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diff --git a/doc/rfc/rfc4651.txt b/doc/rfc/rfc4651.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..63d0133 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/rfc/rfc4651.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1739 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group C. Vogt +Request for Comments: 4651 Universitaet Karlsruhe (TH) +Category: Informational J. Arkko + Ericsson Research NomadicLab + February 2007 + + + A Taxonomy and Analysis of Enhancements to + Mobile IPv6 Route Optimization + +Status of This Memo + + This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does + not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this + memo is unlimited. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). + +IESG Note: + + This RFC is a product of the Internet Research Task Force and is not + a candidate for any level of Internet Standard. The IRTF publishes + the results of Internet-related research and development activities. + These results might not be suitable for deployment. + +Abstract + + This document describes and evaluates strategies to enhance Mobile + IPv6 Route Optimization, on the basis of existing proposals, in order + to motivate and guide further research in this context. This + document is a product of the IP Mobility Optimizations (MobOpts) + Research Group. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 1] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction ....................................................3 + 1.1. A Note on Public-Key Infrastructures .......................4 + 1.2. A Note on Source Address Filtering .........................5 + 2. Objectives for Route Optimization Enhancement ...................7 + 2.1. Latency Optimizations ......................................8 + 2.2. Security Enhancements ......................................8 + 2.3. Signaling Optimizations ....................................9 + 2.4. Robustness Enhancements ....................................9 + 3. Enhancements Toolbox ............................................9 + 3.1. IP Address Tests ..........................................10 + 3.2. Protected Tunnels .........................................10 + 3.3. Optimistic Behavior .......................................11 + 3.4. Proactive IP Address Tests ................................11 + 3.5. Concurrent Care-of Address Tests ..........................12 + 3.6. Diverted Routing ..........................................13 + 3.7. Credit-Based Authorization ................................14 + 3.8. Heuristic Monitoring ......................................17 + 3.9. Crypto-Based Identifiers ..................................18 + 3.10. Pre-Configuration ........................................19 + 3.11. Semi-Permanent Security Associations .....................20 + 3.12. Delegation ...............................................21 + 3.13. Mobile Networks ..........................................21 + 3.14. Location Privacy .........................................22 + 4. Discussion .....................................................22 + 4.1. Cross-Layer Interactions ..................................23 + 4.2. Experimentation and Measurements ..........................23 + 4.3. Future Research ...........................................24 + 5. Security Considerations ........................................24 + 6. Conclusions ....................................................25 + 7. Acknowledgments ................................................25 + 8. References .....................................................26 + 8.1. Normative References ......................................26 + 8.2. Informative References ....................................26 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 2] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + +1. Introduction + + Mobility support for IPv6, or Mobile IPv6, enables mobile nodes to + migrate active transport connections and application sessions from + one IPv6 address to another. The Mobile IPv6 specification, RFC 3775 + [1], introduces a "home agent", which proxies a mobile node at a + permanent "home address". A roaming mobile node connects to the home + agent through a bidirectional tunnel and can so communicate, from its + local "care-of address", as if it was present at the home address. + The mobile node keeps the home agent updated on its current care-of + address via IPsec-protected signaling messages [40]. + + In case the correspondent node lacks appropriate mobility support, it + communicates with the mobile node's home address, and thus all data + packets are routed via the home agent. This mode, Bidirectional + Tunneling, increases packet-propagation delays. RFC 3775 hence + defines an additional mode for Route Optimization, which allows peers + to communicate on the direct path. It requires that the + correspondent node can cache a binding between the mobile node's home + address and current care-of address. The challenge with Route + Optimization is that an administrative relationship between the + mobile node and the correspondent node can generally not be + presupposed. So how can the two authenticate and authorize the + signaling messages that they exchange? + + Mobile IPv6 solves this problem by verifying a routing property of + the mobile node. Specifically, the mobile node is checked to be + reachable at its home address and current care-of address in that it + must prove the reception of a home and care-of keygen token, + respectively. This is called the "return-routability procedure". It + takes place right before a mobile node registers a new care-of + address with a correspondent node and is periodically repeated in + case the mobile node does not move for a while. + + The advantage of the return-routability procedure is that it is + lightweight and does not require pre-shared authentication material. + It also requires no state at the correspondent node. On the other + hand, the two reachability tests can lead to a handoff delay + unacceptable for many real-time or interactive applications such as + Voice over IP (VoIP) and video conferencing. Also, the security that + the return-routability procedure guarantees might not be sufficient + for security-sensitive applications. And finally, periodically + refreshing a registration at a correspondent node implies a hidden + signaling overhead that may prevent mobile nodes from hibernation + during times of inactivity. + + Manifold enhancements for Route Optimizations have hence been + suggested. This document describes and evaluates various strategies + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 3] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + + on the basis of existing proposals. It is meant to provide a + conceptual framework for further work, which was found to be + inevitable in the context of Route Optimization. Many scientists + volunteered to review this document. Their names are duly recorded + in Section 7. Section 2 analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of + Route Optimization and identifies potential objectives for + enhancement. Different enhancement strategies are discussed, based + on existing proposals, in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the + different approaches and identifies opportunities for further + research. Section 5 and Section 6 conclude the document. + + This document represents the consensus of the MobOpts Research Group. + It has been reviewed by the Research Group members active in the + specific area of work. At the request of their chairs, this document + has been comprehensively reviewed by multiple active contributors to + the IETF MIP6 Working Group. At the time of this writing, some of + the ideas presented in this document have been adopted by the + Mobility for IP: Performance, Signaling and Handoff Optimization + (mipshop) Working Group in the IETF. + +1.1. A Note on Public-Key Infrastructures + + Mobile IPv6 Route Optimization verifies a mobile node's authenticity + through a routing property. An alternative is cryptographic + authentication, which requires a binding between a node's identity + and some sort of secret information. Although some proposals suggest + installing shared secrets into end nodes when possible (see Section + 3.10), pre-configuration is not an option for general Internet use + for scalability reasons. Authentication based on a Public-Key + Infrastructure (PKI) does not require pair-wise pre-configuration. + Here, the secret information is the private component of a + public/private-key pair, and the binding between a node's identity + and private key exists indirectly through the cryptographic + properties of public/private-key pairs and a binding between the + identity and the public key. An authority trusted by both end nodes + issues a certificate that effects this latter binding. + + Large-scale use of a PKI, however, was considered unsuitable for + mobility management due to the following reasons. + + o There are differing opinions on whether a PKI could scale up to + hundreds of millions of mobile nodes. Some people argue they do, + as there are already examples of certification authorities + responsible for millions of certificates. But