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| author | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
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| committer | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
| commit | 4bfd864f10b68b71482b35c818559068ef8d5797 (patch) | |
| tree | e3989f47a7994642eb325063d46e8f08ffa681dc /doc/rfc/rfc7516.txt | |
| parent | ea76e11061bda059ae9f9ad130a9895cc85607db (diff) | |
doc: Add RFC documents
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diff --git a/doc/rfc/rfc7516.txt b/doc/rfc/rfc7516.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..21a3d67 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/rfc/rfc7516.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2859 @@ + + + + + + +Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Jones +Request for Comments: 7516 Microsoft +Category: Standards Track J. Hildebrand +ISSN: 2070-1721 Cisco + May 2015 + + + JSON Web Encryption (JWE) + +Abstract + + JSON Web Encryption (JWE) represents encrypted content using + JSON-based data structures. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers + for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON + Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and IANA registries defined by + that specification. Related digital signature and Message + Authentication Code (MAC) capabilities are described in the separate + JSON Web Signature (JWS) specification. + +Status of This Memo + + This is an Internet Standards Track document. + + This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force + (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has + received public review and has been approved for publication by the + Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on + Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741. + + Information about the current status of this document, any errata, + and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at + http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the + document authors. All rights reserved. + + This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal + Provisions Relating to IETF Documents + (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of + publication of this document. Please review these documents + carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect + to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must + include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of + the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as + described in the Simplified BSD License. + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 1] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 3. JSON Web Encryption (JWE) Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 3.1. JWE Compact Serialization Overview . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 3.2. JWE JSON Serialization Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 3.3. Example JWE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 4. JOSE Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 4.1. Registered Header Parameter Names . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 4.1.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . 12 + 4.1.2. "enc" (Encryption Algorithm) Header Parameter . . . . 12 + 4.1.3. "zip" (Compression Algorithm) Header Parameter . . . 12 + 4.1.4. "jku" (JWK Set URL) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . 13 + 4.1.5. "jwk" (JSON Web Key) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . 13 + 4.1.6. "kid" (Key ID) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + 4.1.7. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . 13 + 4.1.8. "x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) Header Parameter . . 13 + 4.1.9. "x5t" (X.509 Certificate SHA-1 Thumbprint) Header + Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + 4.1.10. "x5t#S256" (X.509 Certificate SHA-256 Thumbprint) + Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + 4.1.11. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + 4.1.12. "cty" (Content Type) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . 14 + 4.1.13. "crit" (Critical) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . 14 + 4.2. Public Header Parameter Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + 4.3. Private Header Parameter Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 5. Producing and Consuming JWEs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 5.1. Message Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 5.2. Message Decryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 + 5.3. String Comparison Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 + 6. Key Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 + 7. Serializations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 + 7.1. JWE Compact Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 + 7.2. JWE JSON Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 + 7.2.1. General JWE JSON Serialization Syntax . . . . . . . . 21 + 7.2.2. Flattened JWE JSON Serialization Syntax . . . . . . . 23 + 8. TLS Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 + 9. Distinguishing between JWS and JWE Objects . . . . . . . . . 24 + 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 + 10.1. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters + Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 + 10.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 + 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 + 11.1. Key Entropy and Random Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 + 11.2. Key Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 + 11.3. Using Matching Algorithm Strengths . . . . . . . . . . . 28 + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 2] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + 11.4. Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . 28 + 11.5. Timing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 + 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 + 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 + 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 + Appendix A. JWE Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 + A.1. Example JWE using RSAES-OAEP and AES GCM . . . . . . . . 32 + A.1.1. JOSE Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 + A.1.2. Content Encryption Key (CEK) . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 + A.1.3. Key Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 + A.1.4. Initialization Vector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 + A.1.5. Additional Authenticated Data . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 + A.1.6. Content Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 + A.1.7. Complete Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 + A.1.8. Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 + A.2. Example JWE using RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 and + AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 + A.2.1. JOSE Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 + A.2.2. Content Encryption Key (CEK) . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 + A.2.3. Key Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 + A.2.4. Initialization Vector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 + A.2.5. Additional Authenticated Data . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 + A.2.6. Content Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 + A.2.7. Complete Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 + A.2.8. Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 + A.3. Example JWE Using AES Key Wrap and + AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 + A.3.1. JOSE Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 + A.3.2. Content Encryption Key (CEK) . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 + A.3.3. Key Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 + A.3.4. Initialization Vector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 + A.3.5. Additional Authenticated Data . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 + A.3.6. Content Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 + A.3.7. Complete Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 + A.3.8. Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 + A.4. Example JWE Using General JWE JSON Serialization . . . . 44 + A.4.1. JWE Per-Recipient Unprotected Headers . . . . . . . . 45 + A.4.2. JWE Protected Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 + A.4.3. JWE Shared Unprotected Header . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 + A.4.4. Complete JOSE Header Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 + A.4.5. Additional Authenticated Data . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 + A.4.6. Content Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 + A.4.7. Complete JWE JSON Serialization Representation . . . 47 + A.5. Example JWE Using Flattened JWE JSON Serialization . . . 47 + Appendix B. Example AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 Computation . . . . 48 + B.1. Extract MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY from Key . . . . . . . . . . 48 + B.2. Encrypt Plaintext to Create Ciphertext . . . . . . . . . 49 + B.3. 64-Bit Big-Endian Representation of AAD Length . . . . . 49 + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 3] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + B.4. Initialization Vector Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 + B.5. Create Input to HMAC Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 + B.6. Compute HMAC Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 + B.7. Truncate HMAC Value to Create Authentication Tag . . . . 50 + Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 + +1. Introduction + + JSON Web Encryption (JWE) represents encrypted content using JSON- + based data structures [RFC7159]. The JWE cryptographic mechanisms + encrypt and provide integrity protection for an arbitrary sequence of + octets. + + Two closely related serializations for JWEs are defined. The JWE + Compact Serialization is a compact, URL-safe representation intended + for space constrained environments such as HTTP Authorization headers + and URI query parameters. The JWE JSON Serialization represents JWEs + as JSON objects and enables the same content to be encrypted to + multiple parties. Both share the same cryptographic underpinnings. + + Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this + specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) + [JWA] specification and IANA registries defined by that + specification. Related digital signature and MAC capabilities are + described in the separate JSON Web Signature (JWS) [JWS] + specification. + + Names defined by this specification are short because a core goal is + for the resulting representations to be compact. + +1.1. Notational Conventions + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and + "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in + "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" [RFC2119]. + The interpretation should only be applied when the terms appear in + all capital letters. + + BASE64URL(OCTETS) denotes the base64url encoding of OCTETS, per + Section 2 of [JWS]. + + UTF8(STRING) denotes the octets of the UTF-8 [RFC3629] representation + of STRING, where STRING is a sequence of zero or more Unicode + [UNICODE] characters. + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 4] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + ASCII(STRING) denotes the octets of the ASCII [RFC20] representation + of STRING, where STRING is a sequence of zero or more ASCII + characters. + + The concatenation of two values A and B is denoted as A || B. + +2. Terminology + + The terms "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", "Base64url Encoding", + "Collision-Resistant Name", "Header Parameter", "JOSE Header", and + "StringOrURI" are defined by the JWS specification [JWS]. + + The terms "Ciphertext", "Digital Signature", "Initialization Vector + (IV)", "Message Authentication Code (MAC)", and "Plaintext" are + defined by the "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2" [RFC4949]. + + These terms are defined by this specification: + + JSON Web Encryption (JWE) + A data structure representing an encrypted and integrity-protected + message. + + Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) + An AEAD algorithm is one that encrypts the plaintext, allows + Additional Authenticated Data to be specified, and provides an + integrated content integrity check over the ciphertext and + Additional Authenticated Data. AEAD algorithms accept two inputs, + the plaintext and the Additional Authenticated Data value, and + produce two outputs, the ciphertext and the Authentication Tag + value. AES Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) is