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+Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Santesson
+Request for Comments: 6170 3xA Security
+Updates: 3709 R. Housley
+Category: Standards Track Vigil Security
+ISSN: 2070-1721 S. Bajaj
+ Symantec Corp.
+ L. Rosenthol
+ Adobe
+ May 2011
+
+
+ Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- Certificate Image
+
+Abstract
+
+ This document specifies a method to bind a visual representation of a
+ certificate in the form of a certificate image to a public key
+ certificate as defined in RFC 5280, by defining a new "otherLogos"
+ image type according to RFC 3709.
+
+Status of This Memo
+
+ This is an Internet Standards Track document.
+
+ This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
+ (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
+ received public review and has been approved for publication by the
+ Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
+ Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
+
+ Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
+ and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
+ http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6170.
+
+Copyright Notice
+
+ Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
+ document authors. All rights reserved.
+
+ This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
+ Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
+ (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
+ publication of this document. Please review these documents
+ carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
+ to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
+ include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
+ the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
+ described in the Simplified BSD License.
+
+
+
+Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]
+
+RFC 6170 Certificate Image May 2011
+
+
+Table of Contents
+
+ 1. Introduction ....................................................2
+ 1.1. Terminology ................................................3
+ 2. Certificate Image ...............................................3
+ 3. LogotypeImageInfo ...............................................4
+ 4. Embedded Images .................................................5
+ 5. Certificate Image Formats .......................................6
+ 5.1. PDF ........................................................6
+ 5.2. SVG ........................................................6
+ 5.3. PNG ........................................................7
+ 6. Security Considerations .........................................7
+ 7. Acknowledgements ................................................8
+ 8. References ......................................................9
+ 8.1. Normative References .......................................9
+ 8.2. Informative References .....................................9
+ Appendix A. ASN.1 Module .........................................10
+ Appendix B. Example ..............................................11
+
+1. Introduction
+
+ This standard specifies how to bind a certificate image to a
+ certificate (defined in [RFC5280]), providing a visual representation
+ of that certificate using the Logotype extension defined in [RFC3709]
+ and specifying the certificate image as a new "otherLogos" type.
+
+ The purpose of the certificate image is to aid human interpretation
+ of a certificate by providing meaningful visual information to the
+ user interface (UI).
+
+ Typical situations when a human needs to examine the visual
+ representation of a certificate are:
+
+ - A person establishes a secured channel with an authenticated
+ service. The person needs to determine the identity of the
+ service based on the authenticated credentials.
+
+ - A person validates the signature on critical information, such as
+ signed executable code, and needs to determine the identity of the
+ signer based on the signer's certificate.
+
+ - A person is required to select an appropriate certificate to be
+ used when authenticating to a service or Identity Management
+ infrastructure. The person needs to see the available
+ certificates in order to distinguish between them in the selection
+ process.
+
+
+
+
+
+Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 2]
+
+RFC 6170 Certificate Image May 2011
+
+
+ The display of certificate information to humans is challenging due
+ to lack of well-defined semantics for critical identity attributes.
+ Unless the application has out-of-band knowledge about a particular
+ certificate, the application will not know the exact nature of the
+ data stored in common identification attributes such as serialNumber,
+ organizationName, country, etc. Consequently, the application can
+ display the actual data, but faces the problem of labeling that data
+ in the UI and informing the human about the exact nature (semantics)
+ of that data. It is also challenging for the application to
+ determine which identification attributes are important to display
+ and how to organize them in a logical order.
+
+ RFC 3709 [RFC3709] defines a certificate extension for binding images
+ to a certificate, such as a community logo and issuer logo, enhancing
+ the display of certificate information. The syntax is extensible and
+ allows inclusion of new image types using the otherLogos structure.
+ This standard defines how to include a complete certificate image
+ using the extensibility mechanism of RFC 3709.
+
+1.1. Terminology
+
+ The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
+ "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
+ document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
+
+2. Certificate Image
+
+ This section defines the certificate image as a new otherLogos type
+ according to Section 4.1 of [RFC3709].
+
+ The certificate image otherLogos type is identified by the Object
+ Identifier (OID) id-logo-certimage.
