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| author | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 | 
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| committer | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 | 
| commit | 4bfd864f10b68b71482b35c818559068ef8d5797 (patch) | |
| tree | e3989f47a7994642eb325063d46e8f08ffa681dc /doc/rfc/rfc8047.txt | |
| parent | ea76e11061bda059ae9f9ad130a9895cc85607db (diff) | |
doc: Add RFC documents
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diff --git a/doc/rfc/rfc8047.txt b/doc/rfc/rfc8047.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cbe0b73 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/rfc/rfc8047.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1235 @@ + + + + + + +Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                 T. Henderson, Ed. +Request for Comments: 8047                      University of Washington +Category: Standards Track                                        C. Vogt +ISSN: 2070-1721                                              Independent +                                                                J. Arkko +                                                                Ericsson +                                                           February 2017 + + +            Host Multihoming with the Host Identity Protocol + +Abstract + +   This document defines host multihoming extensions to the Host +   Identity Protocol (HIP), by leveraging protocol components defined +   for host mobility. + +Status of This Memo + +   This is an Internet Standards Track document. + +   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force +   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has +   received public review and has been approved for publication by the +   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on +   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841. + +   Information about the current status of this document, any errata, +   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at +   http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8047. + +Copyright Notice + +   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the +   document authors.  All rights reserved. + +   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal +   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents +   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of +   publication of this document.  Please review these documents +   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect +   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must +   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of +   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as +   described in the Simplified BSD License. + + + + + + +Henderson, et al.            Standards Track                    [Page 1] + +RFC 8047                     HIP Multihoming               February 2017 + + +Table of Contents + +   1.  Introduction and Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3 +   2.  Terminology and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4 +   3.  Protocol Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4 +   4.  Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4 +     4.1.  Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5 +     4.2.  Usage Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6 +       4.2.1.  Multiple Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6 +       4.2.2.  Multiple Security Associations  . . . . . . . . . . .   6 +       4.2.3.  Host Multihoming for Fault Tolerance  . . . . . . . .   7 +       4.2.4.  Host Multihoming for Load Balancing . . . . . . . . .   9 +       4.2.5.  Site Multihoming  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10 +       4.2.6.  Dual-Host Multihoming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10 +       4.2.7.  Combined Mobility and Multihoming . . . . . . . . . .  11 +       4.2.8.  Initiating the Protocol in R1, I2, or R2  . . . . . .  11 +       4.2.9.  Using LOCATOR_SETs across Addressing Realms . . . . .  13 +     4.3.  Interaction with Security Associations  . . . . . . . . .  13 +   5.  Processing Rules  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14 +     5.1.  Sending LOCATOR_SETs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14 +     5.2.  Handling Received LOCATOR_SETs  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16 +     5.3.  Verifying Address Reachability  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18 +     5.4.  Changing the Preferred Locator  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18 +   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19 +   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21 +     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21 +     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21 +   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22 +   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Henderson, et al.            Standards Track                    [Page 2] + +RFC 8047                     HIP Multihoming               February 2017 + + +1.  Introduction and Scope + +   The Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [RFC7401] supports an architecture +   that decouples the transport layer (TCP, UDP, etc.) from the +   internetworking layer (IPv4 and IPv6) by using public/private key +   pairs, instead of IP addresses, as host identities.  When a host uses +   HIP, the overlying protocol sublayers (e.g., transport-layer sockets +   and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Security Associations (SAs)) +   are instead bound to representations of these host identities, and +   the IP addresses are only used for packet forwarding.  However, each +   host must also know at least one IP address at which its peers are +   reachable.  Initially, these IP addresses are the ones used during +   the HIP base exchange. + +   One consequence of such a decoupling is that new solutions to +   network-layer mobility and host multihoming are possible.  Basic host +   mobility is defined in [RFC8046] and covers the case in which a host +   has a single address and changes its network point of attachment +   while desiring to preserve the HIP-enabled security association. +   Host multihoming is somewhat of a dual case to host mobility, in +   that, a host may simultaneously have more than one network point of +   attachment.  There are potentially many variations of host +   multihoming possible.  [RFC8046] specifies the format of the HIP +   parameter (LOCATOR_SET parameter) used to convey IP addressing +   information between peers, the procedures for sending and processing +   this parameter to enable basic host mobility, and procedures for an +   address verification mechanism.  The scope of this document +   encompasses messaging and elements of procedure for some basic host +   multihoming scenarios of interest. + +   Another variation of multihoming that has been heavily studied is +   site multihoming.  Solutions for host multihoming in multihomed IPv6 +   networks have been specified by the IETF shim6 working group.  