one such algorithm. + + Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) + An input to an AEAD operation that is integrity protected but not + encrypted. + + Authentication Tag + An output of an AEAD operation that ensures the integrity of the + ciphertext and the Additional Authenticated Data. Note that some + algorithms may not use an Authentication Tag, in which case this + value is the empty octet sequence. + + Content Encryption Key (CEK) + A symmetric key for the AEAD algorithm used to encrypt the + plaintext to produce the ciphertext and the Authentication Tag. + + + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 5] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + JWE Encrypted Key + Encrypted Content Encryption Key value. Note that for some + algorithms, the JWE Encrypted Key value is specified as being the + empty octet sequence. + + JWE Initialization Vector + Initialization Vector value used when encrypting the plaintext. + Note that some algorithms may not use an Initialization Vector, in + which case this value is the empty octet sequence. + + JWE AAD + Additional value to be integrity protected by the authenticated + encryption operation. This can only be present when using the JWE + JSON Serialization. (Note that this can also be achieved when + using either the JWE Compact Serialization or the JWE JSON + Serialization by including the AAD value as an integrity-protected + Header Parameter value, but at the cost of the value being double + base64url encoded.) + + JWE Ciphertext + Ciphertext value resulting from authenticated encryption of the + plaintext with Additional Authenticated Data. + + JWE Authentication Tag + Authentication Tag value resulting from authenticated encryption + of the plaintext with Additional Authenticated Data. + + JWE Protected Header + JSON object that contains the Header Parameters that are integrity + protected by the authenticated encryption operation. These + parameters apply to all recipients of the JWE. For the JWE + Compact Serialization, this comprises the entire JOSE Header. For + the JWE JSON Serialization, this is one component of the JOSE + Header. + + JWE Shared Unprotected Header + JSON object that contains the Header Parameters that apply to all + recipients of the JWE that are not integrity protected. This can + only be present when using the JWE JSON Serialization. + + JWE Per-Recipient Unprotected Header + JSON object that contains Header Parameters that apply to a single + recipient of the JWE. These Header Parameter values are not + integrity protected. This can only be present when using the JWE + JSON Serialization. + + JWE Compact Serialization + A representation of the JWE as a compact, URL-safe string. + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 6] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + JWE JSON Serialization + A representation of the JWE as a JSON object. The JWE JSON + Serialization enables the same content to be encrypted to multiple + parties. This representation is neither optimized for compactness + nor URL safe. + + Key Management Mode + A method of determining the Content Encryption Key value to use. + Each algorithm used for determining the CEK value uses a specific + Key Management Mode. Key Management Modes employed by this + specification are Key Encryption, Key Wrapping, Direct Key + Agreement, Key Agreement with Key Wrapping, and Direct Encryption. + + Key Encryption + A Key Management Mode in which the CEK value is encrypted to the + intended recipient using an asymmetric encryption algorithm. + + Key Wrapping + A Key Management Mode in which the CEK value is encrypted to the + intended recipient using a symmetric key wrapping algorithm. + + Direct Key Agreement + A Key Management Mode in which a key agreement algorithm is used + to agree upon the CEK value. + + Key Agreement with Key Wrapping + A Key Management Mode in which a key agreement algorithm is used + to agree upon a symmetric key used to encrypt the CEK value to the + intended recipient using a symmetric key wrapping algorithm. + + Direct Encryption + A Key Management Mode in which the CEK value used is the secret + symmetric key value shared between the parties. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 7] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + +3. JSON Web Encryption (JWE) Overview + + JWE represents encrypted content using JSON data structures and + base64url encoding. These JSON data structures MAY contain + whitespace and/or line breaks before or after any JSON values or + structural characters, in accordance with Section 2 of RFC 7159 + [RFC7159]. A JWE represents these logical values (each of which is + defined in Section 2): + + o JOSE Header + o JWE Encrypted Key + o JWE Initialization Vector + o JWE AAD + o JWE Ciphertext + o JWE Authentication Tag + + For a JWE, the JOSE Header members are the union of the members of + these values (each of which is defined in Section 2): + + o JWE Protected Header + o JWE Shared Unprotected Header + o JWE Per-Recipient Unprotected Header + + JWE utilizes authenticated encryption to ensure the confidentiality + and integrity of the plaintext and the integrity of the JWE Protected + Header and the JWE AAD. + + This document defines two serializations for JWEs: a compact, URL- + safe serialization called the JWE Compact Serialization and a JSON + serialization called the JWE JSON Serialization. In both + serializations, the JWE Protected Header, JWE Encrypted Key, JWE + Initialization Vector, JWE Ciphertext, and JWE Authentication Tag are + base64url encoded, since JSON lacks a way to directly represent + arbitrary octet sequences. When present, the JWE AAD is also + base64url encoded. + +3.1. JWE Compact Serialization Overview + + In the JWE Compact Serialization, no JWE Shared Unprotected Header or + JWE Per-Recipient Unprotected Header are used. In this case, the + JOSE Header and the JWE Protected Header are the same. + + + + + + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 8] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + In the JWE Compact Serialization, a JWE is represented as the + concatenation: + + BASE64URL(UTF8(JWE Protected Header)) || '.' || + BASE64URL(JWE Encrypted Key) || '.' || + BASE64URL(JWE Initialization Vector) || '.' || + BASE64URL(JWE Ciphertext) || '.' || + BASE64URL(JWE Authentication Tag) + + See Section 7.1 for more information about the JWE Compact + Serialization. + +3.2. JWE JSON Serialization Overview + + In the JWE JSON Serialization, one or more of the JWE Protected + Header, JWE Shared Unprotected Header, and JWE Per-Recipient + Unprotected Header MUST be present. In this case, the members of the + JOSE Header are the union of the members of the JWE Protected Header, + JWE Shared Unprotected Header, and JWE Per-Recipient Unprotected + Header values that are present. + + In the JWE JSON Serialization, a JWE is represented as a JSON object + containing some or all of these eight members: + + "protected", with the value BASE64URL(UTF8(JWE Protected Header)) + "unprotected", with the value JWE Shared Unprotected Header + "header", with the value JWE Per-Recipient Unprotected Header + "encrypted_key", with the value BASE64URL(JWE Encrypted Key) + "iv", with the value BASE64URL(JWE Initialization Vector) + "ciphertext", with the value BASE64URL(JWE Ciphertext) + "tag", with the value BASE64URL(JWE Authentication Tag) + "aad", with the value BASE64URL(JWE AAD) + + The six base64url-encoded result strings and the two unprotected JSON + object values are represented as members within a JSON object. The + inclusion of some of these values is OPTIONAL. The JWE JSON + Serialization can also encrypt the plaintext to multiple recipients. + See Section 7.2 for more information about the JWE JSON + Serialization. + + + + + + + + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 9] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + +3.3. Example JWE + + This example encrypts the plaintext "The true sign of intelligence is + not knowledge but imagination." to the recipient. + + The following example JWE Protected Header declares that: + + o The Content Encryption Key is encrypted to the recipient using the + RSAES-OAEP [RFC3447] algorithm to produce the JWE Encrypted Key. + + o Authenticated encryption is performed on the plaintext using the + AES GCM [AES] [NIST.800-38D] algorithm with a 256-bit key to + produce the ciphertext and the Authentication Tag. + + {"alg":"RSA-OAEP","enc":"A256GCM"} + + Encoding this JWE Protected Header as BASE64URL(UTF8(JWE Protected + Header)) gives this value: + + eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImVuYyI6IkEyNTZHQ00ifQ + + The remaining steps to finish creating this JWE are: + + o Generate a random Content Encryption Key (CEK). + + o Encrypt the CEK with the recipient's public key using the RSAES- + OAEP algorithm to produce the JWE Encrypted Key. + + o Base64url-encode the JWE Encrypted Key. + + o Generate a random JWE Initialization Vector. + + o Base64url-encode the JWE Initialization Vector. + + o Let the Additional Authenticated Data encryption parameter be + ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWE Protected Header))). + + o Perform authenticated encryption on the plaintext with the AES GCM + algorithm using the CEK as the encryption key, the JWE + Initialization Vector, and the Additional Authenticated Data + value, requesting a 128-bit Authentication Tag output. + + o Base64url-encode the ciphertext. + + o Base64url-encode the Authentication Tag. + + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 10] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + o Assemble the final representation: The Compact Serialization of + this result is the string BASE64URL(UTF8(JWE Protected Header)) || + '.' || BASE64URL(JWE Encrypted Key) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWE + Initialization Vector) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWE Ciphertext) || '.' + || BASE64URL(JWE Authentication Tag). + + The final result in this example (with line breaks for display + purposes only) is: + + eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImVuYyI6IkEyNTZHQ00ifQ. + OKOawDo13gRp2ojaHV7LFpZcgV7T6DVZKTyKOMTYUmKoTCVJRgckCL9kiMT03JGe + ipsEdY3mx_etLbbWSrFr05kLzcSr4qKAq7YN7e9jwQRb23nfa6c9d-StnImGyFDb + Sv04uVuxIp5Zms1gNxKKK2Da14B8S4rzVRltdYwam_lDp5XnZAYpQdb76FdIKLaV + mqgfwX7XWRxv2322i-vDxRfqNzo_tETKzpVLzfiwQyeyPGLBIO56YJ7eObdv0je8 + 1860ppamavo35UgoRdbYaBcoh9QcfylQr66oc6vFWXRcZ_ZT2LawVCWTIy3brGPi + 6UklfCpIMfIjf7iGdXKHzg. + 48V1_ALb6US04U3b. + 5eym8TW_c8SuK0ltJ3rpYIzOeDQz7TALvtu6UG9oMo4vpzs9tX_EFShS8iB7j6ji + SdiwkIr3ajwQzaBtQD_A. + XFBoMYUZodetZdvTiFvSkQ + + See Appendix A.1 for the complete details of computing this JWE. See + Appendix A for additional examples, including examples using the JWE + JSON Serialization in Sections A.4 and A.5. + +4. JOSE Header + + For a JWE, the members of the JSON object(s) representing the JOSE + Header describe the encryption applied to the plaintext and + optionally additional properties of the JWE. The Header Parameter + names within the JOSE Header MUST be unique, just as described in + Section 4 of [JWS]. The rules about handling Header Parameters that + are not understood by the implementation are also the same. The + classes of Header Parameter names are likewise the same. + +4.1. Registered Header Parameter Names + + The following Header Parameter names for use in JWEs are registered + in the IANA "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters" + registry established by [JWS], with meanings as defined below. + + As indicated by the common registry, JWSs and JWEs share a common + Header Parameter space; when a parameter is used by both + specifications, its usage must be compatible between the + specifications. + + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 11] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + +4.1.