more important than + the expected increase in the number of certificates would be a + shift in application patterns. Nowadays, public-key cryptography + is used only for those applications that require strong, + cryptographic authentication. + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 4] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + + If it was used for mobility management as well, certificate checks + would become mandatory for any type of application, leading to + more checks per user. Busy servers with mobility support might be + unwilling to spent the processing resources required for this + depending on the service they provide. + + o Revoked certificates are identified on Certificate Revocation + Lists (CRLs), which correspondent nodes with mobility support + would have to acquire from certification authorities. CRLs must + be kept up to date, requiring periodic downloads. This and the + act of checking a certificate against a CRL create overhead that + some correspondent nodes might be unwilling to spend. + + o Certificate verification may take some time and hence interrupt + ongoing applications. This can be disturbing from the user's + perspective, especially when Route Optimization starts in the + middle of a session, or the session is very short-term anyway. + + o The bigger a PKI grows, the more attractive it becomes as an + attack target, endangering the Internet as a whole. + + o There is little experience with using home addresses as + identifiers in certificates. Although the home address could + theoretically be placed into a certificate's Subject Alternate + Name field, the entities responsible for IP-address assignment and + certification are usually not the same, and it may not be easy to + coordinate the two. + + For these reasons, this document does not consider direct + authentication of mobile nodes based on a PKI. Nevertheless, it does + evaluate certificate-based techniques that make the problems + identified above more tractable (see Section 3.12). + +1.2. A Note on Source Address Filtering + + RFC 3775 uses care-of-address tests to probe a mobile node's presence + at its claimed location. Alternatively, verification of care-of + addresses may be based on infrastructure in the mobile node's local + access network. For instance, the infrastructure can verify that the + IP source addresses of all packets leaving the network are correct. + "Ingress filtering" [38][43] provides this feature to the extent that + it inspects the prefix of IP source addresses and ensures topological + correctness. Network-access providers that use ingress filtering + normally deploy the technique in their first-hop and site-exit + routers. Similarly, ISPs may filter packets originating from a + downstream network. + + + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 5] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + + Ingress filtering may eventually provide a way to replace care-of- + address tests. But there are still a number of uncertainties today: + + o By definition, ingress filtering can prevent source-address + spoofing only from those networks that do deploy the technique. + As a consequence, ingress filtering needs to be widely, preferably + universally, deployed in order to constitute Internet-wide + protection. As long as an attacker can get network access without + filters, all Internet nodes remain vulnerable. + + o There is little incentive for ISPs to deploy ingress filtering + other than conscientiousness. Legal or regulatory prescription as + well as financial motivation does not exist. A corrupt ISP might + even have a financial incentive not to deploy the technique, if + redirection-based denial-of-service (DoS) attacks using Route + Optimization ever become possible and are exploited for financial + gain. A similar issue was observed with, for example, email spam. + + o Ingress filtering is most effective, and easiest to configure, at + the first-hop router. However, since only prefixes are checked, + the filters inevitably get less precise the further upstream they + are enforced. This issue is inherent in the technique, so the + best solution is checking packets as close to the originating + nodes as possible, preferably in the first-hop routers themselves. + + o A popular implementation of ingress filtering is "Reverse Path + Forwarding" (RPF). This technique relies on routes to be + symmetric, which is oftentimes the case between edge networks and + ISPs, but far less often between peering ISPs. Alternatives to + RPF are either manually configured access lists or dynamic + approaches that are more relaxed, and thereby less secure, than + RPF [43]. + + o Another problem with ingress filtering is multi-homing. When a + router attempts to forward to one ISP a packet with a source- + address prefix from another ISP, filters at the second ISP would + block the packet. The IETF seeks to find a way around this [39]. + For instance, one could tunnel the packet to the topologically + correct ISP, or one could allow source-address changes by means of + a locator-identifier split [45]. + + o Finally, RFC 3775 defines an Alternative Care-of Address option + that mobile nodes can use to carry a care-of address within a + Binding Update message outside of the IPv6 header. Such an + address is not subject to inspection by ingress filtering and + would have to be verified through other means [14]. + + + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 6] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + + Although these problems are expected to get solved eventually, there + is currently little knowledge on how applicable and deployable, as a + candidate for care-of-address verification, ingress filtering will + be. High investments or administrative hurdles could prevent a + large, preferably universal deployment of ingress filtering, which + would hinder Internet-wide protection, as mentioned in the first + bullet. For these reasons, this document does not consider ingress + filtering as a viable alternative to care-of-address tests, although + things may be different in the future. + +2. Objectives for Route Optimization Enhancement + + Wireless environments with frequently moving nodes feature a number + of salient properties that distinguish them from environments with + stationary nodes or nodes that move only occasionally. One important + aspect is the efficiency of mobility management. Nodes may not + bother about a few round-trip times of handoff latency if they do not + change their point of IP attachment often. But the negative impact + that a mobility protocol can have on application performance + increases with the level of mobility. Therefore, in order to + maximize user satisfaction, it is important to reduce the handoff + latency that the mobility protocol adds to existing delays in other + places of the network stack. A related issue is the robustness of + the mobility protocol, given that temporary outage of mobility + support can render mobile nodes incapable of continuing to + communicate. + + Furthermore, the wireless nature of data transmissions makes it + potentially easier for an attacker to eavesdrop on other nodes' data + or send data on behalf of other nodes. While applications can + usually authenticate and encrypt their payload if need be, similar + security measures may not be feasible for signaling packets of a + mobility protocol, in particular if communicating end nodes have no + pre-existing relationship. + + Given the typically limited bandwidth in a wireless medium, resources + ought to be spent in an economic matter. This is especially + important for the amount of signaling that a mobility protocol + requires. + + Endeavors to enhance RFC 3775 Route Optimization generally strive for + reduced handoff latency, higher security, lower signaling overhead, + or increased protocol robustness. These objectives are herein + discussed from a requirements perspective; the technical means to + reach the objectives is not considered, nor is the feasibility of + achieving them. + + + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 7] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + +2.1. Latency Optimizations + + One important objective for improving Route Optimization is to reduce + handoff latencies. Assuming that the home-address test dominates the + care-of-address test in terms of latency, a Mobile IPv6 handoff takes + one round-trip time between the mobile node and the home agent for + the home registration, a round-trip time between the mobile node and + the home agent plus a round-trip time between the home agent and the + correspondent node for the home-address test, and a one-way time from + the mobile node to the correspondent node for the propagation of the + Binding Update message. The first packet sent to the new care-of + address requires an additional one-way time to propagate from the + correspondent node to the mobile node. The mobile node can resume + communications right after it has dispatched the Binding Update + message. But if it requests a Binding Acknowledgment message from + the correspondent node, communications are usually delayed until this + is received. + + These delays are additive and are not subsumed by other delays at the + IP