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diff --git a/doc/rfc/rfc6954.txt b/doc/rfc/rfc6954.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4c67575 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/rfc/rfc6954.txt @@ -0,0 +1,619 @@ + + + + + + +Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Merkle +Request for Comments: 6954 secunet Security Networks +Category: Informational M. Lochter +ISSN: 2070-1721 BSI + July 2013 + + + Using the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Curves + for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) + +Abstract + + This document specifies use of the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) + Brainpool elliptic curve groups for key exchange in the Internet Key + Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2). + +Status of This Memo + + This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is + published for informational purposes. + + This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force + (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has + received public review and has been approved for publication by the + Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents + approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet + Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741. + + Information about the current status of this document, any errata, + and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at + http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6954. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the + document authors. All rights reserved. + + This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal + Provisions Relating to IETF Documents + (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of + publication of this document. Please review these documents + carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect + to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must + include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of + the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as + described in the Simplified BSD License. + + + + + +Merkle & Lochter Informational [Page 1] + +RFC 6954 Brainpool Curves for IKEv2 Key Exchange July 2013 + + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction ....................................................2 + 1.1. Requirements Language ......................................2 + 2. IKEv2 Key Exchange Using the ECC Brainpool Curves ...............3 + 2.1. Diffie-Hellman Group Transform IDs .........................3 + 2.2. Using the Twisted Brainpool Curves Internally ..............3 + 2.3. Key Exchange Payload and Shared Secret .....................3 + 3. Security Considerations .........................................4 + 4. IANA Considerations .............................................5 + 5. References ......................................................5 + 5.1. Normative References .......................................5 + 5.2. Informative References .....................................6 + Appendix A. Test Vectors ...........................................8 + A.1. 224-Bit Curve ...............................................8 + A.2. 256-Bit Curve ...............................................9 + A.3. 384-Bit Curve ...............................................9 + A.4. 512-Bit Curve ..............................................10 + +1. Introduction + + [RFC5639] specified a new set of elliptic curve groups over finite + prime fields for use in cryptographic applications. These groups, + denoted as ECC Brainpool curves, were generated in a verifiably + pseudo-random way and comply with the security requirements of + relevant standards from ISO [ISO1] [ISO2], ANSI [ANSI1], NIST [FIPS], + and the Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group [SEC2]. + + While the ASN.1 object identifiers defined in RFC 5639 allow usage of + the ECC Brainpool curves in certificates and certificate revocation + lists, their utilization for key exchange in IKEv2 [RFC5996] requires + the definition and assignment of additional Diffie-Hellman Group + Transform IDs in the respective IANA registry. This document + specifies transform IDs for four curves from RFC 5639, as well as the + encoding of the key exchange payload and derivation of the shared + secret when using one of these curves. + +1.1. Requirements Language + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this + document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. + + + + + + + + + +Merkle & Lochter Informational [Page 2] + +RFC 6954 Brainpool Curves for IKEv2 Key Exchange July 2013 + + +2. IKEv2 Key Exchange Using the ECC