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| author | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
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| committer | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
| commit | 4bfd864f10b68b71482b35c818559068ef8d5797 (patch) | |
| tree | e3989f47a7994642eb325063d46e8f08ffa681dc /doc/rfc/rfc5981.txt | |
| parent | ea76e11061bda059ae9f9ad130a9895cc85607db (diff) | |
doc: Add RFC documents
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diff --git a/doc/rfc/rfc5981.txt b/doc/rfc/rfc5981.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8e679f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/rfc/rfc5981.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2075 @@ + + + + + + +Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Manner +Request for Comments: 5981 Aalto University +Category: Experimental M. Stiemerling +ISSN: 2070-1721 NEC + H. Tschofenig + Nokia Siemens Networks + R. Bless, Ed. + KIT + February 2011 + + + Authorization for NSIS Signaling Layer Protocols + +Abstract + + Signaling layer protocols specified within the Next Steps in + Signaling (NSIS) framework may rely on the General Internet Signaling + Transport (GIST) protocol to handle authorization. Still, the + signaling layer protocol above GIST itself may require separate + authorization to be performed when a node receives a request for a + certain kind of service or resources. This document presents a + generic model and object formats for session authorization within the + NSIS signaling layer protocols. The goal of session authorization is + to allow the exchange of information between network elements in + order to authorize the use of resources for a service and to + coordinate actions between the signaling and transport planes. + +Status of This Memo + + This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is + published for examination, experimental implementation, and + evaluation. + + This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet + community. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering + Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF + community. It has received public review and has been approved for + publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not + all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of + Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741. + + Information about the current status of this document, any errata, + and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at + http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5981. + + + + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 1] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the + document authors. All rights reserved. + + This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal + Provisions Relating to IETF Documents + (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of + publication of this document. Please review these documents + carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect + to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must + include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of + the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as + described in the Simplified BSD License. + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 + 2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 3. Session Authorization Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 3.1. Session Authorization Object format . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 3.2. Session Authorization Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 + 3.2.1. Authorizing Entity Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 3.2.2. Session Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 3.2.3. Source Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 3.2.4. Destination Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 3.2.5. Start Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 3.2.6. End Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + 3.2.7. NSLP Object List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + 3.2.8. Authentication Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 4. Integrity of the SESSION_AUTH Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 4.1. Shared Symmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 4.1.1. Operational Setting Using Shared Symmetric Keys . . . 16 + 4.2. Kerberos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 + 4.3. Public Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + 4.3.1. Operational Setting for Public-Key-Based + Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 + 4.4. HMAC Signed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 + 5. Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 + 5.1. The Coupled Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 + 5.2. The Associated Model with One Policy Server . . . . . . . 23 + 5.3. The Associated Model with Two Policy Servers . . . . . . . 24 + 5.4. The Non-Associated Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 + 6. Message Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 + 6.1. Generation of the SESSION_AUTH by an Authorizing Entity . 25 + 6.2. Processing within the QoS NSLP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 + 6.2.1. Message Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 + 6.2.2. Message Reception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 2] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + + 6.2.3. Authorization (QNE or PDP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 + 6.2.4. Error Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 + 6.3. Processing with the NATFW NSLP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 + 6.3.1. Message Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 + 6.3.2. Message Reception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 + 6.3.3. Authorization (Router/PDP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 + 6.3.4. Error Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 + 6.4. Integrity Protection of NSLP Messages . . . . . . . . . . 29 + 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 + 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 + 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 + 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 + 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 + 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 + +1. Introduction + + The Next Steps in Signaling (NSIS) framework [RFC4080] defines a + suite of protocols for the next generation in Internet signaling. + The design is based on a generalized transport protocol for signaling + applications, the General Internet Signaling Transport (GIST) + [RFC5971], and various kinds of signaling applications. Two + signaling applications and their NSIS Signaling Layer Protocol (NSLP) + have been designed, a Quality of Service application (QoS NSLP) + [RFC5974] and a NAT/firewall application (NATFW NSLP) [RFC5973]. + + The basic security architecture for NSIS is based on a chain-of-trust + model, where each GIST hop may choose the appropriate security + protocol, taking into account the signaling application requirements. + For instance, communication between two directly adjacent GIST peers + may be secured via TCP/TLS. On the one hand, this model is + appropriate for a number of different use cases and allows the + signaling applications to leave the handling of security to GIST. On + the other hand, several sessions of different signaling applications + are then multiplexed onto the same GIST TLS connection. + + Yet, in order to allow for finer-grain per-session or per-user + admission control, it is necessary to provide a mechanism for + ensuring that the use of resources by a host has been properly + authorized before allowing the signaling application to commit the + resource request, e.g., a QoS reservation or mappings for NAT + traversal. In order to meet this requirement, there must be + information in the NSLP message that may be used to verify the + validity of the request. This can be done by providing the host with + a Session Authorization Object that is inserted into the message and + verified by the respective network elements. + + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 3] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + + This document describes a generic NSLP-layer Session Authorization + Object (SESSION_AUTH) used to convey authorization information for + the request. "Generic" in this context means that it is usable by + all NSLPs. The scheme is based on third-party tokens. A trusted + third party provides authentication tokens to clients and allows + verification of the information by the network elements. The + requesting host inserts the authorization information (e.g., a policy + object) acquired from the trusted third party into the NSLP message + to allow verification of the network resource request. Network + elements verify the request and then process it based on admission + policy (e.g., they