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authorThomas Voss <mail@thomasvoss.com> 2024-11-27 20:54:24 +0100
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+Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Jeong, Ed.
+Request for Comments: 9365 Sungkyunkwan University
+Category: Informational March 2023
+ISSN: 2070-1721
+
+
+ IPv6 Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (IPWAVE): Problem
+ Statement and Use Cases
+
+Abstract
+
+ This document discusses the problem statement and use cases of
+ IPv6-based vehicular networking for Intelligent Transportation
+ Systems (ITS). The main scenarios of vehicular communications are
+ vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I), and
+ vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications. First, this document
+ explains use cases using V2V, V2I, and V2X networking. Next, for
+ IPv6-based vehicular networks, it makes a gap analysis of current
+ IPv6 protocols (e.g., IPv6 Neighbor Discovery, mobility management,
+ as well as security and privacy).
+
+Status of This Memo
+
+ This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
+ published for informational purposes.
+
+ This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
+ (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
+ received public review and has been approved for publication by the
+ Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
+ approved by the IESG are candidates for any level of Internet
+ Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.
+
+ Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
+ and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
+ https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9365.
+
+Copyright Notice
+
+ Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
+ document authors. All rights reserved.
+
+ This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
+ Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
+ (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
+ publication of this document. Please review these documents
+ carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
+ to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
+ include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
+ Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
+ in the Revised BSD License.
+
+Table of Contents
+
+ 1. Introduction
+ 2. Terminology
+ 3. Use Cases
+ 3.1. V2V
+ 3.2. V2I
+ 3.3. V2X
+ 4. Vehicular Networks
+ 4.1. Vehicular Network Architecture
+ 4.2. V2I-Based Internetworking
+ 4.3. V2V-Based Internetworking
+ 5. Problem Statement
+ 5.1. Neighbor Discovery
+ 5.1.1. Link Model
+ 5.1.2. MAC Address Pseudonym
+ 5.1.3. Routing
+ 5.2. Mobility Management
+ 6. Security Considerations
+ 6.1. Security Threats in Neighbor Discovery
+ 6.2. Security Threats in Mobility Management
+ 6.3. Other Threats
+ 7. IANA Considerations
+ 8. References
+ 8.1. Normative References
+ 8.2. Informative References
+ Appendix A. Support of Multiple Radio Technologies for V2V
+ Appendix B. Support of Multihop V2X Networking
+ Appendix C. Support of Mobility Management for V2I
+ Appendix D. Support of MTU Diversity for IP-Based Vehicular
+ Networks
+ Acknowledgments
+ Contributors
+ Author's Address
+
+1. Introduction
+
+ Vehicular networking studies have mainly focused on improving road
+ safety and efficiency and also enabling entertainment in vehicular
+ networks. To proliferate the use cases of vehicular networks,
+ several governments and private organizations have committed to
+ allocating dedicated spectrum for vehicular communications. The
+ Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the US allocated wireless
+ channels for Dedicated Short-Range Communications (DSRC) [DSRC] in
+ the Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) with the frequency band
+ of 5.850 - 5.925 GHz (i.e., 5.9 GHz band). In November 2020, the FCC
+ adjusted the lower 45 MHz (i.e., 5.850 - 5.895 GHz) of the 5.9 GHz
+ band for unlicensed use instead of DSRC-dedicated use
+ [FCC-ITS-Modification]. DSRC-based wireless communications can
+ support vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I),
+ and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) networking. The European Union (EU)
+ allocated radio spectrum for safety-related and non-safety-related
+ applications of ITS with the frequency band of 5.875 - 5.905 GHz, as
+ part of the Commission Decision 2008/671/EC [EU-2008-671-EC]. Most
+ other countries and regions in the world have adopted the 5.9 GHz
+ band for vehicular networks, though different countries use different
+ ways to divide the band into channels.
+
+ For direct inter-vehicular wireless connectivity, IEEE has amended
+ standard 802.11 (commonly known as Wi-Fi) to enable safe driving
+ services based on DSRC for the Wireless Access in Vehicular
+ Environments (WAVE) system. The Physical Layer (L1) and Data Link
+ Layer (L2) issues are addressed in IEEE 802.11p [IEEE-802.11p] for
+ the PHY and MAC layers of the DSRC, while IEEE Std 1609.2
+ [WAVE-1609.2] covers security aspects, IEEE Std 1609.3 [WAVE-1609.3]
+ defines related services at network and transport layers, and IEEE
+ Std 1609.4 [WAVE-1609.4] specifies the multichannel operation. IEEE
+ 802.11p was first a separate amendment but was later rolled into the
+ base 802.11 standard (IEEE Std 802.11-2012) as IEEE 802.11 Outside
+ the Context of a Basic Service Set (OCB) in 2012 [IEEE-802.11-OCB].
+
+ 3GPP has standardized Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything (C-V2X)
+ communications to support V2X in LTE mobile networks (called LTE V2X)
+ and V2X in 5G mobile networks (called 5G V2X) [TS-23.285-3GPP]
+ [TR-22.886-3GPP] [TS-23.287-3GPP]. With C-V2X, vehicles can directly
+ communicate with each other without relay nodes (e.g., eNodeB in LTE
+ and gNodeB in 5G).
+
+ Along with these WAVE standards and C-V2X standards, regardless of a
+ wireless access technology under the IP stack of a vehicle, vehicular
+ networks can operate IP mobility with IPv6 [RFC8200], that is, Mobile
+ IPv6 protocols, e.g., Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) [RFC6275], Proxy Mobile
+ IPv6 (PMIPv6) [RFC5213], Distributed Mobility Management (DMM)
+ [RFC7333], Network Mobility (NEMO) [RFC3963], and the Locator/ID
+ Separation Protocol (LISP) [RFC9300]. In addition, ISO has approved
+ a standard specifying the IPv6 network protocols and services to be
+ used for Communications Access for Land Mobiles (CALM) [ISO-ITS-IPv6]
+ [ISO-ITS-IPv6-AMD1].
+
+ This document describes use cases and a problem statement about
+ IPv6-based vehicular networking for ITS, which is named IPv6 Wireless
+ Access in Vehicular Environments (IPWAVE). First, it introduces the
+ use cases for using V2V, V2I, and V2X networking in ITS. Next, for
+ IPv6-based vehicular networks, it makes a gap analysis of current
+ IPv6 protocols (e.g., IPv6 Neighbor Discovery, mobility management,
+ as well as security and privacy) so that those protocols can be
+ tailored to IPv6-based vehicular networking. Thus, this document is
+ intended to motivate development of key protocols for IPWAVE.
+
+2. Terminology
+
+ This document uses the terminology described in [RFC8691]. In
+ addition, the following terms are defined below:
+
+ Context-Awareness: A vehicle can be aware of spatial-temporal
+ mobility information (e.g., position, speed, direction, and
+ acceleration/deceleration) of surrounding vehicles for both safety
+ and non-safety uses through sensing or communication [CASD].
+
+ Distributed Mobility Management (DMM): See [RFC7333] [RFC7429].
+
+ Edge Computing Device (ECD): This is a computing device (or server)
+ at the edge of the network for vehicles and vulnerable road users.
+ It co-locates with or connects to an IP Roadside Unit (IP-RSU),
+ which has a powerful computing capability for different kinds of
+ computing tasks, such as image processing and classification.
+
+ Edge Network (EN): This is an access network that has an IP-RSU for
+ wireless communication with other vehicles having an IP On-Board
+ Unit (IP-OBU) and wired communication with other network devices
+ (e.g., routers, IP-RSUs, ECDs, servers, and Mobility Anchors
+ (MAs)). It may use a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)
+ such as Global Positioning System (GPS) with a GNSS receiver for
+ its position recognition and the localization service for the sake
+ of vehicles.
+
+ Evolved Node B (eNodeB): This is a base station entity that supports
+ the Long Term Evolution (LTE) air interface.
+
+ Internet Protocol On-Board Unit (IP-OBU): An IP-OBU denotes a
+ computer situated in a vehicle (e.g., car, bicycle, electric bike,
+ motorcycle, or similar), which has a basic processing ability and
+ can be driven by a low-power CPU (e.g., ARM). It has at least one
+ IP interface that runs in IEEE 802.11-OCB and has an "OBU"
+ transceiver. Also, it may have an IP interface that runs in
+ Cellular V2X (C-V2X) [TS-23.285-3GPP] [TR-22.886-3GPP]
+ [TS-23.287-3GPP]. It can play the role of a router connecting
+ multiple computers (or in-vehicle devices) inside a vehicle. See
+ the definition of the term "IP-OBU" in [RFC8691].
+
+ IP Roadside Unit (IP-RSU): An IP-RSU is situated along the road. It
+ has at least two distinct IP-enabled interfaces. The wireless
+ PHY/MAC layer of at least one of its IP-enabled interfaces is
+ configured to operate in 802.11-OCB mode [IEEE-802.11-OCB]. An
+ IP-RSU communicates with the IP-OBU over an 802.11 wireless link
+ operating in OCB mode. One of its IP-enabled interfaces is
+ connected to the wired network for wired communication with other
+ network devices (e.g., routers, IP-RSUs, ECDs, servers, and MAs).
+ Also, it may have another IP-enabled wireless interface running in
+ 3GPP C-V2X in addition to the IP-RSU defined in [RFC8691]. An IP-
+ RSU is similar to an Access Network Router (ANR), defined in
+ [RFC3753], and a Wireless Termination Point (WTP), defined in
+ [RFC5415]. See the definition of the term "IP-RSU" in [RFC8691].
+
+ Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR): This is a method for measuring
+ a distance to an object by emitting pulsed laser light and
+ measuring the reflected pulsed light.
+
+ Mobility Anchor (MA): This is a node that maintains IPv6 addresses
+ and mobility information of vehicles in a road network to support
+ their IPv6 address autoconfiguration and mobility management with
+ a binding table. An MA has end-to-end (E2E) connections (e.g.,
+ tunnels) with IP-RSUs under its control for the IPv6 address
+ autoconfiguration and mobility management of the vehicles. This
+ MA is similar to a Local Mobility Anchor (LMA) in PMIPv6 [RFC5213]
+ for network-based mobility management.
+
+ Next Generation Node B (gNodeB): This is a base station entity that
+ supports the 5G New Radio (NR) air interface.
+
+ Outside the Context of a BSS (OCB): This is a mode of operation in
+ which a station (STA) is not a member of a Basic Service Set (BSS)
+ and does not utilize IEEE Std 802.11 authentication, association,
+ or data confidentiality [IEEE-802.11-OCB].
+
+ 802.11-OCB: This refers to the mode specified in IEEE Std
+ 802.11-2016 [IEEE-802.11-OCB] when the MIB attribute
+ dot11OCBActivated is 'true'.
+
+ Platooning: Moving vehicles can be grouped together to reduce air
+ resistance for energy efficiency and reduce the number of drivers
+ such that only the lead vehicle has a driver, and the other
+ vehicles are autonomous vehicles without a driver and closely
+ follow the lead vehicle [Truck-Platooning].
+
+ Traffic Control Center (TCC): This is a system that manages road
+ infrastructure nodes (e.g., IP-RSUs, MAs, traffic signals, and
+ loop detectors) and also maintains vehicular traffic statistics
+ (e.g., average vehicle speed and vehicle inter-arrival time per
+ road segment) and vehicle information (e.g., a vehicle's
+ identifier, position, direction, speed, and trajectory as a
+ navigation path). TCC is part of a Vehicular Cloud for vehicular
+ networks.
+
+ Urban Air Mobility (UAM): This refers to using lower-altitude
+ aircraft to transport passengers or cargo in urban and suburban
+ areas. The carriers used for UAM can be manned or unmanned
+ vehicles, which can include helicopters, electric vertical take-
+ off and landing (eVTOL) aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles
+ (UAVs).
+
+ Vehicle: This is a node that has an IP-OBU for wireless
+ communication with other vehicles and IP-RSUs. It has a GNSS
+ radio navigation receiver for efficient navigation. Any device
+ having an IP-OBU and a GNSS receiver (e.g., smartphone and tablet
+ PC) can be regarded as a vehicle in this document.
+
+ Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET): This is a network that consists of
+ vehicles interconnected by wireless communication. Two vehicles
+ in a VANET can communicate with each other using other vehicles as
+ relays even where they are out of one-hop wireless communication
+ range.
+
+ Vehicular Cloud: This is a cloud infrastructure for vehicular
+ networks, having compute nodes, storage nodes, and network
+ forwarding elements (e.g., switch and router).
+
+ Vehicle to Device (V2D): This is the wireless communication between
+ a vehicle and a device (e.g., smartphone and IoT (Internet of
+ Things) device).
+
+ Vehicle to Pedestrian (V2P): This is the wireless communication
+ between a vehicle and a pedestrian's device (e.g., smartphone and
+ IoT device).
+
+ Vehicle to Infrastructure to Vehicle (V2I2V): This is the wireless
+ communication between a vehicle and another vehicle via an
+ infrastructure node (e.g., IP-RSU).
+
+ Vehicle to Infrastructure to Everything (V2I2X): This is the
+ wireless communication between a vehicle and another entity (e.g.,
+ vehicle, smartphone, and IoT device) via an infrastructure node
+ (e.g., IP-RSU).
+
+ Vehicle to Everything (V2X): This is the wireless communication
+ between a vehicle and any entity (e.g., vehicle, infrastructure
+ node, smartphone, and IoT device), including V2V, V2I, V2D, and
+ V2P.
+
+ Vehicular Mobility Management (VMM): This is IPv6-based mobility
+ management for vehicular networks.
+
+ Vehicular Neighbor Discovery (VND): This is an IPv6 ND (Neighbor
+ Discovery) extension for vehicular networks.
+
+ Vehicular Security and Privacy (VSP): This is IPv6-based security
+ and privacy for vehicular networks.
+
+ Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE): See [WAVE-1609.0].
+
+3. Use Cases
+
+ This section explains use cases of V2V, V2I, and V2X networking. The
+ use cases of the V2X networking exclude the ones of the V2V and V2I
+ networking but include Vehicle-to-Pedestrian (V2P) and Vehicle-to-
+ Device (V2D).
+
+ IP is widely used among popular end-user devices (e.g., smartphone
+ and tablet) in the Internet. Applications (e.g., navigator
+ application) for those devices can be extended such that the V2V use
+ cases in this section can work with IPv6 as a network layer protocol
+ and IEEE 802.11-OCB as a link-layer protocol. In addition, IPv6
+ security needs to be extended to support those V2V use cases in a
+ safe, secure, privacy-preserving way.
+
+ The use cases presented in this section serve as the description and
+ motivation for the need to augment IPv6 and its protocols to
+ facilitate "Vehicular IPv6". Section 5 summarizes the overall
+ problem statement and IPv6 requirements. Note that the adjective
+ "Vehicular" in this document is used to represent extensions of
+ existing protocols, such as IPv6 Neighbor Discovery, IPv6 Mobility
+ Management (e.g., PMIPv6 [RFC5213] and DMM [RFC7429]), and IPv6
+ Security and Privacy Mechanisms rather than new "vehicular-specific"
+ functions.
+
+3.1. V2V
+
+ The use cases of V2V networking discussed in this section include:
+
+ * Context-aware navigation for driving safely and avoiding
+ collisions
+
+ * Collision avoidance service of end systems of Urban Air Mobility
+ (UAM)
+
+ * Cooperative adaptive cruise control on a roadway
+
+ * Platooning on a highway
+
+ * Cooperative environment sensing
+
+ The above use cases are examples for using V2V networking, which can
+ be extended to other terrestrial vehicles, river/sea ships, railed
+ vehicles, or UAM end systems.
+
+ A Context-Aware Safety Driving (CASD) navigator [CASD] can help
+ drivers to drive safely as a context-aware navigation service [CNP]
+ by alerting them to dangerous obstacles and situations. That is, a
+ CASD navigator displays obstacles or neighboring vehicles relevant to
+ possible collisions in real time through V2V networking. CASD
+ provides vehicles with a class-based automatic safety action plan
+ that considers three situations, namely, the Line-of-Sight unsafe,
+ Non-Line-of-Sight unsafe, and safe situations. This action plan can
+ be put into action among multiple vehicles using V2V networking.
