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+Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                    H. Sharma, Ed.
+Request for Comments: 9654                                  Netskope Inc
+Obsoletes: 8954                                              August 2024
+Updates: 6960                                                           
+Category: Standards Track                                               
+ISSN: 2070-1721
+
+
+       Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Nonce Extension
+
+Abstract
+
+   RFC 8954 imposed size constraints on the optional Nonce extension for
+   the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP).  OCSP is used to check
+   the status of a certificate, and the Nonce extension is used to
+   cryptographically bind an OCSP response message to a particular OCSP
+   request message.
+
+   Some environments use cryptographic algorithms that generate a Nonce
+   value that is longer than 32 octets.  This document also modifies the
+   "Nonce" section of RFC 6960 to clearly define and differentiate the
+   encoding format and values for easier implementation and
+   understanding.  This document obsoletes RFC 8954, which includes
+   updated ASN.1 modules for OCSP, and updates RFC 6960.
+
+Status of This Memo
+
+   This is an Internet Standards Track document.
+
+   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
+   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
+   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
+   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
+   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
+
+   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
+   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
+   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9654.
+
+Copyright Notice
+
+   Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
+   document authors.  All rights reserved.
+
+   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
+   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
+   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
+   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
+   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
+   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
+   include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
+   Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
+   in the Revised BSD License.
+
+Table of Contents
+
+   1.  Introduction
+     1.1.  Requirements Language
+   2.  OCSP Extensions
+     2.1.  Nonce Extension
+   3.  Security Considerations
+     3.1.  Replay Attack
+   4.  IANA Considerations
+   5.  References
+     5.1.  Normative References
+     5.2.  Informative References
+   Appendix A.  ASN.1 Modules
+     A.1.  OCSP in ASN.1 - 1998 Syntax
+     A.2.  OCSP in ASN.1 - 2008 Syntax
+   Acknowledgements
+   Author's Address
+
+1.  Introduction
+
+   The Nonce extension was previously defined in Section 4.4.1 of
+   [RFC6960].  The Nonce cryptographically binds an OCSP request and a
+   response.  It guarantees the freshness of an OCSP response and avoids
+   replay attacks.  This extension was updated in [RFC8954].  [RFC8954]
+   limits the maximum Nonce length to 32 octets.  To support
+   cryptographic algorithms that generate a Nonce that is longer than 32
+   octets, this document updates the maximum allowed size of the Nonce
+   to 128 octets.  In addition, this document recommends that the OCSP
+   requester and responder use a Nonce with a minimum length of 32
+   octets.
+
+1.1.  Requirements Language
+
+   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
+   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
+   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
+   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
+   capitals, as shown here.
+
+2.  OCSP Extensions
+
+   The message formats for OCSP requests and responses are defined in
+   [RFC6960] and the Nonce extension was updated in [RFC8954].
+   [RFC6960] also defines the standard extensions for OCSP messages
+   based on the extension model employed in X.509 version 3 certificates
+   (see [RFC5280]).  [RFC8954] replaces Section 4.4.1 of [RFC6960] to
+   limit the minimum and maximum length for the Nonce value.  This
+   document extends the maximum allowed nonce length to 128 octets and
+   does not change the specifications of any of the other extensions
+   defined in [RFC6960].
+
+2.1.  Nonce Extension
+
+   The Nonce cryptographically binds a request and a response to prevent
+   replay attacks.  The Nonce is included as one of the
+   requestExtensions in requests; in responses, it is included as one of
+   the responseExtensions.  In both the request and the response, the
+   Nonce is identified by the object identifier id-pkix-ocsp-nonce,
+   while the extnValue is the encoded value of Nonce.  If the Nonce
+   extension is present, then the length of the Nonce MUST be at least 1
+   octet and can be up to 128 octets.  Implementations compliant with
+   [RFC8954] will not be able to process nonces generated per the new
+   specification with sizes in excess of the limit (32 octets) specified
+   in [RFC8954].
+
+   An OCSP requester that implements the extension in this document MUST
+   use a minimum length of 32 octets for Nonce in the Nonce extension.
+
+   An OCSP responder that supports the Nonce extension MUST accept Nonce
+   lengths of at least 16 octets and up to and including 32 octets.  A
+   responder MAY choose to respond without the Nonce extension for
+   requests in which the length of the Nonce is in between 1 octet and
+   15 octets or 33 octets and 128 octets.