perform a resource reservation or change bindings + or firewall filter). This work is based on RFC 3520 [RFC3520] and + RFC 3521 [RFC3521]. + + The default operation when using NSLP-layer session authorization is + to add one authorization policy object. Yet, in order to support + end-to-end signaling and request authorization from different + networks, a host initiating an NSLP signaling session may add more + than one SESSION_AUTH object in the message. The identifier of the + authorizing entity can be used by the network elements to use the + third party they trust to verify the request. + +2. Conventions Used in This Document + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this + document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119 + [RFC2119]. + + The term "NSLP node" (NN) is used to refer to an NSIS node running an + NSLP protocol that can make use of the authorization object discussed + in this document. Currently, this node would run either the QoS NSLP + [RFC5974] or the NAT/Firewall NSLP [RFC5973] service. + +3. Session Authorization Object + + This section presents a new NSLP-layer object called session + authorization (SESSION_AUTH). The SESSION_AUTH object can be used in + the currently specified and future NSLP protocols. + + The authorization attributes follow the format and specification + given in RFC3520 [RFC3520]. + + + + + + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 4] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + +3.1. Session Authorization Object format + + The SESSION_AUTH object contains a list of fields that describe the + session, along with other attributes. The object header follows the + generic NSLP object header; therefore, it can be used together with + any NSLP. + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + |A|B|r|r| Type |r|r|r|r| Length | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + + + // Session Authorization Attribute List // + + + + +---------------------------------------------------------------+ + + The value for the Type field comes from shared NSLP object type + space. The Length field is given in units of 32-bit words and + measures the length of the Value component of the TLV object (i.e., + it does not include the standard header). + + The bits marked 'A' and 'B' are extensibility flags and are used to + signal the desired treatment for objects whose treatment has not been + defined in the protocol specification (i.e., whose Type field is + unknown at the receiver). The following four categories of object + have been identified, and are described here for informational + purposes only (for normative behavior, refer to the particular NSLP + documents, e.g., [RFC5974] [RFC5973]). + + AB=00 ("Mandatory"): If the object is not understood, the entire + message containing it MUST be rejected, and an error message sent + back (usually of class/code "Protocol Error/Unknown object + present"). + + AB=01 ("Ignore"): If the object is not understood, it MUST be + deleted, and the rest of the message processed as usual. + + AB=10 ("Forward"): If the object is not understood, it MUST be + retained unchanged in any message forwarded as a result of message + processing, but not stored locally. + + AB=11 ("Refresh"): If the object is not understood, it should be + incorporated into the locally stored signaling application state + for this flow/session, forwarded in any resulting message, and + also used in any refresh or repair message which is generated + locally. This flag combination is not used by all NSLPs, e.g., it + is not used in the NATFW NSLP. + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 5] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + + The remaining bits marked 'r' are reserved. The extensibility flags + follow the definition in the GIST specification. The SESSION_AUTH + object defined in this specification MUST have the AB bits set to + "10". An NSLP Node (NN) may use the authorization information if it + is configured to do so, but may also just skip the object. + + Type: SESSION_AUTH_OBJECT (0x016) + + Length: Variable, contains length of session authorization object + list in units of 32-bit words. + + Session Authorization Attribute List: variable length + + The session authorization attribute list is a collection of + objects that describes the session and provides other information + necessary to verify resource request (e.g., a resource + reservation, binding, or firewall filter change request). An + initial set of valid objects is described in Section 3.2. + +3.2. Session Authorization Attributes + + A session authorization attribute may contain a variety of + information and has both an attribute type and sub-type. The + attribute itself MUST be a multiple of 4 octets in length, and any + attributes that are not a multiple of 4 octets long MUST be padded to + a 4-octet boundary. All padding bytes MUST have a value of zero. + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Length | X-Type | SubType | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + // Value ... // + +---------------------------------------------------------------+ + + Length: 16 bits + + The Length field is two octets and indicates the actual length of + the attribute (including Length, X-Type, and SubType fields) in + number of octets. The length does NOT include any padding of the + value field to make the attribute's length a multiple of 4 octets. + + X-Type: 8 bits + + Session authorization attribute type (X-Type) field is one octet. + IANA acts as a registry for X-Types as described in Section 8, + IANA Considerations. This specification uses the following + X-Types: + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 6] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + + 1. AUTH_ENT_ID: The unique identifier of the entity that + authorized the session. + + 2. SESSION_ID: The unique identifier for this session, usually + created locally at the authorizing entity. See also RFC 3520 + [RFC3520]; not to be confused with the SESSION-ID of GIST/ + NSIS. + + 3. SOURCE_ADDR: The address specification for the signaling + session initiator, i.e., the source address of the signaling + message originator. + + 4. DEST_ADDR: The address specification for the signaling session + endpoint. + + 5. START_TIME: The starting time for the session. + + 6. END_TIME: The end time for the session. + + 7. AUTHENTICATION_DATA: The authentication data of the Session + Authorization Object. + + SubType: 8 bits + + Session authorization attribute sub-type is one octet in length. + The value of the SubType depends on the X-Type. + + Value: variable length + + The attribute-specific information. + +3.2.1. Authorizing Entity Identifier + + The AUTH_ENT_ID is used to identify the entity that authorized the + initial service request and generated the Session Authorization + Object. The AUTH_ENT_ID may be represented in various formats, and + the SubType is used to define the format for the ID. The format for + AUTH_ENT_ID is as follows: + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Length | X-Type | SubType | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + // OctetString ... // + +---------------------------------------------------------------+ + + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 7] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + + Length: Length of the attribute, which MUST be > 4. + + X-Type: AUTH_ENT_ID + + SubType: + + The following sub-types for AUTH_ENT_ID are defined. IANA acts as + a registry for AUTH_ENT_ID SubTypes as described in Section 8, + IANA Considerations. Initially, the registry contains the + following SubTypes of AUTH_ENT_ID: + + 1. IPV4_ADDRESS: IPv4 address represented in 32 bits. + + 2. IPV6_ADDRESS: IPv6 address represented in 128 bits. + + 3. FQDN: Fully Qualified Domain Name as defined in [RFC1034] as + an ASCII string. + + 4. ASCII_DN: X.500 Distinguished name as defined in [RFC4514] as + an ASCII string. + + 5. UNICODE_DN: X.500 Distinguished name as defined in [RFC4514] + as a UTF-8 string. + + 6. URI: Universal Resource Identifier, as defined in [RFC3986]. + + 7. KRB_PRINCIPAL: Fully Qualified Kerberos Principal name + represented by the ASCII string of a principal, followed by + the @ realm name as defined in [RFC4120] (e.g., + johndoe@nowhere). + + 8. X509_V3_CERT: The Distinguished Name of the subject of the + certificate as defined in [RFC4514] as a UTF-8 string. + + 9. PGP_CERT: The OpenPGP certificate of the authorizing entity + as defined as Public-Key Packet in [RFC4880]. + + 10. HMAC_SIGNED: Indicates that the AUTHENTICATION_DATA attribute + contains a self-signed HMAC signature [RFC2104] that ensures + the integrity of the NSLP message. The HMAC is calculated + over all NSLP objects given in the NSLP_OBJECT_LIST attribute + that MUST also be present. The object specifies the hash + algorithm that is used for calculation of the HMAC as + Transform ID from Transform Type 3 of the IKEv2 registry + [RFC5996]. + + OctetString: Contains the authorizing entity identifier. + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 8] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + +3.2.2. Session Identifier + + SESSION_ID is a unique identifier used by the authorizing entity to + identify the request. It may be used for a number of purposes, + including replay detection, or to correlate this request to a policy + decision entry made by the authorizing entity. For example, the + SESSION_ID can be based on simple sequence numbers or on a standard + NTP timestamp. + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Length | X-Type | SubType | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + // OctetString ... // + +---------------------------------------------------------------+ + + Length: Length of the attribute, which MUST be > 4. + + X-Type: SESSION_ID + + SubType: + + No sub-types for SESSION_ID are currently defined; this field MUST be + set to zero. The authorizing entity is the only network entity that + needs to interpret the contents of the SESSION_ID; therefore, the + contents and format are implementation dependent. + + OctetString: The OctetString contains the session identifier. + +3.2.3. Source Address + + SOURCE_ADDR is used to identify the source address specification of + the authorized session. This X-Type may be useful in some scenarios + to make sure the resource request has been authorized for that + particular source address and/or port. Usually, it corresponds to + the signaling source, e.g., the IP source address of the GIST packet, + or flow source or flow destination address, respectively, which are + contained in the GIST MRI (Message Routing Information) object. + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Length | X-Type | SubType | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + // OctetString ... // + +---------------------------------------------------------------+ + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 9] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + + Length: Length of the attribute, which MUST be > 4. + + X-Type: SOURCE_ADDR + + SubType: + + The following sub-types for SOURCE_ADDR are defined. IANA acts as + a registry for SOURCE_ADDR SubTypes as described in Section 8, + IANA Considerations. Initially, the registry contains the + following SubTypes for SOURCE_ADDR: + + 1. IPV4_ADDRESS: IPv4 address represented in 32 bits. + + 2. IPV6_ADDRESS: IPv6 address represented in 128 bits. + + 3. UDP_PORT_LIST: list of UDP port specifications, represented as + 16 bits per list entry. + + 4. TCP_PORT_LIST: list of TCP port specifications, represented as + 16 bits per list entry. + + 5. SPI: Security Parameter Index, represented in 32 bits. + + OctetString: The OctetString contains the source address information. + + In scenarios where a source address is required (see Section 5), at + least one of the sub-types 1 or 2 MUST be included in every Session + Authorization Object. Multiple SOURCE_ADDR attributes MAY be + included if multiple addresses have been authorized. The source + address of the request (e.g., a QoS NSLP RESERVE) MUST match one of + the SOURCE_ADDR attributes contained in this Session Authorization + Object. + + At most, one instance of sub-type 3 MAY be included in every Session + Authorization Object. At most, one instance of sub-type 4 MAY be + included in every Session Authorization Object. Inclusion of a sub- + type 3 attribute does not prevent inclusion of a sub-type 4 attribute + (i.e., both UDP and TCP ports may be authorized). + + If no PORT attributes are specified, then all ports are considered + valid; otherwise, only the specified ports are authorized for use. + Every source address and port list must be included in a separate + SOURCE_ADDR attribute. + + + + + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 10] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + +3.2.4. Destination Address + + DEST_ADDR is used to identify the destination address of the + authorized session. This X-Type may be useful in some scenarios to + make sure the resource request has been authorized for that + particular destination address and/or port. + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Length | X-Type | SubType | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + // OctetString ... // + +---------------------------------------------------------------+ + + Length: Length of the attribute in number of octets, which MUST be > + 4. + + X-Type: DEST_ADDR + + SubType: + + The following sub-types for DEST_ADDR are defined. IANA acts as a + registry for DEST_ADDR SubTypes as described in Section 8, IANA + Considerations. Initially, the registry contains the following + SubTypes for DEST_ADDR: + + 1. IPV4_ADDRESS: IPv4 address represented in 32 bits. + + 2. IPV6_ADDRESS: IPv6 address represented in 128 bits. + + 3. UDP_PORT_LIST: list of UDP port specifications, represented as + 16 bits per list entry. + + 4. TCP_PORT_LIST: list of TCP port specifications, represented as + 16 bits per list entry. + + 5. SPI: Security Parameter Index, represented in 32 bits. + + OctetString: The OctetString contains the destination address + specification. + + In scenarios where a destination address is required (see Section 5), + at least one of the sub-types 1 or 2 MUST be included in every + Session Authorization Object. Multiple DEST_ADDR attributes MAY be + included if multiple addresses have been authorized. The destination + + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 11] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + + address field of the resource reservation datagram (e.g., QoS NSLP + Reserve) MUST match one of the DEST_ADDR attributes contained in this + Session Authorization Object. + + At most, one instance of sub-type 3 MAY be included in every Session + Authorization Object. At most, one instance of sub-type 4 MAY be + included in every Session Authorization Object. Inclusion of a sub- + type 3 attribute does not prevent inclusion of a sub-type 4 attribute + (i.e., both UDP and TCP ports may be authorized). + + If no PORT attributes are specified, then all ports are considered + valid; otherwise, only the specified ports are authorized for use. + + Every destination address and port list must be included in a + separate DEST_ADDR attribute. + +3.2.5. Start Time + + START_TIME is used to identify the start time of the authorized + session and can be used to prevent replay attacks. If the + SESSION_AUTH object is presented in a resource request, the network + SHOULD reject the request if it is not received within a few seconds + of the start time specified. + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Length | X-Type | SubType | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + // OctetString ... // + +---------------------------------------------------------------+ + + Length: Length of the attribute, which MUST be > 4. + + X-Type: START_TIME + + SubType: + + The following sub-type for START_TIME is defined. IANA acts as a + registry for START_TIME SubTypes as described in Section 8, IANA + Considerations. Initially, the registry contains the following + SubType for START_TIME: + + 1 NTP_TIMESTAMP: NTP Timestamp Format as defined in RFC 5905 + [RFC5905]. + + OctetString: The OctetString contains the start time. + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 12] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + +3.2.6. End Time + + END_TIME is used to identify the end time of the authorized session + and can be used to limit the amount of time that resources are + authorized for use (e.g., in prepaid session scenarios). + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Length | X-Type | SubType | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + // OctetString ... // + +---------------------------------------------------------------+ + + Length: Length of the attribute, which MUST be > 4. + + X-Type: END_TIME + + SubType: + + The following sub-type for END_TIME is defined. IANA acts as a + registry for END_TIME SubTypes as described in Section 8, IANA + Considerations. Initially, the registry contains the following + SubType for END_TIME: + + 1 NTP_TIMESTAMP: NTP Timestamp Format as defined in RFC 5905 + [RFC5905]. + + OctetString: The OctetString contains the end time. + +3.2.7. NSLP Object List + + The NSLP_OBJECT_LIST attribute contains a list of NSLP object types + that are used in the keyed-hash computation whose result is given in + the AUTHENTICATION_DATA attribute. This allows for an integrity + protection of NSLP PDUs. If an NSLP_OBJECT_LIST attribute has been + included in the SESSION_AUTH object, an AUTHENTICATION_DATA attribute + MUST also be present. + + The creator of this attribute lists every NSLP object type whose NSLP + PDU object was included in the computation of the hash. The hash + computation has to follow the order of the NSLP object types as + specified by the list. The receiver can verify the integrity of the + NSLP PDU by computing a hash over all NSLP objects that are listed in + this attribute (in the given order), including all the attributes of + the authorization object. Since