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author | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
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committer | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
commit | 4bfd864f10b68b71482b35c818559068ef8d5797 (patch) | |
tree | e3989f47a7994642eb325063d46e8f08ffa681dc /doc/rfc/rfc8313.txt | |
parent | ea76e11061bda059ae9f9ad130a9895cc85607db (diff) |
doc: Add RFC documents
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diff --git a/doc/rfc/rfc8313.txt b/doc/rfc/rfc8313.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c46b84f --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/rfc/rfc8313.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2467 @@ + + + + + + +Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) P. Tarapore, Ed. +Request for Comments: 8313 R. Sayko +BCP: 213 AT&T +Category: Best Current Practice G. Shepherd +ISSN: 2070-1721 Cisco + T. Eckert, Ed. + Huawei + R. Krishnan + SupportVectors + January 2018 + + + Use of Multicast across Inter-domain Peering Points + +Abstract + + This document examines the use of Source-Specific Multicast (SSM) + across inter-domain peering points for a specified set of deployment + scenarios. The objectives are to (1) describe the setup process for + multicast-based delivery across administrative domains for these + scenarios and (2) document supporting functionality to enable this + process. + +Status of This Memo + + This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice. + + This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force + (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has + received public review and has been approved for publication by the + Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on + BCPs is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841. + + Information about the current status of this document, any errata, + and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at + https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8313. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 1] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the + document authors. All rights reserved. + + This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal + Provisions Relating to IETF Documents + (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of + publication of this document. Please review these documents + carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect + to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must + include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of + the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as + described in the Simplified BSD License. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 2] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction ....................................................4 + 2. Overview of Inter-domain Multicast Application Transport ........6 + 3. Inter-domain Peering Point Requirements for Multicast ...........7 + 3.1. Native Multicast ...........................................8 + 3.2. Peering Point Enabled with GRE Tunnel .....................10 + 3.3. Peering Point Enabled with AMT - Both Domains + Multicast Enabled .........................................12 + 3.4. Peering Point Enabled with AMT - AD-2 Not + Multicast Enabled .........................................14 + 3.5. AD-2 Not Multicast Enabled - Multiple AMT Tunnels + through AD-2 ..............................................16 + 4. Functional Guidelines ..........................................18 + 4.1. Network Interconnection Transport Guidelines ..............18 + 4.1.1. Bandwidth Management ...............................19 + 4.2. Routing Aspects and Related Guidelines ....................20 + 4.2.1. Native Multicast Routing Aspects ...................21 + 4.2.2. GRE Tunnel over Interconnecting Peering Point ......22 + 4.2.3. Routing Aspects with AMT Tunnels ...................22 + 4.2.4. Public Peering Routing Aspects .....................24 + 4.3. Back-Office Functions - Provisioning and Logging + Guidelines ................................................26 + 4.3.1. Provisioning Guidelines ............................26 + 4.3.2. Inter-domain Authentication Guidelines .............28 + 4.3.3. Log-Management Guidelines ..........................28 + 4.4. Operations - Service Performance and Monitoring + Guidelines ................................................30 + 4.5. Client Reliability Models / Service Assurance Guidelines ..32 + 4.6. Application Accounting Guidelines .........................32 + 5. Troubleshooting and Diagnostics ................................32 + 6. Security Considerations ........................................33 + 6.1. DoS Attacks (against State and Bandwidth) .................33 + 6.2. Content Security ..........................................35 + 6.3. Peering Encryption ........................................37 + 6.4. Operational Aspects .......................................37 + 7. Privacy Considerations .........................................39 + 8. IANA Considerations ............................................40 + 9. References .....................................................40 + 9.1. Normative References ......................................40 + 9.2. Informative References ....................................42 + Acknowledgments ...................................................43 + Authors' Addresses ................................................44 + + + + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 3] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + +1. Introduction + + Content and data from several types of applications (e.g., live video + streaming, software downloads) are well suited for delivery via + multicast means. The use of multicast for delivering such content or + other data offers significant savings in terms of utilization of + resources in any given administrative domain. End User (EU) demand + for such content or other data is growing. Often, this requires + transporting the content or other data across administrative domains + via inter-domain peering points. + + The objectives of this document are twofold: + + o Describe the technical process and establish guidelines for + setting up multicast-based delivery of application content or + other data across inter-domain peering points via a set of + use cases (where "Use Case 3.1" corresponds to Section 3.1, + "Use Case 3.2" corresponds to Section 3.2, etc.). + + o Catalog all required exchanges of information between the + administrative domains to support multicast-based delivery. This + enables operators to initiate necessary processes to support + inter-domain peering with multicast. + + The scope and assumptions for this document are as follows: + + o Administrative Domain 1 (AD-1) sources content to one or more EUs + in one or more Administrative Domain 2 (AD-2) entities. AD-1 and + AD-2 want to use IP multicast to allow support for large and + growing EU populations, with a minimum amount of duplicated + traffic to send across network links. + + * This document does not detail the case where EUs are + originating content. To support that additional service, it is + recommended that some method (outside the scope of this + document) be used by which the content from EUs is transmitted + to the application in AD-1 and AD-1 can send out the traffic as + IP multicast. From that point on, the descriptions in this + document apply, except that they are not complete because they + do not cover the transport or operational aspects of the leg + from the EU to AD-1. + + * This document does not detail the case where AD-1 and AD-2 are + not directly connected to each other and are instead connected + via one or more other ADs (as opposed to a peering point) that + serve as transit providers. The cases described in this + document where tunnels are used between AD-1 and AD-2 can be + applied to such scenarios, but SLA ("Service Level Agreement") + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 4] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + + control, for example, would be different. Additional issues + will likely exist as well in such scenarios. This topic is + left for further study. + + o For the purposes of this document, the term "peering point" refers + to a network connection ("link") between two administrative + network domains over which traffic is exchanged between them. + This is also referred to as a Network-to-Network Interface (NNI). + Unless otherwise noted, it is assumed that the peering point is a + private peering point, where the network connection is a + physically or virtually isolated network connection solely between + AD-1 and AD-2. The other case is that of a broadcast peering + point, which is a common option in public Internet Exchange Points + (IXPs). See Section 4.2.4 for more details. + + o AD-1 is enabled with native multicast. A peering point exists + between AD-1 and AD-2. + + o It is understood that several protocols are available for this + purpose, including Protocol-Independent Multicast - Sparse Mode + (PIM-SM) and Protocol-Independent Multicast - Source-Specific + Multicast (PIM-SSM) [RFC7761], the Internet Group Management + Protocol (IGMP) [RFC3376], and Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) + [RFC3810]. + + o As described in Section 2, the source IP address of the (so-called + "(S,G)") multicast stream in the originating AD (AD-1) is known. + Under this condition, using PIM-SSM is beneficial, as it allows + the receiver's upstream router to send a join message directly to + the source without the need to invoke an intermediate Rendezvous + Point (RP). The use of SSM also presents an improved threat + mitigation profile against attack, as described in [RFC4609]. + Hence, in the case of inter-domain peering, it is recommended that + only SSM protocols be used; the setup of inter-domain peering for + ASM (Any-Source Multicast) is out of scope for this document. + + o The rest of this document assumes that PIM-SSM and BGP are used + across the peering point, plus Automatic Multicast Tunneling (AMT) + [RFC7450] and/or Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE), according to + the scenario in question. The use of other protocols is beyond + the scope of this document. + + o AMT is set up at the peering point if either the peering point or + AD-2 is not multicast enabled. It is assumed that an AMT relay + will be available to a client for multicast delivery. The + selection of an optimal AMT relay by a client is out of scope for + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 5] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + + this document. Note that using AMT is necessary only when native + multicast is unavailable in the peering point (Use Case 3.3) or in + the downstream administrative domain (Use Cases 3.4 and 3.5). + + o It is assumed that the collection of billing data is done at the + application level and is not considered to be a networking issue. + The settlements process for EU billing and/or inter-provider + billing is out of scope for this document. + + o Inter-domain network connectivity troubleshooting is only + considered within the context of a cooperative process between the + two domains. + + This document also attempts to identify ways by which the peering + process can be