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter + + This parameter has the same meaning, syntax, and processing rules as + the "alg" Header Parameter defined in Section 4.1.1 of [JWS], except + that the Header Parameter identifies the cryptographic algorithm used + to encrypt or determine the value of the CEK. The encrypted content + is not usable if the "alg" value does not represent a supported + algorithm, or if the recipient does not have a key that can be used + with that algorithm. + + A list of defined "alg" values for this use can be found in the IANA + "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms" registry established + by [JWA]; the initial contents of this registry are the values + defined in Section 4.1 of [JWA]. + +4.1.2. "enc" (Encryption Algorithm) Header Parameter + + The "enc" (encryption algorithm) Header Parameter identifies the + content encryption algorithm used to perform authenticated encryption + on the plaintext to produce the ciphertext and the Authentication + Tag. This algorithm MUST be an AEAD algorithm with a specified key + length. The encrypted content is not usable if the "enc" value does + not represent a supported algorithm. "enc" values should either be + registered in the IANA "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms" + registry established by [JWA] or be a value that contains a + Collision-Resistant Name. The "enc" value is a case-sensitive ASCII + string containing a StringOrURI value. This Header Parameter MUST be + present and MUST be understood and processed by implementations. + + A list of defined "enc" values for this use can be found in the IANA + "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms" registry established + by [JWA]; the initial contents of this registry are the values + defined in Section 5.1 of [JWA]. + +4.1.3. "zip" (Compression Algorithm) Header Parameter + + The "zip" (compression algorithm) applied to the plaintext before + encryption, if any. The "zip" value defined by this specification + is: + + o "DEF" - Compression with the DEFLATE [RFC1951] algorithm + + Other values MAY be used. Compression algorithm values can be + registered in the IANA "JSON Web Encryption Compression Algorithms" + registry established by [JWA]. The "zip" value is a case-sensitive + string. If no "zip" parameter is present, no compression is applied + to the plaintext before encryption. When used, this Header Parameter + MUST be integrity protected; therefore, it MUST occur only within the + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 12] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + JWE Protected Header. Use of this Header Parameter is OPTIONAL. + This Header Parameter MUST be understood and processed by + implementations. + +4.1.4. "jku" (JWK Set URL) Header Parameter + + This parameter has the same meaning, syntax, and processing rules as + the "jku" Header Parameter defined in Section 4.1.2 of [JWS], except + that the JWK Set resource contains the public key to which the JWE + was encrypted; this can be used to determine the private key needed + to decrypt the JWE. + +4.1.5. "jwk" (JSON Web Key) Header Parameter + + This parameter has the same meaning, syntax, and processing rules as + the "jwk" Header Parameter defined in Section 4.1.3 of [JWS], except + that the key is the public key to which the JWE was encrypted; this + can be used to determine the private key needed to decrypt the JWE. + +4.1.6. "kid" (Key ID) Header Parameter + + This parameter has the same meaning, syntax, and processing rules as + the "kid" Header Parameter defined in Section 4.1.4 of [JWS], except + that the key hint references the public key to which the JWE was + encrypted; this can be used to determine the private key needed to + decrypt the JWE. This parameter allows originators to explicitly + signal a change of key to JWE recipients. + +4.1.7. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter + + This parameter has the same meaning, syntax, and processing rules as + the "x5u" Header Parameter defined in Section 4.1.5 of [JWS], except + that the X.509 public key certificate or certificate chain [RFC5280] + contains the public key to which the JWE was encrypted; this can be + used to determine the private key needed to decrypt the JWE. + +4.1.8. "x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) Header Parameter + + This parameter has the same meaning, syntax, and processing rules as + the "x5c" Header Parameter defined in Section 4.1.6 of [JWS], except + that the X.509 public key certificate or certificate chain [RFC5280] + contains the public key to which the JWE was encrypted; this can be + used to determine the private key needed to decrypt the JWE. + + See Appendix B of [JWS] for an example "x5c" value. + + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 13] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + +4.1.9. "x5t" (X.509 Certificate SHA-1 Thumbprint) Header Parameter + + This parameter has the same meaning, syntax, and processing rules as + the "x5t" Header Parameter defined in Section 4.1.7 of [JWS], except + that the certificate referenced by the thumbprint contains the public + key to which the JWE was encrypted; this can be used to determine the + private key needed to decrypt the JWE. Note that certificate + thumbprints are also sometimes known as certificate fingerprints. + +4.1.10. "x5t#S256" (X.509 Certificate SHA-256 Thumbprint) Header + Parameter + + This parameter has the same meaning, syntax, and processing rules as + the "x5t#S256" Header Parameter defined in Section 4.1.8 of [JWS], + except that the certificate referenced by the thumbprint contains the + public key to which the JWE was encrypted; this can be used to + determine the private key needed to decrypt the JWE. Note that + certificate thumbprints are also sometimes known as certificate + fingerprints. + +4.1.11. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter + + This parameter has the same meaning, syntax, and processing rules as + the "typ" Header Parameter defined in Section 4.1.9 of [JWS], except + that the type is that of this complete JWE. + +4.1.12. "cty" (Content Type) Header Parameter + + This parameter has the same meaning, syntax, and processing rules as + the "cty" Header Parameter defined in Section 4.1.10 of [JWS], except + that the type is that of the secured content (the plaintext). + +4.1.13. "crit" (Critical) Header Parameter + + This parameter has the same meaning, syntax, and processing rules as + the "crit" Header Parameter defined in Section 4.1.11 of [JWS], + except that Header Parameters for a JWE are being referred to, rather + than Header Parameters for a JWS. + +4.2. Public Header Parameter Names + + Additional Header Parameter names can be defined by those using JWEs. + However, in order to prevent collisions, any new Header Parameter + name should either be registered in the IANA "JSON Web Signature and + Encryption Header Parameters" registry established by [JWS] or be a + Public Name: a value that contains a Collision-Resistant Name. In + each case, the definer of the name or value needs to take reasonable + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 14] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + precautions to make sure they are in control of the part of the + namespace they use to define the Header Parameter name. + + New Header Parameters should be introduced sparingly, as they can + result in non-interoperable JWEs. + +4.3. Private Header Parameter Names + + A producer and consumer of a JWE may agree to use Header Parameter + names that are Private Names: names that are not Registered Header + Parameter names (Section 4.1) or Public Header Parameter names + (Section 4.2). Unlike Public Header Parameter names, Private Header + Parameter names are subject to collision and should be used with + caution. + +5. Producing and Consuming JWEs + +5.1. Message Encryption + + The message encryption process is as follows. The order of the steps + is not significant in cases where there are no dependencies between + the inputs and outputs of the steps. + + 1. Determine the Key Management Mode employed by the algorithm used + to determine the Content Encryption Key value. (This is the + algorithm recorded in the "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter of + the resulting JWE.) + + 2. When Key Wrapping, Key Encryption, or Key Agreement with Key + Wrapping are employed, generate a random CEK value. See RFC + 4086 [RFC4086] for considerations on generating random values. + The CEK MUST have a length equal to that required for the + content encryption algorithm. + + 3. When Direct Key Agreement or Key Agreement with Key Wrapping are + employed, use the key agreement algorithm to compute the value + of the agreed upon key. When Direct Key Agreement is employed, + let the CEK be the agreed upon key. When Key Agreement with Key + Wrapping is employed, the agreed upon key will be used to wrap + the CEK. + + 4. When Key Wrapping, Key Encryption, or Key Agreement with Key + Wrapping are employed, encrypt the CEK to the recipient and let + the result be the JWE Encrypted Key. + + 5. When Direct Key Agreement or Direct Encryption are employed, let + the JWE Encrypted Key be the empty octet sequence. + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 15] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + 6. When Direct Encryption is employed, let the CEK be the shared + symmetric key. + + 7. Compute the encoded key value BASE64URL(JWE Encrypted Key). + + 8. If the JWE JSON Serialization is being used, repeat this process + (steps 1-7) for each recipient. + + 9. Generate a random JWE Initialization Vector of the correct size + for the content encryption algorithm (if required for the + algorithm); otherwise, let the JWE Initialization Vector be the + empty octet sequence. + + 10. Compute the encoded Initialization Vector value BASE64URL(JWE + Initialization Vector). + + 11. If a "zip" parameter was included, compress the plaintext using + the specified compression algorithm and let M be the octet + sequence representing the compressed plaintext; otherwise, let M + be the octet sequence representing the plaintext. + + 12. Create the JSON object(s) containing the desired set of Header + Parameters, which together comprise the JOSE Header: one or more + of the JWE Protected Header, the JWE Shared Unprotected Header, + and the JWE Per-Recipient Unprotected Header. + + 13. Compute the Encoded Protected Header value BASE64URL(UTF8(JWE + Protected Header)). If the JWE Protected Header is not present + (which can only happen when using the JWE JSON Serialization and + no "protected" member is present), let this value be the empty + string. + + 14. Let the Additional Authenticated Data encryption parameter be + ASCII(Encoded Protected Header). However, if a JWE AAD value is + present (which can only be the case when using the JWE JSON + Serialization), instead let the Additional Authenticated Data + encryption parameter be ASCII(Encoded Protected Header || '.' || + BASE64URL(JWE AAD)). + + 15. Encrypt M using the CEK, the JWE Initialization Vector, and the + Additional Authenticated Data value using the specified content + encryption algorithm to create the JWE Ciphertext value and the + JWE Authentication Tag (which is the Authentication Tag output + from the encryption operation). + + 16. Compute the encoded ciphertext value BASE64URL(JWE Ciphertext). + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 16] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + 17. Compute the encoded Authentication Tag value BASE64URL(JWE + Authentication Tag). + + 18. If a JWE AAD value is present, compute the encoded AAD value + BASE64URL(JWE AAD). + + 19. Create the desired serialized output. The Compact Serialization + of this result is the string BASE64URL(UTF8(JWE Protected + Header)) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWE Encrypted Key) || '.' || + BASE64URL(JWE Initialization Vector) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWE + Ciphertext) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWE Authentication Tag). The + JWE JSON Serialization is described in Section 7.2. + +5.2. Message Decryption + + The message decryption process is the reverse of the encryption + process. The order of the steps is not significant in cases where + there are no dependencies between the inputs and outputs of the + steps. If any of these steps fail, the encrypted content cannot be + validated. + + When there are multiple recipients, it is an application decision + which of the recipients' encrypted content must successfully validate + for the JWE to be accepted. In some cases, encrypted content for all + recipients must successfully validate or the JWE will be considered + invalid. In other cases, only the encrypted content for a single + recipient needs to be successfully validated. However, in all cases, + the encrypted content for at least one recipient MUST successfully + validate or the JWE MUST be considered invalid. + + 1. Parse the JWE representation to extract the serialized values + for the components of the JWE. When using the JWE Compact + Serialization, these components are the base64url-encoded + representations of the JWE Protected Header, the JWE Encrypted + Key, the JWE Initialization Vector, the JWE Ciphertext, and the + JWE Authentication Tag, and when using the JWE JSON + Serialization, these components also include the base64url- + encoded representation of the JWE AAD and the unencoded JWE + Shared Unprotected Header and JWE Per-Recipient Unprotected + Header values. When using the JWE Compact Serialization, the + JWE Protected Header, the JWE Encrypted Key, the JWE + Initialization Vector, the JWE Ciphertext, and the JWE + Authentication Tag are represented as