all NSLP object types are unique + over all different NSLPs, this will work for any NSLP. + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 13] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + + Basic NSIS Transport Layer Protocol (NTLP) / NSLP objects like the + session ID, the NSLPID, and the MRI MUST be always included in the + HMAC. Since they are not carried within the NSLP itself, but only + within GIST, they have to be provided for HMAC calculation, e.g., + they can be delivered via the GIST API. They MUST be normalized to + their network representation from [RFC5971] again before calculating + the hash. These values MUST be hashed first (in the order session + ID, NSLPID, MRI), before any other NSLP object values that are + included in the hash computation. + + A summary of the NSLP_OBJECT_LIST attribute format is described + below. + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ + | Length | NSLP_OBJ_LIST | zero | + +---------------+---------------+-------+-------+---------------+ + | # of signed NSLP objects = n | rsv | NSLP object type (1) | + +-------+-------+---------------+-------+-------+---------------+ + | rsv | NSLP object type (2) | ..... // + +-------+-------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ + | rsv | NSLP object type (n) | (padding if required) | + +--------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+ + + Length: Length of the attribute, which MUST be > 4. + + X-Type: NSLP_OBJECT_LIST + + SubType: No sub-types for NSLP_OBJECT_LIST are currently defined. + This field MUST be set to 0 and ignored upon reception. + + # of signed NSLP objects: The number n of NSLP object types that + follow. n=0 is allowed; in that case, only a padding field is + contained. + + rsv: reserved bits; MUST be set to 0 and ignored upon reception. + + NSLP object type: the NSLP 12-bit object type identifier of the + object that was included in the hash calculation. The NSLP object + type values comprise only 12 bits, so four bits per type value are + currently not used within the list. Depending on the number of + signed objects, a corresponding padding word of 16 bits must be + supplied. + + + + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 14] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + + padding: padding MUST be added if the number of NSLP objects is even + and MUST NOT be added if the number of NSLP objects is odd. If + padding has to be applied, the padding field MUST be 16 bits set to + 0, and its contents MUST be ignored upon reception. + +3.2.8. Authentication Data + + The AUTHENTICATION_DATA attribute contains the authentication data of + the SESSION_AUTH object and signs all the data in the object up to + the AUTHENTICATION_DATA. If the AUTHENTICATION_DATA attribute has + been included in the SESSION_AUTH object, it MUST be the last + attribute in the list. The algorithm used to compute the + authentication data depends on the AUTH_ENT_ID SubType field. See + Section 4 entitled "Integrity of the SESSION_AUTH Object". + + A summary of the AUTHENTICATION_DATA attribute format is described + below. + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Length | X-Type | SubType | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + // OctetString ... // + +---------------------------------------------------------------+ + + Length: Length of the attribute, which MUST be > 4. + + X-Type: AUTHENTICATION_DATA + + SubType: No sub-types for AUTHENTICATION_DATA are currently defined. + This field MUST be set to 0 and ignored upon reception. + + OctetString: The OctetString contains the authentication data of the + SESSION_AUTH. + +4. Integrity of the SESSION_AUTH Object + + This section describes how to ensure that the integrity of the + SESSION_AUTH object is preserved. + +4.1. Shared Symmetric Keys + + In shared symmetric key environments, the AUTH_ENT_ID MUST be of sub- + types: IPV4_ADDRESS, IPV6_ADDRESS, FQDN, ASCII_DN, UNICODE_DN, or + URI. An example SESSION_AUTH object is shown below. + + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 15] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + |1|0|0|0| Type = SESSION_AUTH |0|0|0|0| Object Length | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Length | AUTH_ENT_ID | IPV4_ADDRESS | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | OctetString ... (The authorizing entity's Identifier) | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Length | AUTH_DATA | zero | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Key-ID | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | OctetString ... (Authentication data) | + +---------------------------------------------------------------+ + + Figure 1: Example of a SESSION_AUTH Object + +4.1.1. Operational Setting Using Shared Symmetric Keys + + This assumes both the Authorizing Entity and the network router/PDP + (Policy Decision Point) are provisioned with shared symmetric keys, + policies detailing which algorithm to be used for computing the + authentication data, and the expected length of the authentication + data for that particular algorithm. + + Key maintenance is outside the scope of this document, but + SESSION_AUTH implementations MUST at least provide the ability to + manually configure keys and their parameters. The key used to + produce the authentication data is identified by the AUTH_ENT_ID + field. Since multiple keys may be configured for a particular + AUTH_ENT_ID value, the first 32 bits of the AUTHENTICATION_DATA field + MUST be a Key-ID to be used to identify the appropriate key. Each + key must also be configured with lifetime parameters for the time + period within which it is valid as well as an associated + cryptographic algorithm parameter specifying the algorithm to be used + with the key. At a minimum, all SESSION_AUTH implementations MUST + support the HMAC-SHA2-256 [RFC4868] [RFC2104] cryptographic algorithm + for computing the authentication data. + + It is good practice to regularly change keys. Keys MUST be + configurable such that their lifetimes overlap, thereby allowing + smooth transitions between keys. At the midpoint of the lifetime + overlap between two keys, senders should transition from using the + current key to the next/longer-lived key. Meanwhile, receivers + simply accept any identified key received within its configured + lifetime and reject those that are not. + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 16] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + +4.2. Kerberos + + Since Kerberos [RFC4120] is widely used for end-user authorization, + e.g., in Windows domains, it is well suited for being used in the + context of user-based authorization for NSIS sessions. For instance, + a user may request a ticket for authorization to install rules in an + NATFW-capable router. + + In a Kerberos environment, it is assumed that the user of the NSLP + requesting host requests a ticket from the Kerberos Key Distribution + Center (KDC) for using the NSLP node (router) as a resource (target + service). The NSLP requesting host (client) can present the ticket + to the NSLP node via Kerberos by sending a KRB_CRED message to the + NSLP node independently but prior to the NSLP exchange. Thus, the + principal name of the service must be known at the client in advance, + though the exact IP address may not be known in advance. How the + name is assigned and made available to the client is implementation + specific. The extracted common session key can subsequently be used + to employ the HMAC_SIGNED variant of the SESSION_AUTH object. + + Another option is to encapsulate the credentials in the + AUTHENTICATION_DATA portion of the SESSION_AUTH object. In this + case, the AUTH_ENT_ID MUST be of the sub-type KRB_PRINCIPAL. The + KRB_PRINCIPAL field is defined as the Fully Qualified Kerberos + Principal name of the authorizing entity. The AUTHENTICATION_DATA + portion of the SESSION_AUTH object contains the KRB_CRED message that + the receiving NSLP node has to extract and verify. A second + SESSION_AUTH object of type HMAC_SIGNED SHOULD protect the integrity + of the NSLP message, including the prior SESSION_AUTH object. The + session key included in the first SESSION_AUTH object has to be used + for HMAC calculation. + + An example of the Kerberos AUTHENTICATION_DATA object is shown below + in Figure 2. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 17] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + |1|0|0|0| Type = SESSION_AUTH |0|0|0|0| Object Length | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Length | AUTH_ENT_ID | KERB_P. | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | OctetString ... (The principal@realm name) | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Length | AUTH_DATA | zero | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | OctetString ... (KRB_CRED Data) | + +---------------------------------------------------------------+ + + Figure 2: Example of a Kerberos AUTHENTICATION_DATA Object + +4.3. Public Key + + In a public key environment, the AUTH_ENT_ID MUST be of the sub- + types: X509_V3_CERT or PGP_CERT. The authentication data is used for + authenticating the authorizing entity. Two examples of the public + key SESSION_AUTH object are shown in Figures 3 and 4. + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + |1|0|0|0| Type = SESSION_AUTH |0|0|0|0| Object Length | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Length | AUTH_ENT_ID | PGP_CERT | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | OctetString ... (Authorizing entity Digital Certificate) | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Length | AUTH_DATA | zero | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | OctetString ... (Authentication data) | + +---------------------------------------------------------------+ + + Figure 3: Example of a SESSION_AUTH_OBJECT Using a PGP Certificate + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 18] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + |1|0|0|0| Type = SESSION_AUTH |0|0|0|0| Object Length | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Length | AUTH_ENT_ID | X509_V3_CERT | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | OctetString ... (Authorizing entity Digital Certificate) | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Length | AUTH_DATA | zero | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | OctetString ... (Authentication data) | + +---------------------------------------------------------------+ + + Figure 4: Example of a SESSION_AUTH_OBJECT Using an X509_V3_CERT + Certificate + +4.3.1. Operational Setting for Public-Key-Based Authentication + + Public-key-based authentication assumes the following: + + o Authorizing entities have a pair of keys (private key and public + key). + + o The private key is secured with the authorizing entity. + + o Public keys are stored in digital certificates; a trusted party, + the certificate authority (CA), issues these digital certificates. + + o The verifier (PDP or router) has the ability to verify the digital + certificate. + + The authorizing entity uses its private key to generate + AUTHENTICATION_DATA. Authenticators (router, PDP) use the + authorizing entity's public key (stored in the digital certificate) + to verify and authenticate the object. + +4.3.1.1. X.509 V3 Digital Certificates + + When the AUTH_ENT_ID is of type X509_V3_CERT, AUTHENTICATION_DATA + MUST be generated by the authorizing entity following these steps: + + o A signed-data is constructed as defined in RFC 5652 [RFC5652]. A + digest is computed on the content (as specified in Section 6.1) + with a signer-specific message-digest algorithm. The certificates + field contains the chain of X.509 V3 digital certificates from + each authorizing entity. The certificate revocation list is + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 19] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + + defined in the crls field. The digest output is digitally signed + following Section 8 of RFC 3447 [RFC3447], using the signer's + private key. + + When the AUTH_ENT_ID is of type X509_V3_CERT, verification at the + verifying network element (PDP or router) MUST be done following + these steps: + + o Parse the X.509 V3 certificate to extract the distinguished name + of the issuer of the certificate. + + o Certification Path Validation is performed as defined in Section 6 + of RFC 5280 [RFC5280]. + + o Parse through the Certificate Revocation list to verify that the + received certificate is not listed. + + o Once the X.509 V3 certificate is validated, the public key of the + authorizing entity can be extracted from the certificate. + + o Extract the digest algorithm and the length of the digested data + by parsing the CMS (Cryptographic Message Syntax) signed-data. + + o The recipient independently computes the message digest. This + message digest and the signer's public key are used to verify the + signature value. + + This verification ensures integrity, non-repudiation, and data + origin. + +4.3.1.2. PGP Digital Certificates + + When the AUTH_ENT_ID is of type PGP_CERT, AUTHENTICATION_DATA MUST be + generated by the authorizing entity following these steps: + + AUTHENTICATION_DATA contains a Signature Packet as defined in Section + 5.2.3 of RFC 4880 [RFC4880]. In summary: + + o Compute the hash of all data in the SESSION_AUTH object up to the + AUTHENTICATION_DATA. + + o The hash output is digitally signed following Section 8 of RFC + 3447, using the signer's private key. + + When the AUTH_ENT_ID is of type PGP_CERT, verification MUST be done + by the verifying network element (PDP or router) following these + steps: + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 20] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + + o Validate the certificate. + + o Once the PGP certificate is validated, the public key of the + authorizing entity can be extracted from the certificate. + + o Extract the hash algorithm and the length of the hashed data by + parsing the PGP signature packet. + + o The recipient independently computes the message digest. This + message digest and the signer's public key are used to verify the + signature value. + + This verification ensures integrity, non-repudiation, and data + origin. + +4.4. HMAC Signed + + A SESSION_AUTH object that carries an AUTH_ENT_ID of HMAC_SIGNED is + used as integrity protection for NSLP messages. The SESSION_AUTH + object MUST contain the following attributes: + + o SOURCE_ADDR: the source address of the entity that created the + HMAC + + o START_TIME: the timestamp when the HMAC signature was calculated. + This MUST be different for any two messages in sequence in order + to prevent replay attacks. The NTP timestamp currently provides a + resolution of 200 picoseconds, which should be sufficient. + + o NSLP_OBJECT_LIST: this attribute lists all NSLP objects that are + included in HMAC calculation. + + o AUTHENTICATION_DATA: this attribute contains the Key-ID that is + used for HMAC calculation as well as the HMAC data itself + [RFC2104]. + + The key used for HMAC calculation must be exchanged securely by some + other means, e.g., a Kerberos Ticket or pre-shared manual + installation etc. The Key-ID in the AUTHENTICATION_DATA allows the + reference to the appropriate key and also to periodically change + signing keys within a session. The key length MUST be at least 64 + bits, but it is ideally longer in order to defend against brute-force + attacks during the key validity period. For scalability reasons it + is suggested to use a per-user key for signing NSLP messages, but + using a per-session key is possible, too, at the cost of a per- + session key exchange. A per-user key allows for verification of the + authenticity of the message and thus provides a basis for a session- + based per-user authorization. It is RECOMMENDED to periodically + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 21] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + + change the shared key in order to prevent eavesdroppers from + performing brute-force off-line attacks on the shared key. The + actual hash algorithm used in the HMAC computation is specified by + the "Transform ID" field (given as Transform Type 3 of the IKEv2 + registry [RFC5996]). The hash algorithm MUST be chosen consistently + between the object creator and the NN verifying the HMAC; this can be + accomplished by out-of-band mechanisms when the shared key is + exchanged. + + Figure 5 shows an example of an object that is used for integrity + protection of NSLP messages. + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + |1|0|0|0| Type = SESSION_AUTH |0|0|0|0| Object Length | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Length | AUTH_ENT_ID | HMAC_SIGNED | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | reserved | Transform ID | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Length | SOURCE_ADDR | IPV4_ADDRESS | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | IPv4 Source Address of NSLP sender | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Length | START_TIME | NTP_TIME_STAMP| + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | NTP Time Stamp (1) | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | NTP Time Stamp (2) | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Length | NSLP_OBJ_LIST | zero | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + |No. of signed NSLP objects = n | rsv | NSLP object type (1) | + +-------+-------+---------------+-------+-------+---------------+ + | rsv | NSLP object type (2) | ..... // + +-------+-------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ + | rsv | NSLP object type (n) | (padding if required) | + +--------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+ + | Length | AUTH_DATA | zero | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Key-ID | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Message Authentication Code HMAC Data | + +---------------------------------------------------------------+ + + Figure 5: Example of a SESSION_AUTH_OBJECT That Provides Integrity + Protection for NSLP Messages + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 22] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + +5. Framework + + RFC 3521 [RFC3521] describes a framework in which the SESSION_AUTH + object may be utilized to transport information required for + authorizing resource reservation for data flows (e.g., media flows). + RFC 3521 introduces four different models: + + 1. The coupled model + + 2. The associated model with one policy server + + 3. The associated model with two policy servers + + 4. The non-associated model + + The fields that are required in a SESSION_AUTH object depend on which + of the models is used. + +5.1. The Coupled Model + + In the coupled model, the only information that MUST be included in + the SESSION_AUTH object is the SESSION_ID; it is used by the + Authorizing Entity to correlate the resource reservation request with + the media authorized during session setup. Since the End Host is + assumed to be untrusted, the Policy Server SHOULD take measures to + ensure that the integrity of the SESSION_ID is preserved in transit; + the exact mechanisms to be used and the format of the SESSION_ID are + implementation dependent. + +5.2. The Associated Model with One Policy Server + + In this model, the contents of the SESSION_AUTH object MUST include: + + o A session identifier - SESSION_ID. This is information that the + authorizing entity can use to correlate the resource request with + the data flows authorized during session setup. + + o The identity of the authorizing entity - AUTH_ENT_ID. This + information is used by an NN to determine which authorizing entity + (Policy Server) should be used to solicit resource policy + decisions. + + In some environments, an NN may have no means for determining if the + identity refers to a legitimate Policy Server within its domain. In + order to protect against redirection of authorization requests to a + bogus authorizing entity, the SESSION_AUTH MUST also include: + + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 23] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + + AUTHENTICATION_DATA. This authentication data is calculated over + all other fields of the SESSION_AUTH object. + +5.3. The Associated Model with Two Policy Servers + + The content of the SESSION_AUTH object is identical to the associated + model with one policy server. + +5.4. The Non-Associated Model + + In this model, the SESSION_AUTH object MUST contain sufficient + information to allow the Policy Server to make resource policy + decisions autonomously from the authorizing entity. The object is + created using information about the session by the authorizing + entity. The information in the SESSION_AUTH object MUST include: + + o Initiating party's IP address or Identity (e.g., FQDN) - + SOURCE_ADDR X-Type + + o Responding party's IP address or Identity (e.g., FQDN) - DEST_ADDR + X-Type + + o The authorization lifetime - START_TIME X-Type + + o The identity of the authorizing entity to allow for validation of + the token in shared symmetric key and Kerberos schemes - + AUTH_ENT_ID X-Type + + o The credentials of the authorizing entity in a public-key scheme - + AUTH_ENT_ID X-Type + + o Authentication data used to prevent tampering with the + SESSION_AUTH object - AUTHENTICATION_DATA X-Type + + Furthermore, the SESSION_AUTH object MAY contain: + + o The lifetime of (each of) the media stream(s) - END_TIME X-Type + + o Initiating party's port number - SOURCE_ADDR X-Type + + o Responding party's port number - DEST_ADDR X-Type + + All SESSION_AUTH fields MUST match with the resource request. If a + field does not match, the request SHOULD be denied. + + + + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 24] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + +6. Message Processing Rules + + This section discusses the message processing related to the + SESSION_AUTH object. Details of the processing of the SESSION_AUTH + object within QoS NSLP and NATFW NSLP are described. New NSLP + protocols should use the same logic in making use of the SESSION_AUTH + object. + +6.1. Generation of the SESSION_AUTH by an Authorizing Entity + + 1. Generate the SESSION_AUTH object with the appropriate contents as + specified in Section 3. + + 2. If authentication is needed, the entire SESSION_AUTH object is + constructed, excluding the length, type, and SubType fields of + the SESSION_AUTH field. Note that the message MUST include a + START_TIME to prevent replay attacks. The output of the + authentication algorithm, plus appropriate header information, is + appended as the AUTHENTICATION_DATA attribute to the SESSION_AUTH + object. + +6.2. Processing within the QoS NSLP + + The SESSION_AUTH object may be used with QoS NSLP QUERY and RESERVE + messages to authorize the query operation for network resources, and + a resource reservation request, respectively. + + Moreover, the SESSION_AUTH object may also be used with RESPONSE + messages in order to indicate that the authorizing entity changed the + original request. For example, the session start or end times may + have been modified, or the client may have requested authorization + for all ports, but the authorizing entity only allowed the use of + certain ports. + + If the QoS NSIS Initiator (QNI) receives a RESPONSE message with a + SESSION_AUTH object, the QNI MUST inspect the SESSION_AUTH object to + see which authentication attribute was changed by an authorizing + entity. The QNI SHOULD also silently accept SESSION_AUTH objects in + the RESPONSE message that do not indicate any change to the original + authorization request. + +6.2.1. Message Generation + + A QoS NSLP message is created as specified in [RFC5974]. + + 1. The policy element received from the authorizing entity MUST be + copied without modification into the SESSION_AUTH object. + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 25] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + + 2. The SESSION_AUTH object (containing the policy element) is + inserted in the NSLP message in the appropriate place. + +6.2.2. Message Reception + + The QoS NSLP message is processed as specified in [RFC5974] with the + following modifications. + + 1. If the QoS NSIS Entity (QNE) is policy aware then it SHOULD use + the Diameter QoS application or the RADIUS QoS protocol to + communicate with the PDP. To construct the AAA message it is + necessary to extract the SESSION_AUTH object and the QoS-related + objects from the QoS NSLP message and to craft the respective + RADIUS or Diameter message. The message processing and object + format are described in the respective RADIUS or Diameter QoS + protocol, respectively. If the QNE is policy unaware, then it + ignores the policy data objects and continues processing the NSLP + message. + + 2. If the response from the PDP is negative, the request must be + rejected. A negative response in RADIUS is an Access-Reject, and + in Diameter is based on the 'DIAMETER_SUCCESS' value in the + Result-Code AVP of the QoS-Authz-Answer (QAA) message. The QNE + must construct and send a RESPONSE message with the status of the + authorization failure as specified in [RFC5974]. + + 3. Continue processing the NSIS message. + +6.2.3. Authorization (QNE or PDP) + + 1. Retrieve the policy element from the SESSION_AUTH object. Check + the AUTH_ENT_ID type and SubType fields and return an error if + the identity type is not supported. + + 2. Verify the message integrity. + + * Shared symmetric key authentication: The QNE or PDP uses the + AUTH_ENT_ID field to consult a table keyed by that field. The + table should identify the cryptographic authentication + algorithm to be used along with the expected length of the + authentication data and the shared symmetric key for the + authorizing entity. Verify that the indicated length of the + authentication data is consistent with the configured table + entry and validate the authentication data. + + * Public Key: Validate the certificate chain against the trusted + Certificate Authority (CA) and validate the message signature + using the public key. + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 26] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + + * HMAC signed: The QNE or PDP uses the Key-ID field of the + AUTHENTICATION_DATA attribute to consult a table keyed by that + field. The table should identify the cryptographic + authentication algorithm to be used along with the expected + length of the authentication data and the shared symmetric key + for the authorizing entity. Verify that the indicated length + of the authentication data is consistent with the configured + table entry and validate the integrity of the parts of the + NSLP message, i.e., session ID, MRI, NSLPID, and all other + NSLP elements listed in the NSLP_OBJECT_LIST authentication + data as well as the SESSION_AUTH object contents (cf. + Section 6.4). + + * Kerberos: If AUTHENTICATION_DATA contains an encapsulated + KRB_CRED message (cf. Section 4.2), the integrity of the + KRB_CRED message can be verified within Kerberos itself. + Moreover, if the same NSLP message contains