+
+ A service for collision avoidance of in-air UAM end systems is one
+ possible use case in air vehicular environments [UAM-ITS]. This use
+ case is similar to that of a context-aware navigator for terrestrial
+ vehicles. Through V2V coordination, those UAM end systems (e.g.,
+ drones) can avoid a dangerous situation (e.g., collision) in three-
+ dimensional space rather than two-dimensional space for terrestrial
+ vehicles. Also, a UAM end system (e.g., flying car), when only a few
+ hundred meters off the ground, can communicate with terrestrial
+ vehicles with wireless communication technologies (e.g., DSRC, LTE,
+ and C-V2X). Thus, V2V means any vehicle to any vehicle, whether the
+ vehicles are ground level or not.
+
+ Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) [CA-Cruise-Control] helps
+ individual vehicles to adapt their speed autonomously through V2V
+ communication among vehicles according to the mobility of their
+ predecessor and successor vehicles on an urban roadway or a highway.
+ Thus, CACC can help adjacent vehicles to efficiently adjust their
+ speed in an interactive way through V2V networking in order to avoid
+ a collision.
+
+ Platooning [Truck-Platooning] allows a series (or group) of vehicles
+ (e.g., trucks) to follow each other very closely. Vehicles can use
+ V2V communication in addition to forward sensors in order to maintain
+ constant clearance between two consecutive vehicles at very short
+ gaps (from 3 to 10 meters). Platooning can maximize the throughput
+ of vehicular traffic on a highway and reduce the gas consumption
+ because the lead vehicle can help the following vehicles experience
+ less air resistance.
+
+ Cooperative-environment-sensing use cases suggest that vehicles can
+ share environmental information (e.g., air pollution, hazards,
+ obstacles, slippery areas by snow or rain, road accidents, traffic
+ congestion, and driving behaviors of neighboring vehicles) from
+ various vehicle-mounted sensors, such as radars, LiDAR systems, and
+ cameras, with other vehicles and pedestrians. [Automotive-Sensing]
+ introduces millimeter-wave vehicular communication for massive
+ automotive sensing. A lot of data can be generated by those sensors,
+ and these data typically need to be routed to different destinations.
+ In addition, from the perspective of driverless vehicles, it is
+ expected that driverless vehicles can be mixed with driver-operated
+ vehicles. Through cooperative environment sensing, driver-operated
+ vehicles can use environmental information sensed by driverless
+ vehicles for better interaction with the other vehicles and
+ environment. Vehicles can also share their intended maneuvering
+ information (e.g., lane change, speed change, ramp in-and-out, cut-
+ in, and abrupt braking) with neighboring vehicles. Thus, this
+ information sharing can help the vehicles behave as more efficient
+ traffic flows and minimize unnecessary acceleration and deceleration
+ to achieve the best ride comfort.
+
+ To support applications of these V2V use cases, the required
+ functions of IPv6 include (a) IPv6-based packet exchange in both
+ control and data planes and (b) secure, safe communication between
+ two vehicles. For the support of V2V under multiple radio
+ technologies (e.g., DSRC and 5G V2X), refer to Appendix A.
+
+3.2. V2I
+
+ The use cases of V2I networking discussed in this section include:
+
+ * Navigation service
+
+ * Energy-efficient speed recommendation service
+
+ * Accident notification service
+
+ * Electric Vehicle (EV) charging service
+
+ * UAM navigation service with efficient battery charging
+
+ A navigation service (for example, the Self-Adaptive Interactive
+ Navigation Tool [SAINT]) that uses V2I networking interacts with a
+ TCC for the large-scale/long-range road traffic optimization and can
+ guide individual vehicles along appropriate navigation paths in real
+ time. The enhanced version of SAINT [SAINTplus] can give fast-moving
+ paths to emergency vehicles (e.g., ambulance and fire engine) to let
+ them reach an accident spot while redirecting other vehicles near the
+ accident spot into efficient detour paths.
+
+ Either a TCC or an ECD can recommend an energy-efficient speed to a
+ vehicle that depends on its traffic environment and traffic signal
+ scheduling [SignalGuru]. For example, when a vehicle approaches an
+ intersection area and a red traffic light for the vehicle becomes
+ turned on, it needs to reduce its speed to save fuel consumption. In
+ this case, either a TCC or an ECD, which has the up-to-date
+ trajectory of the vehicle and the traffic light schedule, can notify
+ the vehicle of an appropriate speed for fuel efficiency.
+ [Fuel-Efficient] covers fuel-efficient route and speed plans for
+ platooned trucks.
+
+ The emergency communication between vehicles in an accident (or
+ emergency-response vehicles) and a TCC can be performed via either
+ IP-RSUs or 4G-LTE or 5G networks. The First Responder Network
+ Authority [FirstNet] is provided by the US government to establish,
+ operate, and maintain an interoperable public safety broadband
+ network for safety and security network services, e.g., emergency
+ calls. The construction of the nationwide FirstNet network requires
+ each state in the US to have a Radio Access Network (RAN) that will
+ connect to the FirstNet's network core. The current RAN is mainly
+ constructed using 4G-LTE for communication between a vehicle and an
+ infrastructure node (i.e., V2I) [FirstNet-Report], but it is expected
+ that DSRC-based vehicular networks [DSRC] will be available for V2I
+ and V2V in the near future. An equivalent project in Europe is
+ called Public Safety Communications Europe [PSCE], which is
+ developing a network for emergency communications.
+
+ An EV charging service with V2I can facilitate the efficient battery
+ charging of EVs. In the case where an EV charging station is
+ connected to an IP-RSU, an EV can be guided toward the deck of the EV
+ charging station or be notified that the charging station is out of
+ service through a battery charging server connected to the IP-RSU.
+ In addition to this EV charging service, other value-added services
+ (e.g., firmware/software update over-the-air and media streaming) can
+ be provided to an EV while it is charging its battery at the EV
+ charging station. For a UAM navigation service, an efficient battery
+ charging plan can improve the battery charging schedule of UAM end
+ systems (e.g., drones) for long-distance flying [CBDN]. For this
+ battery charging schedule, a UAM end system can communicate with a
+ cloud server via an infrastructure node (e.g., IP-RSU). This cloud
+ server can coordinate the battery charging schedules of multiple UAM
+ end systems for their efficient navigation path, considering flight
+ time from their current position to a battery charging station,
+ waiting time in a waiting queue at the station, and battery charging
+ time at the station.
+
+ In some scenarios, such as vehicles moving on highways or staying in
+ parking lots, a V2V2I network is necessary for vehicles to access the
+ Internet since some vehicles may not be covered by an IP-RSU. For
+ those vehicles, a few relay vehicles can help to build the Internet
+ access. For the nested NEMO described in [RFC4888], hosts inside a
+ vehicle shown in Figure 3 for the case of V2V2I may have the same
+ issue in the nested NEMO scenario.
+
+ To better support these use cases, the existing IPv6 protocol must be
+ augmented either through protocol changes or by including a new
+ adaptation layer in the architecture that efficiently maps IPv6 to a
+ diversity of link-layer technologies. Augmentation is necessary to
+ support wireless multihop V2I communications on a highway where RSUs
+ are sparsely deployed so that a vehicle can reach the wireless
+ coverage of an IP-RSU through the multihop data forwarding of
+ intermediate vehicles as packet forwarders. Thus, IPv6 needs to be
+ extended for multihop V2I communications.
+
+ To support applications of these V2I use cases, the required
+ functions of IPv6 include IPv6 communication enablement with
+ neighborhood discovery and IPv6 address management; reachability with
+ adapted network models and routing methods; transport-layer session
+ continuity; and secure, safe communication between a vehicle and an
+ infrastructure node (e.g., IP-RSU) in the vehicular network.
+
+3.3. V2X
+
+ The use case of V2X networking discussed in this section is for a
+ protection service for a vulnerable road user (VRU), e.g., a
+ pedestrian or cyclist. Note that the application area of this use
+ case is currently limited to a specific environment, such as
+ construction sites, plants, and factories, since not every VRU in a
+ public area is equipped with a smart device (e.g., not every child on
+ a road has a smartphone, smart watch, or tablet).
+
+ A VRU protection service, such as the Safety-Aware Navigation
+ Application [SANA], using V2I2P networking can reduce the collision
+ of a vehicle and a pedestrian carrying a smartphone equipped with a
+ network device for wireless communication (e.g., Wi-Fi, DSRC, 4G/5G
+ V2X, and Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)) with an IP-RSU. Vehicles and
+ pedestrians can also communicate with each other via an IP-RSU. An
+ ECD behind the IP-RSU can collect the mobility information from
+ vehicles and pedestrians, and then compute wireless communication
+ scheduling for the sake of them. This scheduling can save the
+ battery of each pedestrian's smartphone by allowing it to work in
+ sleeping mode before communication with vehicles, considering their
+ mobility. The location information of a VRU from a smart device
+ (e.g., smartphone) is multicasted only to the nearby vehicles. The
+ true identifiers of a VRU's smart device shall be protected, and only
+ the type of the VRU, such as pedestrian, cyclist, or scooter, is
+ disclosed to the nearby vehicles.
+
+ For Vehicle-to-Pedestrian (V2P), a vehicle can directly communicate
+ with a pedestrian's smartphone by V2X without IP-RSU relaying.
+ Light-weight mobile nodes, such as bicycles, may also communicate
+ directly with a vehicle for collision avoidance using V2V. Note that
+ it is true that either a pedestrian or a cyclist may have a higher
+ risk of being hit by a vehicle if they are not with a smartphone in
+ the current setting. For this case, other human-sensing technologies
+ (e.g., moving-object detection in images and wireless signal-based
+ human movement detection [LIFS] [DFC]) can be used to provide motion
+ information to vehicles. A vehicle by V2V2I networking can obtain a
+ VRU's motion information via an IP-RSU that either employs or
+ connects to a human-sensing technology.
+
+ The existing IPv6 protocol must be augmented through protocol changes
+ in order to support wireless multihop V2X or V2I2X communications in
+ an urban road network where RSUs are deployed at intersections so
+ that a vehicle (or a pedestrian's smartphone) can reach the wireless
+ coverage of an IP-RSU through the multihop data forwarding of
+ intermediate vehicles (or pedestrians' smartphones) as packet
+ forwarders. Thus, IPv6 needs to be extended for multihop V2X or
+ V2I2X communications.
+
+ To support applications of these V2X use cases, the required
+ functions of IPv6 include IPv6-based packet exchange; transport-layer
+ session continuity; secure, safe communication between a vehicle and
+ a pedestrian either directly or indirectly via an IP-RSU; and the
+ protection of identifiers of either a vehicle or smart device (such
+ as the Media Access Control (MAC) address and IPv6 address), which is
+ discussed in detail in Section 6.3.
+
+4. Vehicular Networks
+
+ This section describes the context for vehicular networks supporting
+ V2V, V2I, and V2X communications and describes an internal network
+ within a vehicle or an Edge Network (EN). Additionally, this section
+ explains not only the internetworking between the internal networks
+ of a vehicle and an EN via wireless links but also the
+ internetworking between the internal networks of two vehicles via
+ wireless links.
+
+ Traffic Control Center in Vehicular Cloud
+ *******************************************
++-------------+ * *
+|Correspondent| * +-----------------+ *
+| Node |<->* | Mobility Anchor | *
++-------------+ * +-----------------+ *
+ * ^ *
+ * | *
+ * v *
+ *******************************************
+ ^ ^ ^
+ | | |
+ | | |
+ v v v
+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+
+ | IP-RSU1 |<--------->| IP-RSU2 |<--------->| IP-RSU3 |
+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+
+ ^ ^ ^
+ : : :
+ +-----------------+ +-----------------+ +-----------------+
+ | : V2I | | : V2I | | : V2I |
+ | v | | v | | v |
++--------+ | +--------+ | | +--------+ | | +--------+ |
+|Vehicle1|===> |Vehicle2|===>| | |Vehicle3|===>| | |Vehicle4|===>|
++--------+<...>+--------+<........>+--------+ | | +--------+ |
+ V2V ^ V2V ^ | | ^ |
+ | : V2V | | : V2V | | : V2V |
+ | v | | v | | v |
+ | +--------+ | | +--------+ | | +--------+ |
+ | |Vehicle5|===> | | |Vehicle6|===>| | |Vehicle7|==>|
+ | +--------+ | | +--------+ | | +--------+ |
+ +-----------------+ +-----------------+ +-----------------+
+ Subnet1 Subnet2 Subnet3
+ (Prefix1) (Prefix2) (Prefix3)
+
+ <----> Wired Link <....> Wireless Link ===> Moving Direction
+
+ Figure 1: An Example Vehicular Network Architecture for V2I and V2V
+
+4.1. Vehicular Network Architecture
+
+ Figure 1 shows an example vehicular network architecture for V2I and
+ V2V in a road network. The vehicular network architecture contains
+ vehicles (including IP-OBU), IP-RSUs, Mobility Anchor, Traffic
+ Control Center, and Vehicular Cloud as components. These components
+ are not mandatory, and they can be deployed into vehicular networks
+ in various ways. Some of them (e.g., Mobility Anchor, Traffic
+ Control Center, and Vehicular Cloud) may not be needed for the
+ vehicular networks according to target use cases in Section 3.
+
+ Existing network architectures, such as the network architectures of
+ PMIPv6 [RFC5213], RPL (IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy
+ Networks) [RFC6550], Automatic Extended Route Optimization [AERO],
+ and Overlay Multilink Network Interface [OMNI], can be extended to a
+ vehicular network architecture for multihop V2V, V2I, and V2X, as
+ shown in Figure 1. Refer to Appendix B for the detailed discussion
+ on multihop V2X networking by RPL and OMNI. Also, refer to
+ Appendix A for the description of how OMNI is designed to support the
+ use of multiple radio technologies in V2X. Note that though AERO/
+ OMNI is not actually deployed in the industry, this AERO/OMNI is
+ mentioned as a possible approach for vehicular networks in this
+ document.
+
+ As shown in Figure 1, IP-RSUs as routers and vehicles with IP-OBU
+ have wireless media interfaces for VANET. The three IP-RSUs (IP-
+ RSU1, IP-RSU2, and IP-RSU3) are deployed in the road network and are
+ connected with each other through the wired networks (e.g.,
+ Ethernet). A Traffic Control Center (TCC) is connected to the
+ Vehicular Cloud for the management of IP-RSUs and vehicles in the
+ road network. A Mobility Anchor (MA) may be located in the TCC as a
+ mobility management controller. Vehicle2, Vehicle3, and Vehicle4 are
+ wirelessly connected to IP-RSU1, IP-RSU2, and IP-RSU3, respectively.
+ The three wireless networks of IP-RSU1, IP-RSU2, and IP-RSU3 can
+ belong to three different subnets (i.e., Subnet1, Subnet2, and
+ Subnet3), respectively. Those three subnets use three different
+ prefixes (i.e., Prefix1, Prefix2, and Prefix3).
+
+ Multiple vehicles under the coverage of an IP-RSU share a prefix just
+ as mobile nodes share a prefix of a Wi-Fi access point in a wireless
+ LAN. This is a natural characteristic in infrastructure-based
+ wireless networks. For example, in Figure 1, two vehicles (i.e.,
+ Vehicle2 and Vehicle5) can use Prefix1 to configure their IPv6 global
+ addresses for V2I communication. Alternatively, two vehicles can
+ employ a "Bring Your Own Addresses (BYOA)" (or "Bring Your Own Prefix
+ (BYOP)") technique using their own IPv6 Unique Local Addresses (ULAs)
+ [RFC4193] over the wireless network.
+
+ In wireless subnets in vehicular networks (e.g., Subnet1 and Subnet2
+ in Figure 1), vehicles can construct a connected VANET (with an
+ arbitrary graph topology) and can communicate with each other via V2V
+ communication. Vehicle1 can communicate with Vehicle2 via V2V
+ communication, and Vehicle2 can communicate with Vehicle3 via V2V
+ communication because they are within the wireless communication
+ range of each other. On the other hand, Vehicle3 can communicate
+ with Vehicle4 via the vehicular infrastructure (i.e., IP-RSU2 and IP-
+ RSU3) by employing V2I (i.e., V2I2V) communication because they are
+ not within the wireless communication range of each other.
+
+ As a basic definition for IPv6 packets transported over IEEE
+ 802.11-OCB, [RFC8691] specifies several details, including Maximum
+ Transmission Unit (MTU), frame format, link-local address, address
+ mapping for unicast and multicast, stateless autoconfiguration, and
+ subnet structure.
