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+Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Turner
+Request for Comments: 8295 sn3rd
+Category: Standards Track January 2018
+ISSN: 2070-1721
+
+
+ EST (Enrollment over Secure Transport) Extensions
+
+Abstract
+
+ The EST (Enrollment over Secure Transport) protocol defines the Well-
+ Known URI (Uniform Resource Identifier) -- /.well-known/est -- along
+ with a number of other path components that clients use for PKI
+ (Public Key Infrastructure) services, namely certificate enrollment
+ (e.g., /simpleenroll). This document defines a number of other PKI
+ services as additional path components -- specifically, firmware and
+ trust anchors as well as symmetric, asymmetric, and encrypted keys.
+ This document also specifies the PAL (Package Availability List),
+ which is an XML (Extensible Markup Language) file or JSON (JavaScript
+ Object Notation) object that clients use to retrieve packages
+ available and authorized for them. This document extends the EST
+ server path components to provide these additional services.
+
+Status of This Memo
+
+ This is an Internet Standards Track document.
+
+ This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
+ (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
+ received public review and has been approved for publication by the
+ Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
+ Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
+
+ Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
+ and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
+ https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8295.
+
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+Turner Standards Track [Page 1]
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+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
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+
+Copyright Notice
+
+ Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
+ document authors. All rights reserved.
+
+ This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
+ Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
+ (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
+ publication of this document. Please review these documents
+ carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
+ to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
+ include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
+ the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
+ described in the Simplified BSD License.
+
+Table of Contents
+
+ 1. Introduction ....................................................4
+ 1.1. Definitions ................................................6
+ 1.2. Authentication and Authorization ...........................7
+ 1.3. TLS Cipher Suites ..........................................7
+ 1.4. URI Configuration ..........................................7
+ 1.5. Message Types ..............................................8
+ 1.6. Key Words .................................................10
+ 2. Locate Available Packages ......................................10
+ 2.1. PAL Format ................................................12
+ 2.1.1. PAL Package Types ..................................14
+ 2.1.2. PAL XML Schema .....................................19
+ 2.1.3. PAL JSON Object ....................................23
+ 2.2. Request PAL ...............................................23
+ 2.3. Provide PAL ...............................................24
+ 3. Distribute EE Certificates .....................................25
+ 3.1. EE Certificate Request ....................................25
+ 3.2. EE Certificate Response ...................................26
+ 4. Distribute CRLs and ARLs .......................................26
+ 4.1. CRL Request ...............................................26
+ 4.2. CRL Response ..............................................26
+ 5. Symmetric Keys, Receipts, and Errors ...........................27
+ 5.1. Symmetric Keys ............................................27
+ 5.1.1. Distribute Symmetric Keys ..........................28
+ 5.1.2. Symmetric Key Response .............................28
+ 5.2. Symmetric Key Receipts and Errors .........................29
+ 5.2.1. Provide Symmetric Key Receipt or Error .............30
+ 5.2.2. Symmetric Key Receipt or Error Response ............31
+
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+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
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+ 6. Firmware, Receipts, and Errors .................................31
+ 6.1. Firmware ..................................................31
+ 6.1.1. Distribute Firmware ................................32
+ 6.1.2. Firmware Response ..................................32
+ 6.2. Firmware Receipts and Errors ..............................33
+ 6.2.1. Provide Firmware Receipt or Error ..................33
+ 6.2.2. Firmware Receipt or Error Response .................33
+ 7. Trust Anchor Management Protocol ...............................34
+ 7.1. TAMP Status Query, Trust Anchor Update,
+ Apex Trust Anchor Update, Community Update,
+ and Sequence Number Adjust ................................34
+ 7.1.1. Request TAMP Packages ..............................34
+ 7.1.2. Return TAMP Packages ...............................35
+ 7.2. TAMP Responses, Confirms, and Errors ......................35
+ 7.2.1. Provide TAMP Responses, Confirms, or Errors ........36
+ 7.2.2. TAMP Responses, Confirms, and Error Responses ......36
+ 8. Asymmetric Keys, Receipts, and Errors ..........................36
+ 8.1. Asymmetric Key Encapsulation ..............................37
+ 8.2. Asymmetric Key Package Receipts and Errors ................38
+ 8.3. PKCS #12 ..................................................39
+ 8.3.1. Server-Side Key Generation Request .................39
+ 8.3.2. Server-Side Key Generation Response ................39
+ 9. PAL and Certificate Enrollment .................................40
+ 10. Security Considerations .......................................43
+ 11. IANA Considerations ...........................................44
+ 11.1. PAL Name Space ...........................................44
+ 11.2. PAL XML Schema ...........................................44
+ 11.3. PAL Package Types ........................................44
+ 12. References ....................................................45
+ 12.1. Normative References .....................................45
+ 12.2. Informative References ...................................50
+ Appendix A. Example Use of PAL ....................................51
+ Appendix B. Additional CSR Attributes .............................53
+ Acknowledgements ..................................................54
+ Author's Address ..................................................54
+
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+Turner Standards Track [Page 3]
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+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
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+
+1. Introduction
+
+ The EST (Enrollment over Secure Transport) protocol [RFC7030] defines
+ the Well-Known URI (Uniform Resource Identifier) -- /.well-known/est
+ -- to support selected services related to the PKI (Public Key
+ Infrastructure), with such PCs (path components) as simple enrollment
+ with /simpleenroll, rekey or renew with /simplereenroll, etc. A
+ server that wishes to support additional PKI-related services and
+ other security-related packages could use the same .well-known URI by
+ defining additional PCs. This document defines six such PCs:
+
+ o /pal - The PAL (Package Availability List) provides a list of all
+ known packages available and authorized for a client. By
+ accessing the service provided by this PC first, the client can
+ walk through the PAL and download all the packages necessary to
+ begin operating securely. The PAL essentially points to other
+ PCs, including the PCs defined in this document as well as those
+ defined in [RFC7030] (e.g., /cacerts, /simpleenroll,
+ /simplereenroll, /fullcmc, /serverkeygen, and /csrattrs). The
+ /pal PC is described in Section 2.
