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authorThomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100
committerThomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100
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+Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) N. Cam-Winget, Ed.
+Request for Comments: 8036 Cisco Systems
+Category: Standards Track J. Hui
+ISSN: 2070-1721 Nest
+ D. Popa
+ Itron, Inc
+ January 2017
+
+
+ Applicability Statement for
+ the Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) in
+ Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) Networks
+
+Abstract
+
+ This document discusses the applicability of the Routing Protocol for
+ Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) in Advanced Metering
+ Infrastructure (AMI) networks.
+
+Status of This Memo
+
+ This is an Internet Standards Track document.
+
+ This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
+ (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
+ received public review and has been approved for publication by the
+ Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
+ Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
+
+ Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
+ and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
+ http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8036.
+
+Copyright Notice
+
+ Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
+ document authors. All rights reserved.
+
+ This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
+ Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
+ (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
+ publication of this document. Please review these documents
+ carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
+ to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
+ include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
+ the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
+ described in the Simplified BSD License.
+
+
+
+
+Cam-Winget, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]
+
+RFC 8036 RPL Applicability for AMI January 2017
+
+
+Table of Contents
+
+ 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+ 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+ 1.2. Required Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+ 1.3. Out-of-Scope Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+ 2. Routing Protocol for LLNs (RPL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+ 3. Description of AMI Networks for Electric Meters . . . . . . . 4
+ 3.1. Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
+ 4. Smart Grid Traffic Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
+ 4.1. Smart Grid Traffic Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . 7
+ 4.2. Smart Grid Traffic QoS Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . 8
+ 4.3. RPL Applicability per Smart Grid Traffic Characteristics 9
+ 5. Layer-2 Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
+ 5.1. IEEE Wireless Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
+ 5.2. IEEE Power Line Communication (PLC) Technology . . . . . 9
+ 6. Using RPL to Meet Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . 10
+ 7. RPL Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+ 7.1. RPL Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+ 7.1.1. RPL Instances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+ 7.1.2. DAO Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+ 7.1.3. Path Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+ 7.1.4. Objective Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+ 7.1.5. DODAG Repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+ 7.1.6. Multicast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+ 7.1.7. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
+ 7.2. Description of Layer-2 Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
+ 7.2.1. IEEE 1901.2 PHY and MAC Sub-layer Features . . . . . 13
+ 7.2.2. IEEE 802.15.4 (Amendments G and E) PHY and MAC
+ Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
+ 7.2.3. IEEE MAC Sub-layer Security Features . . . . . . . . 15
+ 7.3. 6LowPAN Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
+ 7.4. Recommended Configuration Defaults and Ranges . . . . . . 17
+ 7.4.1. Trickle Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
+ 7.4.2. Other Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
+ 8. Manageability Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
+ 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
+ 9.1. Security Considerations during Initial Deployment . . . . 20
+ 9.2. Security Considerations during Incremental Deployment . . 20
+ 9.3. Security Considerations Based on RPL's Threat Analysis . 20
+ 10. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
+ 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
+ 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
+ 11.2. Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
+ Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
+ Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
+
+
+
+
+
+Cam-Winget, et al. Standards Track [Page 2]
+
+RFC 8036 RPL Applicability for AMI January 2017
+
+
+1. Introduction
+
+ Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) systems enable the
+ measurement; configuration; and control of energy, gas, and water
+ consumption and distribution; through two-way scheduled,
+ on-exception, and on-demand communication.
+
+ AMI networks are composed of millions of endpoints, including meters,
+ distribution automation elements, and eventually Home Area Network
+ (HAN) devices. They are typically interconnected using some
+ combination of wireless and power line communications, thus forming
+ the so-called Neighbor Area Network (NAN) along with a backhaul
+ network providing connectivity to "command-and-control" management
+ software applications at the utility company back office.
+
+1.1. Requirements Language
+
+ The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
+ "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
+ "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
+ [RFC2119].
+
+1.2. Required Reading
+
+ [surveySG] gives an overview of Smart Grid architecture and related
+ applications.
+
+ A NAN can use wireless communication technology, which is based on
+ the IEEE 802.15.4 standard family: more specifically, the Physical
+ Layer (PHY) amendment [IEEE.802.15.4g] and the Media Access Control
+ (MAC) sub-layer amendment [IEEE.802.15.4e], which are adapted to
+ smart grid networks.
+
+ NAN can also use Power Line Communication (PLC) technology as an
+ alternative to wireless communications. Several standards for PLC
+ technology have emerged, such as [IEEE.1901.2].
+
+ NAN can further use a mix of wireless and PLC technologies to
+ increase the network coverage ratio, which is a critical requirement
+ for AMI networks.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Cam-Winget, et al. Standards Track [Page 3]
+
+RFC 8036 RPL Applicability for AMI January 2017
+
+
+1.3. Out-of-Scope Requirements
+
+ The following are outside the scope of this document:
+
+ o Applicability statement for RPL [RFC6550] in AMI networks composed
+ of battery-powered devices (i.e., gas/water meters).
+
+ o Applicability statement for RPL in AMI networks composed of a mix
+ of devices powered by alternating current (i.e., electric meters)
+ and battery-powered meters (i.e., gas/water meters).
+
+ o Applicability statement for RPL storing mode of operation in AMI
+ networks.
+
+2. Routing Protocol for LLNs (RPL)
+
+ RPL provides routing functionality for mesh networks that can scale
+ up to thousands of resource-constrained devices that are
+ interconnected by low-power and lossy links and communicate with the
+ external network infrastructure through a common aggregation point(s)
+ (e.g., an LLN Border Router, or LBR).
+
+ RPL builds a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) routing structure rooted at
+ an LBR, ensures loop-free routing, and provides support for alternate
+ routes as well as for a wide range of routing metrics and policies.
+
+ RPL was designed to operate in energy-constrained environments and
+ includes energy-saving mechanisms (e.g., Trickle timers) and energy-
+ aware metrics. RPL's ability to support multiple different metrics
+ and constraints at the same time enables it to run efficiently in
+ heterogeneous networks composed of nodes and links with vastly
+ different characteristics [RFC6551].
+
+ This document describes the applicability of RPL non-storing mode (as
+ defined in [RFC6550]) to AMI deployments. The Routing Requirements
+ for Urban Low-Power and Lossy Networks [RFC5548] are applicable to
+ AMI networks as well. The terminology used in this document is
+ defined in [RFC7102].