+
+ An IPv6 mobility solution is needed for the guarantee of
+ communication continuity in vehicular networks so that a vehicle's
+ TCP session can be continued or that UDP packets can be delivered to
+ a vehicle as a destination without loss while it moves from an IP-
+ RSU's wireless coverage to another IP-RSU's wireless coverage. In
+ Figure 1, assuming that Vehicle2 has a TCP session (or a UDP session)
+ with a correspondent node in the Vehicular Cloud, Vehicle2 can move
+ from IP-RSU1's wireless coverage to IP-RSU2's wireless coverage. In
+ this case, a handover for Vehicle2 needs to be performed by either a
+ host-based mobility management scheme (e.g., MIPv6 [RFC6275]) or a
+ network-based mobility management scheme (e.g., PMIPv6 [RFC5213],
+ NEMO [RFC3963] [RFC4885] [RFC4888], and AERO [AERO]). This document
+ describes issues in mobility management for vehicular networks in
+ Section 5.2. For improving TCP session continuity or successful UDP
+ packet delivery, the Multipath TCP (MPTCP) [RFC8684] or QUIC protocol
+ [RFC9000] can also be used. IP-OBUs, however, may still experience
+ more session time-out and re-establishment procedures due to lossy
+ connections among vehicles caused by the high mobility dynamics of
+ them.
+
+4.2. V2I-Based Internetworking
+
+ This section discusses the internetworking between a vehicle's
+ internal network (i.e., mobile network) and an EN's internal network
+ (i.e., fixed network) via V2I communication. The internal network of
+ a vehicle is nowadays constructed with Ethernet by many automotive
+ vendors [In-Car-Network]. Note that an EN can accommodate multiple
+ routers (or switches) and servers (e.g., ECDs, navigation server, and
+ DNS server) in its internal network.
+
+ A vehicle's internal network often uses Ethernet to interconnect
+ Electronic Control Units (ECUs) in the vehicle. The internal network
+ can support Wi-Fi and Bluetooth to accommodate a driver's and
+ passenger's mobile devices (e.g., smartphone or tablet). The network
+ topology and subnetting depend on each vendor's network configuration
+ for a vehicle and an EN. It is reasonable to consider interactions
+ between the internal network of a vehicle and that of another vehicle
+ or an EN. Note that it is dangerous if the internal network of a
+ vehicle is controlled by a malicious party. These dangers can
+ include unauthorized driving control input and unauthorized driving
+ information disclosure to an unauthorized third party. A malicious
+ party can be a group of hackers, a criminal group, and a competitor
+ for industrial espionage or sabotage. To minimize this kind of risk,
+ an augmented identification and verification protocol, which has an
+ extra means, shall be implemented based on a basic identity
+ verification process. These extra means could include approaches
+ based on certificates, biometrics, credit, or One-Time Passwords
+ (OTPs) in addition to Host Identity Protocol certificates [RFC8002].
+ The parties of the verification protocol can be from a built-in
+ verification protocol in the current vehicle, which is pre-installed
+ by a vehicle vendor. The parties can also be from any verification
+ authorities that have the database of authenticated users. The
+ security properties provided by a verification protocol can be
+ identity-related information, such as the genuineness of an identity,
+ the authenticity of an identity, and the ownership of an identity
+ [RFC7427].
+
+ The augmented identification and verification protocol with extra
+ means can support security properties such as the identification and
+ verification of a vehicle, driver, and passenger. First, a credit-
+ based method is when a vehicle classifies the messages it received
+ from another host into various levels based on their potential
+ effects on driving safety in order to calculate the credit of that
+ sender. Based on accumulated credit, a correspondent node can verify
+ the other party to see whether it is genuine or not. Second, a
+ certificate-based method includes a user certificate (e.g., X.509
+ certificate [RFC5280]) to authenticate a vehicle or its driver.
+ Third, a biometric method includes a fingerprint, face, or voice to
+ authenticate a driver or passenger. Lastly, an OTP-based method lets
+ another already-authenticated device (e.g., smartphone and tablet) of
+ a driver or passenger be used to authenticate a driver or passenger.
+
+ +-----------------+
+ (*)<........>(*) +----->| Vehicular Cloud |
+ (2001:db8:1:1::/64) | | | +-----------------+
+ +------------------------------+ +---------------------------------+
+ | v | | v v |
+ | +-------+ +-------+ | | +-------+ +-------+ |
+ | | Host1 | |IP-OBU1| | | |IP-RSU1| | Host3 | |
+ | +-------+ +-------+ | | +-------+ +-------+ |
+ | ^ ^ | | ^ ^ |
+ | | | | | | | |
+ | v v | | v v |
+ | ---------------------------- | | ------------------------------- |
+ | 2001:db8:10:1::/64 ^ | | ^ 2001:db8:20:1::/64 |
+ | | | | | |
+ | v | | v |
+ | +-------+ +-------+ | | +-------+ +-------+ +-------+ |
+ | | Host2 | |Router1| | | |Router2| |Server1|...|ServerN| |
+ | +-------+ +-------+ | | +-------+ +-------+ +-------+ |
+ | ^ ^ | | ^ ^ ^ |
+ | | | | | | | | |
+ | v v | | v v v |
+ | ---------------------------- | | ------------------------------- |
+ | 2001:db8:10:2::/64 | | 2001:db8:20:2::/64 |
+ +------------------------------+ +---------------------------------+
+ Vehicle1 (Mobile Network1) EN1 (Fixed Network1)
+
+ <----> Wired Link <....> Wireless Link (*) Antenna
+
+ Figure 2: Internetworking between Vehicle and Edge Network
+
+ As shown in Figure 2, as internal networks, a vehicle's mobile
+ network and an EN's fixed network are self-contained networks having
+ multiple subnets and having an edge router (e.g., IP-OBU and IP-RSU)
+ for communication with another vehicle or another EN. The
+ internetworking between two internal networks via V2I communication
+ requires the exchange of the network parameters and the network
+ prefixes of the internal networks. For the efficiency, the network
+ prefixes of the internal networks (as a mobile network) in a vehicle
+ need to be delegated and configured automatically. Note that a
+ mobile network's network prefix can be called a Mobile Network Prefix
+ (MNP) [RFC3963].
+
+ Figure 2 also shows the internetworking between the vehicle's mobile
+ network and the EN's fixed network. There exists an internal network
+ (Mobile Network1) inside Vehicle1. Vehicle1 has two hosts (Host1 and
+ Host2) and two routers (IP-OBU1 and Router1). There exists another
+ internal network (Fixed Network1) inside EN1. EN1 has one host
+ (Host3), two routers (IP-RSU1 and Router2), and the collection of
+ servers (Server1 to ServerN) for various services in the road
+ networks, such as the emergency notification and navigation.
+ Vehicle1's IP-OBU1 (as a mobile router) and EN1's IP-RSU1 (as a fixed
+ router) use 2001:db8:1:1::/64 for an external link (e.g., DSRC) for
+ V2I networking. Thus, a host (Host1) in Vehicle1 can communicate
+ with a server (Server1) in EN1 for a vehicular service through
+ Vehicle1's mobile network, a wireless link between IP-OBU1 and IP-
+ RSU1, and EN1's fixed network.
+
+ For the IPv6 communication between an IP-OBU and an IP-RSU or between
+ two neighboring IP-OBUs, they need to know the network parameters,
+ which include MAC layer and IPv6 layer information. The MAC layer
+ information includes wireless link-layer parameters, transmission
+ power level, and the MAC address of an external network interface for
+ the internetworking with another IP-OBU or IP-RSU. The IPv6 layer
+ information includes the IPv6 address and network prefix of an
+ external network interface for the internetworking with another IP-
+ OBU or IP-RSU.
+
+ Through the mutual knowledge of the network parameters of internal
+ networks, packets can be transmitted between the vehicle's mobile
+ network and the EN's fixed network. Thus, V2I requires an efficient
+ protocol for the mutual knowledge of network parameters. Note that
+ from a security point of view, perimeter-based policy enforcement
+ [RFC9099] can be applied to protect parts of the internal network of
+ a vehicle.
+
+ As shown in Figure 2, the addresses used for IPv6 transmissions over
+ the wireless link interfaces for IP-OBU and IP-RSU can be IPv6 link-
+ local addresses, ULAs, or IPv6 global addresses. When IPv6 addresses
+ are used, wireless interface configuration and control overhead for
+ Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) [RFC4862] and Multicast Listener
+ Discovery (MLD) [RFC2710] [RFC3810] should be minimized to support
+ V2I and V2X communications for vehicles moving fast along roadways.
+
+ Let us consider the upload/download time of a ground vehicle when it
+ passes through the wireless communication coverage of an IP-RSU. For
+ a given typical setting where 1 km is the maximum DSRC communication
+ range [DSRC] and 100 km/h is the speed limit on highways for ground
+ vehicles, the dwelling time can be calculated to be 72 seconds by
+ dividing the diameter of the 2 km (i.e., two times the DSRC
+ communication range where an IP-RSU is located in the center of the
+ circle of wireless communication) by the speed limit of 100 km/h
+ (i.e., about 28 m/s). For the 72 seconds, a vehicle passing through
+ the coverage of an IP-RSU can upload and download data packets to/
+ from the IP-RSU. For special cases, such as emergency vehicles
+ moving above the speed limit, the dwelling time is relatively shorter
+ than that of other vehicles. For cases of airborne vehicles (i.e.,
+ aircraft), considering a higher flying speed and a higher altitude,
+ the dwelling time can be much shorter.
+
+4.3. V2V-Based Internetworking
+
+ This section discusses the internetworking between the mobile
+ networks of two neighboring vehicles via V2V communication.
+
+ (*)<..........>(*)
+ (2001:db8:1:1::/64) | |
+ +------------------------------+ +------------------------------+
+ | v | | v |
+ | +-------+ +-------+ | | +-------+ +-------+ |
+ | | Host1 | |IP-OBU1| | | |IP-OBU2| | Host3 | |
+ | +-------+ +-------+ | | +-------+ +-------+ |
+ | ^ ^ | | ^ ^ |
+ | | | | | | | |
+ | v v | | v v |
+ | ---------------------------- | | ---------------------------- |
+ | 2001:db8:10:1::/64 ^ | | ^ 2001:db8:30:1::/64 |
+ | | | | | |
+ | v | | v |
+ | +-------+ +-------+ | | +-------+ +-------+ |
+ | | Host2 | |Router1| | | |Router2| | Host4 | |
+ | +-------+ +-------+ | | +-------+ +-------+ |
+ | ^ ^ | | ^ ^ |
+ | | | | | | | |
+ | v v | | v v |
+ | ---------------------------- | | ---------------------------- |
+ | 2001:db8:10:2::/64 | | 2001:db8:30:2::/64 |
+ +------------------------------+ +------------------------------+
+ Vehicle1 (Mobile Network1) Vehicle2 (Mobile Network2)
+
+ <----> Wired Link <....> Wireless Link (*) Antenna
+
+ Figure 3: Internetworking between Two Vehicles
+
+ Figure 3 shows the internetworking between the mobile networks of two
+ neighboring vehicles. There exists an internal network (Mobile
+ Network1) inside Vehicle1. Vehicle1 has two hosts (Host1 and Host2)
+ and two routers (IP-OBU1 and Router1). There exists another internal
+ network (Mobile Network2) inside Vehicle2. Vehicle2 has two hosts
+ (Host3 and Host4) and two routers (IP-OBU2 and Router2). Vehicle1's
+ IP-OBU1 (as a mobile router) and Vehicle2's IP-OBU2 (as a mobile
+ router) use 2001:db8:1:1::/64 for an external link (e.g., DSRC) for
+ V2V networking. Thus, a host (Host1) in Vehicle1 can communicate
+ with another host (Host3) in Vehicle2 for a vehicular service through
+ Vehicle1's mobile network, a wireless link between IP-OBU1 and IP-
+ OBU2, and Vehicle2's mobile network.
+
+ As a V2V use case in Section 3.1, Figure 4 shows a linear network
+ topology of platooning vehicles for V2V communications where Vehicle3
+ is the lead vehicle with a driver, and Vehicle2 and Vehicle1 are the
+ following vehicles without drivers. From a security point of view,
+ before vehicles can be platooned, they shall be mutually
+ authenticated to reduce possible security risks.
+
+ (*)<..................>(*)<..................>(*)
+ | | |
+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+
+ | | | | | |
+ | +-------+ | | +-------+ | | +-------+ |
+ | |IP-OBU1| | | |IP-OBU2| | | |IP-OBU3| |
+ | +-------+ | | +-------+ | | +-------+ |
+ | ^ | | ^ | | ^ |
+ | | |=====> | | |=====> | | |=====>
+ | v | | v | | v |
+ | +-------+ | | +-------+ | | +-------+ |
+ | | Host1 | | | | Host2 | | | | Host3 | |
+ | +-------+ | | +-------+ | | +-------+ |
+ | | | | | |
+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+
+ Vehicle1 Vehicle2 Vehicle3
+
+ <----> Wired Link <....> Wireless Link ===> Moving Direction
+ (*) Antenna
+
+ Figure 4: Multihop Internetworking between Two Vehicle Networks
+
+ As shown in Figure 4, multihop internetworking is feasible among the
+ mobile networks of three vehicles in the same VANET. For example,
+ Host1 in Vehicle1 can communicate with Host3 in Vehicle3 via IP-OBU1
+ in Vehicle1, IP-OBU2 in Vehicle2, and IP-OBU3 in Vehicle3 in the
+ VANET, as shown in the figure.
+
+ In this section, the link between two vehicles is assumed to be
+ stable for single-hop wireless communication regardless of the sight
+ relationship, such as Line-of-Sight and Non-Line-of-Sight, as shown
+ in Figure 3. Even in Figure 4, the three vehicles are connected to
+ each other with a linear topology, however, multihop V2V
+ communication can accommodate any network topology (i.e., an
+ arbitrary graph) over VANET routing protocols.
+
+ (*)<..................>(*)<..................>(*)
+ | | |
+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+
+ | | | | | |
+ | +-------+ | | +-------+ | | +-------+ |
+ | |IP-OBU1| | | |IP-RSU1| | | |IP-OBU3| |
+ | +-------+ | | +-------+ | | +-------+ |
+ | ^ | | ^ | | ^ |
+ | | |=====> | | | | | |=====>
+ | v | | v | | v |
+ | +-------+ | | +-------+ | | +-------+ |
+ | | Host1 | | | | Host2 | | | | Host3 | |
+ | +-------+ | | +-------+ | | +-------+ |
+ | | | | | |
+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+
+ Vehicle1 EN1 Vehicle3
+
+ <----> Wired Link <....> Wireless Link ===> Moving Direction
+ (*) Antenna
+
+ Figure 5: Multihop Internetworking between Two Vehicle Networks
+ via IP-RSU (V2I2V)
+
+ As shown in Figure 5, multihop internetworking between two vehicles
+ is feasible via an infrastructure node (e.g., IP-RSU) with wireless
+ connectivity among the mobile networks of two vehicles and the fixed
+ network of an edge network (denoted as EN1) in the same VANET. For
+ example, Host1 in Vehicle1 can communicate with Host3 in Vehicle3 via
+ IP-OBU1 in Vehicle1, IP-RSU1 in EN1, and IP-OBU3 in Vehicle3 in the
+ VANET, as shown in the figure.
+
+ For the reliability required in V2V networking, the ND optimization
+ defined in the Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) [RFC6130] [RFC7466]
+ improves the classical IPv6 ND in terms of tracking neighbor
+ information with up to two hops and introducing several extensible
+ Information Bases. This improvement serves the MANET routing
+ protocols, such as the different versions of Optimized Link State
+ Routing Protocol (OLSR) [RFC3626] [RFC7181], Open Shortest Path First
+ (OSPF) derivatives (e.g., [RFC5614]), and Dynamic Link Exchange
+ Protocol (DLEP) [RFC8175] with its extensions [RFC8629] [RFC8757].
+ In short, the MANET ND mainly deals with maintaining extended network
+ neighbors to enhance the link reliability. However, an ND protocol
+ in vehicular networks shall consider more about the geographical
+ mobility information of vehicles as an important resource for serving
+ various purposes to improve the reliability, e.g., vehicle driving
+ safety, intelligent transportation implementations, and advanced
+ mobility services. For a more reliable V2V networking, some
+ redundancy mechanisms should be provided in L3 in cases of the
+ failure of L2. For different use cases, the optimal solution to
+ improve V2V networking reliability may vary. For example, a group of
+ platooning vehicles may have stabler neighbors than freely moving
+ vehicles, as described in Section 3.1.
