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| author | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
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| committer | Thomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> | 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100 |
| commit | 4bfd864f10b68b71482b35c818559068ef8d5797 (patch) | |
| tree | e3989f47a7994642eb325063d46e8f08ffa681dc /doc/rfc/rfc8439.txt | |
| parent | ea76e11061bda059ae9f9ad130a9895cc85607db (diff) | |
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diff --git a/doc/rfc/rfc8439.txt b/doc/rfc/rfc8439.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c50c862 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/rfc/rfc8439.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2579 @@ + + + + + + +Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) Y. Nir +Request for Comments: 8439 Dell EMC +Obsoletes: 7539 A. Langley +Category: Informational Google, Inc. +ISSN: 2070-1721 June 2018 + + + ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF Protocols + +Abstract + + This document defines the ChaCha20 stream cipher as well as the use + of the Poly1305 authenticator, both as stand-alone algorithms and as + a "combined mode", or Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data + (AEAD) algorithm. + + RFC 7539, the predecessor of this document, was meant to serve as a + stable reference and an implementation guide. It was a product of + the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG). This document merges the + errata filed against RFC 7539 and adds a little text to the Security + Considerations section. + +Status of This Memo + + This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is + published for informational purposes. + + This document is a product of the Internet Research Task Force + (IRTF). The IRTF publishes the results of Internet-related research + and development activities. These results might not be suitable for + deployment. This RFC represents the consensus of the Crypto Forum + Research Group of the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF). Documents + approved for publication by the IRSG are not candidates for any level + of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841. + + Information about the current status of this document, any errata, + and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at + https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8439. + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 1] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the + document authors. All rights reserved. + + This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal + Provisions Relating to IETF Documents + (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of + publication of this document. Please review these documents + carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect + to this document. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 2] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 1.1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 2. The Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 2.1. The ChaCha Quarter Round . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 2.1.1. Test Vector for the ChaCha Quarter Round . . . . . . 6 + 2.2. A Quarter Round on the ChaCha State . . . . . . . . . . . 6 + 2.2.1. Test Vector for the Quarter Round on the ChaCha State 7 + 2.3. The ChaCha20 Block Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 2.3.1. The ChaCha20 Block Function in Pseudocode . . . . . . 9 + 2.3.2. Test Vector for the ChaCha20 Block Function . . . . . 10 + 2.4. The ChaCha20 Encryption Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 2.4.1. The ChaCha20 Encryption Algorithm in Pseudocode . . . 12 + 2.4.2. Example and Test Vector for the ChaCha20 Cipher . . . 12 + 2.5. The Poly1305 Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + 2.5.1. The Poly1305 Algorithms in Pseudocode . . . . . . . . 16 + 2.5.2. Poly1305 Example and Test Vector . . . . . . . . . . 17 + 2.6. Generating the Poly1305 Key Using ChaCha20 . . . . . . . 18 + 2.6.1. Poly1305 Key Generation in Pseudocode . . . . . . . . 19 + 2.6.2. Poly1305 Key Generation Test Vector . . . . . . . . . 19 + 2.7. A Pseudorandom Function for Crypto Suites Based on + ChaCha/Poly1305 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 + 2.8. AEAD Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 + 2.8.1. Pseudocode for the AEAD Construction . . . . . . . . 23 + 2.8.2. Example and Test Vector for AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 . 23 + 3. Implementation Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 + 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 + 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 + 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 + 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 + 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 + Appendix A. Additional Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 + A.1. The ChaCha20 Block Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 + A.2. ChaCha20 Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 + A.3. Poly1305 Message Authentication Code . . . . . . . . . . 36 + A.4. Poly1305 Key Generation Using ChaCha20 . . . . . . . . . 41 + A.5. ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD Decryption . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 + Appendix B. Performance Measurements of ChaCha20 . . . . . . . . 45 + Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 + + + + + + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 3] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + +1. Introduction + + The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES -- [FIPS-197]) has become the + gold standard in encryption. Its efficient design, widespread + implementation, and hardware support allow for high performance in + many areas. On most modern platforms, AES is anywhere from four to + ten times as fast as the previous most-used cipher, Triple Data + Encryption Standard (3DES -- [SP800-67]), which makes it not only the + best choice, but the only practical choice. + + There are several problems with this. If future advances in + cryptanalysis reveal a weakness in AES, users will be in an + unenviable position. With the only other widely supported cipher + being the much slower 3DES, it is not feasible to reconfigure + deployments to use 3DES. [Standby-Cipher] describes this issue and + the need for a standby cipher in greater detail. Another problem is + that while AES is very fast on dedicated hardware, its performance on + platforms that lack such hardware is considerably lower. Yet another + problem is that many AES implementations are vulnerable to cache- + collision timing attacks ([Cache-Collisions]). + + This document provides a definition and implementation guide for + three algorithms: + + 1. The ChaCha20 cipher. This is a high-speed cipher first described + in [ChaCha]. It is considerably faster than AES in software-only + implementations, making it around three times as fast on + platforms that lack specialized AES hardware. See Appendix B for + some hard numbers. ChaCha20 is also not sensitive to timing + attacks (see the security considerations in Section 4). This + algorithm is described in Section 2.4 + + 2. The Poly1305 authenticator. This is a high-speed message + authentication code. Implementation is also straightforward and + easy to get right. The algorithm is described in Section 2.5. + + 3. The CHACHA20-POLY1305 Authenticated Encryption with Associated + Data (AEAD) construction, described in Section 2.8. + + This document and its predecessor do not introduce these new + algorithms for the first time. They have been defined in scientific + papers by D. J. Bernstein [ChaCha][Poly1305]. The purpose of this + document is to serve as a stable reference for IETF documents making + use of these algorithms. + + These algorithms have undergone rigorous analysis. Several papers + discuss the security of Salsa and ChaCha ([LatinDances], + [LatinDances2], [Zhenqing2012]). + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 4] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + This document represents the consensus of the Crypto Forum Research + Group (CFRG). It replaces [RFC7539]. + +1.1. Conventions Used in This Document + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and + "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP + 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all + capitals, as shown here. + + The description of the ChaCha algorithm will at various time refer to + the ChaCha state as a "vector" or as a "matrix". This follows the + use of these terms in [ChaCha]. The matrix notation is more visually + convenient and gives a better notion as to why some rounds are called + "column rounds" while others are called "diagonal rounds". Here's a + diagram of how the matrices relate to vectors (using the C language + convention of zero being the index origin). + + 0 1 2 3 + 4 5 6 7 + 8 9 10 11 + 12 13 14 15 + + The elements in this vector or matrix are 32-bit unsigned integers. + + The algorithm name is "ChaCha". "ChaCha20" is a specific instance + where 20 "rounds" (or 80 quarter rounds -- see Section 2.1) are used. + Other variations are defined, with 8 or 12 rounds, but in this + document we only describe the 20-round ChaCha, so the names "ChaCha" + and "ChaCha20" will be used interchangeably. + +2. The Algorithms + + The subsections below describe the algorithms used and the AEAD + construction. + +2.1. The ChaCha Quarter Round + + The basic operation of the ChaCha algorithm is the quarter round. It + operates on four 32-bit unsigned integers, denoted a, b, c, and d. + The operation is as follows (in C-like notation): + + a += b; d ^= a; d <<<= 16; + c += d; b ^= c; b <<<= 12; + a += b; d ^= a; d <<<= 8; + c += d; b ^= c; b <<<= 7; + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 5] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + Where "+" denotes integer addition modulo 2^32, "^" denotes a bitwise + Exclusive OR (XOR), and "<<< n" denotes an n-bit left roll (towards + the high bits). + + For example, let's see the add, XOR, and roll operations from the + fourth line with sample numbers: + + a = 0x11111111 + b = 0x01020304 + c = 0x77777777 + d = 0x01234567 + c = c + d = 0x77777777 + 0x01234567 = 0x789abcde + b = b ^ c = 0x01020304 ^ 0x789abcde = 0x7998bfda + b = b <<< 7 = 0x7998bfda <<< 7 = 0xcc5fed3c + +2.1.1. Test Vector for the ChaCha Quarter Round + + For a test vector, we will use the same numbers as in the example, + adding something random for c. + + a = 0x11111111 + b = 0x01020304 + c = 0x9b8d6f43 + d = 0x01234567 + + After running a Quarter Round on these four numbers, we get these: + + a = 0xea2a92f4 + b = 0xcb1cf8ce + c = 0x4581472e + d = 0x5881c4bb + +2.2. A Quarter Round on the ChaCha State + + The ChaCha state does not have four integer numbers: it has 16. So + the quarter-round operation works on only four of them -- hence the + name. Each quarter round operates on four predetermined numbers in + the ChaCha state. We will denote by QUARTERROUND(x, y, z, w) a + quarter-round operation on the numbers at indices x, y, z, and w of + the ChaCha state when viewed as a vector. For example, if we apply + QUARTERROUND(1, 5, 9, 13) to a state, this means running the quarter- + round operation on the elements marked with an asterisk, while + leaving the others alone: + + 0 *a 2 3 + 4 *b 6 7 + 8 *c 10 11 + 12 *d 14 15 + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 6] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + Note that this run of quarter round is part of what is called a + "column round". + +2.2.1. Test Vector for the Quarter Round on the ChaCha State + + For a test vector, we will use a ChaCha state that was generated + randomly: + + Sample ChaCha State + + 879531e0 c5ecf37d 516461b1 c9a62f8a + 44c20ef3 3390af7f d9fc690b 2a5f714c + 53372767 b00a5631 974c541a 359e9963 + 5c971061 3d631689 2098d9d6 91dbd320 + + We will apply the QUARTERROUND(2, 7, 8, 13) operation to this state. + For obvious reasons, this one is part of what is called a "diagonal + round": + + After applying QUARTERROUND(2, 7, 8, 13) + + 879531e0 c5ecf37d *bdb886dc c9a62f8a + 44c20ef3 3390af7f d9fc690b *cfacafd2 + *e46bea80 b00a5631 974c541a 359e9963 + 5c971061 *ccc07c79 2098d9d6 91dbd320 + + Note that only the numbers in positions 2, 7, 8, and 13 changed. + +2.3. The ChaCha20 Block Function + + The ChaCha block function transforms a ChaCha state by running + multiple quarter rounds. + + The inputs to ChaCha20 are: + + o A 256-bit key, treated as a concatenation of eight 32-bit little- + endian integers. + + o A 96-bit nonce, treated as a concatenation of three 32-bit little- + endian integers. + + o A 32-bit block count parameter, treated as a 32-bit little-endian + integer. + + The output is 64 random-looking bytes. + + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 7] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + The ChaCha algorithm described here uses a 256-bit key. The original + algorithm also specified 128-bit keys and 8- and 12-round variants, + but these are out of scope for this document. In this section, we + describe the ChaCha block function. + + Note also that the original ChaCha had a 64-bit nonce and 64-bit + block count. We have modified this here to be more consistent with + recommendations in Section 3.2 of [RFC5116]. This limits the use of + a single (key,nonce) combination to 2^32 blocks, or 256 GB, but that + is enough for most uses. In cases where a single key is used by + multiple senders, it is important to make sure that they don't use + the same nonces. This can be assured by partitioning the nonce space + so that the first 32 bits are unique per sender, while the other 64 + bits come from a counter. + + The ChaCha20 state is initialized as follows: + + o The first four words (0-3) are constants: 0x61707865, 0x3320646e, + 0x79622d32, 0x6b206574. + + o The next eight words (4-11) are taken from the 256-bit key by + reading the bytes in little-endian order, in 4-byte chunks. + + o Word 12 is a block counter. Since each block is 64-byte, a 32-bit + word is enough for 256 gigabytes of data. + + o Words 13-15 are a nonce, which MUST not be repeated for the same + key. The 13th word is the first 32 bits of the input nonce taken + as a little-endian integer, while the 15th word is the last 32 + bits. + + cccccccc cccccccc cccccccc cccccccc + kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk + kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk + bbbbbbbb nnnnnnnn nnnnnnnn nnnnnnnn + + c=constant k=key b=blockcount n=nonce + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 8] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + ChaCha20 runs 20 rounds, alternating between "column rounds" and + "diagonal rounds". Each round consists of four quarter-rounds, and + they are run as follows. Quarter rounds 1-4 are part of a "column" + round, while 5-8 are part of a "diagonal" round: + + QUARTERROUND(0, 4, 8, 12) + QUARTERROUND(1, 5, 9, 13) + QUARTERROUND(2, 6, 10, 14) + QUARTERROUND(3, 7, 11, 15) + QUARTERROUND(0, 5, 10, 15) + QUARTERROUND(1, 6, 11, 12) + QUARTERROUND(2, 7, 8, 13) + QUARTERROUND(3, 4, 9, 14) + + At the end of 20 rounds (or 10 iterations of the above list), we add + the original input words to the output words, and serialize the + result by sequencing the words one-by-one in little-endian order. + + Note: "addition" in the above paragraph is done modulo 2^32. In some + machine languages, this is called carryless addition on a 32-bit + word. + +2.3.1. The ChaCha20 Block Function in Pseudocode + + Note: This section and a few others contain pseudocode for the + algorithm explained in a previous section. Every effort was made for + the pseudocode to accurately reflect the algorithm as described in + the preceding section. If a conflict is still present, the textual + explanation and the test vectors are normative. + + inner_block (state): + Qround(state, 0, 4, 8, 12) + Qround(state, 1, 5, 9, 13) + Qround(state, 2, 6, 10, 14) + Qround(state, 3, 7, 11, 15) + Qround(state, 0, 5, 10, 15) + Qround(state, 1, 6, 11, 12) + Qround(state, 2, 7, 8, 13) + Qround(state, 3, 4, 9, 14) + end + + + + + + + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 9] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + chacha20_block(key, counter, nonce): + state = constants | key | counter | nonce + initial_state = state + for i=1 upto 10 + inner_block(state) + end + state += initial_state + return serialize(state) + end + + Where the pipe character ("|") denotes concatenation. + +2.3.2. Test Vector for the ChaCha20 Block Function + + For a test vector, we will use the following inputs to the ChaCha20 + block function: + + o Key = 00:01:02:03:04:05:06:07:08:09:0a:0b:0c:0d:0e:0f:10:11:12:13: + 14:15:16:17:18:19:1a:1b:1c:1d:1e:1f. The key is a sequence of + octets with no particular structure before we copy it into the + ChaCha state. + + o Nonce = (00:00:00:09:00:00:00:4a:00:00:00:00) + + o Block Count = 1. + + After setting up the ChaCha state, it looks like this: + + ChaCha state with the key setup. + + 61707865 3320646e 79622d32 6b206574 + 03020100 07060504 0b0a0908 0f0e0d0c + 13121110 17161514 1b1a1918 1f1e1d1c + 00000001 09000000 4a000000 00000000 + + After running 20 rounds (10 column rounds interleaved with 10 + "diagonal rounds"), the ChaCha state looks like this: + + ChaCha state after 20 rounds + + 837778ab e238d763 a67ae21e 5950bb2f + c4f2d0c7 fc62bb2f 8fa018fc 3f5ec7b7 + 335271c2 f29489f3 eabda8fc 82e46ebd + d19c12b4 b04e16de 9e83d0cb 4e3c50a2 + + Finally, we add the original state to the result (simple vector or + matrix addition), giving this: + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 10] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + ChaCha state at the end of the ChaCha20 operation + + e4e7f110 15593bd1 1fdd0f50 c47120a3 + c7f4d1c7 0368c033 9aaa2204 4e6cd4c3 + 466482d2 09aa9f07 05d7c214 a2028bd9 + d19c12b5 b94e16de e883d0cb 4e3c50a2 + + After we serialize the state, we get this: + + Serialized Block: + 000 10 f1 e7 e4 d1 3b 59 15 50 0f dd 1f a3 20 71 c4 .....;Y.P.... q. + 016 c7 d1 f4 c7 33 c0 68 03 04 22 aa 9a c3 d4 6c 4e ....3.h.."....lN + 032 d2 82 64 46 07 9f aa 09 14 c2 d7 05 d9 8b 02 a2 ..dF............ + 048 b5 12 9c d1 de 16 4e b9 cb d0 83 e8 a2 50 3c 4e ......N......P<N + +2.4. The ChaCha20 Encryption Algorithm + + ChaCha20 is a stream cipher designed by D. J. Bernstein. It is a + refinement of the Salsa20 algorithm, and it uses a 256-bit key. + + ChaCha20 successively calls the ChaCha20 block function, with the + same key and nonce, and with successively increasing block counter + parameters. ChaCha20 then serializes the resulting state by writing + the numbers in little-endian order, creating a keystream block. + Concatenating the keystream blocks from the successive blocks forms a + keystream. The ChaCha20 function then performs an XOR of this + keystream with the plaintext. Alternatively, each keystream block + can be XORed with a plaintext block before proceeding to create the + next block, saving some memory. There is no requirement for the + plaintext to be an integral multiple of 512 bits. If there is extra + keystream from the last block, it is discarded. Specific protocols + MAY require that the plaintext and ciphertext have certain length. + Such protocols need to specify how the plaintext is padded and how + much padding it receives. + + The inputs to ChaCha20 are: + + o A 256-bit key + + o A 32-bit initial counter. This can be set to any number, but will + usually be zero or one. It makes sense to use one if we use the + zero block for something else, such as generating a one-time + authenticator key as part of an AEAD algorithm. + + o A 96-bit nonce. In some protocols, this is known as the + Initialization Vector. + + o An arbitrary-length plaintext + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 11] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + The output is an encrypted message, or "ciphertext", of the same + length. + + Decryption is done in the same way. The ChaCha20 block function is + used to expand the key into a keystream, which is XORed with the + ciphertext giving back the plaintext. + +2.4.1. The ChaCha20 Encryption Algorithm in Pseudocode + + chacha20_encrypt(key, counter, nonce, plaintext): + for j = 0 upto floor(len(plaintext)/64)-1 + key_stream = chacha20_block(key, counter+j, nonce) + block = plaintext[(j*64)..