1 files changed, 395 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/doc/rfc/rfc3008.txt b/doc/rfc/rfc3008.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..08a4a8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/rfc/rfc3008.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,395 @@
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Network Working Group                                      B. Wellington
+Request for Comments: 3008                                       Nominum
+Updates: 2535                                              November 2000
+Category: Standards Track
+
+
+         Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) Signing Authority
+
+Status of this Memo
+
+   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
+   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
+   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
+   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
+   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
+
+Copyright Notice
+
+   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000).  All Rights Reserved.
+
+Abstract
+
+   This document proposes a revised model of Domain Name System Security
+   (DNSSEC) Signing Authority.  The revised model is designed to clarify
+   earlier documents and add additional restrictions to simplify the
+   secure resolution process.  Specifically, this affects the
+   authorization of keys to sign sets of records.
+
+   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
+   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
+   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
+
+1 - Introduction
+
+   This document defines additional restrictions on DNSSEC signatures
+   (SIG) records relating to their authority to sign associated data.
+   The intent is to establish a standard policy followed by a secure
+   resolver; this policy can be augmented by local rules.  This builds
+   upon [RFC2535], updating section 2.3.6 of that document.
+
+   The most significant change is that in a secure zone, zone data is
+   required to be signed by the zone key.
+
+   Familiarity with the DNS system [RFC1034, RFC1035] and the DNS
+   security extensions [RFC2535] is assumed.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Wellington                  Standards Track                     [Page 1]
+
+RFC 3008                DNSSEC Signing Authority           November 2000
+
+
+2 - The SIG Record
+
+   A SIG record is normally associated with an RRset, and "covers" (that
+   is, demonstrates the authenticity and integrity of) the RRset.  This
+   is referred to as a "data SIG".  Note that there can be multiple SIG
+   records covering an RRset, and the same validation process should be
+   repeated for each of them.  Some data SIGs are considered "material",
+   that is, relevant to a DNSSEC capable resolver, and some are
+   "immaterial" or "extra-DNSSEC", as they are not relevant to DNSSEC
+   validation.  Immaterial SIGs may have application defined roles.  SIG
+   records may exist which are not bound to any RRset; these are also
+   considered immaterial.  The validation process determines which SIGs
+   are material; once a SIG is shown to be immaterial, no other
+   validation is necessary.
+
+   SIGs may also be used for transaction security.  In this case, a SIG
+   record with a type covered field of 0 is attached to a message, and
+   is used to protect message integrity.  This is referred to as a
+   SIG(0) [RFC2535, RFC2931].
+
+   The following sections define requirements for all of the fields of a
+   SIG record.  These requirements MUST be met in order for a DNSSEC
+   capable resolver to process this signature.  If any of these
+   requirements are not met, the SIG cannot be further processed.
+   Additionally, once a KEY has been identified as having generated this
+   SIG, there are requirements that it MUST meet.
+
+2.1 - Type Covered
+
+   For a data SIG, the type covered MUST be the same as the type of data
+   in the associated RRset.  For a SIG(0), the type covered MUST be 0.
+
+2.2 - Algorithm Number
+
+   The algorithm specified in a SIG MUST be recognized by the client,
+   and it MUST be an algorithm that has a defined SIG rdata format.
+
+2.3 - Labels
+
+   The labels count MUST be less than or equal to the number of labels
+   in the SIG owner name, as specified in [RFC2535, section 4.1.3].
+
+2.4 - Original TTL
+
+   The original TTL MUST be greater than or equal to the TTL of the SIG
+   record itself, since the TTL cannot be increased by intermediate
+   servers.  This field can be ignored for SIG(0) records.
+
+
+
+
+Wellington                  Standards Track                     [Page 2]
+
+RFC 3008                DNSSEC Signing Authority           November 2000
+
+
+2.5 - Signature Expiration and Inception
+
+   The current time at the time of validation MUST lie within the
+   validity period bounded by the inception and expiration times.
+
+2.6 - Key Tag
+
+   There are no restrictions on the Key Tag field, although it is
+   possible that future algorithms will impose constraints.
+
+2.7 - Signer's Name
+
+   The signer's name field of a data SIG MUST contain the name of the
+   zone to which the data and signature belong.  The combination of
+   signer's name, key tag, and algorithm MUST identify a zone key if the
+   SIG is to be considered material.  The only exception that the
+   signer's name field in a SIG KEY at a zone apex SHOULD contain the
+   parent zone's name, unless the KEY set is self-signed.  This document
+   defines a standard policy for DNSSEC validation; local policy may
+   override the standard policy.
+
+   There are no restrictions on the signer field of a SIG(0) record.
+   The combination of signer's name, key tag, and algorithm MUST
+   identify a key if this SIG(0) is to be processed.
+
+2.8 - Signature
+
+   There are no restrictions on the signature field.  The signature will
+   be verified at some point, but does not need to be examined prior to
+   verification unless a future algorithm imposes constraints.
+
+3 - The Signing KEY Record
+
+   Once a signature has been examined and its fields validated (but
+   before the signature has been verified), the resolver attempts to
+   locate a KEY that matches the signer name, key tag, and algorithm
+   fields in the SIG.  If one is not found, the SIG cannot be verified
+   and is considered immaterial.  If KEYs are found, several fields of
+   the KEY record MUST have specific values if the SIG is to be
+   considered material and authorized.  If there are multiple KEYs, the
+   following checks are performed on all of them, as there is no way to
+   determine which one generated the signature until the verification is
+   performed.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Wellington                  Standards Track                     [Page 3]
+
+RFC 3008                DNSSEC Signing Authority           November 2000
+
+
+3.1 - Type Flags
+
+   The signing KEY record MUST have a flags value of 00 or 01
+   (authentication allowed, confidentiality optional) [RFC2535, 3.1.2].