+
+5. Problem Statement
+
+ In order to specify protocols using the architecture mentioned in
+ Section 4.1, IPv6 core protocols have to be adapted to overcome
+ certain challenging aspects of vehicular networking. Since the
+ vehicles are likely to be moving at great speed, protocol exchanges
+ need to be completed in a relatively short time compared to the
+ lifetime of a link between a vehicle and an IP-RSU or between two
+ vehicles. In these cases, vehicles may not have enough time either
+ to build link-layer connections with each other and may rely more on
+ connections with infrastructure. In other cases, the relative speed
+ between vehicles may be low when vehicles move toward the same
+ direction or are platooned. For those cases, vehicles can have more
+ time to build and maintain connections with each other.
+
+ For safe driving, vehicles need to exchange application messages
+ every 0.5 seconds [NHTSA-ACAS-Report] to let drivers take an action
+ to avoid a dangerous situation (e.g., vehicle collision), so the IPv6
+ control plane (e.g., ND procedure and DAD) needs to support this
+ order of magnitude for application message exchanges. Also,
+ considering the communication range of DSRC (up to 1 km) and 100 km/h
+ as the speed limit on highways (some countries can have much higher
+ speed limits or even no limit, e.g., Germany), the lifetime of a link
+ between a vehicle and an IP-RSU is in the order of a minute (e.g.,
+ about 72 seconds), and the lifetime of a link between two vehicles is
+ about a half minute. Note that if two vehicles are moving in the
+ opposite directions in a roadway, the relative speed of this case is
+ two times the relative speed of a vehicle passing through an IP-RSU.
+ This relative speed causes the lifetime of the wireless link between
+ the vehicle and the IP-RSU to be halved. In reality, the DSRC
+ communication range is around 500 m, so the link lifetime will be
+ half of the maximum time. The time constraint of a wireless link
+ between two nodes (e.g., vehicle and IP-RSU) needs to be considered
+ because it may affect the lifetime of a session involving the link.
+ The lifetime of a session varies depending on the session's type,
+ such as web surfing, a voice call over IP, a DNS query, or context-
+ aware navigation (in Section 3.1). Regardless of a session's type,
+ to guide all the IPv6 packets to their destination host(s), IP
+ mobility should be supported for the session. In a V2V scenario
+ (e.g., context-aware navigation [CNP]), the IPv6 packets of a vehicle
+ should be delivered to relevant vehicles efficiently (e.g.,
+ multicasting). With this observation, IPv6 protocol exchanges need
+ to be performed as quickly as possible to support the message
+ exchanges of various applications in vehicular networks.
+
+ Therefore, the time constraint of a wireless link has a major impact
+ on IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (ND). Mobility Management (MM) is also
+ vulnerable to disconnections that occur before the completion of
+ identity verification and tunnel management. This is especially true
+ given the unreliable nature of wireless communication. Meanwhile,
+ the bandwidth of the wireless link determined by the lower layers
+ (i.e., PHY and link layers) can affect the transmission time of
+ control messages of the upper layers (e.g., IPv6) and the continuity
+ of sessions in the higher layers (e.g., IPv6, TCP, and UDP). Hence,
+ the bandwidth selection according to the Modulation and Coding Scheme
+ (MCS) also affects the vehicular network connectivity. Note that
+ usually the higher bandwidth gives the shorter communication range
+ and the higher packet error rate at the receiving side, which may
+ reduce the reliability of control message exchanges of the higher
+ layers (e.g., IPv6). This section presents key topics, such as
+ neighbor discovery and mobility management for links and sessions in
+ IPv6-based vehicular networks. Note that the detailed discussion on
+ the transport-layer session mobility and usage of available bandwidth
+ to fulfill the use cases is left as potential future work.
+
+5.1. Neighbor Discovery
+
+ IPv6 ND [RFC4861] [RFC4862] is a core part of the IPv6 protocol
+ suite. IPv6 ND is designed for link types including point-to-point,
+ multicast-capable (e.g., Ethernet), and Non-Broadcast Multiple Access
+ (NBMA). It assumes the efficient and reliable support of multicast
+ and unicast from the link layer for various network operations, such
+ as MAC Address Resolution (AR), DAD, MLD, and Neighbor Unreachability
+ Detection (NUD) [RFC4861] [RFC4862] [RFC2710] [RFC3810].
+
+ Vehicles move quickly within the communication coverage of any
+ particular vehicle or IP-RSU. Before the vehicles can exchange
+ application messages with each other, they need IPv6 addresses to run
+ IPv6 ND.
+
+ The requirements for IPv6 ND for vehicular networks are efficient DAD
+ and NUD operations. An efficient DAD is required to reduce the
+ overhead of DAD packets during a vehicle's travel in a road network,
+ which can guarantee the uniqueness of a vehicle's global IPv6
+ address. An efficient NUD is required to reduce the overhead of the
+ NUD packets during a vehicle's travel in a road network, which can
+ guarantee the accurate neighborhood information of a vehicle in terms
+ of adjacent vehicles and IP-RSUs.
+
+ The legacy DAD assumes that a node with an IPv6 address can reach any
+ other node with the scope of its address at the time it claims its
+ address, and can hear any future claim for that address by another
+ party within the scope of its address for the duration of the address
+ ownership. However, the partitioning and merging of VANETs makes
+ this assumption not valid frequently in vehicular networks. The
+ partitioning and merging of VANETs frequently occurs in vehicular
+ networks. This partitioning and merging should be considered for
+ IPv6 ND, such as IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)
+ [RFC4862]. SLAAC is not compatible with the partitioning and
+ merging, and additional work is needed for ND to operate properly
+ under those circumstances. Due to the merging of VANETs, two IPv6
+ addresses may conflict with each other though they were unique before
+ the merging. An address lookup operation may be conducted by an MA
+ or IP-RSU (as Registrar in RPL) to check the uniqueness of an IPv6
+ address that will be configured by a vehicle as DAD. Also, the
+ partitioning of a VANET may make vehicles with the same prefix be
+ physically unreachable. An address lookup operation may be conducted
+ by an MA or IP-RSU (as Registrar in RPL) to check the existence of a
+ vehicle under the network coverage of the MA or IP-RSU as NUD. Thus,
+ SLAAC needs to prevent IPv6 address duplication due to the merging of
+ VANETs, and IPv6 ND needs to detect unreachable neighboring vehicles
+ due to the partitioning of a VANET. According to the partitioning
+ and merging, a destination vehicle (as an IPv6 host) needs to be
+ distinguished as a host that is either on-link or not on-link even
+ though the source vehicle can use the same prefix as the destination
+ vehicle [IPPL].
+
+ To efficiently prevent IPv6 address duplication (due to the VANET
+ partitioning and merging) from happening in vehicular networks, the
+ vehicular networks need to support a vehicular-network-wide DAD by
+ defining a scope that is compatible with the legacy DAD. In this
+ case, two vehicles can communicate with each other when there exists
+ a communication path over VANET or a combination of VANETs and IP-
+ RSUs, as shown in Figure 1. By using the vehicular-network-wide DAD,
+ vehicles can assure that their IPv6 addresses are unique in the
+ vehicular network whenever they are connected to the vehicular
+ infrastructure or become disconnected from it in the form of VANET.
+
+ For vehicular networks with high mobility and density, DAD needs to
+ be performed efficiently with minimum overhead so that the vehicles
+ can exchange driving safety messages (e.g., collision avoidance and
+ accident notification) with each other with a short interval as
+ suggested by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
+ (NHTSA) of the U.S. [NHTSA-ACAS-Report]. Since the partitioning and
+ merging of vehicular networks may require re-performing the DAD
+ process repeatedly, the link scope of vehicles may be limited to a
+ small area, which may delay the exchange of driving safety messages.
+ Driving safety messages can include a vehicle's mobility information
+ (e.g., position, speed, direction, and acceleration/deceleration)
+ that is critical to other vehicles. The exchange interval of this
+ message is recommended to be less than 0.5 seconds, which is required
+ for a driver to avoid an emergency situation, such as a rear-end
+ crash.
+
+ ND time-related parameters, such as router lifetime and Neighbor
+ Advertisement (NA) interval, need to be adjusted for vehicle speed
+ and vehicle density. For example, the NA interval needs to be
+ dynamically adjusted according to a vehicle's speed so that the
+ vehicle can maintain its position relative to its neighboring
+ vehicles in a stable way, considering the collision probability with
+ the NA messages sent by other vehicles. The ND time-related
+ parameters can be an operational setting or an optimization point
+ particularly for vehicular networks. Note that the link-scope
+ multicast messages in the ND protocol may cause a performance issue
+ in vehicular networks. [RFC9119] suggests several optimization
+ approaches for the issue.
+
+ For IPv6-based safety applications (e.g., context-aware navigation,
+ adaptive cruise control, and platooning) in vehicular networks, the
+ delay-bounded data delivery is critical. IPv6 ND needs to work to
+ support those IPv6-based safety applications efficiently.
+ [VEHICULAR-ND] introduces a Vehicular Neighbor Discovery (VND)
+ process as an extension of IPv6 ND for IP-based vehicular networks.
+
+ From the interoperability point of view, in IPv6-based vehicular
+ networking, IPv6 ND should have minimum changes from the legacy IPv6
+ ND used in the Internet, including DAD and NUD operations, so that
+ IPv6-based vehicular networks can be seamlessly connected to other
+ intelligent transportation elements (e.g., traffic signals,
+ pedestrian wearable devices, electric scooters, and bus stops) that
+ use the standard IPv6 network settings.
+
+5.1.1. Link Model
+
+ A subnet model for a vehicular network needs to facilitate
+ communication between two vehicles with the same prefix regardless of
+ the vehicular network topology as long as there exist bidirectional
+ E2E paths between them in the vehicular network including VANETs and
+ IP-RSUs. This subnet model allows vehicles with the same prefix to
+ communicate with each other via a combination of multihop V2V and
+ multihop V2I with VANETs and IP-RSUs. [WIRELESS-ND] introduces other
+ issues in an IPv6 subnet model.
+
+ IPv6 protocols work under certain assumptions that do not necessarily
+ hold for vehicular wireless access link types [VIP-WAVE] [RFC5889].
+ For instance, some IPv6 protocols, such as NUD [RFC4861] and MIPv6
+ [RFC6275], assume symmetry in the connectivity among neighboring
+ interfaces. However, radio interference and different levels of
+ transmission power may cause asymmetric links to appear in vehicular
+ wireless links [RFC6250]. As a result, a new vehicular link model
+ needs to consider the asymmetry of dynamically changing vehicular
+ wireless links.
+
+ There is a relationship between a link and a prefix, besides the
+ different scopes that are expected from the link-local, unique-local,
+ and global types of IPv6 addresses. In an IPv6 link, it is defined
+ that all interfaces that are configured with the same subnet prefix
+ and with the on-link bit set can communicate with each other on an
+ IPv6 link. However, the vehicular link model needs to define the
+ relationship between a link and a prefix, considering the dynamics of
+ wireless links and the characteristics of VANET.
+
+ A VANET can have a single link between each vehicle pair within the
+ wireless communication range, as shown in Figure 4. When two
+ vehicles belong to the same VANET, but they are out of wireless
+ communication range, they cannot communicate directly with each
+ other. Suppose that a global-scope IPv6 prefix (or an IPv6 ULA
+ prefix) is assigned to VANETs in vehicular networks. Considering
+ that two vehicles in the same VANET configure their IPv6 addresses
+ with the same IPv6 prefix, if they are not connected in one hop (that
+ is, they have multihop network connectivity between them), then they
+ may not be able to communicate with each other. Thus, in this case,
+ the concept of an on-link IPv6 prefix does not hold because two
+ vehicles with the same on-link IPv6 prefix cannot communicate
+ directly with each other. Also, when two vehicles are located in two
+ different VANETs with the same IPv6 prefix, they cannot communicate
+ with each other. On the other hand, when these two VANETs converge
+ to one VANET, the two vehicles can communicate with each other in a
+ multihop fashion, for example, when they are Vehicle1 and Vehicle3,
+ as shown in Figure 4.
+
+ From the previous observation, a vehicular link model should consider
+ the frequent partitioning and merging of VANETs due to vehicle
+ mobility. Therefore, the vehicular link model needs to use a prefix
+ that is on-link and a prefix that is not on-link according to the
+ network topology of vehicles, such as a one-hop reachable network and
+ a multihop reachable network (or partitioned networks). If the
+ vehicles with the same prefix are reachable from each other in one
+ hop, the prefix should be on-link. On the other hand, if some of the
+ vehicles with the same prefix are not reachable from each other in
+ one hop due to either the multihop topology in the VANET or multiple
+ partitions, the prefix should not be on-link. In most cases in
+ vehicular networks, due to the partitioning and merging of VANETs and
+ the multihop network topology of VANETs, prefixes that are not on-
+ link will be used for vehicles as default.
+
+ The vehicular link model needs to support multihop routing in a
+ connected VANET where the vehicles with the same global-scope IPv6
+ prefix (or the same IPv6 ULA prefix) are connected in one hop or
+ multiple hops. It also needs to support the multihop routing in
+ multiple connected VANETs through infrastructure nodes (e.g., IP-RSU)
+ where they are connected to the infrastructure. For example, in
+ Figure 1, suppose that Vehicle1, Vehicle2, and Vehicle3 are
+ configured with their IPv6 addresses based on the same global-scope
+ IPv6 prefix. Vehicle1 and Vehicle3 can also communicate with each
+ other via either multihop V2V or multihop V2I2V. When Vehicle1 and
+ Vehicle3 are connected in a VANET, it will be more efficient for them
+ to communicate with each other directly via VANET rather than
+ indirectly via IP-RSUs. On the other hand, when Vehicle1 and
+ Vehicle3 are farther apart than the direct communication range in two
+ separate VANETs and under two different IP-RSUs, they can communicate
+ with each other through the relay of IP-RSUs via V2I2V. Thus, the
+ two separate VANETs can merge into one network via IP-RSU(s). Also,
+ newly arriving vehicles can merge the two separate VANETs into one
+ VANET if they can play the role of a relay node for those VANETs.
+
+ Thus, in IPv6-based vehicular networking, the vehicular link model
+ should have minimum changes for interoperability with standard IPv6
+ links efficiently to support IPv6 DAD, MLD, and NUD operations.
+
+5.1.2. MAC Address Pseudonym
+
+ For the protection of drivers' privacy, a pseudonym of a MAC address
+ of a vehicle's network interface should be used so that the MAC
+ address can be changed periodically. However, although such a
+ pseudonym of a MAC address can protect to some extent the privacy of
+ a vehicle, it may not be able to resist attacks on vehicle
+ identification by other fingerprint information, for example, the
+ scrambler seed embedded in IEEE 802.11-OCB frames [Scrambler-Attack].
+ Note that [MAC-ADD-RAN] discusses more about MAC address
+ randomization, and [RCM-USE-CASES] describes several use cases for
+ MAC address randomization.
+
+ In the ETSI standards, for the sake of security and privacy, an ITS
+ station (e.g., vehicle) can use pseudonyms for its network interface
+ identities (e.g., MAC address) and the corresponding IPv6 addresses
+ [Identity-Management]. Whenever the network interface identifier
+ changes, the IPv6 address based on the network interface identifier
+ needs to be updated, and the uniqueness of the address needs to be
+ checked through a DAD procedure.
+
+5.1.3. Routing
+
+ For multihop V2V communications in either a VANET or VANETs via IP-
+ RSUs, a vehicular Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANET) routing protocol may
+ be required to support both unicast and multicast in the links of the
+ subnet with the same IPv6 prefix. However, it will be costly to run
+ both vehicular ND and a vehicular ad hoc routing protocol in terms of
+ control traffic overhead [RFC9119].
+
+ A routing protocol for a VANET may cause redundant wireless frames in
+ the air to check the neighborhood of each vehicle and compute the
+ routing information in a VANET with a dynamic network topology
+ because IPv6 ND is used to check the neighborhood of each vehicle.
+ Thus, the vehicular routing needs to take advantage of IPv6 ND to
+ minimize its control overhead.