base64url-encoded values + in that order, with each value being separated from the next by + a single period ('.') character, resulting in exactly four + delimiting period characters being used. The JWE JSON + Serialization is described in Section 7.2. + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 17] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + 2. Base64url decode the encoded representations of the JWE + Protected Header, the JWE Encrypted Key, the JWE Initialization + Vector, the JWE Ciphertext, the JWE Authentication Tag, and the + JWE AAD, following the restriction that no line breaks, + whitespace, or other additional characters have been used. + + 3. Verify that the octet sequence resulting from decoding the + encoded JWE Protected Header is a UTF-8-encoded representation + of a completely valid JSON object conforming to RFC 7159 + [RFC7159]; let the JWE Protected Header be this JSON object. + + 4. If using the JWE Compact Serialization, let the JOSE Header be + the JWE Protected Header. Otherwise, when using the JWE JSON + Serialization, let the JOSE Header be the union of the members + of the JWE Protected Header, the JWE Shared Unprotected Header + and the corresponding JWE Per-Recipient Unprotected Header, all + of which must be completely valid JSON objects. During this + step, verify that the resulting JOSE Header does not contain + duplicate Header Parameter names. When using the JWE JSON + Serialization, this restriction includes that the same Header + Parameter name also MUST NOT occur in distinct JSON object + values that together comprise the JOSE Header. + + 5. Verify that the implementation understands and can process all + fields that it is required to support, whether required by this + specification, by the algorithms being used, or by the "crit" + Header Parameter value, and that the values of those parameters + are also understood and supported. + + 6. Determine the Key Management Mode employed by the algorithm + specified by the "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter. + + 7. Verify that the JWE uses a key known to the recipient. + + 8. When Direct Key Agreement or Key Agreement with Key Wrapping are + employed, use the key agreement algorithm to compute the value + of the agreed upon key. When Direct Key Agreement is employed, + let the CEK be the agreed upon key. When Key Agreement with Key + Wrapping is employed, the agreed upon key will be used to + decrypt the JWE Encrypted Key. + + 9. When Key Wrapping, Key Encryption, or Key Agreement with Key + Wrapping are employed, decrypt the JWE Encrypted Key to produce + the CEK. The CEK MUST have a length equal to that required for + the content encryption algorithm. Note that when there are + multiple recipients, each recipient will only be able to decrypt + JWE Encrypted Key values that were encrypted to a key in that + recipient's possession. It is therefore normal to only be able + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 18] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + to decrypt one of the per-recipient JWE Encrypted Key values to + obtain the CEK value. Also, see Section 11.5 for security + considerations on mitigating timing attacks. + + 10. When Direct Key Agreement or Direct Encryption are employed, + verify that the JWE Encrypted Key value is an empty octet + sequence. + + 11. When Direct Encryption is employed, let the CEK be the shared + symmetric key. + + 12. Record whether the CEK could be successfully determined for this + recipient or not. + + 13. If the JWE JSON Serialization is being used, repeat this process + (steps 4-12) for each recipient contained in the representation. + + 14. Compute the Encoded Protected Header value BASE64URL(UTF8(JWE + Protected Header)). If the JWE Protected Header is not present + (which can only happen when using the JWE JSON Serialization and + no "protected" member is present), let this value be the empty + string. + + 15. Let the Additional Authenticated Data encryption parameter be + ASCII(Encoded Protected Header). However, if a JWE AAD value is + present (which can only be the case when using the JWE JSON + Serialization), instead let the Additional Authenticated Data + encryption parameter be ASCII(Encoded Protected Header || '.' || + BASE64URL(JWE AAD)). + + 16. Decrypt the JWE Ciphertext using the CEK, the JWE Initialization + Vector, the Additional Authenticated Data value, and the JWE + Authentication Tag (which is the Authentication Tag input to the + calculation) using the specified content encryption algorithm, + returning the decrypted plaintext and validating the JWE + Authentication Tag in the manner specified for the algorithm, + rejecting the input without emitting any decrypted output if the + JWE Authentication Tag is incorrect. + + 17. If a "zip" parameter was included, uncompress the decrypted + plaintext using the specified compression algorithm. + + 18. If there was no recipient for which all of the decryption steps + succeeded, then the JWE MUST be considered invalid. Otherwise, + output the plaintext. In the JWE JSON Serialization case, also + return a result to the application indicating for which of the + recipients the decryption succeeded and failed. + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 19] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + Finally, note that it is an application decision which algorithms may + be used in a given context. Even if a JWE can be successfully + decrypted, unless the algorithms used in the JWE are acceptable to + the application, it SHOULD consider the JWE to be invalid. + +5.3. String Comparison Rules + + The string comparison rules for this specification are the same as + those defined in Section 5.3 of [JWS]. + +6. Key Identification + + The key identification methods for this specification are the same as + those defined in Section 6 of [JWS], except that the key being + identified is the public key to which the JWE was encrypted. + +7. Serializations + + JWEs use one of two serializations: the JWE Compact Serialization or + the JWE JSON Serialization. Applications using this specification + need to specify what serialization and serialization features are + used for that application. For instance, applications might specify + that only the JWE JSON Serialization is used, that only JWE JSON + Serialization support for a single recipient is used, or that support + for multiple recipients is used. JWE implementations only need to + implement the features needed for the applications they are designed + to support. + +7.1. JWE Compact Serialization + + The JWE Compact Serialization represents encrypted content as a + compact, URL-safe string. This string is: + + BASE64URL(UTF8(JWE Protected Header)) || '.' || + BASE64URL(JWE Encrypted Key) || '.' || + BASE64URL(JWE Initialization Vector) || '.' || + BASE64URL(JWE Ciphertext) || '.' || + BASE64URL(JWE Authentication Tag) + + Only one recipient is supported by the JWE Compact Serialization and + it provides no syntax to represent JWE Shared Unprotected Header, JWE + Per-Recipient Unprotected Header, or JWE AAD values. + +7.2. JWE JSON Serialization + + The JWE JSON Serialization represents encrypted content as a JSON + object. This representation is neither optimized for compactness nor + URL safe. + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 20] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + Two closely related syntaxes are defined for the JWE JSON + Serialization: a fully general syntax, with which content can be + encrypted to more than one recipient, and a flattened syntax, which + is optimized for the single-recipient case. + +7.2.1. General JWE JSON Serialization Syntax + + The following members are defined for use in top-level JSON objects + used for the fully general JWE JSON Serialization syntax: + + protected + The "protected" member MUST be present and contain the value + BASE64URL(UTF8(JWE Protected Header)) when the JWE Protected + Header value is non-empty; otherwise, it MUST be absent. These + Header Parameter values are integrity protected. + + unprotected + The "unprotected" member MUST be present and contain the value JWE + Shared Unprotected Header when the JWE Shared Unprotected Header + value is non-empty; otherwise, it MUST be absent. This value is + represented as an unencoded JSON object, rather than as a string. + These Header Parameter values are not integrity protected. + + iv + The "iv" member MUST be present and contain the value + BASE64URL(JWE Initialization Vector) when the JWE Initialization + Vector value is non-empty; otherwise, it MUST be absent. + + aad + The "aad" member MUST be present and contain the value + BASE64URL(JWE AAD)) when the JWE AAD value is non-empty; + otherwise, it MUST be absent. A JWE AAD value can be included to + supply a base64url-encoded value to be integrity protected but not + encrypted. + + ciphertext + The "ciphertext" member MUST be present and contain the value + BASE64URL(JWE Ciphertext). + + tag + The "tag" member MUST be present and contain the value + BASE64URL(JWE Authentication Tag) when the JWE Authentication Tag + value is non-empty; otherwise, it MUST be absent. + + recipients + The "recipients" member value MUST be an array of JSON objects. + Each object contains information specific to a single recipient. + This member MUST be present with exactly one array element per + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 21] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + recipient, even if some or all of the array element values are the + empty JSON object "{}" (which can happen when all Header Parameter + values are shared between all recipients and when no encrypted key + is used, such as when doing Direct Encryption). + + The following members are defined for use in the JSON objects that + are elements of the "recipients" array: + + header + The "header" member MUST be present and contain the value JWE Per- + Recipient Unprotected Header when the JWE Per-Recipient + Unprotected Header value is non-empty; otherwise, it MUST be + absent. This value is represented as an unencoded JSON object, + rather than as a string. These Header Parameter values are not + integrity protected. + + encrypted_key + The "encrypted_key" member MUST be present and contain the value + BASE64URL(JWE Encrypted Key) when the JWE Encrypted Key value is + non-empty; otherwise, it MUST be absent. + + At least one of the "header", "protected", and "unprotected" members + MUST be present so that "alg" and "enc" Header Parameter values are + conveyed for each recipient computation. + + Additional members can be present in both the JSON objects defined + above; if not understood by implementations encountering them, they + MUST be ignored. + + Some Header Parameters, including the "alg" parameter, can be shared + among all recipient computations. Header Parameters in the JWE + Protected Header and JWE Shared Unprotected Header values are shared + among all recipients. + + The Header Parameter values used when creating or validating per- + recipient ciphertext and Authentication Tag values are the union of + the three sets of Header Parameter values that may be present: (1) + the JWE Protected Header represented in the "protected" member, (2) + the JWE Shared Unprotected Header represented in the "unprotected" + member, and (3) the JWE Per-Recipient Unprotected Header represented + in the "header" member of the recipient's array element. The union + of these sets of Header Parameters comprises the JOSE Header. The + Header Parameter names in the three locations MUST be disjoint. + + Each JWE Encrypted Key value is computed using the parameters of the + corresponding JOSE Header value in the same manner as for the JWE + Compact Serialization. This has the desirable property that each JWE + Encrypted Key value in the "recipients" array is identical to the + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 22] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + value that would have been computed for the same parameter in the JWE + Compact Serialization. Likewise, the JWE Ciphertext and JWE + Authentication Tag values match those produced for the JWE Compact + Serialization, provided that the JWE Protected Header value (which + represents the integrity-protected Header Parameter values) matches + that used in the JWE Compact Serialization. + + All recipients use the same JWE Protected Header, JWE Initialization + Vector, JWE Ciphertext, and JWE Authentication Tag values, when + present, resulting in potentially significant space savings if the + message is large. Therefore, all Header Parameters that specify the + treatment of the plaintext value MUST be the same for all recipients. + This primarily means that the "enc" (encryption algorithm) Header + Parameter value in the JOSE Header for each recipient and any + parameters of that