+
+ o /eecerts - EE (End-Entity) certificates [RFC5280] are needed by
+ the client when they invoke a security protocol for communicating
+ with a peer (i.e., they become operational and do something
+ meaningful as opposed to just communicating with the
+ infrastructure). If the infrastructure knows the certificate(s)
+ needed by the client, then providing the peer's certificate avoids
+ the client having to discover the peer's certificate. This
+ service is not meant to be a general-purpose repository to which
+ clients query a "repository" and then get a response; this is
+ purely a push mechanism. The /eecerts PC is described in
+ Section 3.
+
+ o /crls - CRLs (Certificate Revocation Lists) and ARLs (Authority
+ Revocation Lists) [RFC5280] are also needed by the client when
+ they validate certificate paths. CRLs (and ARLs) from TAs (Trust
+ Anchors) and intermediate CAs (Certification Authorities) are
+ needed to validate the certificates used to generate the client's
+ certificate or the peer's certificate, which is provided by the
+ /eecerts PC, and providing them saves the client from having to
+ "discover" them and then retrieve them. CRL "discovery" is
+ greatly aided by the inclusion of the CRL Distribution Point
+ certificate extension [RFC5280], but this extension is not always
+ present in certificates and requires another connection to
+ retrieve them. Like the /eecerts PC, this service is not meant to
+ be a general-purpose repository to which clients query a
+ repository and then get a response; this is purely a push
+ mechanism. The /crls PC is described in Section 4.
+
+
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+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
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+
+ o /symmetrickeys - In some cases, clients use symmetric keys
+ [RFC6031] when communicating with their peers. If the client's
+ peers are known by the server a priori, then providing them saves
+ the client or an administrator from later having to find,
+ retrieve, and install them. Like the /eecerts and /crls PCs, this
+ service is not meant to be a general-purpose repository to which
+ clients query a repository and then get a response; this is purely
+ a push mechanism for the keys themselves. However, things do not
+ always go as planned, and clients need to inform the server about
+ any errors. If things did go well, then the client, if requested,
+ needs to provide a receipt [RFC7191]. The /symmetrickeys and
+ /symmetrickeys/return PCs are described in Section 5.
+
+ o /firmware - Some client firmware and software support automatic
+ update mechanisms, and some do not. For those that do not, the
+ /firmware PC provides a mechanism for the infrastructure to inform
+ the client that firmware and software updates [RFC4108] are
+ available. Because updates do not always go as planned and
+ because sometimes the server needs to know whether the firmware
+ was received and processed, this PC also provides a mechanism to
+ return errors and receipts. The /firmware and /firmware/return
+ PCs are defined in Section 6.
+
+ o /tamp - To control the TAs in client TA databases, servers use the
+ /tamp PC to request that clients retrieve TAMP (Trust Anchor
+ Management Protocol) query, update, and adjust packages [RFC5934],
+ and clients use the /tamp/return PC to return TAMP responses,
+ confirms, and errors [RFC5934]. The /tamp and /tamp/return PCs
+ are defined in Section 7.
+
+ This document also extends the /est/serverkeygen PC [RFC7030] to
+ support the following (see Section 8):
+
+ o Returning asymmetric key package receipts and errors [RFC7191].
+
+ o Encapsulating returned asymmetric keys in additional CMS
+ (Cryptographic Message Syntax) content types [RFC7193].
+
+ o Returning server-generated public key pairs encapsulated in
+ PKCS #12 (Public Key Cryptography Standard #12) [RFC7292].
+
+ While the motivation is to provide packages to clients during
+ enrollment so that they can perform securely after enrollment, the
+ services defined in this specification can be used after enrollment.