+
+ RPL [RFC6550] defines a routing LLN protocol, which constructs and
+ maintains Destination-Oriented Directed Acyclic Graphs (DODAGs)
+ optimized by an Objective Function (OF). A defined OF provides route
+ selection and optimization within an RPL topology. The RPL nodes use
+ an anisotropic Distance Vector (DV) approach to form a DODAG by
+ discovering and aggressively maintaining the upward default route
+ toward the root of the DODAG. Downward routes follow the same DODAG,
+ with lazy maintenance and stretched peer-to-peer (P2P) routing in the
+ so-called storing mode. It is well-designed to reduce the
+ topological knowledge and routing state that needs to be exchanged.
+ As a result, the routing protocol overhead is minimized, which allows
+ either highly constrained stable networks or less constrained, highly
+ dynamic networks. Refer to Appendix B for the detailed description
+ of RPL for multihop V2X networking.
+
+ An address registration extension for 6LoWPAN (IPv6 over Low-Power
+ Wireless Personal Area Network) in [RFC8505] can support light-weight
+ mobility for nodes moving through different parents. The extension
+ described in [RFC8505] is stateful and proactively installs the ND
+ cache entries; this saves broadcasts and provides deterministic
+ presence information for IPv6 addresses. Mainly, it updates the
+ Address Registration Option (ARO) of ND defined in [RFC6775] to
+ include a status field (which can indicate the movement of a node)
+ and optionally a Transaction ID (TID) field (which is a sequence
+ number that can be used to determine the most recent location of a
+ node). Thus, RPL can use the information provided by the Extended
+ ARO (EARO) defined in [RFC8505] to deal with a certain level of node
+ mobility. When a leaf node moves to the coverage of another parent
+ node, it should de-register its addresses with the previous parent
+ node and register itself with a new parent node along with an
+ incremented TID.
+
+ RPL can be used in IPv6-based vehicular networks, but it is primarily
+ designed for low-power networks, which puts energy efficiency first.
+ For using it in IPv6-based vehicular networks, there have not been
+ actual experiences and practical implementations, though it was
+ tested in IoT Low-Power and Lossy Network (LLN) scenarios. Another
+ concern is that RPL may generate excessive topology discovery
+ messages in a highly moving environment, such as vehicular networks.
+ This issue can be an operational or optimization point for a
+ practitioner.
+
+ Moreover, due to bandwidth and energy constraints, RPL does not
+ suggest using a proactive mechanism (e.g., keepalive) to maintain
+ accurate routing adjacencies, such as Bidirectional Forwarding
+ Detection [RFC5881] and MANET Neighborhood Discovery Protocol
+ [RFC6130]. As a result, due to the mobility of vehicles, network
+ fragmentation may not be detected quickly, and the routing of packets
+ between vehicles or between a vehicle and an infrastructure node may
+ fail.
+
+5.2. Mobility Management
+
+ The seamless connectivity and timely data exchange between two
+ endpoints requires efficient mobility management including location
+ management and handover. Most vehicles are equipped with a GNSS
+ receiver as part of a dedicated navigation system or a corresponding
+ smartphone app. Note that the GNSS receiver may not provide vehicles
+ with accurate location information in adverse environments, such as a
+ building area or a tunnel. The location precision can be improved
+ with assistance of the IP-RSUs or a cellular system with a GNSS
+ receiver for location information.
+
+ With a GNSS navigator, efficient mobility management can be performed
+ with the help of vehicles periodically reporting their current
+ position and trajectory (i.e., navigation path) to the vehicular
+ infrastructure (having IP-RSUs and an MA in TCC). This vehicular
+ infrastructure can predict the future positions of the vehicles from
+ their mobility information (e.g., the current position, speed,
+ direction, and trajectory) for efficient mobility management (e.g.,
+ proactive handover). For a better proactive handover, link-layer
+ parameters, such as the signal strength of a link-layer frame (e.g.,
+ Received Channel Power Indicator (RCPI) [VIP-WAVE]), can be used to
+ determine the moment of a handover between IP-RSUs along with
+ mobility information.
+
+ By predicting a vehicle's mobility, the vehicular infrastructure
+ needs to better support IP-RSUs to perform efficient SLAAC, data
+ forwarding, horizontal handover (i.e., handover in wireless links
+ using a homogeneous radio technology), and vertical handover (i.e.,
+ handover in wireless links using heterogeneous radio technologies) in
+ advance along with the movement of the vehicle.
+
+ For example, as shown in Figure 1, when a vehicle (e.g., Vehicle2) is
+ moving from the coverage of an IP-RSU (e.g., IP-RSU1) into the
+ coverage of another IP-RSU (e.g., IP-RSU2) belonging to a different
+ subnet, the IP-RSUs can proactively support the IPv6 mobility of the
+ vehicle while performing the SLAAC, data forwarding, and handover for
+ the sake of the vehicle.
+
+ For a mobility management scheme in a domain, where the wireless
+ subnets of multiple IP-RSUs share the same prefix, an efficient
+ vehicular-network-wide DAD is required. On the other hand, for a
+ mobility management scheme with a unique prefix per mobile node
+ (e.g., PMIPv6 [RFC5213]), DAD is not required because the IPv6
+ address of a vehicle's external wireless interface is guaranteed to
+ be unique. There is a trade-off between the prefix usage efficiency
+ and DAD overhead. Thus, the IPv6 address autoconfiguration for
+ vehicular networks needs to consider this trade-off to support
+ efficient mobility management.
+
+ Even though SLAAC with classic ND costs DAD overhead during mobility
+ management, SLAAC with the registration extension specified in
+ [RFC8505] and/or with AERO/OMNI does not cost DAD overhead. SLAAC
+ for vehicular networks needs to consider the minimization of the cost
+ of DAD with the help of an infrastructure node (e.g., IP-RSU and MA).
+ Using an infrastructure prefix over VANET allows direct routability
+ to the Internet through the multihop V2I toward an IP-RSU. On the
+ other hand, a BYOA does not allow such direct routability to the
+ Internet since the BYOA is not topologically correct, that is, not
+ routable in the Internet. In addition, a vehicle configured with a
+ BYOA needs a tunnel home (e.g., IP-RSU) connected to the Internet,
+ and the vehicle needs to know which neighboring vehicle is reachable
+ inside the VANET toward the tunnel home. There is non-negligible
+ control overhead to set up and maintain routes to such a tunnel home
+ [RFC4888] over the VANET.
+
+ For the case of a multihomed network, a vehicle can follow the first-
+ hop router selection rule described in [RFC8028]. For example, an
+ IP-OBU inside a vehicle may connect to an IP-RSU that has multiple
+ routers behind. In this scenario, because the IP-OBU can have
+ multiple prefixes from those routers, the default router selection,
+ source address selection, and packet redirect process should follow
+ the guidelines in [RFC8028]. That is, the vehicle should select its
+ default router for each prefix by preferring the router that
+ advertised the prefix.
+
+ Vehicles can use the TCC as their Home Network having a home agent
+ for mobility management as in MIPv6 [RFC6275], PMIPv6 [RFC5213], and
+ NEMO [RFC3963], so the TCC (or an MA inside the TCC) maintains the
+ mobility information of vehicles for location management. Also, in
+ vehicular networks, asymmetric links sometimes exist and must be
+ considered for wireless communications, such as V2V and V2I.
+ [VEHICULAR-MM] discusses a Vehicular Mobility Management (VMM) scheme
+ to proactively do handover for vehicles.
+
+ Therefore, for the proactive and seamless IPv6 mobility of vehicles,
+ the vehicular infrastructure (including IP-RSUs and MA) needs to
+ efficiently perform the mobility management of the vehicles with
+ their mobility information and link-layer information. Also, in
+ IPv6-based vehicular networking, IPv6 mobility management should have
+ minimum changes for the interoperability with the legacy IPv6
+ mobility management schemes, such as PMIPv6, DMM, LISP, and AERO.
+
+6. Security Considerations
+
+ This section discusses security and privacy for IPv6-based vehicular
+ networking. Security and privacy are paramount in V2I, V2V, and V2X
+ networking along with neighbor discovery and mobility management.
+
+ Vehicles and infrastructure must be authenticated to each other by a
+ password, a key, and/or a fingerprint in order to participate in
+ vehicular networking. For the authentication in vehicular networks,
+ the Vehicular Cloud needs to support a Public Key Infrastructure
+ (PKI) efficiently, as either a dedicated or a co-located component
+ inside a TCC. To provide safe interaction between vehicles or
+ between a vehicle and infrastructure, only authenticated nodes (i.e.,
+ vehicle and infrastructure nodes) can participate in vehicular
+ networks. Also, in-vehicle devices (e.g., ECUs) and a driver/
+ passenger's mobile devices (e.g., smartphones and tablet PCs) in a
+ vehicle need to securely communicate with other in-vehicle devices,
+ another driver/passenger's mobile devices in another vehicle, or
+ other servers behind an IP-RSU. Even though a vehicle is perfectly
+ authenticated by another entity and legitimate to use the data
+ generated by another vehicle, it may be hacked by malicious
+ applications that track and collect its and other vehicles'
+ information. In this case, an attack mitigation process may be
+ required to reduce the aftermath of malicious behaviors. Note that
+ when a driver/passenger's mobile devices are connected to a vehicle's
+ internal network, the vehicle may be more vulnerable to possible
+ attacks from external networks due to the exposure of its in-flight
+ traffic packets. [SEC-PRIV] discusses several types of threats for
+ Vehicular Security and Privacy (VSP).
+
+ For secure V2I communication, a secure channel (e.g., IPsec) between
+ a mobile router (i.e., IP-OBU) in a vehicle and a fixed router (i.e.,
+ IP-RSU) in an EN needs to be established, as shown in Figure 2
+ [RFC4301] [RFC4302] [RFC4303] [RFC4308] [RFC7296]. Also, for secure
+ V2V communication, a secure channel (e.g., IPsec) between a mobile
+ router (i.e., IP-OBU) in a vehicle and a mobile router (i.e., IP-OBU)
+ in another vehicle needs to be established, as shown in Figure 3.
+
+ For secure V2I/V2V communication, an element in a vehicle (e.g., an
+ in-vehicle device and a driver/passenger's mobile device) needs to
+ establish a secure connection (e.g., TLS) with another element in
+ another vehicle or another element in a Vehicular Cloud (e.g., a
+ server). Note that any key management approach can be used for the
+ secure communication, and particularly for IPv6-based vehicular
+ networks, a new or enhanced key management approach resilient to
+ wireless networks is required.
+
+ IEEE Std 1609.2 [WAVE-1609.2] specifies security services for
+ applications and management messages, but this WAVE specification is
+ optional. Thus, if the link layer does not support the security of a
+ WAVE frame, either the network layer or the transport layer needs to
+ support security services for the WAVE frame.
+
+6.1. Security Threats in Neighbor Discovery
+
+ For the classical IPv6 ND (i.e., the legacy ND), DAD is required to
+ ensure the uniqueness of the IPv6 address of a vehicle's wireless
+ interface. This DAD can be used as a flooding attack that uses the
+ DAD-related ND packets disseminated over the VANET or vehicular
+ networks. [RFC6959] introduces threats enabled by IP source address
+ spoofing. This possibility indicates that vehicles and IP-RSUs need
+ to filter out suspicious ND traffic in advance. [RFC8928] introduces
+ a mechanism that protects the ownership of an address for 6LoWPAN ND
+ from address theft and impersonation attacks. Based on the SEND
+ mechanism [RFC3971], the authentication for routers (i.e., IP-RSUs)
+ can be conducted by only selecting an IP-RSU that has a certification
+ path toward trusted parties. For authenticating other vehicles,
+ Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGAs) can be used to verify
+ the true owner of a received ND message, which requires using the CGA
+ ND option in the ND protocol. This CGA can protect vehicles against
+ DAD flooding by DAD filtering based on the verification for the true
+ owner of the received DAD message. For a general protection of the
+ ND mechanism, the RSA Signature ND option can also be used to protect
+ the integrity of the messages by public key signatures. For a more
+ advanced authentication mechanism, a distributed blockchain-based
+ approach [Vehicular-BlockChain] can be used. However, for a scenario
+ where a trustable router or an authentication path cannot be
+ obtained, it is desirable to find a solution in which vehicles and
+ infrastructure nodes can authenticate each other without any support
+ from a third party.
+
+ When applying the classical IPv6 ND process to VANET, one of the
+ security issues is that an IP-RSU (or IP-OBU) as a router may receive
+ deliberate or accidental DoS attacks from network scans that probe
+ devices on a VANET. In this scenario, the IP-RSU (or IP-OBU) can be
+ overwhelmed by processing the network scan requests so that the
+ capacity and resources of the IP-RSU (or IP-OBU) are exhausted,
+ causing the failure of receiving normal ND messages from other hosts
+ for network address resolution. [RFC6583] describes more about the
+ operational problems in the classical IPv6 ND mechanism that can be
+ vulnerable to deliberate or accidental DoS attacks and suggests
+ several implementation guidelines and operational mitigation
+ techniques for those problems. Nevertheless, for running IPv6 ND in
+ VANET, those issues can be acuter since the movements of vehicles can
+ be so diverse that there is a wider opportunity for rogue behaviors,
+ and the failure of networking among vehicles may lead to grave
+ consequences.
+
+ Strong security measures shall protect vehicles roaming in road
+ networks from the attacks of malicious nodes that are controlled by
+ hackers. For safe driving applications (e.g., context-aware
+ navigation, cooperative adaptive cruise control, and platooning), as
+ explained in Section 3.1, the cooperative action among vehicles is
+ assumed. Malicious nodes may disseminate wrong driving information
+ (e.g., location, speed, and direction) for disturbing safe driving.
+ For example, a Sybil attack, which tries to confuse a vehicle with
+ multiple false identities, may disturb a vehicle from taking a safe
+ maneuver. Since cybersecurity issues in vehicular networks may cause
+ physical vehicle safety issues, it may be necessary to consider those
+ physical safety concerns when designing protocols in IPWAVE.
+
+ To identify malicious vehicles among vehicles, an authentication
+ method may be required. A Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) (or a
+ vehicle manufacturer certificate) and a user certificate (e.g., X.509
+ certificate [RFC5280]) along with an in-vehicle device's identifier
+ generation can be used to efficiently authenticate a vehicle or its
+ driver (having a user certificate) through a road infrastructure node
+ (e.g., IP-RSU) connected to an authentication server in the Vehicular
+ Cloud. This authentication can be used to identify the vehicle that
+ will communicate with an infrastructure node or another vehicle. In
+ the case where a vehicle has an internal network (called a mobile
+ network) and elements in the network (e.g., in-vehicle devices and a
+ user's mobile devices), as shown in Figure 2, the elements in the
+ network need to be authenticated individually for safe
+ authentication. Also, Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates
+ [RFC8446] [RFC5280] can be used for an element's authentication to
+ allow secure E2E vehicular communications between an element in a
+ vehicle and another element in a server in a Vehicular Cloud or
+ between an element in a vehicle and another element in another
+ vehicle.
+
+6.2. Security Threats in Mobility Management
+
+ For mobility management, a malicious vehicle can construct multiple
+ virtual bogus vehicles and register them with IP-RSUs and MAs. This
+ registration makes the IP-RSUs and MAs waste their resources. The
+ IP-RSUs and MAs need to determine whether a vehicle is genuine or
+ bogus in mobility management. Also, for the confidentiality of
+ control packets and data packets between IP-RSUs and MAs, the E2E
+ paths (e.g., tunnels) need to be protected by secure communication
+ channels. In addition, to prevent bogus IP-RSUs and MAs from
+ interfering with the IPv6 mobility of vehicles, mutual authentication
+ among the IP-RSUs, MAs, and vehicles needs to be performed by
+ certificates (e.g., TLS certificate).
+
+6.3. Other Threats
+
+ For the setup of a secure channel over IPsec or TLS, the multihop V2I
+ communications over DSRC or 5G V2X (or LTE V2X) is required on a
+ highway. In this case, multiple intermediate vehicles as relay nodes
+ can help to forward association and authentication messages toward an
+ IP-RSU (or gNodeB/eNodeB) connected to an authentication server in
+ the Vehicular Cloud. In this kind of process, the authentication
+ messages forwarded by each vehicle can be delayed or lost, which may
+ increase the construction time of a connection or cause some vehicles
+ to not be able to be authenticated.
