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author | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
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committer | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
commit | 4bfd864f10b68b71482b35c818559068ef8d5797 (patch) | |
tree | e3989f47a7994642eb325063d46e8f08ffa681dc /doc/rfc/rfc7090.txt | |
parent | ea76e11061bda059ae9f9ad130a9895cc85607db (diff) |
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diff --git a/doc/rfc/rfc7090.txt b/doc/rfc/rfc7090.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1966a31 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/rfc/rfc7090.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1011 @@ + + + + + + +Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) H. Schulzrinne +Request for Comments: 7090 Columbia University +Category: Standards Track H. Tschofenig +ISSN: 2070-1721 + C. Holmberg + Ericsson + M. Patel + Huawei Technologies (UK) Co., Ltd. + April 2014 + + + Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) Callback + +Abstract + + After an emergency call is completed (terminated either prematurely + by the emergency caller or normally by the call taker), the call + taker may feel the need for further communication. For example, the + call may have been dropped by accident without the call taker having + sufficient information about the current state of an accident victim. + A call taker may trigger a callback to the emergency caller using the + contact information provided with the initial emergency call. This + callback could, under certain circumstances, be treated like any + other call and, as a consequence, it may get blocked by authorization + policies or may get forwarded to an answering machine. + + The IETF emergency services architecture specification already offers + a solution approach for allowing Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) + callbacks to bypass authorization policies in order to reach the + caller without unnecessary delays. Unfortunately, the specified + mechanism only supports limited scenarios. This document discusses + shortcomings of the current mechanisms and illustrates additional + scenarios where better-than-normal call treatment behavior would be + desirable. We describe a solution based on a new header field value + for the SIP Priority header field, called "psap-callback", to mark + PSAP callbacks. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Schulzrinne, et al. Standards Track [Page 1] + +RFC 7090 PSAP Callback April 2014 + + +Status of This Memo + + This is an Internet Standards Track document. + + This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force + (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has + received public review and has been approved for publication by the + Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on + Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741. + + Information about the current status of this document, any errata, + and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at + http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7090. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the + document authors. All rights reserved. + + This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal + Provisions Relating to IETF Documents + (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of + publication of this document. Please review these documents + carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect + to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must + include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of + the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as + described in the Simplified BSD License. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Schulzrinne, et al. Standards Track [Page 2] + +RFC 7090 PSAP Callback April 2014 + + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction ....................................................3 + 2. Terminology .....................................................5 + 3. Callback Scenarios ..............................................5 + 3.1. Routing Asymmetry ..........................................5 + 3.2. Multi-Stage Routing ........................................7 + 3.3. Call Forwarding ............................................8 + 3.4. Network-Based Service URN Resolution ......................10 + 3.5. PSTN Interworking .........................................11 + 4. SIP PSAP Callback Indicator ....................................12 + 4.1. General ...................................................12 + 4.2. Usage .....................................................12 + 4.3. Syntax ....................................................12 + 4.3.1. General ............................................12 + 4.3.2. ABNF ...............................................12 + 5. Security Considerations ........................................12 + 5.1. Security Threat ...........................................12 + 5.2. Security Requirements .....................................13 + 5.3. Security Solution .........................................13 + 6. IANA Considerations ............................................15 + 7. Acknowledgements ...............................................16 + 8. References .....................................................16 + 8.1. Normative References ......................................16 + 8.2. Informative References ....................................17 + +1. Introduction + + Summoning police, the fire department, or an ambulance in emergencies + is one of the fundamental and most valuable functions of the + telephone. As telephone functionality moves from circuit-switched + telephony to Internet telephony, its users rightfully expect that + this core functionality will continue to work at least as well as it + has for the legacy technology. New devices and services are being + made available that could be used to make a request for help and that + are not traditional telephones. Users are increasingly expecting + them to be used to place emergency calls. + + An overview of the protocol interactions for emergency calling using + the IETF emergency services architecture is described in [RFC6443], + and [RFC6881] specifies the technical details. As part of the + emergency call setup procedure, two important identifiers are + conveyed to the PSAP call taker's user agent, namely the address-of- + record (AOR), and if available, the Globally Routable User Agent (UA) + URIs (GRUUs). RFC 3261 [RFC3261] defines the AOR as: + + + + + + +Schulzrinne, et al. Standards Track [Page 3] + +RFC 7090 PSAP Callback April 2014 + + + An address-of-record (AOR) is a SIP or SIPS URI that points to a + domain with a location service that can map the URI to another URI + where the user might be available. Typically, the location + service is populated through registrations. An AOR is frequently + thought of as the "public address" of the user. + + In SIP systems, a single user can have a number of user agents + (handsets, softphones, voicemail accounts, etc.) that are all + referenced by the same AOR. There are a number of cases in which it + is desirable to have an identifier that addresses a single user agent + rather than the group of user agents indicated by an AOR. The GRUU + is such a unique user-agent identifier, and it is also globally + routable. [RFC5627] specifies how to obtain and use GRUUs. + [RFC6881] also makes use of the GRUU for emergency calls. + + Regulatory requirements demand that the emergency call setup + procedure itself provides enough information to allow the call taker + to initiate a callback to the emergency caller. This is desirable in + those cases where the call is dropped prematurely or when further + communication needs arise. The AOR and the GRUU serve this purpose. + + The communication attempt by the PSAP call taker back to the + emergency caller is called a "PSAP callback". + + A PSAP callback may, however, be blocked by user-configured + authorization policies or may be forwarded to an answering machine + since SIP entities (SIP proxies as well as the SIP user equipment + itself) cannot differentiate the PSAP callback from any other SIP + call. "Call barring", "do not disturb", or "call diversion" (also + called call forwarding) are features that prevent delivery of a call. + It is important to note that these features may be implemented by SIP + intermediaries as well as by the user agent. + + Among the emergency services community, there is a desire to treat + PSAP callbacks in such a way that the chances of reaching the + emergency caller are increased. At the same time, any solution must + minimize the chance that other calls bypass call forwarding or other + authorization policies. Ideally, the PSAP callback has to relate to + an earlier emergency call that was made "not too long ago". An exact + time interval is difficult to define in a global IETF standard due to + the variety of national regulatory requirements, but [RFC6881] + suggests 30 minutes. + + + + + + + + + +Schulzrinne, et al. Standards Track [Page 4] + +RFC 7090 PSAP Callback April 2014 + + + Nevertheless, to meet the needs from the emergency services + community, a basic mechanism for preferential treatment of PSAP + callbacks was defined in Section 13 of [RFC6443]. The specification + says: + + A UA may be able to determine a PSAP callback by examining the + domain of incoming calls after placing an emergency call and + comparing that to the domain of the answering PSAP from the + emergency call. Any call from the same domain and directed to the + supplied Contact header or AOR after an emergency call should be + accepted as a callback from the PSAP if it occurs within a + reasonable time after an emergency call was placed. + + This approach mimics a stateful packet-filtering firewall and is + indeed helpful in a number of cases. It is also relatively simple to + implement even though it requires call state to be maintained by the + user agent as well as by SIP intermediaries. Unfortunately, the + solution does not work in all deployment scenarios. In