layer or link layer. They can cause perceptible quality + degradations for interactive and real-time applications. TCP bulk- + data transfers are likewise affected since long handoff latencies may + lead to successive retransmission timeouts and degraded throughput. + +2.2. Security Enhancements + + The return-routability procedure was designed with the objective to + provide a level of security that compares to that of today's non- + mobile Internet [46]. As such, it protects against impersonation, + denial of service, and redirection-based flooding attacks that would + not be possible without Route Optimization. This approach is based + on an assumption that a mobile Internet cannot become any safer than + the non-mobile Internet. + + Applications that require a security level higher than what the + return-routability procedure can provide are generally advised to use + end-to-end protection such as IPsec or Transport Layer Security + (TLS). But even then they are vulnerable to denial of service. This + motivates research for stronger Route Optimization security. + Security enhancements may also become necessary if future + technological improvements mitigate some of the existing mobility- + unrelated vulnerabilities. + + One particular issue with Route Optimization is location privacy + because route-optimized packets carry both home and care-of addresses + in plaintext. A standard workaround is to fall back to Bidirectional + Tunneling when location privacy is needed. Packets with the care-of + address are then transferred only between the mobile node and the + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 8] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + + home agent, where they can be encrypted through IPsec Encapsulating + Security Payload (ESP) [42]. But even Bidirectional Tunneling + requires the mobile node to periodically re-establish IPsec security + associations with the home agent so as to become untraceable through + Security Parameter Indexes (SPIs). + +2.3. Signaling Optimizations + + Route Optimization requires periodic signaling even when the mobile + node does not move. The signaling overhead amounts to 7.16 bits per + second if the mobile node communicates with a stationary node [6]. + It doubles if both peers are mobile. This overhead may be negligible + when the nodes communicate, but it can be an issue for mobile nodes + that are inactive and stay at the same location for a while. These + nodes typically prefer to go to standby mode to conserve battery + power. Also, the periodic refreshes consume a fraction of the + wireless bandwidth that one could use more efficiently. + Optimizations for reduced signaling overhead could mitigate these + issues. + +2.4. Robustness Enhancements + + Route Optimization could conceptually enable continued communications + during periods of temporary home-agent unavailability. The protocol + defined in RFC 3775 does not achieve this independence, however, as + the home agent plays an active role in the return-routability + procedure. Appropriate enhancements could increase the independence + from the home agent and thus enable robust Route Optimization even in + the absence of the home agent. + +3. Enhancements Toolbox + + A large body of effort has recently gone into improving Mobile IPv6 + Route Optimization. Some of the proposed techniques are + modifications to the return-routability procedure, while others + replace the procedure by alternative mechanisms. Some of them + operate end-to-end; others introduce network-side mobility support. + In most cases, it is the combination of a set of techniques that is + required to gain a complete -- that is, efficient and secure -- + route-optimization mechanism. + + + + + + + + + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 9] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + +3.1. IP Address Tests + + RFC 3775 uses IP-address tests to ensure that a mobile node is live + and on the path to a specific destination address: The home-address + test provides evidence that the mobile node is the legitimate owner + of its home address; the care-of-address test detects spoofed care-of + addresses and prevents redirection-based flooding attacks. Both + tests can be performed in parallel. + + A home-address test should be initiated by the mobile node so that + the correspondent node can delay state creation until the mobile node + has authenticated. The care-of-address test can conceptually be + initiated by either side. It originates with the mobile node in RFC + 3775, but with the correspondent node in [16] and [22]. The + correspondent-node-driven approach suggests itself when + authentication is done through other means than a home-address test. + + Important advantages of IP-address tests are zero-configurability and + the independence of ancillary infrastructure. As a disadvantage, + IP-address tests can only guarantee that a node is on the path to the + probed address, not that the node truly owns this address. This does + not lead to new security threats, however, because the types of + attacks that an on-path attacker can do with Route Optimization are + already possible in the non-mobile Internet [46]. + +3.2. Protected Tunnels + + RFC 3775 protects certain signaling messages, exchanged between a + mobile node and its home agent, through an authenticated and + encrypted tunnel. This prevents unauthorized nodes on that path, + including eavesdroppers in the mobile node's wireless access network, + from listening in on these messages. + + Given that a pre-existing end-to-end security relationship between + the mobile node and the correspondent node cannot generally be + assumed, this protection exists only for the mobile node's side. If + the correspondent node is immobile, the path between the home agent + and the correspondent node remains unprotected. This is a path + between two stationary nodes, so all types of attacks that a villain + could wage on this path are already possible in the non-mobile + Internet. In case the correspondent node is mobile, it has its own + home agent, and only the path between the two (stationary) home + agents remains unprotected. + + + + + + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 10] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + +3.3. Optimistic Behavior + + Many Mobile IPv6 implementations [29][31] defer a correspondent + registration until the associated home registration has been + completed successfully. In contrast to such "conservative" behavior, + a more "optimistic" approach is to begin the return-routability + procedure in parallel with the home registration [52]. Conservative + behavior avoids a useless return-routability procedure in case the + home registration fails. This comes at the cost of additional + handoff delay when the home registration is successful. Optimistic + behavior saves this delay, but the return-routability procedure will + be in vain should the corresponding home registration be + unsuccessful. + + While a parallelization of the home registration and the return- + routability procedure is feasible within the bounds of RFC 3775, the + specification does not permit mobile nodes to continue with the + correspondent registration, by sending a Binding Update message to + the correspondent node, until a Binding Acknowledgment message + indicating successful home registration has been received. This is + usually not a problem because the return-routability procedure is + likely to take longer than the home registration anyway. However, + some optimizations (see Section 3.4) reduce the delay caused by the + return-routability procedure. A useful improvement is then to allow + Binding Update messages to be sent to correspondent nodes even before + the home registration has been acknowledged. + + The drawback of optimistic behavior is that a lost, reordered, or + rejected Binding Update message can cause data packets to be + discarded. Nevertheless, packet loss would have similar negative + impacts on conservative approaches, so the mobile node needs to be + prepared for the possible loss of these packets in any case. + +3.4. Proactive IP Address Tests + + The critical handoff phase, during which the mobile node and the + correspondent node cannot fully communicate, spans the home + registration and the correspondent registration, including the + return-routability procedure. One technique to shorten this phase is + to accomplish part of the signaling proactively before the handoff. + In particular, the home-address test can be done in advance without + violating the specifications of RFC 3775 [52][51]. + + In order to have a fresh home keygen token ready for a future + handoff, the mobile node should initiate a proactive home-address + test at least once per token lifetime, that is, every 3.5 minutes. + This does at most double the signaling overhead spent on home-address + tests given that correspondent registrations must be refreshed every + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 11] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + + 7 minutes even when the mobile node does not move for a while. An + optimization is possible where the mobile node's local link layer can + anticipate handoffs and trigger the home-address test in such a