algorithm MUST be the same. + + In summary, the syntax of a JWE using the general JWE JSON + Serialization is as follows: + + { + "protected":"<integrity-protected shared header contents>", + "unprotected":<non-integrity-protected shared header contents>, + "recipients":[ + {"header":<per-recipient unprotected header 1 contents>, + "encrypted_key":"<encrypted key 1 contents>"}, + ... + {"header":<per-recipient unprotected header N contents>, + "encrypted_key":"<encrypted key N contents>"}], + "aad":"<additional authenticated data contents>", + "iv":"<initialization vector contents>", + "ciphertext":"<ciphertext contents>", + "tag":"<authentication tag contents>" + } + + See Appendix A.4 for an example JWE using the general JWE JSON + Serialization syntax. + +7.2.2. Flattened JWE JSON Serialization Syntax + + The flattened JWE JSON Serialization syntax is based upon the general + syntax, but flattens it, optimizing it for the single-recipient case. + It flattens it by removing the "recipients" member and instead + placing those members defined for use in the "recipients" array (the + "header" and "encrypted_key" members) in the top-level JSON object + (at the same level as the "ciphertext" member). + + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 23] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + The "recipients" member MUST NOT be present when using this syntax. + Other than this syntax difference, JWE JSON Serialization objects + using the flattened syntax are processed identically to those using + the general syntax. + + In summary, the syntax of a JWE using the flattened JWE JSON + Serialization is as follows: + + { + "protected":"<integrity-protected header contents>", + "unprotected":<non-integrity-protected header contents>, + "header":<more non-integrity-protected header contents>, + "encrypted_key":"<encrypted key contents>", + "aad":"<additional authenticated data contents>", + "iv":"<initialization vector contents>", + "ciphertext":"<ciphertext contents>", + "tag":"<authentication tag contents>" + } + + Note that when using the flattened syntax, just as when using the + general syntax, any unprotected Header Parameter values can reside in + either the "unprotected" member or the "header" member, or in both. + + See Appendix A.5 for an example JWE using the flattened JWE JSON + Serialization syntax. + +8. TLS Requirements + + The Transport Layer Security (TLS) requirements for this + specification are the same as those defined in Section 8 of [JWS]. + +9. Distinguishing between JWS and JWE Objects + + There are several ways of distinguishing whether an object is a JWS + or JWE. All these methods will yield the same result for all legal + input values; they may yield different results for malformed inputs. + + o If the object is using the JWS Compact Serialization or the JWE + Compact Serialization, the number of base64url-encoded segments + separated by period ('.') characters differs for JWSs and JWEs. + JWSs have three segments separated by two period ('.') characters. + JWEs have five segments separated by four period ('.') characters. + + o If the object is using the JWS JSON Serialization or the JWE JSON + Serialization, the members used will be different. JWSs have a + "payload" member and JWEs do not. JWEs have a "ciphertext" member + and JWSs do not. + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 24] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + o The JOSE Header for a JWS can be distinguished from the JOSE + Header for a JWE by examining the "alg" (algorithm) Header + Parameter value. If the value represents a digital signature or + MAC algorithm, or is the value "none", it is for a JWS; if it + represents a Key Encryption, Key Wrapping, Direct Key Agreement, + Key Agreement with Key Wrapping, or Direct Encryption algorithm, + it is for a JWE. (Extracting the "alg" value to examine is + straightforward when using the JWS Compact Serialization or the + JWE Compact Serialization and may be more difficult when using the + JWS JSON Serialization or the JWE JSON Serialization.) + + o The JOSE Header for a JWS can also be distinguished from the JOSE + Header for a JWE by determining whether an "enc" (encryption + algorithm) member exists. If the "enc" member exists, it is a + JWE; otherwise, it is a JWS. + +10. IANA Considerations + +10.1. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters Registration + + This section registers the Header Parameter names defined in + Section 4.1 in the IANA "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header + Parameters" registry established by [JWS]. + +10.1.1. Registry Contents + + o Header Parameter Name: "alg" + o Header Parameter Description: Algorithm + o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.1 of RFC 7516 + + o Header Parameter Name: "enc" + o Header Parameter Description: Encryption Algorithm + o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.2 of RFC 7516 + + o Header Parameter Name: "zip" + o Header Parameter Description: Compression Algorithm + o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.3 of RFC 7516 + + + + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 25] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + o Header Parameter Name: "jku" + o Header Parameter Description: JWK Set URL + o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.4 of RFC 7516 + + o Header Parameter Name: "jwk" + o Header Parameter Description: JSON Web Key + o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE + + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.5 of RFC 7516 + + o Header Parameter Name: "kid" + o Header Parameter Description: Key ID + o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.6 of RFC 7516 + + o Header Parameter Name: "x5u" + o Header Parameter Description: X.509 URL + o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.7 of RFC 7516 + + o Header Parameter Name: "x5c" + o Header Parameter Description: X.509 Certificate Chain + o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.8 of RFC 7516 + + o Header Parameter Name: "x5t" + o Header Parameter Description: X.509 Certificate SHA-1 Thumbprint + o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.9 of RFC 7516 + + o Header Parameter Name: "x5t#S256" + o Header Parameter Description: X.509 Certificate SHA-256 Thumbprint + o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.10 of RFC 7516 + + o Header Parameter Name: "typ" + o Header Parameter Description: Type + o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.11 of RFC 7516 + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 26] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + o Header Parameter Name: "cty" + o Header Parameter Description: Content Type + o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.12 of RFC 7516 + + o Header Parameter Name: "crit" + o Header Parameter Description: Critical + o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE + + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.13 of RFC 7516 + +11. Security Considerations + + All of the security issues that are pertinent to any cryptographic + application must be addressed by JWS/JWE/JWK agents. Among these + issues are protecting the user's asymmetric private and symmetric + secret keys and employing countermeasures to various attacks. + + All the security considerations in the JWS specification also apply + to this specification. Likewise, all the security considerations in + XML Encryption 1.1 [W3C.REC-xmlenc-core1-20130411] also apply, other + than those that are XML specific. + +11.1. Key Entropy and Random Values + + See Section 10.1 of [JWS] for security considerations on key entropy + and random values. In addition to the uses of random values listed + there, note that random values are also used for Content Encryption + Keys (CEKs) and Initialization Vectors (IVs) when performing + encryption. + +11.2. Key Protection + + See Section 10.2 of [JWS] for security considerations on key + protection. In addition to the keys listed there that must be + protected, implementations performing encryption must protect the key + encryption key and the Content Encryption Key. Compromise of the key + encryption key may result in the disclosure of all contents protected + with that key. Similarly, compromise of the Content Encryption Key + may result in disclosure of the associated encrypted content. + + + + + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 27] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + +11.3. Using Matching Algorithm Strengths + + Algorithms of matching strengths should be used together whenever + possible. For instance, when AES Key Wrap is used with a given key + size, using the same key size is recommended when AES GCM is also + used. If the key encryption and content encryption algorithms are + different, the effective security is determined by the weaker of the + two algorithms. + + Also, see RFC 3766 [RFC3766] for information on determining strengths + for public keys used for exchanging symmetric keys. + +11.4. Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks + + When decrypting, particular care must be taken not to allow the JWE + recipient to be used as an oracle for decrypting messages. RFC 3218 + [RFC3218] should be consulted for specific countermeasures to attacks + on RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5. An attacker might modify the contents of the + "alg" Header Parameter from "RSA-OAEP" to "RSA1_5" in order to + generate a formatting error that can be detected and used to recover + the CEK even if RSAES-OAEP was used to encrypt the CEK. It is + therefore particularly important to report all formatting errors to + the CEK, Additional Authenticated Data, or ciphertext as a single + error when the encrypted content is rejected. + + Additionally, this type of attack can be prevented by restricting the + use of a key to a limited set of algorithms -- usually one. This + means, for instance, that if the key is marked as being for + "RSA-OAEP" only, any attempt to decrypt a message using the "RSA1_5" + algorithm with that key should fail immediately due to invalid use of + the key. + +11.5. Timing Attacks + + To mitigate the attacks described in RFC 3218 [RFC3218], the + recipient MUST NOT distinguish between format, padding, and length + errors of encrypted keys. It is strongly recommended, in the event + of receiving an improperly formatted key, that the recipient + substitute a randomly generated CEK and proceed to the next step, to + mitigate timing attacks. + + + + + + + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 28] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + +12. References + +12.1. Normative References + + [JWA] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518, + DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>. + + [JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, + DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>. + + [JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web + Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May + 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>. + + [RFC1951] Deutsch, P., "DEFLATE Compressed Data Format Specification + version 1.3", RFC 1951, DOI 10.17487/RFC1951, May 1996, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1951>. + + [RFC20] Cerf, V., "ASCII format for Network Interchange", STD 80, + RFC 20, DOI 10.17487/RFC0020, October 1969, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc20>. + + [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, + DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. + + [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO + 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November + 2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>. + + [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", + FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>. + + [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., + Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key + Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List + (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>. + + [RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data + Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March + 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>. + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 29] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + [UNICODE] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard", + <http://www.unicode.org/versions/latest/>. + +12.2. Informative References + + [AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), + "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS PUB 197, + November 2001, <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/ + fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf>. + + [JSE] Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), "JSON