The +   Shim6 protocol [RFC5533] bears many architectural similarities to +   HIP, but there are differences in the security model and in the +   protocol. + +   While HIP can potentially be used with transports other than the ESP +   transport format [RFC7402], this document largely assumes the use of +   ESP and leaves other transport formats for further study. + +   Finally, making underlying IP multihoming transparent to the +   transport layer has implications on the proper response of transport +   congestion control, path MTU selection, and Quality of Service (QoS). +   Transport-layer mobility triggers, and the proper transport response +   to a HIP multihoming address change, are outside the scope of this +   document. + + + + +Henderson, et al.            Standards Track                    [Page 3] + +RFC 8047                     HIP Multihoming               February 2017 + + +   This specification relies on implementing Sections 4 ("LOCATOR_SET +   Parameter Format") and 5 ("Processing Rules") of [RFC8046] as a +   starting point for this implementation. + +2.  Terminology and Conventions + +   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", +   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this +   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. + +   The following terms used in this document are defined in [RFC8046]: +   LOCATOR_SET, Locator, locator, Address, preferred locator, and +   Credit-Based Authorization. + +3.  Protocol Model + +   The protocol model for HIP support of host multihoming extends the +   model for host mobility described in Section 3 of [RFC8046].  This +   section only highlights the differences. + +   In host multihoming, a host has multiple locators simultaneously +   rather than sequentially, as in the case of mobility.  By using the +   LOCATOR_SET parameter defined in [RFC8046], a host can inform its +   peers of additional (multiple) locators at which it can be reached. +   When multiple locators are available and announced to the peer, a +   host can designate a particular locator as a "preferred" locator, +   meaning that the host prefers that its peer send packets to the +   designated address before trying an alternative address.  Although +   this document defines a basic mechanism for multihoming, it does not +   define all possible policies and procedures, such as which locators +   to choose when more than one is available, the operation of +   simultaneous mobility and multihoming, source address selection +   policies (beyond those specified in [RFC6724]), and the implications +   of multihoming on transport protocols. + +4.  Protocol Overview + +   In this section, we briefly introduce a number of usage scenarios for +   HIP multihoming.  These scenarios assume that HIP is being used with +   the ESP transport [RFC7402], although other scenarios may be defined +   in the future.  To understand these usage scenarios, the reader +   should be at least minimally familiar with the HIP protocol +   specification [RFC7401], the use of the ESP transport format +   [RFC7402], and the HIP mobility specification [RFC8046].  However, +   for the (relatively) uninitiated reader, it is most important to keep +   in mind that in HIP, the actual payload traffic is protected with +   ESP, and that the ESP Security Parameter Index (SPI) acts as an index +   to the right host-to-host context. + + + +Henderson, et al.            Standards Track                    [Page 4] + +RFC 8047                     HIP Multihoming               February 2017 + + +4.1.  Background + +   The multihoming scenarios can be explained in contrast to the +   non-multihoming case described in the base protocol specification +   [RFC7401].  We review the pertinent details here.  In the base +   specification, when used with the ESP transport format, the HIP base +   exchange will set up a single SA in each direction.  The IP addresses +   associated with the SAs are the same as those used to convey the HIP +   packets.  For data traffic, a security policy database (SPD) and +   security association database (SAD) will likely exist, following the +   IPsec architecture.  One distinction between HIP and IPsec, however, +   is that the host IDs, and not the IP addresses, are conceptually used +   as selectors in the SPD.  In the outbound direction, as a result of +   SPD processing, when an outbound SA is selected, the correct IP +   destination address for the peer must also be assigned.  Therefore, +   outbound SAs are conceptually associated with the peer IP address +   that must be used as the destination IP address below the HIP layer. +   In the inbound direction, the IP addresses may be used as selectors +   in the SAD to look up the SA, but they are not strictly required; the +   ESP SPI may be used alone.  To summarize, in the non-multihoming +   case, there is only one source IP address, one destination IP +   address, one inbound SA, and one outbound SA. + +   The HIP readdressing protocol [RFC8046] is an asymmetric protocol in +   which a mobile or multihomed host informs a peer host about changes +   of IP addresses on affected SPIs.  IP address and ESP SPI information +   is carried in Locator fields in a HIP parameter called a LOCATOR_SET. +   The HIP mobility specification [RFC8046] describes how the +   LOCATOR_SET is carried in a HIP UPDATE packet. + +   To summarize the mobility elements of procedure, as background for +   multihoming, the basic idea of host mobility is to communicate a +   local IP address change to the peer when active HIP-maintained SAs +   are in use.  To do so, the IP address must be conveyed, any +   association between the IP address and an inbound SA (via the SPI +   index) may be conveyed, and protection against flooding attacks must +   be ensured.  The association of an IP address with an SPI is +   performed by a Locator Type of "1", which is a concatenation of an +   ESP SPI with an IP address. + +   An address verification method is specified in [RFC8046].  It is +   expected that addresses learned in multihoming scenarios also are +   subject to the same verification rules.  At times, the scenarios +   describe addresses as being in either an ACTIVE, VERIFIED, or +   DEPRECATED state.  From the perspective of a host, newly learned +   addresses of the peer must be verified before put into active + + + + + +Henderson, et al.            Standards Track                    [Page 5] + +RFC 8047                     HIP Multihoming               February 2017 + + +   service, and addresses removed by the peer are put into a deprecated +   state.  Under limited conditions described in [RFC8046], an +   UNVERIFIED address may be used. + +   With this background, we next describe an additional protocol to +   facilitate scenarios in which one or both hosts have multiple IP +   addresses available.  Increasingly, this is the common case with +   network-connected hosts on the Internet. + +4.2.  Usage Scenarios + +4.2.1.  Multiple Addresses + +   Hosts may have multiple IP addresses within different address +   families (IPv4 and IPv6) and scopes available to support HIP +   messaging and HIP-enabled SAs.  The multiple addresses may be on a +   single network interface or multiple network interfaces.  It is +   outside of the scope of this document to specify how a host decides +   which of possibly multiple addresses may be used to support a HIP +   association.  