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author | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
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committer | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
commit | 4bfd864f10b68b71482b35c818559068ef8d5797 (patch) | |
tree | e3989f47a7994642eb325063d46e8f08ffa681dc /doc/rfc/rfc8064.txt | |
parent | ea76e11061bda059ae9f9ad130a9895cc85607db (diff) |
doc: Add RFC documents
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diff --git a/doc/rfc/rfc8064.txt b/doc/rfc/rfc8064.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c4037e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/rfc/rfc8064.txt @@ -0,0 +1,507 @@ + + + + + + +Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) F. Gont +Request for Comments: 8064 SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH +Updates: 2464, 2467, 2470, 2491, 2492, A. Cooper + 2497, 2590, 3146, 3572, 4291, Cisco + 4338, 4391, 5072, 5121 D. Thaler +Category: Standards Track Microsoft +ISSN: 2070-1721 W. Liu + Huawei Technologies + February 2017 + + + Recommendation on Stable IPv6 Interface Identifiers + +Abstract + + This document changes the recommended default Interface Identifier + (IID) generation scheme for cases where Stateless Address + Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) is used to generate a stable IPv6 address. + It recommends using the mechanism specified in RFC 7217 in such + cases, and recommends against embedding stable link-layer addresses + in IPv6 IIDs. It formally updates RFC 2464, RFC 2467, RFC 2470, RFC + 2491, RFC 2492, RFC 2497, RFC 2590, RFC 3146, RFC 3572, RFC 4291, RFC + 4338, RFC 4391, RFC 5072, and RFC 5121. This document does not + change any existing recommendations concerning the use of temporary + addresses as specified in RFC 4941. + +Status of This Memo + + This is an Internet Standards Track document. + + This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force + (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has + received public review and has been approved for publication by the + Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on + Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841. + + Information about the current status of this document, any errata, + and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at + http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8064. + + + + + + + + + + + + +Gont, et al. Standards Track [Page 1] + +RFC 8064 Default Interface Identifiers February 2017 + + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the + document authors. All rights reserved. + + This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal + Provisions Relating to IETF Documents + (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of + publication of this document. Please review these documents + carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect + to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must + include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of + the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as + described in the Simplified BSD License. + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 + 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 3. Generation of IPv6 Interface Identifiers with SLAAC . . . . . 5 + 4. Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 + Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Gont, et al. Standards Track [Page 2] + +RFC 8064 Default Interface Identifiers February 2017 + + +1. Introduction + + [RFC4862] specifies Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) for + IPv6 [RFC2460], which typically results in hosts configuring one or + more "stable" addresses composed of a network prefix advertised by a + local router, and an Interface Identifier (IID) [RFC4291] that + typically embeds a stable link-layer address (e.g., an IEEE LAN MAC + address). + + In some network technologies and adaptation layers, the use of an IID + based on a link-layer address may offer some advantages. For + example, [RFC6282] allows for the compression of IPv6 datagrams over + IEEE 802.15.4-based networks [RFC4944] when the IID is based on the + underlying link-layer address. + + The security and privacy implications of embedding a stable link- + layer address in an IPv6 IID have been known for some time now and + are discussed in great detail in [RFC7721]. They include: + + o Network-activity correlation + + o Location tracking + + o Address scanning + + o Device-specific