+
+3. Description of AMI Networks for Electric Meters
+
+ In many deployments, in addition to measuring energy consumption, the
+ electric meter network plays a central role in the Smart Grid since
+ the device enables the utility company to control and query the
+ electric meters themselves and can serve as a backhaul for all other
+ devices in the Smart Grid, e.g., water and gas meters, distribution
+ automation, and HAN devices. Electric meters may also be used as
+
+
+
+
+Cam-Winget, et al. Standards Track [Page 4]
+
+RFC 8036 RPL Applicability for AMI January 2017
+
+
+ sensors to monitor electric grid quality and to support applications
+ such as electric vehicle charging.
+
+ Electric meter networks can be composed of millions of smart meters
+ (or nodes), each of which is resource constrained in terms of
+ processing power, storage capabilities, and communication bandwidth
+ due to a combination of factors including regulations on spectrum
+ use; on meter behavior and performance; and on heat emissions within
+ the meter, form factor, and cost considerations. These constraints
+ result in a compromise between range and throughput with effective
+ link throughput of tens to a few hundred kilobits per second per
+ link, a potentially significant portion of which is taken up by
+ protocol and encryption overhead when strong security measures are in
+ place.
+
+ Electric meters are often interconnected into multi-hop mesh
+ networks, each of which is connected to a backhaul network leading to
+ the utility company network through a network aggregation point,
+ e.g., an LBR.
+
+3.1. Deployment Scenarios
+
+ AMI networks are composed of millions of endpoints distributed across
+ both urban and rural environments. Such endpoints can include
+ electric, gas, and water meters; distribution automation elements;
+ and HAN devices.
+
+ Devices in the network communicate directly with other devices in
+ close proximity using a variety of low-power and/or lossy link
+ technologies that are both wireless and wired (e.g., IEEE 802.15.4g,
+ IEEE 802.15.4e, IEEE 1901.2, and [IEEE.802.11]). In addition to
+ serving as sources and destinations of packets, many network elements
+ typically also forward packets and thus form a mesh topology.
+
+ In a typical AMI deployment, groups of meters within physical
+ proximity form routing domains, each in the order of a 1,000 to
+ 10,000 meters. Thus, each electric meter mesh typically has several
+ thousand wireless endpoints with densities varying based on the area
+ and the terrain.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Cam-Winget, et al. Standards Track [Page 5]
+
+RFC 8036 RPL Applicability for AMI January 2017
+
+
+ |
+ +M
+ |
+ M M M M | M
+ /-----------\ /---+---+---+---+--+-+- phase 1
+ +----+ ( Internet ) +-----+ / M M M M
+ |MDMS|---( )----| LBR |/----+----+----+----+---- phase 2
+ +----+ ( WAN ) +-----+\
+ \----------/ \ M M M M
+ \--+--+----+-+---+----- phase 3
+ \ M M
+ +--+---+--
+ <----------------------------->
+ RPL
+
+ Figure 1: Typical NAN Topology
+
+ A typical AMI network architecture (see Figure 1) is composed of a
+ Meter Data Management System (MDMS) connected through an IP network
+ to an LBR, which can be located in the power substation or somewhere
+ else in the field. The power substation connects the households and
+ buildings. The physical topology of the electrical grid is a tree
+ structure, either due to the three different power phases coming
+ through the substation or just to the electrical network topology.
+ Meters (represented by a M in the previous figure) can also
+ participate in a HAN. The scope of this document is the
+ communication between the LBR and the meters, i.e., the NAN segment.
+
+ Node density can vary significantly. For example, apartment
+ buildings in urban centers may have hundreds of meters in close
+ proximity, whereas rural areas may have sparse node distributions and
+ may include nodes that only have a small number of network neighbors.
+ Each routing domain is connected to the larger IP infrastructure
+ through one or more LBRs, which provide Wide Area Network (WAN)
+ connectivity through various traditional network technologies, e.g.,
+ Ethernet, cellular, private WAN based on Worldwide Interoperability
+ for Microwave Access (WiMAX), and optical fiber. Paths in the mesh
+ between a network node and the nearest LBR may be composed of several
+ hops or even several tens of hops. Powered from the main line,
+ electric meters have less energy constraints than battery powered
+ devices, such as gas and water meters, and can afford the additional
+ resources required to route packets.
+
+ As a function of the technology used to exchange information, the
+ logical network topology will not necessarily match the electric grid
+ topology. If meters exchange information through radio technologies
+ such as in the IEEE 802.15.4 family, then the topology is a meshed
+
+
+
+
+Cam-Winget, et al. Standards Track [Page 6]
+
+RFC 8036 RPL Applicability for AMI January 2017
+
+
+ network where nodes belonging to the same Destination-Oriented DAG
+ (DODAG) can be connected to the grid through different substations.
+ If narrowband PLC technology is used, it will more or less follow the
+ physical tree structure since crosstalk may allow one phase to
+ communicate with the other. This is particularly true near the LBR.
+ Some mixed topology can also be observed since some LBRs may be
+ strategically installed in the field to avoid all the communications
+ going through a single LBR. Nevertheless, the short propagation
+ range forces meters to relay the information.
+
+4. Smart Grid Traffic Description
+
+4.1. Smart Grid Traffic Characteristics
+
+ In current AMI deployments, metering applications typically require
+ all smart meters to communicate with a few head-end servers that are
+ deployed in the utility company data center. Head-end servers
+ generate data traffic to configure smart data reading or initiate
+ queries and use unicast and multicast to efficiently communicate with
+ a single device (i.e., Point-to-Point (P2P) communications) or groups
+ of devices respectively (i.e., Point-to-Multipoint (P2MP)
+ communication). The head-end server may send a single small packet
+ at a time to the meters (e.g., a meter read request, a small
+ configuration change, or a service-switch command) or a series of
+ large packets (e.g., a firmware download across one or even thousands
+ of devices). The frequency of large file transfers (e.g., firmware
+ download of all metering devices) is typically much lower than the
+ frequency of sending configuration messages or queries. Each smart
+ meter generates Smart Metering Data (SMD) traffic according to a
+ schedule (e.g., periodic meter reads) in response to on-demand
+ queries (e.g., on-demand meter reads) or in response to some local
+ event (e.g., power outage or leak detection). Such traffic is
+ typically destined to a single head-end server. The SMD traffic is
+ thus highly asymmetric, where the majority of the traffic volume
+ generated by the smart meters typically goes through the LBRs, and is
+ directed from the smart meter devices to the head-end servers in a
+ Mesh Peer-to-Peer (MP2P) fashion. Current SMD traffic patterns are
+ fairly uniform and well understood. The traffic generated by the
+ head-end server and destined to metering devices is dominated by
+ periodic meter reads while traffic generated by the metering devices
+ is typically uniformly spread over some periodic read time-window.