Some IP addresses may be held back from usage due to +   privacy, security, or cost considerations. + +   When multiple IP addresses are shared with a peer, the procedures +   described in the HIP mobility specification [RFC8046] allow for a +   host to set a preferred locator ("P") bit, requesting that one of the +   multiple addresses be preferred for control- or data-plane traffic. +   It is also permitted to leave the preferred bit unset for all +   addresses, allowing the peer to make address selection decisions. + +   Hosts that use link-local addresses as source addresses in their HIP +   handshakes may not be reachable by a mobile peer.  Such hosts SHOULD +   provide a globally routable address either in the initial handshake +   or via the LOCATOR_SET parameter. + +   To support mobility, as described in the HIP mobility specification +   [RFC8046], the LOCATOR_SET may be sent in a HIP UPDATE packet.  To +   support multihoming, the LOCATOR_SET may also be sent in R1, I2, or +   R2 packets defined in the HIP protocol specification [RFC7401].  The +   reason to consider sending LOCATOR_SET parameters in base exchange +   packets is to convey all usable addresses for fault-tolerance or +   load-balancing considerations. + +4.2.2.  Multiple Security Associations + +   When multiple addresses are available between peer hosts, a question +   that arises is whether to use one or multiple SAs.  The intent of +   this specification is to support different use cases but to leave the +   policy decision to the hosts. + + + +Henderson, et al.            Standards Track                    [Page 6] + +RFC 8047                     HIP Multihoming               February 2017 + + +   When one host has n addresses and the other host has m addresses, it +   is possible to set up as many as (n * m) SAs in each direction.  In +   such a case, every combination of source and destination IP addresses +   would have a unique SA, and the possibility of the reordering of +   datagrams on each SA will be lessened (ESP SAs may have an anti- +   replay window [RFC4303] sensitive to reordering).  However, the +   downside to creating a mesh of SAs is the signaling overhead required +   (for exchanging UPDATE messages conveying ESP_INFO parameters) and +   the state maintenance required in the SPD/SAD. + +   For load balancing, when multiple paths are to be used in parallel, +   it may make sense to create different SAs for different paths.  In +   this use case, while a full mesh of 2 * (n * m) SAs may not be +   required, it may be beneficial to create one SA pair per load- +   balanced path to avoid anti-replay window issues. + +   For fault tolerance, it is more likely that a single SA and multiple +   IP addresses associated with that SA can be used, and the alternative +   addresses can be used only upon failure detection of the addresses in +   use.  Techniques for path failure detection are outside the scope of +   this specification.  An implementation may use ICMP interactions, +   reachability checks, or other means to detect the failure of a +   locator. + +   In summary, whether and how a host decides to leverage additional +   addresses in a load-balancing or fault-tolerant manner is outside the +   scope of the specification (although the academic literature on +   multipath TCP schedulers may provide guidance on how to design such a +   policy).  However, in general, this document recommends that for +   fault tolerance, it is likely sufficient to use a single SA pair for +   all addresses, and for load balancing, to support a different SA pair +   for all active paths being balanced across. + +4.2.3.  Host Multihoming for Fault Tolerance + +   A (mobile or stationary) host may have more than one interface or +   global address.  The host may choose to notify the peer host of the +   additional interface or address by using the LOCATOR_SET parameter. +   The LOCATOR_SET parameter may be included in an I2, R1, or R2 packet, +   or it may be conveyed, after the base exchange completes in an UPDATE +   packet. + +   When more than one locator is provided to the peer host, the host MAY +   indicate which locator is preferred (the locator on which the host +   prefers to receive traffic).  By default, the address that a host +   uses in the base exchange is its preferred locator (for the address + + + + + +Henderson, et al.            Standards Track                    [Page 7] + +RFC 8047                     HIP Multihoming               February 2017 + + +   family and address scope in use during the base exchange) until +   indicated otherwise.  It may be the case that the host does not +   express any preferred locators. + +   In the multihoming case, the sender may also have multiple valid +   locators from which to source traffic.  In practice, a HIP +   association in a multihoming configuration may have both a preferred +   peer locator and a preferred local locator.  The host should try to +   use the peer's preferred locator unless policy or other circumstances +   prevent such usage.  A preferred local locator may be overridden if +   source address selection rules on the destination address (peer's +   preferred locator) suggest the use of a different source address. + +   Although the protocol may allow for configurations in which there is +   an asymmetric number of SAs between the hosts (e.g., one host has two +   interfaces and two inbound SAs, while the peer has one interface and +   one inbound SA), it is suggested that inbound and outbound SAs be +   created pairwise between hosts.  When an ESP_INFO arrives to rekey a +   particular outbound SA, the corresponding inbound SA should also be +   rekeyed at that time.  Section 4.3 discusses the interaction between +   addresses and security associations in more detail. + +   Consider the case of two hosts, one single-homed and one multihomed. +   The multihomed host may decide to inform the single-homed host about +   its other address(es).  It may choose to do so as follows. + +   If the multihomed host wishes to convey the additional address(es) +   for fault tolerance, it should include all of its addresses in +   Locator fields, indicating the Traffic Type, Locator Type, and +   whether the locator is a preferred locator.  If it wishes to bind any +   particular address to an existing SPI, it may do so by using a +   Locator Type of "1" as specified in the HIP mobility specification +   [RFC8046].  It does not need to rekey the existing SA or request +   additional SAs at this time. + +   Figure 1 illustrates this scenario.  Note that the conventions for +   message parameter notations in figures (use of parentheses and +   brackets) is defined in Section 2.2 of [RFC7401]. + +     Multihomed Host                     Peer Host + +              UPDATE(LOCATOR_SET, SEQ) +        -----------------------------------> +              UPDATE(ACK) +        <----------------------------------- + +                   Figure 1: Basic Multihoming Scenario + + + + +Henderson, et al.            Standards Track                    [Page 8] + +RFC 8047                     HIP Multihoming               February 2017 + + +   In this scenario, the peer host associates the multiple addresses +   with the SA pair between it and the multihomed host.  It may also +   undergo address verification procedures to transition the addresses +   to ACTIVE state.  For inbound data traffic, it may choose to use the +   addresses along with the SPI as selectors.  