diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'doc/rfc/rfc1192.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/rfc/rfc1192.txt | 731 |
1 files changed, 731 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/doc/rfc/rfc1192.txt b/doc/rfc/rfc1192.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3da359d --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/rfc/rfc1192.txt @@ -0,0 +1,731 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Working Group B. Kahin, Editor +Request for Comments: 1192 Harvard + November 1990 + + + Commercialization of the Internet + Summary Report + +Status of this Memo + + This memo is based on a workshop held by the Science, Technology and + Public Policy Program of the John F. Kennedy School of Government, + Harvard University, March 1-3, 1990. + + This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does + not specify any standard. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +Introduction + + "The networks of Stages 2 and 3 will be implemented and operated so + that they can become commercialized; industry will then be able to + supplant the government in supplying these network services." -- + Federal Research Internet Coordinating Committee, Program Plan for + the National Research and Education Network, May 23, 1989, pp. 4-5. + + "The NREN should be the prototype of a new national information + infrastructure which could be available to every home, office and + factory. Wherever information is used, from manufacturing to high- + definition home video entertainment, and most particularly in + education, the country will benefit from deployment of this + technology.... The corresponding ease of inter-computer + communication will then provide the benefits associated with the NREN + to the entire nation, improving the productivity of all information- + handling activities. To achieve this end, the deployment of the + Stage 3 NREN will include a specific, structured process resulting in + transition of the network from a government operation a commercial + service." -- Office of Science and Technology Policy, The Federal + High Performance Computing Program, September 8, 1989, pp. 32, 35. + + "The National Science Foundation shall, in cooperation with the + Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department of + Commerce, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and + other appropriate agencies, provide for the establishment of a + national multi-gigabit-per-second research and education computer + network by 1996, to be known as the National Research and Education + Network, which shall: + + (1) link government, industry, and the education + + + +Kahin [Page 1] + +RFC 1192 Commercialization of the Internet November 1990 + + + community; + .... + (6) be established in a manner which fosters and + maintains competition and private sector investment in high + speed data networking within the telecommunications + industry; + .... + (8) be phased out when commercial networks can meet the + networking needs of American researchers." + + -- S. 1067, 101st Congress, 2nd Session, as marked up April 3, 1990 + ["High-Performance Computing Act of 1990"], Title II, Section 201. + +Background + + This report is based on a workshop held at the John F. Kennedy School + of Government, Harvard University March 1-3, 1990, by the Harvard + Science, Technology and Public Policy Program. Sponsored by the + National Science Foundation and the U.S. Congress Office of + Technology Assessment, the workshop was designed to explore the + issues involved in the commercialization of the Internet, including + the envisioned National Research and Education Network (NREN). + Rather than recapitulate the discussion at the workshop, this report + attempts to synthesize the issues for the benefit of those not + present at the workshop. It is intended for readers familiar with + the general landscape of the Internet, the NSFNET, and proposals and + plans for the NREN. + + At the workshop, Stephen Wolff, Director of the NSF Division of + Networking and Communications Research and Infrastructure, + distinguished "commercialization" and "privatization" on the basis of + his experience developing policy for the NSFNET. He defined + commercialization as permitting commercial users and providers to + access and use Internet facilities and services and privatization as + the elimination of the federal role in providing or subsidizing + network services. In principle, privatization could be achieved by + shifting the federal subsidy from network providers to users, thus + spurring private sector investment in network services. Creation of + a market for private vendors would in turn defuse concerns about + acceptable use and commercialization. + +Commercialization and Privatization + + Commercialization. In the past, many companies were connected to the + old ARPANET when it was entirely underwritten by the federal + government. Now, corporate R&D facilities are already connected to, + and are sometimes voting members of, mid-level networks. There are + mail connections from the Internet to commercial services such as + + + +Kahin [Page 2] + +RFC 1192 Commercialization of the Internet November 1990 + + + MCIMAIL, SprintMail, and Compuserve. DASnet provides a commercial + mail gateway to and from the Internet and commercial mail services. + UUNET, a nonprofit corporation, markets TCP/IP services (Alternet) + with access to the Internet as well as mail services. Performance + Systems