case. + [6] or [54] reduce the frequency of home-address tests even further. + Proactive care-of-address tests are possible only if the mobile node + is capable of attaching to two networks simultaneously. Dual + attachment is possible if the link-layer technology enables it with a + single interface [10], or if the mobile node is endowed with multiple + interfaces [7]. + +3.5. Concurrent Care-of Address Tests + + Without the assumption that a mobile node can simultaneously attach + to multiple networks, proactive care-of-address tests, executed prior + to handoff, are not an option. A correspondent node may instead + authorize a mobile node to defer the care-of-address test until an + early, tentative binding has been registered [52][51]. This in + combination with a technique to eliminate the handoff delay of home- + address tests (see Section 3.4 and Section 3.9) facilitates early + resumption of bidirectional communications subsequent to handoff. + The care-of address is called "unverified" during the concurrent + care-of-address test, and it is said to be "verified" once the + correspondent node has obtained evidence that the mobile node is + present at the address. A tentative binding's lifetime can be + limited to a few seconds. + + Home-address tests must not be accomplished concurrently, however, + given that they serve the purpose of authentication. They guarantee + that only the legitimate mobile node can create or update a binding + pertaining to a particular home address. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 12] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + + mobile node home agent correspondent node + | | | + | | | + |--Home Test Init------>|---------------------->| + | | | + | | | + |<----------------------|<-----------Home Test--| + | | | + | | + ~~+~~ handoff | + | | + |--Early Binding Update------------------------>| -+- + |--Care-of Test Init -------------------------->| | + | | | + | | | care-of + |<----------------Early Binding Acknowledgment--| | address + |<-------------------------------Care-of Test---| | unverified + | | | + | | | + |--Binding Update------------------------------>| -+- + | | + | | + |<----------------------Binding Acknowledgment--| + | | + + Figure 1: Concurrent Care-of Address Tests + + Figure 1 illustrates how concurrent care-of-address tests are used in + [52][51]: As soon as the mobile node has configured a new care-of + address after a handoff, it sends to the correspondent node an Early + Binding Update message. Only a home keygen token, obtained from a + proactive home-address test, is required to sign this message. The + correspondent node creates a tentative binding for the new, + unverified care-of address when it receives the Early Binding Update + message. This address can be used immediately. The mobile node + finally sends a (standard) Binding Update message to the + correspondent node when the concurrent care-of-address test is + complete. Credit-Based Authorization (see Section 3.7) prevents + misuse of care-of addresses while they are unverified. + +3.6. Diverted Routing + + Given that a home registration is faster than a correspondent + registration in the absence of additional optimizations, the mobile + node may request its traffic to be routed through the home address + until a new binding has been set up at the correspondent node + [52][51]. The performance of such diverted routing depends on the + propagation properties of the involved routes, however. + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 13] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + + For packets to be diverted via the home address, signaling is + necessary with both the home agent and the correspondent node. The + home agent must be informed about the new care-of address so that it + can correctly forward packets intercepted at the home address. The + correspondent node continues to send packets to the old care-of + address until it receives a Binding Update message indicating that + the current binding is no longer valid and ought to be removed. This + request requires authentication through a home-address test in order + to prevent denial of service by unauthorized nodes. The test can be + accomplished in a proactive way (see Section 3.4). + + The mobile node may send packets via the home address as soon as it + has dispatched the Binding Update message to the home agent. It may + send outgoing packets along the direct path once a Binding Update + message for the new care-of address has been sent to the + correspondent node. + + It depends on the propagation latency on the end-to-end path via the + home agent relative to the latency on the direct path for how long + the correspondent node should continue to send packets to the home + address. If the former path is slow, it may be better to queue some + of the packets until the correspondent registration is complete and + packets can be sent along the direct route. + +3.7. Credit-Based Authorization + + Concurrent care-of-address tests (see Section 3.5) require protection + against spoofed unverified care-of addresses and redirection-based + flooding attacks. Credit-Based Authorization [50] is a technique + that provides such protection based on the following three + hypotheses: + + 1. A flooding attacker typically seeks to somehow multiply the + packets it assembles for the purpose of the attack because + bandwidth is an ample resource for many attractive victims. + + 2. An attacker can always cause unamplified flooding by generating + bogus packets itself and sending them to its victim directly. + + 3. Consequently, the additional effort required to set up a + redirection-based flooding attack pays off for the attacker only + if amplification can be obtained this way. + + On this basis, rather than eliminating malicious packet redirection + in the first place, Credit-Based Authorization prevents any + amplification that can be reached through it. This is accomplished + by limiting the data a correspondent node can send to an unverified + care-of address of a mobile node by the data that the correspondent + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 14] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + + node has recently received from that mobile node. (See Section 3.5 + for a definition on when a care-of address is verified and when it is + unverified.) A redirection-based flooding attack is thus no more + attractive than pure direct flooding, where the attacker itself sends + bogus packets to the victim. It is actually less attractive given + that the attacker must keep Mobile IPv6 state to coordinate the + redirection. + + mobile node correspondent node + | | + | | + address |--data----------------->| credit += size(data) + verified | | + |--data----------------->| credit += size(data) + |<-----------------data--| don't change credit + | | + address + address change | + unverified |<-----------------data--| credit -= size(data) + |--data----------------->| credit += size(data) + |<-----------------data--| credit -= size(data) + | | + |<-----------------data--| credit -= size(data) + | X credit < size(data) + | | ==> Do not send! + address | | + verified |<-----------------data--| don't change credit + | | + + Figure 2: Credit-Based Authorization + + Figure 2 illustrates Credit-Based Authorization for an exemplifying + exchange of data packets: The correspondent node measures the bytes + received from the mobile node. When the mobile node registers a new + care-of address, the correspondent node labels this address + "unverified" and sends packets there as long as the sum of the packet + sizes does not exceed the measured, received data volume. A + concurrent care-of-address test is meanwhile performed. Once the + care-of address has been verified, the correspondent node relabels + the address from "unverified" to "verified". Packets can then be + sent to the new care-of address without restrictions. When + insufficient credit is left while the care-of address is still + "unverified", the correspondent node stops sending further packets to + the address until the verification completes. The correspondent node + may drop these packets, direct them to the mobile node's home + address, or buffer them for later transmission when the care-of + address is verified. Figure 2 does not show Mobile IPv6 signaling + packets. + + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 15] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + + The correspondent node ensures that the mobile node's acquired credit + gradually decreases over time. This "aging" prevents the mobile node + from building up credit over a long time. A malicious node with a + slow Internet connection could otherwise provision for a burst of + redirected packets that does not relate to its own upstream capacity. + + Allocating the mobile node's credit based on the packets that the + mobile node sends and reducing the credit based on packets that the + mobile node receives is defined as "Inbound Mode". (The + correspondent node is in control of credit allocation, and it + computes the credit based on inbound packets received from the mobile + node.) A nice property of Inbound Mode is that it does not require + support from the mobile node. The mobile node neither