Brainpool Curves + +2.1. Diffie-Hellman Group Transform IDs + + In order to use the ECC Brainpool curves for key exchange within + IKEv2, the Diffie-Hellman Group Transform IDs (Transform Type 4) + listed in the following table have been registered with IANA + [IANA-IKE2]. The parameters associated with these curves are defined + in RFC 5639 [RFC5639]. + + +-----------------+--------------+ + | Curve | Transform ID | + +-----------------+--------------+ + | brainpoolP224r1 | 27 | + | brainpoolP256r1 | 28 | + | brainpoolP384r1 | 29 | + | brainpoolP512r1 | 30 | + +-----------------+--------------+ + + Table 1 + + Test vectors for the groups defined by the ECC Brainpool curves are + provided in Appendix A. + +2.2. Using the Twisted Brainpool Curves Internally + + In [RFC5639], for each random curve, a "twisted curve" (defined by a + quadratic twist; see [HMV]) is defined that offers the same level of + security but potentially allows more efficient arithmetic due to the + curve parameter A = -3. The transform IDs listed in Table 1 also + allow using the twisted curve corresponding to the specified random + curve: points (x,y) of any of the listed curves can be efficiently + transformed to the corresponding point (x',y') on the twisted curve + of the same bit length -- and vice versa -- by setting (x',y') = + (x*Z^2, y*Z^3) with the coefficient Z specified for that curve + [RFC5639]. + +2.3. Key Exchange Payload and Shared Secret + + For the encoding of the key exchange payload and the derivation of + the shared secret, the methods specified in [RFC5903] are adopted. + + In an Elliptic Curve Group over GF[P] (ECP) key exchange in IKEv2, + the Diffie-Hellman public value passed in a key establishment (KE) + payload consists of two components, x and y, corresponding to the + coordinates of an elliptic curve point. Each component MUST be + computed from the corresponding coordinate using the FieldElement-to- + OctetString conversion method specified in [SEC1] and MUST have a bit + + + +Merkle & Lochter Informational [Page 3] + +RFC 6954 Brainpool Curves for IKEv2 Key Exchange July 2013 + + + length as indicated in Table 2. This length is enforced by the + FieldElement-to-OctetString conversion method, if necessary, by + prepending the value with zeros. + + Note: The FieldElement-to-OctetString conversion method specified in + [SEC1] is equivalent to applying the conversion between integers and + octet strings (as described in Section 6 of [RFC6090]) after + representing the field element as an integer in the interval + [0, p-1]. + + +---------------------+-----------------------+---------------------+ + | Curves | Bit length of each | Bit length of key | + | | component (x or y) | exchange payload | + +---------------------+-----------------------+---------------------+ + | brainpoolP224r1 | 224 | 448 | + | brainpoolP256r1 | 256 | 512 | + | brainpoolP384r1 | 384 | 768 | + | brainpoolP512r1 | 512 | 1024 | + +---------------------+-----------------------+---------------------+ + + Table 2 + + From these components, the key exchange payload MUST be computed as + the concatenation of the x- and y-coordinates. Hence, the key + exchange payload has the bit length indicated in Table 2. + + The Diffie-Hellman shared secret value consists only of the x value. + In particular, the shared secret value MUST be computed from the + x-coordinate of the Diffie-Hellman common value using the + FieldElement-to-OctetString conversion method specified in [SEC1] and + MUST have bit length as indicated in Table 2. + +3. Security Considerations + + The security considerations of [RFC5996] apply accordingly. + + In order to thwart certain active attacks, the validity of the other + peer's public Diffie-Hellman value (x,y) recovered from the received + key exchange payload needs to be verified. In particular, it MUST be + verified that the x- and y-coordinates of the public value satisfy + the curve equation. For additional information, we refer the reader + to [RFC6989]. + + The confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity of a secure + communication based on IKEv2 are limited by the weakest cryptographic + primitive applied. In order to achieve a maximum security level when + + + + + +Merkle & Lochter Informational [Page 4] + +RFC 6954 Brainpool Curves for IKEv2 Key Exchange July 2013 + + + using one of the elliptic curves from Table 1 for key exchange, the + following should be chosen according to the recommendations of + [NIST800-57] and [RFC5639]: + + o key derivation function + + o algorithms and key lengths of symmetric encryption and message + authentication + + o algorithm, bit length, and hash function used for signature + generation + + Furthermore, the private Diffie-Hellman keys should be selected with + the same bit length as the order of the group generated by the base + point G and with approximately maximum entropy. + + Implementations of elliptic curve cryptography for IKEv2 could be + susceptible to side-channel attacks. Particular care should be taken + for implementations that internally use the corresponding twisted + curve to take advantage of an efficient arithmetic for the special + parameters (A = -3): although the twisted curve itself offers the + same level of security as the corresponding random curve (through + mathematical equivalence), an arithmetic based on small curve + parameters could be harder to protect against side-channel attacks. + General guidance on resistance of elliptic curve cryptography + implementations against side-channel attacks is given in [BSI1] and + [HMV]. + +4. IANA Considerations + + IANA has updated its "Transform Type 4 - Diffie-Hellman Group + Transform IDs" registry in [IANA-IKE2] to include the groups listed + in Table 1. + +5. References + +5.1. Normative References + + [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. + + [RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen, + "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", + RFC 5996, September 2010. + + [RFC5639] Lochter, M. and J. Merkle, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography + (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation", + RFC 5639, March 2010. + + + +Merkle & Lochter Informational [Page 5] + +RFC 6954 Brainpool Curves for IKEv2 Key Exchange July 2013 + + + [RFC6989] Sheffer, Y. and S. Fluhrer, "Additional Diffie-Hellman + Tests for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 + (IKEv2)", RFC 6989, July 2013. + + [IANA-IKE2] Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, "Internet Key + Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) Parameters", + <http://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters>. + + [SEC1] Certicom Research, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography", + Standards for Efficient Cryptography (SEC) 1, + September 2000. + +5.2. Informative References + + [RFC5903] Fu, D. and J. Solinas, "Elliptic Curve Groups modulo a + Prime (ECP Groups) for IKE and IKEv2", RFC 5903, + June 2010. + + [RFC6090] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental + Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090, + February 2011. + + [ANSI1] American National Standards Institute, "Public Key + Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry: The + Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)", + ANSI X9.62, 2005. + + [BSI1] Bundesamt fuer Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, + "Minimum Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel Attack + Resistance of Elliptic Curve Implementations", July + 2011. + + [FIPS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital + Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS PUB 186-2, December + 1998. + + [HMV] Hankerson, D., Menezes, A., and S. Vanstone, "Guide to + Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Springer-Verlag, 2004. + + [ISO1] International Organization for Standardization, + "Information Technology -- Security Techniques -- + Digital Signatures with Appendix - Part 3: Discrete + Logarithm Based Mechanisms", ISO/IEC 14888-3, 2006. + + [ISO2] International Organization for Standardization, + "Information Technology -- Security Techniques -- + Cryptographic Techniques Based on Elliptic Curves - + Part 2: Digital signatures", ISO/IEC 15946-2, 2002. + + + +Merkle & Lochter Informational [Page 6] + +RFC 6954 Brainpool Curves for IKEv2 Key Exchange July 2013 + + + [NIST800-57] National Institute of Standards and Technology, + "Recommendation for Key Management -- Part 1: General + (Revised)", NIST Special Publication 800-57, March 2007. + + [SEC2] Certicom Research, "Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain + Parameters", Standards for Efficient Cryptography (SEC) + 2, September 2000. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Merkle & Lochter Informational [Page 7] + +RFC 6954 Brainpool Curves for IKEv2 Key Exchange July 2013 + + +Appendix A. Test Vectors + + This section provides some test vectors, for example, Diffie-Hellman + key exchanges using each of the curves defined in Section 2. The + following notation is used in the subsequent subsections: + + d_A: the secret key of party A + + x_qA: the x-coordinate of the public key of party A + + y_qA: the y-coordinate of the public key of party A + + d_B: the secret key of party B + + x_qB: the x-coordinate of the public key of party B + + y_qB: the y-coordinate of the public key of party B + + x_Z: the x-coordinate of the shared secret that results from + completion of the Diffie-Hellman computation + + y_Z: the y-coordinate of the shared secret that results from + completion of the Diffie-Hellman computation + + The field elements x_qA, y_qA, x_qB, y_qB, x_Z, and y_Z are + represented as hexadecimal values using the FieldElement-to- + OctetString conversion method specified in [SEC1]. + +A.1. 