International (PSI), a startup company which now operates + NYSERNET (the New York State regional network, partially funded by + NSF) is aggressively marketing Internet-connected TCP/IP services on + the East and West Coasts. RLG is selling access to its RLIN database + over the Internet directly to end users. Other fee-based services + include Clarinet, a private news filtering service, and FAST, a non- + profit parts brokering service. However, in all these cases, any use + of the NSFNET backbone must, in principle, support the "purpose of + the NSFNET." + + Under the draft acceptable use policy in effect from 1988 to mid- + 1990, use of the NSFNET backbone had to support the purpose of + "scientific research and other scholarly activities." The interim + policy promulgated in June 1990 is the same, except that the purpose + of the NSFNET is now "to support research and education in and among + academic institutions in the U.S. by access to unique resources and + the opportunity for collaborative work." Despite this limitation, + use of the NSFNET backbone has been growing at 15-20% per month or + more, and there are regular requests for access by commercial + services. Even though such services may, directly or indirectly, + support the purposes of the NSFNET, they raise prospects of + overburdening network resources and unfair competition with private + providers of network services (notably the public X.25 packet- + switched networks, such as SprintNet and Tymnet). + + Privatization. In some respects, the Internet is already + substantially privatized. The physical circuits are owned by the + private sector, and the logical networks are usually managed and + operated by the private sector. The nonprofit regional networks of + the NSFNET increasingly contract out routine operations, including + network information centers, while retaining control of policy and + planning functions. This helps develop expertise, resources, and + competition in the private sector and so facilitates the development + of similar commercial services. + + In the case of NSFNET, the annual federal investment covers only a + minor part of the backbone and the regional networks. Although the + NSFNET backbone is operated as a cooperative agreement between NSF + and Merit, the Michigan higher education network, NSF contributes + less than $3 million of approximately $10 million in annual costs. + The State of Michigan Strategic Fund contributes $1 million and the + balance is covered by contributed services from the subcontractors to + Merit, IBM and MCI. + + + + +Kahin [Page 3] + +RFC 1192 Commercialization of the Internet November 1990 + + + At the regional level, NSF provides approximately 40% of the + operating costs of the mid-level networks it funds -- with the + remainder covered by membership and connection fees, funding from + state governments, and in-kind contributions. This calculation does + not include a number of authorized networks (e.g., PREPnet, and, + until recently, NEARnet and CERFnet) that receive no NSF funding. + However, NSF also funds institutional connections to the NSFNET, + which includes payments by the institution to the regional network. + Other agencies (DOD, NASA, and DOE) have also funded some connections + to NSFNET networks for the benefit of their respective research + communities -- and have occasionally funded the networks directly. + + Finally, the campus-level networks at academic institutions probably + represent a perhaps 7-10 times larger annual investment than the + mid-level networks and the backbone together, yet there is no federal + funding program at this level. Furthermore, since these local + networks must ordinarily be built by the institution rather than + leased, there is an additional capitalization cost incurred by the + institutions, which, annualized and aggregated, is perhaps another + 20-50 times the annual costs of the mid-level and backbone networks. + (These figures are the roughest of estimates, intended only for + illustration.) + +The NSFNET Backbone as a Free Good + + Whereas the NSF funding of mid-level networks varies greatly -- from + 0% to 75% -- the backbone is available as a free good to the NSF- + funded mid-level networks. It is also used free of charge by other + authorized networks, including networks not considered part of + NSFNET: CSNET, BITNET, UUNET, and PSI, as well as the research + networks of other federal agencies. As noted, their use of the + backbone is in principle limited to the support of academic research + and education. + + Through their use of the NSFNET backbone, these networks appear to be + enjoying a subsidy from NSF -- and from IBM, MCI, and the State of + Michigan. BITNET and some agency networks even use the backbone for + their internal traffic. Nonetheless, these other networks generally + add value to NSFNET for NSFNET users and regional networks insofar as + all networks benefit from access to each other's users and resources. + + However, small or startup networks generally bring in fewer network- + based resources, so one side may benefit more than the other. To the + extent that the mail traffic is predominantly mailing lists (or other + information resources) originating on one network, questions of + imbalance and implicit subsidy arise. For example, because of the + mailing lists available without charge on the Internet, three times + as much traffic runs over the mail gateway from the Internet to + + + +Kahin [Page 4] + +RFC 1192 