vulnerability exploitation + + More generally, the reuse of identifiers that have their own + semantics or properties across different contexts or scopes can be + detrimental for security and privacy [NUM-IDS]. In the case of + traditional stable IPv6 IIDs, some of the security and privacy + implications are dependent on the properties of the underlying link- + layer addresses (e.g., whether the link-layer address is ephemeral or + randomly generated), while other implications (e.g., reduction of the + entropy of the IID) depend on the algorithm for generating the IID + itself. In standardized recommendations for stable IPv6 IID + generation meant to achieve particular security and privacy + properties, it is necessary to recommend against embedding stable + link-layer addresses in IPv6 IIDs. + + Furthermore, some popular IPv6 implementations have already deviated + from the traditional stable IID generation scheme to mitigate the + aforementioned security and privacy implications [Microsoft]. + + As a result of the aforementioned issues, this document changes the + recommended default IID generation scheme for generating stable IPv6 + addresses with SLAAC to that specified in [RFC7217] and recommends + against embedding stable link-layer addresses in IPv6 Interface + + + +Gont, et al. Standards Track [Page 3] + +RFC 8064 Default Interface Identifiers February 2017 + + + Identifiers, such that the aforementioned issues are mitigated. That + is, this document simply replaces the default algorithm that is + recommended to be employed when generating stable IPv6 IIDs. + + NOTE: + [RFC4291] defines the "Modified EUI-64 format" for IIDs. + Appendix A of [RFC4291] then describes how to transform an IEEE + EUI-64 identifier, or an IEEE 802 48-bit MAC address from which an + EUI-64 identifier is derived, into an IID in the Modified EUI-64 + format. + + In a variety of scenarios, addresses that remain stable for the + lifetime of a host's connection to a single subnet are viewed as + desirable. For example, stable addresses may be viewed as beneficial + for network management, event logging, enforcement of access control, + provision of quality of service, or for server or router interfaces. + Similarly, stable addresses (as opposed to temporary addresses + [RFC4941]) allow for long-lived TCP connections and are also usually + desirable when performing server-like functions (i.e., receiving + incoming connections). + + The recommendations in this document apply only in cases where + implementations otherwise would have configured a stable IPv6 IID + containing a link-layer address. For example, this document does not + change any existing recommendations concerning the use of temporary + addresses as specified in [RFC4941] and the recommendations do not + apply to cases where SLAAC is employed to generate non-stable IPv6 + addresses (e.g., by embedding a link-layer address that is + periodically randomized); in addition, this document does not + introduce any new requirements regarding when stable addresses are to + be configured. Thus, the recommendations in this document simply + improve the security and privacy properties of stable addresses. + +2. Terminology + + Stable address: + An address that does not vary over time within the same network + (as defined in [RFC7721]). + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this + document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. + + + + + + + + + +Gont, et al. Standards Track [Page 4] + +RFC 8064 Default Interface Identifiers February 2017 + + +3. Generation of IPv6 Interface Identifiers with SLAAC + + Nodes SHOULD implement and employ [RFC7217] as the default scheme for + generating stable IPv6 addresses with SLAAC. A link layer MAY also + define a mechanism for stable IPv6 address generation that is more + efficient and does not address the security and privacy + considerations discussed in Section 1. The choice of whether or not + to enable the security- and privacy-preserving mechanism SHOULD be + configurable in such a case. + + By default, nodes SHOULD NOT employ IPv6 address generation schemes + that embed a stable link-layer address in the IID. In particular, + this document RECOMMENDS that nodes do not generate stable IIDs with + the schemes specified in [RFC2464], [RFC2467], [RFC2470], [RFC2491], + [RFC2492], [RFC2497], [RFC2590], [RFC3146], [RFC3572], [RFC4338], + [RFC4391], [RFC5072], and [RFC5121]. + +4. Future Work + + At the time of this writing, the mechanisms specified in the + following