improved. Development of new methods for improvement + is beyond the scope of this document. + +2. Overview of Inter-domain Multicast Application Transport + + A multicast-based application delivery scenario is as follows: + + o Two independent administrative domains are interconnected via a + peering point. + + o The peering point is either multicast enabled (end-to-end native + multicast across the two domains) or connected by one of two + possible tunnel types: + + * A GRE tunnel [RFC2784] allowing multicast tunneling across the + peering point, or + + * AMT [RFC7450]. + + o A service provider controls one or more application sources in + AD-1 that will send multicast IP packets via one or more (S,G)s + (multicast traffic flows; see Section 4.2.1 if you are unfamiliar + with IP multicast). It is assumed that the service being provided + is suitable for delivery via multicast (e.g., live video streaming + of popular events, software downloads to many devices) and that + the packet streams will be carried by a suitable multicast + transport protocol. + + o An EU controls a device connected to AD-2, which runs an + application client compatible with the service provider's + application source. + + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 6] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + + o The application client joins appropriate (S,G)s in order to + receive the data necessary to provide the service to the EU. The + mechanisms by which the application client learns the appropriate + (S,G)s are an implementation detail of the application and are out + of scope for this document. + + The assumption here is that AD-1 has ultimate responsibility for + delivering the multicast-based service on behalf of the content + source(s). All relevant interactions between the two domains + described in this document are based on this assumption. + + Note that AD-2 may be an independent network domain (e.g., a Tier 1 + network operator domain). Alternately, AD-2 could also be an + enterprise network domain operated by a single customer of AD-1. The + peering point architecture and requirements may have some unique + aspects associated with enterprise networks; see Section 3. + + The use cases describing various architectural configurations for + multicast distribution, along with associated requirements, are + described in Section 3. Section 4 contains a comprehensive list of + pertinent information that needs to be exchanged between the two + domains in order to support functions to enable application + transport. + +3. Inter-domain Peering Point Requirements for Multicast + + The transport of applications using multicast requires that the + inter-domain peering point be enabled to support such a process. + This section presents five use cases for consideration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 7] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + +3.1. Native Multicast + + This use case involves end-to-end native multicast between the two + administrative domains, and the peering point is also native + multicast enabled. See Figure 1. + + ------------------- ------------------- + / AD-1 \ / AD-2 \ + / (Multicast Enabled) \ / (Multicast Enabled) \ + / \ / \ + | +----+ | | | + | | | +------+ | | +------+ | +----+ + | | AS |------>| BR |-|---------|->| BR |-------------|-->| EU | + | | | +------+ | I1 | +------+ |I2 +----+ + \ +----+ / \ / + \ / \ / + \ / \ / + ------------------- ------------------- + + AD = Administrative Domain (independent autonomous system) + AS = multicast (e.g., content) Application Source + BR = Border Router + I1 = AD-1 and AD-2 multicast interconnection (e.g., MP-BGP) + I2 = AD-2 and EU multicast connection + + Figure 1: Content Distribution via End-to-End Native Multicast + + Advantages of this configuration: + + o Most efficient use of bandwidth in both domains. + + o Fewer devices in the path traversed by the multicast stream when + compared to an AMT-enabled peering point. + + From the perspective of AD-1, the one disadvantage associated with + native multicast to AD-2 instead of individual unicast to every EU in + AD-2 is that it does not have the ability to count the number of EUs + as well as the transmitted bytes delivered to them. This information + is relevant from the perspective of customer billing and operational + logs. It is assumed that such data will be collected by the + application layer. The application-layer mechanisms for generating + this information need to be robust enough so that all pertinent + requirements for the source provider and the AD operator are + satisfactorily met. The specifics of these methods are beyond the + scope of this document. + + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 8] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + + Architectural guidelines for this configuration are as follows: + + a. Dual homing for peering points between domains is recommended as + a way to ensure reliability with full BGP table visibility. + + b. If the peering point between AD-1 and AD-2 is a controlled + network environment, then bandwidth can be allocated accordingly + by the two domains to permit the transit of non-rate-adaptive + multicast traffic. If this is not the case, then the multicast + traffic must support congestion control via any of the mechanisms + described in Section 4.1 of [BCP145]. + + c. The sending and receiving of multicast traffic between two + domains is typically determined by local policies associated with + each domain. For example, if AD-1 is a service provider and AD-2 + is an enterprise, then AD-1 may support local policies for + traffic delivery to, but not traffic reception from, AD-2. + Another example is the use of a policy by which AD-1 delivers + specified content to AD-2 only if such delivery has been accepted + by contract. + + d. It is assumed that relevant information on multicast streams + delivered to EUs in AD-2 is collected by available capabilities + in the application layer. The precise nature and formats of the + collected information will be determined by directives from the + source owner and the domain operators. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 9] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + +3.2. Peering Point Enabled with GRE Tunnel + + The peering point is not native multicast enabled in this use case. + There is a GRE tunnel provisioned over the peering point. See + Figure 2. + + ------------------- ------------------- + / AD-1 \ / AD-2 \ + / (Multicast Enabled) \ / (Multicast Enabled) \ + / \ / \ + | +----+ +---+ | (I1) | +---+ | + | | | +--+ |uBR|-|--------|-|uBR| +--+ | +----+ + | | AS |-->|BR| +---+-| | +---+ |BR| -------->|-->| EU | + | | | +--+<........|........|........>+--+ |I2 +----+ + \ +----+ / I1 \ / + \ / GRE \ / + \ / Tunnel \ / + ------------------- ------------------- + + AD = Administrative Domain (independent autonomous system) + AS = multicast (e.g., content) Application Source + uBR = unicast Border Router - not necessarily multicast enabled; + may be the same router as BR + BR = Border Router - for multicast + I1 = AD-1 and AD-2 multicast interconnection (e.g., MP-BGP) + I2 = AD-2 and EU multicast connection + + Figure 2: Content Distribution via GRE Tunnel + + In this case, interconnection I1 between AD-1 and AD-2 in Figure 2 is + multicast enabled via a GRE tunnel [RFC2784] between the two BRs and + encapsulating the multicast protocols across it. + + Normally, this approach is chosen if the uBR physically connected to + the peering link cannot or should not be enabled for IP multicast. + This approach may also be beneficial if the BR and uBR are the same + device but the peering link is a broadcast domain (IXP); see + Section 4.2.4. + + The routing configuration is basically unchanged: instead of running + BGP (SAFI-2) ("SAFI" stands for "Subsequent Address Family + Identifier") across the native IP multicast link between AD-1 and + AD-2, BGP (SAFI-2) is now run across the GRE tunnel. + + + + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 10] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + + Advantages of this configuration: + + o Highly efficient use of bandwidth in both domains, although not as + efficient as the fully native multicast use case (Section 3.1). + + o Fewer devices in the path traversed by the multicast stream when + compared to an AMT-enabled peering point. + + o Ability to support partial and/or incremental IP multicast + deployments in AD-1 and/or AD-2: only the path or paths between + the AS/BR (AD-1) and the BR/EU (AD-2) need to be multicast + enabled. The uBRs may not support IP multicast or enabling it + could be seen as operationally risky on that important edge node, + whereas dedicated BR nodes for IP multicast may (at least + initially) be more acceptable. The BR can also be located such + that only parts of the domain may need to support native IP + multicast (e.g., only the core in AD-1 but not edge networks + towards the uBR). + + o GRE is an existing technology and is relatively simple to + implement. + + Disadvantages of this configuration: + + o Per Use Case 3.1, current router technology cannot count the + number of EUs or the number of bytes transmitted. + + o The GRE tunnel requires manual configuration. + + o The GRE tunnel must be established prior to starting the stream. + + o The GRE tunnel is often left pinned up. + + Architectural guidelines for this configuration include the + following: + + Guidelines (a) through (d) are the same as those described in + Use Case 3.1. Two additional guidelines are as follows: + + e. GRE tunnels are typically configured manually between peering + points to support multicast delivery between domains. + + f. It is recommended that the GRE tunnel (tunnel server) + configuration in the source network be such that it only + advertises the routes to the application sources and not to the + entire network. This practice will prevent unauthorized delivery + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 11] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + + of applications through the tunnel (for example, if the + application (e.g., content) is not part of an agreed-upon + inter-domain partnership). + +3.3. Peering Point Enabled with AMT - Both Domains Multicast Enabled + + It is assumed that both administrative domains in this use case are + native multicast enabled here; however, the peering point is not. + + The peering point is enabled with AMT. The basic configuration is + depicted in Figure 3. + + ------------------- ------------------- + / AD-1 \ / AD-2 \ + / (Multicast Enabled) \ / (Multicast Enabled) \ + / \ / \ + | +----+ +---+ | I1 | +---+ | + | | | +--+ |uBR|-|--------|-|uBR| +--+ | +----+ + | | AS |-->|AR| +---+-| | +---+ |AG| -------->|-->| EU | + | | | +--+<........|........|........