+
+ Smart metering applications typically do not have hard real-time
+ constraints, but they are often subject to bounded latency and
+ stringent service level agreements about reliability.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Cam-Winget, et al. Standards Track [Page 7]
+
+RFC 8036 RPL Applicability for AMI January 2017
+
+
+ Distribution Automation (DA) applications typically involve a small
+ number of devices that communicate with each other in a P2P fashion
+ and may or may not be in close physical proximity. DA applications
+ typically have more stringent latency requirements than SMD
+ applications.
+
+ There are also a number of emerging applications such as electric
+ vehicle charging. These applications may require P2P communication
+ and may eventually have more stringent latency requirements than SMD
+ applications.
+
+4.2. Smart Grid Traffic QoS Requirements
+
+ As described previously, the two main traffic families in a NAN are:
+
+ A) Meter-initiated traffic (Meter-to-Head-End - M2HE)
+
+ B) Head-end-initiated traffic (Head-End-to-Meter - HE2M)
+
+ B1) request is sent in P2P to a specific meter
+
+ B2) request is sent in multicast to a subset of meters
+
+ B3) request is sent in multicast to all meters
+
+ The M2HE are event based while the HE2M are mostly command response.
+ In most cases, M2HE traffic is more critical than HE2M one, but there
+ can be exceptions.
+
+ Regarding priority, traffic may also be divided into several classes:
+
+ C1) High-Priority Critical traffic for Power System Outage, Pricing
+ Events, and Emergency Messages require a 98%+ packet delivery
+ under 5 s (payload size < 100 bytes)
+
+ C2) Critical Priority traffic for Power Quality Events and Meter
+ Service Connection and Disconnection requires 98%+ packet
+ delivery under 10s (payload size < 150 bytes)
+
+ C3) Normal Priority traffic for System Events including Faults,
+ Configuration, and Security requires 98%+ packet delivery under
+ 30 s (payload size < 200 bytes)
+
+ C4) Low Priority traffic for Recurrent Meter Reading requires 98%+
+ packet 2-hour delivery window 6 times per day (payload size <
+ 400 bytes)
+
+
+
+
+
+Cam-Winget, et al. Standards Track [Page 8]
+
+RFC 8036 RPL Applicability for AMI January 2017
+
+
+ C5) Background Priority traffic for firmware/software updates
+ processed to 98%+ of devices within 7 days (average firmware
+ update is 1 MB)
+
+4.3. RPL Applicability per Smart Grid Traffic Characteristics
+
+ The RPL non-storing mode of operation naturally supports upstream and
+ downstream forwarding of unicast traffic between the DODAG root and
+ each DODAG node, and between DODAG nodes and the DODAG root,
+ respectively.
+
+ The group communication model used in smart grid requires the RPL
+ non-storing mode of operation to support downstream forwarding of
+ multicast traffic with a scope larger than link-local. The DODAG
+ root is the single device that injects multicast traffic, with a
+ scope larger than link-local, into the DODAG.
+
+5. Layer-2 Applicability
+
+5.1. IEEE Wireless Technology
+
+ IEEE amendments 802.15.4g and 802.15.4e to the standard IEEE 802.15.4
+ have been specifically developed for smart grid networks. They are
+ the most common PHY and MAC layers used for wireless AMI networks.
+ IEEE 802.15.4g specifies multiple modes of operation (FSK, OQPSK, and
+ OFDM modulations) with speeds from 50 kbps to 600 kbps and allows for
+ transport of a full IPv6 packet (i.e., 1280 octets) without the need
+ for upper-layer segmentation and reassembly.
+
+ IEEE Std 802.15.4e is an amendment to IEEE Std 802.15.4 that
+ specifies additional Media Access Control (MAC) behaviors and frame
+ formats that allow IEEE 802.15.4 devices to support a wide range of
+ industrial and commercial applications that were not adequately
+ supported prior to the release of this amendment. It is important to
+ notice that IEEE 802.15.4e does not change the link-layer security
+ scheme defined in the last two updates to IEEE Std 802.15.4 (e.g.,
+ 2006 and 2011 amendments).
+
+5.2. IEEE Power Line Communication (PLC) Technology
+
+ IEEE Std 1901.2 specifies communications for low frequency (less than
+ 500 kHz) narrowband power line devices via alternating current and
+ direct current electric power lines. IEEE Std 1901.2 supports indoor
+ and outdoor communications over a low voltage line (the line between
+ transformer and meter, which is less than 1000 V) through a
+ transformer of low-voltage to medium-voltage (1000 V up to 72 kV) and
+ through a transformer of medium-voltage to low-voltage power lines in
+
+
+
+
+Cam-Winget, et al. Standards Track [Page 9]
+
+RFC 8036 RPL Applicability for AMI January 2017
+
+
+ both urban and in long distance (multi-kilometer) rural
+ communications.
+
+ IEEE Std 1901.2 defines the PHY layer and the MAC sub-layer of the
+ data link layer. The MAC sub-layer endorses a subset of IEEE
+ Std 802.15.4 and IEEE 802.15.4e MAC sub-layer features.
+
+ The IEEE Std 1901.2 PHY layer bit rates are scalable up to 500 kbps
+ depending on the application requirements and type of encoding used.
+
+ The IEEE Std 1901.2 MAC layer allows for transport of a full IPv6
+ packet (i.e., 1280 octets) without the need for upper-layer
+ segmentation and reassembly.
+
+ IEEE Std 1901.2 specifies the necessary link-layer security features
+ that fully endorse the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC sub-layer security scheme.
+
+6. Using RPL to Meet Functional Requirements
+
+ The functional requirements for most AMI deployments are similar to
+ those listed in [RFC5548]. This section informally highlights some
+ of the similarities:
+
+ o The routing protocol MUST be capable of supporting the
+ organization of a large number of nodes into regions containing on
+ the order of 10^2 to 10^4 nodes each.