Section 3 we + describe cases where the currently standardized approach is + insufficient. + +2. Terminology + + Emergency-services-related terminology is borrowed from [RFC5012]. + This includes terminology like emergency caller, user equipment, call + taker, Emergency Service Routing Proxy (ESRP), and Public Safety + Answering Point (PSAP). + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this + document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. + +3. Callback Scenarios + + This section illustrates a number of scenarios where the currently + specified solution, as described in [RFC6881], for preferential + treatment of callbacks fails. As explained in Section 1, a SIP + entity examines an incoming PSAP callback by comparing the domain of + the PSAP with the destination domain of the outbound emergency call + placed earlier. + +3.1. Routing Asymmetry + + In some deployment environments, it is common to have incoming and + outgoing SIP messaging routed through different SIP entities. + Figure 1 shows this graphically whereby a Voice over IP (VoIP) + provider uses different SIP proxies for inbound and for outbound call + handling. Unless the two devices are synchronized, the callback + + + +Schulzrinne, et al. Standards Track [Page 5] + +RFC 7090 PSAP Callback April 2014 + + + reaching the inbound proxy would get treated like any other call + since the emergency call established state information at the + outbound proxy only. + + ,-------. + ,' `. + ,-------. / Emergency \ + ,' `. | Services | + / VoIP \ I | Network | + | Provider | n | | + | | t | | + | | e | | + | +-------+ | r | | + +--+---|Inbound|<--+-----m | | + | | |Proxy | | e | +------+ | + | | +-------+ | d | |PSAP | | + | | | i | +--+---+ | + +----+ | | | a-+ | | | + | UA |<---+ | | t | | | | + | |----+ | | e | | | | + +----+ | | | | | | | + | | | P | | | | + | | | r | | | | + | | +--------+ | o | | | | + +--+-->|Outbound|--+---->v | | +--+---+ | + | |Proxy | | i | | +-+ESRP | | + | +--------+ | d | | | +------+ | + | | e | | | | + | | r +----+-+ | + \ / | | + `. ,' \ / + '-------' `. ,' + '-------' + + Figure 1: Example for Routing Asymmetry + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Schulzrinne, et al. Standards Track [Page 6] + +RFC 7090 PSAP Callback April 2014 + + +3.2. Multi-Stage Routing + + Consider the emergency call routing scenario shown in Figure 2 where + routing towards the PSAP occurs in several stages. In this scenario, + we consider a SIP UA that uses the Location-to-Service Translation + (LoST) Protocol [RFC5222] to learn the next-hop destination, namely + esrp@example.net, to get the call closer to the PSAP. This call is + then sent to the proxy of the user's VoIP provider (example.org). + The user's VoIP provider receives the emergency call and creates a + state based on the destination domain, namely example.net. It then + routes the call to the indicated ESRP. When the ESRP receives the + call, it needs to decide what the next hop is to get to the final + PSAP. In our example, the next hop is the PSAP with the URI + psap@example.com. + + When a callback is sent from psap@example.com towards the emergency + caller, the call will get normal treatment by the proxy of the VoIP + provider since the domain of the PSAP does not match the stored state + information. + + ,-----------. + +----+ ,' `. + | UA |--- esrp@example.net / Emergency \ + +----+ \ | Services | + \ ,-------. | Network | + ,' `. | | + / VoIP \ | +------+ | + ( Provider ) | | PSAP | | + \ example.org / | +--+---+ | + `. ,' | | | + '---+---' | | | + | | psap@example.com | + esrp@example.net | | | + | | | | + | | | | + | | +--+---+ | + +------------+-----+ ESRP | | + | +------+ | + | | + \ / + `. ,' + '----------' + + Figure 2: Example for Multi-Stage Routing + + + + + + + +Schulzrinne, et al. Standards Track [Page 7] + +RFC 7090 PSAP Callback April 2014 + + +3.3. Call Forwarding + + Imagine the following case where an emergency call enters an + emergency network (state.example) via an ESRP, but then it gets + forwarded to a different emergency services network (in our example, + to example.net, example.org, or example.com). The same + considerations apply when the police, fire and, ambulance networks + are part of the state.example subdomains (e.g., + police.state.example). + + Similar to the previous scenario, the wrong state information is + being set up during the emergency call setup procedure. A callback + would originate in the example.net, example.org, or example.com + domains whereas the emergency caller's SIP UA or the VoIP outbound + proxy has stored state.example. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Schulzrinne, et al. Standards Track [Page 8] + +RFC 7090 PSAP Callback April 2014 + + + ,-------. + ,' `. + / Emergency \ + | Services | + | Network | + |(state.example)| + | | + | | + | +------+ | + | |PSAP +--+ | + | +--+---+ | | + | | | | + | | | | + | | | | + | | | | + | | | | + | +--+---+ | | + ------------------+---+ESRP | | | + esrp-a@state.org | +------+ | | + | | | + | Call Fwd | | + | +-+-+---+ | + \ | | | / + `. | | | ,' + '-|-|-|-' ,-------. + Police | | | Fire ,' `. + +------------+ | +----+ / Emergency \ + ,-------. | | | | Services | + ,' `. | | | | Network | + / Emergency \ | Ambulance | | (Fire) | + | Services | | | | | | + | Network | | +----+ | | +------+ | + | (Police) | | ,-------. | +----+---+PSAP | | + | | | ,' `. | | +------+ | + | +------+ | | / Emergency \ | | | + | |PSAP +----+--+ | Services | | | example.com , + | +------+ | | Network | | `~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + | | | (Ambulance) | | + | example.net , | | | + `~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | +------+ | | + | |PSAP +----+ + + | +------+ | + | | + | example.org , + `~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + Figure 3: Example for Call Forwarding + + + + +Schulzrinne, et al. Standards Track [Page 9] + +RFC 7090 PSAP Callback April 2014 + + +3.4. Network-Based Service URN Resolution + + The IETF emergency services architecture also considers cases where + the resolution from the Service URN to the PSAP URI does not only + happen at the SIP UA itself but at intermediate SIP entities, such as + the user's VoIP provider. + + Figure 4 shows this message exchange of the outgoing emergency call + and the incoming PSAP graphically. While the state information + stored at the VoIP provider is correct, the state allocated at the + SIP UA is not. + + ,-------. + ,' `. + / Emergency \ + | Services | + | Network | + | example.com | + | | + | +------+ | INVITE to police@example.com + | |PSAP +<---+------------------------+ + | | +----+--------------------+ ^ + | +------+ |INVITE from | | + | ,police@example.com | | + `~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | | + v | + +--------+ Query with location +--+---+-+ + | | + urn:service:sos | VoIP | + | LoST |<-----------------------|Service | + | Server | police@example.com |Provider| + | |----------------------->| | + +--------+ +--------+ + | ^ + INVITE| | INVITE + from| | to + police@example.com| | urn:service:sos + V | + +-------+ + | SIP | + | UA | + | Alice | + +-------+ + + Figure 4: Example for Network-Based Service URN Resolution + + + + + + + +Schulzrinne, et al. Standards Track [Page 10] + +RFC 7090 PSAP Callback April 2014 + + +3.5. PSTN Interworking + + In case an emergency call enters the Public Switched Telephone + Network (PSTN), as shown in Figure 5, there is no guarantee that the + callback sometime later leaves the same PSTN/VoIP gateway or that the + same endpoint identifier is used in the forward as well as in the + backward direction making it difficult to reliably detect PSAP + callbacks. + + +-----------+ + | PSTN |-------------+ + | Calltaker | | + | Bob |<--------+ | + +-----------+ | v + ------------------- + //// \\\\ +------------+ + | | |PSTN / VoIP | + | PSTN |---->|Gateway | + \\\\ //// | | + ------------------- +----+-------+ + ^ | + | | + +-------------+ | +--------+ + | | | |VoIP | + | PSTN / VoIP | +->|Service | + | Gateway | |Provider| + | |<------INVITE----| Y | + +-------------+ +--------+ + | ^ + | | + INVITE INVITE + | | + V | + +-------+ + | SIP | + | UA | + | Alice | + +-------+ + + Figure 5: Example for PSTN Interworking + + Note: This scenario is considered outside the scope of this document. + The specified solution does not support this use case. + + + + + + + + +Schulzrinne, et al. Standards Track [Page 11] + +RFC 7090 PSAP Callback April 2014 + + +4. SIP PSAP Callback Indicator + +4.1. General + + This section defines a new header field value, called "psap- + callback", for the SIP Priority header field defined in [RFC3261]. + The value is used to inform SIP entities that the request is + associated with a PSAP callback SIP session. + +4.2. Usage + + SIP entities that receive the header field value within an initial + request for a SIP session can, depending on local policies, apply + PSAP callback-specific procedures for the session or request. + + The PSAP callback-specific procedures may be applied by SIP-based + network entities and by the callee. The specific actions taken when + receiving a call marked as a PSAP callback marked call, such as + bypassing services and barring procedures, are outside the scope of + this document. + +4.3. Syntax + +4.3.1. General + + This section defines the ABNF [RFC5234] for the new SIP Priority + header field value "psap-callback". + +4.3.2. ABNF + + priority-value =/ "psap-callback" + + Figure 6: ABNF + +5. Security Considerations + +5.1. Security Threat + + The PSAP callback functionality described in this document allows + marked calls to bypass blacklists and ignore call-forwarding + procedures and other similar features used to raise the attention of + emergency callers when attempting to contact them. In the case where + the SIP Priority header value, "psap-callback", is supported by the + SIP UA, it would override user-interface configurations, such as + vibrate-only mode, to alert the caller of the incoming call. + + + + + + +Schulzrinne, et al. Standards Track [Page 12] + +RFC 7090 PSAP Callback April 2014 + + +5.2. Security Requirements + + The