+
+ id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
+ { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
+ security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) }
+
+ id-logo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 20 }
+
+ id-logo-certimage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-logo 3 }
+
+ When present, the certificate image MUST be a complete visual
+ representation of the certificate. This means that the display of
+ this certificate image represents all information about the
+ certificate that the issuer subjectively defines as relevant to show
+ to a typical human user within the typical intended use of the
+ certificate, giving adequate information about at least the following
+ three aspects of the certificate:
+
+
+
+Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 3]
+
+RFC 6170 Certificate Image May 2011
+
+
+ - Certificate Context
+
+ - Certificate Issuer
+
+ - Certificate Subject
+
+ Certificate Context information is visual marks and/or textual
+ information that helps the typical user to understand the typical
+ usage and/or purpose of the certificate.
+
+ It is up to the issuer to decide what information -- in the form of
+ text, graphical symbols, and elements -- represents a complete visual
+ representation of the certificate. However, the visual
+ representation of Certificate Subject and Certificate Issuer
+ information from the certificate MUST have the same meaning as the
+ textual representation of that information in the certificate itself.
+
+ Applications providing a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to the
+ certificate user MAY present a certificate image according to this
+ standard in any given application interface, as the only visual
+ representation of a certificate.
+
+3. LogotypeImageInfo
+
+ The optional LogotypeImageInfo structure is defined in [RFC3709] and
+ is included here for convenience:
+
+ LogotypeImageInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ type [0] LogotypeImageType DEFAULT color,
+ fileSize INTEGER, -- In octets
+ xSize INTEGER, -- Horizontal size in pixels
+ ySize INTEGER, -- Vertical size in pixels
+ resolution LogotypeImageResolution OPTIONAL,
+ language [4] IA5String OPTIONAL } -- RFC 3066 Language Tag
+
+ NOTE: The referenced RFC 3066 in the structure above (from RFC 3709)
+ is obsolete and is currently replaced by RFC 5646 [RFC5646].
+ The language tag may carry information about the language used
+ to express any textual elements within the image as well as any
+ audio information associated with the image.
+
+ When the optional LogotypeImageInfo is included with a certificate
+ image, the parameters shall be used with the following semantics and
+ restrictions.
+
+ xSize and ySize represent the recommended display size for the image.
+ When a value of 0 (zero) is present, no recommended display size is
+ specified. When non-zero values are present and these values differ
+
+
+
+Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 4]
+
+RFC 6170 Certificate Image May 2011
+
+
+ from corresponding size values in the referenced image file, then the
+ referenced image SHOULD be scaled to fit within the size parameters
+ of LogotypeImageInfo, while keeping the x and y ratio intact.
+
+ The resolution parameter is redundant for all image formats that are
+ relevant for certificate images and MUST NOT be specified.
+
+4. Embedded Images
+
+ The certificate image otherLogos type defined in this specification
+ and all logotype types defined in RFC 3709 [RFC3709] MAY be stored
+ within the logotype extension using the "data" URL scheme defined in
+ RFC 2397 [RFC2397] if the logotype image is provided through direct
+ addressing, i.e., the image is referenced using the LogotypeDetails
+ structure.
+
+ The syntax of Logotype details defined in RFC 3709 is included here
+ for convenience:
+
+ LogotypeDetails ::= SEQUENCE {
+ mediaType IA5String, -- MIME media type name and optional
+ -- parameters (see Section 5)
+ logotypeHash SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF HashAlgAndValue,
+ logotypeURI SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF IA5String }
+
+ The syntax of the "data" URL scheme defined in RFC 2397 is included
+ here for convenience:
+
+ dataurl := "data:" [ mediatype ] [ ";base64" ] "," data
+ mediatype := [ type "/" subtype ] *( ";" parameter )
+ data := *urlchar
+ parameter := attribute "=" value
+
+ When including the image data in the logotype extension using the
+ "data" URL scheme, the following conventions apply.
+
+ - The value of mediaType in LogotypeDetails MUST be identical to the
+ media type value in the "data" URL.