+
+ o The routing protocol MUST provide mechanisms to support
+ configuration of the routing protocol itself.
+
+ o The routing protocol SHOULD support and utilize the large number
+ of highly directed flows to a few head-end servers to handle
+ scalability.
+
+ o The routing protocol MUST dynamically compute and select effective
+ routes composed of low-power and lossy links. Local network
+ dynamics SHOULD NOT impact the entire network. The routing
+ protocol MUST compute multiple paths when possible.
+
+ o The routing protocol MUST support multicast and unicast
+ addressing. The routing protocol SHOULD support formation and
+ identification of groups of field devices in the network.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Cam-Winget, et al. Standards Track [Page 10]
+
+RFC 8036 RPL Applicability for AMI January 2017
+
+
+ RPL supports the following features:
+
+ o Scalability: Large-scale networks characterized by highly directed
+ traffic flows between each smart meter and the head-end servers in
+ the utility network. To this end, RPL builds a Directed Acyclic
+ Graph (DAG) rooted at each LBR.
+
+ o Zero-touch configuration: This is done through in-band methods for
+ configuring RPL variables using DIO (DODAG Information Object)
+ messages and DIO message options [RFC6550].
+
+ o The use of links with time-varying quality characteristics: This
+ is accomplished by allowing the use of metrics that effectively
+ capture the quality of a path (e.g., Expected Transmission Count
+ (ETX)) and by limiting the impact of changing local conditions by
+ discovering and maintaining multiple DAG parents (and by using
+ local repair mechanisms when DAG links break).
+
+7. RPL Profile
+
+7.1. RPL Features
+
+7.1.1. RPL Instances
+
+ RPL operation is defined for a single RPL instance. However,
+ multiple RPL instances can be supported in multi-service networks
+ where different applications may require the use of different routing
+ metrics and constraints, e.g., a network carrying both SMD and DA
+ traffic.
+
+7.1.2. DAO Policy
+
+ Two-way communication is a requirement in AMI systems. As a result,
+ nodes SHOULD send Destination Advertisement Object (DAO) messages to
+ establish downward paths from the root to themselves.
+
+7.1.3. Path Metrics
+
+ Smart metering deployments utilize link technologies that may exhibit
+ significant packet loss and thus require routing metrics that take
+ packet loss into account. To characterize a path over such link
+ technologies, AMI deployments can use the ETX metric as defined in
+ [RFC6551].
+
+ Additional metrics may be defined in companion RFCs.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Cam-Winget, et al. Standards Track [Page 11]
+
+RFC 8036 RPL Applicability for AMI January 2017
+
+
+7.1.4. Objective Function
+
+ RPL relies on an Objective Function for selecting parents and
+ computing path costs and rank. This objective function is decoupled
+ from the core RPL mechanisms and also from the metrics in use in the
+ network. Two objective functions for RPL have been defined at the
+ time of this writing, Objective Function 0 (OF0) [RFC6552] and
+ Minimum Rank with Hysteresis Objective Function (MRHOF) [RFC6719],
+ both of which define the selection of a preferred parent and backup
+ parents and are suitable for AMI deployments.
+
+ Additional objective functions may be defined in companion RFCs.
+
+7.1.5. DODAG Repair
+
+ To effectively handle time-varying link characteristics and
+ availability, AMI deployments SHOULD utilize the local repair
+ mechanisms in RPL. Local repair is triggered by broken link
+ detection. The first local repair mechanism consists of a node
+ detaching from a DODAG and then reattaching to the same or to a
+ different DODAG at a later time. While detached, a node advertises
+ an infinite rank value so that its children can select a different
+ parent. This process is known as "poisoning" and is described in
+ Section 8.2.2.5 of [RFC6550]. While RPL provides an option to form a
+ local DODAG, doing so in AMI for electric meters is of little benefit
+ since AMI applications typically communicate through an LBR. After
+ the detached node has made sufficient effort to send a notification
+ to its children that it is detached, the node can rejoin the same
+ DODAG with a higher rank value. The configured duration of the
+ poisoning mechanism needs to take into account the disconnection time
+ that applications running over the network can tolerate. Note that
+ when joining a different DODAG, the node need not perform poisoning.
+ The second local repair mechanism controls how much a node can
+ increase its rank within a given DODAG version (e.g., after detaching
+ from the DODAG as a result of broken link or loop detection).
+ Setting the DAGMaxRankIncrease to a non-zero value enables this
+ mechanism, and setting it to a value of less than infinity limits the
+ cost of count-to-infinity scenarios when they occur, thus controlling
+ the duration of disconnection applications may experience.
+
+7.1.6. Multicast
+
+ Multicast support for RPL in non-storing mode are being developed in
+ companion RFCs (see [RFC7731]).
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Cam-Winget, et al. Standards Track [Page 12]
+
+RFC 8036 RPL Applicability for AMI January 2017
+
+
+7.1.7. Security
+
+ AMI deployments operate in areas that do not provide any physical
+ security. For this reason, the link-layer, transport-layer, and
+ application-layer technologies utilized within AMI networks typically
+ provide security mechanisms to ensure authentication,
+ confidentiality, integrity, and freshness. As a result, AMI
+ deployments may not need to implement RPL's security mechanisms; they
+ MUST include, at a minimum, link-layer security such as that defined
+ by IEEE 1901.2 and IEEE 802.15.4.
+
+7.2. Description of Layer-2 Features
+
+7.2.1. IEEE 1901.2 PHY and MAC Sub-layer Features
+
+ The IEEE Std 1901.2 PHY layer is based on OFDM modulation and defines
+ a time frequency interleaver over the entire PHY frame coupled with a
+ Reed Solomon and Viterbi Forward Error Correction for maximum
+ robustness. Since the noise level in each OFDM subcarrier can vary
+ significantly, IEEE 1901.2 specifies two complementary mechanisms
+ that allow fine-tuning of the robustness/performance tradeoff
+ implicit in such systems. More specifically, the first (coarse-
+ grained) mechanism defines the modulation from several possible
+ choices (robust (super-ROBO, ROBO), BPSK, QPSK, and so on). The
+ second (fine-grained) mechanism maps the subcarriers that are too
+ noisy and deactivates them.