+
+
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+1.1. Definitions
+
+ Familiarity with the following specifications is assumed:
+
+ o "Using Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) to Protect Firmware
+ Packages" [RFC4108]
+
+ o "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)" [RFC5272]
+
+ o "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Encrypted Key Package Content
+ Type" [RFC6032]
+
+ o "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)" [RFC5652]
+
+ o "Additional New ASN.1 Modules for the Cryptographic Message Syntax
+ (CMS) and the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)"
+ [RFC6268]
+
+ o "Trust Anchor Management Protocol (TAMP)" [RFC5934]
+
+ o "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Content Constraints Extension"
+ [RFC6010]
+
+ o "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Symmetric Key Package Content
+ Type" [RFC6031]
+
+ o "Enrollment over Secure Transport" [RFC7030]
+
+ o "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Key Package Receipt and Error
+ Content Types" [RFC7191]
+
+ Also, familiarity with the CMS protecting content types signed-data
+ and encrypted-data [RFC5652] is assumed. The CMS encrypted key
+ package is defined in [RFC6032].
+
+ In addition to the definitions found in [RFC7030], the following
+ definitions are used in this document:
+
+ Agent: An entity that performs functions on behalf of a client.
+ Agents can service a) one or more clients on the same network as
+ the server, b) clients on non-IP-based networks, or c) clients
+ that have a non-electronic air gap [RFC4949] between themselves
+ and the server. Interactions between the agent and client in the
+ last two cases are beyond the scope of this document. Before an
+ agent can service clients, the agent must have a trust
+ relationship with the server (i.e., be authorized to act on behalf
+ of clients).
+
+
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+ Client: A device that ultimately consumes and uses the packages to
+ enable communications. In other words, the client is the endpoint
+ for the packages, and an agent may have one or more clients. To
+ avoid confusion, this document henceforth uses the term "client"
+ to refer to both agents and clients.
+
+ Package: An object that contains one or more content types. There
+ are numerous types of packages, e.g., packages for asymmetric
+ keys, symmetric keys, encrypted keys, CRLs, firmware, and TAMP.
+ See Section 2.1.1. All of these packages are digitally signed by
+ their creator and encapsulated in a CMS signed-data [RFC5652]
+ [RFC6268] (except the public key certificates and CRLs that are
+ already digitally signed by a CA): firmware receipts and errors;
+ TAMP responses, confirms, and errors; and "key package" receipts
+ and errors that can be optionally signed. Certificates and CRLs
+ are included in a package that uses signed-data, which is often
+ referred to as a "degenerate CMS", or as a "certs-only" [RFC5751]
+ [RFC6268] or "crls-only" message (see Section 4.2), but no
+ signature or content is present -- hence the names "certs-only"
+ and "crls-only".
+
+ Note: As per [RFC7030], the creator may or may not be the EST
+ server or the EST CA.
+
+1.2. Authentication and Authorization
+
+ Client and server authentication as well as client and server
+ authorization are as defined in [RFC7030]. The requirements for each
+ are discussed in the "request" and "response" sections (e.g.,
+ Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of this document) of each of the PCs defined
+ herein.
+
+ The requirements for the TA databases are as specified in [RFC7030]
+ as well.
+
+1.3. TLS Cipher Suites
+
+ TLS (Transport Layer Security) cipher suites and issues associated
+ with them are as defined in [RFC7030].
+
+1.4. URI Configuration
+
+ As specified in Section 3.1 of [RFC7030], the client is configured
+ with sufficient information to form the server URI [RFC3986]. Like
+ EST, this configuration mechanism is beyond the scope of this
+ document.
+
+
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+1.5. Message Types
+
+ This document uses existing media types for the messages as specified
+ by "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Operational Protocols:
+ FTP and HTTP" [RFC2585], "The application/pkcs10 Media Type"
+ [RFC5967], and "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)" [RFC5272].
+
+ For consistency with [RFC5273], each distinct EST message type uses
+ an HTTP Content-Type header with a specific media type.