For outbound data +   traffic, it must choose among the available addresses of the +   multihomed host, considering the state of address verification +   [RFC8046] of each address, and also considering available information +   about whether an address is in a working state. + +4.2.4.  Host Multihoming for Load Balancing + +   A multihomed host may decide to set up new SA pairs corresponding to +   new addresses, for the purpose of load balancing.  The decision to +   load balance and the mechanism for splitting load across multiple SAs +   is out of scope of this document.  The scenario can be supported by +   sending the LOCATOR_SET parameter with one or more ESP_INFO +   parameters to initiate new ESP SAs.  To do this, the multihomed host +   sends a LOCATOR_SET with an ESP_INFO, indicating the request for a +   new SA by setting the OLD SPI value to zero and the NEW SPI value to +   the newly created incoming SPI.  A Locator Type of "1" is used to +   associate the new address with the new SPI.  The LOCATOR_SET +   parameter also contains a second Type "1" Locator, that of the +   original address and SPI.  To simplify parameter processing and avoid +   explicit protocol extensions to remove locators, each LOCATOR_SET +   parameter MUST list all locators in use on a connection (a complete +   listing of inbound locators and SPIs for the host).  The multihomed +   host waits for a corresponding ESP_INFO (new outbound SA) from the +   peer and an ACK of its own UPDATE.  As in the mobility case, the peer +   host must perform an address verification before actively using the +   new address. + +   Figure 2 illustrates this scenario. + +     Multihomed Host                     Peer Host + +              UPDATE(ESP_INFO, LOCATOR_SET, SEQ, [DIFFIE_HELLMAN]) +        -----------------------------------> +              UPDATE(ESP_INFO, SEQ, ACK, [DIFFIE_HELLMAN,] ECHO_REQUEST) +        <----------------------------------- +              UPDATE(ACK, ECHO_RESPONSE) +        -----------------------------------> + +               Figure 2: Host Multihoming for Load Balancing + +   In multihoming scenarios, it is important that hosts receiving +   UPDATEs associate them correctly with the destination address used in +   the packet carrying the UPDATE.  When processing inbound LOCATOR_SETs + + + +Henderson, et al.            Standards Track                    [Page 9] + +RFC 8047                     HIP Multihoming               February 2017 + + +   that establish new security associations on an interface with +   multiple addresses, a host uses the destination address of the UPDATE +   containing the LOCATOR_SET as the local address to which the +   LOCATOR_SET plus ESP_INFO is targeted.  This is because hosts may +   send UPDATEs with the same (locator) IP address to different peer +   addresses -- this has the effect of creating multiple inbound SAs +   implicitly affiliated with different peer source addresses. + +4.2.5.  Site Multihoming + +   A host may have an interface that has multiple globally routable IP +   addresses.  Such a situation may be a result of the site having +   multiple upper Internet Service Providers, or just because the site +   provides all hosts with both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.  The host +   should stay reachable at all or any subset of the currently available +   global routable addresses, independent of how they are provided. + +   This case is handled the same as if there were different IP +   addresses, described above in Sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.4.  Note that a +   single interface may have addresses corresponding to site multihoming +   while the host itself may also have multiple network interfaces. + +   Note that a host may be multihomed and mobile simultaneously, and +   that a multihomed host may want to protect the location of some of +   its interfaces while revealing the real IP address of some others. + +   This document does not present additional site multihoming extensions +   to HIP; such extensions are for further study. + +4.2.6.  Dual-Host Multihoming + +   Consider the case in which both hosts are multihomed and would like +   to notify the peer of an additional address after the base exchange +   completes.  It may be the case that both hosts choose to simply +   announce the second address in a LOCATOR_SET parameter using an +   UPDATE message exchange.  It may also be the case that one or both +   hosts decide to ask for new SA pairs to be created using the newly +   announced address.  In the case that both hosts request this, the +   result will be a full mesh of SAs as depicted in Figure 3.  In such a +   scenario, consider that host1, which used address addr1a in the base +   exchange to set up SPI1a and SPI2a, wants to add address addr1b.  It +   would send an UPDATE with LOCATOR_SET (containing the address addr1b) +   to host2, using destination address addr2a, and a new ESP_INFO, and a +   new set of SPIs would be added between hosts 1 and 2 (call them SPI1b +   and SPI2b; not shown in the figure).  Next, consider host2 deciding +   to add addr2b to the relationship.  Host2 must select one of host1's +   addresses towards which to initiate an UPDATE.  It may choose to +   initiate an UPDATE to addr1a, addr1b, or both.  If it chooses to send + + + +Henderson, et al.            Standards Track                   [Page 10] + +RFC 8047                     HIP Multihoming               February 2017 + + +   to both, then a full mesh (four SA pairs) of SAs would exist between +   the two hosts.  This is the most general case; the protocol is +   flexible enough to accommodate this choice. + +              -<- SPI1a --                         -- SPI2a ->- +      host1 <              > addr1a <---> addr2a <              > host2 +              ->- SPI2a --                         -- SPI1a -<- + +                             addr1b <---> addr2a  (second SA pair) +                             addr1a <---> addr2b  (third SA pair) +                             addr1b <---> addr2b  (fourth SA pair) + +    Figure 3: Dual-Multihoming Case in which Each Host Uses LOCATOR_SET +                          to Add a Second Address + +4.2.7.  Combined Mobility and Multihoming + +   Mobile hosts may be simultaneously mobile and multihomed, i.e., have +   multiple mobile interfaces.  Furthermore, if the interfaces use +   different access technologies, it is fairly likely that one of the +   interfaces may appear stable (retain its current IP address) while +   some others may experience mobility (undergo IP address change). + +   The use of LOCATOR_SET plus ESP_INFO should be flexible enough to +   handle most such scenarios, although more complicated scenarios have +   not been studied so far. + +4.2.8.  Initiating the Protocol in R1, I2, or R2 + +   A Responder host MAY include a LOCATOR_SET parameter in the R1 packet +   that it sends to the Initiator.  This parameter MUST be protected by +   the R1 signature.  If the R1 packet contains LOCATOR_SET parameters +   with a new preferred locator, the Initiator SHOULD directly set the +   new preferred locator to status ACTIVE without performing address +   verification first, and it MUST send the I2 packet to the new +   preferred locator.  The I1 destination address and the new preferred +   locator may be identical.  All new non-preferred locators must still +   undergo address verification once the base exchange completes.  