(j*64+63)] + encrypted_message += block ^ key_stream + end + if ((len(plaintext) % 64) != 0) + j = floor(len(plaintext)/64) + key_stream = chacha20_block(key, counter+j, nonce) + block = plaintext[(j*64)..len(plaintext)-1] + encrypted_message += (block^key_stream)[0..len(plaintext)%64] + end + return encrypted_message + end + +2.4.2. Example and Test Vector for the ChaCha20 Cipher + + For a test vector, we will use the following inputs to the ChaCha20 + block function: + + o Key = 00:01:02:03:04:05:06:07:08:09:0a:0b:0c:0d:0e:0f:10:11:12:13: + 14:15:16:17:18:19:1a:1b:1c:1d:1e:1f. + + o Nonce = (00:00:00:00:00:00:00:4a:00:00:00:00). + + o Initial Counter = 1. + + We use the following for the plaintext. It was chosen to be long + enough to require more than one block, but not so long that it would + make this example cumbersome (so, less than 3 blocks): + + + + + + + + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 12] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + Plaintext Sunscreen: + 000 4c 61 64 69 65 73 20 61 6e 64 20 47 65 6e 74 6c Ladies and Gentl + 016 65 6d 65 6e 20 6f 66 20 74 68 65 20 63 6c 61 73 emen of the clas + 032 73 20 6f 66 20 27 39 39 3a 20 49 66 20 49 20 63 s of '99: If I c + 048 6f 75 6c 64 20 6f 66 66 65 72 20 79 6f 75 20 6f ould offer you o + 064 6e 6c 79 20 6f 6e 65 20 74 69 70 20 66 6f 72 20 nly one tip for + 080 74 68 65 20 66 75 74 75 72 65 2c 20 73 75 6e 73 the future, suns + 096 63 72 65 65 6e 20 77 6f 75 6c 64 20 62 65 20 69 creen would be i + 112 74 2e t. + + The following figure shows four ChaCha state matrices: + + 1. First block as it is set up. + + 2. Second block as it is set up. Note that these blocks are only + two bits apart -- only the counter in position 12 is different. + + 3. Third block is the first block after the ChaCha20 block operation + was applied. + + 4. Final block is the second block after the ChaCha20 block + operation was applied. + + After that, we show the keystream. + + First block setup: + 61707865 3320646e 79622d32 6b206574 + 03020100 07060504 0b0a0908 0f0e0d0c + 13121110 17161514 1b1a1918 1f1e1d1c + 00000001 00000000 4a000000 00000000 + + Second block setup: + 61707865 3320646e 79622d32 6b206574 + 03020100 07060504 0b0a0908 0f0e0d0c + 13121110 17161514 1b1a1918 1f1e1d1c + 00000002 00000000 4a000000 00000000 + + First block after block operation: + f3514f22 e1d91b40 6f27de2f ed1d63b8 + 821f138c e2062c3d ecca4f7e 78cff39e + a30a3b8a 920a6072 cd7479b5 34932bed + 40ba4c79 cd343ec6 4c2c21ea b7417df0 + + Second block after block operation: + 9f74a669 410f633f 28feca22 7ec44dec + 6d34d426 738cb970 3ac5e9f3 45590cc4 + da6e8b39 892c831a cdea67c1 2b7e1d90 + 037463f3 a11a2073 e8bcfb88 edc49139 + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 13] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + Keystream: + 22:4f:51:f3:40:1b:d9:e1:2f:de:27:6f:b8:63:1d:ed:8c:13:1f:82:3d:2c:06 + e2:7e:4f:ca:ec:9e:f3:cf:78:8a:3b:0a:a3:72:60:0a:92:b5:79:74:cd:ed:2b + 93:34:79:4c:ba:40:c6:3e:34:cd:ea:21:2c:4c:f0:7d:41:b7:69:a6:74:9f:3f + 63:0f:41:22:ca:fe:28:ec:4d:c4:7e:26:d4:34:6d:70:b9:8c:73:f3:e9:c5:3a + c4:0c:59:45:39:8b:6e:da:1a:83:2c:89:c1:67:ea:cd:90:1d:7e:2b:f3:63 + + Finally, we XOR the keystream with the plaintext, yielding the + ciphertext: + + Ciphertext Sunscreen: + 000 6e 2e 35 9a 25 68 f9 80 41 ba 07 28 dd 0d 69 81 n.5.%h..A..(..i. + 016 e9 7e 7a ec 1d 43 60 c2 0a 27 af cc fd 9f ae 0b .~z..C`..'...... + 032 f9 1b 65 c5 52 47 33 ab 8f 59 3d ab cd 62 b3 57 ..e.RG3..Y=..b.W + 048 16 39 d6 24 e6 51 52 ab 8f 53 0c 35 9f 08 61 d8 .9.$.QR..S.5..a. + 064 07 ca 0d bf 50 0d 6a 61 56 a3 8e 08 8a 22 b6 5e ....P.jaV....".^ + 080 52 bc 51 4d 16 cc f8 06 81 8c e9 1a b7 79 37 36 R.QM.........y76 + 096 5a f9 0b bf 74 a3 5b e6 b4 0b 8e ed f2 78 5e 42 Z...t.[......x^B + 112 87 4d .M + +2.5. The Poly1305 Algorithm + + Poly1305 is a one-time authenticator designed by D. J. Bernstein. + Poly1305 takes a 32-byte one-time key and a message and produces a + 16-byte tag. This tag is used to authenticate the message. + + The original article ([Poly1305]) is titled "The Poly1305-AES + message-authentication code", and the MAC function there requires a + 128-bit AES key, a 128-bit "additional key", and a 128-bit (non- + secret) nonce. AES is used there for encrypting the nonce, so as to + get a unique (and secret) 128-bit string, but as the paper states, + "There is nothing special about AES here. One can replace AES with + an arbitrary keyed function from an arbitrary set of nonces to + 16-byte strings." + + Regardless of how the key is generated, the key is partitioned into + two parts, called "r" and "s". The pair (r,s) should be unique, and + MUST be unpredictable for each invocation (that is why it was + originally obtained by encrypting a nonce), while "r" MAY be + constant, but needs to be modified as follows before being used: ("r" + is treated as a 16-octet little-endian number): + + o r[3], r[7], r[11], and r[15] are required to have their top four + bits clear (be smaller than 16) + + o r[4], r[8], and r[12] are required to have their bottom two bits + clear (be divisible by 4) + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 14] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + The following sample code clamps "r" to be appropriate: + + /* + Adapted from poly1305aes_test_clamp.c version 20050207 + D. J. Bernstein + Public domain. + */ + + #include "poly1305aes_test.h" + + void poly1305aes_test_clamp(unsigned char r[16]) + { + r[3] &= 15; + r[7] &= 15; + r[11] &= 15; + r[15] &= 15; + r[4] &= 252; + r[8] &= 252; + r[12] &= 252; + } + + Where "&=" is the C language bitwise AND assignment operator. + + The "s" should be unpredictable, but it is perfectly acceptable to + generate both "r" and "s" uniquely each time. Because each of them + is 128 bits, pseudorandomly generating them (see Section 2.6) is also + acceptable. + + The inputs to Poly1305 are: + + o A 256-bit one-time key + + o An arbitrary length message + + The output is a 128-bit tag. + + First, the "r" value is clamped. + + Next, set the constant prime "P" be 2^130-5: + 3fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffb. Also set a variable "accumulator" + to zero. + + + + + + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 15] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + Next, divide the message into 16-byte blocks. The last one might be + shorter: + + o Read the block as a little-endian number. + + o Add one bit beyond the number of octets. For a 16-byte block, + this is equivalent to adding 2^128 to the number. For the shorter + + block, it can be 2^120, 2^112, or any power of two that is evenly + divisible by 8, all the way down to 2^8. + + o If the block is not 17 bytes long (the last block), pad it with + zeros. This is meaningless if you are treating the blocks as + numbers. + + o Add this number to the accumulator. + + o Multiply by "r". + + o Set the accumulator to the result modulo p. To summarize: Acc = + ((Acc+block)*r) % p. + + Finally, the value of the secret key "s" is added to the accumulator, + and the 128 least significant bits are serialized in little-endian + order to form the tag. + +2.5.1. The Poly1305 Algorithms in Pseudocode + + clamp(r): r &= 0x0ffffffc0ffffffc0ffffffc0fffffff + poly1305_mac(msg, key): + r = le_bytes_to_num(key[0..15]) + clamp(r) + s = le_bytes_to_num(key[16..31]) + a = 0 /* a is the accumulator */ + p = (1<<130)-5 + for i=1 upto ceil(msg length in bytes / 16) + n = le_bytes_to_num(msg[((i-1)*16)..(i*16)] | [0x01]) + a += n + a = (r * a) % p + end + a += s + return num_to_16_le_bytes(a) + end + + + + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 16] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + +2.5.2. Poly1305 Example and Test Vector + + For our example, we will dispense with generating the one-time key + using AES, and assume that we got the following keying material: + + o Key Material: 85:d6:be:78:57:55:6d:33:7f:44:52:fe:42:d5:06:a8:01:0 + 3:80:8a:fb:0d:b2:fd:4a:bf:f6:af:41:49:f5:1b + + o s as an octet string: + 01:03:80:8a:fb:0d:b2:fd:4a:bf:f6:af:41:49:f5:1b + + o s as a 128-bit number: 1bf54941aff6bf4afdb20dfb8a800301 + + o r before clamping: 85:d6:be:78:57:55:6d:33:7f:44:52:fe:42:d5:06:a8 + + o Clamped r as a number: 806d5400e52447c036d555408bed685 + + For our message, we'll use a short text: + + Message to be Authenticated: + 000 43 72 79 70 74 6f 67 72 61 70 68 69 63 20 46 6f Cryptographic Fo + 016 72 75 6d 20 52 65 73 65 61 72 63 68 20 47 72 6f rum Research Gro + 032 75 70 up + + Since Poly1305 works in 16-byte chunks, the 34-byte message divides + into three blocks. In the following calculation, "Acc" denotes the + accumulator and "Block" the current block: + + Block #1 + + Acc = 00 + Block = 6f4620636968706172676f7470797243 + Block with 0x01 byte = 016f4620636968706172676f7470797243 + Acc + block = 016f4620636968706172676f7470797243 + (Acc+Block) * r = + b83fe991ca66800489155dcd69e8426ba2779453994ac90ed284034da565ecf + Acc = ((Acc+Block)*r) % P = 2c88c77849d64ae9147ddeb88e69c83fc + + Block #2 + + Acc = 2c88c77849d64ae9147ddeb88e69c83fc + Block = 6f7247206863726165736552206d7572 + Block with 0x01 byte = 016f7247206863726165736552206d7572 + Acc + block = 437febea505c820f2ad5150db0709f96e + (Acc+Block) * r = + 21dcc992d0c659ba4036f65bb7f88562ae59b32c2b3b8f7efc8b00f78e548a26 + Acc = ((Acc+Block)*r) % P = 2d8adaf23b0337fa7cccfb4ea344b30de + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 17] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + Last Block + + Acc = 2d8adaf23b0337fa7cccfb4ea344b30de + Block = 7075 + Block with 0x01 byte = 017075 + Acc + block = 2d8adaf23b0337fa7cccfb4ea344ca153 + (Acc + Block) * r = + 16d8e08a0f3fe1de4fe4a15486aca7a270a29f1e6c849221e4a6798b8e45321f + ((Acc + Block) * r) % P = 28d31b7caff946c77c8844335369d03a7 + + Adding s, we get this number, and serialize if to get the tag: + + Acc + s = 2a927010caf8b2bc2c6365130c11d06a8 + + Tag: a8:06:1d:c1:30:51:36:c6:c2:2b:8b:af:0c:01:27:a9 + +2.6. Generating the Poly1305 Key Using ChaCha20 + + As said in Section 2.5, it is acceptable to generate the one-time + Poly1305 key pseudorandomly. This section defines such a method. + + To generate such a key pair (r,s), we will use the ChaCha20 block + function described in Section 2.3. This assumes that we have a + 256-bit session key specifically for the Message Authentication Code + (MAC) function. Any document that specifies the use of Poly1305 as a + MAC algorithm for some protocol MUST specify