another + SESSION_AUTH object using HMAC_SIGNED, the latter can be used + to verify the message integrity as described above. + + 3. Once the identity of the authorizing entity and the validity of + the service request have been established, the authorizing + router/PDP MUST then consult its authorization policy in order to + determine whether or not the specific request is finally + authorized (e.g., based on available credits and on information + in the subscriber's database). To the extent to which these + access control decisions require supplementary information, + routers/PDPs MUST ensure that supplementary information is + obtained securely. + + 4. Verify that the requested resources do not exceed the authorized + QoS. + +6.2.4. Error Signaling + + When the PDP (e.g., a RADIUS or Diameter server) fails to verify the + policy element, the appropriate actions described in the respective + AAA document need to be taken. + + The QNE node MUST return a RESPONSE message with the INFO_SPEC error + code 'Authorization failure' as defined in the QoS NSLP specification + [RFC5974]. The QNE MAY include an INFO_SPEC Object Value Info to + indicate which SESSION_AUTH attribute created the error. + +6.3. Processing with the NATFW NSLP + + This section presents processing rules for the NATFW NSLP [RFC5973]. + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 27] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + +6.3.1. Message Generation + + A NATFW NSLP message is created as specified in [RFC5973]. + + 1. The policy element received from the authorizing entity MUST be + copied without modification into the SESSION_AUTH object. + + 2. The SESSION_AUTH object (containing the policy element) is + inserted in the NATFW NSLP message in the appropriate place. + +6.3.2. Message Reception + + The NATFW NSLP message is processed as specified in [RFC5973] with + the following modifications. + + 1. If the router is policy aware, then it SHOULD use the Diameter + application or the RADIUS protocol to communicate with the PDP. + To construct the AAA message, it is necessary to extract the + SESSION_AUTH object and the objects related to NATFW policy rules + from the NSLP message and to craft the respective RADIUS or + Diameter message. The message processing and object format is + described in the respective RADIUS or Diameter protocols. If the + router is policy unaware, then it ignores the policy data objects + and continues processing the NSLP message. + + 2. Reject the message if the response from the PDP is negative. A + negative response in RADIUS is an Access-Reject, and in Diameter + is based on the 'DIAMETER_SUCCESS' value in the Result-Code AVP. + + 3. Continue processing the NSIS message. + +6.3.3. Authorization (Router/PDP) + + 1. Retrieve the policy element from the SESSION_AUTH object. Check + the AUTH_ENT_ID type and SubType fields and return an error if + the identity type is not supported. + + 2. Verify the message integrity. + + * Shared symmetric key authentication: The network router/PDP + uses the AUTH_ENT_ID field to consult a table keyed by that + field. The table should identify the cryptographic + authentication algorithm to be used, along with the expected + length of the authentication data and the shared symmetric key + for the authorizing entity. Verify that the indicated length + of the authentication data is consistent with the configured + table entry and validate the authentication data. + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 28] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + + * Public Key: Validate the certificate chain against the trusted + Certificate Authority (CA) and validate the message signature + using the public key. + + * HMAC signed: The QNE or PDP uses the Key-ID field of the + AUTHENTICATION_DATA attribute to consult a table keyed by that + field. The table should identify the cryptographic + authentication algorithm to be used along with the expected + length of the authentication data and the shared symmetric key + for the authorizing entity. Verify that the indicated length + of the authentication data is consistent with the configured + table entry and validate the integrity of parts of the NSLP + message, i.e., session ID, MRI, NSLPID, and all other NSLP + elements listed in the NSLP_OBJECT_LIST authentication data as + well as the SESSION_AUTH object contents (cf. Section 6.4). + + * Kerberos: If AUTHENTICATION_DATA contains an encapsulated + KRB_CRED message (cf. Section 4.2), the integrity of the + KRB_CRED message can be verified within Kerberos itself. + Moreover, an if the same NSLP message contains another + SESSION_AUTH object using HMAC_SIGNED, the latter can be used + to verify the message integrity as described above. + + 3. Once the identity of the authorizing entity and the validity of + the service request have been established, the authorizing + router/PDP MUST then consult its authorization policy in order to + determine whether or not the specific request is authorized. To + the extent to which these access control decisions require + supplementary information, routers/PDPs MUST ensure that + supplementary information is obtained securely. + +6.3.4. Error Signaling + + When the PDP (e.g., a RADIUS or Diameter server) fails to verify the + SESSION_AUTH object, the appropriate actions described in the + respective AAA document need to be taken. The NATFW NSLP node MUST + return an error message of class 'Permanent failure' (0x5) with error + code 'Authorization failed' (0x02). + +6.4. Integrity Protection of NSLP Messages + + The SESSION_AUTH object can also be used to provide an integrity + protection for every NSLP signaling message, thereby also + authenticating requests or responses. Assume that a user has + deposited a shared key at some NN. This NN can then verify the + integrity of every NSLP message sent by the user to the NN. Based on + this authentication, the NN can apply authorization policies to + actions like resource reservations or opening of firewall pinholes. + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 29] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + + The sender of an NSLP message creates a SESSION_AUTH object that + contains the AUTH_ENT_ID attribute set to HMAC_SIGNED (cf. + Section 4.4) and hashes with the shared key over all NSLP objects + that need to be protected and lists them in the NSLP_OBJECT_LIST. + The SESSION_AUTH object itself is also protected by the HMAC. By + inclusion of the SESSION_AUTH object into the NSLP message, the + receiver of this NSLP message can verify its integrity if it has the + suitable shared key for the HMAC. Any response to the sender should + also be protected by inclusion of a SESSION_AUTH object in order to + prevent attackers from sending unauthorized responses on behalf of + the real NN. + + If a SESSION_AUTH object is present that has an AUTH_ENT_ID attribute + set to HMAC_SIGNED, the integrity of all NSLP elements listed in the + NSLP_OBJECT_LIST has to be checked, including the SESSION_AUTH object + contents itself. Furthermore, session ID, MRI, and NSLPID have to be + included into the HMAC calculation, too, as specified in + Section 3.2.7. The key that is used to calculate the HMAC is + referred to by the Key-ID included in the AUTHENTICATION_DATA + attribute. If the provided timestamp in START_TIME is not recent + enough or the calculated HMAC differs from the one provided in + AUTHENTICATION_DATA, the message must be discarded silently and an + error should be logged locally. + +7. Security Considerations + + This document describes a mechanism for session authorization to + prevent theft of service. There are three types of security issues + to consider: protection against replay attacks, integrity of the + SESSION_AUTH object, and the choice of the authentication algorithms + and keys. + + The first issue, replay attacks, MUST be prevented. In the non- + associated model, the SESSION_AUTH object MUST include a START_TIME + field, and the NNs as well as Policy Servers MUST support NTP to + ensure proper clock synchronization. Failure to ensure proper clock + synchronization will allow replay attacks since the clocks of the + different network entities may not be in sync. The start time is + used to verify that the request is not being replayed at a later + time. In all other models, the SESSION_ID is used by the Policy + Server to ensure that the resource request successfully correlates + with records of an authorized session. If a SESSION_AUTH object is + replayed, it MUST be detected by the policy server (using internal + algorithms), and the request MUST be rejected. + + The second issue, the integrity of the SESSION_AUTH object, is + preserved in untrusted environments by including the + AUTHENTICATION_DATA attribute in such environments. + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 30] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + + In environments where shared symmetric keys are possible, they should + be used in order to keep the SESSION_AUTH object size to a