+
+ The EST messages, their corresponding media types for each operation,
+ and the sections that provide request and response information are as
+ follows:
+
+ +-------------------+---------------------------------+---------------+
+ | Message type | Request media type | Request |
+ | | Response media type(s) | Response |
+ | (per operation) | Source(s) of types | |
+ +===================+=================================+===============+
+ | Locate Available | N/A | Section 2.2 |
+ | Packages | application/xml or | Section 2.3 |
+ | | application/json | |
+ | | [RFC7303] [RFC8259] | |
+ | /pal | | |
+ +===================+=================================+===============+
+ | Distribute EE | N/A | Section 3.1 |
+ | Certificates | application/pkcs7-mime | Section 3.2 |
+ | | [RFC5751] | |
+ | /eecerts | | |
+ +===================+=================================+===============+
+ | Distribute CRLs | N/A | Section 4.1 |
+ | | application/pkcs7-mime | Section 4.2 |
+ | | [RFC5751] | |
+ | /crls | | |
+ +===================+=================================+===============+
+ | Symmetric Key | N/A | Section 5.1.1 |
+ | Distribution | application/cms | Section 5.1.2 |
+ | | [RFC7193] | |
+ | /symmetrickeys | | |
+ +===================+=================================+===============+
+ | Return Symmetric | application/cms | Section 5.2.1 |
+ | Key | N/A | Section 5.2.2 |
+ | Receipts/Errors | [RFC7193] | |
+ | | | |
+ | /symmetrickeys/ | | |
+ | return | | |
+
+
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+ +===================+=================================+===============+
+ | Firmware | N/A | Section 6.1.1 |
+ | Distribution | application/cms | Section 6.1.2 |
+ | | [RFC7193] | |
+ | /firmware | | |
+ +===================+=================================+===============+
+ | Return Firmware | application/cms | Section 6.2.1 |
+ | Receipts/Errors | N/A | Section 6.2.2 |
+ | | [RFC7193] | |
+ | /firmware/return | | |
+ +===================+=================================+===============+
+ | Trust Anchor | N/A | Section 7.1.1 |
+ | Management | application/ | Section 7.1.2 |
+ | | tamp-status-query | |
+ | | tamp-update | |
+ | | tamp-apex-update | |
+ | | tamp-community-update | |
+ | | tamp-sequence-adjust | |
+ | | [RFC5934] | |
+ | /tamp | | |
+ +===================+=================================+===============+
+ | Return TAMP | application/ | Section 7.2.1 |
+ | Responses/ | tamp-status-response | |
+ | Confirms/ | tamp-update-confirm | |
+ | Errors | tamp-apex-update-confirm | |
+ | | tamp-community-update-confirm | |
+ | | tamp-sequence-adjust-confirm | |
+ | | tamp-error | |
+ | | N/A | Section 7.2.2 |
+ | | [RFC5934] | |
+ | /tamp/return | | |
+ +===================+=================================+===============+
+ | Server-Side Key | application/pkcs10 with | Section 8.1 |
+ | Generation | content type attribute | |
+ | | CSR* | |
+ | | application/cms | Section 8.1 |
+ | /serverkeygen | [RFC5967] [RFC7193] [RFC7030] | |
+
+
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+ +===================+=================================+===============+
+ | Return Asymmetric | application/cms | Section 8.2 |
+ | Key | N/A | Section 8.2 |
+ | Receipts/Errors | [RFC7193] | |
+ | | | |
+ | /serverkeygen/ | | |
+ | return | | |
+ +===================+=================================+===============+
+ | Server-Side Key | application/pkcs10 | Section 8.3.1 |
+ | Generation: | application/pkcs12 | Section 8.3.2 |
+ | PKCS #12 | [RFC5967] [RFC7193] [RFC7030] | |
+ | | | |
+ | /serverkeygen | | |
+ +===================+=================================+===============+
+
+ * Certificate Signing Request
+
+1.6. Key Words
+
+ The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
+ "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
+ "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
+ BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
+ capitals, as shown here.
+
+2. Locate Available Packages
+
+ The PAL (Package Availability List) is either an XML (Extensible
+ Markup Language) [XML] or JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) [RFC8259]
+ object available through the /pal PC, which furnishes the following
+ information to clients:
+
+ o Advertisements for available packages that can be retrieved from
+ the server;
+
+ o Notifications to begin public key certificate management or to
+ return package receipts and errors; and
+
+ o Advertisement for another PAL.
+
+ After being configured (see Section 1.4), the client can use this
+ service to retrieve its PAL (see Section 2.1), which, if properly
+ constructed (see Section 2.3), allows the client to determine some or
+ all of the security-related packages needed for bootstrapping. Each
+ PAL entry refers to other PCs (as defined in this document and in
+ [RFC7030]) that clients use to a) retrieve packages that are
+ available to them (e.g., CA certificates, firmware, trust anchors,
+ symmetric keys, and asymmetric keys) or b) receive notifications to
+
+
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+ initiate public key certificate enrollment. PAL entries can also be
+ used to notify clients that they are to return receipts or errors for
+ certain packages (see Section 2.1.1). Placing these entries after
+ entries that clients used to retrieve the packages is the same as
+ requesting receipts in the originally distributed package. Figure 1
+ provides a ladder diagram for the /pal PC protocol flow. Appendix A
+ provides a detailed example.
+
+ | |
+ Client | Establish TLS | Server
+ | Session |
+ |<-------------------->|
+ | |
+ | Request PAL |
+ | (HTTP GET Request) |
+ |--------------------->|
+ |<---------------------|
+ | Deliver PAL |
+ | (HTTP GET Response) |
+ | |
+ | Request package by |
+ | specified URI |
+ | (HTTP GET or POST |
+ | Request) |
+ |--------------------->|
+ |<---------------------|
+ | Deliver requested |
+ | CMS package product |
+ | (HTTP GET or POST |
+ | Response) |
+ | |
+
+ Repeat as necessary.
+
+ Figure 1: /pal Message Sequence
+
+ PALs are designed to support an arbitrary number of entries, but for
+ PALs that need to be divided for any reason, there is a special PAL
+ entry type that constitutes a collection of "PAL package types".