Simple + Encryption", September 2010, + <http://jsonenc.info/enc/1.0/>. + + [JSMS] Rescorla, E. and J. Hildebrand, "JavaScript Message + Security Format", Work in Progress, + draft-rescorla-jsms-00, March 2011. + + [NIST.800-38D] + National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), + "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: + Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC", NIST PUB 800-38D, + November 2007, <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/ + nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf>. + + [RFC3218] Rescorla, E., "Preventing the Million Message Attack on + Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 3218, + DOI 10.17487/RFC3218, January 2002, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3218>. + + [RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography + Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications + Version 2.1", RFC 3447, DOI 10.17487/RFC3447, February + 2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3447>. + + [RFC3766] Orman, H. and P. Hoffman, "Determining Strengths For + Public Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric Keys", BCP 86, + RFC 3766, DOI 10.17487/RFC3766, April 2004, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3766>. + + [RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, + "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, + DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>. + + + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 30] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, + RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>. + + [W3C.REC-xmlenc-core1-20130411] + Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., Hirsch, F., and T. Roessler, + "XML Encryption Syntax and Processing Version 1.1", World + Wide Web Consortium Recommendation + REC-xmlenc-core1-20130411, April 2013, + <http://www.w3.org/TR/2013/REC-xmlenc-core1-20130411/>. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 31] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + +Appendix A. JWE Examples + + This section provides examples of JWE computations. + +A.1. Example JWE using RSAES-OAEP and AES GCM + + This example encrypts the plaintext "The true sign of intelligence is + not knowledge but imagination." to the recipient using RSAES-OAEP for + key encryption and AES GCM for content encryption. The + representation of this plaintext (using JSON array notation) is: + + [84, 104, 101, 32, 116, 114, 117, 101, 32, 115, 105, 103, 110, 32, + 111, 102, 32, 105, 110, 116, 101, 108, 108, 105, 103, 101, 110, 99, + 101, 32, 105, 115, 32, 110, 111, 116, 32, 107, 110, 111, 119, 108, + 101, 100, 103, 101, 32, 98, 117, 116, 32, 105, 109, 97, 103, 105, + 110, 97, 116, 105, 111, 110, 46] + +A.1.1. JOSE Header + + The following example JWE Protected Header declares that: + + o The Content Encryption Key is encrypted to the recipient using the + RSAES-OAEP algorithm to produce the JWE Encrypted Key. + o Authenticated encryption is performed on the plaintext using the + AES GCM algorithm with a 256-bit key to produce the ciphertext and + the Authentication Tag. + + {"alg":"RSA-OAEP","enc":"A256GCM"} + + Encoding this JWE Protected Header as BASE64URL(UTF8(JWE Protected + Header)) gives this value: + + eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImVuYyI6IkEyNTZHQ00ifQ + +A.1.2. Content Encryption Key (CEK) + + Generate a 256-bit random CEK. In this example, the value (using + JSON array notation) is: + + [177, 161, 244, 128, 84, 143, 225, 115, 63, 180, 3, 255, 107, 154, + 212, 246, 138, 7, 110, 91, 112, 46, 34, 105, 47, 130, 203, 46, 122, + 234, 64, 252] + + + + + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 32] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + +A.1.3. Key Encryption + + Encrypt the CEK with the recipient's public key using the RSAES-OAEP + algorithm to produce the JWE Encrypted Key. This example uses the + RSA key represented in JSON Web Key [JWK] format below (with line + breaks within values for display purposes only): + + {"kty":"RSA", + "n":"oahUIoWw0K0usKNuOR6H4wkf4oBUXHTxRvgb48E-BVvxkeDNjbC4he8rUW + cJoZmds2h7M70imEVhRU5djINXtqllXI4DFqcI1DgjT9LewND8MW2Krf3S + psk_ZkoFnilakGygTwpZ3uesH-PFABNIUYpOiN15dsQRkgr0vEhxN92i2a + sbOenSZeyaxziK72UwxrrKoExv6kc5twXTq4h-QChLOln0_mtUZwfsRaMS + tPs6mS6XrgxnxbWhojf663tuEQueGC-FCMfra36C9knDFGzKsNa7LZK2dj + YgyD3JR_MB_4NUJW_TqOQtwHYbxevoJArm-L5StowjzGy-_bq6Gw", + "e":"AQAB", + "d":"kLdtIj6GbDks_ApCSTYQtelcNttlKiOyPzMrXHeI-yk1F7-kpDxY4-WY5N + WV5KntaEeXS1j82E375xxhWMHXyvjYecPT9fpwR_M9gV8n9Hrh2anTpTD9 + 3Dt62ypW3yDsJzBnTnrYu1iwWRgBKrEYY46qAZIrA2xAwnm2X7uGR1hghk + qDp0Vqj3kbSCz1XyfCs6_LehBwtxHIyh8Ripy40p24moOAbgxVw3rxT_vl + t3UVe4WO3JkJOzlpUf-KTVI2Ptgm-dARxTEtE-id-4OJr0h-K-VFs3VSnd + VTIznSxfyrj8ILL6MG_Uv8YAu7VILSB3lOW085-4qE3DzgrTjgyQ", + "p":"1r52Xk46c-LsfB5P442p7atdPUrxQSy4mti_tZI3Mgf2EuFVbUoDBvaRQ- + SWxkbkmoEzL7JXroSBjSrK3YIQgYdMgyAEPTPjXv_hI2_1eTSPVZfzL0lf + fNn03IXqWF5MDFuoUYE0hzb2vhrlN_rKrbfDIwUbTrjjgieRbwC6Cl0", + "q":"wLb35x7hmQWZsWJmB_vle87ihgZ19S8lBEROLIsZG4ayZVe9Hi9gDVCOBm + UDdaDYVTSNx_8Fyw1YYa9XGrGnDew00J28cRUoeBB_jKI1oma0Orv1T9aX + IWxKwd4gvxFImOWr3QRL9KEBRzk2RatUBnmDZJTIAfwTs0g68UZHvtc", + "dp":"ZK-YwE7diUh0qR1tR7w8WHtolDx3MZ_OTowiFvgfeQ3SiresXjm9gZ5KL + hMXvo-uz-KUJWDxS5pFQ_M0evdo1dKiRTjVw_x4NyqyXPM5nULPkcpU827 + rnpZzAJKpdhWAgqrXGKAECQH0Xt4taznjnd_zVpAmZZq60WPMBMfKcuE", + "dq":"Dq0gfgJ1DdFGXiLvQEZnuKEN0UUmsJBxkjydc3j4ZYdBiMRAy86x0vHCj + ywcMlYYg4yoC4YZa9hNVcsjqA3FeiL19rk8g6Qn29Tt0cj8qqyFpz9vNDB + UfCAiJVeESOjJDZPYHdHY8v1b-o-Z2X5tvLx-TCekf7oxyeKDUqKWjis", + "qi":"VIMpMYbPf47dT1w_zDUXfPimsSegnMOA1zTaX7aGk_8urY6R8-ZW1FxU7 + AlWAyLWybqq6t16VFd7hQd0y6flUK4SlOydB61gwanOsXGOAOv82cHq0E3 + eL4HrtZkUuKvnPrMnsUUFlfUdybVzxyjz9JF_XyaY14ardLSjf4L_FNY" + } + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 33] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + The resulting JWE Encrypted Key value is: + + [56, 163, 154, 192, 58, 53, 222, 4, 105, 218, 136, 218, 29, 94, 203, + 22, 150, 92, 129, 94, 211, 232, 53, 89, 41, 60, 138, 56, 196, 216, + 82, 98, 168, 76, 37, 73, 70, 7, 36, 8, 191, 100, 136, 196, 244, 220, + 145, 158, 138, 155, 4, 117, 141, 230, 199, 247, 173, 45, 182, 214, + 74, 177, 107, 211, 153, 11, 205, 196, 171, 226, 162, 128, 171, 182, + 13, 237, 239, 99, 193, 4, 91, 219, 121, 223, 107, 167, 61, 119, 228, + 173, 156, 137, 134, 200, 80, 219, 74, 253, 56, 185, 91, 177, 34, 158, + 89, 154, 205, 96, 55, 18, 138, 43, 96, 218, 215, 128, 124, 75, 138, + 243, 85, 25, 109, 117, 140, 26, 155, 249, 67, 167, 149, 231, 100, 6, + 41, 65, 214, 251, 232, 87, 72, 40, 182, 149, 154, 168, 31, 193, 126, + 215, 89, 28, 111, 219, 125, 182, 139, 235, 195, 197, 23, 234, 55, 58, + 63, 180, 68, 202, 206, 149, 75, 205, 248, 176, 67, 39, 178, 60, 98, + 193, 32, 238, 122, 96, 158, 222, 57, 183, 111, 210, 55, 188, 215, + 206, 180, 166, 150, 166, 106, 250, 55, 229, 72, 40, 69, 214, 216, + 104, 23, 40, 135, 212, 28, 127, 41, 80, 175, 174, 168, 115, 171, 197, + 89, 116, 92, 103, 246, 83, 216, 182, 176, 84, 37, 147, 35, 45, 219, + 172, 99, 226, 233, 73, 37, 124, 42, 72, 49, 242, 35, 127, 184, 134, + 117, 114, 135, 206] + + Encoding this JWE Encrypted Key as BASE64URL(JWE Encrypted Key) gives + this value (with line breaks for display purposes only): + + OKOawDo13gRp2ojaHV7LFpZcgV7T6DVZKTyKOMTYUmKoTCVJRgckCL9kiMT03JGe + ipsEdY3mx_etLbbWSrFr05kLzcSr4qKAq7YN7e9jwQRb23nfa6c9d-StnImGyFDb + Sv04uVuxIp5Zms1gNxKKK2Da14B8S4rzVRltdYwam_lDp5XnZAYpQdb76FdIKLaV + mqgfwX7XWRxv2322i-vDxRfqNzo_tETKzpVLzfiwQyeyPGLBIO56YJ7eObdv0je8 + 1860ppamavo35UgoRdbYaBcoh9QcfylQr66oc6vFWXRcZ_ZT2LawVCWTIy3brGPi + 6UklfCpIMfIjf7iGdXKHzg + +A.1.4. Initialization Vector + + Generate a random 96-bit JWE Initialization Vector. In this example, + the value is: + + [227, 197, 117, 252, 2, 219, 233, 68, 180, 225, 77, 219] + + Encoding this JWE Initialization Vector as BASE64URL(JWE + Initialization Vector) gives this value: + + 48V1_ALb6US04U3b + + + + + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 34] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + +A.1.5. Additional Authenticated Data + + Let the Additional Authenticated Data encryption parameter be + ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWE Protected Header))). This value is: + + [101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 83, 85, 48, 69, + 116, 84, 48, 70, 70, 85, 67, 73, 115, 73, 109, 86, 117, 89, 121, 73, + 54, 73, 107, 69, 121, 78, 84, 90, 72, 81, 48, 48, 105, 102, 81] + +A.1.6. Content Encryption + + Perform authenticated encryption on the plaintext with the AES GCM + algorithm using the CEK as the encryption key, the JWE Initialization + Vector, and the Additional Authenticated Data value above, requesting + a 128-bit Authentication Tag output. The resulting ciphertext is: + + [229, 236, 166, 241, 53, 191, 115, 196, 174, 43, 73, 109, 39, 122, + 233, 96, 140, 206, 120, 52, 51, 237, 48, 11, 190, 219, 186, 80, 111, + 104, 50, 142, 47, 167, 59, 61, 181, 127, 196, 21, 40, 82, 242, 32, + 123, 143, 168, 226, 73, 216, 176, 144, 138, 247, 106, 60, 16, 205, + 160, 109, 64, 63, 192] + + The resulting Authentication Tag value is: + + [92, 80, 104, 49, 133, 25, 161, 215, 173, 101, 219, 211, 136, 91, + 210, 145] + + Encoding this JWE Ciphertext as BASE64URL(JWE Ciphertext) gives this + value (with line breaks for display purposes only): + + 5eym8TW_c8SuK0ltJ3rpYIzOeDQz7TALvtu6UG9oMo4vpzs9tX_EFShS8iB7j6ji + SdiwkIr3ajwQzaBtQD_A + + Encoding this JWE Authentication Tag as BASE64URL(JWE Authentication + Tag) gives this value: + + XFBoMYUZodetZdvTiFvSkQ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 35] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + +A.1.7. Complete Representation + + Assemble the final representation: The Compact Serialization of this + result is the string BASE64URL(UTF8(JWE Protected Header)) || '.' || + BASE64URL(JWE Encrypted Key) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWE Initialization + Vector) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWE Ciphertext) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWE + Authentication Tag). + + The final result in this example (with line breaks for display + purposes only) is: + + eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImVuYyI6IkEyNTZHQ00ifQ. + OKOawDo13gRp2ojaHV7LFpZcgV7T6DVZKTyKOMTYUmKoTCVJRgckCL9kiMT03JGe + ipsEdY3mx_etLbbWSrFr05kLzcSr4qKAq7YN7e9jwQRb23nfa6c9d-StnImGyFDb + Sv04uVuxIp5Zms1gNxKKK2Da14B8S4rzVRltdYwam_lDp5XnZAYpQdb76FdIKLaV + mqgfwX7XWRxv2322i-vDxRfqNzo_tETKzpVLzfiwQyeyPGLBIO56YJ7eObdv0je8 + 1860ppamavo35UgoRdbYaBcoh9QcfylQr66oc6vFWXRcZ_ZT2LawVCWTIy3brGPi + 6UklfCpIMfIjf7iGdXKHzg. + 48V1_ALb6US04U3b. + 5eym8TW_c8SuK0ltJ3rpYIzOeDQz7TALvtu6UG9oMo4vpzs9tX_EFShS8iB7j6ji + SdiwkIr3ajwQzaBtQD_A. + XFBoMYUZodetZdvTiFvSkQ + +A.1.8. Validation + + This example illustrates the process of creating a JWE with + RSAES-OAEP for key encryption and AES GCM for content encryption. + These results can be used to validate JWE decryption implementations + for these algorithms. Note that since the RSAES-OAEP computation + includes random values, the encryption results above will not be + completely reproducible. However, since the AES GCM computation is + deterministic, the JWE Encrypted Ciphertext values will be the same + for all encryptions performed using these inputs. + +A.2. Example JWE using RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 and AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 + + This example encrypts the plaintext "Live long and prosper." to the + recipient using RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 for key encryption and + AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 for content encryption. The representation + of this plaintext (using JSON array notation) is: + + [76, 105, 118, 101, 32, 108, 111, 110, 103, 32, 97, 110, 100, 32, + 112, 114, 111, 115, 112, 101, 114, 46] + + + + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 36] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + +A.2.1. JOSE Header + + The following example JWE Protected Header declares that: + + o The Content Encryption Key is encrypted to the recipient using the + RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithm to produce the JWE Encrypted Key. + o Authenticated encryption is performed on the plaintext using the + AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 algorithm to produce the ciphertext and + the Authentication Tag. + + {"alg":"RSA1_5","enc":"A128CBC-HS256"} + + Encoding this JWE Protected Header as BASE64URL(UTF8(JWE Protected + Header)) gives this value: + + eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0 + +A.2.2. Content Encryption Key (CEK) + + Generate a 256-bit random CEK. In this example, the key value is: + + [4, 211, 31, 197, 84, 157, 252, 254, 11, 100, 157, 250, 63, 170, 106, + 206, 107, 124, 212, 45, 111, 107, 9, 219, 200, 177, 0, 240, 143, 