+
+ - The hash of the image MUST be included in logotypeHash and MUST be
+ calculated over the same data as it would have been, had the image
+ been referenced through a link to an external resource.
+
+ NOTE: As the "data" URL scheme is processed as a data source rather
+ than as a URL, the image data is typically not limited by any
+ URL length limit settings that otherwise apply to URLs in
+ general.
+
+
+
+
+Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 5]
+
+RFC 6170 Certificate Image May 2011
+
+
+ NOTE: Implementations need to be cautious about the size of images
+ included in a certificate in order to ensure that the size of
+ the certificate does not prevent the certificate from being
+ used as intended.
+
+5. Certificate Image Formats
+
+ Implementations of this specification MUST support JPEG and GIF as
+ defined in RFC 3709 [RFC3709]. In addition to these mandatory-to-
+ implement formats, this specification specifies the use of the
+ Portable Document Format (PDF), Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG), and
+ Portable Network Graphics (PNG) as image formats.
+
+5.1. PDF
+
+ A certificate image MAY be provided in the form of a Portable
+ Document Format (PDF) document according to [ISO32000] and following
+ the conventions defined in this section. When a certificate image is
+ formatted as a PDF document, it MUST also be formatted according to
+ the profile PDF/A [ISO19005].
+
+ When including a PDF document as a certificate image, the following
+ MIME media type as specified in [RFC3778] MUST be used as mediaType
+ in LogotypeDetails:
+
+ application/pdf
+
+5.2. SVG
+
+ A certificate image MAY be provided in the form of a Scalable Vector
+ Graphics (SVG) image, which MUST follow the SVG Tiny profile [SVGT]
+ with the following amendments:
+
+ - The SVG image MUST NOT contain any Internationalized Resource
+ Identifier (IRI) references to information stored outside of the
+ SVG image of type B, C, or D, according to Section 14.1.4 of SVG
+ Tiny 1.2 [SVGT].
+
+ - The SVG image MUST NOT contain any 'script' element, according to
+ Section 15.2 of SVG Tiny 1.2 [SVGT].
+
+ - The XML structure in the SVG file MUST use <LF> (linefeed 0x0A) as
+ the end-of-line (EOL) character when calculating a hash over the
+ SVG image.
+
+ The referenced SVG file MAY be provided in GZIP-compressed [RFC1952]
+ form as an SVGZ file. In this case, the extension 'svgz' is used as
+ an alias for 'svg.gz' [RFC1952], i.e., octet streams of type
+
+
+
+Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 6]
+
+RFC 6170 Certificate Image May 2011
+
+
+ image/svg+xml, subsequently compressed with gzip as specified in
+ [SVGR]. The hash over the SVGZ file is calculated over the
+ decompressed SVG content with canonicalized EOL characters (<LF>) as
+ specified above.
+
+ The following MIME media type, defined in Appendix M of [SVGT], MUST
+ be included as mediaType in LogotypeDetails for all SVG and SVGZ
+ images:
+
+ image/svg+xml
+
+ When the SVG image is embedded using the "data" URL scheme as defined
+ in Section 4, SVG image data MUST be provided in SVGZ (GZIP
+ compressed) form (i.e., it MUST NOT be provided in uncompressed SVG
+ form).
+
+ Compliant implementations of this specification SHOULD be able to
+ process SVG images that are formatted according to this section.
+
+5.3. PNG
+
+ If a certificate image is provided as a bitmapped image, the PNG
+ [ISO15948] format SHOULD be used.
+
+ PNG images are identified by the following mediaType in
+ LogotypeDetails:
+
+ image/png
+
+6. Security Considerations
+
+ This document is based on and inherits all security considerations
+ from RFC 3709 [RFC3709]. In particular, RFC 3709 discusses several
+ issues a Certificate Authority (CA) should take into consideration
+ when evaluating a request to issue a certificate with a certificate
+ image.