>+--+ |I2 +----+ + \ +----+ / AMT \ / + \ / Tunnel \ / + \ / \ / + ------------------- ------------------- + + AD = Administrative Domain (independent autonomous system) + AS = multicast (e.g., content) Application Source + AR = AMT Relay + AG = AMT Gateway + uBR = unicast Border Router - not multicast enabled; + also, either AR = uBR (AD-1) or uBR = AG (AD-2) + I1 = AMT interconnection between AD-1 and AD-2 + I2 = AD-2 and EU multicast connection + + Figure 3: AMT Interconnection between AD-1 and AD-2 + + Advantages of this configuration: + + o Highly efficient use of bandwidth in AD-1. + + o AMT is an existing technology and is relatively simple to + implement. Attractive properties of AMT include the following: + + * Dynamic interconnection between the gateway-relay pair across + the peering point. + + * Ability to serve clients and servers with differing policies. + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 12] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + + Disadvantages of this configuration: + + o Per Use Case 3.1 (AD-2 is native multicast), current router + technology cannot count the number of EUs or the number of bytes + transmitted to all EUs. + + o Additional devices (AMT gateway and relay pairs) may be introduced + into the path if these services are not incorporated into the + existing routing nodes. + + o Currently undefined mechanisms for the AG to automatically select + the optimal AR. + + Architectural guidelines for this configuration are as follows: + + Guidelines (a) through (d) are the same as those described in + Use Case 3.1. In addition, + + e. It is recommended that AMT relay and gateway pairs be configured + at the peering points to support multicast delivery between + domains. AMT tunnels will then configure dynamically across the + peering points once the gateway in AD-2 receives the (S,G) + information from the EU. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 13] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + +3.4. Peering Point Enabled with AMT - AD-2 Not Multicast Enabled + + In this AMT use case, AD-2 is not multicast enabled. Hence, the + interconnection between AD-2 and the EU is also not multicast + enabled. This use case is depicted in Figure 4. + + ------------------- ------------------- + / AD-1 \ / AD-2 \ + / (Multicast Enabled) \ / (Not Multicast \ + / \ / Enabled) \ N(large) + | +----+ +---+ | | +---+ | # EUs + | | | +--+ |uBR|-|--------|-|uBR| | +----+ + | | AS |-->|AR| +---+-| | +---+ ................>|EU/G| + | | | +--+<........|........|........... |I2 +----+ + \ +----+ / N x AMT\ / + \ / Tunnel \ / + \ / \ / + ------------------- ------------------- + + AS = multicast (e.g., content) Application Source + uBR = unicast Border Router - not multicast enabled; + otherwise, AR = uBR (in AD-1) + AR = AMT Relay + EU/G = Gateway client embedded in EU device + I2 = AMT tunnel connecting EU/G to AR in AD-1 through + non-multicast-enabled AD-2 + + Figure 4: AMT Tunnel Connecting AD-1 AMT Relay and EU Gateway + + This use case is equivalent to having unicast distribution of the + application through AD-2. The total number of AMT tunnels would be + equal to the total number of EUs requesting the application. The + peering point thus needs to accommodate the total number of AMT + tunnels between the two domains. Each AMT tunnel can provide the + data usage associated with each EU. + + Advantages of this configuration: + + o Efficient use of bandwidth in AD-1 (the closer the AR is to the + uBR, the more efficient). + + o Ability of AD-1 to introduce content delivery based on IP + multicast, without any support by network devices in AD-2: only + the application side in the EU device needs to perform AMT gateway + library functionality to receive traffic from the AMT relay. + + o Allows AD-2 to "upgrade" to Use Case 3.5 (see Section 3.5) at a + later time, without any change in AD-1 at that time. + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 14] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + + o AMT is an existing technology and is relatively simple to + implement. Attractive properties of AMT include the following: + + * Dynamic interconnection between the AMT gateway-relay pair + across the peering point. + + * Ability to serve clients and servers with differing policies. + + o Each AMT tunnel serves as a count for each EU and is also able to + track data usage (bytes) delivered to the EU. + + Disadvantages of this configuration: + + o Additional devices (AMT gateway and relay pairs) are introduced + into the transport path. + + o Assuming multiple peering points between the domains, the EU + gateway needs to be able to find the "correct" AMT relay in AD-1. + + Architectural guidelines for this configuration are as follows: + + Guidelines (a) through (c) are the same as those described in + Use Case 3.1. In addition, + + d. It is necessary that proper procedures be implemented such that + the AMT gateway at the EU device is able to find the correct AMT + relay for each (S,G) content stream. Standard mechanisms for + that selection are still subject to ongoing work. This includes + the use of anycast gateway addresses, anycast DNS names, or + explicit configuration that maps (S,G) to a relay address; or + letting the application in the EU/G provide the relay address to + the embedded AMT gateway function. + + e. The AMT tunnel's capabilities are expected to be sufficient for + the purpose of collecting relevant information on the multicast + streams delivered to EUs in AD-2. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 15] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + +3.5. AD-2 Not Multicast Enabled - Multiple AMT Tunnels through AD-2 + + Figure 5 illustrates a variation of Use Case 3.4: + + ------------------- ------------------- + / AD-1 \ / AD-2 \ + / (Multicast Enabled) \ / (Not Multicast \ + / +---+ \ (I1) / +---+ Enabled) \ + | +----+ |uBR|-|--------|-|uBR| | + | | | +--+ +---+ | | +---+ +---+ | +----+ + | | AS |-->|AR|<........|.... | +---+ |AG/|....>|EU/G| + | | | +--+ | ......|.|AG/|..........>|AR2| |I3 +----+ + \ +----+ / I1 \ |AR1| I2 +---+ / + \ / Single \+---+ / + \ / AMT Tunnel \ / + ------------------- ------------------- + + uBR = unicast Border Router - not multicast enabled; + also, either AR = uBR (AD-1) or uBR = AGAR1 (AD-2) + AS = multicast (e.g., content) Application Source + AR = AMT Relay in AD-1 + AGAR1 = AMT Gateway/Relay node in AD-2 across peering point + I1 = AMT tunnel connecting AR in AD-1 to gateway in AGAR1 in AD-2 + AGAR2 = AMT Gateway/Relay node at AD-2 network edge + I2 = AMT tunnel connecting relay in AGAR1 to gateway in AGAR2 + EU/G = Gateway client embedded in EU device + I3 = AMT tunnel connecting EU/G to AR in AGAR2 + + Figure 5: AMT Tunnel Connecting AMT Gateways and Relays + + Use Case 3.4 results in several long AMT tunnels crossing the entire + network of AD-2 linking the EU device and the AMT relay in AD-1 + through the peering point. Depending on the number of EUs, there is + a likelihood of an unacceptably high amount of traffic due to the + large number of AMT tunnels -- and unicast streams -- through the + peering point. This situation can be alleviated as follows: + + o Provisioning of strategically located AMT nodes in AD-2. An + AMT node comprises co-location of an AMT gateway and an AMT relay. + No change is required by AD-1, as compared to Use Case 3.4. This + can be done whenever AD-2 sees fit (e.g., too much traffic across + the peering point). + + o One such node is on the AD-2 side of the peering point (AMT node + AGAR1 in Figure 5). + + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 16] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + + o A single AMT tunnel established across the peering point linking + the AMT relay in AD-1 to the AMT gateway in AMT node AGAR1 + in AD-2. + + o AMT tunnels linking AMT node AGAR1 at the peering point in AD-2 to + other AMT nodes located at the edges of AD-2: e.g., AMT tunnel I2 + linking the AMT relay in AGAR1 to the AMT gateway in AMT + node AGAR2 (Figure 5). + + o AMT tunnels linking an EU device (via a gateway client embedded in + the device) and an AMT relay in an appropriate AMT node at the + edge of AD-2: e.g., I3 linking the EU gateway in the device to the + AMT relay in AMT node AGAR2. + + o In the simplest option (not shown), AD-2 only deploys a single + AGAR1 node and lets the EU/G build AMT tunnels directly to it. + This setup already solves the problem of replicated traffic across + the peering point. As soon as there is a need to support more AMT + tunnels to the EU/G, then additional AGAR2 nodes can be deployed + by AD-2. + + The advantage of such a chained set of AMT tunnels is that the total + number of unicast streams across AD-2 is significantly reduced, thus + freeing up bandwidth. Additionally, there will be a single unicast + stream across the peering point instead of, possibly, an unacceptably + large number of such streams per Use Case 3.4. However, this implies + that several AMT tunnels will need to be dynamically configured by + the various AMT gateways, based solely on the (S,G) information + received from the application client at the EU device. A suitable + mechanism for such dynamic configurations is therefore critical. + + Architectural guidelines for this configuration are as follows: + + Guidelines (a) through (c) are the same as those described in + Use Case 3.1. In addition, + + d. It is necessary that proper procedures be implemented such that + the various AMT gateways (at the EU devices and the AMT nodes in + AD-2) are able to find the correct AMT relay in other AMT nodes + as appropriate. Standard mechanisms for that selection are still + subject to ongoing work. This includes the use of anycast + gateway addresses, anycast DNS names, or explicit configuration + that maps (S,G) to a relay address. On the EU/G, this mapping + information may come from the application. + + e. The AMT tunnel's capabilities are expected to be sufficient for + the purpose of collecting relevant information on the multicast + streams delivered to EUs in AD-2. + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 17] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + +4. Functional Guidelines + + Supporting functions and related interfaces over the peering point + that enable the multicast transport of the application are listed in + this section. Critical information parameters that need to be + exchanged in support of these functions are enumerated, along with + guidelines as appropriate. Specific interface functions for + consideration are as follows. + +4.1. Network Interconnection Transport Guidelines + + The term "network interconnection transport" refers to the + interconnection points between the two administrative domains. The + following is a representative set of attributes that the two + administrative domains will need to agree on to support multicast + delivery. + + o Number of peering points. + + o Peering point addresses and locations. + + o Connection type - Dedicated for multicast delivery or shared with + other services. + + o Connection mode - Direct connectivity between the two ADs or via + another ISP. + + o Peering point protocol support - Multicast protocols that will be + used for multicast delivery will need to be supported at these + points. Examples of such protocols include External BGP (EBGP) + [RFC4760] peering via MP-BGP (Multiprotocol BGP) SAFI-2 [RFC4760]. + + o Bandwidth allocation - If shared with other services, then there + needs to be a determination of the share of bandwidth reserved for + multicast delivery. See Section 4.1.1 below for more details. + + o QoS requirements - Delay and/or latency specifications that need + to be specified in an SLA. + + o AD roles and responsibilities - The role played by each AD for + provisioning and maintaining the set of peering points to support + multicast delivery. + + + + + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 18] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + +4.1.1. Bandwidth Management + + Like IP unicast traffic, IP multicast traffic carried across + non-controlled networks must comply with congestion control + principles as described in [BCP41] and as explained in detail for UDP + IP multicast in [BCP145]. + + Non-controlled networks (such as the Internet) are networks where + there is no policy for managing bandwidth other than best effort with + a fair share of bandwidth under congestion. As a simplified rule of + thumb, complying with congestion control principles means reducing + bandwidth under congestion in a way that is fair to competing + (typically TCP) flows ("rate adaptive"). + + In many instances, multicast content delivery evolves from + intra-domain deployments where it is handled as a controlled network + service and does not comply with congestion control principles. It + was given a reserved amount of bandwidth and admitted to the network + so that congestion never occurs. Therefore, the congestion control + issue should be given specific attention when evolving to an + inter-domain peering deployment. + + In the case where end-to-end IP multicast traffic passes across the + network of two ADs (and their subsidiaries/customers), both ADs must + agree on a consistent traffic-management policy. If, for example, + AD-1 sources non-congestion-aware IP multicast traffic and AD-2 + carries it as best-effort traffic across links shared with other + Internet traffic (subject to congestion), this will not work: under + congestion, some amount of that traffic will be dropped, often + rendering the remaining packets as undecodable garbage clogging up + the network in AD-2; because this traffic is not congestion aware, + the loss does not reduce this rate. Competing traffic will not get + their fair share under congestion, and EUs will be frustrated by the + extremely bad quality of both their IP multicast traffic and other + (e.g., TCP) traffic. Note that this is not an IP multicast + technology issue but is solely a transport-layer / application-layer + issue: the problem would just as likely happen if AD-1 were to send + non-rate-adaptive unicast traffic -- for example, legacy IPTV + video-on-demand traffic, which is typically also non-congestion + aware. Note that because rate adaptation in IP unicast video is + commonplace today due to the availability of ABR (Adaptive Bitrate) + video, it is very unlikely that this will happen in reality with IP + unicast. + + While the rules for traffic management apply whether IP multicast is + tunneled or not, the one feature that can make AMT tunnels more + difficult is the unpredictability of bandwidth requirements across + underlying links because of the way they can be used: with native IP + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 19] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + + multicast or GRE tunnels, the amount of bandwidth depends on the + amount of content -- not the number of EUs -- and is therefore easier + to plan for. AMT tunnels terminating in the EU/G, on the other hand, + scale with the number of EUs. In the vicinity of the AMT relay, they + can introduce a very large amount of replicated traffic, and it is + not always feasible to provision enough bandwidth for all possible + EUs to get the highest quality for all their content during peak + utilization in such setups -- unless the AMT relays are very close to + the EU edge. Therefore, it is also recommended that IP multicast + rate adaptation be used, even inside controlled networks, when using + AMT tunnels directly to the EU/G. + + Note that rate-adaptive IP multicast traffic in general does not mean + that the sender is reducing the bitrate but rather that the EUs that + experience congestion are joining to a lower-bitrate (S,G) stream of + the content, similar to ABR streaming over TCP. Therefore, migration + from a non-rate-adaptive bitrate to a rate-adaptive bitrate in IP + multicast will also change the dynamic (S,G) join behavior in the + network, resulting in potentially higher performance requirements for + IP multicast protocols (IGMP/PIM), especially on the last hops where + dynamic changes occur (including AMT gateways/relays): in non-rate- + adaptive IP multicast, only "channel change" causes state change, but + in rate-adaptive multicast, congestion also causes state change. + + Even though not fully specified in this document, peerings that rely + on GRE/AMT tunnels may be across one or more transit ADs instead of + an exclusive (non-shared, L1/L2) path. Unless those transit ADs are + explicitly contracted to provide other than "best effort" transit for + the tunneled traffic, the tunneled IP multicast traffic must be + rate adaptive in order to not violate BCP 41 across those + transit ADs. + +4.2. Routing Aspects and Related Guidelines + + The main objective for multicast delivery routing is to ensure that + the EU receives the multicast stream from the "most optimal" source + [INF_ATIS_10], which typically: + + o Maximizes the multicast portion of the transport and minimizes any + unicast portion of the delivery, and + + o Minimizes the overall combined route distance of the network(s). + + + + + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 20] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + + This routing objective applies to both native multicast and AMT; the + actual methodology of the solution will be different for each. + Regardless, the routing solution is expected to: + + o Be scalable, + + o Avoid or minimize new protocol development or modifications, and + + o Be robust enough to achieve high reliability and to automatically + adjust to changes and problems in the multicast infrastructure. + + For both native and AMT environments, having a source as close as + possible to the EU network is most desirable; therefore, in some + cases, an AD may prefer to have multiple sources near different + peering points. However, that is entirely an implementation issue. + +4.2.1. Native Multicast Routing Aspects + + Native multicast simply requires that the administrative domains + coordinate and advertise the correct source address(es) at their + network interconnection peering points (i.e., BRs). An example of + multicast delivery via a native multicast process across two + administrative domains is as follows, assuming that the + interconnecting peering points are also multicast enabled: + + o Appropriate information is obtained by the EU client, who is a + subscriber to AD-2 (see Use Case 3.1). This information is in the + form of metadata, and it contains instructions directing the EU + client to launch an appropriate application if necessary, as well + as additional information for the application about the source + location and the group (or stream) ID in the form of (S,G) data. + The "S" portion provides the name or IP address of the source of + the multicast stream. The metadata may also contain alternate + delivery information, such as specifying the unicast address of + the stream. + + o The client uses the join message with (S,G) to join the multicast + stream [RFC4604]. To facilitate this process, the two ADs need to + do the following: + + * Advertise the source ID(s) over the peering points. + + * Exchange such relevant peering point information as capacity + and utilization. + + * Implement compatible multicast protocols to ensure proper + multicast delivery across the peering points. + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 21] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + +4.2.2. GRE Tunnel over Interconnecting Peering Point + + If the interconnecting peering point is not multicast enabled and + both ADs are multicast enabled, then a simple solution is to + provision a GRE tunnel between the two ADs; see Use Case 3.2 + (Section 3.2). The termination points of the tunnel will usually be + a network engineering decision but generally will be between the BRs + or even between the AD-2 BR and the AD-1 source (or source access + router). The GRE tunnel would allow end-to-end native multicast or + AMT multicast to traverse the interface. Coordination and + advertisement of the source IP are still required. + + The two ADs need to follow the same process as the process described + in Section 4.2.1 to facilitate multicast delivery across the peering + points. + +4.2.3. Routing Aspects with AMT Tunnels + + Unlike native multicast (with or without GRE), an AMT multicast + environment is more complex. It presents a two-layered problem + in that there are two criteria that should be simultaneously met: + + o Find the closest AMT relay to the EU that also has multicast + connectivity to the content source, and + + o Minimize the AMT unicast tunnel distance. + + There are essentially two components in the AMT specification: + + AMT relays: These serve the purpose of tunneling UDP multicast + traffic to the receivers (i.e., endpoints). The AMT relay will + receive the traffic natively from the multicast media source and + will replicate the stream on behalf of the downstream AMT + gateways, encapsulating the multicast packets into unicast packets + and sending them over the tunnel toward the AMT gateways. In + addition, the AMT relay may collect various usage and activity + statistics. This results in moving the replication point closer + to the EU and cuts down on traffic across the network. Thus, the + linear costs of adding unicast subscribers can be avoided. + However, unicast replication is still required for each requesting + endpoint within the unicast-only network. + + AMT gateway: The gateway will reside on an endpoint; this could be + any type of IP host, such as a Personal Computer (PC), mobile + phone, Set-Top Box (STB), or appliances. The AMT gateway receives + join and leave requests from the application via an Application + Programming Interface (API). In this manner, the gateway allows + the endpoint to conduct itself as a true multicast endpoint. The + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 22] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + + AMT gateway will encapsulate AMT messages into UDP packets and + send them through a tunnel (across the unicast-only + infrastructure) to the AMT relay. + + The simplest AMT use case (Section 3.3) involves peering points that + are not multicast enabled between two multicast-enabled ADs. An + AMT tunnel is deployed between an AMT relay on the AD-1 side of the + peering point and an AMT gateway on the AD-2 side of the peering + point. One advantage of this arrangement is that the tunnel is + established on an as-needed basis and need not be a provisioned + element. The two ADs can coordinate and advertise special AMT relay + anycast addresses with, and to, each other. Alternately, they may + decide to simply provision relay addresses, though this would not be + an optimal solution in terms of scalability. + + Use Cases 3.4 and 3.5 describe AMT situations that are more + complicated, as AD-2 is not multicast enabled in these two cases. + For these cases, the EU device needs to be able to set up an AMT + tunnel in the most optimal manner. There are many methods by which + relay selection can be done, including the use of DNS-based queries + and static lookup tables [RFC7450]. The choice of the method is + implementation dependent and is up to the network operators. + Comparison