It is +   also possible for the host to send the LOCATOR_SET without any +   preferred bits set, in which case the exchange will continue as +   normal and the newly learned addresses will be in an UNVERIFIED state +   at the initiator. + + + + + + + + + +Henderson, et al.            Standards Track                   [Page 11] + +RFC 8047                     HIP Multihoming               February 2017 + + +            Initiator                                Responder + +                              R1 with LOCATOR_SET +                  <----------------------------------- +   record additional addresses +   change Responder address +                     I2 sent to newly indicated preferred address +                  -----------------------------------> +                                                     (process normally) +                                  R2 +                  <----------------------------------- +   (process normally, later verification of non-preferred locators) + +                   Figure 4: LOCATOR_SET Inclusion in R1 + +   An Initiator MAY include one or more LOCATOR_SET parameters in the I2 +   packet, independent of whether or not there was a LOCATOR_SET +   parameter in the R1.  These parameters MUST be protected by the I2 +   signature.  Even if the I2 packet contains LOCATOR_SET parameters, +   the Responder MUST still send the R2 packet to the source address of +   the I2.  The new preferred locator, if set, SHOULD be identical to +   the I2 source address.  If the I2 packet contains LOCATOR_SET +   parameters, all new locators must undergo address verification as +   usual, and the ESP traffic that subsequently follows should use the +   preferred locator. + +            Initiator                                Responder + +                             I2 with LOCATOR_SET +                  -----------------------------------> +                                                     (process normally) +                                             record additional addresses +                       R2 sent to source address of I2 +                  <----------------------------------- +   (process normally) + +                   Figure 5: LOCATOR_SET Inclusion in I2 + +   The I1 and I2 may be arriving from different source addresses if the +   LOCATOR_SET parameter is present in R1.  In this case, +   implementations simultaneously using multiple pre-created R1s, +   indexed by Initiator IP addresses, may inadvertently fail the puzzle +   solution of I2 packets due to a perceived puzzle mismatch.  See, for +   instance, the example in Appendix A of [RFC7401].  As a solution, the +   Responder's puzzle indexing mechanism must be flexible enough to +   accommodate the situation when R1 includes a LOCATOR_SET parameter. + + + + + +Henderson, et al.            Standards Track                   [Page 12] + +RFC 8047                     HIP Multihoming               February 2017 + + +   Finally, the R2 may be used to carry the LOCATOR_SET parameter.  In +   this case, the LOCATOR_SET is covered by the HIP_MAC_2 and +   HIP_SIGNATURE.  Including LOCATOR_SET in R2 as opposed to R1 may have +   some advantages when a host prefers not to divulge additional +   locators until after the I2 is successfully processed. + +   When the LOCATOR_SET parameter is sent in an UPDATE packet, the +   receiver will respond with an UPDATE acknowledgment.  When the +   LOCATOR_SET parameter is sent in an R1, I2, or R2 packet, the base +   exchange retransmission mechanism will confirm its successful +   delivery. + +4.2.9.  Using LOCATOR_SETs across Addressing Realms + +   It is possible for HIP associations to use these mechanisms to +   migrate their HIP associations and security associations from +   addresses in the IPv4 addressing realm to IPv6, or vice versa.  It +   may be possible for a state to arise in which both hosts are only +   using locators in different addressing realms, but in such a case, +   some type of mechanism for interworking between the different realms +   must be employed; such techniques are outside the scope of the +   present text. + +4.3.  Interaction with Security Associations + +   A host may establish any number of security associations (or SPIs) +   with a peer.  The main purpose of having multiple SPIs with a peer is +   to group the addresses into collections that are likely to experience +   fate sharing, or to perform load balancing. + +   A basic property of HIP SAs is that the inbound IP address is not +   used to look up the incoming SA.  However, the use of different +   source and destination addresses typically leads to different paths, +   with different latencies in the network, and if packets were to +   arrive via an arbitrary destination IP address (or path) for a given +   SPI, the reordering due to different latencies may cause some packets +   to fall outside of the ESP anti-replay window.  For this reason, HIP +   provides a mechanism to affiliate destination addresses with inbound +   SPIs, when there is a concern that anti-replay windows might be +   violated.  In this sense, we can say that a given inbound SPI has an +   "affinity" for certain inbound IP addresses, and this affinity is +   communicated to the peer host.  Each physical interface SHOULD have a +   separate SA, unless the ESP anti-replay window is extended or +   disabled. + +   Moreover, even when the destination addresses used for a particular +   SPI are held constant, the use of different source interfaces may +   also cause packets to fall outside of the ESP anti-replay window, + + + +Henderson, et al.            Standards Track                   [Page 13] + +RFC 8047                     HIP Multihoming               February 2017 + + +   since the path traversed is often affected by the source address or +   interface used.  A host has no way to influence the source interface +   on which a peer sends its packets on a given SPI.  A host SHOULD +   consistently use the same source interface and address when sending +   to a particular destination IP address and SPI.  For this reason, a +   host may find it useful to change its SPI or at least reset its ESP +   anti-replay window when the peer host readdresses. + +5.  Processing Rules + +   Basic processing rules for the LOCATOR_SET parameter are specified in +   [RFC8046].  This document focuses on multihoming-specific rules. + +5.1.  Sending LOCATOR_SETs + +   The decision of when to send a LOCATOR_SET, and which addresses to +   include, is a local policy issue.  [RFC8046] recommends that a host +   "send a LOCATOR_SET whenever it recognizes a change of its IP +   addresses in use on an active HIP association and [when it] assumes +   that the change is going to last at least for a few seconds."  It is +   possible to delay the exposure of additional locators to the peer, +   and to send data from previously unannounced locators, as might arise +   in certain mobility or multihoming situations. + +   When a host decides to inform its peers about changes in its IP +   addresses, it has to decide how to group the various addresses with +   SPIs.  If hosts are deployed in an operational environment in which +   HIP-aware NATs and firewalls (that may perform parameter inspection) +   exist, and different such devices may exist on different paths, hosts +   may take that knowledge into consideration about how addresses are +   grouped, and may send the same LOCATOR_SET in separate UPDATEs on the +   different paths.  