+
+ Images incorporated according to RFC 3709 provide an additional
+ possibility for a CA with bad intentions or bad security procedures
+ to include false, conflicting, or malicious information to relying
+ parties. Such a CA may, for example:
+
+ - include information in graphical form that is in conflict with
+ information in provided text-based attributes or other name forms,
+ and
+
+ - include malicious data that could exploit known security bugs in
+ common software libraries used to render graphical images.
+
+
+
+Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 7]
+
+RFC 6170 Certificate Image May 2011
+
+
+ This underlines the necessity for CAs to provide reliable services,
+ and the relying party's responsibility and need to carefully select
+ which CAs are trusted to provide public key certificates.
+
+ This also underlines the general necessity for relying parties to use
+ up-to-date software libraries to render or dereference data from
+ external sources (such as certificates), to minimize risks related to
+ processing potentially malicious data before the data has been
+ adequately verified and validated.
+
+ Referenced image files are hashed in order to bind the image to the
+ signature of the certificate. Some image types, such as SVG, allow
+ part of the image to be collected from an external source by
+ incorporating a reference to an external image file. If this feature
+ were used within a certificate image file, the hash of the image file
+ would only cover the URI reference to the external image file, but
+ not the referenced image data. Clients SHOULD verify that SVGT
+ images meet all requirements listed in Section 5.2 and reject images
+ that contain references to external data.
+
+ CAs issuing certificates with embedded certificate images should be
+ cautious when accepting graphics from the certificate requestor for
+ inclusion in the certificate if the hash algorithm used to sign the
+ certificate is vulnerable to collision attacks. In such a case, the
+ accepted image may contain data that could help an attacker to obtain
+ colliding certificates with identical certificate signatures.
+
+ Certificates, and hence their certificate images, are commonly public
+ objects and as such usually will not contain privacy-sensitive
+ information. However, when a certificate image that is referenced
+ from a certificate contains privacy-sensitive information,
+ appropriate security controls should be in place to protect the
+ privacy of that information. Details of such controls are outside
+ the scope of this document.
+
+7. Acknowledgements
+
+ The authors recognize valuable contributions from members of the PKIX
+ working group, the CA Browser Forum, and James Manger, for their
+ review and sample data.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 8]
+
+RFC 6170 Certificate Image May 2011
+
+
+8. References
+
+8.1. Normative References
+
+ [RFC1952] Deutsch, P., "GZIP file format specification version
+ 4.3", RFC 1952, May 1996.
+
+ [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
+ Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
+
+ [RFC2397] Masinter, L., "The "data" URL scheme", RFC 2397, August
+ 1998.
+
+ [RFC3709] Santesson, S., Housley, R., and T. Freeman, "Internet
+ X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Logotypes in X.509
+ Certificates", RFC 3709, February 2004.
+
+ [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
+ Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
+ Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
+ List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
+
+ [RFC5646] Phillips, A., Ed., and M. Davis, Ed., "Tags for
+ Identifying Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, September 2009.
+
+ [ISO15948] ISO/IEC 15948:2004, "Information technology -- Computer
+ graphics and image processing -- Portable Network
+ Graphics (PNG): Functional specification", 2004.
+
+ [ISO19005] ISO 19005-1:2005, "Document management -- Electronic
+ document file format for long-term preservation -- Part
+ 1: Use of PDF 1.4 (PDF/A-1)", 2005.
+
+ [ISO32000] ISO 32000-1:2008, "Document management -- Portable
+ document format -- Part 1: PDF 1.7", April 2008.
+
+ [SVGT] W3C Recommendation, "Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG) Tiny
+ 1.2 Specification", December 2008.
+
+8.2. Informative References
+
+ [RFC3778] Taft, E., Pravetz, J., Zilles, S., and L. Masinter, "The
+ application/pdf Media Type", RFC 3778, May 2004.
+
+ [SVGR] "Media Type Registration for image/svg+xml",
+ http://dev.w3.org/SVG/profiles/1.1F2/master/mimereg.html.