156, + 44, 207] + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 37] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + +A.2.3. Key Encryption + + Encrypt the CEK with the recipient's public key using the + RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithm to produce the JWE Encrypted Key. This + example uses the RSA key represented in JSON Web Key [JWK] format + below (with line breaks within values for display purposes only): + + {"kty":"RSA", + "n":"sXchDaQebHnPiGvyDOAT4saGEUetSyo9MKLOoWFsueri23bOdgWp4Dy1Wl + UzewbgBHod5pcM9H95GQRV3JDXboIRROSBigeC5yjU1hGzHHyXss8UDpre + cbAYxknTcQkhslANGRUZmdTOQ5qTRsLAt6BTYuyvVRdhS8exSZEy_c4gs_ + 7svlJJQ4H9_NxsiIoLwAEk7-Q3UXERGYw_75IDrGA84-lA_-Ct4eTlXHBI + Y2EaV7t7LjJaynVJCpkv4LKjTTAumiGUIuQhrNhZLuF_RJLqHpM2kgWFLU + 7-VTdL1VbC2tejvcI2BlMkEpk1BzBZI0KQB0GaDWFLN-aEAw3vRw", + "e":"AQAB", + "d":"VFCWOqXr8nvZNyaaJLXdnNPXZKRaWCjkU5Q2egQQpTBMwhprMzWzpR8Sxq + 1OPThh_J6MUD8Z35wky9b8eEO0pwNS8xlh1lOFRRBoNqDIKVOku0aZb-ry + nq8cxjDTLZQ6Fz7jSjR1Klop-YKaUHc9GsEofQqYruPhzSA-QgajZGPbE_ + 0ZaVDJHfyd7UUBUKunFMScbflYAAOYJqVIVwaYR5zWEEceUjNnTNo_CVSj + -VvXLO5VZfCUAVLgW4dpf1SrtZjSt34YLsRarSb127reG_DUwg9Ch-Kyvj + T1SkHgUWRVGcyly7uvVGRSDwsXypdrNinPA4jlhoNdizK2zF2CWQ", + "p":"9gY2w6I6S6L0juEKsbeDAwpd9WMfgqFoeA9vEyEUuk4kLwBKcoe1x4HG68 + ik918hdDSE9vDQSccA3xXHOAFOPJ8R9EeIAbTi1VwBYnbTp87X-xcPWlEP + krdoUKW60tgs1aNd_Nnc9LEVVPMS390zbFxt8TN_biaBgelNgbC95sM", + "q":"uKlCKvKv_ZJMVcdIs5vVSU_6cPtYI1ljWytExV_skstvRSNi9r66jdd9-y + BhVfuG4shsp2j7rGnIio901RBeHo6TPKWVVykPu1iYhQXw1jIABfw-MVsN + -3bQ76WLdt2SDxsHs7q7zPyUyHXmps7ycZ5c72wGkUwNOjYelmkiNS0", + "dp":"w0kZbV63cVRvVX6yk3C8cMxo2qCM4Y8nsq1lmMSYhG4EcL6FWbX5h9yuv + ngs4iLEFk6eALoUS4vIWEwcL4txw9LsWH_zKI-hwoReoP77cOdSL4AVcra + Hawlkpyd2TWjE5evgbhWtOxnZee3cXJBkAi64Ik6jZxbvk-RR3pEhnCs", + "dq":"o_8V14SezckO6CNLKs_btPdFiO9_kC1DsuUTd2LAfIIVeMZ7jn1Gus_Ff + 7B7IVx3p5KuBGOVF8L-qifLb6nQnLysgHDh132NDioZkhH7mI7hPG-PYE_ + odApKdnqECHWw0J-F0JWnUd6D2B_1TvF9mXA2Qx-iGYn8OVV1Bsmp6qU", + "qi":"eNho5yRBEBxhGBtQRww9QirZsB66TrfFReG_CcteI1aCneT0ELGhYlRlC + tUkTRclIfuEPmNsNDPbLoLqqCVznFbvdB7x-Tl-m0l_eFTj2KiqwGqE9PZ + B9nNTwMVvH3VRRSLWACvPnSiwP8N5Usy-WRXS-V7TbpxIhvepTfE0NNo" + } + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 38] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + The resulting JWE Encrypted Key value is: + + [80, 104, 72, 58, 11, 130, 236, 139, 132, 189, 255, 205, 61, 86, 151, + 176, 99, 40, 44, 233, 176, 189, 205, 70, 202, 169, 72, 40, 226, 181, + 156, 223, 120, 156, 115, 232, 150, 209, 145, 133, 104, 112, 237, 156, + 116, 250, 65, 102, 212, 210, 103, 240, 177, 61, 93, 40, 71, 231, 223, + 226, 240, 157, 15, 31, 150, 89, 200, 215, 198, 203, 108, 70, 117, 66, + 212, 238, 193, 205, 23, 161, 169, 218, 243, 203, 128, 214, 127, 253, + 215, 139, 43, 17, 135, 103, 179, 220, 28, 2, 212, 206, 131, 158, 128, + 66, 62, 240, 78, 186, 141, 125, 132, 227, 60, 137, 43, 31, 152, 199, + 54, 72, 34, 212, 115, 11, 152, 101, 70, 42, 219, 233, 142, 66, 151, + 250, 126, 146, 141, 216, 190, 73, 50, 177, 146, 5, 52, 247, 28, 197, + 21, 59, 170, 247, 181, 89, 131, 241, 169, 182, 246, 99, 15, 36, 102, + 166, 182, 172, 197, 136, 230, 120, 60, 58, 219, 243, 149, 94, 222, + 150, 154, 194, 110, 227, 225, 112, 39, 89, 233, 112, 207, 211, 241, + 124, 174, 69, 221, 179, 107, 196, 225, 127, 167, 112, 226, 12, 242, + 16, 24, 28, 120, 182, 244, 213, 244, 153, 194, 162, 69, 160, 244, + 248, 63, 165, 141, 4, 207, 249, 193, 79, 131, 0, 169, 233, 127, 167, + 101, 151, 125, 56, 112, 111, 248, 29, 232, 90, 29, 147, 110, 169, + 146, 114, 165, 204, 71, 136, 41, 252] + + Encoding this JWE Encrypted Key as BASE64URL(JWE Encrypted Key) gives + this value (with line breaks for display purposes only): + + UGhIOguC7IuEvf_NPVaXsGMoLOmwvc1GyqlIKOK1nN94nHPoltGRhWhw7Zx0-kFm + 1NJn8LE9XShH59_i8J0PH5ZZyNfGy2xGdULU7sHNF6Gp2vPLgNZ__deLKxGHZ7Pc + HALUzoOegEI-8E66jX2E4zyJKx-YxzZIItRzC5hlRirb6Y5Cl_p-ko3YvkkysZIF + NPccxRU7qve1WYPxqbb2Yw8kZqa2rMWI5ng8OtvzlV7elprCbuPhcCdZ6XDP0_F8 + rkXds2vE4X-ncOIM8hAYHHi29NX0mcKiRaD0-D-ljQTP-cFPgwCp6X-nZZd9OHBv + -B3oWh2TbqmScqXMR4gp_A + +A.2.4. Initialization Vector + + Generate a random 128-bit JWE Initialization Vector. In this + example, the value is: + + [3, 22, 60, 12, 43, 67, 104, 105, 108, 108, 105, 99, 111, 116, 104, + 101] + + Encoding this JWE Initialization Vector as BASE64URL(JWE + Initialization Vector) gives this value: + + AxY8DCtDaGlsbGljb3RoZQ + + + + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 39] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + +A.2.5. Additional Authenticated Data + + Let the Additional Authenticated Data encryption parameter be + ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWE Protected Header))). This value is: + + [101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 83, 85, 48, 69, + 120, 88, 122, 85, 105, 76, 67, 74, 108, 98, 109, 77, 105, 79, 105, + 74, 66, 77, 84, 73, 52, 81, 48, 74, 68, 76, 85, 104, 84, 77, 106, 85, + 50, 73, 110, 48] + +A.2.6. Content Encryption + + Perform authenticated encryption on the plaintext with the + AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 algorithm using the CEK as the encryption + key, the JWE Initialization Vector, and the Additional Authenticated + Data value above. The steps for doing this using the values from + Appendix A.3 are detailed in Appendix B. The resulting ciphertext + is: + + [40, 57, 83, 181, 119, 33, 133, 148, 198, 185, 243, 24, 152, 230, 6, + 75, 129, 223, 127, 19, 210, 82, 183, 230, 168, 33, 215, 104, 143, + 112, 56, 102] + + The resulting Authentication Tag value is: + + [246, 17, 244, 190, 4, 95, 98, 3, 231, 0, 115, 157, 242, 203, 100, + 191] + + Encoding this JWE Ciphertext as BASE64URL(JWE Ciphertext) gives this + value: + + KDlTtXchhZTGufMYmOYGS4HffxPSUrfmqCHXaI9wOGY + + Encoding this JWE Authentication Tag as BASE64URL(JWE Authentication + Tag) gives this value: + + 9hH0vgRfYgPnAHOd8stkvw + +A.2.7. Complete Representation + + Assemble the final representation: The Compact Serialization of this + result is the string BASE64URL(UTF8(JWE Protected Header)) || '.' || + BASE64URL(JWE Encrypted Key) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWE Initialization + Vector) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWE Ciphertext) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWE + Authentication Tag). + + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 40] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + The final result in this example (with line breaks for display + purposes only) is: + + eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0. + UGhIOguC7IuEvf_NPVaXsGMoLOmwvc1GyqlIKOK1nN94nHPoltGRhWhw7Zx0-kFm + 1NJn8LE9XShH59_i8J0PH5ZZyNfGy2xGdULU7sHNF6Gp2vPLgNZ__deLKxGHZ7Pc + HALUzoOegEI-8E66jX2E4zyJKx-YxzZIItRzC5hlRirb6Y5Cl_p-ko3YvkkysZIF + NPccxRU7qve1WYPxqbb2Yw8kZqa2rMWI5ng8OtvzlV7elprCbuPhcCdZ6XDP0_F8 + rkXds2vE4X-ncOIM8hAYHHi29NX0mcKiRaD0-D-ljQTP-cFPgwCp6X-nZZd9OHBv + -B3oWh2TbqmScqXMR4gp_A. + AxY8DCtDaGlsbGljb3RoZQ. + KDlTtXchhZTGufMYmOYGS4HffxPSUrfmqCHXaI9wOGY. + 9hH0vgRfYgPnAHOd8stkvw + +A.2.8. Validation + + This example illustrates the process of creating a JWE with + RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 for key encryption and AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 for content + encryption. These results can be used to validate JWE decryption + implementations for these algorithms. Note that since the + RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 computation includes random values, the encryption + results above will not be completely reproducible. However, since + the AES-CBC computation is deterministic, the JWE Encrypted + Ciphertext values will be the same for all encryptions performed + using these inputs. + +A.3. Example JWE Using AES Key Wrap and AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 + + This example encrypts the plaintext "Live long and prosper." to the + recipient using AES Key Wrap for key encryption and + AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 for content encryption. The representation + of this plaintext (using JSON array notation) is: + + [76, 105, 118, 101, 32, 108, 111, 110, 103, 32, 97, 110, 100, 32, + 112, 114, 111, 115, 112, 101, 114, 46] + +A.3.1. JOSE Header + + The following example JWE Protected Header declares that: + + o The Content Encryption Key is encrypted to the recipient using the + AES Key Wrap algorithm with a 128-bit key to produce the JWE + Encrypted Key. + o Authenticated encryption is performed on the plaintext using the + AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 algorithm to produce the ciphertext and + the Authentication Tag. + + {"alg":"A128KW","enc":"A128CBC-HS256"} + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 41] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + Encoding this JWE Protected Header as BASE64URL(UTF8(JWE Protected + Header)) gives this value: + + eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0 + +A.3.2. Content Encryption Key (CEK) + + Generate a 256-bit random CEK. In this example, the value is: + + [4, 211, 31, 197, 84, 157, 252, 254, 11, 100, 157, 250, 63, 170, 106, + 206, 107, 124, 212, 45, 111, 107, 9, 219, 200, 177, 0, 240, 143, 156, + 44, 207] + +A.3.3. Key Encryption + + Encrypt the CEK with the shared symmetric key using the AES Key Wrap + algorithm to produce the JWE Encrypted Key. This example uses the + symmetric key represented in JSON Web Key [JWK] format below: + + {"kty":"oct", + "k":"GawgguFyGrWKav7AX4VKUg" + } + + The resulting JWE Encrypted Key value is: + + [232, 160, 123, 211, 183, 76, 245, 132, 200, 128, 123, 75, 190, 216, + 22, 67, 201, 138, 193, 186, 9, 91, 122, 31, 246, 90, 28, 139, 57, 3, + 76, 124, 193, 11, 98, 37, 173, 61, 104, 57] + + Encoding this JWE Encrypted Key as BASE64URL(JWE Encrypted Key) gives + this value: + + 6KB707dM9YTIgHtLvtgWQ8mKwboJW3of9locizkDTHzBC2IlrT1oOQ + +A.3.4. Initialization Vector + + Generate a random 128-bit JWE Initialization Vector. In this + example, the value is: + + [3, 22, 60, 12, 43, 67, 104, 105, 108, 108, 105, 99, 111, 116, 104, + 101] + + Encoding this JWE Initialization Vector as BASE64URL(JWE + Initialization Vector) gives this value: + + AxY8DCtDaGlsbGljb3RoZQ + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 42] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + +A.3.5. Additional Authenticated Data + + Let the Additional Authenticated Data encryption parameter be + ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWE Protected Header))). This value is: + + [101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 66, 77, 84, 73, 52, + 83, 49, 99, 105, 76, 67, 74, 108, 98, 109, 77, 105, 79, 105, 74, 66, + 77, 84, 73, 52, 81, 48, 74, 68, 76, 85, 104, 84, 77, 106, 85, 50, 73, + 110, 48] + +A.3.6. Content Encryption + + Perform authenticated encryption on the plaintext with the + AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 algorithm using the CEK as the encryption + key, the JWE Initialization Vector, and the Additional Authenticated + Data value above. The steps for doing this using the values from + this example are detailed in Appendix B. The resulting ciphertext + is: + + [40, 57, 83, 181, 119, 33, 133, 148, 198, 185, 243, 24, 152, 230, 6, + 75, 129, 223, 127, 19, 210, 82, 183, 230, 168, 33, 215, 104, 143, + 112, 56, 102] + + The resulting Authentication Tag value is: + + [83, 73, 191, 98, 104, 205, 211, 128, 201, 189, 199, 133, 32, 38, + 194, 85] + + Encoding this JWE Ciphertext as BASE64URL(JWE Ciphertext) gives this + value: + + KDlTtXchhZTGufMYmOYGS4HffxPSUrfmqCHXaI9wOGY + + Encoding this JWE Authentication Tag as BASE64URL(JWE Authentication + Tag) gives this value: + + U0m_YmjN04DJvceFICbCVQ + +A.3.7. Complete Representation + + Assemble the final representation: The Compact Serialization of this + result is the string BASE64URL(UTF8(JWE Protected Header)) || '.' || + BASE64URL(JWE Encrypted Key) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWE Initialization + Vector) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWE Ciphertext) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWE + Authentication Tag). + + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 43] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + The final result in this example (with line breaks for display + purposes only) is: + + eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0. + 6KB707dM9YTIgHtLvtgWQ8mKwboJW3of9locizkDTHzBC2IlrT1oOQ. + AxY8DCtDaGlsbGljb3RoZQ. + KDlTtXchhZTGufMYmOYGS4HffxPSUrfmqCHXaI9wOGY. + U0m_YmjN04DJvceFICbCVQ + +A.3.8. Validation + + This example illustrates the process of creating a JWE with AES Key + Wrap for key encryption and AES GCM for content encryption. These + results can be used to validate JWE decryption implementations for + these algorithms. Also, since both the AES Key Wrap and AES GCM + computations are deterministic, the resulting JWE value will be the + same for all encryptions performed using these