+
+   Responders that implement the extension in this document MUST reject
+   any OCSP request that has a Nonce with a length of either 0 octets or
+   greater than 128 octets, with the malformedRequest OCSPResponseStatus
+   as described in Section 4.2.1 of [RFC6960].
+
+   The value of the Nonce MUST be generated using a cryptographically
+   strong pseudorandom number generator (see [RFC4086]).  The minimum
+   Nonce length of 1 octet is defined to provide backward compatibility
+   with older OCSP requesters that follow [RFC6960].
+
+   id-pkix-ocsp           OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad-ocsp }
+   id-pkix-ocsp-nonce     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
+   Nonce ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..128))
+
+   The following is an example of an encoded OCSP Nonce extension with a
+   32-octet Nonce in hexadecimal format.
+
+      30 2f 06 09 2b 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 02 04 22 04
+      20 dd 49 d4 07 2c 44 9d a1 c3 17 bd 1c 1b df fe
+      db e1 50 31 2e c4 cd 0a dd 18 e5 bd 6f 84 bf 14
+      c8
+
+   Here is the decoded version of the above example.  Offset, Length,
+   and Object Identifier are in decimal.
+
+
+      Offset  Length
+      0       47    : SEQUENCE {
+      2       9     :  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ocspNonce
+                    :   (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 2)
+      13      34    :  OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
+      15      32    :   OCTET STRING
+                    :    DD 49 D4 07 2C 44 9D A1 C3 17 BD 1C 1B DF FE DB
+                    :    E1 50 31 2E C4 CD 0A DD 18 E5 BD 6F 84 BF 14 C8
+                    :  }
+                    : }
+
+3.  Security Considerations
+
+   The security considerations of OCSP, in general, are described in
+   [RFC6960].  During the interval in which the previous OCSP response
+   for a certificate is not expired but the responder has a changed
+   status for that certificate, a copy of that OCSP response can be used
+   to indicate that the status of the certificate is still valid.
+   Including a requester's nonce value in the OCSP response ensures that
+   the response is the most recent response from the server and not an
+   old copy.
+
+3.1.  Replay Attack
+
+   The Nonce extension is used to avoid replay attacks.  Since the OCSP
+   responder may choose not to send the Nonce extension in the OCSP
+   response even if the requester has sent the Nonce extension in the
+   request [RFC5019], an on-path attacker can intercept the OCSP request
+   and respond with an earlier response from the server without the
+   Nonce extension.  This can be mitigated by configuring the server to
+   use a short time interval between the thisUpdate and nextUpdate
+   fields in the OCSP response.
+
+4.  IANA Considerations
+
+   For the ASN.1 modules in Appendixes A.1 and A.2, IANA has assigned
+   the following object identifiers (OIDs) in the "SMI Security for PKIX
+   Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0):
+
+                      +=======+=====================+
+                      | Value | Description         |
+                      +=======+=====================+
+                      | 111   | id-mod-ocsp-2024-88 |
+                      +-------+---------------------+
+                      | 112   | id-mod-ocsp-2024-08 |
+                      +-------+---------------------+
+
+                                  Table 1
+
+5.  References
+
+5.1.  Normative References
+
+   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
+              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
+              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
+              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
+
+   [RFC4086]  Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
+              "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
+              DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
+              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
+
+   [RFC5019]  Deacon, A. and R. Hurst, "The Lightweight Online
+              Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Profile for High-Volume
+              Environments", RFC 5019, DOI 10.17487/RFC5019, September
+              2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5019>.
+
+   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
+              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
+              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
+              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
+              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
+
+   [RFC6960]  Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
+              Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
+              Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
+              RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
+              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.
+
+   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
+              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
+              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
+
+   [RFC8954]  Sahni, M., Ed., "Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
+              Nonce Extension", RFC 8954, DOI 10.17487/RFC8954, November
+              2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8954>.
+
+5.2.  Informative References
+
+   [Err5891]  RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5891, RFC 6960,
+              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5891>.
+
+   [RFC5912]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
+              Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
+              DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
+              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
+
+Appendix A.  ASN.1 Modules
+
+   This section includes the ASN.1 modules for OCSP and replaces the
+   entirety of Section 5 of [RFC8954].  It addresses Errata ID 5891
+   [Err5891] as well.
+
+   Appendix A.1 includes an ASN.1 module that conforms to the 1998
+   version of ASN.1 for all syntax elements of OCSP.  This module
+   replaces the module in Appendix B.1 of [RFC6960].