+   A DNSSEC resolver MUST only trust signatures generated by keys that
+   are permitted to authenticate data.
+
+3.2 - Name Flags
+
+   The interpretation of this field is considerably different for data
+   SIGs and SIG(0) records.
+
+3.2.1 - Data SIG
+
+   If the SIG record covers an RRset, the name type of the associated
+   KEY MUST be 01 (zone) [RFC2535, 3.1.2].  This updates RFC 2535,
+   section 2.3.6.  The DNSSEC validation process performed by a resolver
+   MUST ignore all keys that are not zone keys unless local policy
+   dictates otherwise.
+
+   The primary reason that RFC 2535 allows host and user keys to
+   generate material DNSSEC signatures is to allow dynamic update
+   without online zone keys; that is, avoid storing private keys in an
+   online server.  The desire to avoid online signing keys cannot be
+   achieved, though, because they are necessary to sign NXT and SOA sets
+   [RFC3007].  These online zone keys can sign any incoming data.
+   Removing the goal of having no online keys removes the reason to
+   allow host and user keys to generate material signatures.
+
+   Limiting material signatures to zone keys simplifies the validation
+   process.  The length of the verification chain is bounded by the
+   name's label depth.  The authority of a key is clearly defined; a
+   resolver does not need to make a potentially complicated decision to
+   determine whether a key has the proper authority to sign data.
+
+   Finally, there is no additional flexibility granted by allowing
+   host/user key generated material signatures.  As long as users and
+   hosts have the ability to authenticate update requests to the primary
+   zone server, signatures by zone keys are sufficient to protect the
+   integrity of the data to the world at large.
+
+3.2.2 - SIG(0)
+
+   If the SIG record is a SIG(0) protecting a message, the name type of
+   the associated KEY SHOULD be 00 (user) or 10 (host/entity).
+   Transactions are initiated by a host or user, not a zone, so zone
+   keys SHOULD not generate SIG(0) records.
+
+
+
+
+Wellington                  Standards Track                     [Page 4]
+
+RFC 3008                DNSSEC Signing Authority           November 2000
+
+
+   A client is either explicitly executed by a user or on behalf of a
+   host, therefore the name type of a SIG(0) generated by a client
+   SHOULD be either user or host.  A nameserver is associated with a
+   host, and its use of SIG(0) is not associated with a particular zone,
+   so the name type of a SIG(0) generated by a nameserver SHOULD be
+   host.
+
+3.3 - Signatory Flags
+
+   This document does not assign any values to the signatory field, nor
+   require any values to be present.
+
+3.4 - Protocol
+
+   The signing KEY record MUST have a protocol value of 3 (DNSSEC) or
+   255 (ALL).  If a key is not specified for use with DNSSEC, a DNSSEC
+   resolver MUST NOT trust any signature that it generates.
+
+3.5 - Algorithm Number
+
+   The algorithm field MUST be identical to that of the generated SIG
+   record, and MUST meet all requirements for an algorithm value in a
+   SIG record.
+
+4 - Security Considerations
+
+   This document defines a standard baseline for a DNSSEC capable
+   resolver.  This is necessary for a thorough security analysis of
+   DNSSEC, if one is to be done.
+
+   Specifically, this document places additional restrictions on SIG
+   records that a resolver must validate before the signature can be
+   considered worthy of DNSSEC trust.  This simplifies the protocol,
+   making it more robust and able to withstand scrutiny by the security
+   community.
+
+5 - Acknowledgements
+
+   The author would like to thank the following people for review and
+   informative comments (in alphabetical order):
+
+   Olafur Gudmundsson
+   Ed Lewis
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Wellington                  Standards Track                     [Page 5]
+
+RFC 3008                DNSSEC Signing Authority           November 2000
+
+
+6 - References
+
+   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain Names - Concepts and Facilities",
+              STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
+
+   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain Names - Implementation and
+              Specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
+
+   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
+              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
+
+   [RFC2136]  Vixie (Ed.), P., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y. and J. Bound,
+              "Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System", RFC 2136,
+              April 1997.
+
+   [RFC2535]  Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions",
+              RFC 2535, March 1999.
+
+   [RFC2931]  Eastlake, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures
+              (SIG(0)s )", RFC 2931, September 2000.
+
+   [RFC3007]      Wellington, B., "Simple Secure Domain Name System
+              (DNS) Dynamic Update", RFC 3007, November 2000.
+
+7 - Author's Address
+
+   Brian Wellington
+   Nominum, Inc.
+   950 Charter Street
+   Redwood City, CA 94063
+
+   Phone: +1 650 381 6022
+   EMail: Brian.Wellington@nominum.com
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Wellington                  Standards Track                     [Page 6]
+
+RFC 3008                DNSSEC Signing Authority           November 2000
+
+
+8  Full Copyright Statement
+
+   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000).  All Rights Reserved.
+
+   This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
+   others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
+   or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
+   and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
+   kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
+   included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this
+   document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
+   the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
+   Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
+   developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
+   copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
+   followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
+   English.
+
+   The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
+   revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
+
+   This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
+   "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
+   TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
+   BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
+   HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+   MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+
+Acknowledgement
+
+   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
+   Internet Society.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Wellington                  Standards Track                     [Page 7]
+