+
+
+
+
+
+Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 9]
+
+RFC 6170 Certificate Image May 2011
+
+
+Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
+
+ CERT-IMAGE-MODULE { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
+ internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
+ id-mod-logotype-certimage(68) }
+
+ DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
+ BEGIN
+
+ EXPORTS ALL; -- export all items from this module
+
+ id-logo-certImage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
+ { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
+ security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-logo(20) 3 }
+
+ END
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 10]
+
+RFC 6170 Certificate Image May 2011
+
+
+Appendix B. Example
+
+ The following example stores an embedded svgz-encoded SVG image using
+ the "data" URL scheme.
+
+ 
+ W2/bOBZ+n19BqBigwdoS7xK9jmeapB0EWHQHzez2WZZoR1tZMiQ5jvvr95CSL7Gl1E
+ m8C9d9iERSPOd85+O5EB3+9jhL0YMuyiTPLh3iYgfpLMrjJJteOv/661M/cFBZhVkc
+ pnmmL50sd34b/TIsH6YoiS+da11UySSJwkqj21k41Q6CDbNyUMSTS+e+quYDz1sul+
+ 6SuXkx9YhSysPUo7QPK/rlKqvCx35Wvmu+a/uGYow9EOigh0Qvr/LHSwcjjDjGiGHQ
+ 914n0/sKlMf4Vwctk7i6X7/sGEYdNA5L/WeRT5IUDKmSbLVWNoo2cqNCh1XyoKN8Ns
+ uz0iqwVW8Qb1fOF0Vqp+PI06me6awqPeISzxn9goYzXYVxWIUWpfWLCMwcGoLpgy83
+ n8wzGkbR4GtefENmMBznC7DEroKpOBpM8mIWVqPEYGtA+BvoMfS2E5uF1Wqu7R6FLv
+ NFEelWReNolpiV3l2VpGntMW9nk6RKdf0+9BrFrMbeVuWhtzbHvMR6UlobPyVpBWjX
+ Bk7six2vH5nCwY6nXCo5xb7YusvFVPqCOGh16fSxSxglmPkScLfvmDDmC4FlDc1wov
+ 8IF2WZhNlVumgEPRliimDD3PhGPyTgUUMC6lKqKAjxaptq1boUJvQFsvi+LOJyxZkP
+ E/vCwHuAmXmoj1AarnRBatzqkbv7cK5Ls2ORfwM/vsOG5lURZqXxOnDXPKZw5t5jVz
+ IhFKO0B6D6hARSXDR6Fzqq7H7mQeJAOQiUSPvFIrUHOfuui3zrFI5dYVeAmpcOcOb9
+ u63vLjae4kYX4yRifYPrTa2SlMigYdO+cEWeGADMLZLH96SH4R9xRYApl6q3Y02f+N
+ zlRAl+cZSKhB6qSIVa80fsqMnWOqZJpmsXwAPoyNaQ95uNIGasKPwhxGzQzOXzMIIz
+ BKabmLIil470zfSjWWn+kvpvLQ9g1l3yRIc8gukz0uysEcakcDfy3KMk+l0SOXlOop
+ ltJL7EPtUlzZfP4tnM70k8xkKCySt92MwfIXPoTe0pnu4dYbp7hJ/kxWySN0ey0o/1
+ qbiCsxDXJMWWo37QekBcAUFPSGkPCnUJF5wwBacDK5cGlEp4BC2lYoJcrNNGVc7DzI
+ qxT4CKsPlrAG8mL8whRejiQe9EmImIAoz3sds9NxP4RZEzugqzb7c3Q89u3WQKY9ae
+ gbsA/AUJB/bJs6pfJt9BHFEuk5DWITzOH5uZSThLUsDjQ5GE6RMsyihMTaQLfA6BIi
+ AQMAhnHHN1sd61WtUhDVJiuhkrdBXd740+hLB9Vm1HjQe4ywLOBLWOMMiyQAXNB8sm
+ 9Gx2qdGgGkMG6wY8aLfqgH4dfnmrVc+pPrE/Z/QnZOs8C1Okb2/ggwLdxlDC1D6DFP
