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author | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
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committer | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
commit | 4bfd864f10b68b71482b35c818559068ef8d5797 (patch) | |
tree | e3989f47a7994642eb325063d46e8f08ffa681dc /doc/rfc/rfc6712.txt | |
parent | ea76e11061bda059ae9f9ad130a9895cc85607db (diff) |
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diff --git a/doc/rfc/rfc6712.txt b/doc/rfc/rfc6712.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f787a08 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/rfc/rfc6712.txt @@ -0,0 +1,563 @@ + + + + + + +Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) T. Kause +Request for Comments: 6712 SSH +Updates: 4210 M. Peylo +Category: Standards Track NSN +ISSN: 2070-1721 September 2012 + + + Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- HTTP Transfer + for the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) + +Abstract + + This document describes how to layer the Certificate Management + Protocol (CMP) over HTTP. It is the "CMPtrans" document referenced + in RFC 4210; therefore, this document updates the reference given + therein. + +Status of This Memo + + This is an Internet Standards Track document. + + This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force + (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has + received public review and has been approved for publication by the + Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on + Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741. + + Information about the current status of this document, any errata, + and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at + http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6712. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the + document authors. All rights reserved. + + This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal + Provisions Relating to IETF Documents + (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of + publication of this document. Please review these documents + carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect + to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must + include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of + the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as + described in the Simplified BSD License. + + + + + + +Kause & Peylo Standards Track [Page 1] + +RFC 6712 CMPtrans September 2012 + + + This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF + Contributions published or made publicly available before November + 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this + material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow + modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. + Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling + the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified + outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may + not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format + it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other + than English. + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction ....................................................2 + 2. Conventions Used in This Document ...............................3 + 3. HTTP-Based Protocol .............................................3 + 3.1. HTTP Versions ..............................................4 + 3.2. Persistent Connections .....................................4 + 3.3. General Form ...............................................4 + 3.4. Media Type .................................................4 + 3.5. Communication Workflow .....................................5 + 3.6. HTTP Request-URI ...........................................5 + 3.7. Pushing of Announcements ...................................5 + 3.8. HTTP Considerations ........................................6 + 4. Implementation Considerations ...................................7 + 5. Security Considerations .........................................7 + 6. IANA Considerations .............................................8 + 7. Acknowledgments .................................................8 + 8. References ......................................................9 + 8.1. Normative References .......................................9 + 8.2. Informative References .....................................9 + +1. Introduction + + The Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) [RFC4210] requires a well- + defined transfer mechanism to enable End Entities (EEs), Registration + Authorities (RAs), and Certification Authorities (CAs) to pass + PKIMessage sequences between them. + + The first version of the CMP specification [RFC2510] included a brief + description of a simple transfer protocol layer on top of TCP. Its + features were simple transfer-level error handling and a mechanism to + poll for outstanding PKI messages. Additionally, it was mentioned + that PKI messages could also be conveyed using file-, E-mail-, and + HTTP-based transfer, but those were not specified in detail. + + + + + +Kause & Peylo Standards Track [Page 2] + +RFC 6712 CMPtrans September 2012 + + + The current version of the CMP specification [RFC4210] incorporated + its own polling mechanism, and thus the need for a transfer protocol + providing this functionality vanished. The remaining features CMP + requires from its transfer protocols are connection and error + handling. + + Before this document was published as an RFC, the draft version + underwent drastic changes during the long-lasting work process. The + so-called "Direct TCP-Based Management Protocol" specified in + [RFC2510] was enhanced, and at some point a version existed where + this protocol was again transferred over HTTP. As both approaches + proved to be needless and cumbersome, implementers preferred to use + plain HTTP transfer following [RFC1945] or [RFC2616]. This document + now reflects that by exclusively describing HTTP as the transfer + protocol for CMP. + + The usage of HTTP for transferring CMP messages exclusively uses the + POST method for requests, effectively tunneling CMP over HTTP. While + this is generally considered bad practice and should not be emulated, + there are good reasons to do so for transferring CMP. HTTP is used + as it is generally easy to implement and it is able to traverse + network borders utilizing ubiquitous proxies. Most importantly, HTTP + is already commonly used in existing CMP implementations. Other HTTP + request methods, such as GET, are not used because PKI management + operations can only be triggered using CMP's PKI messages, which need + to be transferred using a POST request. + + With its