+
+   Appendix A.2 includes an ASN.1 module, corresponding to the module
+   present in Appendix A.1, that conforms to the 2008 version of ASN.1.
+   This module replaces the modules in Section 4 of [RFC5912] and
+   Appendix B.2 of [RFC6960].  Although a 2008 ASN.1 module is provided,
+   the module in Appendix A.1 remains the normative module per the
+   policy of the PKIX Working Group.
+
+A.1.  OCSP in ASN.1 - 1998 Syntax
+
+   <CODE BEGINS>
+   OCSP-2024-88
+         { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
+           security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
+           id-mod-ocsp-2024-88(111) }
+
+   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
+   BEGIN
+
+   IMPORTS
+       AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax, CRLReason, GeneralName
+       FROM PKIX1Implicit88 -- From [RFC5280]
+       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
+         internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
+         id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit(19) }
+
+       Name, CertificateSerialNumber, Extensions,
+       id-kp, id-ad-ocsp, Certificate, AlgorithmIdentifier
+       FROM PKIX1Explicit88 -- From [RFC5280]
+       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
+         internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
+         id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(18) } ;
+
+   OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
+      tbsRequest              TBSRequest,
+      optionalSignature   [0] EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL }
+
+   TBSRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
+      version             [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
+      requestorName       [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL,
+      requestList             SEQUENCE OF Request,
+      requestExtensions   [2] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
+
+   Signature ::= SEQUENCE {
+      signatureAlgorithm      AlgorithmIdentifier,
+      signature               BIT STRING,
+      certs               [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF
+                              Certificate OPTIONAL }
+
+   Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) }
+
+   Nonce ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..128))
+
+   Request ::= SEQUENCE {
+      reqCert                     CertID,
+      singleRequestExtensions [0] EXPLICIT
+                                  Extensions OPTIONAL }
+
+   CertID ::= SEQUENCE {
+      hashAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
+      issuerNameHash  OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's DN
+      issuerKeyHash   OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's public key
+      serialNumber    CertificateSerialNumber }
+
+   OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
+      responseStatus     OCSPResponseStatus,
+      responseBytes  [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }
+
+   OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED {
+      successful       (0),  -- Response has valid confirmations
+      malformedRequest (1),  -- Illegal confirmation request
+      internalError    (2),  -- Internal error in issuer
+      tryLater         (3),  -- Try again later
+                             -- (4) is not used
+      sigRequired      (5),  -- Must sign the request
+      unauthorized     (6)   -- Request unauthorized
+   }
+
+   ResponseBytes ::= SEQUENCE {
+      responseType            OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+      response                OCTET STRING }
+
+   BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
+     tbsResponseData          ResponseData,
+     signatureAlgorithm       AlgorithmIdentifier,
+     signature                BIT STRING,
+     certs                [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF
+                              Certificate OPTIONAL }
+
+   ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE {
+      version             [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
+      responderID             ResponderID,
+      producedAt              GeneralizedTime,
+                              -- The format for GeneralizedTime is
+                              -- as specified in Section 4.1.2.5.2
+                              -- [RFC5280]
+      responses               SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,
+      responseExtensions  [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
+
+   ResponderID ::= CHOICE {
+      byName              [1] Name,
+      byKey               [2] KeyHash }
+
+   KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING
+               -- SHA-1 hash of responder's public key (i.e., the
+               -- SHA-1 hash of the value of the BIT STRING
+               -- subjectPublicKey [excluding the tag, length, and
+               -- number of unused bits] in the responder's
+               -- certificate)
+
+   SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
+      certID                  CertID,
+      certStatus              CertStatus,
+      thisUpdate              GeneralizedTime,
+      nextUpdate          [0] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
+      singleExtensions    [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
+
+   CertStatus ::= CHOICE {
+      good                [0] IMPLICIT NULL,
+      revoked             [1] IMPLICIT RevokedInfo,
+      unknown             [2] IMPLICIT UnknownInfo }
+
+   RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+      revocationTime        GeneralizedTime,
+      revocationReason  [0] EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL }
+
+   UnknownInfo ::= NULL
+
+   ArchiveCutoff ::= GeneralizedTime
+
+   AcceptableResponses ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+
+   ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE {
+      issuer       Name,
+      locator      AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax }
+
+   CrlID ::= SEQUENCE {
+       crlUrl     [0] EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL,
