational [Page 22] + +RFC 5720 RANGER February 2010 + + + The RANGER architecture supports effective mitigations for attacks + such as distributed denial-of-service, traffic amplification, etc. + In particular, when VET and SEAL are used, EBGs can use the 32-bit + identification encoded in the SEAL header as well as ingress + filtering to determine if a message has come from a topologically + correct enterprise located across the commons. This allows + enterprises to employ effective mitigations at their borders without + the requirement for mutual cooperation from other enterprises. When + source address spoofing by on-path attackers located within the + commons is also subject for concern, additional securing mechanisms + such as tunnel-mode IPsec between enterprise EBGs can also be used. + + EBRs can obtain PI prefixes through arrangements with a prefix + delegation authority. Thereafter, the EBR can announce and/or + withdraw the prefixes within an enterprise by sending IPv6 Router + Advertisements (RAs). In environments where additional + authenticating mechanisms are necessary, the EBR can sign its RAs + using SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) [RFC3971]. + + While the RANGER architecture does not in itself address security + considerations, it proposes an architectural framework for functional + specifications that do. Security concerns with tunneling, along with + recommendations that are compatible with the RANGER architecture, are + found in [HOAGLAND]. + +6. Acknowledgements + + This work was inspired through the encouragement of the Boeing DC&NT + network technology team and through the communications of the IESG. + + Many individuals have contributed to the architectural principles + that form the basis for RANGER over the course of many years. The + following individuals have given specific feedback on the RANGER + document itself: Jari Arkko, Brian Carpenter, Eric Fleischman, Joel + Halpern, Thomas Henderson, Steven Russert, Dallas Thomas, Robin + Whittle. + +7. References + +7.1. Normative References + + [RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, September + 1981. + + [RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 + (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998. + + + + + +Templin Informational [Page 23] + +RFC 5720 RANGER February 2010 + + +7.2. Informative References + + [CATENET] Pouzin, L., "A Proposal for Interconnecting Packet + Switching Networks", Proceedings of EUROCOMP, Bronel + University, p. 1023-1036, May 1974. + + [COEXIST] Arkko, J. and M. Townsley, "IPv4 Run-Out and IPv4-IPv6 Co- + Existence Scenarios", Work in Progress, July 2009. + + [BAUER] Bauer, C. and S. Ayaz, "ATN Topology Considerations for + Aeronautical NEMO RO", Work in Progress, September 2009. + + [LISP] Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis, + "Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)", Work in Progress, + September 2009. + + [HOAGLAND] Hoagland, J., Krishnan, S., and D. Thaler, "Security + Concerns With IP Tunneling", Work in Progress, October + 2008. + + [JEN] Jen, D., Meisel, M., Massey, D., Wang, L., Zhang, B., and + L. Zhang, "APT: A Practical Transit Mapping Service", Work + in Progress, November 2007. + + [RUSSERT] Russert, S., Fleischman, E., and F. Templin, "RANGER + Scenarios", Work in Progress, September 2009. + + [SEAL] Templin, F., Ed., "The Subnetwork Encapsulation and + Adaptation Layer (SEAL)", RFC 5320, February 2010. + + [VET] Templin, F., Ed., "Virtual Enterprise Traversal (VET)", + RFC 5558, February 2010. + + [WING] Wing, D., Ward, D., and A. Durand, "A Comparison of + Proposals to Replace NAT-PT", Work in Progress, September + 2008. + + [IEN48] Cerf, V., "The Catenet Model for Internetworking", July + 1978. + + [ILNP] Atkinson, R., "ILNP Concept of Operations", Work in + Progress, December 2008. + + [RFC1380] Gross, P. and P. Almquist, "IESG Deliberations on Routing + and Addressing", RFC 1380, November 1992. + + + + + + +Templin Informational [Page 24] + +RFC 5720 RANGER February 2010 + + + [RFC1753] Chiappa, N., "IPng Technical Requirements Of the Nimrod + Routing and Addressing Architecture", RFC 1753, December + 1994. + + [RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G., + and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", + BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996. + + [RFC1955] Hinden, R., "New Scheme for Internet Routing and + Addressing (ENCAPS) for IPNG", RFC 1955, June 1996. + + [RFC2003] Perkins, C., "IP Encapsulation within IP", RFC 2003, + October 1996. + + [RFC2529] Carpenter, B. and C. Jung, "Transmission of IPv6 over IPv4 + Domains without Explicit Tunnels", RFC 2529, March 1999. + + [RFC2775] Carpenter, B., "Internet Transparency", RFC 2775, February + 2000. + + [RFC3633] Troan, O. and R. Droms, "IPv6 Prefix Options for Dynamic + Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) version 6", RFC 3633, + December 2003. + + [RFC3775] Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support + in IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004. + + [RFC3971] Arkko, J., Ed., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, + "SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005. + + [RFC4213] Nordmark, E. and R. Gilligan, "Basic Transition Mechanisms + for IPv6 Hosts and Routers", RFC 4213, October 2005. + + [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the + Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005. + + [RFC4423] Moskowitz, R. and P. Nikander, "Host Identity Protocol + (HIP) Architecture", RFC 4423, May 2006. + + [RFC4555] Eronen, P., "IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol + (MOBIKE)", RFC 4555, June 2006. + + [RFC4852] Bound, J., Pouffary, Y., Klynsma, S., Chown, T., and D. + Green, "IPv6 Enterprise Network Analysis - IP Layer 3 + Focus", RFC 4852, April 2007. + + + + + + +Templin Informational [Page 25] + +RFC 5720 RANGER February 2010 + + + [RFC5214] Templin, F., Gleeson, T., and D. Thaler, "Intra-Site + Automatic Tunnel Addressing Protocol (ISATAP)", RFC 5214, + March 2008. + + [RFC5340] Coltun, R., Ferguson, D., Moy, J., and A. Lindem, "OSPF + for IPv6", RFC 5340, July 2008. + + [VA] Francis, P., Xu, X., Ballani, H., Jen, D., Raszuk, R., and + L. Zhang, "FIB Suppression with Virtual Aggregation", Work + in Progress, October 2009. + + [VOGT] Vogt, C., "Six/One: A Solution for Routing and Addressing + in IPv6", Work in Progress, October 2009. + + [WHITTLE] Whittle, R., "Ivip (Internet Vastly Improved Plumbing) + Architecture", Work in Progress, August 2008. + + [XBONE] Touch, J., "The X-Bone", March 1997, + http://www.isi.edu/touch/pubs/ngi97/x-bone-ngi97.pdf + +Author's Address + + Fred L. Templin + Boeing Phantom Works + P.O. Box 3707 MC 7L-49 + Seattle, WA 98124 + USA + + EMail: fltemplin@acm.org + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Templin Informational [Page 26] + |