+ ZDD98txv8xQf5TEc7Ax6ZyaDf6BC4SylWKCMqtizp80+UMchATal63qHq0M3ZTs83O
+ b/XO6LYsFzpGVY5+iLxdWvwY+NaKoR/0iJIXL3dBjT2hG+wO+NXm53XStSh1eogfeo
+ jV35BTOaqh/cmPUe2Mdp91pQp2CjWOO2k7OamhjU1HB3DLGm66n6iajz4bqn2oICmN
+ FxDR/x2mC5s+rKhlkUA3Ne3P8lgP0qJfjf9uvu+HWXSfFwNoH4uqGUmTadYMtOc7yj
+ EEd9EUhkwEEOcDSHKQ+yhnSvUYRH8miQo2FK5TCjWZZGWKB8iHPud16wApnCvTOzjI
+ FAj9TQdCxa+ddOTizaa1xJvD0qMrKx+Ydaj6iwJQG0vaSdYWpTv4HwVRAP3Z6ONjOJ
+ unEIeKRVmhujpA2+wPmQR9WFQAFhh9bGQzFEXX+WwOnXq8pV35P2Acdn0pGebcMg7O
+ gQKaEdOKEAkFlk/9HuEKGBVwucc4AjnJ/LBYU09hVwWY1F0HlBUC2lbyIuYF58O8p+
+ adMwUt9YAoX/IwRtAC9NAdBAyGuEB3VR59u8/TGYx9/Xjz8bPB/Z/F9B0SghBK+4xx
+ fiwtr0GXECqedQQ9PRVpEAQ+26MidbGSmPm8RwRzcQsT17EPSmoorH3+av4Jcj78O/
+ vIp/uzMEkHKAE6/F7VHHSj8HddR0Q3ymcGZfRVjwfmOnNn3GuWR+FzhcPmPqiptHca
+ yacT28T8j3Cs0/LQCwo6J2iYxP4R58AsobjFegusoJhuq7VNS2evRPcqASvQki+gbk
+ BYwETNPt/1A2pT6UErR1zMzUITZRvF5Lp5basO1fk2U4aBSjkji8quL3cDyW7TpI3u
+ nxezMcSTNhQJhfpGctKgKN2Amo7/7ShSev4oXicPSYS+6GkCm9a1Qw3VEchCUA+z5H
+ tTcbQhK6F14YFUp+Yn7WgmzwpZCDf5DDiXT9B7U6RdHAHpdb7IqmLVjqZSLnTW61zj
+ Q7/G7D3hm9E846uTDZoNMADmLlm7IG2ieXfUtu1US9TeNGUHibE9Nv//2jRJGZfQmK
+ 3v7ykJJOv1IXjBsDCPpmgWppe6sHxR3KVSQKqp+WIqammuJbtqkxZmMHry4oS/9pLh
+ dCXKq8uR0R+LDEqCKRxqc5VXdvPvIP+ggwR0RkyBfO9iKZvrWGAKVdz31cuocvoO/q
+ emClFMYEFEH7oI+vpkek4s4bCMBqK+5mHQUlDpE/oylpy+2/6pWXK31PEYagP04epV
+ 1cE50UMy6IQZeQM7+Ol74Z+eHfpHNc7OjffQ/HeV0X8BopoDkGEkAAA=
+
+
+
+
+Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 11]
+
+RFC 6170 Certificate Image May 2011
+
+
+Authors' Addresses
+
+ Stefan Santesson
+ 3xA Security (AAA-sec.com)
+ Bjornstorp 744
+ 247 98 Genarp
+ Sweden
+ EMail: sts@aaa-sec.com
+
+
+ Russell Housley
+ Vigil Security, LLC
+ 918 Spring Knoll Drive
+ Herndon, VA 20170
+ USA
+ EMail: housley@vigilsec.com
+
+
+ Siddharth Bajaj
+ Symantec Corp.
+ 350 Ellis Street
+ Mountain View, CA 94043
+ USA
+ EMail: siddharthietf@gmail.com
+
+
+ Leonard Rosenthol
+ 3533 Sunset Way
+ Huntingdon Valley, PA 19006
+ USA
+ EMail: leonardr@adobe.com
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
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+
+
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+
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+
+
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+Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 12]
+