Commercialization of the Internet November 1990 + + + MCIMAIL as from MCIMAIL to the Internet. This pattern is reinforced + by the sender-pays fee structure of MCIMAIL, which discourages + mailing list distribution from within MCIMAIL. + + The impact of such imbalances is not clear. For now, the capacity of + the NSFNET backbone is staying ahead of demand: It jumped from 56 + Kbps to 1.544 Mbps (T-1) in 1988 and will go to 45 Mbps over the next + year. But NSF is concerned about a possible recurrence of the + congestion which drove users off the NSFNET prior to the 1988 + upgrade. Given the tripling of campus-level connections over the + past year, continued growth in users at each site, the parade of new + resources available over the network, and, especially, the + development of high-bandwidth uses, there is reason to fear that + demand may again overwhelm capacity. + + Offering the NSFNET backbone at no cost to authorized networks both + encourages undisciplined use of the backbone and inhibits private + investment in backbone networks. It constrains the development of a + market for commercial TCP/IP services by diverting an established and + rapidly growing user base to a subsidized resource. Charging NSFNET + regionals and other mid-level networks for the use of the NSFNET + backbone would resolve this problem, but this would impose a + substantial cost burden on the mid-level networks, which would in + turn have to raise membership and connection fees dramatically. To + compensate, the NSF subsidy that now underwrites the backbone could + be moved down the distribution chain to the users of the backbone -- + i.e., to the regional networks, to the campuses, or even to + researchers themselves. + + Each option poses unique opportunities and problems. In theory, the + further down the chain the subsidy is pushed, the more accountable + providers will be to end-user needs. Funding in hands of researchers + would make universities more responsive to researchers' networking + needs. Funding in the hands of universities would in turn make + regional networks more responsive and competitive. And funds for + regional networks would spur a general market for backbone services. + But the mechanisms for expressing user demand upward through these + tiers are imperfect. And, from an administrative standpoint, it is + easier for NSF to simply provide one free backbone to all comers -- + rather than deal with 25 mid-level networks, or 500 universities, or + perhaps tens or hundreds of thousands of individual researchers. + +Option: Funding Researchers + + It would be possible to earmark funds for network services in agency + research grants as a matter of course, so that no new administrative + process would be required. But since network costs are presently not + usage based, such funding will not readily translate into + + + +Kahin [Page 5] + +RFC 1192 Commercialization of the Internet November 1990 + + + identifiable services and may simply end up in local overhead + accounts since few institutions allocate out costs of access to the + Internet. The use of vouchers rather than cash add-ons might help + ensure that federal resources are in fact applied to qualifying wide + area network services -- and possibly avoid the imposition of + standard institutional overhead on direct funding. However, if + vouchers can be sold to other institutions, as economists would + advocate in the interests of market efficiency, these advantages may + be compromised. Even non-transferable vouchers may create a unique + set of accounting problems for both funding agencies and + institutional recipients. + + A federal subsidy channeled automatically to research grants could + substantially limit or segregate the user community. It would tend + to divide the academic community by exacerbating obvious divisions + between the resource-rich and resource-poor -- between federally + funded researchers and other researchers, between scientists and + faculty in other disciplines, and between research and education. + Within the academic community, there is considerable sentiment for + providing basic network services out of institutional overhead to + faculty and researchers in all disciplines, at least as long as basic + services remain unmetered and relatively low at the institutional + level. Of course, special costing and funding may well make sense + for high-bandwidth usage-sensitive network services (such as remote + imaging) as they become available in the future. + +Option: Funding Institutions + + Alternatively, funding for external network services, whether in the + form of cash or vouchers, could be provided directly to institutions + without linking it directly to federal research funding. As it is, + institutions may apply for one-time grants to connect to regional + networks, and these are awarded based on peer assessment of a number + of different factors, not just the quality of the institution's + research. But redirecting the subsidy of the backbone could provide + regular support at the institutional level in ways that need not + involve peer review. For example, annual funding might be tied to + the number of PhD candidates within specific disciplines -- or to all + degrees awarded in science. Geographic location could be factored in + -- as could financial need. This, of course, would amount to an + entitlement program, a rarity for NSF. Nonetheless, it would allow + institutions to make decisions based on their own needs -- without + putting NSF