needs to + understand that Credit-Based Authorization is effective at the + correspondent node, nor does it have to have an idea of how much + credit it has at a particular point in time. + + Inbound Mode works fine with applications that send comparable data + volumes into both directions. On the other hand, the mode may + prevent the mobile node from collecting the amount of credit it needs + for a handoff when applications with asymmetric traffic patterns are + in use. For instance, file transfers and media streaming are + characterized by high throughput towards the client, typically the + mobile node, and comparably little throughput towards the serving + correspondent node. + + An additional "Outbound Mode" was designed to better accommodate + applications with asymmetric traffic patterns. In Outbound Mode, + packets that the correspondent node sends to the mobile node + determine both, how much the credit increases while the current + care-of address is verified, and how much the credit shrinks while + the care-of address is unverified. This resolves the issue with + asymmetric traffic patterns. + + The security of Outbound Mode is based on the further hypothesis that + the mobile node invests comparable effort for packet reception and + transmission in terms of bandwidth, memory, and processing capacity. + This justifies why credit, allocated for packets received by the + mobile node, can be turned into packets that the correspondent node + sends. The question is, though, how the correspondent node can + determine how many of the packets sent to a mobile node are actually + received and processed by that mobile node. Relying on transport- + layer acknowledgments is not an option as such messages can easily be + faked. Outbound Mode hence defines its own feedback mechanism, + Care-of Address Spot Checks, which is robust to spoofing. The + correspondent node periodically tags packets that it sends to the + mobile node with a random, unguessable number, a so-called Spot Check + Token. When the mobile node receives a packet with an attached Spot + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 16] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + + Check Token, it buffers the token until it sends the next packet to + the correspondent node. The Spot Check Token is then included in + this packet. Upon reception, the correspondent node verifies whether + the returned Spot Check Token matches a token recently sent to the + mobile node. New credit is allocated in proportion to the ratio + between the number of successfully returned Spot Check Tokens and the + total number of tokens sent. This implies that new credit is + approximately proportional to the fraction of packets that have made + their way at least up to the mobile node's IP stack. The preciseness + of Care-of Address Spot Checks can be traded with overhead through + the frequency with which packets are tagged with Spot Check Tokens. + + An interesting question is whether Outbound Mode could be misused by + an attacker with asymmetric Internet connection. Widespread digital + subscriber lines (DSL), for example, typically have a much higher + download rate than upload rate. The limited upload rate would render + most denial-of-service attempts through direct flooding meaningless. + But the attacker could leverage the strong download rate to build up + credit at one or multiple correspondent nodes. It could then + illegitimately spend the credit on a stronger, redirection-based + flooding attack. The reason why this has so far not been considered + an issue is that, in order to accumulate enough credit at the remote + end, the attacker would first have to expose itself to the same + packet flood that it could then redirect towards the victim. + +3.8. Heuristic Monitoring + + Heuristic approaches to prevent misuse of unverified care-of + addresses (see Section 3.5) are conceivable as well. A heuristic, + implemented at the correspondent node and possibly supplemented by a + restrictive lifetime limit for tentative bindings, can prevent, or at + least effectually discourage such misuse. The challenge here seems + to be a feasible heuristic: On one hand, the heuristic must be + sufficiently rigid to quickly respond to malicious intents at the + other side. On the other hand, it should not have a negative impact + on a fair-minded mobile node's communications. + + Another problem with heuristics is that they are usually reactive. + The correspondent node can only respond to misbehavior after it + appeared. If sanctions are imposed quickly, attacks may simply not + be worthwhile. Yet premature measures should be avoided. One must + also bear in mind that an attacker may be able to use different home + addresses, and it is in general impossible for the correspondent node + to see that the set of home addresses belongs to the same node. The + attacker may furthermore exploit multiple correspondent nodes for its + attack in an attempt to amplify the result. + + + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 17] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + +3.9. Crypto-Based Identifiers + + A Crypto-Based Identifier (CBID) is an identifier with a strong + cryptographic binding to the public component of its owner's + public/private-key pair [33]. This allows the owner to prove its + claim on the CBID: It signs a piece of data with its private key and + sends this to the verifier along with its public key and the + parameters necessary to recompute the CBID. The verifier recomputes + the CBID and checks the owner's knowledge of the corresponding + private key. + + CBIDs offer three main advantages: First, spoofing attacks against a + CBID are much harder than attacks against a non-cryptographic + identifier like a domain name or a Mobile IPv6 home address. Though + an attacker can always create its own CBID, it is unlikely to find a + public/private-key pair that produces someone else's. Second, a CBID + does not depend on a PKI given its inherent binding to the owner's + public key. Third, a CBID can be used to bind a public key to an IP + address, in which case it is called a Cryptographically Generated + Address (CGA) [44][34][47]. A CGA is syntactically just an ordinary + IPv6 address. It has a standard routing prefix and an interface + identifier generated from a hash on the CGA owner's public key and + additional parameters. + + Many applications are conceivable where CGAs are advantageous. In + Mobile IPv6, CGAs can bind a mobile node's home address to its public + key [35][5] and so avoid the home-address test in most correspondent + registrations. This accelerates the registration process and allows + the peers to communicate independently of home-agent availability. + + Since only the interface identifier of a CGA is cryptographically + protected, its network prefix can be spoofed, and flooding attacks + against networks are still an issue. An initial home-address test is + hence required to validate the network prefix even when the home + address is a CGA. For the same reason, CGAs are rarely used as + care-of addresses. + + One limitation of CGAs compared to other types of CBIDs is that the + cryptographically protected portion is only at most 62 bits long. + The rest of the address is occupied by a 64-bit network prefix as + well as the universal/local and individual/group bits. (The + specification in [44] further hard-codes a 3-bit security parameter + into the address, reducing the cryptographically protected portion to + 59 bits.) A brute-force attack might thus reveal a public/private + key public/private-key pair that produces a certain CGA. This + vulnerability can be contained by including the network prefix in the + hash computation for the interface identifier so that an attacker, in + + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 18] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + + case it did find the right public/private key public/private-key + pair, could not form CGAs for multiple networks from it. + + To resolve collisions in generating CGAs, a collision count is part + of the input to the hash function. Changing this produces a + different CGA. Unfortunately, the collision count also reduces the + complexity of a brute-force attack against a CGA because it allows + the same private/public-key pair to be used to generate multiple + CGAs. The collision count is therefore limited to a few values only. + + Higher security can be achieved through longer CBIDs. For example, a + node's primary identifier in the Host Identity Protocol [21] is a + 128-bit hash on the node's public key. It is used as an IP-address + replacement at stack layers above IP. This CBID is not routable, so + there needs to be some external localization mechanism if a node + wants to contact a peer of which it only knows the identifier. + +3.10. Pre-Configuration + + Where mobile and correspondent nodes can be pre-configured with a + shared key, bound to the mobile node's home address, authentication + through a home-address test can be replaced by a cryptographic + mechanism. This has three advantages. First, cryptography allows + for stronger authentication than address tests. Second, strong + authentication facilitates binding lifetimes longer than the 7- + minute