+
+ The existence of multiple modulations and dynamic frequency exclusion
+ renders the problem of selecting a path between two nodes non-trivial
+ as the possible number of combinations increases significantly, e.g.,
+ use a direct link with slow robust modulation or use a relay meter
+ with fast modulation and 12 disabled subcarriers. In addition, IEEE
+ 1901.2 technology offers a mechanism (adaptive tone map) for periodic
+ exchanges on the link quality between nodes to constantly react to
+ channel fluctuations. Every meter keeps a state of the quality of
+ the link to each of its neighbors by either piggybacking the tone
+ mapping on the data traffic or by sending explicit tone map requests.
+
+ The IEEE 1901.2 MAC frame format shares most in common with the IEEE
+ 802.15.4 MAC frame format [IEEE.802.15.4]. A few exceptions are
+ described below.
+
+ o The IEEE 1901.2 MAC frame is obtained by prepending a Segment
+ Control Field to the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC header. One function of
+ the Segment Control Field is to signal the use of the MAC
+ sub-layer segmentation and reassembly.
+
+
+
+
+
+Cam-Winget, et al. Standards Track [Page 13]
+
+RFC 8036 RPL Applicability for AMI January 2017
+
+
+ o IEEE 1901.2 MAC frames use only the 802.15.4 MAC addresses with a
+ length of 16 and 64 bits.
+
+ o The IEEE 1901.2 MAC sub-layer endorses the concept of Information
+ Elements, as defined in [IEEE.802.15.4e]. The format and use of
+ Information Elements are not relevant to the RPL applicability
+ statement.
+
+ The IEEE 1901.2 PHY frame payload size varies as a function of the
+ modulation used to transmit the frame and the strength of the Forward
+ Error Correction scheme.
+
+ The IEEE 1901.2 PHY MTU size is variable and dependent on the PHY
+ settings in use (e.g., bandwidth, modulation, tones, etc). As quoted
+ from the IEEE 1901.2 specification:
+
+ For CENELEC A/B, if MSDU size is more than 247 octets for robust
+ OFDM (ROBO) and Super-ROBO modulations or more than 239 octets for
+ all other modulations, the MAC layer shall divide the MSDU into
+ multiple segments as described in 5.3.7. For FCC and ARIB, if the
+ MSDU size meets one of the following conditions: a) For ROBO and
+ Super-ROBO modulations, the MSDU size is more than 247 octets but
+ less than 494 octets, b) For all other modulations, the MSDU size
+ is more than 239 octets but less than 478 octets.
+
+7.2.2. IEEE 802.15.4 (Amendments G and E) PHY and MAC Features
+
+ IEEE Std 802.15.4g defines multiple modes of operation, where each
+ mode uses different modulation and has multiple data rates.
+ Additionally, the 802.15.4g PHY layer includes mechanisms to improve
+ the robustness of the radio communications, such as data whitening
+ and Forward Error Correction coding. The 802.15.4g PHY frame payload
+ can carry up to 2048 octets.
+
+ IEEE Std 802.15.4g defines the following modulations: Multi-Rate and
+ Multi-Regional FSK (MR-FSK), MR-OFDM, and MR-O-QPSK. The (over-the-
+ air) bit rates for these modulations range from 4.8 to 600 kbps for
+ MR-FSK, from 50 to 600 kbps for MR-OFDM, and from 6.25 to 500 kbps
+ for MR-O-QPSK.
+
+ The MAC sub-layer running on top of a 4g radio link is based on IEEE
+ 802.15.4e. The 802.15.4e MAC allows for a variety of modes for
+ operation. These include:
+
+ o Timetimeslotslotted Channel Hopping (TSCH): specifically designed
+ for application domains such as process automation
+
+
+
+
+
+Cam-Winget, et al. Standards Track [Page 14]
+
+RFC 8036 RPL Applicability for AMI January 2017
+
+
+ o Low-Latency Deterministic Networks (LLDN): for application domains
+ such as factory automation.
+
+ o Deterministic and Synchronous Multi-channel Extension (DSME): for
+ general industrial and commercial application domains that
+ includes channel diversity to increase network robustness.
+
+ o Asynchronous Multi-channel Adaptation (AMCA): for large
+ infrastructure application domains.
+
+ The MAC addressing scheme supports short (16-bit) addresses along
+ with extended (64-bit) addresses. These addresses are assigned in
+ different ways and are specified by specific standards organizations.
+ Information Elements, Enhanced Beacons, and frame version 2, as
+ defined in IEEE 802.15.4e, MUST be supported.
+
+ Since the MAC frame payload size limitation is given by the 4g PHY
+ frame payload size limitation (i.e., 2048 bytes) and MAC layer
+ overhead (headers, trailers, Information Elements, and security
+ overhead), the MAC frame payload MUST able to carry a full IPv6
+ packet of 1280 octets without upper-layer fragmentation and
+ reassembly.
+
+7.2.3. IEEE MAC Sub-layer Security Features
+
+ Since the IEEE 1901.2 standard is based on the 802.15.4 MAC sub-layer
+ and fully endorses the security scheme defined in 802.15.4, we only
+ focus on the description of the IEEE 802.15.4 security scheme.
+
+ The IEEE 802.15.4 specification was designed to support a variety of
+ applications, many of which are security sensitive. IEEE 802.15.4
+ provides four basic security services: message authentication,
+ message integrity, message confidentiality, and freshness checks to
+ avoid replay attacks.
+
+ The 802.15.4 security layer is handled at the media access control
+ layer, below the 6LowPAN (IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area
+ Network) layer. The application specifies its security requirements
+ by setting the appropriate control parameters into the radio/PLC
+ stack. IEEE 802.15.4 defines four packet types: beacon frames, data
+ frames, acknowledgment frames, and command frames for the media
+ access control layer. The 802.15.4 specification does not support
+ security for acknowledgement frames; data frames, beacon frames, and
+ command frames can support integrity protection and confidentiality
+ protection for the frames' data field. An application has a choice
+ of security suites that control the type of security protection that
+ is provided for the transmitted MAC frame. Each security suite
+ offers a different set of security properties and guarantees, and
+
+
+
+Cam-Winget, et al. Standards Track [Page 15]
+
+RFC 8036 RPL Applicability for AMI January 2017
+
+
+ ultimately offers different MAC frame formats. The 802.15.4
+ specification defines eight different security suites, outlined
+ below. We can broadly classify the suites by the properties that
+ they offer: no security, encryption only (AES-CTR), authentication
+ only (AES-CBC-MAC), and encryption and authentication (AES-CCM).