of various methods is out of scope for this document and + is left for further study. + + An illustrative example of a relay selection based on DNS queries as + part of an anycast IP address process is described here for Use + Cases 3.4 and 3.5 (Sections 3.4 and 3.5). Using an anycast + IP address for AMT relays allows all AMT gateways to find the + "closest" AMT relay -- the nearest edge of the multicast topology of + the source. Note that this is strictly illustrative; the choice of + the method is up to the network operators. The basic process is as + follows: + + o Appropriate metadata is obtained by the EU client application. + The metadata contains instructions directing the EU client to an + ordered list of particular destinations to seek the requested + stream and, for multicast, specifies the source location and the + group (or stream) ID in the form of (S,G) data. The "S" portion + provides the URI (name or IP address) of the source of the + multicast stream, and the "G" identifies the particular stream + originated by that source. The metadata may also contain + alternate delivery information such as the address of the unicast + form of the content to be used -- for example, if the multicast + stream becomes unavailable. + + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 23] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + + o Using the information from the metadata and, possibly, information + provisioned directly in the EU client, a DNS query is initiated in + order to connect the EU client / AMT gateway to an AMT relay. + + o Query results are obtained and may return an anycast address or a + specific unicast address of a relay. Multiple relays will + typically exist. The anycast address is a routable + "pseudo-address" shared among the relays that can gain multicast + access to the source. + + o If a specific IP address unique to a relay was not obtained, the + AMT gateway then sends a message (e.g., the discovery message) to + the anycast address such that the network is making the routing + choice of a particular relay, e.g., the relay that is closest to + the EU. Details are outside the scope of this document. See + [RFC4786]. + + o The contacted AMT relay then returns its specific unicast IP + address (after which the anycast address is no longer required). + Variations may exist as well. + + o The AMT gateway uses that unicast IP address to initiate a + three-way handshake with the AMT relay. + + o The AMT gateway provides the (S,G) information to the AMT relay + (embedded in AMT protocol messages). + + o The AMT relay receives the (S,G) information and uses it to join + the appropriate multicast stream, if it has not already subscribed + to that stream. + + o The AMT relay encapsulates the multicast stream into the tunnel + between the relay and the gateway, providing the requested content + to the EU. + +4.2.4. Public Peering Routing Aspects + + Figure 6 shows an example of a broadcast peering point. + + AD-1a AD-1b + BR BR + | | + --+-+---------------+-+-- broadcast peering point LAN + | | + BR BR + AD-2a AD-2b + + Figure 6: Broadcast Peering Point + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 24] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + + A broadcast peering point is an L2 subnet connecting three or more + ADs. It is common in IXPs and usually consists of Ethernet + switch(es) operated by the IXP connecting to BRs operated by the ADs. + + In an example setup domain, AD-2a peers with AD-1a and wants to + receive IP multicast from it. Likewise, AD-2b peers with AD-1b and + wants to receive IP multicast from it. + + Assume that one or more IP multicast (S,G) traffic streams can be + served by both AD-1a and AD-1b -- for example, because both AD-1a and + AD-1b contact this content from the same content source. + + In this case, AD-2a and AD-2b can no longer control which upstream + domain -- AD-1a or AD-1b -- will forward this (S,G) into the LAN. + The AD-2a BR requests the (S,G) from the AD-1a BR, and the AD-2b BR + requests the same (S,G) from the AD-1b BR. To avoid duplicate + packets, an (S,G) can be forwarded by only one router onto the LAN; + PIM-SM / PIM-SSM detects requests for duplicate transmissions and + resolves them via the so-called "assert" protocol operation, which + results in only one BR forwarding the traffic. Assume that this is + the AD-1a BR. AD-2b will then receive unexpected multicast traffic + from a provider with whom it does not have a mutual agreement for + that traffic. Quality issues in EUs behind AD-2b caused by AD-1a + will cause a lot of issues related to responsibility and + troubleshooting. + + In light of these technical issues, we describe, via the following + options, how IP multicast can be carried across broadcast peering + point LANs: + + 1. IP multicast is tunneled across the LAN. Any of the GRE/AMT + tunneling solutions mentioned in this document are applicable. + This is the one case where a GRE tunnel between the upstream BR + (e.g., AD-1a) and downstream BR (e.g., AD-2a) is specifically + recommended, as opposed to tunneling across uBRs (which are not + the actual BRs). + + 2. The LAN has only one upstream AD that is sourcing IP multicast, + and native IP multicast is used. This is an efficient way to + distribute the same IP multicast content to multiple downstream + ADs. Misbehaving downstream BRs can still disrupt the delivery + of IP multicast from the upstream BR to other downstream BRs; + therefore, strict rules must be followed to prohibit such a case. + The downstream BRs must ensure that they will always consider + only the upstream BR as a source for multicast traffic: e.g., no + BGP SAFI-2 peerings between the downstream ADs across the peering + point LAN, so that the upstream BR is the only possible next hop + reachable across this LAN. Also, routing policies can be + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 25] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + + configured to avoid falling back to using SAFI-1 (unicast) routes + for IP multicast if unicast BGP peering is not limited in the + same way. + + 3. The LAN has multiple upstream ADs, but they are federated and + agree on a consistent policy for IP multicast traffic across the + LAN. One policy is that each possible source is only announced + by one upstream BR. Another policy is that sources are + redundantly announced (the problematic case mentioned in the + example in Figure 6 above), but the upstream domains also provide + mutual operational insight to help with troubleshooting (outside + the scope of this document). + +4.3. Back-Office Functions - Provisioning and Logging Guidelines + + "Back office" refers to the following: + + o Servers and content-management systems that support the delivery + of applications via multicast and interactions between ADs. + + o Functionality associated with logging, reporting, ordering, + provisioning, maintenance, service assurance, settlement, etc. + +4.3.1. Provisioning Guidelines + + Resources for basic connectivity between ADs' providers need to be + provisioned as follows: + + o Sufficient capacity must be provisioned to support multicast-based + delivery across ADs. + + o Sufficient capacity must be provisioned for connectivity between + all supporting back offices of the ADs as appropriate. This + includes activating proper security treatment for these + back-office connections (gateways, firewalls, etc.) as + appropriate. + + Provisioning aspects related to multicast-based inter-domain delivery + are as follows. + + The ability to receive a requested application via multicast is + triggered via receipt of the necessary metadata. Hence, this + metadata must be provided to the EU regarding the multicast URL -- + and unicast fallback if applicable. AD-2 must enable the delivery of + this metadata to the EU and provision appropriate resources for this + purpose. + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 26] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + + It is assumed that native multicast functionality is available across + many ISP backbones, peering points, and access networks. If, + however, native multicast is not an option (Use Cases 3.4 and 3.5), + then: + + o The EU must have a multicast client to use AMT multicast obtained + from either (1) the application source (per agreement with AD-1) + or (2) AD-1 or AD-2 (if delegated by the application source). + + o If provided by AD-1 or AD-2, then the EU could be redirected to a + client download site. (Note: This could be an application source + site.) If provided by the application source, then this source + would have to coordinate with AD-1 to ensure that the proper + client is provided (assuming multiple possible clients). + + o Where AMT gateways support different application sets, all AD-2 + AMT relays need to be provisioned with all source and group + addresses for streams it is allowed to join. + + o DNS across each AD must be provisioned to enable a client gateway + to locate the optimal AMT relay (i.e., longest multicast path and + shortest unicast tunnel) with connectivity to the content's + multicast source. + + Provisioning aspects related to operations and customer care are as + follows. + + It is assumed that each AD provider will provision operations and + customer care access to their own systems. + + AD-1's operations and customer care functions must be able to see + enough of what is happening in AD-2's network or in the service + provided by AD-2 to verify their mutual goals and operations, e.g., + to know how the EUs are being served. This can be done in two ways: + + o Automated interfaces are built between AD-1 and AD-2 such that + operations and customer care continue using their own systems. + This requires coordination between the two ADs, with appropriate + provisioning of necessary resources. + + o AD-1's operations and customer care personnel are provided direct + access to AD-2's systems. In this scenario, additional + provisioning in these systems will be needed to provide necessary + access. The two ADs must agree on additional provisioning to + support this option. + + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 27] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + +4.3.2. Inter-domain Authentication Guidelines + + All interactions between pairs of ADs can be discovered and/or + associated with the account(s) utilized for delivered applications. + Supporting guidelines are as follows: + + o A unique identifier is recommended to designate each master + account. + + o AD-2 is expected to set up "accounts" (a logical facility + generally protected by credentials such as login passwords) for + use by AD-1. Multiple accounts, and multiple types or partitions + of accounts, can apply, e.g., customer accounts, security + accounts. + + The reason to specifically mention the need for AD-1 to initiate + interactions with AD-2 (and use some account for that), as opposed to + the opposite, is based on the recommended workflow initiated by + customers (see Section 4.4): the customer contacts the content + source, which is part of AD-1. Consequently, if AD-1 sees the need + to escalate the issue to AD-2, it will interact with AD-2 using the + aforementioned guidelines. + +4.3.3. Log-Management Guidelines + + Successful delivery (in terms of user experience) of applications or + content via multicast between pairs