in the position of judging among competing networks, + nonprofit and for-profit. + + There are, however, questions about what sort of services the + earmarked funding or vouchers could be used for. Could they be used + to pay the institution's BITNET fee? Or a SprintNet bill? Or to + + + +Kahin [Page 6] + +RFC 1192 Commercialization of the Internet November 1990 + + + acquire modems? For information services? And, if so, what sort? + Such questions force the funding agency to assume a kind of + regulatory in an environment where competing equities, demonstrated + need, technological foresight, and politics must be constantly + weighed and juggled. + +Option: Funding Regional Networks + + Shifting the subsidy to the regional networks is appealing in that it + appears to be the least radical alternative and would only require + allocating funds among some two dozen contenders. Since most of the + regional networks are already receiving federal funding, it would be + relatively simple to tack on funds for the purchase of backbone + services. However, providing additional funding at this level + highlights the problem of competition among mid-level networks. + + Although most regional networks are to some degree creatures of NSF, + funded to ensure the national reach of NSFNET, they do not hold + exclusive geographic franchises, and in some areas, there is + competition between regionals for members/customers. NSF grants to + regional networks, by their very size, have an effect of unleveling + the playing field among regionals and distorting competitive + strengths and weaknesses. + + Alternet and PSI further complicate the picture, since there is no + clear basis for NSF or other agencies to discriminate against them. + The presence of these privately funded providers (and the possibility + of others) raises difficult questions about what network services the + government should be funding: What needs is the market now capable of + meeting? And where will it continue to fail? + + Experience with regulation of the voice network shows that it is + inefficient to subsidize local residential service for everybody. If + one is concerned about people dropping off the voice network -- or + institutions not getting on the Internet -- the answer is to identify + and subsidize those who really need help. The market-driven + suppliers of TCP/IP-based Internet connectivity are naturally going + after those markets which can be wired at a low cost per institution, + i.e., large metropolitan areas, especially those with a high + concentration of R&D facilities, such as Boston, San Francisco, and + Washington, DC. In the voice environment, this kind of targeted + marketing by unregulated companies is widely recognized as cream- + skimming. + + Like fully regulated voice common carriers (i.e., the local exchange + carriers), the non-profit NSF-funded regional networks are expected + to serve all institutions within a large geographic area. In areas + with few R&D facilities, this will normally result in a + + + +Kahin [Page 7] + +RFC 1192 Commercialization of the Internet November 1990 + + + disproportionately large investment in leased lines. Either remote + institutions must pay for the leased line to the nearest network + point of presence -- or the network must include the leased line as + part of common costs. If the regional network assumes such costs, it + will not be price-competitive with other more compact networks. + + Accordingly, a subsidy redirected to the regional networks could be + keyed to the density of the network. This might be calculated by + number of circuit miles per member institution or some form of + aggregate institutional size, figured for either the network as a + whole or for a defined subregion. This subsidy could be available to + both for-profit and non-profit networks, but only certain non-profit + networks would meet the density requirement, presumably those most in + need of help. + +Increasing the Value of the Connection + + The principal advantage in underwriting the backbone is that it + provides a evenhanded, universal benefit that does not involve NSF in + choosing among competing networks. By increasing the value of + belonging to a regional network, the backbone offers all attached + networks a continuing annual subsidy commensurate with their size. + + Increased value can also derived from access to complementary + resources -- supercomputer cycles, databases, electronic newsletters, + special instruments, etc. -- over the network. Like direct funding + of backbone, funding these resources would induce more institutions + to join regional networks and to upgrade their connections. For + example, where a database already exists, mounting it on the network + can be a very cost-effective investment, increasing the value of the + network as well as directly benefiting the users of the database. + + Commercial information services (e.g., Dialog, Orbit, Lexis) may + serve this function well since they represents resources already + available without any public investment. Marketing commercial + services to universities over the Internet is permissible in that it + supports academic research and education (although the guidelines + state that such commercial uses "should be reviewed on a case-by-case + basis" by NSF). + + But to date there has been remarkably little use of the regional + networks, let alone the NSFNET backbone, to deliver commercial + information services. In part, this is because the