+ Each category that supports authentication comes in three variants
+ depending on the size of the Message Authentication Code that it
+ offers. The MAC can be either 4, 8, or 16 bytes long. Additionally,
+ for each suite that offers encryption, the recipient can optionally
+ enable replay protection.
+
+ o Null = No security
+
+ o AES-CTR = Encryption only, CTR mode
+
+ o AES-CBC-MAC-128 = No encryption, 128-bit MAC
+
+ o AES-CBC-MAC-64 = No encryption, 64-bit MAC
+
+ o AES-CCM-128 = Encryption and 128-bit MAC
+
+ o AES-CCM-64 = Encryption and 64-bit MAC
+
+ o AES-CCM-32 = Encryption and 32-bit MAC
+
+ Note that AES-CCM-32 is the most commonly used cipher in these
+ deployments today.
+
+ To achieve authentication, any device can maintain an Access Control
+ List (ACL), which is a list of trusted nodes from which the device
+ wishes to receive data. Data encryption is done by encryption of
+ Message Authentication Control frame payload using the key shared
+ between two devices or among a group of peers. If the key is to be
+ shared between two peers, it is stored with each entry in the ACL
+ list; otherwise, the key is stored as the default key. Thus, the
+ device can make sure that its data cannot be read by devices that do
+ not possess the corresponding key. However, device addresses are
+ always transmitted unencrypted, which makes attacks that rely on
+ device identity somewhat easier to launch. Integrity service is
+ applied by appending a Message Integrity Code (MIC) generated from
+ blocks of encrypted message text. This ensures that a frame cannot
+ be modified by a receiver device that does not share a key with the
+ sender. Finally, sequential freshness uses a frame counter and key
+ sequence counter to ensure the freshness of the incoming frame and
+ guard against replay attacks.
+
+ A cryptographic Message Authentication Code (or keyed MIC) is used to
+ authenticate messages. While longer MICs lead to improved resiliency
+
+
+
+Cam-Winget, et al. Standards Track [Page 16]
+
+RFC 8036 RPL Applicability for AMI January 2017
+
+
+ of the code, they also make the packet size larger and thus take up
+ bandwidth in the network. In constrained environments such as
+ metering infrastructures, an optimum balance between security
+ requirements and network throughput must be found.
+
+7.3. 6LowPAN Options
+
+ AMI implementations based on IEEE 1901.2 and 802.15.4 (amendments g
+ and e) can utilize all of the IPv6 Header Compression schemes
+ specified in Section 3 of [RFC6282] and all of the IPv6 Next Header
+ compression schemes specified in Section 4 of [RFC6282], if reducing
+ over the air/wire overhead is a requirement.
+
+7.4. Recommended Configuration Defaults and Ranges
+
+7.4.1. Trickle Parameters
+
+ Trickle [RFC6206] was designed to be density aware and perform well
+ in networks characterized by a wide range of node densities. The
+ combination of DIO packet suppression and adaptive timers for sending
+ updates allows Trickle to perform well in both sparse and dense
+ environments. Node densities in AMI deployments can vary greatly,
+ from nodes having only one or a handful of neighbors to nodes having
+ several hundred neighbors. In high-density environments, relatively
+ low values for Imin may cause a short period of congestion when an
+ inconsistency is detected and DIO updates are sent by a large number
+ of neighboring nodes nearly simultaneously. While the Trickle timer
+ will exponentially backoff, some time may elapse before the
+ congestion subsides. While some link layers employ contention
+ mechanisms that attempt to avoid congestion, relying solely on the
+ link layer to avoid congestion caused by a large number of DIO
+ updates can result in increased communication latency for other
+ control and data traffic in the network. To mitigate this kind of
+ short-term congestion, this document recommends a more conservative
+ set of values for the Trickle parameters than those specified in
+ [RFC6206]. In particular, DIOIntervalMin is set to a larger value to
+ avoid periods of congestion in dense environments, and
+ DIORedundancyConstant is parameterized accordingly as described
+ below. These values are appropriate for the timely distribution of
+ DIO updates in both sparse and dense scenarios while avoiding the
+ short-term congestion that might arise in dense scenarios. Because
+ the actual link capacity depends on the particular link technology
+ used within an AMI deployment, the Trickle parameters are specified
+ in terms of the link's maximum capacity for transmitting link-local
+ multicast messages. If the link can transmit m link-local multicast
+ packets per second on average, the expected time it takes to transmit
+ a link-local multicast packet is 1/m seconds.
+
+
+
+
+Cam-Winget, et al. Standards Track [Page 17]
+
+RFC 8036 RPL Applicability for AMI January 2017
+
+
+ DIOIntervalMin: AMI deployments SHOULD set DIOIntervalMin such that
+ the Trickle Imin is at least 50 times as long as it takes to
+ transmit a link-local multicast packet. This value is larger than
+ that recommended in [RFC6206] to avoid congestion in dense urban
+ deployments as described above.
+
+ DIOIntervalDoublings: AMI deployments SHOULD set
+ DIOIntervalDoublings such that the Trickle Imax is at least 2
+ hours or more.
+
+ DIORedundancyConstant: AMI deployments SHOULD set
+ DIORedundancyConstant to a value of at least 10. This is due to
+ the larger chosen value for DIOIntervalMin and the proportional
+ relationship between Imin and k suggested in [RFC6206]. This
+ increase is intended to compensate for the increased communication
+ latency of DIO updates caused by the increase in the
+ DIOIntervalMin value, though the proportional relationship between
+ Imin and k suggested in [RFC6206] is not preserved. Instead,
+ DIORedundancyConstant is set to a lower value in order to reduce
+ the number of packet transmissions in dense environments.
+
+7.4.2. Other Parameters
+
+ o AMI deployments SHOULD set MinHopRankIncrease to 256, resulting in
+ 8 bits of resolution (e.g., for the ETX metric).
+
+ o To enable local repair, AMI deployments SHOULD set MaxRankIncrease
+ to a value that allows a device to move a small number of hops
+ away from the root. With a MinHopRankIncrease of 256, a
+ MaxRankIncrease of 1024 would allow a device to move up to 4 hops
+ away.