However, more detailed guidelines about how to +   operate in the presence of such HIP-aware NATs and firewalls are a +   topic for further study.  Since each SPI is associated with a +   different security association, the grouping policy may also be based +   on ESP anti-replay protection considerations.  In the typical case, +   simply basing the grouping on actual kernel-level physical and +   logical interfaces may be the best policy.  The grouping policy is +   outside of the scope of this document. + +   Locators corresponding to tunnel interfaces (e.g., IPsec tunnel +   interfaces or Mobile IP home addresses) or other virtual interfaces +   MAY be announced in a LOCATOR_SET, but implementations SHOULD avoid +   announcing such locators as preferred locators if more direct paths +   may be obtained by instead preferring locators from non-tunneling +   interfaces if such locators provide a more direct path to the HIP +   peer. + + + + +Henderson, et al.            Standards Track                   [Page 14] + +RFC 8047                     HIP Multihoming               February 2017 + + +   [RFC8046] specifies that hosts MUST NOT announce broadcast or +   multicast addresses in LOCATOR_SETs.  Link-local addresses MAY be +   announced to peers that are known to be neighbors on the same link, +   such as when the IP destination address of a peer is also link local. +   The announcement of link-local addresses in this case is a policy +   decision; link-local addresses used as preferred locators will create +   reachability problems when the host moves to another link.  In any +   case, link-local addresses MUST NOT be announced to a peer unless +   that peer is known to be on the same link. + +   Once the host has decided on the groups and assignment of addresses +   to the SPIs, it creates a LOCATOR_SET parameter that serves as a +   complete representation of the addresses and associated SPIs intended +   for active use.  We now describe a few cases introduced in Section 4. +   We assume that the Traffic Type for each locator is set to "0" (other +   values for Traffic Type may be specified in documents that separate +   the HIP control plane from data-plane traffic).  Other mobility and +   multihoming cases are possible but are left for further +   experimentation. + +   1.  Host multihoming (addition of an address).  We only describe the +       simple case of adding an additional address to a (previously) +       single-homed, non-mobile host.  The host MAY choose to simply +       announce this address to the peer, for fault tolerance.  To do +       this, the multihomed host creates a LOCATOR_SET parameter +       including the existing address and SPI as a Type "1" Locator, and +       the new address as a Type "0" Locator.  The host sends this in an +       UPDATE message with the SEQ parameter, which is acknowledged by +       the peer. + +   2.  The host MAY set up a new SA pair between this new address and an +       address of the peer host.  To do this, the multihomed host +       creates a new inbound SA and creates a new SPI.  For the outgoing +       UPDATE message, it inserts an ESP_INFO parameter with an OLD SPI +       field of "0", a NEW SPI field corresponding to the new SPI, and a +       KEYMAT Index as selected by local policy.  The host adds to the +       UPDATE message a LOCATOR_SET with two Type "1" Locators: the +       original address and SPI active on the association, and the new +       address and new SPI being added (with the SPI matching the NEW +       SPI contained in the ESP_INFO).  The preferred bit SHOULD be set +       depending on the policy to tell the peer host which of the two +       locators is preferred.  The UPDATE also contains a SEQ parameter +       and optionally a DIFFIE_HELLMAN parameter and follows rekeying +       procedures with respect to this new address.  The UPDATE message +       SHOULD be sent to the peer's preferred address with a source +       address corresponding to the new locator. + + + + + +Henderson, et al.            Standards Track                   [Page 15] + +RFC 8047                     HIP Multihoming               February 2017 + + +   The sending of multiple LOCATOR_SETs is unsupported.  Note that the +   inclusion of LOCATOR_SET in an R1 packet requires the use of Type "0" +   Locators since no SAs are set up at that point. + +5.2.  Handling Received LOCATOR_SETs + +   A host SHOULD be prepared to receive a LOCATOR_SET parameter in the +   following HIP packets: R1, I2, R2, and UPDATE. + +   This document describes sending both ESP_INFO and LOCATOR_SET +   parameters in an UPDATE.  The ESP_INFO parameter is included when +   there is a need to rekey or key a new SPI and can otherwise be +   included for the possible benefit of HIP-aware middleboxes.  The +   LOCATOR_SET parameter contains a complete map of the locators that +   the host wishes to make or keep active for the HIP association. + +   In general, the processing of a LOCATOR_SET depends upon the packet +   type in which it is included.  Here, we describe only the case in +   which ESP_INFO is present and a single LOCATOR_SET and ESP_INFO are +   sent in an UPDATE message; other cases are for further study.  The +   steps below cover each of the cases described in Section 5.1. + +   The processing of ESP_INFO and LOCATOR_SET parameters is intended to +   be modular and support future generalization to the inclusion of +   multiple ESP_INFO and/or multiple LOCATOR_SET parameters.  A host +   SHOULD first process the ESP_INFO before the LOCATOR_SET, since the +   ESP_INFO may contain a new SPI value mapped to an existing SPI, while +   a Type "1" Locator will only contain a reference to the new SPI. + +   When a host receives a validated HIP UPDATE with a LOCATOR_SET and +   ESP_INFO parameter, it processes the ESP_INFO as follows.  The +   ESP_INFO parameter indicates whether an SA is being rekeyed, created, +   deprecated, or just identified for the benefit of middleboxes.  The +   host examines the OLD SPI and NEW SPI values in the ESP_INFO +   parameter: + +   1.  (no rekeying) If the OLD SPI is equal to the NEW SPI and both +       correspond to an existing SPI, the ESP_INFO is gratuitous +       (provided for middleboxes), and no rekeying is necessary. + +   2.  (rekeying) If the OLD SPI indicates an existing SPI and the NEW +       SPI is a different non-zero value, the existing SA is being +       rekeyed and the host follows HIP ESP rekeying procedures by +       creating a new outbound SA with an SPI corresponding to the NEW +       SPI, with no addresses bound to this SPI.  Note that locators in +       the LOCATOR_SET parameter will reference this new SPI instead of +       the old SPI. + + + + +Henderson, et al.            Standards Track                   [Page 16] + +RFC 8047                     HIP Multihoming               February 2017 + + +   3.  (new SA) If the OLD SPI value is zero and the NEW SPI is a new +       non-zero value, then a new SA is being requested by the peer. +       This case is also treated like a rekeying event; the receiving +       host must create a new SA and respond with an UPDATE ACK. + +   4.  (deprecating the SA) If the OLD SPI indicates an existing SPI and +       the NEW SPI is zero, the SA is being deprecated and all locators +       uniquely bound to the SPI are put into the DEPRECATED state. + +   If none of the above cases apply, a protocol error has occurred and +   the processing of the UPDATE is stopped. + +   Next, the locators in the LOCATOR_SET parameter are processed.  For +   each locator listed in the LOCATOR_SET parameter, check that the +   address therein is a legal unicast or anycast address.  That is, the +   address MUST NOT be a broadcast or multicast address.  Note that some +   implementations MAY accept addresses that indicate the local host, +   since it may be allowed that the host runs HIP with itself. + +   For each Type "1" address listed in the LOCATOR_SET parameter, the +   host checks whether the address is already bound to the SPI +   indicated.  If the address is already bound, its lifetime is updated. +   If the status of the address is DEPRECATED, the status is changed to +   UNVERIFIED.  If the address is not already bound, the address is +   added, and its status is set to UNVERIFIED.  If there exist remaining +   addresses corresponding to the SPI that were NOT listed in the +   LOCATOR_SET parameter, the host sets the status of such addresses to +   DEPRECATED. + +   For each Type "0" address listed in the LOCATOR_SET parameter, if the +   status of the address is DEPRECATED, or the address was not +   previously known, the status is changed to UNVERIFIED.  The host MAY +   choose to associate this address with one or more SAs.  The +   association with different SAs is a local policy decision, unless the +   peer has indicated that the address is preferred, in which case the +   address should be put into use on an SA that is prioritized in the +   security policy database. + +   As a result, at the end of processing, the addresses listed in the +   LOCATOR_SET parameter have a state of either UNVERIFIED or ACTIVE, +   and any old addresses on the old SA not listed in the LOCATOR_SET +   parameter have a state of DEPRECATED. + +   Once the host has processed the locators, if the LOCATOR_SET +   parameter contains a new preferred locator, the host SHOULD initiate +   a change of the preferred locator.  This requires that the host first +   verifies reachability of the associated address and only then changes +   the preferred locator; see Section 5.4. + + + +Henderson, et al.            Standards Track                   [Page 17] + +RFC 8047                     HIP Multihoming               February 2017 + + +   If a host receives a locator with an unsupported Locator Type, and +   when such a locator is also declared to be the preferred locator for +   the peer, the host SHOULD send a NOTIFY error with a Notify Message +   Type of LOCATOR_TYPE_UNSUPPORTED, with the Notification Data field +   containing the locator(s) that the receiver failed to process. +   Otherwise, a host MAY send a NOTIFY error if a (non-preferred) +   locator with an unsupported Locator Type is received in a LOCATOR_SET +   parameter. + +5.3.  Verifying Address Reachability + +   Address verification is defined in [RFC8046]. + +   When address verification is in progress for a new preferred locator, +   the host SHOULD select a different locator listed as ACTIVE, if one +   such locator is available, to continue communications until address +   verification completes.  Alternatively, the host MAY use the new +   preferred locator while in UNVERIFIED status to the extent Credit- +   Based Authorization permits.  Credit-Based Authorization is explained +   in [RFC8046].  Once address verification succeeds, the status of the +   new preferred locator changes to ACTIVE. + +5.4.  Changing the Preferred Locator + +   A host MAY want to change the preferred outgoing locator for +   different reasons, e.g., because traffic information or ICMP error +   messages indicate that the currently used preferred address may have +   become unreachable.  Another reason may be due to receiving a +   LOCATOR_SET parameter that has the preferred bit set. + +   To change the preferred locator, the host initiates the following +   procedure: + +   1.  If the new preferred locator has ACTIVE status, the preferred +       locator is changed and the procedure succeeds. + +   2.  If the new preferred locator has UNVERIFIED status, the host +       starts to verify its reachability.  The host SHOULD use a +       different locator listed as ACTIVE until address verification +       completes if one such locator is available.  Alternatively, the +       host MAY use the new preferred locator, even though in UNVERIFIED +       status, to the extent Credit-Based Authorization permits.  Once +       address verification succeeds, the status of the new preferred +       locator changes to ACTIVE, and its use is no longer governed by +       Credit-Based Authorization. + + + + + + +Henderson, et al.            Standards Track                   [Page 18] + +RFC 8047                     HIP Multihoming               February 2017 + + +   3.  If the peer host has not indicated a preference for any address, +       then the host picks one of the peer's ACTIVE addresses randomly +       or according to policy.  This case may arise if, for example, +       ICMP error messages that deprecate the preferred locator arrive, +       but the peer has not yet indicated a new preferred locator. + +   4.  If the new preferred locator has DEPRECATED status and there is +       at least one non-deprecated address, the host selects one of the +       non-deprecated addresses as a new preferred locator and +       continues.  If the selected address is UNVERIFIED, the address +       verification procedure described above will apply. + +6.  Security Considerations + +   This document extends the scope of host mobility solutions defined in +   [RFC8046] to also include host multihoming, and as a result, many of +   the same security considerations for mobility also pertain to +   multihoming.  In particular, [RFC8046] describes how HIP host +   mobility is resistant to different types of impersonation attacks and +   denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. + +   The security considerations for this document are similar to those of +   [RFC8046] because the strong authentication capabilities for mobility +   also carry over to end-host multihoming.  [RFC4218] provides a threat +   analysis for IPv6 multihoming, and the remainder of this section +   first describes how HIP host multihoming addresses those previously +   described threats, and then it discusses some additional security +   considerations. + +   The high-level threats discussed in [RFC4218] involve redirection +   attacks for the purposes of packet recording, data manipulation, and +   availability.  There are a few types of attackers to consider: +   on-path attackers, off-path attackers, and malicious hosts. + +   [RFC4218] also makes the comment that in identifier/locator split +   solutions such as HIP, application security mechanisms should be tied +   to the identifier, not the locator, and attacks on the identifier +   mechanism and on the mechanism binding locators to the identifier are +   of concern.  This document does not consider the former issue +   (application-layer security bindings) to be within scope.  