security threat discussed in Section 5.1 leads to the requirement + to ensure that the mechanisms described in this document cannot be + used for malicious purposes, including telemarketing. + + Furthermore, if the newly defined extension is not recognized, not + verified adequately, or not obeyed by SIP intermediaries or SIP + endpoints, then it must not lead to a failure of the call handling + procedure. Such a call must be treated like a call that does not + have any marking attached. + + The indicator described in Section 4 can be inserted by any SIP + entity, including attackers. So it is critical that the indicator + only lead to preferential call treatment in cases where the recipient + has some trust in the caller, as described in the next section. + +5.3. Security Solution + + The approach for dealing with the implementation of the security + requirements described in Section 5.2 can be differentiated between + the behavior applied by the UA and by SIP proxies. A UA that has + made an emergency call MUST keep state information so that it can + recognize and accept a callback from the PSAP if it occurs within a + reasonable time after an emergency call was placed, as described in + Section 13 of [RFC6443]. Only a timer started at the time when the + original emergency call has ended is required; information about the + calling party identity is not needed since the callback may use a + different calling party identity, as described in Section 3. Since + these SIP UA considerations are described already in [RFC6443] as + well as in [RFC6881] the rest of this section focuses on the behavior + of SIP proxies. + + Figure 7 shows the architecture that utilizes the identity of the + PSAP to decide whether a preferential treatment of callbacks should + be provided. To make this policy decision, the identity of the PSAP + (i.e., calling party identity) is compared with a PSAPs white list. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Schulzrinne, et al. Standards Track [Page 13] + +RFC 7090 PSAP Callback April 2014 + + + +----------+ + | List of |+ + | valid || + | PSAPs || + +----------+| + +----------+ + * + * white list + * + V + Incoming +----------+ Normal + SIP Msg | SIP |+ Treatment + -------------->| Entity ||======================> + + Identity | ||(if not in white list) + Info +----------+| + +----------+ + || + || + || Preferential + || Treatment + ++========================> + (if successfully verified) + + Figure 7: Identity-Based Authorization + + The identity assurance in SIP can come in different forms, namely via + the SIP Identity [RFC4474] or the P-Asserted-Identity [RFC3325] + mechanisms. The former technique relies on a cryptographic assurance + and the latter on a chain of trust. Also, the usage of Transport + Layer Security (TLS) between neighboring SIP entities may provide + useful identity information. At the time of writing, these identity + technologies are being revised in the Secure Telephone Identity + Revisited (stir) working group [STIR] to offer better support for + legacy technologies interworking and SIP intermediaries that modify + the content of various SIP headers and the body. Once the work on + these specifications has been completed, they will offer a stronger + calling party identity mechanism that limits or prevents identity + spoofing. + + An important aspect from a security point of view is the relationship + between the emergency services network (containing the PSAPs) and the + VoIP provider, assuming that the emergency call travels via the VoIP + provider and not directly between the SIP UA and the PSAP. + + The establishment of a white list with PSAP identities may be + operationally complex and dependent on the relationship between the + emergency services operator and the VoIP provider. If there is a + relationship between the VoIP provider and the PSAP operator, for + + + +Schulzrinne, et al. Standards Track [Page 14] + +RFC 7090 PSAP Callback April 2014 + + + example, when they are both operating in the same geographical + region, then populating the white list is fairly simple and + consequently the identification of a PSAP callback is less + problematic compared to the case where the two entities have never + interacted with each other before. In the end, the VoIP provider has + to verify whether the marked callback message indeed came from a + legitimate source. + + VoIP providers MUST only give PSAP callbacks preferential treatment + when the calling party identity of the PSAP was successfully matched + against entries in the white list. If it cannot be verified (because + there was no match), then the VoIP provider MUST remove the PSAP + callback marking. Thereby, the callback reverts to a normal call. + As a second step, SIP UAs MUST maintain a timer that is started with + the original emergency call and this timer expires within a + reasonable amount of time, such as 30 minutes per [RFC6881]. Such a + timer also ensures that VoIP providers cannot misuse the PSAP + callback mechanism, for example, to ensure that their support calls + reach their