+
+8. Manageability Considerations
+
+ Network manageability is a critical aspect of smart grid network
+ deployment and operation. With millions of devices participating in
+ the smart grid network, many requiring real-time reachability,
+ automatic configuration, and lightweight-network health monitoring
+ and management are crucial for achieving network availability and
+ efficient operation. RPL enables automatic and consistent
+ configuration of RPL routers through parameters specified by the
+ DODAG root and disseminated through DIO packets. The use of Trickle
+ for scheduling DIO transmissions ensures lightweight yet timely
+ propagation of important network and parameter updates and allows
+ network operators to choose the trade-off point with which they are
+ comfortable with respect to overhead vs. reliability and timeliness
+ of network updates. The metrics in use in the network along with the
+ Trickle Timer parameters used to control the frequency and redundancy
+
+
+
+Cam-Winget, et al. Standards Track [Page 18]
+
+RFC 8036 RPL Applicability for AMI January 2017
+
+
+ of network updates can be dynamically varied by the root during the
+ lifetime of the network. To that end, all DIO messages SHOULD
+ contain a Metric Container option for disseminating the metrics and
+ metric values used for DODAG setup. In addition, DIO messages SHOULD
+ contain a DODAG Configuration option for disseminating the Trickle
+ Timer parameters throughout the network. The possibility of
+ dynamically updating the metrics in use in the network as well as the
+ frequency of network updates allows deployment characteristics (e.g.,
+ network density) to be discovered during network bring-up and to be
+ used to tailor network parameters once the network is operational
+ rather than having to rely on precise pre-configuration. This also
+ allows the network parameters and the overall routing protocol
+ behavior to evolve during the lifetime of the network. RPL specifies
+ a number of variables and events that can be tracked for purposes of
+ network fault and performance monitoring of RPL routers. Depending
+ on the memory and processing capabilities of each smart grid device,
+ various subsets of these can be employed in the field.
+
+9. Security Considerations
+
+ Smart grid networks are subject to stringent security requirements,
+ as they are considered a critical infrastructure component. At the
+ same time, they are composed of large numbers of resource-constrained
+ devices interconnected with limited-throughput links. As a result,
+ the choice of security mechanisms is highly dependent on the device
+ and network capabilities characterizing a particular deployment.
+
+ In contrast to other types of LLNs, in smart grid networks both
+ centralized administrative control and access to a permanent secure
+ infrastructure are available. As a result, smart grid networks are
+ deployed with security mechanisms such as link-layer, transport-
+ layer, and/or application-layer security mechanisms; while it is best
+ practice to secure all layers, using RPL's secure mode may not be
+ necessary. Failure to protect any of these layers can result in
+ various attacks; a lack of strong authentication of devices in the
+ infrastructure can lead to uncontrolled and unauthorized access.
+ Similarly, failure to protect the communication layers can enable
+ passive (in wireless mediums) attacks as well as man-in-the-middle
+ and active attacks.
+
+ As this document describes the applicability of RPL non-storing mode,
+ the security considerations as defined in [RFC6550] also apply to
+ this document and to AMI deployments.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Cam-Winget, et al. Standards Track [Page 19]
+
+RFC 8036 RPL Applicability for AMI January 2017
+
+
+9.1. Security Considerations during Initial Deployment
+
+ During the manufacturing process, the meters are loaded with the
+ appropriate security credentials (keys and certificates). The
+ configured security credentials during manufacturing are used by the
+ devices to authenticate with the system and to further negotiate
+ operational security credentials for both network and application
+ layers.
+
+9.2. Security Considerations during Incremental Deployment
+
+ If during the system operation a device fails or is known to be
+ compromised, it is replaced with a new device. The new device does
+ not take over the security identity of the replaced device. The
+ security credentials associated with the failed/compromised device
+ are removed from the security appliances.
+
+9.3. Security Considerations Based on RPL's Threat Analysis
+
+ [RFC7416] defines a set of security considerations for RPL security.
+ This document defines how it leverages the device's link-layer and
+ application-layer security mechanisms to address the threats as
+ defined in Section 6 of [RFC7416].
+
+ Like any secure network infrastructure, an AMI deployment's ability
+ to address node impersonation and active man-in-the-middle attacks
+ rely on a mutual authentication and authorization process. To enable
+ strong mutual authentication, all nodes, from smart meters to nodes
+ in the infrastructure, must have a credential. The credential may be
+ bootstrapped at the time the node is manufactured but must be
+ appropriately managed and classified through the authorization
+ process. The management and authorization process ensures that the
+ nodes are properly authenticated and behaving or 'acting' in their
+ assigned roles.
+
+ Similarly, to ensure that data has not been modified, confidentiality
+ and integrity at the suitable layers (e.g., the link layer, the
+ application layer, or both) should be used.
+
+ To provide the security mechanisms to address these threats, an AMI
+ deployment MUST include the use of the security schemes as defined by
+ IEEE 1901.2 (and IEEE 802.15.4) with IEEE 802.15.4 defining the
+ security mechanisms to afford mutual authentication, access control
+ (e.g., authorization), and transport confidentiality and integrity.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Cam-Winget, et al. Standards Track [Page 20]
+
+RFC 8036 RPL Applicability for AMI January 2017
+
+
+10. Privacy Considerations
+
+ Privacy of information flowing through smart grid networks are
+ subject to consideration. An evolving set of recommendations and
+ requirements are being defined by different groups and consortiums;
+ for example, the U.S. Department of Energy issued a document [DOEVCC]
+ defining a process and set of recommendations to address privacy
+ issues. As this document describes the applicability of RPL, the
+ privacy considerations as defined in [PRIVACY] and [EUPR] apply to
+ this document and to AMI deployments.
+
+11. References
+
+11.1. Normative References
+
+ [IEEE.1901.2]
+ IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Low-Frequency (less than 500 kHz)
+ Narrowband Power Line Communications for Smart Grid
+ Applications", IEEE 1901.2-2013,
+ DOI 10.1109/ieeestd.2013.6679210, December 2013,
+ <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/servlet/
+ opac?punumber=6679208>.
+
+ [IEEE.802.15.4]
+ IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area
+ networks--Part 15.4: Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area
+ Networks (LR-WPANs)", IEEE 802.15.4-2011,
+ DOI 10.1109/ieeestd.2011.6012487, September 2011,
+ <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/servlet/
+ opac?punumber=6012485>.