that 256 bits are + allocated for the integrity key. Note that in the AEAD construction + defined in Section 2.8, the same key is used for encryption and key + generation. + + The method is to call the block function with the following + parameters: + + o The 256-bit session integrity key is used as the ChaCha20 key. + + o The block counter is set to zero. + + o The protocol will specify a 96-bit or 64-bit nonce. This MUST be + unique per invocation with the same key, so it MUST NOT be + randomly generated. A counter is a good way to implement this, + but other methods, such as a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) + are also acceptable. ChaCha20 as specified here requires a 96-bit + nonce. So if the provided nonce is only 64-bit, then the first 32 + bits of the nonce will be set to a constant number. This will + usually be zero, but for protocols with multiple senders it may be + different for each sender, but SHOULD be the same for all + invocations of the function with the same key by a particular + sender. + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 18] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + After running the block function, we have a 512-bit state. We take + the first 256 bits of the serialized state, and use those as the one- + time Poly1305 key: the first 128 bits are clamped and form "r", while + the next 128 bits become "s". The other 256 bits are discarded. + + Note that while many protocols have provisions for a nonce for + encryption algorithms (often called Initialization Vectors, or IVs), + they usually don't have such a provision for the MAC function. In + that case, the per-invocation nonce will have to come from somewhere + else, such as a message counter. + +2.6.1. Poly1305 Key Generation in Pseudocode + + poly1305_key_gen(key,nonce): + counter = 0 + block = chacha20_block(key,counter,nonce) + return block[0..31] + end + +2.6.2. Poly1305 Key Generation Test Vector + + For this example, we'll set: + + Key: + 000 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 8a 8b 8c 8d 8e 8f ................ + 016 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 9a 9b 9c 9d 9e 9f ................ + + Nonce: + 000 00 00 00 00 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 ............ + + The ChaCha state setup with key, nonce, and block counter zero: + 61707865 3320646e 79622d32 6b206574 + 83828180 87868584 8b8a8988 8f8e8d8c + 93929190 97969594 9b9a9998 9f9e9d9c + 00000000 00000000 03020100 07060504 + + The ChaCha state after 20 rounds: + 8ba0d58a cc815f90 27405081 7194b24a + 37b633a8 a50dfde3 e2b8db08 46a6d1fd + 7da03782 9183a233 148ad271 b46773d1 + 3cc1875a 8607def1 ca5c3086 7085eb87 + + Output bytes: + 000 8a d5 a0 8b 90 5f 81 cc 81 50 40 27 4a b2 94 71 ....._...P@'J..q + 016 a8 33 b6 37 e3 fd 0d a5 08 db b8 e2 fd d1 a6 46 .3.7...........F + + And that output is also the 32-byte one-time key used for Poly1305. + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 19] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + +2.7. A Pseudorandom Function for Crypto Suites Based on ChaCha/Poly1305 + + Some protocols, such as IKEv2 ([RFC7296]), require a Pseudorandom + Function (PRF), mostly for key derivation. In the IKEv2 definition, + a PRF is a function that accepts a variable-length key and a + variable-length input, and returns a fixed-length output. Most + commonly, Hashed MAC (HMAC) constructions are used for this purpose, + and often the same function is used for both message authentication + and PRF. + + Poly1305 is not a suitable choice for a PRF. Poly1305 prohibits + using the same key twice, whereas the PRF in IKEv2 is used multiple + times with the same key. Additionally, unlike HMAC, Poly1305 is + biased, so using it for key derivation would reduce the security of + the symmetric encryption. + + Chacha20 could be used as a key-derivation function, by generating an + arbitrarily long keystream. However, that is not what protocols such + as IKEv2 require. + + For this reason, this document does not specify a PRF. + +2.8. AEAD Construction + + AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 is an authenticated encryption with additional + data algorithm. The inputs to AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 are: + + o A 256-bit key + + o A 96-bit nonce -- different for each invocation with the same key + + o An arbitrary length plaintext + + o Arbitrary length additional authenticated data (AAD) + + Some protocols may have unique per-invocation inputs that are not 96 + bits in length. For example, IPsec may specify a 64-bit nonce. In + such a case, it is up to the protocol document to define how to + transform the protocol nonce into a 96-bit nonce, for example, by + concatenating a constant value. + + The ChaCha20 and Poly1305 primitives are combined into an AEAD that + takes a 256-bit key and 96-bit nonce as follows: + + o First, a Poly1305 one-time key is generated from the 256-bit key + and nonce using the procedure described in Section 2.6. + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 20] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + o Next, the ChaCha20 encryption function is called to encrypt the + plaintext, using the same key and nonce, and with the initial + counter set to 1. + + o Finally, the Poly1305 function is called with the Poly1305 key + calculated above, and a message constructed as a concatenation of + the following: + + * The AAD + + * padding1 -- the padding is up to 15 zero bytes, and it brings + the total length so far to an integral multiple of 16. If the + length of the AAD was already an integral multiple of 16 bytes, + this field is zero-length. + + * The ciphertext + + * padding2 -- the padding is up to 15 zero bytes, and it brings + the total length so far to an integral multiple of 16. If the + length of the ciphertext was already an integral multiple of 16 + bytes, this field is zero-length. + + * The length of the additional data in octets (as a 64-bit + little-endian integer). + + * The length of the ciphertext in octets (as a 64-bit little- + endian integer). + + The output from the AEAD is the concatenation of: + + o A ciphertext of the same length as the plaintext. + + o A 128-bit tag, which is the output of the Poly1305 function. + + Decryption is similar with the following differences: + + o The roles of ciphertext and plaintext are reversed, so the + ChaCha20 encryption function is applied to the ciphertext, + producing the plaintext. + + o The Poly1305 function is still run on the AAD and the ciphertext, + not the plaintext. + + o The calculated tag is bitwise compared to the received tag. The + message is authenticated if and only if the tags match. + + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 21] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + A few notes about this design: + + 1. The amount of encrypted data possible in a single invocation is + 2^32-1 blocks of 64 bytes each, because of the size of the block + counter field in the ChaCha20 block function. This gives a total + of 274,877,906,880 bytes, or nearly 256 GB. This should be + enough for traffic protocols such as IPsec and TLS, but may be + too small for file and/or disk encryption. For such uses, we can + return to the original design, reduce the nonce to 64 bits, and + use the integer at position 13 as the top 32 bits of a 64-bit + block counter, increasing the total message size to over a + million petabytes (1,180,591,620,717,411,303,360 bytes to be + exact). + + 2. Despite the previous item, the ciphertext length field in the + construction of the buffer on which Poly1305 runs limits the + ciphertext (and hence, the plaintext) size to 2^64 bytes, or + sixteen thousand petabytes (18,446,744,073,709,551,616 bytes to + be exact). + + The AEAD construction in this section is a novel composition of + ChaCha20 and Poly1305. A security analysis of this composition is + given in [Procter]. + + Here is a list of the parameters for this construction as defined in + Section 4 of [RFC5116]: + + o K_LEN (key length) is 32 octets. + + o P_MAX (maximum size of the plaintext) is 274,877,906,880 bytes, or + nearly 256 GB. + + o A_MAX (maximum size of the associated data) is set to 2^64-1 + octets by the length field for associated data. + + o N_MIN = N_MAX = 12 octets. + + o C_MAX = P_MAX + tag length = 274,877,906,896 octets. + + Distinct AAD inputs (as described in Section 3.3 of [RFC5116]) shall + be concatenated into a single input to AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305. It is + up to the application to create a structure in the AAD input if it is + needed. + + + + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 22] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + +2.8.1. Pseudocode for the AEAD Construction + + pad16(x): + if (len(x) % 16)==0 + then return NULL + else return copies(0, 16-(len(x)%16)) + end + + chacha20_aead_encrypt(aad, key, iv, constant, plaintext): + nonce = constant | iv + otk = poly1305_key_gen(key, nonce) + ciphertext = chacha20_encrypt(key, 1, nonce, plaintext) + mac_data = aad | pad16(aad) + mac_data |= ciphertext | pad16(ciphertext) + mac_data |= num_to_8_le_bytes(aad.length) + mac_data |= num_to_8_le_bytes(ciphertext.length) + tag = poly1305_mac(mac_data, otk) + return (ciphertext, tag) + +2.8.2. Example and Test Vector for AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 + + For a test vector, we will use the following inputs to the + AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 function: + + Plaintext: + 000 4c 61 64 69 65 73 20 61 6e 64 20 47 65 6e 74 6c Ladies and Gentl + 016 65 6d 65 6e 20 6f 66 20 74 68 65 20 63 6c 61 73 emen of the clas + 032 73 20 6f 66 20 27 39 39 3a 20 49 66 20 49 20 63 s of '99: If I c + 048 6f 75 6c 64 20 6f 66 66 65 72 20 79 6f 75 20 6f ould offer you o + 064 6e 6c 79 20 6f 6e 65 20 74 69 70 20 66 6f 72 20 nly one tip for + 080 74 68 65 20 66 75 74 75 72 65 2c 20 73 75 6e 73 the future, suns + 096 63 72 65 65 6e 20 77 6f 75 6c 64 20 62 65 20 69 creen would be i + 112 74 2e t. + + AAD: + 000 50 51 52 53 c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 PQRS........ + + Key: + 000 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 8a 8b 8c 8d 8e 8f ................ + 016 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 9a 9b 9c 9d 9e 9f ................ + + IV: + 000 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 @ABCDEFG + + 32-bit fixed-common part: + 000 07 00 00 00 .... + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 23] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + Setup for generating Poly1305 one-time key (sender id=7): + 61707865 3320646e 79622d32 6b206574 + 83828180 87868584 8b8a8988 8f8e8d8c + 93929190 97969594 9b9a9998 9f9e9d9c + 00000000 00000007 43424140 47464544 + + After generating Poly1305 one-time key: + 252bac7b af47b42d 557ab609 8455e9a4 + 73d6e10a ebd97510 7875932a ff53d53e + decc7ea2 b44ddbad e49c17d1 d8430bc9 + 8c94b7bc 8b7d4b4b 3927f67d 1669a432 + + Poly1305 Key: + 000 7b ac 2b 25 2d b4 47 af 09 b6 7a 55 a4 e9 55 84 {.+%-.G...zU..U. + 016 0a e1 d6 73 10 75 d9 eb 2a 93 75 78 3e d5 53 ff ...s.u..*.ux>.S. + + Poly1305 r = 455e9a4057ab6080f47b42c052bac7b + Poly1305 s = ff53d53e7875932aebd9751073d6e10a + + keystream bytes: + 9f:7b:e9:5d:01:fd:40:ba:15:e2:8f:fb:36:81:0a:ae: + c1:c0:88:3f:09:01:6e:de:dd:8a:d0:87:55:82:03:a5: + 4e:9e:cb:38:ac:8e:5e:2b:b8:da:b2:0f:fa:db:52:e8: + 75:04:b2:6e:be:69:6d:4f:60:a4:85:cf:11:b8:1b:59: + fc:b1:c4:5f:42:19:ee:ac:ec:6a:de:c3:4e:66:69:78: + 8e:db:41:c4:9c:a3:01:e1:27:e0:ac:ab:3b:44:b9:cf: + 5c:86:bb:95:e0:6b:0d:f2:90:1a:b6:45:e4:ab:e6:22: + 15:38 + + Ciphertext: + 000 d3 1a 8d 34 64 8e 60 db 7b 86 af bc 53 ef 7e c2 ...4d.`.{...S.~. + 016 a4 ad ed 51 29 6e 08 fe a9 e2 b5 a7 36 ee 62 d6 ...Q)n......6.b. + 032 3d be a4 5e 8c a9 67 12 82 fa fb 69 da 92 72 8b =..^..g....i..r. + 048 1a 71 de 0a 9e 06 0b 29 05 d6 a5 b6 7e cd 3b 36 .q.....)....~.;6 + 064 92 dd bd 7f 2d 77 8b 8c 98 03 ae e3 28 09 1b 58 ....-w......(..X + 080 fa b3 24 e4 fa d6 75 94 55 85 80 8b 48 31 d7 bc ..$...u.U...H1.. + 096 3f f4 de f0 8e 4b 7a 9d e5 76 d2 65 86 ce c6 4b ?....Kz..v.e...K + 112 61 16 a. + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 24] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + AEAD Construction for Poly1305: + 000 50 51 52 53 c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 00 00 00 00 PQRS............ + 016 d3 1a 8d 34 64 8e 60 db 7b 86 af bc 53 ef 7e c2 ...4d.`.{...S.~. + 032 a4 ad ed 51 29 6e 08 fe a9 e2 b5 a7 36 ee 62 d6 ...Q)n......6.b. + 048 3d be a4 5e 8c a9 67 12 82 fa fb 69 da 92 72 8b =..^..g....i..r. + 064 1a 71 de 0a 9e 06 0b 29 05 d6 a5 b6 7e cd 3b 36 .q.....)....~.;6 + 080 92 dd bd 7f 2d 77 8b 8c 98 03 ae e3 28 09 1b 58 ....-w......(..X + 096 fa b3 24 e4 fa d6 75 94 55 85 80 8b 48 31 d7 bc ..$...u.U...H1.. + 112 3f f4 de f0 8e 4b 7a 9d e5 76 d2 65 86 ce c6 4b ?....Kz..v.e...K + 128 61 16 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 a............... + 144 0c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 72 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........r....... + + Note the four zero bytes in line 000 and the 14 zero bytes in line + 128 + + Tag: + 1a:e1:0b:59:4f:09:e2:6a:7e:90:2e:cb:d0:60:06:91 + +3. Implementation Advice + + Each block of ChaCha20 involves 16 move operations and one increment + operation for loading the state, 80 each of XOR, addition and roll + operations for the rounds, 16 more add operations and 16 XOR + operations for protecting the plaintext. Section 2.3 describes the + ChaCha block function as "adding the original input words". This + implies that before starting the rounds on the ChaCha state, we copy + it aside, only to add it in later. This is correct, but we can save + a few operations if we instead copy the state and do the work on the + copy. This way, for the next block you don't need to recreate the + state, but only to increment the block counter. This saves + approximately 5.5% of the cycles. + + It is not recommended to use a generic big number library such as the + one in OpenSSL for the arithmetic operations in Poly1305. Such + libraries use dynamic allocation to be able to handle an integer of + any size, but that flexibility comes at the expense of performance as + well as side-channel security. More efficient implementations that + run in constant time are available, one of them in D. J. Bernstein's + own library, NaCl ([NaCl]). A constant-time but not optimal approach + would be to naively implement the arithmetic operations for 288-bit + integers, because even a naive implementation will not exceed 2^288 + in the multiplication of (acc+block) and r. An efficient constant- + time implementation can be found in the public domain library + poly1305-donna ([Poly1305_Donna]). + + + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 25] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + +4. Security Considerations + + The ChaCha20 cipher is designed to provide 256-bit security. + + The Poly1305 authenticator is designed to ensure that forged messages + are rejected with a probability of 1-(n/(2^102)) for a 16n-byte + message, even after sending 2^64 legitimate messages, so it is + SUF-CMA (strong unforgeability against chosen-message attacks) in the + terminology of [AE]. + + Proving the security of either of these is beyond the scope of this + document. Such proofs are available in the referenced academic + papers ([ChaCha], [Poly1305], [LatinDances], [LatinDances2], and + [Zhenqing2012]). + + The most important security consideration in implementing this + document is the uniqueness of the nonce used in ChaCha20. Counters + and LFSRs are both acceptable ways of generating unique nonces, as is + encrypting a counter using a block cipher with a 64-bit block size + such as DES. Note that it is not acceptable to use a truncation of a + counter encrypted with block ciphers with 128-bit or 256-bit blocks, + because such a truncation may repeat after a short time. + + Consequences of repeating a nonce: If a nonce is repeated, then both + the one-time Poly1305 key and the keystream are identical between the + messages. This reveals the XOR of the plaintexts, because the XOR of + the plaintexts is equal to the XOR of the ciphertexts. + + The Poly1305 key MUST be unpredictable to an attacker. Randomly + generating the key would fulfill this requirement, except that + Poly1305 is often used in communications protocols, so the receiver + should know the key. Pseudorandom number generation such as by + encrypting a counter is acceptable. Using ChaCha with a secret key + and a nonce is also acceptable. + + The algorithms presented here were designed to be easy to implement + in constant time to avoid side-channel vulnerabilities. The + operations used in ChaCha20 are all additions, XORs, and fixed rolls. + All of these can and should be implemented in constant time. Access + to offsets into the ChaCha state and the number of operations do not + depend on any property of the key, eliminating the chance of + information about the key leaking through the timing of cache misses. + + For Poly1305, the operations are addition, multiplication. and + modulus, all on numbers with greater than 128 bits. This can be done + in constant time, but a naive implementation (such as using some + generic big number library) will not be constant time. For example, + if the multiplication is performed as a separate operation from the + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 26] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + modulus, the result will sometimes be under 2^256 and sometimes be + above 2^256. Implementers should be careful about timing side- + channels for Poly1305 by using the appropriate implementation of + these operations. + + Validating the authenticity of a message involves a bitwise + comparison of the calculated tag with the received tag. In most use + cases, nonces and AAD contents are not "used up" until a valid + message is received. This allows an attacker to send multiple + identical messages with different tags until one passes the tag + comparison. This is hard if the attacker has to try all 2^128 + possible tags one by one. However, if the timing of the tag + comparison operation reveals how long a prefix of the calculated and + received tags is identical, the number of messages can be reduced + significantly. For this reason, with online protocols, + implementation MUST use a constant-time comparison function rather + than relying on optimized but insecure library functions such as the + C language's memcmp(). + + Additionally, any protocol using this algorithm MUST include the + complete tag to minimize the opportunity for forgery. Tag truncation + MUST NOT be done. + +5. IANA Considerations + + IANA has updated the entry in the "Authenticated Encryption with + Associated Data (AEAD) Parameters" registry with 29 as the Numeric ID + and "AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305" as the name to point to this document as + its reference. + +6. References + +6.1. Normative References + + [ChaCha] Bernstein, D., "ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20", January + 2008, <http://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf>. + + [Poly1305] + Bernstein, D., "The Poly1305-AES message-authentication + code", March 2005, + <http://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf>. + + [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, + DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 27] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC + 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, + May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. + +6.2. Informative References + + [AE] Bellare, M. and C. Namprempre, "Authenticated Encryption: + Relations among notions and analysis of the generic + composition paradigm", DOI 10.1007/s00145-008-9026-x, + September 2008, + <http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1410269>. + + [Cache-Collisions] + Bonneau, J. and I. Mironov, "Cache-Collision Timing + Attacks Against AES", 2006, + <http://research.microsoft.com/pubs/64024/aes-timing.pdf>. + + [FIPS-197] + National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Advanced + Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS PUB 197, November 2001, + <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/ + fips-197.pdf>. + + [LatinDances] + Aumasson, J., Fischer, S., Khazaei, S., Meier, W., and C. + Rechberger, "New Features of Latin Dances: Analysis of + Salsa, ChaCha, and Rumba", December 2007, + <http://cr.yp.to/rumba20/newfeatures-20071218.pdf>. + + [LatinDances2] + Ishiguro, T., Kiyomoto, S., and Y. Miyake, "Modified + version of 'Latin Dances Revisited: New Analytic Results + of Salsa20 and ChaCha'", February 2012, + <https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/065.pdf>. + + [NaCl] Bernstein, D., Lange, T., and P. Schwabe, "NaCl: + Networking and Cryptography library", July 2012, + <http://nacl.cr.yp.to>. + + [Poly1305_Donna] + "poly1305-donna", commit e6ad6e0, March 2016, + <https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna>. + + [Procter] Procter, G., "A Security Analysis of the Composition of + ChaCha20 and Poly1305", August 2014, + <http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/613.pdf>. + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 28] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + [RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated + Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>. + + [RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T. + Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 + (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October + 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>. + + [RFC7539] Nir, Y. and A. Langley, "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF + Protocols", RFC 7539, DOI 10.17487/RFC7539, May 2015, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7539>. + + [SP800-67] + National Institute of Standards and Technology, + "Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm + (TDEA) Block Cipher", NIST 800-67, Rev. 2, November 2017, + <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-67/ + rev-2/final>. + + [Standby-Cipher] + McGrew, D., Grieco, A., and Y. Sheffer, "Selection of + Future Cryptographic Standards", Work in Progress, draft- + mcgrew-standby-cipher-00, January 2013. + + [Zhenqing2012] + Zhenqing, S., Bin, Z., Dengguo, F., and W. Wenling, + "Improved Key Recovery Attacks on Reduced-Round Salsa20 + and ChaCha*", 2012. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 29] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + +Appendix A. Additional Test Vectors + + The subsections of this appendix contain more test vectors for the + algorithms in the subsections of Section 2. + +A.1. The ChaCha20 Block Functions + + Test Vector #1: + ============== + + Key: + 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + 016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + + Nonce: + 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............ + + Block Counter = 0 + + ChaCha state at the end + ade0b876 903df1a0 e56a5d40 28bd8653 + b819d2bd 1aed8da0 ccef36a8 c70d778b + 7c5941da 8d485751 3fe02477 374ad8b8 + f4b8436a 1ca11815 69b687c3 8665eeb2 + + Keystream: + 000 76 b8 e0 ad a0 f1 3d 90 40 5d 6a e5 53 86 bd 28 v.....=.@]j.S..( + 016 bd d2 19 b8 a0 8d ed 1a a8 36 ef cc 8b 77 0d c7 .........6...w.. + 032 da 41 59 7c 51 57 48 8d 77 24 e0 3f b8 d8 4a 37 .AY|QWH.w$.?..J7 + 048 6a 43 b8 f4 15 18 a1 1c c3 87 b6 69 b2 ee 65 86 jC.........i..e. + + Test Vector #2: + ============== + + Key: + 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + 016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + + Nonce: + 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............ + + Block Counter = 1 + + ChaCha state at the end + bee7079f 7a385155 7c97ba98 0d082d73 + a0290fcb 6965e348 3e53c612 ed7aee32 + 7621b729 434ee69c b03371d5 d539d874 + 281fed31 45fb0a51 1f0ae1ac 6f4d794b + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 30] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + Keystream: + 000 9f 07 e7 be 55 51 38 7a 98 ba 97 7c 73 2d 08 0d ....UQ8z...|s-.. + 016 cb 0f 29 a0 48 e3 65 69 12 c6 53 3e 32 ee 7a ed ..).H.ei..S>2.z. + 032 29 b7 21 76 9c e6 4e 43 d5 71 33 b0 74 d8 39 d5 ).!v..NC.q3.t.9. + 048 31 ed 1f 28 51 0a fb 45 ac e1 0a 1f 4b 79 4d 6f 1..(Q..E....KyMo + + Test Vector #3: + ============== + + Key: + 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + 016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 ................ + + Nonce: + 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............ + + Block Counter = 1 + + ChaCha state at the end + 2452eb3a 9249f8ec 8d829d9b ddd4ceb1 + e8252083 60818b01 f38422b8 5aaa49c9 + bb00ca8e da3ba7b4 c4b592d1 fdf2732f + 4436274e 2561b3c8 ebdd4aa6 a0136c00 + + Keystream: + 000 3a eb 52 24 ec f8 49 92 9b 9d 82 8d b1 ce d4 dd :.R$..I......... + 016 83 20 25 e8 01 8b 81 60 b8 22 84 f3 c9 49 aa 5a . %....`."...I.Z + 032 8e ca 00 bb b4 a7 3b da d1 92 b5 c4 2f 73 f2 fd ......;...../s.. + 048 4e 27 36 44 c8 b3 61 25 a6 4a dd eb 00 6c 13 a0 N'6D..a%.J...l.. + + Test Vector #4: + ============== + + Key: + 000 00 ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + 016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + + Nonce: + 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............ + + Block Counter = 2 + + ChaCha state at the end + fb4dd572 4bc42ef1 df922636 327f1394 + a78dea8f 5e269039 a1bebbc1 caf09aae + a25ab213 48a6b46c 1b9d9bcb 092c5be6 + 546ca624 1bec45d5 87f47473 96f0992e + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 31] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + Keystream: + 000 72 d5 4d fb f1 2e c4 4b 36 26 92 df 94 13 7f 32 r.M....K6&.....2 + 016 8f ea 8d a7 39 90 26 5e c1 bb be a1 ae 9a f0 ca ....9.&^........ + 032 13 b2 5a a2 6c b4 a6 48 cb 9b 9d 1b e6 5b 2c 09 ..Z.l..H.....[,. + 048 24 a6 6c 54 d5 45 ec 1b 73 74 f4 87 2e 99 f0 96 $.lT.E..st...... + + Test Vector #5: + ============== + + Key: + 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + 016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + + Nonce: + 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 ............ + + Block Counter = 0 + + ChaCha state at the end + 374dc6c2 3736d58c b904e24a cd3f93ef + 88228b1a 96a4dfb3 5b76ab72 c727ee54 + 0e0e978a f3145c95 1b748ea8 f786c297 + 99c28f5f 628314e8 398a19fa 6ded1b53 + + Keystream: + 000 c2 c6 4d 37 8c d5 36 37 4a e2 04 b9 ef 93 3f cd ..M7..67J.....?. + 016 1a 8b 22 88 b3 df a4 96 72 ab 76 5b 54 ee 27 c7 ..".....r.v[T.'. + 032 8a 97 0e 0e 95 5c 14 f3 a8 8e 74 1b 97 c2 86 f7 .....\....t..... + 048 5f 8f c2 99 e8 14 83 62 fa 19 8a 39 53 1b ed 6d _......b...9S..m + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 32] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + +A.2. ChaCha20 Encryption + + Test Vector #1: + ============== + + Key: + 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + 016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + + Nonce: + 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............ + + Initial Block Counter = 0 + + Plaintext: + 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + 016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + 032 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + 048 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + + Ciphertext: + 000 76 b8 e0 ad a0 f1 3d 90 40 5d 6a e5 53 86 bd 28 v.....=.@]j.S..( + 016 bd d2 19 b8 a0 8d ed 1a a8 36 ef cc 8b 77 0d c7 .........6...w.. + 032 da 41 59 7c 51 57 48 8d 77 24 e0 3f b8 d8 4a 37 .AY|QWH.w$.?..J7 + 048 6a 43 b8 f4 15 18 a1 1c c3 87 b6 69 b2 ee 65 86 jC.........i..e. + + Test Vector #2: + ============== + + Key: + 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + 016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 ................ + + Nonce: + 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 ............ + + Initial Block Counter = 1 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 33] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + Plaintext: + 000 41 6e 79 20 73 75 62 6d 69 73 73 69 6f 6e 20 74 Any submission t + 016 6f 20 74 68 65 20 49 45 54 46 20 69 6e 74 65 6e o the IETF inten + 032 64 65 64 20 62 79 20 74 68 65 20 43 6f 6e 74 72 ded by the Contr + 048 69 62 75 74 6f 72 20 66 6f 72 20 70 75 62 6c 69 ibutor for publi + 064 63 61 74 69 6f 6e 20 61 73 20 61 6c 6c 20 6f 72 cation as all or + 080 20 70 61 72 74 20 6f 66 20 61 6e 20 49 45 54 46 part of an IETF + 096 20 49 6e 74 65 72 6e 65 74 2d 44 72 61 66 74 20 Internet-Draft + 112 6f 72 20 52 46 43 20 61 6e 64 20 61 6e 79 20 73 or RFC and any s + 128 74 61 74 65 6d 65 6e 74 20 6d 61 64 65 20 77 69 tatement made wi + 144 74 68 69 6e 20 74 68 65 20 63 6f 6e 74 65 78 74 thin the context + 160 20 6f 66 20 61 6e 20 49 45 54 46 20 61 63 74 69 of an IETF acti + 176 76 69 74 79 20 69 73 20 63 6f 6e 73 69 64 65 72 vity is consider + 192 65 64 20 61 6e 20 22 49 45 54 46 20 43 6f 6e 74 ed an "IETF Cont + 208 72 69 62 75 74 69 6f 6e 22 2e 20 53 75 63 68 20 ribution". Such + 224 73 74 61 74 65 6d 65 6e 74 73 20 69 6e 63 6c 75 statements inclu + 240 64 65 20 6f 72 61 6c 20 73 74 61 74 65 6d 65 6e de oral statemen + 256 74 73 20 69 6e 20 49 45 54 46 20 73 65 73 73 69 ts in IETF sessi + 272 6f 6e 73 2c 20 61 73 20 77 65 6c 6c 20 61 73 20 ons, as well as + 288 77 72 69 74 74 65 6e 20 61 6e 64 20 65 6c 65 63 written and elec + 304 74 72 6f 6e 69 63 20 63 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 tronic communica + 320 74 69 6f 6e 73 20 6d 61 64 65 20 61 74 20 61 6e tions made at an + 336 79 20 74 69 6d 65 20 6f 72 20 70 6c 61 63 65 2c y time or place, + 352 20 77 68 69 63 68 20 61 72 65 20 61 64 64 72 65 which are addre + 368 73 73 65 64 20 74 6f ssed to + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 34] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + Ciphertext: + 000 a3 fb f0 7d f3 fa 2f de 4f 37 6c a2 3e 82 73 70 ...}../.O7l.>.sp + 016 41 60 5d 9f 4f 4f 57 bd 8c ff 2c 1d 4b 79 55 ec A`].OOW...,.KyU. + 032 2a 97 94 8b d3 72 29 15 c8 f3 d3 37 f7 d3 70 05 *....r)....7..p. + 048 0e 9e 96 d6 47 b7 c3 9f 56 e0 31 ca 5e b6 25 0d ....G...V.1.^.%. + 064 40 42 e0 27 85 ec ec fa 4b 4b b5 e8 ea d0 44 0e @B.'....KK....D. + 080 20 b6 e8 db 09 d8 81 a7 c6 13 2f 42 0e 52 79 50 ........./B.RyP + 096 42 bd fa 77 73 d8 a9 05 14 47 b3 29 1c e1 41 1c B..ws....G.)..A. + 112 68 04 65 55 2a a6 c4 05 b7 76 4d 5e 87 be a8 5a h.eU*....vM^...Z + 128 d0 0f 84 49 ed 8f 72 d0 d6 62 ab 05 26 91 ca 66 ...I..r..b..&..f + 144 42 4b c8 6d 2d f8 0e a4 1f 43 ab f9 37 d3 25 9d BK.m-....C..7.%. + 160 c4 b2 d0 df b4 8a 6c 91 39 dd d7 f7 69 66 e9 28 ......l.9...if.( + 176 e6 35 55 3b a7 6c 5c 87 9d 7b 35 d4 9e b2 e6 2b .5U;.l\..{5....+ + 192 08 71 cd ac 63 89 39 e2 5e 8a 1e 0e f9 d5 28 0f .q..c.9.^.....(. + 208 a8 ca 32 8b 35 1c 3c 76 59 89 cb cf 3d aa 8b 6c ..2.5.<vY...=..l + 224 cc 3a af 9f 39 79 c9 2b 37 20 fc 88 dc 95 ed 84 .:..9y.