+
+ Even though vehicles can be authenticated with valid certificates by
+ an authentication server in the Vehicular Cloud, the authenticated
+ vehicles may harm other vehicles. To deal with this kind of security
+ issue, for monitoring suspicious behaviors, vehicles' communication
+ activities can be recorded in either a centralized approach through a
+ logging server (e.g., TCC) in the Vehicular Cloud or a decentralized
+ approach (e.g., an ECD and blockchain [Bitcoin]) by the help of other
+ vehicles and infrastructure.
+
+ There are trade-offs between centralized and decentralized approaches
+ in logging of vehicles' behaviors (e.g., location, speed, direction,
+ acceleration/deceleration, and lane change) and communication
+ activities (e.g., transmission time, reception time, and packet
+ types, such as TCP, UDP, SCTP, QUIC, HTTP, and HTTPS). A centralized
+ approach is more efficient than a decentralized approach in terms of
+ log data collection and processing in a central server in the
+ Vehicular Cloud. However, the centralized approach may cause a
+ higher delay than a decentralized approach in terms of the analysis
+ of the log data and counteraction in a local ECD or a distributed
+ database like a blockchain. The centralized approach stores log data
+ collected from VANET into a remote logging server in a Vehicular
+ Cloud as a central cloud, so it takes time to deliver the log data to
+ a remote logging server. On the other hand, the decentralized
+ approach stores the log data into a nearby edge computing device as a
+ local logging server or a nearby blockchain node, which participates
+ in a blockchain network. On the stored log data, an analyzer needs
+ to perform a machine learning technique (e.g., deep learning) and
+ seek suspicious behaviors of the vehicles. If such an analyzer is
+ located either within or near the edge computing device, it can
+ access the log data with a short delay, analyze it quickly, and
+ generate feedback to allow for a quick counteraction against such
+ malicious behaviors. On the other hand, if the Vehicular Cloud with
+ the log data is far away from a problematic VANET with malicious
+ behaviors, the centralized approach takes a longer time with the
+ analysis of the log data and the decision-making on malicious
+ behaviors than the decentralized approach. If the log data is
+ encrypted by a secret key, it can be protected from the observation
+ of a hacker. The secret key sharing among legal vehicles, ECDs, and
+ Vehicular Clouds should be supported efficiently.
+
+ Log data can release privacy breakage of a vehicle. The log data can
+ contain the MAC address and IPv6 address for a vehicle's wireless
+ network interface. If the unique MAC address of the wireless network
+ interface is used, a hacker can track the vehicle with that MAC
+ address and can track the privacy information of the vehicle's driver
+ (e.g., location information). To prevent this privacy breakage, a
+ MAC address pseudonym can be used for the MAC address of the wireless
+ network interface, and the corresponding IPv6 address should be based
+ on such a MAC address pseudonym. By solving a privacy issue of a
+ vehicle's identity in logging, vehicles may observe each other's
+ activities to identify any misbehaviors without privacy breakage.
+ Once identifying a misbehavior, a vehicle shall have a way to either
+ isolate itself from others or isolate a suspicious vehicle by
+ informing other vehicles.
+
+ For completely secure vehicular networks, we shall embrace the
+ concept of "zero-trust" for vehicles where no vehicle is trustable
+ and verifying every message (such as IPv6 control messages including
+ ND, DAD, NUD, and application-layer messages) is necessary. In this
+ way, vehicular networks can defend against many possible
+ cyberattacks. Thus, we need to have an efficient zero-trust
+ framework or mechanism for vehicular networks.
+
+ For the non-repudiation of the harmful activities from malicious
+ vehicles, as it is difficult for other normal vehicles to identify
+ them, an additional and advanced approach is needed. One possible
+ approach is to use a blockchain-based approach [Bitcoin] as an IPv6
+ security checking framework. Each IPv6 packet from a vehicle can be
+ treated as a transaction, and the neighboring vehicles can play the
+ role of peers in a consensus method of a blockchain [Bitcoin]
+ [Vehicular-BlockChain]. For a blockchain's efficient consensus in
+ vehicular networks having fast-moving vehicles, either a new
+ consensus algorithm needs to be developed, or an existing consensus
+ algorithm needs to be enhanced. In addition, a consensus-based
+ mechanism for the security of vehicular networks in the IPv6 layer
+ can also be considered. A group of servers as blockchain
+ infrastructure can be part of the security checking process in the IP
+ layer.
+
+ To prevent an adversary from tracking a vehicle with its MAC address
+ or IPv6 address, especially for a long-living transport-layer session
+ (e.g., voice call over IP and video streaming service), a MAC address
+ pseudonym needs to be provided to each vehicle; that is, each vehicle
+ periodically updates its MAC address, and the vehicle's IPv6 address
+ needs to be updated accordingly by the MAC address change [RFC4086]
+ [RFC8981]. Such an update of the MAC and IPv6 addresses should not
+ interrupt the E2E communications between two vehicles (or between a
+ vehicle and an IP-RSU) for a long-living transport-layer session.
+ However, if this pseudonym is performed without strong E2E
+ confidentiality (using either IPsec or TLS), there will be no privacy
+ benefit from changing MAC and IPv6 addresses because an adversary can
+ observe the change of the MAC and IPv6 addresses and track the
+ vehicle with those addresses. Thus, the MAC address pseudonym and
+ the IPv6 address update should be performed with strong E2E
+ confidentiality.
+
+ The privacy exposure to the TCC via V2I is mostly about the location
+ information of vehicles and may also include other in-vehicle
+ activities, such as transactions of credit cards. The assumed,
+ trusted actors are the owner of a vehicle, an authorized vehicle
+ service provider (e.g., navigation service provider), and an
+ authorized vehicle manufacturer for providing after-sales services.
+ In addition, privacy concerns for excessively collecting vehicle
+ activities from roadway operators, such as public transportation
+ administrators and private contractors, may also pose threats on
+ violating privacy rights of vehicles. It might be interesting to
+ find a solution from a technological point of view along with public
+ policy development for the issue.
+
+ The "multicasting" of the location information of a VRU's smartphone
+ means IPv6 multicasting. There is a possible security attack related
+ to this multicasting. Attackers can use "fake identifiers" as source
+ IPv6 addresses of their devices to generate IPv6 packets and
+ multicast them to nearby vehicles in order to cause confusion that
+ those vehicles are surrounded by other vehicles or pedestrians. As a
+ result, navigation services (e.g., Google Maps [Google-Maps] and Waze
+ [Waze]) can be confused with fake road traffic by those vehicles or
+ smartphones with "fake identifiers" [Fake-Identifier-Attack]. This
+ attack with "fake identifiers" should be detected and handled by
+ vehicular networks. To cope with this attack, both legal vehicles
+ and legal VRUs' smartphones can be registered with a TCC and their
+ locations can be tracked by the TCC. With this tracking, the TCC can
+ tell the road traffic conditions caused by those vehicles and
+ smartphones. In addition, to prevent hackers from tracking the
+ locations of those vehicles and smartphones, either a MAC address
+ pseudonym [MAC-ADD-RAN] or secure IPv6 address generation [RFC7721]
+ can be used to protect the privacy of those vehicles and smartphones.
+
+7. IANA Considerations
+
+ This document has no IANA actions.
+
+8. References
+
+8.1. Normative References
+
+ [RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
+ "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, September 2007,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861>.
+
+ [RFC4862] Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
+ Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC4862, September 2007,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4862>.
+
+ [RFC6275] Perkins, C., Ed., Johnson, D., and J. Arkko, "Mobility
+ Support in IPv6", RFC 6275, DOI 10.17487/RFC6275, July
+ 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6275>.
+
+ [RFC8691] Benamar, N., Härri, J., Lee, J., and T. Ernst, "Basic
+ Support for IPv6 Networks Operating Outside the Context of
+ a Basic Service Set over IEEE Std 802.11", RFC 8691,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC8691, December 2019,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8691>.
+
+8.2. Informative References
+
+ [AERO] Templin, F. L., Ed., "Automatic Extended Route
+ Optimization (AERO)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
+ draft-templin-intarea-aero-27, 23 February 2023,
+ <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-templin-
+ intarea-aero-27>.
+
+ [Automotive-Sensing]
+ Choi, J., Va, V., Gonzalez-Prelcic, N., Daniels, R., Bhat,
+ C., and R. Heath, "Millimeter-Wave Vehicular Communication
+ to Support Massive Automotive Sensing", IEEE
+ Communications Magazine, Volume 54, Issue 12, pp. 160-167,
+ DOI 10.1109/MCOM.2016.1600071CM, December 2016,
+ <https://doi.org/10.1109/MCOM.2016.1600071CM>.
+
+ [Bitcoin] Nakamoto, S., "Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash
+ System", <https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf>.
+
+ [CA-Cruise-Control]
+ California Partners for Advanced Transportation Technology
+ (PATH), "Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control",
+ <https://path.berkeley.edu/research/connected-and-
+ automated-vehicles/cooperative-adaptive-cruise-control>.
+
+ [CASD] Shen, Y., Jeong, J., Oh, T., and S. H. Son, "CASD: A
+ Framework of Context-Awareness Safety Driving in Vehicular
+ Networks", 30th International Conference on Advanced
+ Information Networking and Applications Workshops (WAINA),
+ DOI 10.1109/WAINA.2016.74, March 2016,
+ <https://doi.org/10.1109/WAINA.2016.74>.
+
+ [CBDN] Kim, J., Kim, S., Jeong, J., Kim, H., Park, J., and T.
+ Kim, "CBDN: Cloud-Based Drone Navigation for Efficient
+ Battery Charging in Drone Networks", IEEE Transactions on
+ Intelligent Transportation Systems, Volume 20, Issue 11,
+ pp. 4174-4191, DOI 10.1109/TITS.2018.2883058, November
+ 2019, <https://doi.org/10.1109/TITS.2018.2883058>.
+
+ [CNP] Mugabarigira, B., Shen, Y., Jeong, J., Oh, T., and H.
+ Jeong, "Context-Aware Navigation Protocol for Safe Driving
+ in Vehicular Cyber-Physical Systems", IEEE Transactions on
+ Intelligent Transportation Systems, Volume 24, Issue 1,
+ pp. 128-138, DOI 10.1109/TITS.2022.3210753, January 2023,
+ <https://doi.org/10.1109/TITS.2022.3210753>.
+
+ [DFC] Jeong, J., Shen, Y., Kim, S., Choe, D., Lee, K., and Y.
+ Kim, "DFC: Device-free human counting through WiFi fine-
+ grained subcarrier information", IET Communications,
+ Volume 15, Issue 3, pp. 337-350, DOI 10.1049/cmu2.12043,
+ February 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1049/cmu2.12043>.
+
+ [DSRC] ASTM International, "Standard Specification for
+ Telecommunications and Information Exchange Between
+ Roadside and Vehicle Systems - 5 GHz Band Dedicated Short
+ Range Communications (DSRC) Medium Access Control (MAC)
+ and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications",
+ ASTM E2213-03(2010), DOI 10.1520/E2213-03R10, September
+ 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1520/E2213-03R10>.
+
+ [EU-2008-671-EC]
+ European Union, "COMMISSION DECISION of 5 August 2008 on
+ the harmonised use of radio spectrum in the 5 875-5 905
+ MHz frequency band for safety-related applications of
+ Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS)", EU 2008/671/EC,
+ August 2008, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
+ content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008D0671&rid=7>.
+
+ [Fake-Identifier-Attack]
+ ABC News, "Berlin artist uses handcart full of smartphones
+ to trick Google Maps' traffic algorithm into thinking
+ there is traffic jam", February 2020,
+ <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-02-04/man-creates-fake-
+ traffic-jam-on-google-maps-by-carting-99-phones/11929136>.
+
+ [FCC-ITS-Modification]
+ Federal Communications Commission, "FCC Modernizes 5.9 GHz
+ Band to Improve Wi-Fi and Automotive Safety", November
+ 2020, <https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-modernizes-59-ghz-
+ band-improve-wi-fi-and-automotive-safety-0>.
+
+ [FirstNet] FirstNet Authority, "First Responder Network Authority |
+ FirstNet", <https://www.firstnet.gov/>.
+
+ [FirstNet-Report]
+ FirstNet, "FY 2017: ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, Advancing
+ Public Safety Broadband Communications", FirstNet FY 2017,
+ December 2017, <https://www.firstnet.gov/system/tdf/
+ FirstNet-Annual-Report-
+ FY2017.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=449>.
+
+ [FPC-DMM] Matsushima, S., Bertz, L., Liebsch, M., Gundavelli, S.,
+ Moses, D., and C. E. Perkins, "Protocol for Forwarding
+ Policy Configuration (FPC) in DMM", Work in Progress,
+ Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-dmm-fpc-cpdp-14, 22 September
+ 2020, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
+ dmm-fpc-cpdp-14>.
+
+ [Fuel-Efficient]
+ van de Hoef, S., Johansson, K., and D. Dimarogonas, "Fuel-
+ Efficient En Route Formation of Truck Platoons", IEEE
+ Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, Volume
+ 19, Issue 1, pp. 102-112, DOI 10.1109/TITS.2017.2700021,
+ January 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1109/TITS.2017.2700021>.
+
+ [Google-Maps]
+ Google, "Google Maps", <https://www.google.com/maps/>.
+
+ [Identity-Management]
+ Wetterwald, M., Hrizi, F., and P. Cataldi, "Cross-layer
+ identities management in ITS stations", 10th IEEE
+ International Conference on ITS Telecommunications,
+ November 2010,
+ <https://www.eurecom.fr/fr/publication/3205>.
+
+ [IEEE-802.11-OCB]
+ IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Information technology -
+ Telecommunications and information exchange between
+ systems Local and metropolitan area networks-Specific
+ requirements - Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control
+ (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications",
+ DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2016.7786995, IEEE Std 802.11-2016,
+ December 2016,
+ <https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEESTD.2016.7786995>.
+
+ [IEEE-802.11p]
+ IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Information technology-- Local
+ and metropolitan area networks-- Specific requirements--
+ Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and
+ Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications Amendment 6: Wireless
+ Access in Vehicular Environments",
+ DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2010.5514475, IEEE Std 802.11p-2010,
+ July 2010, <https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEESTD.2010.5514475>.
+
+ [In-Car-Network]
+ Lim, H., Volker, L., and D. Herrscher, "Challenges in a
+ future IP/Ethernet-based in-car network for real-time
+ applications", Proceedings of the 48th Design Automation
+ Conference, pp. 7-12, DOI 10.1145/2024724.2024727, June
+ 2011, <https://doi.org/10.1145/2024724.2024727>.
+
+ [IPPL] Nordmark, E., "IP over Intentionally Partially Partitioned
+ Links", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
+ intarea-ippl-00, 30 March 2017,
+ <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-intarea-
+ ippl-00>.
+
+ [ISO-ITS-IPv6]
+ ISO/TC 204, "Intelligent transport systems -
+ Communications access for land mobiles (CALM) - IPv6
+ Networking", ISO 21210:2012, June 2012,
+ <https://www.iso.org/standard/46549.html>.
+
+ [ISO-ITS-IPv6-AMD1]
+ ISO/TC 204, "Intelligent transport systems -
+ Communications access for land mobiles (CALM) - IPv6
+ Networking - Amendment 1", ISO 21210:2012/AMD 1:2017,
+ September 2017, <https://www.iso.org/standard/65691.html>.
+
+ [LIFS] Wang, J., Xiong, J., Jiang, H., Jamieson, K., Chen, X.,
+ Fang, D., and C. Wang, "Low Human-Effort, Device-Free
+ Localization with Fine-Grained Subcarrier Information",
+ IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, Volume 17, Issue
+ 11, pp. 2550-2563, DOI 10.1109/TMC.2018.2812746, November
+ 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1109/TMC.2018.2812746>.
+
+ [MAC-ADD-RAN]
+ Zuniga, JC., Bernardos, CJ., Ed., and A. Andersdotter,
+ "Randomized and Changing MAC Address", Work in Progress,
+ Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-madinas-mac-address-
+ randomization-06, 11 March 2023,
+ <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-madinas-
+ mac-address-randomization-06>.
+
+ [NHTSA-ACAS-Report]
+ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
+ "Automotive Collision Avoidance Systems (ACAS) Program
+ Final Report", DOT HS 809 080, August 2000,
+ <https://one.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/research/pub/ACAS/
+ ACAS_index.htm>.
+
+ [OMNI] Templin, F. L., Ed., "Transmission of IP Packets over
+ Overlay Multilink Network (OMNI) Interfaces", Work in
+ Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-templin-intarea-omni-27,
+ 23 February 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
+ draft-templin-intarea-omni-27>.