+       crlNum     [1] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+       crlTime    [2] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }
+
+   PreferredSignatureAlgorithms ::= SEQUENCE OF
+                                    PreferredSignatureAlgorithm
+
+   PreferredSignatureAlgorithm ::= SEQUENCE {
+      sigIdentifier   AlgorithmIdentifier,
+      certIdentifier  AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL }
+
+
+   -- Object Identifiers
+
+   id-kp-OCSPSigning            OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 }
+   id-pkix-ocsp                 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad-ocsp }
+   id-pkix-ocsp-basic           OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 1 }
+   id-pkix-ocsp-nonce           OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
+   id-pkix-ocsp-crl             OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 3 }
+   id-pkix-ocsp-response        OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 4 }
+   id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck         OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 5 }
+   id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 6 }
+   id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 7 }
+   id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 8 }
+   id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 9 }
+
+   END
+   <CODE ENDS>
+
+A.2.  OCSP in ASN.1 - 2008 Syntax
+
+   <CODE BEGINS>
+   OCSP-2024-08
+        { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
+          security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
+          id-mod-ocsp-2024-08(112) }
+
+   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
+   BEGIN
+
+   IMPORTS
+       Extensions{}, EXTENSION
+       FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
+       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
+         internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
+         id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) }
+
+       AlgorithmIdentifier{}, DIGEST-ALGORITHM,
+       SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, PUBLIC-KEY
+       FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
+       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
+         internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
+         id-mod(0) id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }
+
+       AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax, GeneralName,
+       CrlEntryExtensions, CRLReason
+       FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
+       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
+         internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
+         id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59) }
+
+       Name, Certificate, CertificateSerialNumber,
+       id-kp, id-ad-ocsp
+       FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
+       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
+         internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
+         id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) }
+
+       sa-dsaWithSHA1, sa-rsaWithMD2,
+       sa-rsaWithMD5, sa-rsaWithSHA1
+       FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
+       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
+       internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
+       id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) } ;
+
+   OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
+      tbsRequest             TBSRequest,
+      optionalSignature  [0] EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL }
+
+   TBSRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
+      version            [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
+      requestorName      [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL,
+      requestList             SEQUENCE OF Request,
+      requestExtensions  [2] EXPLICIT Extensions
+                             {{ re-ocsp-nonce | re-ocsp-response |
+                             re-ocsp-preferred-signature-algorithms,
+                             ... }} OPTIONAL }
+
+   Signature ::= SEQUENCE {
+      signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier
+                               { SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {...}},
+      signature            BIT STRING,
+      certs            [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF
+                           Certificate OPTIONAL }
+
+   Version ::= INTEGER  {  v1(0) }
+
+   Nonce ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..128))
+
+   Request ::= SEQUENCE {
+      reqCert                      CertID,
+      singleRequestExtensions  [0] EXPLICIT Extensions
+                                   {{ re-ocsp-service-locator,
+                                   ... }} OPTIONAL }
+
+   CertID ::= SEQUENCE {
+      hashAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier
+                          { DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
+      issuerNameHash  OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's DN
+      issuerKeyHash   OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's public key
+      serialNumber    CertificateSerialNumber }
+
+   OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
+     responseStatus       OCSPResponseStatus,
+     responseBytes    [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }
+
+   OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED {
+      successful        (0), -- Response has valid confirmations
+      malformedRequest  (1), -- Illegal confirmation request
+      internalError     (2), -- Internal error in issuer
+      tryLater          (3), -- Try again later
+                             -- (4) is not used
+      sigRequired       (5), -- Must sign the request
+      unauthorized      (6)  -- Request unauthorized
+   }
+
+   RESPONSE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
+
+   ResponseSet RESPONSE ::= { basicResponse, ... }
+
+   ResponseBytes ::= SEQUENCE {
+      responseType  RESPONSE.&id ({ResponseSet}),
+      response      OCTET STRING (CONTAINING RESPONSE.