inputs. Since the + computation is reproducible, these results can also be used to + validate JWE encryption implementations for these algorithms. + +A.4. Example JWE Using General JWE JSON Serialization + + This section contains an example using the general JWE JSON + Serialization syntax. This example demonstrates the capability for + encrypting the same plaintext to multiple recipients. + + Two recipients are present in this example. The algorithm and key + used for the first recipient are the same as that used in + Appendix A.2. The algorithm and key used for the second recipient + are the same as that used in Appendix A.3. The resulting JWE + Encrypted Key values are therefore the same; those computations are + not repeated here. + + The plaintext, the CEK, JWE Initialization Vector, and JWE Protected + Header are shared by all recipients (which must be the case, since + the ciphertext and Authentication Tag are also shared). + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 44] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + +A.4.1. JWE Per-Recipient Unprotected Headers + + The first recipient uses the RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithm to encrypt + the CEK. The second uses AES Key Wrap to encrypt the CEK. Key ID + values are supplied for both keys. The two JWE Per-Recipient + Unprotected Header values used to represent these algorithms and key + IDs are: + + {"alg":"RSA1_5","kid":"2011-04-29"} + + and + + {"alg":"A128KW","kid":"7"} + +A.4.2. JWE Protected Header + + Authenticated encryption is performed on the plaintext using the + AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 algorithm to produce the common JWE + Ciphertext and JWE Authentication Tag values. The JWE Protected + Header value representing this is: + + {"enc":"A128CBC-HS256"} + + Encoding this JWE Protected Header as BASE64URL(UTF8(JWE Protected + Header)) gives this value: + + eyJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0 + +A.4.3. JWE Shared Unprotected Header + + This JWE uses the "jku" Header Parameter to reference a JWK Set. + This is represented in the following JWE Shared Unprotected Header + value as: + + {"jku":"https://server.example.com/keys.jwks"} + +A.4.4. Complete JOSE Header Values + + Combining the JWE Per-Recipient Unprotected Header, JWE Protected + Header, and JWE Shared Unprotected Header values supplied, the JOSE + Header values used for the first and second recipient, respectively, + are: + + {"alg":"RSA1_5", + "kid":"2011-04-29", + "enc":"A128CBC-HS256", + "jku":"https://server.example.com/keys.jwks"} + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 45] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + and + + {"alg":"A128KW", + "kid":"7", + "enc":"A128CBC-HS256", + "jku":"https://server.example.com/keys.jwks"} + +A.4.5. Additional Authenticated Data + + Let the Additional Authenticated Data encryption parameter be + ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWE Protected Header))). This value is: + + [101, 121, 74, 108, 98, 109, 77, 105, 79, 105, 74, 66, 77, 84, 73, + 52, 81, 48, 74, 68, 76, 85, 104, 84, 77, 106, 85, 50, 73, 110, 48] + +A.4.6. Content Encryption + + Perform authenticated encryption on the plaintext with the + AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 algorithm using the CEK as the encryption + key, the JWE Initialization Vector, and the Additional Authenticated + Data value above. The steps for doing this using the values from + Appendix A.3 are detailed in Appendix B. The resulting ciphertext + is: + + [40, 57, 83, 181, 119, 33, 133, 148, 198, 185, 243, 24, 152, 230, 6, + 75, 129, 223, 127, 19, 210, 82, 183, 230, 168, 33, 215, 104, 143, + 112, 56, 102] + + The resulting Authentication Tag value is: + + [51, 63, 149, 60, 252, 148, 225, 25, 92, 185, 139, 245, 35, 2, 47, + 207] + + Encoding this JWE Ciphertext as BASE64URL(JWE Ciphertext) gives this + value: + + KDlTtXchhZTGufMYmOYGS4HffxPSUrfmqCHXaI9wOGY + + Encoding this JWE Authentication Tag as BASE64URL(JWE Authentication + Tag) gives this value: + + Mz-VPPyU4RlcuYv1IwIvzw + + + + + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 46] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + +A.4.7. Complete JWE JSON Serialization Representation + + The complete JWE JSON Serialization for these values is as follows + (with line breaks within values for display purposes only): + + { + "protected": + "eyJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0", + "unprotected": + {"jku":"https://server.example.com/keys.jwks"}, + "recipients":[ + {"header": + {"alg":"RSA1_5","kid":"2011-04-29"}, + "encrypted_key": + "UGhIOguC7IuEvf_NPVaXsGMoLOmwvc1GyqlIKOK1nN94nHPoltGRhWhw7Zx0- + kFm1NJn8LE9XShH59_i8J0PH5ZZyNfGy2xGdULU7sHNF6Gp2vPLgNZ__deLKx + GHZ7PcHALUzoOegEI-8E66jX2E4zyJKx-YxzZIItRzC5hlRirb6Y5Cl_p-ko3 + YvkkysZIFNPccxRU7qve1WYPxqbb2Yw8kZqa2rMWI5ng8OtvzlV7elprCbuPh + cCdZ6XDP0_F8rkXds2vE4X-ncOIM8hAYHHi29NX0mcKiRaD0-D-ljQTP-cFPg + wCp6X-nZZd9OHBv-B3oWh2TbqmScqXMR4gp_A"}, + {"header": + {"alg":"A128KW","kid":"7"}, + "encrypted_key": + "6KB707dM9YTIgHtLvtgWQ8mKwboJW3of9locizkDTHzBC2IlrT1oOQ"}], + "iv": + "AxY8DCtDaGlsbGljb3RoZQ", + "ciphertext": + "KDlTtXchhZTGufMYmOYGS4HffxPSUrfmqCHXaI9wOGY", + "tag": + "Mz-VPPyU4RlcuYv1IwIvzw" + } + +A.5. Example JWE Using Flattened JWE JSON Serialization + + This section contains an example using the flattened JWE JSON + Serialization syntax. This example demonstrates the capability for + encrypting the plaintext to a single recipient in a flattened JSON + structure. + + The values in this example are the same as those for the second + recipient of the previous example in Appendix A.4. + + + + + + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 47] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + The complete JWE JSON Serialization for these values is as follows + (with line breaks within values for display purposes only): + + { + "protected": + "eyJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0", + "unprotected": + {"jku":"https://server.example.com/keys.jwks"}, + "header": + {"alg":"A128KW","kid":"7"}, + "encrypted_key": + "6KB707dM9YTIgHtLvtgWQ8mKwboJW3of9locizkDTHzBC2IlrT1oOQ", + "iv": + "AxY8DCtDaGlsbGljb3RoZQ", + "ciphertext": + "KDlTtXchhZTGufMYmOYGS4HffxPSUrfmqCHXaI9wOGY", + "tag": + "Mz-VPPyU4RlcuYv1IwIvzw" + } + +Appendix B. Example AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 Computation + + This example shows the steps in the AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 + authenticated encryption computation using the values from the + example in Appendix A.3. As described where this algorithm is + defined in Sections 5.2 and 5.2.3 of JWA, the AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 + family of algorithms are implemented using Advanced Encryption + Standard (AES) in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode with Public-Key + Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #7 padding to perform the encryption + and an HMAC SHA-2 function to perform the integrity calculation -- in + this case, HMAC SHA-256. + +B.1. Extract MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY from Key + + The 256 bit AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 key K used in this example + (using JSON array notation) is: + + [4, 211, 31, 197, 84, 157, 252, 254, 11, 100, 157, 250, 63, 170, 106, + 206, 107, 124, 212, 45, 111, 107, 9, 219, 200, 177, 0, 240, 143, 156, + 44, 207] + + Use the first 128 bits of this key as the HMAC SHA-256 key MAC_KEY, + which is: + + [4, 211, 31, 197, 84, 157, 252, 254, 11, 100, 157, 250, 63, 170, 106, + 206] + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 48] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + Use the last 128 bits of this key as the AES-CBC key ENC_KEY, which + is: + + [107, 124, 212, 45, 111, 107, 9, 219, 200, 177, 0, 240, 143, 156, 44, + 207] + + Note that the MAC key comes before the encryption key in the input + key K; this is in the opposite order of the algorithm names in the + identifiers "AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256" and "A128CBC-HS256". + +B.2. Encrypt Plaintext to Create Ciphertext + + Encrypt the plaintext with AES in CBC mode using PKCS #7 padding + using the ENC_KEY above. The plaintext in this example is: + + [76, 105, 118, 101, 32, 108, 111, 110, 103, 32, 97, 110, 100, 32, + 112, 114, 111, 115, 112, 101, 114, 46] + + The encryption result is as follows, which is the ciphertext output: + + [40, 57, 83, 181, 119, 33, 133, 148, 198, 185, 243, 24, 152, 230, 6, + 75, 129, 223, 127, 19, 210, 82, 183, 230, 168, 33, 215, 104, 143, + 112, 56, 102] + +B.3. 64-Bit Big-Endian Representation of AAD Length + + The Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) in this example is: + + [101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 66, 77, 84, 73, 52, + 83, 49, 99, 105, 76, 67, 74, 108, 98, 109, 77, 105, 79, 105, 74, 66, + 77, 84, 73, 52, 81, 48, 74, 68, 76, 85, 104, 84, 77, 106, 85, 50, 73, + 110, 48] + + This AAD is 51-bytes long, which is 408-bits long. The octet string + AL, which is the number of bits in AAD expressed as a big-endian + 64-bit unsigned integer is: + + [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 152] + +B.4. Initialization Vector Value + + The Initialization Vector value used in this example is: + + [3, 22, 60, 12, 43, 67, 104, 105, 108, 108, 105, 99, 111, 116, 104, + 101] + + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 49] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + +B.5. Create Input to HMAC Computation + + Concatenate the AAD, the Initialization Vector, the ciphertext, and + the AL value. The result of this concatenation is: + + [101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 66, 77, 84, 73, 52, + 83, 49, 99, 105, 76, 67, 74, 108, 98, 109, 77, 105, 79, 105, 74, 66, + 77, 84, 73, 52, 81, 48, 74, 68, 76, 85, 104, 84, 77, 106, 85, 50, 73, + 110, 48, 3, 22, 60, 12, 43, 67, 104, 105, 108, 108, 105, 99, 111, + 116, 104, 101, 40, 57, 83, 181, 119, 33, 133, 148, 198, 185, 243, 24, + 152, 230, 6, 75, 129, 223, 127, 19, 210, 82, 183, 230, 168, 33, 215, + 104, 143, 112, 56, 102, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 152] + +B.6. Compute HMAC Value + + Compute the HMAC SHA-256 of the concatenated value above. This + result M is: + + [83, 73, 191, 98, 104, 205, 211, 128, 201, 189, 199, 133, 32, 38, + 194, 85, 9, 84, 229, 201, 219, 135, 44, 252, 145, 102, 179, 140, 105, + 86, 229, 116] + +B.7. Truncate HMAC Value to Create Authentication Tag + + Use the first half (128 bits) of the HMAC output M as the + Authentication Tag output T. This truncated value is: + + [83, 73, 191, 98, 104, 205, 211, 128, 201, 189, 199, 133, 32, 38, + 194, 85] + +Acknowledgements + + Solutions for encrypting JSON content were also explored by "JSON + Simple Encryption" [JSE] and "JavaScript Message Security Format" + [JSMS], both of which significantly influenced this document. This + document attempts to explicitly reuse as many of the relevant + concepts from XML Encryption 1.1 [W3C.REC-xmlenc-core1-20130411] and + RFC 5652 [RFC5652] as possible, while utilizing simple, compact JSON- + based data structures. + + Special thanks are due to John Bradley, Eric Rescorla, and Nat + Sakimura for the discussions that helped inform the content of this + specification; to Eric Rescorla and Joe Hildebrand for allowing the + reuse of text from [JSMS] in this document; and to Eric Rescorla for + co-authoring many drafts of this specification. + + Thanks to Axel Nennker, Emmanuel Raviart, Brian Campbell, and Edmund + Jay for validating the examples in this specification. + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 50] + +RFC 7516 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) May 2015 + + + This specification is the work of the JOSE working group, which + includes dozens of active and dedicated participants. In particular, + the following individuals contributed ideas, feedback, and wording + that influenced this specification: + + Richard Barnes, John Bradley, Brian Campbell, Alissa Cooper, Breno de + Medeiros, Stephen Farrell, Dick Hardt, Jeff Hodges, Russ Housley, + Edmund Jay, Scott Kelly, Stephen Kent, Barry Leiba, James Manger, + Matt Miller, Kathleen Moriarty, Tony Nadalin, Hideki Nara, Axel + Nennker, Ray Polk, Emmanuel Raviart, Eric Rescorla, Pete Resnick, Nat + Sakimura, Jim Schaad, Hannes Tschofenig, and Sean Turner. + + Jim Schaad and Karen O'Donoghue chaired the JOSE working group and + Sean Turner, Stephen Farrell, and Kathleen Moriarty served as + Security Area Directors during the creation of this specification. + +Authors' Addresses + + Michael B. Jones + Microsoft + + EMail: mbj@microsoft.com + URI: http://self-issued.info/ + + + Joe Hildebrand + Cisco Systems, Inc. + + EMail: jhildebr@cisco.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Jones & Hildebrand Standards Track [Page 51] + |