+
+ [PARCELS] Templin, F. L., Ed., "IP Parcels and Advanced Jumbos",
+ Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-templin-intarea-
+ parcels-55, 28 February 2023,
+ <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-templin-
+ intarea-parcels-55>.
+
+ [PSCE] European Commission, "PSCEurope Public Safety
+ Communications Europe", <https://www.psc-europe.eu/>.
+
+ [RCM-USE-CASES]
+ Henry, J. and Y. Lee, "Randomized and Changing MAC Address
+ Use Cases and Requirements", Work in Progress, Internet-
+ Draft, draft-ietf-madinas-use-cases-05, 13 March 2023,
+ <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-madinas-
+ use-cases-05>.
+
+ [RFC2710] Deering, S., Fenner, W., and B. Haberman, "Multicast
+ Listener Discovery (MLD) for IPv6", RFC 2710,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC2710, October 1999,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2710>.
+
+ [RFC3626] Clausen, T., Ed. and P. Jacquet, Ed., "Optimized Link
+ State Routing Protocol (OLSR)", RFC 3626,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC3626, October 2003,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3626>.
+
+ [RFC3753] Manner, J., Ed. and M. Kojo, Ed., "Mobility Related
+ Terminology", RFC 3753, DOI 10.17487/RFC3753, June 2004,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3753>.
+
+ [RFC3810] Vida, R., Ed. and L. Costa, Ed., "Multicast Listener
+ Discovery Version 2 (MLDv2) for IPv6", RFC 3810,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC3810, June 2004,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3810>.
+
+ [RFC3963] Devarapalli, V., Wakikawa, R., Petrescu, A., and P.
+ Thubert, "Network Mobility (NEMO) Basic Support Protocol",
+ RFC 3963, DOI 10.17487/RFC3963, January 2005,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3963>.
+
+ [RFC3971] Arkko, J., Ed., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander,
+ "SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC3971, March 2005,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3971>.
+
+ [RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
+ "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
+
+ [RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
+ Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193>.
+
+ [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
+ Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
+ December 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.
+
+ [RFC4302] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC4302, December 2005,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4302>.
+
+ [RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
+ RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.
+
+ [RFC4308] Hoffman, P., "Cryptographic Suites for IPsec", RFC 4308,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC4308, December 2005,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4308>.
+
+ [RFC4821] Mathis, M. and J. Heffner, "Packetization Layer Path MTU
+ Discovery", RFC 4821, DOI 10.17487/RFC4821, March 2007,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4821>.
+
+ [RFC4885] Ernst, T. and H-Y. Lach, "Network Mobility Support
+ Terminology", RFC 4885, DOI 10.17487/RFC4885, July 2007,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4885>.
+
+ [RFC4888] Ng, C., Thubert, P., Watari, M., and F. Zhao, "Network
+ Mobility Route Optimization Problem Statement", RFC 4888,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC4888, July 2007,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4888>.
+
+ [RFC5213] Gundavelli, S., Ed., Leung, K., Devarapalli, V.,
+ Chowdhury, K., and B. Patil, "Proxy Mobile IPv6",
+ RFC 5213, DOI 10.17487/RFC5213, August 2008,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5213>.
+
+ [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
+ Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
+ Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
+ (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
+
+ [RFC5415] Calhoun, P., Ed., Montemurro, M., Ed., and D. Stanley,
+ Ed., "Control And Provisioning of Wireless Access Points
+ (CAPWAP) Protocol Specification", RFC 5415,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC5415, March 2009,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5415>.
+
+ [RFC5614] Ogier, R. and P. Spagnolo, "Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET)
+ Extension of OSPF Using Connected Dominating Set (CDS)
+ Flooding", RFC 5614, DOI 10.17487/RFC5614, August 2009,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5614>.
+
+ [RFC5881] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
+ (BFD) for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop)", RFC 5881,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC5881, June 2010,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5881>.
+
+ [RFC5889] Baccelli, E., Ed. and M. Townsley, Ed., "IP Addressing
+ Model in Ad Hoc Networks", RFC 5889, DOI 10.17487/RFC5889,
+ September 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5889>.
+
+ [RFC6130] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., and J. Dean, "Mobile Ad Hoc
+ Network (MANET) Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP)",
+ RFC 6130, DOI 10.17487/RFC6130, April 2011,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6130>.
+
+ [RFC6250] Thaler, D., "Evolution of the IP Model", RFC 6250,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC6250, May 2011,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6250>.
+
+ [RFC6550] Winter, T., Ed., Thubert, P., Ed., Brandt, A., Hui, J.,
+ Kelsey, R., Levis, P., Pister, K., Struik, R., Vasseur,
+ JP., and R. Alexander, "RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for
+ Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC 6550,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC6550, March 2012,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6550>.
+
+ [RFC6583] Gashinsky, I., Jaeggli, J., and W. Kumari, "Operational
+ Neighbor Discovery Problems", RFC 6583,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC6583, March 2012,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6583>.
+
+ [RFC6775] Shelby, Z., Ed., Chakrabarti, S., Nordmark, E., and C.
+ Bormann, "Neighbor Discovery Optimization for IPv6 over
+ Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs)",
+ RFC 6775, DOI 10.17487/RFC6775, November 2012,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6775>.
+
+ [RFC6959] McPherson, D., Baker, F., and J. Halpern, "Source Address
+ Validation Improvement (SAVI) Threat Scope", RFC 6959,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC6959, May 2013,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6959>.
+
+ [RFC7149] Boucadair, M. and C. Jacquenet, "Software-Defined
+ Networking: A Perspective from within a Service Provider
+ Environment", RFC 7149, DOI 10.17487/RFC7149, March 2014,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7149>.
+
+ [RFC7181] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., Jacquet, P., and U. Herberg,
+ "The Optimized Link State Routing Protocol Version 2",
+ RFC 7181, DOI 10.17487/RFC7181, April 2014,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7181>.
+
+ [RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
+ Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
+ (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
+ 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
+
+ [RFC7333] Chan, H., Ed., Liu, D., Seite, P., Yokota, H., and J.
+ Korhonen, "Requirements for Distributed Mobility
+ Management", RFC 7333, DOI 10.17487/RFC7333, August 2014,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7333>.
+
+ [RFC7427] Kivinen, T. and J. Snyder, "Signature Authentication in
+ the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 7427,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC7427, January 2015,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7427>.
+
+ [RFC7429] Liu, D., Ed., Zuniga, JC., Ed., Seite, P., Chan, H., and
+ CJ. Bernardos, "Distributed Mobility Management: Current
+ Practices and Gap Analysis", RFC 7429,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC7429, January 2015,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7429>.
+
+ [RFC7466] Dearlove, C. and T. Clausen, "An Optimization for the
+ Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) Neighborhood Discovery
+ Protocol (NHDP)", RFC 7466, DOI 10.17487/RFC7466, March
+ 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7466>.
+
+ [RFC7721] Cooper, A., Gont, F., and D. Thaler, "Security and Privacy
+ Considerations for IPv6 Address Generation Mechanisms",
+ RFC 7721, DOI 10.17487/RFC7721, March 2016,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7721>.
+
+ [RFC8002] Heer, T. and S. Varjonen, "Host Identity Protocol
+ Certificates", RFC 8002, DOI 10.17487/RFC8002, October
+ 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8002>.
+
+ [RFC8028] Baker, F. and B. Carpenter, "First-Hop Router Selection by
+ Hosts in a Multi-Prefix Network", RFC 8028,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC8028, November 2016,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8028>.
+
+ [RFC8175] Ratliff, S., Jury, S., Satterwhite, D., Taylor, R., and B.
+ Berry, "Dynamic Link Exchange Protocol (DLEP)", RFC 8175,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC8175, June 2017,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8175>.
+
+ [RFC8200] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
+ (IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>.
+
+ [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
+ Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
+
+ [RFC8505] Thubert, P., Ed., Nordmark, E., Chakrabarti, S., and C.
+ Perkins, "Registration Extensions for IPv6 over Low-Power
+ Wireless Personal Area Network (6LoWPAN) Neighbor
+ Discovery", RFC 8505, DOI 10.17487/RFC8505, November 2018,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8505>.
+
+ [RFC8629] Cheng, B. and L. Berger, Ed., "Dynamic Link Exchange
+ Protocol (DLEP) Multi-Hop Forwarding Extension", RFC 8629,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC8629, July 2019,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8629>.
+
+ [RFC8684] Ford, A., Raiciu, C., Handley, M., Bonaventure, O., and C.
+ Paasch, "TCP Extensions for Multipath Operation with
+ Multiple Addresses", RFC 8684, DOI 10.17487/RFC8684, March
+ 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8684>.
+
+ [RFC8757] Cheng, B. and L. Berger, Ed., "Dynamic Link Exchange
+ Protocol (DLEP) Latency Range Extension", RFC 8757,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC8757, March 2020,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8757>.
+
+ [RFC8899] Fairhurst, G., Jones, T., Tüxen, M., Rüngeler, I., and T.
+ Völker, "Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery for
+ Datagram Transports", RFC 8899, DOI 10.17487/RFC8899,
+ September 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8899>.
+
+ [RFC8928] Thubert, P., Ed., Sarikaya, B., Sethi, M., and R. Struik,
+ "Address-Protected Neighbor Discovery for Low-Power and
+ Lossy Networks", RFC 8928, DOI 10.17487/RFC8928, November
+ 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8928>.
+
+ [RFC8981] Gont, F., Krishnan, S., Narten, T., and R. Draves,
+ "Temporary Address Extensions for Stateless Address
+ Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 8981,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC8981, February 2021,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8981>.
+
+ [RFC9000] Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
+ Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.
+
+ [RFC9099] Vyncke, É., Chittimaneni, K., Kaeo, M., and E. Rey,
+ "Operational Security Considerations for IPv6 Networks",
+ RFC 9099, DOI 10.17487/RFC9099, August 2021,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9099>.
+
+ [RFC9119] Perkins, C., McBride, M., Stanley, D., Kumari, W., and JC.
+ Zúñiga, "Multicast Considerations over IEEE 802 Wireless
+ Media", RFC 9119, DOI 10.17487/RFC9119, October 2021,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9119>.
+
+ [RFC9300] Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., Lewis, D., and A.
+ Cabellos, Ed., "The Locator/ID Separation Protocol
+ (LISP)", RFC 9300, DOI 10.17487/RFC9300, October 2022,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9300>.
+
+ [SAINT] Jeong, J., Jeong, H., Lee, E., Oh, T., and D. H. C. Du,
+ "SAINT: Self-Adaptive Interactive Navigation Tool for
+ Cloud-Based Vehicular Traffic Optimization", IEEE
+ Transactions on Vehicular Technology, Volume 65, Issue 6,
+ pp. 4053-4067, DOI 10.1109/TVT.2015.2476958, June 2016,
+ <https://doi.org/10.1109/TVT.2015.2476958>.
+
+ [SAINTplus]
+ Shen, Y., Lee, J., Jeong, H., Jeong, J., Lee, E., and D.
+ H. C. Du, "SAINT+: Self-Adaptive Interactive Navigation
+ Tool+ for Emergency Service Delivery Optimization", IEEE
+ Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, Volume
+ 19, Issue 4, pp. 1038-1053, DOI 10.1109/TITS.2017.2710881,
+ June 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1109/TITS.2017.2710881>.
+
+ [SANA] Hwang, T. and J. Jeong, "SANA: Safety-Aware Navigation
+ Application for Pedestrian Protection in Vehicular
+ Networks", Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series
+ (LNISA, Volume 9502), DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-27293-1_12,
+ December 2015,
+ <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27293-1_12>.
+
+ [Scrambler-Attack]
+ Bloessl, B., Sommer, C., Dressier, F., and D. Eckhoff,
+ "The scrambler attack: A robust physical layer attack on
+ location privacy in vehicular networks", 2015
+ International Conference on Computing, Networking and
+ Communications (ICNC), DOI 10.1109/ICCNC.2015.7069376,
+ February 2015,
+ <https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCNC.2015.7069376>.
+
+ [SEC-PRIV] Jeong, J., Ed., Shen, Y., Jung, H., Park, J., and T. Oh,
+ "Basic Support for Security and Privacy in IP-Based
+ Vehicular Networks", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
+ draft-jeong-ipwave-security-privacy-07, 4 February 2023,
+ <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-jeong-ipwave-
+ security-privacy-07>.
+
+ [SignalGuru]
+ Koukoumidis, E., Peh, L., and M. Martonosi, "SignalGuru:
+ leveraging mobile phones for collaborative traffic signal
+ schedule advisory", MobiSys '11: Proceedings of the 9th
+ international conference on Mobile systems, applications,
+ and services, pp. 127-140, DOI 10.1145/1999995.2000008,
+ June 2011, <https://doi.org/10.1145/1999995.2000008>.
+
+ [TR-22.886-3GPP]
+ 3GPP, "Study on enhancement of 3GPP support for 5G V2X
+ services", 3GPP TS 22.886 16.2.0, December 2018,
+ <https://portal.3gpp.org/desktopmodules/Specifications/
+ SpecificationDetails.aspx?specificationId=3108>.
+
+ [Truck-Platooning]
+ California Partners for Advanced Transportation Technology
+ (PATH), "Truck Platooning",
+ <https://path.berkeley.edu/research/connected-and-
+ automated-vehicles/truck-platooning>.
+
+ [TS-23.285-3GPP]
+ 3GPP, "Architecture enhancements for V2X services", 3GPP
+ TS 23.285 16.2.0, December 2019,
+ <https://portal.3gpp.org/desktopmodules/Specifications/
+ SpecificationDetails.aspx?specificationId=3078>.
+
+ [TS-23.287-3GPP]
+ 3GPP, "Architecture enhancements for 5G System (5GS) to
+ support Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) services", 3GPP
+ TS 23.287 16.2.0, March 2020,
+ <https://portal.3gpp.org/desktopmodules/Specifications/
+ SpecificationDetails.aspx?specificationId=3578>.
+
+ [UAM-ITS] Templin, F., Ed., "Urban Air Mobility Implications for
+ Intelligent Transportation Systems", Work in Progress,
+ Internet-Draft, draft-templin-ipwave-uam-its-04, 4 January
+ 2021, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
+ templin-ipwave-uam-its-04>.
+
+ [Vehicular-BlockChain]
+ Dorri, A., Steger, M., Kanhere, S., and R. Jurdak,
+ "BlockChain: A Distributed Solution to Automotive Security
+ and Privacy", IEEE Communications Magazine, Volume 55,
+ Issue 12, pp. 119-125, DOI 10.1109/MCOM.2017.1700879,
+ December 2017,
+ <https://doi.org/10.1109/MCOM.2017.1700879>.
+
+ [VEHICULAR-MM]
+ Jeong, J., Ed., Mugabarigira, B., Shen, Y., and H. Jung,
+ "Vehicular Mobility Management for IP-Based Vehicular
+ Networks", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-jeong-
+ ipwave-vehicular-mobility-management-09, 4 February 2023,
+ <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-jeong-ipwave-
+ vehicular-mobility-management-09>.
+
+ [VEHICULAR-ND]
+ Jeong, J., Ed., Shen, Y., Kwon, J., and S. Cespedes,
+ "Vehicular Neighbor Discovery for IP-Based Vehicular
+ Networks", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-jeong-
+ ipwave-vehicular-neighbor-discovery-15, 4 February 2023,
+ <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-jeong-ipwave-
+ vehicular-neighbor-discovery-15>.
+
+ [VIP-WAVE] Cespedes, S., Lu, N., and X. Shen, "VIP-WAVE: On the
+ Feasibility of IP Communications in 802.11p Vehicular
+ Networks", IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation
+ Systems, Volume 14, Issue 1, pp. 82-97,
+ DOI 10.1109/TITS.2012.2206387, March 2013,
+ <https://doi.org/10.1109/TITS.2012.2206387>.
+
+ [WAVE-1609.0]
+ IEEE, "IEEE Guide for Wireless Access in Vehicular
+ Environments (WAVE) - Architecture",
+ DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2014.6755433, IEEE Std 1609.0-2013,
+ March 2014,
+ <https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEESTD.2014.6755433>.
+
+ [WAVE-1609.2]
+ IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular
+ Environments - Security Services for Applications and
+ Management Messages", DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2016.7426684,
+ IEEE Std 1609.2-2016, March 2016,
+ <https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEESTD.2016.7426684>.