+ Package type 0001 ("Additional PAL value present") refers to another
+ PAL. See Sections 2.1 and 2.1.1. If present, the 0001 package type
+ is always last because other entries after it are ignored. Also, in
+ order to avoid needlessly dereferencing URIs, the 0001 package type
+ cannot be the only PAL entry. In addition to using the PAL during
+ bootstrapping, clients can be configured to periodically poll the
+ server to determine if updated packages are available for them. Note
+ that the mechanism to configure how often clients poll the server is
+ beyond the scope of this document. However, there are some services
+
+
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+ that support indicating when a client should retry its request (e.g.,
+ simple enrollment and re-enroll responses include the Retry-After
+ header [RFC7030]).
+
+ As noted earlier, the PAL supports two variants: XML and JSON.
+ Clients include the HTTP Accept header [RFC7231] when they connect to
+ the server to indicate whether they support XML or JSON.
+
+ The client MUST authenticate the server as specified in [RFC7030],
+ and the client MUST check the server's authorization as specified in
+ [RFC7030].
+
+ The server MUST authenticate the client as specified in [RFC7030],
+ and the server MUST check the client's authorization as specified in
+ [RFC7030].
+
+ PAL support is OPTIONAL. It is shown in figures throughout this
+ document, but clients need not support the PAL to access services
+ offered by the server.
+
+2.1. PAL Format
+
+ Each PAL is composed of zero or more entries. Each entry is composed
+ of four fields -- type, date, size, and info -- whose semantics
+ follow:
+
+ Note: Both XML elements and JSON values are described below. XML
+ elements are enclosed in angle brackets (<>), and JSON values are
+ enclosed in single quotes (''). When described together, they are
+ enclosed in square brackets ([]) separated by a vertical bar (|).
+
+ o [<type> | 'type'] uniquely identifies each package that a client
+ may retrieve from the server with a 4-digit string.
+ [<type> | 'type'] MUST be present. The PAL package types are
+ defined in Section 2.1.1.
+
+ o [<date> | 'date'] indicates one of the following:
+
+ * The date and time that the client last successfully downloaded
+ the identified package from the server. [<date> | 'date'] MUST
+ be represented as Generalized Time with 20 characters:
+ YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ; <date> matches the dateTime production in
+ "canonical representation" [XMLSCHEMA]; 'date' is a string.
+ Implementations SHOULD NOT rely on time resolution finer than
+ seconds and MUST NOT generate time instants that specify
+ leap seconds.
+
+
+
+
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+ * The omission of [<date> | 'date'] indicates the following:
+
+ - There is no indication that the client has successfully
+ downloaded the identified package, or
+
+ - The PAL entry corresponds to a pointer to the next PAL, or
+ the server is requesting a package from the client (e.g.,
+ certification request, receipt, error).
+
+ o [<size> | 'size'] indicates the size in bytes of the package;
+ <size> is a nonNegativeInteger, and 'size' is a number. A package
+ size of zero (i.e., "0" without the quotes) indicates that the
+ client needs to begin a transaction, return an error, or return a
+ receipt. [<size> | 'size'] MUST be present.
+
+ o [<info> | 'info'] provides an SKI (Subject Key Identifier), a DN
+ (Distinguished Name), an Issuer and Serial Number tuple, or a URI,
+ i.e., it is a choice between these four items, all of which are
+ defined in [RFC5280]. When a URI [RFC3986] is included,
+ [<uri> | 'uri'] indicates the location where the identified
+ package can be retrieved. When a DN, an SKI, or an Issuer Name
+ and Serial Number tuple is included, it points to a certificate
+ that is the subject of the notification (i.e., the certificate to
+ be rekeyed or renewed); [<dn> | 'dn'] is encoded as a string with
+ the format defined in [RFC4514]; <ski> is a hexBinary, and 'ski'
+ is a string of hex digits (i.e., 0-9, a-f, and A-F);
+ [<iasn> | 'iasn'] includes both [<issuer> | 'issuer'] and
+ [<serial> | 'serial'] as a complexType in XML and an object in
+ JSON. [<issuer> | 'issuer'] is a DN encoded as a string with the
+ format defined in [RFC4514]; <serial> is a positiveInteger, and
+ 'serial' is a number. [<info> | 'info'] MUST be present, and
+ [<info> | 'info'] MUST include exactly one [<dn> | 'dn'],
+ [<ski> | 'ski'], [<iasn> | 'iasn'], or [<uri> | 'uri'].
+
+ Clients are often limited by the size of objects they can consume;
+ the PAL is not immune to these limitations. As opposed to picking a
+ limit for all clients, a special package type (0001) is defined (see
+ Section 2.1.1) to indicate that another PAL is available. Servers
+ can use this value to limit the size of the PALs provided to clients.