limit that RFC 3775 defines for correspondent registrations. + Third, handoff delays are usually shorter with cryptographic + approaches because the round-trips of the home-address test can be + spared. The disadvantage of pre-configuration is its limited + applicability. + + Two proposals for pre-configuration are currently under discussion + within the IETF. [25] endows mobile nodes with the information they + need to compute home and care-of keygen tokens themselves rather than + having to obtain them through the return-routability procedure. [15] + uses the Internet Key Exchange protocol to establish an IPsec + security association between the peers. + + From a technical standpoint, pre-configuration can only replace a + home-address test. A test of the care-of address is still necessary + to verify the mobile node's presence at that address. The problem is + circumvented in [25] by postulating that the correspondent node has + sufficient trust in the mobile node to believe that the care-of + address is correct. This assumption discourages the use of pre- + configuration in scenarios where such trust is unavailable, however. + For example, a mobile-phone operator may be able to configure + subscribers with secret keys for authorization to a particular + service, but it may not be able to vouch that all subscribers use + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 19] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + + this service in a responsible manner. And even if users are + trustworthy, their mobile nodes may become infected with malware and + start behaving unreliably. + + Another way to avoid care-of-address verification is to rely on + access networks to filter out packets with incorrect IP source + addresses [38][43]. This approach is taken in [15]. The problem + with local filtering is that it can only protect a network from + becoming the source of an attack, not from falling victim to an + attack. The technique is hence potentially unreliable unless + deployed in access networks worldwide (see Section 1.2). + + Care-of-address tests facilitate the use of pre-configuration in + spite of lacking trust relationships or the existence of access + networks without local filtering techniques. For increased + performance, concurrent care-of-address tests can be used in + combination with Credit-Based Authorization or heuristic monitoring. + +3.11. Semi-Permanent Security Associations + + A compromise between the return-routability procedure and pre- + configuration are semi-permanent security associations. A semi- + permanent security association is established between a mobile node + and a correspondent node upon first contact, and it is used to + authenticate the mobile node during subsequent correspondent + registrations. Semi-permanent security associations eliminate the + need for periodic home-address tests and permit correspondent + registrations with lifetimes longer than the 7-minute limit specified + in RFC 3775. + + It is important to verify a mobile node's home address before a + security association is bound to it. An impersonator could otherwise + create a security association for a victim's IP address and then + redirect the victim's traffic at will until the security association + expires. An initial home-address test mitigates this vulnerability + because it requires the attacker to be on the path between the victim + and the victim's peer at least while the security association is + being established. Stronger security can be obtained through + cryptographically generated home addresses (see Section 3.9). + + Semi-permanent security associations alone provide no verification of + care-of addresses and must therefore be supplemented by care-of- + address tests. These may be performed concurrently for reduced + handoff delays. Semi-permanent security associations were first + developed in [8] where they were called "purpose-built keys". + + + + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 20] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + +3.12. Delegation + + Section 1.1 lists numerous problems of PKIs with respect to + authentication of mobile nodes. These problems become more + tractable, however, if correspondent nodes authenticate home agents + rather than mobile nodes, and the home agents vouch for the + authenticity and trustworthiness of the mobile nodes [37]. Such + delegation of responsibilities solves the scalability issue with PKIs + given that home agents can be expected to be much less numerous than + mobile nodes. Certificate revocation becomes less delicate as well + because home agents are commonly administrated by a mobility provider + and should as such be more accountable than mobile nodes. + + Another advantage of delegation is that it avoids public-key + computations at mobile nodes. On the other hand, the processing + overhead at correspondent nodes increases. This may or may not be an + issue depending on resources available at the correspondent node + relative to the services that the correspondent node provides. The + correspondent node may also be mobile itself, in which case + cryptographic operations would be problematic. Furthermore, the + increased overhead implies a higher risk to resource-exhaustion + attacks. + +3.13. Mobile Networks + + Mobile nodes may move as a group and attach to the Internet via a + "mobile router" that stays with the group. This happens, for + example, in trains or aircraft where passengers communicate via a + local wireless network that is globally interconnected through a + satellite link. + + It is straightforward to support such network mobility [41] with a + single home agent and a tunnel between the mobile router and this + home agent. The mobile nodes themselves then do not have to be + mobility-aware. However, Route Optimization for moving networks + [36][26][27][55] is more complicated. One possibility is to have the + mobile router handle Route Optimization on behalf of the mobile + nodes. This requires the mobile router to modify incoming and + outgoing packets such that they can be routed on the direct path + between the end nodes. The mobile router would also have to perform + Mobile IPv6 signaling on behalf of the mobile nodes. Similarly, a + network of correspondent nodes can communicate with mobile nodes, + through a "correspondent router", in a route-optimized way without + providing mobility support themselves. + + + + + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 21] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + +3.14. Location Privacy + + RFC 3775 fails to conceal a mobile node's current position as route- + optimized packets always carry both home and care-of addresses. Both + the correspondent node and a third party can therefore track the + mobile node's whereabouts. A workaround is to fall back to + bidirectional tunneling where location privacy is needed. Packets + carrying the mobile node's care-of address are thus only transferred + between the mobile node and the home agent, where they can be + encrypted through IPsec ESP [42]. But even then should the mobile + node periodically re-establish its IPsec security associations so as + to become untraceable through its SPIs. Early efforts on location + privacy in Route Optimization include [17][13][24][30]. + +4. Discussion + + Common to the proposals discussed in Section 3 is that all of them + affect a trade-off between effectiveness, on one hand, and economical + deployability, administrative overhead, and wide applicability, on + the other. Effectiveness may be equated with low latency, strong + security, reduced signaling, or increased robustness. Economy + implies no, or only moderate requirements in terms of hardware + upgrades and software modifications. Administrative overhead relates + to the amount of manual configuration and intervention that a + technique needs. + + The standard return-routability procedure avoids costly pre- + configuration or new network entities. This minimizes both + deployment investments as well as administrative expenses. Variants + with optimistic behavior and proactive or concurrent IP-address tests + have these advantages as well. CBIDs allow for public-key + authentication without a PKI. They constitute a more secure + alternative to home-address tests and are as such most effective when + combined with concurrent reachability verification. CBID-based + authentication may require nodes to be programmed with a mapping + between human-readable identifiers and the corresponding CBIDs. + Pre-configuration is another approach to avoid home-address tests. + It does without computationally expensive public-key algorithms, but + requires pair-wise credentials and, therefore, administrative + maintenance. Where suitable infrastructure is available, end nodes + may delegate authentication and encryption tasks to trusted network + entities which, in turn, vouch for the end nodes. Delegation could + resurrect the use of certificates for the purpose of mobility + support. But it introduces a dependency on the delegatees, adds the + provisioning costs for new network entities, and is likely to be + limited to communities of authorized nodes. + + + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 22] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + +4.1. Cross-Layer Interactions + + The performance of Route Optimization, as evaluated in this document, + should be put into perspective of handoff-related activities in other + parts of the network stack. These include link-layer attachment + procedures; link-layer security mechanisms such as negotiation, + authentication, and key agreement; as well as IPv6 router discovery, + address configuration, and movement detection. A complete network + attachment in a typical IEEE 802.11 commercial deployment requires + over twenty link- and IP-layer messages. Current protocol stacks + also have a number of limitations in addition to long attachment + delays, such as denial-of-service vulnerabilities, difficulties in + trusting a set of access nodes distributed to physically insecure + locations, or the inability to retrieve sufficient information for + making a handoff decision [2]. + + A number of proposals have been put forth to improve handoff + performance on different parts of the network stack, mostly focusing + on handoff performance. These include link-layer parameter tuning + [49] and network-access authentication [18][2][32], as well as IPv6 + router discovery [11][12], address configuration [23], and movement + detection [19][20]. It is uncertain how far this optimization can be + taken by only looking at the different parts individually. An + integrated approach may eventually become necessary [4][53]. + +4.2. Experimentation and Measurements + + The number and diversity of mobility-related activities within a + typical network stack oftentimes render theoretical analyses + insufficient and call for additional, extensive experimentation or + simulation. The following is a non-exhaustive list of areas where + practical experience is likely to yield valuable insight. + + o Conception of a set of standard scenarios that can be used as a + reference for comparable measurements and experimentation. + Ideally, such standard scenarios ought to be derived from real- + world environments, and they should include all features that + would likely be needed in a commercial deployment. These features + include link-layer access control, for instance. + + o Measurements of the performance impacts that existing enhancement + proposals have on the different parts of the stack. + + o Comparisons of different implementations that are based on the + same specification. For instance, it would be valuable to know + how much implementations differ with regards to the use of + parallelism that RFC 3775 allows in home and correspondent + registrations. + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 23] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + + o Measurements of the impact that network conditions such as packet + loss can have on existing and new optimizations. + + o Statistical data collection on the behavior of mobile nodes in + different networks. Several Route Optimization techniques behave + differently depending on the degree of mobility. + + o Measurements of the performance that Route Optimization schemes + show under different application scenarios, such as the use of + applications with symmetric vs. asymmetric traffic patterns. + +4.3. Future Research + + Future research that goes beyond the techniques discussed in this + document may consider the following items. + + o Local mobility support or local route-repair mechanisms that do + not require expensive configuration. This includes + infrastructure-based Route Optimization like [48]. + + o Care-of-address verification mechanisms that are based on Secure + Neighbor Discovery. + + o The introduction of optimizations developed in the context of + Mobile IPv6 to other mobility protocols, such as the Host Identity + Protocol, the Stream Control Transmission Protocol, the Datagram + Congestion Control Protocol, or link-layer mobility solutions. + + o The extension of the developed mobility techniques to full multi- + addressing, including multi-homing. + + o Further strategies that are based on "asymmetric cost wars" [3], + such as Credit-Based Authorization. + + o Integrated techniques taking into account both link- and IP-layer + mobility tasks. + +5. Security Considerations + + Standard Route Optimization enables mobile nodes to redirect IP + packets at a remote peer from one IP address to another IP address. + This ability introduces new security issues, which are explained and + discussed in depth in [46]. The alternative Route Optimization + techniques described in this document may introduce new security + threats that go beyond those identified in [46]. Where such new + threats exist, they are discussed and analyzed along with the + description of the respective technique in Section 3. + + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 24] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + +6. Conclusions + + Mobile IPv6 Route Optimization reduces packet-propagation latencies + so as to facilitate interactive and real-time applications in mobile + environments. Unfortunately, the end-to-end protocol's high handoff + latencies hinder exactly these applications. A large body of effort + has therefore recently been dedicated to Route Optimization + improvements. Some of the proposed techniques operate on an end-to- + end basis, others require new or extended infrastructure in the + network; some need pre-configuration, others are zero-configurable. + This document has compared and evaluated the different strategies + based on a selected set of enhancement proposals. It stands out that + all proposals make a trade-off between effectiveness, on one hand -- + be it in terms of reduced handoff latency, increased security, or + lower signaling overhead -- and pre-configuration costs or requisite + network upgrades, on the other. An optimization's investment + requirements, in turn, are in relation to its suitability for + widespread deployment. + + However, the real-life performance of end-to-end mobility does not + only depend on enhancements of Route Optimization, but ultimately on + all parts of the protocol stack [2]. Related optimization endeavors + are in fact gaining momentum, and a comprehensive approach towards + Route Optimization must incorporate the most suitable solutions + amongst them [4]. Whichever proposals will eventually reach a + maturity level sufficient for standardization, any effort should be + expended to arrive at that point within the foreseeable future. + Route Optimization requires support from both peers and depends on a + solid basis of installed implementations in correspondent nodes. + This should hence be included in emerging IPv6 stacks early on. + Although IPv6 deployment is yet far away from becoming widespread, + the sooner efficient Route Optimization will be available, the more + likely that it will in the end be ubiquitously supported. + +7. Acknowledgments + + This document was thoroughly reviewed, in alphabetical order, by + Samita Chakrabarti, Francis Dupont, Thierry Ernst, Gerardo Giaretta, + James Kempf, Rajeev Koodli, Gabriel Montenegro, Vidya Narayanan, and + Fan Zhao. The authors wish to thank these folks for their valuable + comments and suggestions. + + + + + + + + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 25] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + +8. References + +8.1. Normative References + + [1] Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support in + IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004. + +8.2. Informative References + + [2] Alimian, A. and B. Aboba, "Analysis of Roaming Techniques", + IEEE Contribution 802.11-04/0377r1, March 2004. + + [3] Arkko, J. and P. Nikander, "Weak Authentication: How to + Authenticate Unknown Principals without Trusted Parties", + Proceedings of Security Protocols Workshop 2002, Cambridge, UK, + April 2002. + + [4] Arkko, J., Eronen, P., Nikander, P., and V. Torvinen, "Secure + and Efficient Network Access", Proceedings of the DIMACS + Workshop on Mobile and Wireless Security, November 2004. + + [5] Arkko, J., Vogt, C., and W. Haddad, "Enhanced Route + Optimization for Mobile IPv6", Work in Progress, August 2006. + + [6] Arkko, J. and C. Vogt, "Credit-Based Authorization for Binding + Lifetime Extension", Work in Progress, May 2004. + + [7] Bahl, P., Adya, A., Padhye, J., and A. Walman, "Reconsidering + Wireless Systems With Multiple Radios", ACM SIGCOMM Computer + Communication Review, ACM Press, Vol. 34, No. 5, October 2004. + + [8] Bradner, S., Mankin, A., and J. Schiller, "A Framework for + Purpose-Built Keys (PBK)", Work in Progress, June 2003. + + [9] Castellucia, C., Montenegro, G., Laganier, J., and C. Neumann, + "Hindering Eavesdropping via IPv6 Opportunistic Encryption", + Proceedings of the European Symposium on Research in Computer + Security, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, + September 2004. + + [10] Chandra, R., Bahl, P., and P. Bahl, "MultiNet: Connecting to + Multiple IEEE 802.11 Networks Using a Single Wireless Card", + Proceedings of the IEEE INFOCOM, Vol. 2, August 2004. + + [11] Daley, G., Pentland, B., and R. Nelson, "Effects of Fast + Routers Advertisement on Mobile IPv6 Handovers", Proceedings of + the IEEE International Symposium on Computers and + Communication, Vol. 1, June 