of interconnecting ADs can be + improved through the ability to exchange appropriate logs for various + workflows -- troubleshooting, accounting and billing, optimization of + traffic and content transmission, optimization of content and + application development, and so on. + + Specifically, AD-1 take over primary responsibility for customer + experience on behalf of the content source, with support from AD-2 as + needed. The application/content owner is the only participant who + has, and needs, full insight into the application level and can map + the customer application experience to the network traffic flows -- + which, with the help of AD-2 or logs from AD-2, it can then analyze + and interpret. + + The main difference between unicast delivery and multicast delivery + is that the content source can infer a lot more about downstream + network problems from a unicast stream than from a multicast stream: + the multicast stream is not per EU, except after the last + replication, which is in most cases not in AD-1. Logs from the + application, including the receiver side at the EU, can provide + insight but cannot help to fully isolate network problems because of + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 28] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + + the IP multicast per-application operational state built across AD-1 + and AD-2 (aka the (S,G) state and any other operational-state + features, such as Diffserv QoS). + + See Section 7 for more discussion regarding the privacy + considerations of the model described here. + + Different types of logs are known to help support operations in AD-1 + when provided by AD-2. This could be done as part of AD-1/AD-2 + contracts. Note that except for implied multicast-specific elements, + the options listed here are not unique or novel for IP multicast, but + they are more important for services novel to the operators than for + operationally well-established services (such as unicast). We + therefore detail them as follows: + + o Usage information logs at an aggregate level. + + o Usage failure instances at an aggregate level. + + o Grouped or sequenced application access: performance, behavior, + and failure at an aggregate level to support potential + application-provider-driven strategies. Examples of aggregate + levels include grouped video clips, web pages, and software- + download sets. + + o Security logs, aggregated or summarized according to agreement + (with additional detail potentially provided during security + events, by agreement). + + o Access logs (EU), when needed for troubleshooting. + + o Application logs ("What is the application doing?"), when needed + for shared troubleshooting. + + o Syslogs (network management), when needed for shared + troubleshooting. + + The two ADs may supply additional security logs to each other, as + agreed upon in contract(s). Examples include the following: + + o Information related to general security-relevant activity, which + may be of use from a protection or response perspective: types and + counts of attacks detected, related source information, related + target information, etc. + + o Aggregated or summarized logs according to agreement (with + additional detail potentially provided during security events, by + agreement). + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 29] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + +4.4. Operations - Service Performance and Monitoring Guidelines + + "Service performance" refers to monitoring metrics related to + multicast delivery via probes. The focus is on the service provided + by AD-2 to AD-1 on behalf of all multicast application sources + (metrics may be specified for SLA use or otherwise). Associated + guidelines are as follows: + + o Both ADs are expected to monitor, collect, and analyze service + performance metrics for multicast applications. AD-2 provides + relevant performance information to AD-1; this enables AD-1 to + create an end-to-end performance view on behalf of the multicast + application source. + + o Both ADs are expected to agree on the types of probes to be used + to monitor multicast delivery performance. For example, AD-2 may + permit AD-1's probes to be utilized in the AD-2 multicast service + footprint. Alternately, AD-2 may deploy its own probes and relay + performance information back to AD-1. + + "Service monitoring" generally refers to a service (as a whole) + provided on behalf of a particular multicast application source + provider. It thus involves complaints from EUs when service problems + occur. EUs direct their complaints to the source provider; the + source provider in turn submits these complaints to AD-1. The + responsibility for service delivery lies with AD-1; as such, AD-1 + will need to determine where the service problem is occurring -- in + its own network or in AD-2. It is expected that each AD will have + tools to monitor multicast service status in its own network. + + o Both ADs will determine how best to deploy multicast service + monitoring tools. Typically, each AD will deploy its own set of + monitoring tools, in which case both ADs are expected to inform + each other when multicast delivery problems are detected. + + o AD-2 may experience some problems in its network. For example, + for the AMT use cases (Sections 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5), one or more + AMT relays may be experiencing difficulties. AD-2 may be able to + fix the problem by rerouting the multicast streams via alternate + AMT relays. If the fix is not successful and multicast service + delivery degrades, then AD-2 needs to report the issue to AD-1. + + + + + + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 30] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + + o When a problem notification is received from a multicast + application source, AD-1 determines whether the cause of the + problem is within its own network or within AD-2. If the cause is + within AD-2, then AD-1 supplies all necessary information to AD-2. + Examples of supporting information include the following: + + * Kind(s) of problem(s). + + * Starting point and duration of problem(s). + + * Conditions in which one or more problems occur. + + * IP address blocks of affected users. + + * ISPs of affected users. + + * Type of access, e.g., mobile versus desktop. + + * Network locations of affected EUs. + + o Both ADs conduct some form of root-cause analysis for multicast + service delivery problems. Examples of various factors for + consideration include: + + * Verification that the service configuration matches the product + features. + + * Correlation and consolidation of the various customer problems + and resource troubles into a single root-service problem. + + * Prioritization of currently open service problems, giving + consideration to problem impacts, SLAs, etc. + + * Conducting service tests, including tests performed once or a + series of tests over a period of time. + + * Analysis of test results. + + * Analysis of relevant network fault or performance data. + + * Analysis of the problem information provided by the customer. + + o Once the cause of the problem has been determined and the problem + has been fixed, both ADs need to work jointly to verify and + validate the success of the fix. + + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 31] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + +4.5. Client Reliability Models / Service Assurance Guidelines + + There are multiple options for instituting reliability architectures. + Most are at the application level. Both ADs should work these + options out per their contract or agreement and also with the + multicast application source providers. + + Network reliability can also be enhanced by the two ADs if they + provision alternate delivery mechanisms via unicast means. + +4.6. Application Accounting Guidelines + + Application-level accounting needs to be handled differently in the + application than in IP unicast, because the source side does not + directly deliver packets to individual receivers. Instead, this + needs to be signaled back by the receiver to the source. + + For network transport diagnostics, AD-1 and AD-2 should have + mechanisms in place to ensure proper accounting for the volume of + bytes delivered through the peering point and, separately, the number + of bytes delivered to EUs. + +5. Troubleshooting and Diagnostics + + Any service provider supporting multicast delivery of content should + be able to collect diagnostics as part of multicast troubleshooting + practices and resolve network issues accordingly. Issues may become + apparent or identifiable through either (1) network monitoring + functions or (2) problems reported by customers, as described in + Section 4.4. + + It is recommended that multicast diagnostics be performed, leveraging + established operational practices such as those documented in + [MDH-05]. However, given that inter-domain multicast creates a + significant interdependence of proper networking functionality + between providers, there exists a need for providers to be able to + signal (or otherwise alert) each other if there are any issues noted + by either one. + + For troubleshooting purposes, service providers may also wish to + allow limited read-only administrative access to their routers to + their AD peers. Access to active troubleshooting tools -- especially + [Traceroute] and the tools discussed in [Mtrace-v2] -- is of specific + interest. + + + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 32] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + + Another option is to include this functionality in the IP multicast + receiver application on the EU device and allow these diagnostics to + be remotely used by support operations. Note, though, that AMT + does not allow the passing of traceroute or mtrace requests; + therefore, troubleshooting in the presence of AMT does not work as + well end to end as it can with native (or even GRE-encapsulated) IP + multicast, especially with regard to traceroute and mtrace. Instead, + troubleshooting directly on the actual network devices is then more + likely necessary. + + The specifics of notifications and alerts are beyond the scope of + this document, but general guidelines are similar to those described + in Section 4.4. Some general communications issues are as follows. + + o Appropriate communications channels will be established between + the customer service and operations groups from both ADs to + facilitate information-sharing related to diagnostic + troubleshooting. + + o A default resolution period may be considered to resolve open + issues. Alternately, mutually acceptable resolution periods could + be established, depending on the severity of the identified + trouble. + +6. Security Considerations + +6.1. DoS Attacks (against State and Bandwidth) + + Reliable IP multicast operations require some basic protection + against DoS (Denial of Service) attacks. + + SSM IP multicast is self-protecting against attacks from illicit + sources; such traffic will not be forwarded beyond the first-hop + router, because that would require (S,G) membership reports from the + receiver. Only valid traffic from sources will be forwarded, because + RPF ("Reverse Path Forwarding") is part of the protocols. One can + say that protection against spoofed source traffic performed in the + style