+                        &Type({ResponseSet}{@responseType}))}
+
+   basicResponse RESPONSE ::=
+      { BasicOCSPResponse IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-basic }
+
+   BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
+     tbsResponseData      ResponseData,
+     signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier
+                              { SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM,
+                                  { sa-dsaWithSHA1 |
+                                    sa-rsaWithSHA1 |
+                                    sa-rsaWithMD5  |
+                                    sa-rsaWithMD2,
+                                    ... }},
+     signature            BIT STRING,
+     certs            [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF
+                          Certificate OPTIONAL }
+
+   ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE {
+     version             [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
+     responderID             ResponderID,
+     producedAt              GeneralizedTime,
+     responses               SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,
+     responseExtensions  [1] EXPLICIT Extensions
+                                 {{ re-ocsp-nonce |
+                                    re-ocsp-extended-revoke,
+                                    ... }} OPTIONAL }
+
+   ResponderID ::= CHOICE {
+     byName   [1] Name,
+     byKey    [2] KeyHash }
+
+   KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING
+               -- SHA-1 hash of responder's public key
+               -- (excluding the tag and length and number
+               -- of unused bits)
+
+   SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
+     certID                CertID,
+     certStatus            CertStatus,
+     thisUpdate            GeneralizedTime,
+     nextUpdate        [0] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
+     singleExtensions  [1] EXPLICIT Extensions
+                           {{ re-ocsp-crl |
+                              re-ocsp-archive-cutoff |
+                              CrlEntryExtensions,
+                              ... }} OPTIONAL }
+
+   CertStatus ::= CHOICE {
+      good     [0] IMPLICIT NULL,
+      revoked  [1] IMPLICIT RevokedInfo,
+      unknown  [2] IMPLICIT UnknownInfo }
+
+   RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+      revocationTime        GeneralizedTime,
+      revocationReason  [0] EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL }
+
+   UnknownInfo ::= NULL
+
+   ArchiveCutoff ::= GeneralizedTime
+
+   AcceptableResponses ::= SEQUENCE OF RESPONSE.&id({ResponseSet})
+
+   ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE {
+      issuer    Name,
+      locator   AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax }
+
+   CrlID ::= SEQUENCE {
+      crlUrl   [0] EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL,
+      crlNum   [1] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+      crlTime  [2] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }
+
+   PreferredSignatureAlgorithms ::= SEQUENCE OF
+                                    PreferredSignatureAlgorithm
+
+   PreferredSignatureAlgorithm ::= SEQUENCE {
+      sigIdentifier  AlgorithmIdentifier
+                         { SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {...} },
+      certIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier {PUBLIC-KEY, {...}}
+                         OPTIONAL }
+
+
+   -- Certificate Extensions
+
+   ext-ocsp-nocheck EXTENSION ::= {
+       SYNTAX NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck }
+
+
+   -- Request Extensions
+
+   re-ocsp-nonce EXTENSION ::= {
+       SYNTAX Nonce IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-nonce }
+
+   re-ocsp-response EXTENSION ::= {
+       SYNTAX AcceptableResponses IDENTIFIED BY
+       id-pkix-ocsp-response }
+
+   re-ocsp-service-locator EXTENSION ::= {
+       SYNTAX ServiceLocator IDENTIFIED BY
+       id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator }
+
+   re-ocsp-preferred-signature-algorithms EXTENSION ::= {
+       SYNTAX PreferredSignatureAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY
+       id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs  }
+
+
+   -- Response Extensions
+
+   re-ocsp-crl EXTENSION ::= {
+       SYNTAX CrlID IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-crl }
+
+   re-ocsp-archive-cutoff EXTENSION ::= {
+       SYNTAX ArchiveCutoff IDENTIFIED BY
+       id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff }
+
+   re-ocsp-extended-revoke EXTENSION ::= {
+       SYNTAX NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke }
+
+
+   -- Object Identifiers
+
+   id-kp-OCSPSigning            OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 }
+   id-pkix-ocsp                 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-ad-ocsp
+   id-pkix-ocsp-basic           OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 1 }
+   id-pkix-ocsp-nonce           OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
+   id-pkix-ocsp-crl             OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 3 }
+   id-pkix-ocsp-response        OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 4 }
+   id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck         OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 5 }
+   id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 6 }
+   id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 7 }
+   id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 8 }
+   id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 9 }
+
+   END
+   <CODE ENDS>
+
+Acknowledgements
+
+   The authors of this document thank Mohit Sahni for his work to
+   produce [RFC8954].
+
+   The authors also thank Russ Housley, Corey Bonnell, Michael StJohns,
+   Tomas Gustavsson, and Carl Wallace for their feedback and
+   suggestions.
+
+Author's Address
+
+   Himanshu Sharma (editor)
+   Netskope Inc
+   2445 Augustine Dr 3rd floor
+   Santa Clara, California 95054
+   United States of America
+   Email: himanshu@netskope.com
+   URI:   www.netskope.com