documents might require updates to be fully compatible with + the recommendations in this document: + + o "Compression Format for IPv6 Datagrams over IEEE 802.15.4-Based + Networks" [RFC6282] + + o "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4 Networks" + [RFC4944] + + o "Neighbor Discovery Optimization for IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless + Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs)" [RFC6775] + + o "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over ITU-T G.9959 Networks" + [RFC7428] + + Future revisions or updates of these documents should consider the + issues of privacy and security mentioned in Section 1 and explain any + design and engineering considerations that lead to the use of stable + IIDs based on a node's link-layer address. + +5. Security Considerations + + This document recommends against the (default) use of predictable + Interface Identifiers in IPv6 addresses. It recommends [RFC7217] as + the default scheme for generating IPv6 stable addresses with SLAAC, + such that the security and privacy issues of IIDs that embed stable + link-layer addresses are mitigated. + + + + +Gont, et al. Standards Track [Page 5] + +RFC 8064 Default Interface Identifiers February 2017 + + +6. References + +6.1. Normative References + + [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, + DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. + + [RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 + (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, DOI 10.17487/RFC2460, + December 1998, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2460>. + + [RFC2464] Crawford, M., "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over Ethernet + Networks", RFC 2464, DOI 10.17487/RFC2464, December 1998, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2464>. + + [RFC2467] Crawford, M., "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over FDDI + Networks", RFC 2467, DOI 10.17487/RFC2467, December 1998, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2467>. + + [RFC2470] Crawford, M., Narten, T., and S. Thomas, "Transmission of + IPv6 Packets over Token Ring Networks", RFC 2470, + DOI 10.17487/RFC2470, December 1998, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2470>. + + [RFC2491] Armitage, G., Schulter, P., Jork, M., and G. Harter, + "IPv6 over Non-Broadcast Multiple Access (NBMA) + networks", RFC 2491, DOI 10.17487/RFC2491, January 1999, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2491>. + + [RFC2492] Armitage, G., Schulter, P., and M. Jork, "IPv6 over ATM + Networks", RFC 2492, DOI 10.17487/RFC2492, January 1999, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2492>. + + [RFC2497] Souvatzis, I., "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over ARCnet + Networks", RFC 2497, DOI 10.17487/RFC2497, January 1999, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2497>. + + [RFC2590] Conta, A., Malis, A., and M. Mueller, "Transmission of + IPv6 Packets over Frame Relay Networks Specification", + RFC 2590, DOI 10.17487/RFC2590, May 1999, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2590>. + + [RFC3146] Fujisawa, K. and A. Onoe, "Transmission of IPv6 Packets + over IEEE 1394 Networks", RFC 3146, DOI 10.17487/RFC3146, + October 2001, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3146>. + + + + +Gont, et al. Standards Track [Page 6] + +RFC 8064 Default Interface Identifiers February 2017 + + + [RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing + Architecture", RFC 4291, DOI 10.17487/RFC4291, February + 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4291>. + + [RFC4338] DeSanti, C., Carlson, C., and R. Nixon, "Transmission of + IPv6, IPv4, and Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) Packets + over Fibre Channel", RFC 4338, DOI 10.17487/RFC4338, + January 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4338>. + + [RFC4391] Chu, J. and V. Kashyap, "Transmission of IP over + InfiniBand (IPoIB)", RFC 4391, DOI 10.17487/RFC4391, + April 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4391>. + + [RFC4862] Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless + Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862, + DOI 10.17487/RFC4862, September 2007, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4862>. + + [RFC4941] Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy + Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in + IPv6", RFC 4941, DOI 10.17487/RFC4941, September 