of [BCP38] is therefore built into PIM-SM / PIM-SSM. + + Receivers can attack SSM IP multicast by originating such (S,G) + membership reports. This can result in a DoS attack against state + through the creation of a large number of (S,G) states that create + high control-plane load or even inhibit the later creation of a valid + (S,G). In conjunction with collaborating illicit sources, it can + also result in the forwarding of traffic from illicit sources. + + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 33] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + + Today, these types of attacks are usually mitigated by explicitly + defining the set of permissible (S,G) on, for example, the last-hop + routers in replicating IP multicast to EUs (e.g., via (S,G) access + control lists applied to IGMP/MLD membership state creation). Each + AD (say, "ADi") is expected to know what sources located in ADi are + permitted to send and what their valid (S,G)s are. ADi can therefore + also filter invalid (S,G)s for any "S" located inside ADi, but not + sources located in another AD. + + In the peering case, without further information, AD-2 is not aware + of the set of valid (S,G) from AD-1, so this set needs to be + communicated via operational procedures from AD-1 to AD-2 to provide + protection against this type of DoS attack. Future work could signal + this information in an automated way: BGP extensions, DNS resource + records, or backend automation between AD-1 and AD-2. Backend + automation is, in the short term, the most viable solution: unlike + BGP extensions or DNS resource records, backend automation does not + require router software extensions. Observation of traffic flowing + via (S,G) state could also be used to automate the recognition of + invalid (S,G) state created by receivers in the absence of explicit + information from AD-1. + + The second type of DoS attack through (S,G) membership reports exists + when the attacking receiver creates too much valid (S,G) state and + the traffic carried by these (S,G)s congests bandwidth on links + shared with other EUs. Consider the uplink to a last-hop router + connecting to 100 EUs. If one EU joins to more multicast content + than what fits into this link, then this would also impact the + quality of the same content for the other 99 EUs. If traffic is not + rate adaptive, the effects are even worse. + + The mitigation technique is the same as what is often employed for + unicast: policing of the per-EU total amount of traffic. Unlike + unicast, though, this cannot be done anywhere along the path (e.g., + on an arbitrary bottleneck link); it has to happen at the point of + last replication to the different EU. Simple solutions such as + limiting the maximum number of joined (S,G)s per EU are readily + available; solutions that take consumed bandwidth into account are + available as vendor-specific features in routers. Note that this is + primarily a non-peering issue in AD-2; it only becomes a peering + issue if the peering link itself is not big enough to carry all + possible content from AD-1 or, as in Use Case 3.4, when the AMT relay + in AD-1 is that last replication point. + + Limiting the amount of (S,G) state per EU is also a good first + measure to prohibit too much undesired "empty" state from being built + (state not carrying traffic), but it would not suffice in the case of + DDoS attacks, e.g., viruses that impact a large number of EU devices. + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 34] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + +6.2. Content Security + + Content confidentiality, DRM (Digital Rights Management), + authentication, and authorization are optional, based on the content + delivered. For content that is "FTA" (Free To Air), the following + considerations can be ignored, and content can be sent unencrypted + and without EU authentication and authorization. Note, though, that + the mechanisms described here may also be desirable for the + application source to better track users even if the content itself + would not require it. + + For inter-domain content, there are at least two models for content + confidentiality, including (1) DRM authentication and authorization + and (2) EU authentication and authorization: + + o In the classical (IP)TV model, responsibility is per domain, and + content is and can be passed on unencrypted. AD-1 delivers + content to AD-2; AD-2 can further process the content, including + features like ad insertion, and AD-2 is the sole point of contact + regarding the contact for its EUs. In this document, we do not + consider this case because it typically involves service aspects + operated by AD-2 that are higher than the network layer; this + document focuses on the network-layer AD-1/AD-2 peering case but + not the application-layer peering case. Nevertheless, this model + can be derived through additional work beyond what is described + here. + + o The other model is the one in which content confidentiality, DRM, + EU authentication, and EU authorization are end to end: + responsibilities of the multicast application source provider and + receiver application. This is the model assumed here. It is also + the model used in Internet "Over the Top" (OTT) video delivery. + Below, we discuss the threats incurred in this model due to the + use of IP multicast in AD-1 or AD-2 and across the peering point. + + End-to-end encryption enables end-to-end EU authentication and + authorization: the EU may be able to join (via IGMP/MLD) and receive + the content, but it can only decrypt it when it receives the + decryption key from the content source in AD-1. The key is the + authorization. Keeping that key to itself and prohibiting playout of + the decrypted content to non-copy-protected interfaces are typical + DRM features in that receiver application or EU device operating + system. + + End-to-end encryption is continuously attacked. Keys may be subject + to brute-force attacks so that content can potentially be decrypted + later, or keys are extracted from the EU application/device and + shared with other unauthenticated receivers. One important class of + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 35] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + + content is where the value is in live consumption, such as sports or + other event (e.g., concert) streaming. Extraction of keying material + from compromised authenticated EUs and sharing with unauthenticated + EUs are not sufficient. It is also necessary for those + unauthenticated EUs to get a streaming copy of the content itself. + In unicast streaming, they cannot get such a copy from the content + source (because they cannot authenticate), and, because of asymmetric + bandwidths, it is often impossible to get the content from + compromised EUs to a large number of unauthenticated EUs. EUs behind + classical "16 Mbps down, 1 Mbps up" ADSL links are the best example. + With increasing broadband access speeds, unicast peer-to-peer copying + of content becomes easier, but it likely will always be easily + detectable by the ADs because of its traffic patterns and volume. + + When IP multicast is being used without additional security, AD-2 is + not aware of which EU is authenticated for which content. Any + unauthenticated EU in AD-2 could therefore get a copy of the + encrypted content without triggering suspicion on the part of AD-2 or + AD-1 and then either (1) live-decode it, in the presence of the + compromised authenticated EU and key-sharing or (2) decrypt it later, + in the presence of federated brute-force key-cracking. + + To mitigate this issue, the last replication point that is creating + (S,G) copies to EUs would need to permit those copies only after + authentication of the EUs. This would establish the same + authenticated "EU only" copy that is used in unicast. + + Schemes for per-EU IP multicast authentication/authorization (and, as + a result, non-delivery or copying of per-content IP multicast + traffic) have been built in the past and are deployed in service + providers for intra-domain IPTV services, but no standards exist for + this. For example, there is no standardized RADIUS attribute for + authenticating the IGMP/MLD filter set, but such implementations + exist. The authors of this document are specifically also not aware + of schemes where the same authentication credentials used to get the + encryption key from the content source could also be used to + authenticate and authorize the network-layer IP multicast replication + for the content. Such schemes are technically not difficult to build + and would avoid creating and maintaining a separate network + traffic-forwarding authentication/authorization scheme decoupled from + the end-to-end authentication/authorization system of the + application. + + + + + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 36] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + + If delivery of such high-value content in conjunction with the + peering described here is desired, the short-term recommendations are + for sources to clearly isolate the source and group addresses used + for different content bundles, communicate those (S,G) patterns from + AD-1 to AD-2, and let AD-2 leverage existing per-EU authentication/ + authorization mechanisms in network devices to establish filters for + (S,G) sets to each EU. + +6.3. Peering Encryption + + Encryption at peering points for multicast delivery may be used per + agreement between AD-1 and AD-2. + + In the case of a private peering link, IP multicast does not have + attack vectors on a peering link different from those of IP unicast, + but the content owner may have defined strict constraints against + unauthenticated copying of even the end-to-end encrypted content; in + this case, AD-1 and AD-2 can agree on additional transport encryption + across that peering link. In the case of a broadcast peering + connection (e.g., IXP), transport encryption is again the easiest way + to prohibit unauthenticated copies by other ADs on the same peering + point. + + If peering is across a tunnel that spans intermittent transit ADs + (not discussed in detail in this document), then encryption of that + tunnel traffic is recommended. It not only prohibits possible + "leakage" of content but also protects the information regarding what + content is being consumed in AD-2 (aggregated privacy protection). + + See Section 6.4 for reasons why the peering point may also need to be + encrypted for operational reasons. + +6.4. Operational Aspects + + Section 4.3.3 discusses the exchange of log information, and + Section 7 discusses the exchange of program information. All these + operational pieces of data should by default be exchanged via + authenticated and encrypted peer-to-peer communication protocols + between AD-1 and AD-2 so that only the intended recipients in the + peers' AD have access to it. Even exposure of the least sensitive + information to third parties opens up attack vectors. Putting valid + (S,G) information, for example, into DNS (as opposed to passing it + via secured channels from AD-1 to AD-2) to allow easier filtering of + invalid (S,G) information would also allow attackers to more easily + identify valid (S,G) information and change their attack vector. + + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 37] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + + From the perspective of the ADs, security is most critical for log + information, as it provides operational insight into the originating + AD but also contains sensitive user data. + + Sensitive user data exported from AD-2 to AD-1 as part of logs could + be as much as the equivalent of 5-tuple unicast traffic flow + accounting (but not more, e.g., no application-level information). + As mentioned in Section 7, in unicast, AD-1 could capture these + traffic statistics itself because this is all about traffic flows + (originated by AD-1) to EU receivers in AD-2, and operationally + passing it from AD-2 to AD-1 may be necessary when IP multicast is + used because of the replication taking place in AD-2. + + Nevertheless, passing such traffic statistics inside AD-1 from a + capturing router to a backend system is likely less subject to + third-party attacks than passing it "inter-domain" from AD-2 to AD-1, + so more diligence needs to be applied to secure it. + + If any protocols used for the operational exchange of information are + not easily secured at the transport layer or higher (because of the + use of legacy products or protocols in the network), then AD-1 and + AD-2 can also consider ensuring that all operational data exchanges + go across the same peering point as the traffic and use network-layer + encryption of the peering point (as discussed previously) to + protect it. + + End-to-end authentication and authorization of EUs may involve some + kind of token authentication and are done at the application layer, + independently of the two ADs. If there are problems related to the + failure of token authentication when EUs are supported by AD-2, then + some means of validating proper operation of the token authentication + process (e.g., validating that backend servers querying the multicast + application source provider's token authentication server are + communicating properly) should be considered. Implementation details + are beyond the scope of this document. + + In the event of a security breach, the two ADs are expected to have a + mitigation plan for shutting down the peering point and directing + multicast traffic over alternative peering points. It is also + expected that appropriate information will be shared for the purpose + of securing the identified breach. + + + + + + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 38] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + +7. Privacy Considerations + + The described flow of information about content and EUs as described + in this document aims to maintain privacy: + + AD-1 is operating on behalf of (or owns) the content source and is + therefore part of the content-consumption relationship with the EU. + The privacy considerations between the EU and AD-1 are therefore + generally the same (with one exception; see below) as they would be + if no IP multicast was used, especially because end-to-end encryption + can and should be used for any privacy-conscious content. + + Information related to inter-domain multicast transport service is + provided to AD-1 by the AD-2 operators. AD-2 is not required to gain + additional insight into the user's behavior through this process + other than what it would already have without service collaboration + with AD-1, unless AD-1 and AD-2 agree on it and get approval from + the EU. + + For example, if it is deemed beneficial for the EU to get support + directly from AD-2, then it would generally be necessary for AD-2 to + be aware of the mapping between content and network (S,G) state so + that AD-2 knows which (S,G) to troubleshoot when the EU complains + about problems with specific content. The degree to which this + dissemination is done by AD-1 explicitly to meet privacy expectations + of EUs is typically easy to assess by AD-1. Two simple examples are + as follows: + + o For a sports content bundle, every EU will happily click on the + "I approve that the content program information is shared with + your service provider" button, to ensure best service reliability, + because service-conscious AD-2 would likely also try to ensure + that high-value content, such as the (S,G) for the Super Bowl, + would be the first to receive care in the case of network issues. + + o If the content in question was content for which the EU expected + more privacy, the EU should prefer a content bundle that included + this content in a large variety of other content, have all content + end-to-end encrypted, and not share programming information with + AD-2, to maximize privacy. Nevertheless, the privacy of the EU + against AD-2 observing traffic would still be lower than in the + equivalent setup using unicast, because in unicast, AD-2 could not + correlate which EUs are watching the same content and use that to + deduce the content. Note that even the setup in Section 3.4, + where AD-2 is not involved in IP multicast at all, does not + provide privacy against this level of analysis by AD-2, because + there is no transport-layer encryption in AMT; therefore, AD-2 can + correlate by on-path traffic analysis who is consuming the same + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 39] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + + content from an AMT relay from both the (S,G) join messages in AMT + and the identical content segments (that were replicated at the + AMT relay). + + In summary, because only content to be consumed by multiple EUs is + carried via IP multicast here and all of that content can be + end-to-end encrypted, the only privacy consideration specific to IP + multicast is for AD-2 to know or reconstruct what content an EU is + consuming. For content for which this is undesirable, some form of + protections as explained above are possible, but ideally, the model + described in Section 3.4 could be used in conjunction with future + work, e.g., adding Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) + encryption [RFC6347] between the AMT relay and the EU. + + Note that IP multicast by nature would permit the EU's privacy + against the content source operator because, unlike unicast, the + content source does not natively know which EU is consuming which + content: in all cases where AD-2 provides replication, only AD-2 + knows this directly. This document does not attempt to describe a + model that maintains such a level of privacy against the content + source; rather, we describe a model that only protects against + exposure to intermediate parties -- in this case, AD-2. + +8. IANA Considerations + + This document does not require any IANA actions. + +9. References + +9.1. Normative References + + [RFC2784] Farinacci, D., Li, T., Hanks, S., Meyer, D., and P. + Traina, "Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)", RFC 2784, + DOI 10.17487/RFC2784, March 2000, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2784>. + + [RFC3376] Cain, B., Deering, S., Kouvelas, I., Fenner, B., and A. + Thyagarajan, "Internet Group Management Protocol, + Version 3", RFC 3376, DOI 10.17487/RFC3376, October 2002, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3376>. + + [RFC3810] Vida, R., Ed., and L. Costa, Ed., "Multicast Listener + Discovery Version 2 (MLDv2) for IPv6", RFC 3810, + DOI 10.17487/RFC3810, June 2004, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3810>. + + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 40] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + + [RFC4760] Bates, T., Chandra, R., Katz, D., and Y. Rekhter, + "Multiprotocol Extensions for BGP-4", RFC 4760, + DOI 10.17487/RFC4760, January 2007, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4760>. + + [RFC4604] Holbrook, H., Cain, B., and B. Haberman, "Using Internet + Group Management Protocol Version 3 (IGMPv3) and Multicast + Listener Discovery Protocol Version 2 (MLDv2) for + Source-Specific Multicast", RFC 4604, + DOI 10.17487/RFC4604, August 2006, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4604>. + + [RFC4609] Savola, P., Lehtonen, R., and D. Meyer, "Protocol + Independent Multicast - Sparse Mode (PIM-SM) Multicast + Routing Security Issues and Enhancements", RFC 4609, + DOI 10.17487/RFC4609, October 2006, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4609>. + + [RFC7450] Bumgardner, G., "Automatic Multicast Tunneling", RFC 7450, + DOI 10.17487/RFC7450, February 2015, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7450>. + + [RFC7761] Fenner, B., Handley, M., Holbrook, H., Kouvelas, I., + Parekh, R., Zhang, Z., and L. Zheng, "Protocol Independent + Multicast - Sparse Mode (PIM-SM): Protocol Specification + (Revised)", STD 83, RFC 7761, DOI 10.17487/RFC7761, + March 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7761>. + + [BCP38] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering: + Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source + Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2827>. + + [BCP41] Floyd, S., "Congestion Control Principles", BCP 41, + RFC 2914, September 2000, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2914>. + + [BCP145] Eggert, L., Fairhurst, G., and G. Shepherd, "UDP Usage + Guidelines", BCP 145, RFC 8085, March 2017, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8085>. + + + + + + + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 41] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + +9.2. Informative References + + [RFC4786] Abley, J. and K. Lindqvist, "Operation of Anycast + Services", BCP 126, RFC 4786, DOI 10.17487/RFC4786, + December 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4786>. + + [RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer + Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347, + January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>. + + [INF_ATIS_10] + "CDN Interconnection Use Cases and Requirements in a + Multi-Party Federation Environment", ATIS Standard + A-0200010, December 2012. + + [MDH-05] Thaler, D. and B. Aboba, "Multicast Debugging Handbook", + Work in Progress, draft-ietf-mboned-mdh-05, November 2000. + + [Traceroute] + "traceroute.org", <http://traceroute.org/#source%20code>. + + [Mtrace-v2] + Asaeda, H., Meyer, K., and W. Lee, Ed., "Mtrace Version 2: + Traceroute Facility for IP Multicast", Work in Progress, + draft-ietf-mboned-mtrace-v2-22, December 2017. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 42] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + +Acknowledgments + + The authors would like to thank the following individuals for their + suggestions, comments, and corrections: + + Mikael Abrahamsson + + Hitoshi Asaeda + + Dale Carder + + Tim Chown + + Leonard Giuliano + + Jake Holland + + Joel Jaeggli + + Henrik Levkowetz + + Albert Manfredi + + Stig Venaas + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 43] + +RFC 8313 Multicast for Inter-domain Peering Points January 2018 + + +Authors' Addresses + + Percy S. Tarapore (editor) + AT&T + + Phone: 1-732-420-4172 + Email: tarapore@att.com + + + Robert Sayko + AT&T + + Phone: 1-732-420-3292 + Email: rs1983@att.com + + + Greg Shepherd + Cisco + + Email: shep@cisco.com + + + Toerless Eckert (editor) + Huawei USA - Futurewei Technologies Inc. + + Email: tte+ietf@cs.fau.de, toerless.eckert@huawei.com + + + Ram Krishnan + SupportVectors + + Email: ramkri123@gmail.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Tarapore, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 44] + |