+ The mechanism for servers to know client PAL size limits is beyond
+ the scope of this document; one possible solution is through
+ provisioned information.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 13]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+2.1.1. PAL Package Types
+
+ Table 1 lists the PAL package types that are defined by this
+ document:
+
+ Package Package Description
+ Number
+ -------- ---------------------------------------------------
+ 0000 Reserved
+ 0001 Additional PAL value present
+ 0002 X.509 CA certificate
+ 0003 X.509 EE certificate
+ 0004 X.509 ARL
+ 0005 X.509 CRL
+ 0006 Start DS certificate enrollment with CSR attribute
+ 0007 Start DS certificate enrollment
+ 0008 DS certificate enrollment (success)
+ 0009 DS certificate enrollment (failure)
+ 0010 Start DS certificate re-enrollment
+ 0011 DS certificate re-enrollment (success)
+ 0012 DS certificate re-enrollment (failure)
+ 0013 Start KE certificate enrollment with CSR attribute
+ 0014 Start KE certificate enrollment
+ 0015 KE certificate enrollment (success)
+ 0016 KE certificate enrollment (failure)
+ 0017 Start KE certificate re-enrollment
+ 0018 KE certificate re-enrollment (success)
+ 0019 KE certificate re-enrollment (failure)
+ 0020 Asymmetric Key Package (PKCS #8)
+ 0021 Asymmetric Key Package (CMS)
+ 0022 Asymmetric Key Package (PKCS #12)
+ 0023 Asymmetric Key Package Receipt or Error
+ 0024 Symmetric Key Package
+ 0025 Symmetric Key Package Receipt or Error
+ 0026 Firmware Package
+ 0027 Firmware Package Receipt or Error
+ 0028 TAMP Status Query
+ 0029 TAMP Status Query Response or Error
+ 0030 Trust Anchor Update
+ 0031 Trust Anchor Update Confirm or Error
+ 0032 Apex Trust Anchor Update
+ 0033 Apex Trust Anchor Update Confirm or Error
+ 0034 Community Update
+ 0035 Community Update Confirm or Error
+ 0036 Sequence Number Adjust
+ 0037 Sequence Number Adjust Confirm or Error
+
+ Table 1: PAL Package Types
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 14]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+ Note: "CSR" is Certificate Signing Request, "DS" is Digital
+ Signature, and "KE" is Key Establishment.
+
+ PAL package types are essentially hints about the type of package the
+ client is about to retrieve or is asked to return. Savvy clients can
+ parse the packages to determine what has been provided, but in some
+ instances it is better to know before retrieving the package. The
+ hint provided here does not obviate the need for clients to check the
+ type of package provided before they store it, possibly in specially
+ allocated locations (i.e., some clients might store Root ARLs
+ separately from intermediate CRLs). For packages provided by the
+ client, the server is asking the client to provide an enrollment
+ package, receipt, response, confirm, or error.
+
+ The PAL package types have the following meanings:
+
+ Note: The semantics behind Codes 0002 and 0006-0021 are defined in
+ [RFC7030].
+
+ 0000 Reserved: Reserved for future use.
+
+ 0001 Additional PAL value present: Indicates that this PAL entry
+ refers to another PAL by referring to another /pal URI, which is
+ defined in this section. This PAL package type limits the size
+ of PALs to a more manageable size for clients. If this PAL
+ package type appears, it MUST be the last entry in the PAL.
+
+ Additionally, in order to avoid needlessly dereferencing URIs,
+ this PAL package type MUST NOT be the only entry.
+
+ 0002 X.509 CA certificate: Indicates that one or more CA certificates
+ [RFC5280] are available for the client by pointing to a
+ /cacerts URI, which is defined in [RFC7030].
+
+ 0003 X.509 EE certificate: Indicates that one or more EE certificates
+ [RFC5280] are available for the client by pointing to an
+ /eecerts URI, which is defined in Section 3.
+
+ 0004 X.509 ARL: Indicates that one or more ARLs (Authority Revocation
+ Lists) [RFC5280] are available for the client by pointing to a
+ /crls URI, which is defined in Section 4.
+
+ 0005 X.509 CRL: Indicates that one or more CRLs (Certificate
+ Revocation Lists) [RFC5280] are available for the client by
+ pointing to a /crls URI, which is defined in Section 4.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 15]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+ Note: See Section 9 for additional information about PAL and
+ certificate enrollment interaction. See Appendix B for additional
+ informative information.
+
+ 0006 Start DS certificate enrollment with CSR: Indicates that the
+ client needs to begin enrolling its DS certificate (i.e., any
+ certificate for which the key usage extension will have a
+ digital signature set), using a template provided by the server
+ with a CSR (Certificate Signing Request) attribute (see
+ Appendix B). The PAL entry points to a /csrattrs URI, which is
+ defined in [RFC7030].
+
+ 0007 Start DS certificate enrollment: Indicates that the client needs
+ to begin enrolling its DS certificate. The PAL entry points to
+ a /simpleenroll URI, which is defined in [RFC7030].
+
+ 0008 DS certificate enrollment (success): Indicates that the client
+ needs to retrieve a successful certification response. The PAL
+ entry points to a /simpleenroll or a /fullcmc URI, both of which
+ are defined in [RFC7030].
+
+ 0009 DS certificate enrollment (failure): Indicates that the client
+ needs to retrieve a failed certification response for a DS
+ certificate. This PAL entry points to a /simpleenroll or a
+ /fullcmc URI.