strict + minimum, e.g., when wireless links are used. A secondary option + would be Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) authentication, which + provides a high level of security and good scalability. However, PKI + authentication requires the presence of credentials in the + SESSION_AUTH object, thus impacting its size. + + The SESSION_AUTH object can also serve to protect the integrity of + NSLP message parts by using the HMAC_SIGNED Authentication Data as + described in Section 6.4. + + When shared keys are used, e.g., in AUTHENTICATION_DATA (cf. + Section 4.1) or in conjunction with HMAC_SIGNED (cf. Section 4.4), it + is important that the keys are kept secret, i.e., they must be + exchanged, stored, and managed in a secure and confidential manner, + so that no unauthorized party gets access to the key material. If + the key material is disclosed to an unauthorized party, + authentication and integrity protection are ineffective. + + Furthermore, security considerations for public-key mechanisms using + the X.509 certificate mechanisms described in [RFC5280] apply. + Similarly, security considerations for PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) + described in [RFC4880] apply. + + Further security issues are outlined in RFC 4081 [RFC4081]. + +8. IANA Considerations + + The SESSION_AUTH_OBJECT NSLP Message Object type is specified as + 0x016. + + This document specifies an 8-bit Session authorization attribute type + (X-Type) field as well as 8-bit SubType fields per X-Type, for which + IANA has created and will maintain corresponding sub-registries for + the NSLP Session Authorization Object. + + Initial values for the X-Type registry and the registration + procedures according to [RFC5226] are as follows: + + Registration Procedure: + Specification Required + + + + + + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 31] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + + X-Type Description + -------- ------------------- + 0 Reserved + 1 AUTH_ENT_ID + 2 SESSION_ID + 3 SOURCE_ADDR + 4 DEST_ADDR + 5 START_TIME + 6 END_TIME + 7 NSLP_OBJECT_LIST + 8 AUTHENTICATION_DATA + 9-127 Unassigned + 128-255 Reserved for Private or Experimental Use + + In the following, registration procedures and initial values for the + SubType registries are specified. + + Sub-registry: AUTH_ENT_ID (X-Type 1) SubType values + + Registration Procedure: + Specification Required + + Registry: + SubType Description + -------- ------------- + 0 Reserved + 1 IPV4_ADDRESS + 2 IPV6_ADDRESS + 3 FQDN + 4 ASCII_DN + 5 UNICODE_DN + 6 URI + 7 KRB_PRINCIPAL + 8 X509_V3_CERT + 9 PGP_CERT + 10 HMAC_SIGNED + 11-127 Unassigned + 128-255 Reserved for Private or Experimental Use + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 32] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + + Sub-registry: SOURCE_ADDR (X-Type 3) SubType values + + Registration Procedure: + Specification Required + + Registry: + SubType Description + -------- ------------- + 0 Reserved + 1 IPV4_ADDRESS + 2 IPV6_ADDRESS + 3 UDP_PORT_LIST + 4 TCP_PORT_LIST + 5 SPI + 6-127 Unassigned + 128-255 Reserved for Private or Experimental Use + + + Sub-registry: DEST_ADDR (X-Type 4) SubType values + + Registration Procedure: + Specification Required + + Registry: + 0 Reserved + 1 IPV4_ADDRESS + 2 IPV6_ADDRESS + 3 UDP_PORT_LIST + 4 TCP_PORT_LIST + 5 SPI + 6-127 Unassigned + 128-255 Reserved for Private or Experimental Use + + + Sub-registry: START_TIME (X-Type 5) SubType values + + Registration Procedure: + Specification Required + + Registry: + SubType Description + -------- ------------- + 0 Reserved + 1 NTP_TIMESTAMP + 2-127 Unassigned + 128-255 Reserved for Private or Experimental Use + + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 33] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + + Sub-registry: END_TIME (X-Type 6) SubType values + + Registration Procedure: + Specification Required + + Registry: + SubType Description + -------- ------------- + 0 Reserved + 1 NTP_TIMESTAMP + 2-127 Unassigned + 128-255 Reserved for Private or Experimental Use + +9. Acknowledgments + + We would like to thank Xioaming Fu and Lars Eggert for providing + reviews and comments. Helpful comments were also provided by Gen-ART + reviewer Ben Campbell, as well as Sean Turner and Tim Polk from the + Security Area. This document is largely based on the RFC 3520 + [RFC3520] and credit therefore goes to the authors of RFC 3520 -- + namely, Louis-Nicolas Hamer, Brett Kosinski, Bill Gage, and Hugh + Shieh. Part of this work was funded by Deutsche Telekom Laboratories + within the context of the BMBF-funded ScaleNet project. + +10. References + +10.1. Normative References + + [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. + + [RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography + Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications + Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003. + + [RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network + Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms + Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010. + + [RFC5971] Schulzrinne, H. and R. Hancock, "GIST: General Internet + Signalling Transport", RFC 5971, October 2010. + + [RFC5973] Stiemerling, M., Tschofenig, H., Aoun, C., and E. Davies, + "NAT/Firewall NSIS Signaling Layer Protocol (NSLP)", + RFC 5973, October 2010. + + + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 34] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + + [RFC5974] Manner, J., Karagiannis, G., and A. McDonald, "NSIS + Signaling Layer Protocol (NSLP) for Quality-of-Service + Signaling", RFC 5974, October 2010. + + [RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen, + "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", + RFC 5996, September 2010. + +10.2. Informative References + + [RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", + STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987. + + [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- + Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, + February 1997. + + [RFC3520] Hamer, L-N., Gage, B., Kosinski, B., and H. Shieh, + "Session Authorization Policy Element", RFC 3520, + April 2003. + + [RFC3521] Hamer, L-N., Gage, B., and H. Shieh, "Framework for + Session Set-up with Media Authorization", RFC 3521, + April 2003. + + [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform + Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, + RFC 3986, January 2005. + + [RFC4080] Hancock, R., Karagiannis, G., Loughney, J., and S. Van den + Bosch, "Next Steps in Signaling (NSIS): Framework", + RFC 4080, June 2005. + + [RFC4081] Tschofenig, H. and D. Kroeselberg, "Security Threats for + Next Steps in Signaling (NSIS)", RFC 4081, June 2005. + + [RFC4120] Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The + Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120, + July 2005. + + [RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol + (LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names", + RFC 4514, June 2006. + + [RFC4868] Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA- + 384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec", RFC 4868, May 2007. + + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 35] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + + [RFC4880] Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., Shaw, D., and R. + Thayer, "OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 4880, November 2007. + + [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an + IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, + May 2008. + + [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., + Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key + Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List + (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. + + [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, + RFC 5652, September 2009. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 36] + +RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011 + + +Authors' Addresses + + Jukka Manner + Aalto University + Department of Communications and Networking (Comnet) + P.O. Box 13000 + Aalto FI-00076 + Finland + + Phone: +358 9 470 22481 + EMail: jukka.manner@tkk.fi + + + Martin Stiemerling + Network Laboratories, NEC Europe Ltd. + Kurfuersten-Anlage 36 + Heidelberg 69115 + Germany + + Phone: +49 (0) 6221 4342 113 + EMail: martin.stiemerling@neclab.eu + URI: http://www.stiemerling.org + + + Hannes Tschofenig + Nokia Siemens Networks + Linnoitustie 6 + Espoo 02600 + Finland + + Phone: +358 (50) 4871445 + EMail: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net + URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at + + + Roland Bless (editor) + Karlsruhe Institute of Technology + Institute of Telematics + Zirkel 2, Building 20.20 + P.O. Box 6980 + Karlsruhe 76049 + Germany + + Phone: +49 721 608 46413 + EMail: roland.bless@kit.edu + URI: http://tm.kit.edu/~bless + + + + + +Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 37] + |