The latter +   issue (locator bindings to identifier) is directly addressed by the +   cryptographic protections of the HIP protocol, in that locators +   associated to an identifier are listed in HIP packets that are signed +   using the identifier key. + +   Section 3.1 of [RFC4218] lists several classes of security +   configurations in use in the Internet.  HIP maps to the fourth +   (strong identifier) and fifth ("leap-of-faith") categories, the + + + +Henderson, et al.            Standards Track                   [Page 19] + +RFC 8047                     HIP Multihoming               February 2017 + + +   latter being associated with the optional opportunistic mode of HIP +   operation.  The remainder of Section 3 describes existing security +   problems in the Internet and comments that the goal of a multihoming +   solution is not to solve them specifically but rather not to make any +   of them worse.  HIP multihoming should not increase the severity of +   the identified risks.  One concern for both HIP mobility and +   multihoming is the susceptibility of the mechanisms to misuse +   flooding-based redirections due to a malicious host.  The mechanisms +   described in [RFC8046] for address verification are important in this +   regard. + +   Regarding the new types of threats introduced by multihoming +   (Section 4 of [RFC4218]), HIP multihoming should not introduce new +   concerns.  Classic and premeditated redirection are prevented by the +   strong authentication in HIP messages.  Third-party DoS attacks are +   prevented by the address verification mechanism.  Replay attacks can +   be avoided via use of replay protection in ESP SAs.  In addition, +   accepting packets from unknown locators is protected by either the +   strong authentication in the HIP control packets or by the ESP-based +   encryption in use for data packets. + +   The HIP mechanisms are designed to limit the ability to introduce DoS +   on the mechanisms themselves (Section 7 of [RFC4218]).  Care is taken +   in the HIP base exchange to avoid creating state or performing much +   work before hosts can authenticate one another.  A malicious host +   involved in HIP multihoming with another host might attempt to misuse +   the mechanisms for multihoming by, for instance, increasing the state +   required or inducing a resource limitation attack by sending too many +   candidate locators to the peer host.  Therefore, implementations +   supporting the multihoming extensions should consider avoiding +   accepting large numbers of peer locators and rate limiting any UPDATE +   messages being exchanged. + +   The exposure of a host's IP addresses through HIP mobility and +   multihoming extensions may raise the following privacy concern.  The +   administrator of a host may be trying to hide its location in some +   context through the use of a VPN or other virtual interfaces. +   Similar privacy issues also arise in other frameworks such as WebRTC +   and are not specific to HIP.  Implementations SHOULD provide a +   mechanism to allow the host administrator to block the exposure of +   selected addresses or address ranges. + +   Finally, some implementations of VPN tunneling have experienced +   instances of 'leakage' of flows that were intended to have been +   protected by a security tunnel but are instead sent in the clear, +   perhaps because some of the addresses used fall outside of the range +   of addresses configured for the tunnel in the security policy or +   association database.  Implementors are advised to take steps to + + + +Henderson, et al.            Standards Track                   [Page 20] + +RFC 8047                     HIP Multihoming               February 2017 + + +   ensure that the usage of multiple addresses between hosts does not +   cause accidental leakage of some data session traffic outside of the +   ESP-protected envelope. + +7.  References + +7.1.  Normative References + +   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate +              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, +              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, +              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. + +   [RFC6724]  Thaler, D., Ed., Draves, R., Matsumoto, A., and T. Chown, +              "Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol Version 6 +              (IPv6)", RFC 6724, DOI 10.17487/RFC6724, September 2012, +              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6724>. + +   [RFC7401]  Moskowitz, R., Ed., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T. +              Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)", +              RFC 7401, DOI 10.17487/RFC7401, April 2015, +              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7401>. + +   [RFC7402]  Jokela, P., Moskowitz, R., and J. Melen, "Using the +              Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Transport Format with +              the Host Identity Protocol (HIP)", RFC 7402, +              DOI 10.17487/RFC7402, April 2015, +              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7402>. + +   [RFC8046]  Henderson, T., Ed., Vogt, C., and J. Arkko, "Host Mobility +              with the Host Identity Protocol", RFC 8046, +              DOI 10.17487/RFC8046, February 2017, +              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8046>. + +7.2.  Informative References + +   [RFC4218]  Nordmark, E. and T. Li, "Threats Relating to IPv6 +              Multihoming Solutions", RFC 4218, DOI 10.17487/RFC4218, +              October 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4218>. + +   [RFC4303]  Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", +              RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005, +              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>. + +   [RFC5533]  Nordmark, E. and M. Bagnulo, "Shim6: Level 3 Multihoming +              Shim Protocol for IPv6", RFC 5533, DOI 10.17487/RFC5533, +              June 2009, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5533>. + + + + +Henderson, et al.            Standards Track                   [Page 21] + +RFC 8047                     HIP Multihoming               February 2017 + + +Acknowledgments + +   This document contains content that was originally included in RFC +   5206.  Pekka Nikander and Jari Arkko originated RFC 5206, and +   Christian Vogt and Thomas Henderson (editor) later joined as +   coauthors.  Also in RFC 5206, Greg Perkins contributed the initial +   draft of the security section, and Petri Jokela was a coauthor of the +   initial individual submission. + +   The authors thank Miika Komu, Mika Kousa, Jeff Ahrenholz, and Jan +   Melen for many improvements to the document.  Concepts from a paper +   on host multihoming across address families, by Samu Varjonen, Miika +   Komu, and Andrei Gurtov, contributed to this revised specification. + +Authors' Addresses + +   Thomas R. Henderson (editor) +   University of Washington +   Campus Box 352500 +   Seattle, WA +   United States of America + +   Email: tomhend@u.washington.edu + + +   Christian Vogt +   Independent +   3473 North First Street +   San Jose, CA  95134 +   United States of America + +   Email: mail@christianvogt.net + + +   Jari Arkko +   Ericsson +   Jorvas,  FIN-02420 +   Finland + +   Phone: +358 40 5079256 +   Email: jari.arkko@piuha.net + + + + + + + + + + +Henderson, et al.            Standards Track                   [Page 22] +  |