+
+ [IEEE.802.15.4e]
+ IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area
+ networks--Part 15.4: Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area
+ Networks (LR-WPANs) Amendment 1: MAC sublayer", IEEE
+ 802.15.4e-2012, DOI 10.1109/ieeestd.2012.6185525, April
+ 2012, <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/servlet/
+ opac?punumber=6185523>.
+
+ [IEEE.802.15.4g]
+ IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area
+ networks--Part 15.4: Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area
+ Networks (LR-WPANs) Amendment 3: Physical Layer (PHY)
+ Specifications for Low-Data-Rate, Wireless, Smart Metering
+ Utility Networks", IEEE 802.15.4g-2012,
+ DOI 10.1109/ieeestd.2012.6190698, April 2012,
+ <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/servlet/
+ opac?punumber=6190696>.
+
+
+
+Cam-Winget, et al. Standards Track [Page 21]
+
+RFC 8036 RPL Applicability for AMI January 2017
+
+
+ [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
+ Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
+ <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
+
+ [RFC6550] Winter, T., Ed., Thubert, P., Ed., Brandt, A., Hui, J.,
+ Kelsey, R., Levis, P., Pister, K., Struik, R., Vasseur,
+ JP., and R. Alexander, "RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for
+ Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC 6550,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC6550, March 2012,
+ <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6550>.
+
+ [surveySG] Gungor, V., Sahin, D., Kocak, T., Ergut, S., Buccella, C.,
+ Cecati, C., and G. Hancke, "A Survey on Smart Grid
+ Potential Applications and Communication Requirements",
+ IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics Volume 9,
+ Issue 1, pp. 28-42, DOI 10.1109/TII.2012.2218253, February
+ 2013.
+
+11.2. Informative references
+
+ [DOEVCC] "Voluntary Code of Conduct (VCC) Final Concepts and
+ Principles", January 2015,
+ <http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/01/f19/VCC%20Conc
+ epts%20and%20Principles%202015_01_08%20FINAL.pdf>.
+
+ [EUPR] "Information for investors and data controllers", June
+ 2016, <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/node/1748>.
+
+ [IEEE.802.11]
+ IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Information technology--
+ Telecommunications and information exchange between
+ systems Local and metropolitan area networks--Specific
+ requirements Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control
+ (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications",
+ IEEE 802.11-2012, DOI 10.1109/ieeestd.2012.6178212, March
+ 2012, <https://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/
+ download/802.11-2012.pdf>.
+
+ [PRIVACY] Thaler, D., "Privacy Considerations for IPv6 Adaptation
+ Layer Mechanisms", Work in Progress, draft-ietf-6lo-
+ privacy-considerations-04, October 2016.
+
+ [RFC5548] Dohler, M., Ed., Watteyne, T., Ed., Winter, T., Ed., and
+ D. Barthel, Ed., "Routing Requirements for Urban Low-Power
+ and Lossy Networks", RFC 5548, DOI 10.17487/RFC5548, May
+ 2009, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5548>.
+
+
+
+
+Cam-Winget, et al. Standards Track [Page 22]
+
+RFC 8036 RPL Applicability for AMI January 2017
+
+
+ [RFC6206] Levis, P., Clausen, T., Hui, J., Gnawali, O., and J. Ko,
+ "The Trickle Algorithm", RFC 6206, DOI 10.17487/RFC6206,
+ March 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6206>.
+
+ [RFC6282] Hui, J., Ed. and P. Thubert, "Compression Format for IPv6
+ Datagrams over IEEE 802.15.4-Based Networks", RFC 6282,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC6282, September 2011,
+ <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6282>.
+
+ [RFC6551] Vasseur, JP., Ed., Kim, M., Ed., Pister, K., Dejean, N.,
+ and D. Barthel, "Routing Metrics Used for Path Calculation
+ in Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC 6551,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC6551, March 2012,
+ <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6551>.
+
+ [RFC6552] Thubert, P., Ed., "Objective Function Zero for the Routing
+ Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL)",
+ RFC 6552, DOI 10.17487/RFC6552, March 2012,
+ <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6552>.
+
+ [RFC6719] Gnawali, O. and P. Levis, "The Minimum Rank with
+ Hysteresis Objective Function", RFC 6719,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC6719, September 2012,
+ <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6719>.
+
+ [RFC7102] Vasseur, JP., "Terms Used in Routing for Low-Power and
+ Lossy Networks", RFC 7102, DOI 10.17487/RFC7102, January
+ 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7102>.
+
+ [RFC7416] Tsao, T., Alexander, R., Dohler, M., Daza, V., Lozano, A.,
+ and M. Richardson, Ed., "A Security Threat Analysis for
+ the Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks
+ (RPLs)", RFC 7416, DOI 10.17487/RFC7416, January 2015,
+ <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7416>.
+
+ [RFC7731] Hui, J. and R. Kelsey, "Multicast Protocol for Low-Power
+ and Lossy Networks (MPL)", RFC 7731, DOI 10.17487/RFC7731,
+ February 2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7731>.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Cam-Winget, et al. Standards Track [Page 23]
+
+RFC 8036 RPL Applicability for AMI January 2017
+
+
+Acknowledgements
+
+ Matthew Gillmore, Laurent Toutain, Ruben Salazar, and Kazuya Monden
+ were contributors and noted as authors in earlier versions of this
+ document. The authors would also like to acknowledge the review,
+ feedback, and comments of Jari Arkko, Dominique Barthel, Cedric
+ Chauvenet, Yuichi Igarashi, Philip Levis, Jeorjeta Jetcheva, Nicolas
+ Dejean, and JP Vasseur.
+
+Authors' Addresses
+
+ Nancy Cam-Winget (editor)
+ Cisco Systems
+ 3550 Cisco Way
+ San Jose, CA 95134
+ United States of America
+
+ Email: ncamwing@cisco.com
+
+
+ Jonathan Hui
+ Nest
+ 3400 Hillview Ave
+ Palo Alto, CA 94304
+ United States of America
+
+ Email: jonhui@nestlabs.com
+
+
+ Daniel Popa
+ Itron, Inc
+ 52, rue Camille Desmoulins
+ Issy les Moulineaux 92130
+ France
+
+ Email: daniel.popa@itron.com
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Cam-Winget, et al. Standards Track [Page 24]
+