+
+ 0010 Start DS certificate re-enrollment: Indicates that the client
+ needs to rekey or renew a DS certificate. The PAL entry points
+ to a /simplereenroll or a /fullcmc URI.
+
+ 0011 DS certificate re-enrollment (success): See PAL package
+ type 0008.
+
+ 0012 DS certificate re-enrollment (failure): See PAL package
+ type 0009.
+
+ Note: The KE (Key Establishment) responses that follow use the same
+ URIs as DS certificates, except that the certificates' key usage
+ extension is set to only key agreement or key transport.
+
+ 0013 Start KE certificate enrollment with CSR: See PAL package
+ type 0006.
+
+ 0014 Start KE certificate enrollment: See PAL package type 0007.
+
+ 0015 KE certificate enrollment (success): See PAL package type 0008.
+
+ 0016 KE certificate enrollment (failure): See PAL package type 0009.
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 16]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+ 0017 Start KE certificate re-enrollment: See PAL package type 0010.
+
+ 0018 KE certificate re-enrollment (success): See PAL package
+ type 0008.
+
+ 0019 KE certificate re-enrollment (failure): See PAL package
+ type 0009.
+
+ Note: The variations in the asymmetric key packages are due to the
+ number of CMS content types that can be used to protect the
+ asymmetric key; the syntax for the asymmetric key is the same, but
+ additional ASN.1 is needed to include it in a signed-data (i.e., the
+ ASN.1 needs to be a CMS content type and not the private key info
+ type). See Section 8 of this document for additional information.
+
+ 0020 Asymmetric Key Package (PKCS #8): Indicates that an asymmetric
+ key generated by the server is available for the client; the
+ package is an asymmetric key without additional encryption as
+ specified in Section 4.4.2 of [RFC7030]. The PAL entry points
+ to a /serverkeygen or a /fullcmc URI, which are defined in
+ [RFC7030].
+
+ 0021 Asymmetric Key Package (CMS): See PAL package type 0020 (the
+ difference being that the package available is an asymmetric key
+ package [RFC5958] that is signed and encapsulated in a
+ signed-data content type, as specified in Section 4.4.2 of
+ [RFC7030]). Also, see Section 8.1 of this document.
+
+ 0022 Asymmetric Key Package (PKCS #12): See PAL package type 0020
+ (the difference being that the package available is the PKCS #12
+ [RFC7292] content type). See Section 8.3 of this document.
+
+ 0023 Asymmetric Key Package Receipt or Error: Indicates that the
+ server wants the client to return a key package receipt or error
+ [RFC7191] to the /serverkeygen/return URI, which is defined in
+ Section 8.
+
+ 0024 Symmetric Key Package: Indicates that a symmetric key package
+ [RFC6031] is available for the client by pointing to a
+ /symmetrickeys URI, which is defined in Section 5.
+
+ 0025 Symmetric Key Package Receipt or Error: Indicates that the
+ server wants the client to return a key package receipt or error
+ [RFC7191] to the /symmetrickeys/return URI, which is defined in
+ Section 5.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 17]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+ 0026 Firmware Package: Indicates that a firmware package [RFC4108] is
+ available for the client, using the /firmware URI, which is
+ defined in Section 6.
+
+ 0027 Firmware Package Receipt or Error: Indicates that the server
+ wants the client to return a firmware package load receipt or
+ error [RFC4108] to the /firmware/return URI, which is defined in
+ Section 6.
+
+ Note: The /tamp and tamp/return URIs are defined in Section 7.
+
+ 0028 TAMP Status Query: Indicates that a TAMP Status Query package
+ [RFC5934] is available for the client, using the /tamp URI.
+
+ 0029 TAMP Status Query Response or Error: Indicates that the server
+ wants the client to return a TAMP Status Query Response or Error
+ [RFC5934] to the /tamp/return URI.
+
+ 0030 Trust Anchor Update: Indicates that a Trust Anchor Update
+ package [RFC5934] is available for the client, using the /tamp
+ URI.
+
+ 0031 Trust Anchor Update Confirm or Error: Indicates that the server
+ wants the client to return a Trust Anchor Update Confirm or
+ Error [RFC5934] to the /tamp/return URI.
+
+ 0032 Apex Trust Anchor Update: Indicates that an Apex Trust Anchor
+ Update package [RFC5934] is available for the client, using the
+ /tamp URI.
+
+ 0033 Apex Trust Anchor Update Confirm or Error: Indicates that the
+ server wants the client to return an Apex Trust Anchor Update
+ Confirm or Error [RFC5934] to the /tamp/return URI.
+
+ 0034 Community Update: Indicates that a Community Update package
+ [RFC5934] is available for the client, using the /tamp URI.
+
+ 0035 Community Update Confirm or Error: Indicates that the server
+ wants the client to return a Community Update Confirm or Error
+ [RFC5934] to the /tamp/return URI.
+
+ 0036 Sequence Number Adjust: Indicates that a Sequence Number Adjust
+ package [RFC5934] is available for the client, using the /tamp
+ URI.