commercial + services are unaware of the opportunities or unsure how to market in + this environment and are concerned about losing control of their + product. It is also due to uneasiness within the regional networks + about usage policies and reluctance to compete directly with public + packet-switched networks. However, for weak regional networks, it + + + +Kahin [Page 8] + +RFC 1192 Commercialization of the Internet November 1990 + + + may be necessary to involve commercial services in order to attract + and hold sufficient membership -- at least if NSF subsidies are + withdrawn. Without a critical mass of users, commercialization may + need to precede privatization. + +Impact of Removing NSF Subsidy from the Backbone + + Any shift to a less direct form of subsidy may cause some disocation + and distress at the regional network level -- until the benefits + begin to be felt. No regional network has yet folded, and no + institution has permanently dropped its connection to a regional + network as a consequence of higher prices, but concerns about the + viability of some regionals would suggest that any withdrawal of + subsidy proceed in phases. + + Moreover, as the NSF subsidy vanishes, the operation of the backbone + becomes a private concern of Merit, the Michigan Strategic Fund, IBM, + and MCI. While Merit and the Michigan Strategic Fund are more or + less public enterprises within the state, they are essentially + private entrepreneurs in the national operation of a backbone + network. Without NSF's imprimatur and the leveraging federal funds, + the remaining parties are much less likely to treat the backbone as a + charity offering and may well look to recovering costs and using + revenues to expand service. + + The backbone operation could conceivably become either a nonprofit or + for-profit utility. While nonprofit status might be more appealing + to the academic networking community now served by the backbone, it + is not readily apparent how a broadly representative nonprofit + corporation, or even a cooperative, could be constituted in a form + its many heterogeneous users would embrace. A non-profit + organization may also have difficulty financing rapid expansion of + services. At the same time, the fact that it will compete with + private suppliers may preclude recognition as a tax-exempt + organization -- and so its ability to reinvest retained earnings. + + Operation of the backbone on a for-profit basis would attract private + investment and could be conducted with relative efficiency. However, + given the dominant position of the backbone, a for-profit operation + could conceivably get entangled in complex antitrust, regulatory, and + political struggles. A nonprofit organization is not immune from + such risks, but to the extent its users are represented in policy- + making, tensions are more likely to get expressed and resolved + internally. + + The status of backbone or regional networks within the Internet is + entirely separate from the question of whether network services are + metered and charged on a usage basis. Confusion in this regard stems + + + +Kahin [Page 9] + +RFC 1192 Commercialization of the Internet November 1990 + + + from the fact that the low-speed public data networks (SprintNet, + TymNet), which are sometimes seen as competitive to Internet + services, do bill on a connect-time basis. However, these commercial + services use X.25 connection-based packet-switching -- rather than + the connectionless (datagram) TCP/IP packet-switching used on the + Internet. Internet services could conceivably be billed on per- + packet basis, but the accounting overhead would be high and packets + do not contain information about individual users. At bottom, this + is a marketing issue, and there is no evidence of any market for + metered services -- except possibly among very small users. The + private suppliers, Alternet and PSI, both sell "pipes" not packets. + +Privatization by Function + + As an alternative approach to encouraging privatization, Dr. Wolff + suggested barring mature services such as electronic mail from the + subsidized network. In particular, NSF could bar the mail and news + protocols, SMTP and NNTP, from the backbone and thereby encourage + private providers to offer a national mail backbone connecting the + regional networks. Implementation would not be trivial, but it would + arguably help move the academic and research community toward the + improved functionality of X.400 standards. It would also reduce + traffic over the backbone by about 30% -- although given continued + growth in traffic, this would only buy two months of time. + + If mail were moved off the regional networks as well as off the + NSFNET backbone, this would relieve the more critical congestion + problem within certain regions. But logistically, it would be more + complicated since it would require diverting mail at perhaps a + thousand institutional nodes rather than at one or two dozen regional + nodes. Politically, it would be difficult because NSF has + traditionally recognized the autonomy of the regional networks it has + funded, and the networks have been free to adopt their own usage + guidelines. And it would hurt the regional networks financially, + especially the marginal networks most in need of NSF subsidies. + Economies of scale are critical at the regional level, and the loss + of mail would cause the networks to lose present and potential + members. + +The National Research and Education Network + + The initiative for a National Research and Education Network (NREN) + raises a broader set of policy issues because of the potentially much + larger set of users and diverse expectations concerning the scope and + purpose of the NREN. The decision to restyle what was originally + described as a National Research Network to include education was an + important political and strategic step. However, this move to a + broader purpose and constituency has made it all the more difficult + + + +Kahin [Page 10] + +RFC 1192 Commercialization of the Internet November 1990 + + + to limit the community of potential users -- and, by extension, the + market for commercial services. At the regional, and especially the + state level, public networking initiatives may already encompass + economic development, education at all levels, medical and public + health services, and public libraries. + + The high bandwidth envisioned for the NREN suggests a growing + distance between resource-intensive high-end uses and wide use of + low-bandwidth services at low fixed prices. The different demands + placed on network resources by different kinds of services will + likely lead to more sophisticated pricing structures, including + usage-based pricing for production-quality high-bandwidth services. + The need to relate such prices to costs incurred will in turn + facilitate comparison and interconnection with services provided by + commercial vendors. This will happen first within and among + metropolitan areas where diverse user needs, such as + videoconferencing and medical imaging, combine to support the + development of such services. + + As shown in Figures 1. and 2., the broadening of scope corresponds to + a similar generalization of structure. The path begins with + mission-specific research activity organized within a single + computer. It ends with the development of a national or + international infrastructure: a ubiquitous, orderly communications + system that reflects and addresses all social needs and market + demand, without being subject to artificial limitations on purpose or + connection. There is naturally tension between retaining the + benefits of specialization and exclusivity and seeking the benefits + of resource-sharing and economies of scale and scope. But the + development and growth of distributed computing and network + technologies encourage fundamental structures to multiply and evolve + as components of a generalized, heterogeneous infrastructure. And + the vision driving the NREN is the aggregation and maturing of a + seamless market for specialized information and computing resources + in a common, negotiable environment. These resources have costs + which are far greater than the NREN. But the NREN can minimize the + costs of access and spread the costs of creation across the widest + universe of users. + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Kahin [Page 11] + +RFC 1192 Commercialization of the Internet November 1990 + + +Figure 1. Generalization of Purpose: + + Discipline-Specific Research CSNET, HEPnet, MFEnet + + General Research early NSFNET, "NRN" + + Research and Education BITNET, present NSFNET, + early "NREN" + + Quasi-Public many regional networks, + "NREN" + + National Infrastructure "commercialized NREN" + + _______________________________________________________________ + + +Figure 2. Generalization of Structure: + + Computer time-sharing hosts + + Network early ARPANET + + Internetwork ESNET, NSFNET (tiered) + + Multiple Internetworks present Internet + + Infrastructure "NREN" + + +Workshop Participants + + Rick Adams, UUNET + Eric Aupperle, Merit + Stanley Besen, RAND Corporation + Lewis Branscomb, Harvard University + Yale Braunstein, University of California, Berkeley + Charles Brownstein, National Science Foundation + Deborah Estrin, University of Southern California + David Farber, University of Pennsylvania + Darleen Fisher, National Science Foundation + Thomas Fletcher, Harvard University + Kenneth Flamm, Brookings Institution + Lisa Heinz, U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment + Fred Howlett, AT&T + Brian Kahin, Harvard University + Robert Kahn, Corporation for National Research Initiatives + Kenneth King, EDUCOM + + + +Kahin [Page 12] + +RFC 1192 Commercialization of the Internet November 1990 + + + Kenneth Klingenstein, University of Colorado + Joel Maloff, CICNet + Bruce McConnell, Office of Management and Budget + Jerry Mechling, Harvard University + James Michalko, Research Libraries Group + Elizabeth Miller, U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment + Eli Noam, New York State Public Service Commission + Eric Nussbaum, Bellcore + Peter O'Neil, Digital Equipment Corporation + Robert Powers, MCI + Charla Rath, National Telecommunications and Information + Administration, Department of Commerce + Ira Richer, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency + William Schrader, Performance Systems International + Howard Webber, Digital Equipment Corporation + Allan Weis, IBM + Stephen Wolff, National Science Foundation + +Security Considerations + + Security issues are not discussed in this memo. + +Author's Address + + Brian Kahin + Director, Information Infrastructure Project + Science, Technology & Public Program + John F. Kennedy School of Government + Harvard University + + Phone: 617-495-8903 + + EMail: kahin@hulaw.harvard.edu + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Kahin [Page 13] +
\ No newline at end of file |