+7 ...... + 240 a1 be 05 9c 64 99 b9 fd a2 36 e7 e8 18 b0 4b 0b ....d....6....K. + 256 c3 9c 1e 87 6b 19 3b fe 55 69 75 3f 88 12 8c c0 ....k.;.Uiu?.... + 272 8a aa 9b 63 d1 a1 6f 80 ef 25 54 d7 18 9c 41 1f ...c..o..%T...A. + 288 58 69 ca 52 c5 b8 3f a3 6f f2 16 b9 c1 d3 00 62 Xi.R..?.o......b + 304 be bc fd 2d c5 bc e0 91 19 34 fd a7 9a 86 f6 e6 ...-.....4...... + 320 98 ce d7 59 c3 ff 9b 64 77 33 8f 3d a4 f9 cd 85 ...Y...dw3.=.... + 336 14 ea 99 82 cc af b3 41 b2 38 4d d9 02 f3 d1 ab .......A.8M..... + 352 7a c6 1d d2 9c 6f 21 ba 5b 86 2f 37 30 e3 7c fd z....o!.[./70.|. + 368 c4 fd 80 6c 22 f2 21 ...l".! + + Test Vector #3: + ============== + + Key: + 000 1c 92 40 a5 eb 55 d3 8a f3 33 88 86 04 f6 b5 f0 ..@..U...3...... + 016 47 39 17 c1 40 2b 80 09 9d ca 5c bc 20 70 75 c0 G9..@+....\. pu. + + Nonce: + 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 ............ + + Initial Block Counter = 42 + + Plaintext: + 000 27 54 77 61 73 20 62 72 69 6c 6c 69 67 2c 20 61 'Twas brillig, a + 016 6e 64 20 74 68 65 20 73 6c 69 74 68 79 20 74 6f nd the slithy to + 032 76 65 73 0a 44 69 64 20 67 79 72 65 20 61 6e 64 ves.Did gyre and + 048 20 67 69 6d 62 6c 65 20 69 6e 20 74 68 65 20 77 gimble in the w + 064 61 62 65 3a 0a 41 6c 6c 20 6d 69 6d 73 79 20 77 abe:.All mimsy w + 080 65 72 65 20 74 68 65 20 62 6f 72 6f 67 6f 76 65 ere the borogove + 096 73 2c 0a 41 6e 64 20 74 68 65 20 6d 6f 6d 65 20 s,.And the mome + 112 72 61 74 68 73 20 6f 75 74 67 72 61 62 65 2e raths outgrabe. + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 35] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + Ciphertext: + 000 62 e6 34 7f 95 ed 87 a4 5f fa e7 42 6f 27 a1 df b.4....._..Bo'.. + 016 5f b6 91 10 04 4c 0d 73 11 8e ff a9 5b 01 e5 cf _....L.s....[... + 032 16 6d 3d f2 d7 21 ca f9 b2 1e 5f b1 4c 61 68 71 .m=..!...._.Lahq + 048 fd 84 c5 4f 9d 65 b2 83 19 6c 7f e4 f6 05 53 eb ...O.e...l....S. + 064 f3 9c 64 02 c4 22 34 e3 2a 35 6b 3e 76 43 12 a6 ..d.."4.*5k>vC.. + 080 1a 55 32 05 57 16 ea d6 96 25 68 f8 7d 3f 3f 77 .U2.W....%h.}??w + 096 04 c6 a8 d1 bc d1 bf 4d 50 d6 15 4b 6d a7 31 b1 .......MP..Km.1. + 112 87 b5 8d fd 72 8a fa 36 75 7a 79 7a c1 88 d1 ....r..6uzyz... + +A.3. Poly1305 Message Authentication Code + + Notice how, in test vector #2, r is equal to zero. The part of the + Poly1305 algorithm where the accumulator is multiplied by r means + that with r equal zero, the tag will be equal to s regardless of the + content of the text. Fortunately, all the proposed methods of + generating r are such that getting this particular weak key is very + unlikely. + + Test Vector #1: + ============== + + One-time Poly1305 Key: + 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + 016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + + Text to MAC: + 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + 016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + 032 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + 048 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + + Tag: + 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + + Test Vector #2: + ============== + + One-time Poly1305 Key: + 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + 016 36 e5 f6 b5 c5 e0 60 70 f0 ef ca 96 22 7a 86 3e 6.....`p...."z.> + + + + + + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 36] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + Text to MAC: + 000 41 6e 79 20 73 75 62 6d 69 73 73 69 6f 6e 20 74 Any submission t + 016 6f 20 74 68 65 20 49 45 54 46 20 69 6e 74 65 6e o the IETF inten + 032 64 65 64 20 62 79 20 74 68 65 20 43 6f 6e 74 72 ded by the Contr + 048 69 62 75 74 6f 72 20 66 6f 72 20 70 75 62 6c 69 ibutor for publi + 064 63 61 74 69 6f 6e 20 61 73 20 61 6c 6c 20 6f 72 cation as all or + 080 20 70 61 72 74 20 6f 66 20 61 6e 20 49 45 54 46 part of an IETF + 096 20 49 6e 74 65 72 6e 65 74 2d 44 72 61 66 74 20 Internet-Draft + 112 6f 72 20 52 46 43 20 61 6e 64 20 61 6e 79 20 73 or RFC and any s + 128 74 61 74 65 6d 65 6e 74 20 6d 61 64 65 20 77 69 tatement made wi + 144 74 68 69 6e 20 74 68 65 20 63 6f 6e 74 65 78 74 thin the context + 160 20 6f 66 20 61 6e 20 49 45 54 46 20 61 63 74 69 of an IETF acti + 176 76 69 74 79 20 69 73 20 63 6f 6e 73 69 64 65 72 vity is consider + 192 65 64 20 61 6e 20 22 49 45 54 46 20 43 6f 6e 74 ed an "IETF Cont + 208 72 69 62 75 74 69 6f 6e 22 2e 20 53 75 63 68 20 ribution". Such + 224 73 74 61 74 65 6d 65 6e 74 73 20 69 6e 63 6c 75 statements inclu + 240 64 65 20 6f 72 61 6c 20 73 74 61 74 65 6d 65 6e de oral statemen + 256 74 73 20 69 6e 20 49 45 54 46 20 73 65 73 73 69 ts in IETF sessi + 272 6f 6e 73 2c 20 61 73 20 77 65 6c 6c 20 61 73 20 ons, as well as + 288 77 72 69 74 74 65 6e 20 61 6e 64 20 65 6c 65 63 written and elec + 304 74 72 6f 6e 69 63 20 63 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 tronic communica + 320 74 69 6f 6e 73 20 6d 61 64 65 20 61 74 20 61 6e tions made at an + 336 79 20 74 69 6d 65 20 6f 72 20 70 6c 61 63 65 2c y time or place, + 352 20 77 68 69 63 68 20 61 72 65 20 61 64 64 72 65 which are addre + 368 73 73 65 64 20 74 6f ssed to + + Tag: + 000 36 e5 f6 b5 c5 e0 60 70 f0 ef ca 96 22 7a 86 3e 6.....`p...."z.> + + Test Vector #3: + ============== + + One-time Poly1305 Key: + 000 36 e5 f6 b5 c5 e0 60 70 f0 ef ca 96 22 7a 86 3e 6.....`p...."z.> + 016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 37] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + Text to MAC: + 000 41 6e 79 20 73 75 62 6d 69 73 73 69 6f 6e 20 74 Any submission t + 016 6f 20 74 68 65 20 49 45 54 46 20 69 6e 74 65 6e o the IETF inten + 032 64 65 64 20 62 79 20 74 68 65 20 43 6f 6e 74 72 ded by the Contr + 048 69 62 75 74 6f 72 20 66 6f 72 20 70 75 62 6c 69 ibutor for publi + 064 63 61 74 69 6f 6e 20 61 73 20 61 6c 6c 20 6f 72 cation as all or + 080 20 70 61 72 74 20 6f 66 20 61 6e 20 49 45 54 46 part of an IETF + 096 20 49 6e 74 65 72 6e 65 74 2d 44 72 61 66 74 20 Internet-Draft + 112 6f 72 20 52 46 43 20 61 6e 64 20 61 6e 79 20 73 or RFC and any s + 128 74 61 74 65 6d 65 6e 74 20 6d 61 64 65 20 77 69 tatement made wi + 144 74 68 69 6e 20 74 68 65 20 63 6f 6e 74 65 78 74 thin the context + 160 20 6f 66 20 61 6e 20 49 45 54 46 20 61 63 74 69 of an IETF acti + 176 76 69 74 79 20 69 73 20 63 6f 6e 73 69 64 65 72 vity is consider + 192 65 64 20 61 6e 20 22 49 45 54 46 20 43 6f 6e 74 ed an "IETF Cont + 208 72 69 62 75 74 69 6f 6e 22 2e 20 53 75 63 68 20 ribution". Such + 224 73 74 61 74 65 6d 65 6e 74 73 20 69 6e 63 6c 75 statements inclu + 240 64 65 20 6f 72 61 6c 20 73 74 61 74 65 6d 65 6e de oral statemen + 256 74 73 20 69 6e 20 49 45 54 46 20 73 65 73 73 69 ts in IETF sessi + 272 6f 6e 73 2c 20 61 73 20 77 65 6c 6c 20 61 73 20 ons, as well as + 288 77 72 69 74 74 65 6e 20 61 6e 64 20 65 6c 65 63 written and elec + 304 74 72 6f 6e 69 63 20 63 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 tronic communica + 320 74 69 6f 6e 73 20 6d 61 64 65 20 61 74 20 61 6e tions made at an + 336 79 20 74 69 6d 65 20 6f 72 20 70 6c 61 63 65 2c y time or place, + 352 20 77 68 69 63 68 20 61 72 65 20 61 64 64 72 65 which are addre + 368 73 73 65 64 20 74 6f ssed to + + Tag: + 000 f3 47 7e 7c d9 54 17 af 89 a6 b8 79 4c 31 0c f0 .G~|.T.....yL1.. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 38] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + Test Vector #4: + ============== + + One-time Poly1305 Key: + 000 1c 92 40 a5 eb 55 d3 8a f3 33 88 86 04 f6 b5 f0 ..@..U...3...... + 016 47 39 17 c1 40 2b 80 09 9d ca 5c bc 20 70 75 c0 G9..@+....\. pu. + + Text to MAC: + 000 27 54 77 61 73 20 62 72 69 6c 6c 69 67 2c 20 61 'Twas brillig, a + 016 6e 64 20 74 68 65 20 73 6c 69 74 68 79 20 74 6f nd the slithy to + 032 76 65 73 0a 44 69 64 20 67 79 72 65 20 61 6e 64 ves.Did gyre and + 048 20 67 69 6d 62 6c 65 20 69 6e 20 74 68 65 20 77 gimble in the w + 064 61 62 65 3a 0a 41 6c 6c 20 6d 69 6d 73 79 20 77 abe:.All mimsy w + 080 65 72 65 20 74 68 65 20 62 6f 72 6f 67 6f 76 65 ere the borogove + 096 73 2c 0a 41 6e 64 20 74 68 65 20 6d 6f 6d 65 20 s,.And the mome + 112 72 61 74 68 73 20 6f 75 74 67 72 61 62 65 2e raths outgrabe. + + Tag: + 000 45 41 66 9a 7e aa ee 61 e7 08 dc 7c bc c5 eb 62 EAf.~..a...|...b + + Test Vector #5: If one uses 130-bit partial reduction, does the code + handle the case where partially reduced final result is not fully + reduced? + + R: + 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + S: + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + data: + FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF + tag: + 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + + Test Vector #6: What happens if addition of s overflows modulo 2^128? + + R: + 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + S: + FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF + data: + 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + tag: + 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + + + + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 39] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + Test Vector #7: What happens if data limb is all ones and there is + carry from lower limb? + + R: + 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + S: + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + data: + FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF + F0 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF + 11 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + tag: + 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + + Test Vector #8: What happens if final result from polynomial part is + exactly 2^130-5? + + R: + 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + S: + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + data: + FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF + FB FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE + 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 + tag: + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + + Test Vector #9: What happens if final result from polynomial part is + exactly 2^130-6? + + R: + 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + S: + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + data: + FD FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF + tag: + FA FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 40] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + Test Vector #10: What happens if 5*H+L-type reduction produces + 131-bit intermediate result? + + R: + 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + S: + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + data: + E3 35 94 D7 50 5E 43 B9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + 33 94 D7 50 5E 43 79 CD 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + tag: + 14 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + + Test Vector #11: What happens if 5*H+L-type reduction produces + 131-bit final result? + + R: + 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + S: + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + data: + E3 35 94 D7 50 5E 43 B9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + 33 94 D7 50 5E 43 79 CD 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + tag: + 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + +A.4. Poly1305 Key Generation Using ChaCha20 + + Test Vector #1: + ============== + + The ChaCha20 Key: + 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + 016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + + The nonce: + 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............ + + Poly1305 one-time key: + 000 76 b8 e0 ad a0 f1 3d 90 40 5d 6a e5 53 86 bd 28 v.....=.@]j.S..( + 016 bd d2 19 b8 a0 8d ed 1a a8 36 ef cc 8b 77 0d c7 .........6...w.. + + + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 41] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + Test Vector #2: + ============== + + The ChaCha20 Key + 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + 016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 ................ + + The nonce: + 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 ............ + + Poly1305 one-time key: + 000 ec fa 25 4f 84 5f 64 74 73 d3 cb 14 0d a9 e8 76 ..%O._dts......v + 016 06 cb 33 06 6c 44 7b 87 bc 26 66 dd e3 fb b7 39 ..3.lD{..&f....9 + + Test Vector #3: + ============== + + The ChaCha20 Key + 000 1c 92 40 a5 eb 55 d3 8a f3 33 88 86 04 f6 b5 f0 ..@..U...3...... + 016 47 39 17 c1 40 2b 80 09 9d ca 5c bc 20 70 75 c0 G9..@+....\. pu. + + The nonce: + 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 ............ + + Poly1305 one-time key: + 000 96 5e 3b c6 f9 ec 7e d9 56 08 08 f4 d2 29 f9 4b .^;...~.V....).K + 016 13 7f f2 75 ca 9b 3f cb dd 59 de aa d2 33 10 ae ...u..?..Y...3.. + +A.5. ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD Decryption + + Below we see decrypting a message. We receive a ciphertext, a nonce, + and a tag. We know the key. We will check the tag and then + (assuming that it validates) decrypt the ciphertext. In this + particular protocol, we'll assume that there is no padding of the + plaintext. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 42] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + The ChaCha20 Key + 000 1c 92 40 a5 eb 55 d3 8a f3 33 88 86 04 f6 b5 f0 ..@..U...3...... + 016 47 39 17 c1 40 2b 80 09 9d ca 5c bc 20 70 75 c0 G9..@+....\. pu. + + Ciphertext: + 000 64 a0 86 15 75 86 1a f4 60 f0 62 c7 9b e6 43 bd d...u...`.b...C. + 016 5e 80 5c fd 34 5c f3 89 f1 08 67 0a c7 6c 8c b2 ^.\.4\....g..l.. + 032 4c 6c fc 18 75 5d 43 ee a0 9e e9 4e 38 2d 26 b0 Ll..u]C....N8-&. + 048 bd b7 b7 3c 32 1b 01 00 d4 f0 3b 7f 35 58 94 cf ...<2.....;.5X.. + 064 33 2f 83 0e 71 0b 97 ce 98 c8 a8 4a bd 0b 94 81 3/..q......J.... + 080 14 ad 17 6e 00 8d 33 bd 60 f9 82 b1 ff 37 c8 55 ...n..3.`....7.U + 096 97 97 a0 6e f4 f0 ef 61 c1 86 32 4e 2b 35 06 38 ...n...a..2N+5.8 + 112 36 06 90 7b 6a 7c 02 b0 f9 f6 15 7b 53 c8 67 e4 6..{j|.....{S.g. + 128 b9 16 6c 76 7b 80 4d 46 a5 9b 52 16 cd e7 a4 e9 ..lv{.MF..R..... + 144 90 40 c5 a4 04 33 22 5e e2 82 a1 b0 a0 6c 52 3e .@...3"^.....lR> + 160 af 45 34 d7 f8 3f a1 15 5b 00 47 71 8c bc 54 6a .E4..?..[.Gq..Tj + 176 0d 07 2b 04 b3 56 4e ea 1b 42 22 73 f5 48 27 1a ..+..VN..B"s.H'. + 192 0b b2 31 60 53 fa 76 99 19 55 eb d6 31 59 43 4e ..1`S.v..U..1YCN + 208 ce bb 4e 46 6d ae 5a 10 73 a6 72 76 27 09 7a 10 ..NFm.Z.s.rv'.z. + 224 49 e6 17 d9 1d 36 10 94 fa 68 f0 ff 77 98 71 30 I....6...h..w.q0 + 240 30 5b ea ba 2e da 04 df 99 7b 71 4d 6c 6f 2c 29 0[.......{qMlo,) + 256 a6 ad 5c b4 02 2b 02 70 9b ..\..+.p. + + The nonce: + 000 00 00 00 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 ............ + + The AAD: + 000 f3 33 88 86 00 00 00 00 00 00 4e 91 .3........N. + + Received Tag: + 000 ee ad 9d 67 89 0c bb 22 39 23 36 fe a1 85 1f 38 ...g..."9#6....8 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 43] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + First, we calculate the one-time Poly1305 key + + ChaCha state with key setup + 61707865 3320646e 79622d32 6b206574 + a540921c 8ad355eb 868833f3 f0b5f604 + c1173947 09802b40 bc5cca9d c0757020 + 00000000 00000000 04030201 08070605 + + ChaCha state after 20 rounds + a94af0bd 89dee45c b64bb195 afec8fa1 + 508f4726 63f554c0 1ea2c0db aa721526 + 11b1e514 a0bacc0f 828a6015 d7825481 + e8a4a850 d9dcbbd6 4c2de33a f8ccd912 + + out bytes: + bd:f0:4a:a9:5c:e4:de:89:95:b1:4b:b6:a1:8f:ec:af: + 26:47:8f:50:c0:54:f5:63:db:c0:a2:1e:26:15:72:aa + + Poly1305 one-time key: + 000 bd f0 4a a9 5c e4 de 89 95 b1 4b b6 a1 8f ec af ..J.\.....K..... + 016 26 47 8f 50 c0 54 f5 63 db c0 a2 1e 26 15 72 aa &G.P.T.c....&.r. + + Next, we construct the AEAD buffer + + Poly1305 Input: + 000 f3 33 88 86 00 00 00 00 00 00 4e 91 00 00 00 00 .3........N..... + 016 64 a0 86 15 75 86 1a f4 60 f0 62 c7 9b e6 43 bd d...u...`.b...C. + 032 5e 80 5c fd 34 5c f3 89 f1 08 67 0a c7 6c 8c b2 ^.\.4\....g..l.. + 048 4c 6c fc 18 75 5d 43 ee a0 9e e9 4e 38 2d 26 b0 Ll..u]C....N8-&. + 064 bd b7 b7 3c 32 1b 01 00 d4 f0 3b 7f 35 58 94 cf ...<2.....;.5X.. + 080 33 2f 83 0e 71 0b 97 ce 98 c8 a8 4a bd 0b 94 81 3/..q......J.... + 096 14 ad 17 6e 00 8d 33 bd 60 f9 82 b1 ff 37 c8 55 ...n..3.`....7.U + 112 97 97 a0 6e f4 f0 ef 61 c1 86 32 4e 2b 35 06 38 ...n...a..2N+5.8 + 128 36 06 90 7b 6a 7c 02 b0 f9 f6 15 7b 53 c8 67 e4 6..{j|.....{S.g. + 144 b9 16 6c 76 7b 80 4d 46 a5 9b 52 16 cd e7 a4 e9 ..lv{.MF..R..... + 160 90 40 c5 a4 04 33 22 5e e2 82 a1 b0 a0 6c 52 3e .@...3"^.....lR> + 176 af 45 34 d7 f8 3f a1 15 5b 00 47 71 8c bc 54 6a .E4..?..[.Gq..Tj + 192 0d 07 2b 04 b3 56 4e ea 1b 42 22 73 f5 48 27 1a ..+..VN..B"s.H'. + 208 0b b2 31 60 53 fa 76 99 19 55 eb d6 31 59 43 4e ..1`S.v..U..1YCN + 224 ce bb 4e 46 6d ae 5a 10 73 a6 72 76 27 09 7a 10 ..NFm.Z.s.rv'.z. + 240 49 e6 17 d9 1d 36 10 94 fa 68 f0 ff 77 98 71 30 I....6...h..w.q0 + 256 30 5b ea ba 2e da 04 df 99 7b 71 4d 6c 6f 2c 29 0[.......{qMlo,) + 272 a6 ad 5c b4 02 2b 02 70 9b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..\..+.p........ + 288 0c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 09 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + + + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 44] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + + We calculate the Poly1305 tag and find that it matches + + Calculated Tag: + 000 ee ad 9d 67 89 0c bb 22 39 23 36 fe a1 85 1f 38 ...g..."9#6....8 + + Finally, we decrypt the ciphertext + + Plaintext:: + 000 49 6e 74 65 72 6e 65 74 2d 44 72 61 66 74 73 20 Internet-Drafts + 016 61 72 65 20 64 72 61 66 74 20 64 6f 63 75 6d 65 are draft docume + 032 6e 74 73 20 76 61 6c 69 64 20 66 6f 72 20 61 20 nts valid for a + 048 6d 61 78 69 6d 75 6d 20 6f 66 20 73 69 78 20 6d maximum of six m + 064 6f 6e 74 68 73 20 61 6e 64 20 6d 61 79 20 62 65 onths and may be + 080 20 75 70 64 61 74 65 64 2c 20 72 65 70 6c 61 63 updated, replac + 096 65 64 2c 20 6f 72 20 6f 62 73 6f 6c 65 74 65 64 ed, or obsoleted + 112 20 62 79 20 6f 74 68 65 72 20 64 6f 63 75 6d 65 by other docume + 128 6e 74 73 20 61 74 20 61 6e 79 20 74 69 6d 65 2e nts at any time. + 144 20 49 74 20 69 73 20 69 6e 61 70 70 72 6f 70 72 It is inappropr + 160 69 61 74 65 20 74 6f 20 75 73 65 20 49 6e 74 65 iate to use Inte + 176 72 6e 65 74 2d 44 72 61 66 74 73 20 61 73 20 72 rnet-Drafts as r + 192 65 66 65 72 65 6e 63 65 20 6d 61 74 65 72 69 61 eference materia + 208 6c 20 6f 72 20 74 6f 20 63 69 74 65 20 74 68 65 l or to cite the + 224 6d 20 6f 74 68 65 72 20 74 68 61 6e 20 61 73 20 m other than as + 240 2f e2 80 9c 77 6f 72 6b 20 69 6e 20 70 72 6f 67 /...work in prog + 256 72 65 73 73 2e 2f e2 80 9d ress./... + +Appendix B. Performance Measurements of ChaCha20 + + The following measurements were made by Adam Langley for a blog post + published on February 27th, 2014. The original blog post was + available at the time of this writing at + <https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/02/27/tlssymmetriccrypto.html>. + + +----------------------------+-------------+-------------------+ + | Chip | AES-128-GCM | ChaCha20-Poly1305 | + +----------------------------+-------------+-------------------+ + | OMAP 4460 | 24.1 MB/s | 75.3 MB/s | + | Snapdragon S4 Pro | 41.5 MB/s | 130.9 MB/s | + | Sandy Bridge Xeon (AES-NI) | 900 MB/s | 500 MB/s | + +----------------------------+-------------+-------------------+ + + Table 1: Speed Comparison + + + + + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 45] + +RFC 8439 ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018 + + +Acknowledgements + + ChaCha20 and Poly1305 were invented by Daniel J. Bernstein. The AEAD + construction and the method of creating the one-time Poly1305 key + were invented by Adam Langley. + + Thanks to Robert Ransom, Watson Ladd, Stefan Buhler, Dan Harkins, and + Kenny Paterson for their helpful comments and explanations. Thanks + to Niels Moller for suggesting the more efficient AEAD construction + in this document. Special thanks to Ilari Liusvaara for providing + extra test vectors, helpful comments, and for being the first to + attempt an implementation from this document. Thanks to Sean + Parkinson for suggesting improvements to the examples and the + pseudocode. Thanks to David Ireland for pointing out a bug in the + pseudocode, and to Stephen Farrell and Alyssa Rowan for pointing out + missing advise in the security considerations. + + Special thanks goes to Gordon Procter for performing a security + analysis of the composition and publishing [Procter]. + + Jim Schaad and John Mattson provided feedback on tag truncation, and + Russ Housley, Stanislav Smyshlyaev, and John Mattson each provided a + review of this version. + +Authors' Addresses + + Yoav Nir + Dell EMC + 9 Andrei Sakharov St + Haifa 3190500 + Israel + + Email: ynir.ietf@gmail.com + + + Adam Langley + Google, Inc. + + Email: agl@google.com + + + + + + + + + + + + +Nir & Langley Informational [Page 46] + |