customers. + + Finally, a PSAP callback MUST use the same media as the original + emergency call. For example, when an initial emergency call + established a real-time text communication session, then the PSAP + callback must also attempt to establish a real-time communication + interaction. The reason for this is twofold. First, the person + seeking help may have disabilities that prevent them from using + certain media and hence using the same media for the callback avoids + unpleasant surprises and delays. Second, the emergency caller may + have intentionally chosen a certain media and does not prefer to + communicate in a different way. For example, it would be unfortunate + if a hostage tries to seek help using instant messaging to avoid any + noise when subsequently the ringtone triggered by a PSAP callback + using a voice call gets the attention of the hostage-taker. User- + interface designs need to cater to such situations. + +6. IANA Considerations + + This document adds the "psap-callback" value to the SIP "Priority + Header Field Values" registry allocated by [RFC6878]. The semantic + of the newly defined "psap-callback" value is defined in Section 4. + + + + + + + + + + + +Schulzrinne, et al. Standards Track [Page 15] + +RFC 7090 PSAP Callback April 2014 + + +7. Acknowledgements + + We would like to thank the following persons for their feedback: + Bernard Aboba, Andrew Allen, John-Luc Bakker, Kenneth Carlberg, + Martin Dolly, Keith Drage, Timothy Dwight, John Elwell, Janet Gunn, + Cullen Jennings, Hadriel Kaplan, Paul Kyzivat, John Medland, Atle + Monrad, James Polk, Dan Romascanu, Brian Rosen, Robert Sparks, Geoff + Thompson, and Martin Thomson. + + We would also like to thank the ECRIT working group chairs, Marc + Linsner and Roger Marshall, for their support. Roger Marshall was + the document shepherd for this document. Vijay Gurbani provided the + general area review. + + During IESG review, the document received good feedback from Barry + Leiba, Spencer Dawkins, Richard Barnes, Joel Jaeggli, Stephen + Farrell, and Benoit Claise. + +8. References + +8.1. Normative References + + [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. + + [RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, + A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. + Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, + June 2002. + + [RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed., and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for + Syntax Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January + 2008. + + [RFC5627] Rosenberg, J., "Obtaining and Using Globally Routable User + Agent URIs (GRUUs) in the Session Initiation Protocol + (SIP)", RFC 5627, October 2009. + + [RFC6878] Roach, A., "IANA Registry for the Session Initiation + Protocol (SIP) "Priority" Header Field", RFC 6878, March + 2013. + + + + + + + + + + +Schulzrinne, et al. Standards Track [Page 16] + +RFC 7090 PSAP Callback April 2014 + + +8.2. Informative References + + [RFC3325] Jennings, C., Peterson, J., and M. Watson, "Private + Extensions to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for + Asserted Identity within Trusted Networks", RFC 3325, + November 2002. + + [RFC4474] Peterson, J. and C. Jennings, "Enhancements for + Authenticated Identity Management in the Session + Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4474, August 2006. + + [RFC5012] Schulzrinne, H. and R. Marshall, "Requirements for + Emergency Context Resolution with Internet Technologies", + RFC 5012, January 2008. + + [RFC5222] Hardie, T., Newton, A., Schulzrinne, H., and H. + Tschofenig, "LoST: A Location-to-Service Translation + Protocol", RFC 5222, August 2008. + + [RFC6443] Rosen, B., Schulzrinne, H., Polk, J., and A. Newton, + "Framework for Emergency Calling Using Internet + Multimedia", RFC 6443, December 2011. + + [RFC6881] Rosen, B. and J. Polk, "Best Current Practice for + Communications Services in Support of Emergency Calling", + BCP 181, RFC 6881, March 2013. + + [STIR] IETF, "Secure Telephone Identity Revisited (stir) Working + Group", http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/stir/charter/, + October 2013. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Schulzrinne, et al. Standards Track [Page 17] + +RFC 7090 PSAP Callback April 2014 + + +Authors' Addresses + + Henning Schulzrinne + Columbia University + Department of Computer Science + 450 Computer Science Building + New York, NY 10027 + US + + Phone: +1 212 939 7004 + EMail: hgs+ecrit@cs.columbia.edu + URI: http://www.cs.columbia.edu + + + Hannes Tschofenig + + EMail: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net + URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at + + + Christer Holmberg + Ericsson + Hirsalantie 11 + Jorvas 02420 + Finland + + EMail: christer.holmberg@ericsson.com + + + Milan Patel + Huawei Technologies (UK) Co., Ltd. + 300 South Oak Way, Green Park + Reading, Berkshire RG2 6UF + U.K. + + EMail: Milan.Patel@huawei.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Schulzrinne, et al. Standards Track [Page 18] + |