2007, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4941>. + + [RFC4944] Montenegro, G., Kushalnagar, N., Hui, J., and D. Culler, + "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4 + Networks", RFC 4944, DOI 10.17487/RFC4944, September + 2007, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4944>. + + [RFC5072] Varada, S., Ed., Haskins, D., and E. Allen, "IP Version 6 + over PPP", RFC 5072, DOI 10.17487/RFC5072, September + 2007, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5072>. + + [RFC5121] Patil, B., Xia, F., Sarikaya, B., Choi, JH., and S. + Madanapalli, "Transmission of IPv6 via the IPv6 + Convergence Sublayer over IEEE 802.16 Networks", + RFC 5121, DOI 10.17487/RFC5121, February 2008, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5121>. + + [RFC6282] Hui, J., Ed. and P. Thubert, "Compression Format for IPv6 + Datagrams over IEEE 802.15.4-Based Networks", RFC 6282, + DOI 10.17487/RFC6282, September 2011, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6282>. + + [RFC6775] Shelby, Z., Ed., Chakrabarti, S., Nordmark, E., and C. + Bormann, "Neighbor Discovery Optimization for IPv6 over + Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs)", + RFC 6775, DOI 10.17487/RFC6775, November 2012, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6775>. + + + +Gont, et al. Standards Track [Page 7] + +RFC 8064 Default Interface Identifiers February 2017 + + + [RFC7217] Gont, F., "A Method for Generating Semantically Opaque + Interface Identifiers with IPv6 Stateless Address + Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)", RFC 7217, + DOI 10.17487/RFC7217, April 2014, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7217>. + + [RFC7428] Brandt, A. and J. Buron, "Transmission of IPv6 Packets + over ITU-T G.9959 Networks", RFC 7428, + DOI 10.17487/RFC7428, February 2015, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7428>. + +6.2. Informative References + + [Microsoft] Davies, J., "Understanding IPv6, 3rd. ed", + page 83, Microsoft Press, 2012, + <http://it-ebooks.info/book/1022/>. + + [NUM-IDS] Gont, F. and I. Arce, "Security and Privacy Implications + of Numeric Identifiers Employed in Network Protocols", + Work in Progress, February 2016. + + [RFC3572] Ogura, T., Maruyama, M., and T. Yoshida, "Internet + Protocol Version 6 over MAPOS (Multiple Access Protocol + Over SONET/SDH)", RFC 3572, DOI 10.17487/RFC3572, July + 2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3572>. + + [RFC7721] Cooper, A., Gont, F., and D. Thaler, "Security and + Privacy Considerations for IPv6 Address Generation + Mechanisms", RFC 7721, DOI 10.17487/RFC7721, March 2016, + <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7721>. + +Acknowledgements + + The authors would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Bob Hinden, + Ray Hunter, and Erik Nordmark, for providing a detailed review of + this document. + + The authors would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Fred Baker, + Carsten Bormann, Scott Brim, Brian Carpenter, Samita Chakrabarti, Tim + Chown, Lorenzo Colitti, Jean-Michel Combes, Greg Daley, Esko Dijk, + Ralph Droms, David Farmer, Brian Haberman, Ulrich Herberg, Philip + Homburg, Jahangir Hossain, Jonathan Hui, Christian Huitema, Ray + Hunter, Erik Kline, Sheng Jiang, Roger Jorgensen, Dan Luedtke, Kerry + Lynn, George Mitchel, Gabriel Montenegro, Erik Nordmark, Simon + Perreault, Tom Petch, Alexandru Petrescu, Michael Richardson, Arturo + Servin, Mark Smith, Tom Taylor, Ole Troan, Tina Tsou, Glen Turner, + Randy Turner, James Woodyatt, and Juan Carlos Zuniga, for providing + valuable comments on earlier draft versions of this document. + + + +Gont, et al. Standards Track [Page 8] + +RFC 8064 Default Interface Identifiers February 2017 + + +Authors' Addresses + + Fernando Gont + SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH + Evaristo Carriego 2644 + Haedo, Provincia de Buenos Aires 1706 + Argentina + + Phone: +54 11 4650 8472 + Email: fgont@si6networks.com + URI: https://www.si6networks.com + + + Alissa Cooper + Cisco + 707 Tasman Drive + Milpitas, CA 95035 + United States of America + + Phone: +1-408-902-3950 + Email: alcoop@cisco.com + URI: https://www.cisco.com/ + + + Dave Thaler + Microsoft + Microsoft Corporation + One Microsoft Way + Redmond, WA 98052 + + Phone: +1 425 703 8835 + Email: dthaler@microsoft.com + + + Will (Shucheng) Liu + Huawei Technologies + Bantian, Longgang District + Shenzhen 518129 + China + + Email: liushucheng@huawei.com + + + + + + + + + + +Gont, et al. Standards Track [Page 9] + |