status codes, HTTP provides needed error reporting + capabilities. General problems on the server side, as well as those + directly caused by the respective request, can be reported to the + client. + + As CMP implements a transaction ID, identifying transactions spanning + over more than just a single request/response pair, the statelessness + of HTTP is not blocking its usage as the transfer protocol for CMP + messages. + +2. Conventions Used in This Document + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this + document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. + +3. HTTP-Based Protocol + + For direct interaction between two entities, where a reliable + transport protocol like TCP is available, HTTP SHOULD be utilized for + conveying CMP messages. + + + +Kause & Peylo Standards Track [Page 3] + +RFC 6712 CMPtrans September 2012 + + +3.1. HTTP Versions + + Implementations MUST support HTTP/1.0 [RFC1945] and SHOULD support + HTTP/1.1 [RFC2616]. + +3.2. Persistent Connections + + HTTP persistent connections [RFC2616] allow multiple interactions to + take place on the same HTTP connection. However, neither HTTP nor + the protocol specified in this document are designed to correlate + messages on the same connection in any meaningful way; persistent + connections are only a performance optimization. In particular, + intermediaries can do things like mix connections from different + clients into one "upstream" connection, terminate persistent + connections, and forward requests as non-persistent requests, etc. + As such, implementations MUST NOT infer that requests on the same + connection come from the same client (e.g., for correlating PKI + messages with ongoing transactions); every message is to be evaluated + in isolation. + +3.3. General Form + + A DER-encoded [ITU.X690.1994] PKIMessage [RFC4210] is sent as the + entity-body of an HTTP POST request. If this HTTP request is + successful, the server returns the CMP response in the body of the + HTTP response. The HTTP response status code in this case MUST be + 200; other "Successful 2xx" codes MUST NOT be used for this purpose. + HTTP responses to pushed CMP Announcement messages (i.e., CA + Certificate Announcement, Certificate Announcement, Revocation + Announcement, and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Announcement) + utilize the status codes 201 and 202 to identify whether the received + information was processed. + + While "Redirection 3xx" status codes MAY be supported by + implementations, clients should only be enabled to automatically + follow them after careful consideration of possible security + implications. As described in Section 5, "301 Moved Permanently" + could be misused for permanent denial of service. + + All applicable "Client Error 4xx" or "Server Error 5xx" status codes + MAY be used to inform the client about errors. + +3.4. Media Type + + The Internet Media Type "application/pkixcmp" MUST be set in the HTTP + Content-Type header field when conveying a PKIMessage. + + + + + +Kause & Peylo Standards Track [Page 4] + +RFC 6712 CMPtrans September 2012 + + +3.5. Communication Workflow + + In CMP, most communication is initiated by the EEs where every CMP + request triggers a CMP response message from the CA or RA. + + The CMP Announcement messages described in Section 3.7 are an + exception. Their creation may be triggered by certain events or done + on a regular basis by a CA. The recipient of the Announcement only + replies with an HTTP status code acknowledging the receipt or + indicating an error, but not with a CMP response. + + If the receipt of an HTTP request is not confirmed by receiving an + HTTP response, it MUST be assumed that the transferred CMP message + was not successfully delivered to its destination. + +3.6. HTTP Request-URI + + The Request-URI is formed as specified in [RFC3986]. + + A server implementation MUST handle Request-URI paths, with or + without a trailing slash, as identical. + + An example of a Request-Line and a Host header field in an HTTP/1.1 + header, sending a CMP request to a server, located in the "/cmp" path + of the host "example.com", would be + + POST /cmp HTTP/1.1 + Host: example.com + + or in the absoluteURI form + + POST http://example.com/cmp/ HTTP/1.1 + Host: example.com + +3.7. Pushing of Announcements + + A CMP server may create event-triggered announcements or generate + them on a regular basis. It MAY utilize HTTP transfer to convey them + to a suitable recipient. In this use case, the CMP server acts as an + HTTP client, and the recipient needs to utilize an HTTP server. As + no request messages are specified for those announcements, they can + only be pushed to the recipient. + + If an EE wants to poll for a potential CA Key Update Announcement or + the current CRL, a PKI Information Request using a General Message as + described in Appendix E.5 of [RFC4210] can be used. + + + + + +Kause & Peylo Standards Track [Page 5] + +RFC 6712 CMPtrans September 2012 + + + When pushing Announcement messages, PKIMessage structures are sent as + the entity-body of an HTTP POST request. + + Suitable recipients for CMP announcements might, for example, be + repositories storing the announced information, such as directory + services. Those services listen for incoming messages, utilizing the + same HTTP Request-URI scheme as defined in Section 3.6. + + The following PKIMessages are announcements that may be pushed by a + CA. The prefixed numbers reflect ASN.1 numbering of the respective + element. + + [15] CA Key Update Announcement + [16] Certificate Announcement + [17] Revocation Announcement + [18] CRL Announcement + + CMP Announcement messages do not require any CMP response. However, + the recipient MUST acknowledge receipt with an HTTP response having + an appropriate status code and an empty body. When not receiving + such a response, it MUST be assumed that the delivery was not + successful. If applicable, the sending side MAY try sending the + Announcement again after waiting for an appropriate time span. + + If the announced issue was successfully stored in a database or was + already present, the answer MUST be an HTTP response with a "201 + Created" status code and an empty message body. + + In case the announced information was only accepted for further + processing, the status code of the returned HTTP response MAY also be + "202 Accepted". After an appropriate delay, the sender may then try + to send the Announcement again and may repeat this until it receives + a confirmation that it has been successfully processed. The + appropriate duration of the delay and the option to increase it + between consecutive attempts should be carefully considered. + + A receiver MUST answer with a suitable 4xx or 5xx HTTP error code + when a problem occurs. + +3.8. HTTP Considerations + + While all defined features of the HTTP protocol are available to + implementations, they SHOULD keep the protocol utilization as simple + as possible. For example, there is no benefit in using chunked + Transfer-Encoding, as the length of an ASN.1 sequence is known when + starting to send it. + + + + + +Kause & Peylo Standards Track [Page 6] + +RFC 6712 CMPtrans September 2012 + + + There is no need for the clients to send an "Expect" request-header + field with the "100-continue" expectation and wait for a "100 + Continue" status as described in Section 8.2.3 of [RFC2616]. The CMP + payload sent by a client is relatively small, so having extra + messages exchanged is inefficient, as the server will only seldom + reject a message without evaluating the body. + +4. Implementation Considerations + + Implementors should be aware that implementations might exist that + use a different approach for transferring CMP over HTTP, because this + document has been under development for more than a decade. Further, + implementations based on earlier drafts of this document might use an + unregistered "application/pkixcmp-poll" MIME type. + +5. Security Considerations + + The following aspects need to be considered by implementers and + users: + + 1. There is the risk for denial-of-service attacks through resource + consumption by opening many connections to an HTTP server. + Therefore, idle connections should be terminated after an + appropriate timeout; this may also depend on the available free + resources. After sending a CMP Error Message, the server should + close the connection, even if the CMP transaction is not yet + fully completed. + + 2. Without being encapsulated in effective security protocols, such + as Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246], there is no + integrity protection at the HTTP protocol level. Therefore, + information from the HTTP protocol should not be used to change + state of the transaction. + + 3. Client users should be aware that storing the target location of + an HTTP response with the "301 Moved Permanently" status code + could be exploited by a man-in-the-middle attacker trying to + block them permanently from contacting the correct server. + + 4. If no measures to authenticate and protect the HTTP responses to + pushed Announcement messages are in place, their information + regarding the Announcement's processing state may not be trusted. + In that case, the overall design of the PKI system must not + depend on the Announcements being reliably received and processed + by their destination. + + + + + + +Kause & Peylo Standards Track [Page 7] + +RFC 6712 CMPtrans September 2012 + + + 5. CMP provides inbuilt integrity protection and authentication. + The information communicated unencrypted in CMP messages does not + contain sensitive information endangering the security of the PKI + when intercepted. However, it might be possible for an + eavesdropper to utilize the available information to gather + confidential technical or business critical information. + Therefore, users of the HTTP transfer for CMP might want to + consider using HTTP over TLS according to [RFC2818] or virtual + private networks created, for example, by utilizing Internet + Protocol Security according to [RFC4301]. Compliant + implementations MUST support TLS with the option to authenticate + both server and client. + +6. IANA Considerations + + The IANA has already registered the MIME media type "application/ + pkixcmp" for identifying CMP sequences due to an request made in + connection with [RFC2510]. + + No further action by the IANA is necessary for this document or any + anticipated updates. + +7. Acknowledgments + + Amit Kapoor and Ronald Tschlaer were the original authors of this + document, and their version focused on the so-called "TCP-Based + Management Protocol", which has been removed from this document. + Their contact data, as originally stated by them, is as follows: + + Amit Kapoor + Certicom + 25801 Industrial Blvd + Hayward, CA + US + Email: amit@trustpoint.com + + Ronald Tschalaer + Certicom + 25801 Industrial Blvd + Hayward, CA + US + Email: ronald@trustpoint.com + + The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of various + members of the IETF PKIX working group and the ICSA CA-talk mailing + list (a list solely devoted to discussing CMP interoperability + efforts). + + + + +Kause & Peylo Standards Track [Page 8] + +RFC 6712 CMPtrans September 2012 + + + By providing ideas, giving hints, and doing invaluable review work, + the following alphabetically listed individuals have significantly + contributed to this document: + + Tomas Gustavsson, Primekey + Peter Gutmann, University of Auckland + Wolf-Dietrich Moeller, Nokia Siemens Networks + +8. References + +8.1. Normative References + + [ITU.X690.1994] + International Telecommunications Union, "Information + Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic + Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and + Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation + X.690, 1994. + + [RFC1945] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and H. Frystyk, "Hypertext + Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.0", RFC 1945, May 1996. + + [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. + + [RFC2510] Adams, C. and S. Farrell, "Internet X.509 Public Key + Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols", RFC + 2510, March 1999. + + [RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., + Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext + Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999. + + [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform + Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC + 3986, January 2005. + + [RFC4210] Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen, + "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate + Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210, September 2005. + +8.2. Informative References + + [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000. + + [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the + Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005. + + + + +Kause & Peylo Standards Track [Page 9] + +RFC 6712 CMPtrans September 2012 + + + [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security + (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. + +Authors' Addresses + + Tomi Kause + SSH Communications Security + Takomotie 8 + Helsinki 00380 + Finland + + EMail: toka@ssh.com + + + Martin Peylo + Nokia Siemens Networks + Linnoitustie 6 + Espoo 02600 + Finland + + EMail: martin.peylo@nsn.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Kause & Peylo Standards Track [Page 10] + |