+
+ [WAVE-1609.3]
+ IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular
+ Environments (WAVE) - Networking Services",
+ DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2016.7458115, IEEE Std 1609.3-2016,
+ April 2016,
+ <https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEESTD.2016.7458115>.
+
+ [WAVE-1609.4]
+ IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular
+ Environments (WAVE) - Multi-Channel Operation",
+ DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2016.7435228, IEEE Std 1609.4-2016,
+ March 2016,
+ <https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEESTD.2016.7435228>.
+
+ [Waze] Google, "Waze", <https://www.waze.com/>.
+
+ [WIRELESS-ND]
+ Thubert, P., Ed. and M. Richardson, "Architecture and
+ Framework for IPv6 over Non-Broadcast Access", Work in
+ Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-thubert-6man-ipv6-over-
+ wireless-15, 8 March 2023,
+ <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-thubert-6man-
+ ipv6-over-wireless-15>.
+
+Appendix A. Support of Multiple Radio Technologies for V2V
+
+ Vehicular networks may consist of multiple radio technologies, such
+ as DSRC and 5G V2X (or LTE V2X). Although a Layer 2 solution can
+ provide support for multihop communications in vehicular networks,
+ the scalability issue related to multihop forwarding still remains
+ when vehicles need to disseminate or forward packets toward
+ destinations that are multiple hops away. In addition, the
+ IPv6-based approach for V2V as a network-layer protocol can
+ accommodate multiple radio technologies as MAC protocols, such as
+ DSRC and 5G V2X (or LTE V2X). Therefore, the existing IPv6 protocol
+ can be augmented through the addition of a virtual interface (e.g.,
+ OMNI [OMNI] and DLEP [RFC8175]) and/or protocol changes in order to
+ support both wireless single-hop/multihop V2V communications and
+ multiple radio technologies in vehicular networks. In such a way,
+ vehicles can communicate with each other by V2V communications to
+ share either an emergency situation or road hazard information on a
+ highway having multiple radio technologies.
+
+Appendix B. Support of Multihop V2X Networking
+
+ The multihop V2X networking can be supported by RPL (IPv6 Routing
+ Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks) [RFC6550] and Overlay
+ Multilink Network Interface [OMNI] with AERO [AERO].
+
+ RPL defines an IPv6 routing protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks
+ (LLNs) as being mostly designed for home automation routing, building
+ automation routing, industrial routing, and urban LLN routing. It
+ uses a Destination-Oriented Directed Acyclic Graph (DODAG) to
+ construct routing paths for hosts (e.g., IoT devices) in a network.
+ The DODAG uses an Objective Function (OF) for route selection and
+ optimization within the network. A user can use different routing
+ metrics to define an OF for a specific scenario. RPL supports
+ multipoint-to-point, point-to-multipoint, and point-to-point traffic;
+ and the major traffic flow is the multipoint-to-point traffic. For
+ example, in a highway scenario, a vehicle may not access an IP-RSU
+ directly because of the distance of the DSRC coverage (up to 1 km).
+ In this case, the RPL can be extended to support a multihop V2I since
+ a vehicle can take advantage of other vehicles as relay nodes to
+ reach the IP-RSU. Also, RPL can be extended to support both multihop
+ V2V and V2X in the similar way.
+
+ RPL is primarily designed to minimize the control plane activity,
+ which is the relative amount of routing protocol exchanges versus
+ data traffic; this approach is beneficial for situations where the
+ power and bandwidth are scarce (e.g., an IoT LLN where RPL is
+ typically used today), but also in situations of high relative
+ mobility between the nodes in the network (also known as swarming,
+ e.g., within a variable set of vehicles with a similar global motion,
+ or a variable set of drones flying toward the same direction).
+
+ To reduce the routing exchanges, RPL leverages a Distance Vector (DV)
+ approach, which does not need a global knowledge of the topology, and
+ only optimizes the routes to and from the root, allowing peer-to-peer
+ (P2P) paths to be stretched. Although RPL installs its routes
+ proactively, it only maintains them lazily, that is, in reaction to
+ actual traffic or as a slow background activity. Additionally, RPL
+ leverages the concept of an OF, which allows adapting the activity of
+ the routing protocol to use cases, e.g., type, speed, and quality of
+ the radios. RPL does not need to converge and provides connectivity
+ to most nodes most of the time. The default route toward the root is
+ maintained aggressively and may change while a packet progresses
+ without causing loops, so the packet will still reach the root.
+ There are two modes for routing in RPL: non-storing mode and storing
+ mode. In non-storing mode, a node inside the mesh or swarm that
+ changes its point(s) of attachment to the graph informs the root with
+ a single unicast packet flowing along the default route, and the
+ connectivity is restored immediately; this mode is preferable for use
+ cases where Internet connectivity is dominant. On the other hand, in
+ storing mode, the routing stretch is reduced for better P2P
+ connectivity, and the Internet connectivity is restored more slowly
+ during the time for the DV operation to operate hop-by-hop. While an
+ RPL topology can quickly scale up and down and fit the needs of
+ mobility of vehicles, the total performance of the system will also
+ depend on how quickly a node can form an address, join the mesh
+ (including Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA)), and
+ manage its global mobility to become reachable from another node
+ outside the mesh.
+
+ OMNI defines a protocol for the transmission of IPv6 packets over
+ Overlay Multilink Network Interfaces that are virtual interfaces
+ governing multiple physical network interfaces. OMNI supports
+ multihop V2V communication between vehicles in multiple forwarding
+ hops via intermediate vehicles with OMNI links. It also supports
+ multihop V2I communication between a vehicle and an infrastructure
+ access point by multihop V2V communication. The OMNI interface
+ supports an NBMA link model where multihop V2V and V2I communications
+ use each mobile node's ULAs without need for any DAD or MLD
+ messaging.
+
+ In the OMNI protocol, an OMNI virtual interface can have a ULA
+ [RFC4193] indeed, but wireless physical interfaces associated with
+ the OMNI virtual interface can use any prefixes. The ULA supports
+ both V2V and V2I multihop forwarding within the vehicular network
+ (e.g., via a VANET routing protocol) while each vehicle can
+ communicate with Internet correspondents using IPv6 global addresses
+ via OMNI interface encapsulation over the wireless interface.
+
+ For the control traffic overhead for running both vehicular ND and a
+ VANET routing protocol, the AERO/OMNI approach may avoid this issue
+ by using MANET routing protocols only (i.e., no multicast of IPv6 ND
+ messaging) in the wireless underlay network while applying efficient
+ unicast IPv6 ND messaging in the OMNI overlay on an as-needed basis
+ for router discovery and NUD. This greatly reduces the overhead for
+ VANET-wide multicasting while providing agile accommodation for
+ dynamic topology changes.
+
+Appendix C. Support of Mobility Management for V2I
+
+ The seamless application communication between two vehicles or
+ between a vehicle and an infrastructure node requires mobility
+ management in vehicular networks. The mobility management schemes
+ include a host-based mobility scheme, network-based mobility scheme,
+ and software-defined networking scheme.
+
+ In the host-based mobility scheme (e.g., MIPv6), an IP-RSU plays the
+ role of a home agent. On the other hand, in the network-based
+ mobility scheme (e.g., PMIPv6), an MA plays the role of a mobility
+ management controller, such as a Local Mobility Anchor (LMA) in
+ PMIPv6, which also serves vehicles as a home agent, and an IP-RSU
+ plays the role of an access router, such as a Mobile Access Gateway
+ (MAG) in PMIPv6 [RFC5213]. The host-based mobility scheme needs
+ client functionality in the IPv6 stack of a vehicle as a mobile node
+ for mobility signaling message exchange between the vehicle and home
+ agent. On the other hand, the network-based mobility scheme does not
+ need such client functionality of a vehicle because the network
+ infrastructure node (e.g., MAG in PMIPv6) as a proxy mobility agent
+ handles the mobility signaling message exchange with the home agent
+ (e.g., LMA in PMIPv6) for the sake of the vehicle.
+
+ There are a scalability issue and a route optimization issue in the
+ network-based mobility scheme (e.g., PMIPv6) when an MA covers a
+ large vehicular network governing many IP-RSUs. In this case, a
+ distributed mobility scheme (e.g., DMM [RFC7429]) can mitigate the
+ scalability issue by distributing multiple MAs in the vehicular
+ network such that they are positioned closer to vehicles for route
+ optimization and bottleneck mitigation in a central MA in the
+ network-based mobility scheme. All these mobility approaches (i.e.,
+ a host-based mobility scheme, network-based mobility scheme, and
+ distributed mobility scheme) and a hybrid approach of a combination
+ of them need to provide an efficient mobility service to vehicles
+ moving fast and moving along with relatively predictable trajectories
+ along the roadways.
+
+ In vehicular networks, the control plane can be separated from the
+ data plane for efficient mobility management and data forwarding by
+ using the concept of Software-Defined Networking (SDN) [RFC7149]
+ [FPC-DMM]. Note that Forwarding Policy Configuration (FPC) in
+ [FPC-DMM], which is a flexible mobility management system, can manage
+ the separation of data plane and control plane in DMM. In SDN, the
+ control plane and data plane are separated for the efficient
+ management of forwarding elements (e.g., switches and routers) where
+ an SDN controller configures the forwarding elements in a centralized
+ way, and they perform packet forwarding according to their forwarding
+ tables that are configured by the SDN controller. An MA as an SDN
+ controller needs to efficiently configure and monitor its IP-RSUs and
+ vehicles for mobility management and security services.
+
+Appendix D. Support of MTU Diversity for IP-Based Vehicular Networks
+
+ The wireless and/or wired-line links in paths between both mobile
+ nodes and fixed network correspondents may configure a variety of
+ Maximum Transmission Units (MTUs), where all IPv6 links are required
+ to support a minimum MTU of 1280 octets and may support larger MTUs.
+ Unfortunately, determining the path MTU (i.e., the minimum link MTU
+ in the path) has proven to be inefficient and unreliable due to the
+ uncertain nature of the loss-oriented ICMPv6 messaging service used
+ for path MTU discovery. Recent developments have produced a more
+ reliable path MTU determination service for TCP [RFC4821] and UDP
+ [RFC8899]; however, the MTUs discovered are always limited by the
+ most restrictive link MTU in the path (often 1500 octets or smaller).
+
+ The AERO/OMNI service addresses the MTU issue by introducing a new
+ layer in the Internet architecture known as the "OMNI Adaptation
+ Layer (OAL)". The OAL allows end systems that configure an OMNI
+ interface to utilize a full 65535-octet MTU by leveraging the IPv6
+ fragmentation and reassembly service during encapsulation to produce
+ fragment sizes that are assured of traversing the path without loss
+ due to a size restriction. Thus, this allows end systems to send
+ packets that are often much larger than the actual path MTU.
+
+ Performance studies over the course of many decades have proven that
+ applications will see greater performance by sending smaller numbers
+ of large packets (as opposed to larger numbers of small packets) even
+ if fragmentation is needed. The OAL further supports even larger
+ packet sizes through the IP Parcels construct [PARCELS], which
+ provides "packets-in-packet" encapsulation for a total size up to 4
+ MB. Together, the OAL and IP Parcels will provide a revolutionary
+ new capability for greater efficiency in both mobile and fixed
+ networks. On the other hand, due to the highly dynamic nature of
+ vehicular networks, a high packet loss may not be able to be avoided.
+ The high packet loss on IP Parcels can simultaneously cause multiple
+ TCP sessions to experience packet retransmissions, session time-out,
+ or re-establishment of the sessions. Other protocols, such as MPTCP
+ and QUIC, may also experience similar issues. A mechanism for
+ mitigating this issue in OAL and IP Parcels should be considered.
+
+Acknowledgments
+
+ This work was supported by a grant from the Institute of Information
+ & Communications Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) funded by
+ the Korea MSIT (Ministry of Science and ICT) (R-20160222-002755,
+ Cloud-based Security Intelligence Technology Development for the
+ Customized Security Service Provisioning).
+
+ This work was supported in part by the MSIT, Korea, under the ITRC
+ (Information Technology Research Center) support program (IITP-
+ 2022-2017-0-01633) supervised by the IITP.
+
+ This work was supported in part by the IITP (2020-0-00395-003,
+ Standard Development of Blockchain-based Network Management
+ Automation Technology).
+
+ This work was supported in part by the French research project
+ DataTweet (ANR-13-INFR-0008) and in part by the HIGHTS project funded
+ by the European Commission I (636537-H2020).
+
+ This work was supported in part by the Cisco University Research
+ Program Fund, Grant # 2019-199458 (3696), and by ANID Chile Basal
+ Project FB0008.
+
+Contributors
+
+ This document is a group work of the IPWAVE working group, greatly
+ benefiting from inputs and texts by Rex Buddenberg (Naval
+ Postgraduate School), Thierry Ernst (YoGoKo), Bokor Laszlo (Budapest
+ University of Technology and Economics), Jose Santa Lozanoi
+ (Universidad of Murcia), Richard Roy (MIT), Francois Simon (Pilot),
+ Sri Gundavelli (Cisco), Erik Nordmark (Zededa), Dirk von Hugo
+ (Deutsche Telekom), Pascal Thubert (Cisco), Carlos Bernardos (UC3M),
+ Russ Housley (Vigil Security), Suresh Krishnan (Cisco), Nancy Cam-
+ Winget (Cisco), Fred L. Templin (The Boeing Company), Jung-Soo Park
+ (ETRI), Zeungil (Ben) Kim (Hyundai Motors), Kyoungjae Sun (Soongsil
+ University), Zhiwei Yan (CNNIC), YongJoon Joe (LSware), Peter E. Yee
+ (Akayla), and Erik Kline (Aalyria). The authors sincerely appreciate
+ their contributions.
+
+ The following are coauthors of this document:
+
+ Nabil Benamar
+ Department of Computer Sciences,
+ High School of Technology of Meknes
+ Moulay Ismail University
+ Morocco
+ Phone: +212 6 70 83 22 36
+ Email: benamar73@gmail.com
+
+
+ Sandra Cespedes
+ NIC Chile Research Labs
+ Universidad de Chile
+ Av. Blanco Encalada 1975
+ Santiago
+ Chile
+ Phone: +56 2 29784093
+ Email: scespede@niclabs.cl
+
+
+ Jérôme Härri
+ Communication Systems Department
+ EURECOM
+ Sophia-Antipolis
+ France
+ Phone: +33 4 93 00 81 34
+ Email: jerome.haerri@eurecom.fr
+
+
+ Dapeng Liu
+ Alibaba
+ Beijing
+ 100022
+ China
+ Phone: +86 13911788933
+ Email: max.ldp@alibaba-inc.com
+
+
+ Tae (Tom) Oh
+ Department of Information Sciences and Technologies
+ Rochester Institute of Technology
+ One Lomb Memorial Drive
+ Rochester, NY 14623-5603
+ United States of America
+ Phone: +1 585 475 7642
+ Email: Tom.Oh@rit.edu
+
+
+ Charles E. Perkins
+ Futurewei Inc.
+ 2330 Central Expressway,
+ Santa Clara, CA 95050
+ United States of America
+ Phone: +1 408 330 4586,
+ Email: charliep@computer.org
+
+
+ Alexandre Petrescu
+ CEA, LIST, CEA Saclay
+ 91190 Gif-sur-Yvette
+ France
+ Phone: +33169089223
+ Email: Alexandre.Petrescu@cea.fr
+
+
+ Yiwen Chris Shen
+ Department of Computer Science & Engineering
+ Sungkyunkwan University
+ 2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
+ Suwon
+ Gyeonggi-Do
+ 16419
+ Republic of Korea
+ Phone: +82 31 299 4106
+ Email: chrisshen@skku.edu
+ URI: https://chrisshen.github.io
+
+
+ Michelle Wetterwald
+ FBConsulting
+ 21, Route de Luxembourg,
+ L-L-6633, Wasserbillig,
+ Luxembourg
+ Email: Michelle.Wetterwald@gmail.com
+
+
+Author's Address
+
+ Jaehoon Paul Jeong (editor)
+ Department of Computer Science and Engineering
+ Sungkyunkwan University
+ 2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
+ Suwon
+ Gyeonggi-Do
+ 16419
+ Republic of Korea
+ Phone: +82 31 299 4957
+ Email: pauljeong@skku.edu
+ URI: http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php