2003. + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 26] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + + [12] Daley, G., Pentland, B., and R. Nelson, "Movement Detection + Optimizations in Mobile IPv6", Proceedings of the IEEE + International Conference on Networks, September 2003. + + [13] Daley, G., "Location Privacy and Mobile IPv6", Work in + Progress, January 2004. + + [14] Dupont, F., "A Note about 3rd Party Bombing in Mobile IPv6", + Work in Progress, July 2006. + + [15] Dupont, F. and J. Combes, "Using IPsec between Mobile and + Correspondent IPv6 Nodes", Work in Progress, August 2004. + + [16] Dupont, F. and J. Combes, "Care-of Address Test for MIPv6 using + a State Cookie", Work in Progress, July 2006. + + [17] Haddad, W., Nordmark, E., Dupont, F., Bagnulo, M., and B. + Patil, "Privacy for Mobile and Multi-homed Nodes: MoMiPriv + Problem Statement", Work in Progress, June 2006. + + [18] "IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Port- + Based Network Access Control", IEEE Standard 802.1X, December + 2004. + + [19] Choi, J. and E. Nordmark, "DNA with Unmodified Routers: Prefix + List Based Approach", Work in Progress, January 2006. + + [20] Narayanan, S., Ed., "Detecting Network Attachment in IPv6 + Networks (DNAv6)", Work in Progress, October 2006. + + [21] Moskowitz, R., Nikander, P., Jokela, Ed., P., and T. Henderson, + "Host Identity Protocol", Work in Progress, June 2006. + + [22] Henderson, T., Ed., "End-Host Mobility and Multihoming with the + Host Identity Protocol", Work in Progress, June 2006. + + [23] Moore, N., "Optimistic Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) for + IPv6", RFC 4429, April 2006. + + [24] Koodli, R., "IP Address Location Privacy and Mobile IPv6: + Problem Statement", Work in Progress, October 2006. + + [25] Perkins, C., "Securing Mobile IPv6 Route Optimization Using a + Static Shared Key", RFC 4449, June 2006. + + [26] Ng, C., Thubert, P., Watari, M., and F. Zhao, "Network Mobility + Route Optimization Problem Statement", Work in Progress, + September 2006. + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 27] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + + [27] Ng, C., Zhao, F., Watari, M., and P. Thubert, "Network Mobility + Route Optimization Solution Space Analysis", Work in Progress, + September 2006. + + [28] Arbaugh, W. and B. Aboba, "Handoff Extension to RADIUS", Work + in Progress, October 2003. + + [29] "Kame-Shisa", Mobile IPv6 for FreeBSD. + + [30] Koodli, R., Devarapalli, V., Flinck, H., and C. Perkins, + "Solutions for IP Address Location Privacy in the Presence of + IP Mobility", Work in Progress, February 2005. + + [31] Nuorvala, V., Petander, H., and A. Tuominen, "Mobile IPv6 for + Linux (MIPL)". + + [32] Mishra, A., Shin, M., Petroni Jr., N., Clancy, C., and W. + Arbaugh, "Proactive Key Distribution Using Neighbor Graphs", + IEEE Wireless Communications, Vol. 11, No. 1, February 2004. + + [33] Montenegro, G. and Claude. Castelluccia, "Crypto-Based + Identifiers (CBIDs): Concepts and Applications", ACM + Transactions on Information and System Security Vol.7, No. 1, + February 2004. + + [34] Nikander, P., "Denial-of-Service, Address Ownership, and Early + Authentication in the IPv6 World", Revised papers from the + International Workshop on Security Protocols, Springer-Verlag, + April 2002. + + [35] O'Shea, G. and M. Roe, "Child-proof Authentication for MIPv6", + ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, April 2001. + + [36] Perera, E., Sivaraman, V., and A. Seneviratne, "Survey on + Network Mobility Support", ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication + Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, ACM Press, April 2004. + + [37] Bao, F., Deng, R., Qiu, Y., and J. Zhou, "Certificate- + basedBinding Update Protocol (CBU)", Work in Progress, March + 2005. + + [38] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering: + Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source + Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000. + + [39] Abley, J., Black, B., and V. Gill, "Goals for IPv6 Site- + Multihoming Architectures", RFC 3582, August 2003. + + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 28] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + + [40] Arkko, J., Devarapalli, V., and F. Dupont, "Using IPsec to + Protect Mobile IPv6 Signaling Between Mobile Nodes and Home + Agents", RFC 3776, June 2004. + + [41] Devarapalli, V., Wakikawa, R., Petrescu, A., and P. Thubert, + "Network Mobility (NEMO) Basic Support Protocol", RFC 3963, + January 2005. + + [42] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 4303, + December 2005. + + [43] Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed + Networks", BCP 84, RFC 3704, March 2004. + + [44] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)", RFC + 3972, March 2005. + + [45] Huston, G., "Architectural Approaches to Multi-homing for + IPv6", RFC 4177, September 2005. + + [46] Nikander, P., Arkko, J., Aura, T., Montenegro, G., and E. + Nordmark, "Mobile IP Version 6 Route Optimization Security + Design Background", RFC 4225, December 2005. + + [47] Roe, M., Aura, T., O'Shea, G., and J. Arkko, "Authentication of + Mobile IPv6 Binding Updates and Acknowledgments", Work in + Progress, February 2002. + + [48] Vadali, R., Li, J., Wu, Y., and G. Cao, "Agent-Based Route + Optimization for Mobile IP", Proceedings of the IEEE Vehicular + Technology Conference, October 2001. + + [49] Velayos, H. and G. Karlsson, "Techniques to Reduce IEEE 802.11b + MAC Layer Handoff Time", Laboratory for Communication Networks, + KTH, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden, TRITA- + IMIT-LCN R 03:02, April 2003. + + [50] Vogt, C., "Credit-Based Authorization for Concurrent IP-Address + Tests", Proceedings of the IST Mobile and Wireless + Communications Summit, June 2005. + + [51] Vogt, C., Bless, R., Doll, M., and T. Kuefner, "Early Binding + Updates for Mobile IPv6", Proceedings of the IEEE Wireless + Communications and Networking Conference, IEEE, Vol. 3, March + 2005. + + + + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 29] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + + [52] Vogt, C. and M. Doll, "Efficient End-to-End Mobility Support in + IPv6", Proceedings of the IEEE Wireless Communications and + Networking Conference, April 2006. + + [53] Vogt, C., "A Comprehensive Delay Analysis for Reactive and + Proactive Handoffs with Mobile IPv6 Route Optimization", + Institute of Telematics, Universitaet Karlsruhe (TH), + Karlsruhe, Germany, TM-2006-1, January 2006. + + [54] Zhao, F., Wu, F., and S. Jung, "Extensions to Return + Routability Test in MIP6", Work in Progress, February 2005. + + [55] Calderon, M., Bernardos, C., Bagnulo, M., Soto, I., and A. de + la Oliva, "Design and Experimental Evaluation of a Route + Optimisation Solution for NEMO", IEEE Journal on Selected Areas + in Communications, Vol. 24, No. 9, September 2006. + +Authors' Addresses + + Christian Vogt + Institute of Telematics + Universitaet Karlsruhe (TH) + P.O. Box 6980 + 76128 Karlsruhe + Germany + + EMail: chvogt@tm.uka.de + + + Jari Arkko + Ericsson Research NomadicLab + FI-02420 Jorvas + Finland + + EMail: jari.arkko@ericsson.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 30] + +RFC 4651 MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements February 2007 + + +Full Copyright Statement + + Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). + + This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions + contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors + retain all their rights. + + This document and the information contained herein are provided on an + "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS + OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND + THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS + OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF + THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED + WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +Intellectual Property + + The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any + Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to + pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in + this document or the extent to which any license under such rights + might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has + made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information + on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be + found in BCP 78 and BCP 79. + + Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any + assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an + attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of + such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this + specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at + http://www.ietf.org/ipr. + + The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any + copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary + rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement + this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at + ietf-ipr@ietf.org. + +Acknowledgement + + Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the + Internet Society. + + + + + + + +Vogt & Arkko Informational [Page 31] + |