224-Bit Curve + + Curve brainpoolP224r1 + + dA = 39F155483CEE191FBECFE9C81D8AB1A03CDA6790E7184ACE44BCA161 + + x_qA = A9C21A569759DA95E0387041184261440327AFE33141CA04B82DC92E + + y_qA = 98A0F75FBBF61D8E58AE5511B2BCDBE8E549B31E37069A2825F590C1 + + dB = 6060552303899E2140715816C45B57D9B42204FB6A5BF5BEAC10DB00 + + x_qB = 034A56C550FF88056144E6DD56070F54B0135976B5BF77827313F36B + + y_qB = 75165AD99347DC86CAAB1CBB579E198EAF88DC35F927B358AA683681 + + x_Z = 1A4BFE705445120C8E3E026699054104510D119757B74D5FE2462C66 + + y_Z = BB6802AC01F8B7E91B1A1ACFB9830A95C079CEC48E52805DFD7D2AFE + + + + +Merkle & Lochter Informational [Page 8] + +RFC 6954 Brainpool Curves for IKEv2 Key Exchange July 2013 + + +A.2. 256-Bit Curve + + Curve brainpoolP256r1 + + dA = + 81DB1EE100150FF2EA338D708271BE38300CB54241D79950F77B063039804F1D + + x_qA = + 44106E913F92BC02A1705D9953A8414DB95E1AAA49E81D9E85F929A8E3100BE5 + + y_qA = + 8AB4846F11CACCB73CE49CBDD120F5A900A69FD32C272223F789EF10EB089BDC + + dB = + 55E40BC41E37E3E2AD25C3C6654511FFA8474A91A0032087593852D3E7D76BD3 + + x_qB = + 8D2D688C6CF93E1160AD04CC4429117DC2C41825E1E9FCA0ADDD34E6F1B39F7B + + y_qB = + 990C57520812BE512641E47034832106BC7D3E8DD0E4C7F1136D7006547CEC6A + + x_Z = + 89AFC39D41D3B327814B80940B042590F96556EC91E6AE7939BCE31F3A18BF2B + + y_Z = + 49C27868F4ECA2179BFD7D59B1E3BF34C1DBDE61AE12931648F43E59632504DE + +A.3. 384-Bit Curve + + Curve brainpoolP384r1 + + dA = 1E20F5E048A5886F1F157C74E91BDE2B98C8B52D58E5003D57053FC4B0BD6 + 5D6F15EB5D1EE1610DF870795143627D042 + + x_qA = 68B665DD91C195800650CDD363C625F4E742E8134667B767B1B47679358 + 8F885AB698C852D4A6E77A252D6380FCAF068 + + y_qA = 55BC91A39C9EC01DEE36017B7D673A931236D2F1F5C83942D049E3FA206 + 07493E0D038FF2FD30C2AB67D15C85F7FAA59 + + dB = 032640BC6003C59260F7250C3DB58CE647F98E1260ACCE4ACDA3DD869F74E + 01F8BA5E0324309DB6A9831497ABAC96670 + + x_qB = 4D44326F269A597A5B58BBA565DA5556ED7FD9A8A9EB76C25F46DB69D19 + DC8CE6AD18E404B15738B2086DF37E71D1EB4 + + + + + +Merkle & Lochter Informational [Page 9] + +RFC 6954 Brainpool Curves for IKEv2 Key Exchange July 2013 + + + y_qB = 62D692136DE56CBE93BF5FA3188EF58BC8A3A0EC6C1E151A21038A42E91 + 85329B5B275903D192F8D4E1F32FE9CC78C48 + + x_Z = 0BD9D3A7EA0B3D519D09D8E48D0785FB744A6B355E6304BC51C229FBBCE2 + 39BBADF6403715C35D4FB2A5444F575D4F42 + + y_Z = 0DF213417EBE4D8E40A5F76F66C56470C489A3478D146DECF6DF0D94BAE9 + E598157290F8756066975F1DB34B2324B7BD + +A.4. 512-Bit Curve + + Curve brainpoolP512r1 + + dA = 16302FF0DBBB5A8D733DAB7141C1B45ACBC8715939677F6A56850A38BD87B + D59B09E80279609FF333EB9D4C061231FB26F92EEB04982A5F1D1764CAD5766542 + 2 + + x_qA = 0A420517E406AAC0ACDCE90FCD71487718D3B953EFD7FBEC5F7F27E28C6 + 149999397E91E029E06457DB2D3E640668B392C2A7E737A7F0BF04436D11640FD0 + 9FD + + y_qA = 72E6882E8DB28AAD36237CD25D580DB23783961C8DC52DFA2EC138AD472 + A0FCEF3887CF62B623B2A87DE5C588301EA3E5FC269B373B60724F5E82A6AD147F + DE7 + + dB = 230E18E1BCC88A362FA54E4EA3902009292F7F8033624FD471B5D8ACE49D1 + 2CFABBC19963DAB8E2F1EBA00BFFB29E4D72D13F2224562F405CB80503666B2542 + 9 + + x_qB = 9D45F66DE5D67E2E6DB6E93A59CE0BB48106097FF78A081DE781CDB31FC + E8CCBAAEA8DD4320C4119F1E9CD437A2EAB3731FA9668AB268D871DEDA55A54731 + 99F + + y_qB = 2FDC313095BCDD5FB3A91636F07A959C8E86B5636A1E930E8396049CB48 + 1961D365CC11453A06C719835475B12CB52FC3C383BCE35E27EF194512B7187628 + 5FA + + x_Z = A7927098655F1F9976FA50A9D566865DC530331846381C87256BAF322624 + 4B76D36403C024D7BBF0AA0803EAFF405D3D24F11A9B5C0BEF679FE1454B21C4CD + 1F + + y_Z = 7DB71C3DEF63212841C463E881BDCF055523BD368240E6C3143BD8DEF8B3 + B3223B95E0F53082FF5E412F4222537A43DF1C6D25729DDB51620A832BE6A26680 + A2 + + + + + + + +Merkle & Lochter Informational [Page 10] + +RFC 6954 Brainpool Curves for IKEv2 Key Exchange July 2013 + + +Authors' Addresses + + Johannes Merkle + secunet Security Networks + Mergenthaler Allee 77 + 65760 Eschborn + Germany + + Phone: +49 201 5454 3091 + EMail: johannes.merkle@secunet.com + + + Manfred Lochter + Bundesamt fuer Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) + Postfach 200363 + 53133 Bonn + Germany + + Phone: +49 228 9582 5643 + EMail: manfred.lochter@bsi.bund.de + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Merkle & Lochter Informational [Page 11] + |