+
+ 0037 Sequence Number Adjust Confirm or Error: Indicates that the
+ server wants the client to return a Sequence Number Adjust
+ Confirm or Error [RFC5934] to the /tamp/return URI.
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 18]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+2.1.2. PAL XML Schema
+
+ The namespace is specified in Section 11.1. The fields in the schema
+ were discussed earlier, in Sections 2.1 and 2.1.1.
+
+ <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+ <xsd:schema xmlns:xsd="https://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
+ xmlns:pal="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pal"
+ targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pal"
+ elementFormDefault="qualified" attributeFormDefault="unqualified"
+ version="1.0">
+ <xsd:annotation>
+ <xsd:documentation>
+ This schema defines the types and elements needed
+ to retrieve client packages from the server or for the
+ client to post packages to the server.
+ </xsd:documentation>
+ </xsd:annotation>
+
+ <!-- ===== Element Declarations ===== -->
+
+ <xsd:element name="pal" type="pal:PAL" />
+
+ <!-- ===== Complex Data Element Type Definitions ===== -->
+
+ <xsd:complexType name="PAL">
+ <xsd:annotation>
+ <xsd:documentation>
+ This type defines the Package Availability List (PAL).
+ </xsd:documentation>
+ </xsd:annotation>
+ <xsd:sequence>
+ <xsd:element name="message" type="pal:PALEntry"
+ minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded">
+ <xsd:annotation>
+ <xsd:documentation>
+ This item contains information about the package
+ and a link that the client uses to download or post
+ the package.
+ </xsd:documentation>
+ </xsd:annotation>
+ </xsd:element>
+ </xsd:sequence>
+ </xsd:complexType>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 19]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+ <xsd:complexType name="PALEntry">
+ <xsd:annotation>
+ <xsd:documentation>
+ This type defines a product in the PAL.
+ </xsd:documentation>
+ </xsd:annotation>
+ <xsd:sequence>
+ <xsd:element name="type" type="pal:PackageType" />
+ <xsd:element name="date" type="pal:GeneralizedTimeType"
+ minOccurs="0" />
+ <xsd:element name="size" type="xsd:nonNegativeInteger">
+ <xsd:annotation>
+ <xsd:documentation>
+ This item indicates the package's size.
+ </xsd:documentation>
+ </xsd:annotation>
+ </xsd:element>
+ <xsd:element name="info" type="pal:PackageInfoType" />
+ </xsd:sequence>
+ </xsd:complexType>
+
+ <xsd:complexType name="PackageInfoType">
+ <xsd:annotation>
+ <xsd:documentation>
+ This type allows a choice of X.500 Distinguished Name,
+ Subject Key Identifier, Issuer and Serial Number tuple,
+ or URI.
+ </xsd:documentation>
+ </xsd:annotation>
+ <xsd:choice>
+ <xsd:element name="dn" type="pal:DistinguishedName" />
+ <xsd:element name="ski" type="pal:SubjectKeyIdentifier" />
+ <xsd:element name="iasn" type="pal:IssuerAndSerialNumber" />
+ <xsd:element name="uri" type="pal:ThisURI" />
+ </xsd:choice>
+ </xsd:complexType>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 20]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+ <xsd:complexType name="IssuerAndSerialNumber">
+ <xsd:annotation>
+ <xsd:documentation>
+ This type holds the issuer Distinguished Name and
+ serial number of a referenced certificate.
+ </xsd:documentation>
+ </xsd:annotation>
+ <xsd:sequence>
+ <xsd:element name="issuer" type="pal:DistinguishedName" />
+ <xsd:element name="serial" type="xsd:positiveInteger" />
+ </xsd:sequence>
+ </xsd:complexType>
+
+ <!-- ===== Simple Data Element Type Definitions ===== -->
+
+ <xsd:simpleType name="PackageType">
+ <xsd:annotation>
+ <xsd:documentation>
+ This type identifies each package that a client may retrieve
+ from the server with a 4-digit string.
+ </xsd:documentation>
+ </xsd:annotation>
+ <xsd:restriction base="xsd:string">
+ <xsd:pattern value="d{4}" />
+ </xsd:restriction>
+ </xsd:simpleType>
+
+ <xsd:simpleType name="GeneralizedTimeType">
+ <xsd:annotation>
+ <xsd:documentation>
+ This type indicates the date and time (YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ)
+ that the client last acknowledged successful receipt of the
+ package; it is absent if a) there is no indication that the
+ package has been downloaded or b) the PAL entry corresponds
+ to a pointer to the next PAL.
+ </xsd:documentation>
+ </xsd:annotation>
+ <xsd:restriction base="xsd:dateTime">
+ <xsd:pattern value=".*:d{2}Z" />
+ <xsd:minInclusive value="2013-05-23T00:00:00Z" />
+ </xsd:restriction>
+ </xsd:simpleType>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 21]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+ <xsd:simpleType name="DistinguishedName">
+ <xsd:annotation>
+ <xsd:documentation>
+ This type holds an X.500 Distinguished Name.
+ </xsd:documentation>
+ </xsd:annotation>
+ <xsd:restriction base="xsd:string">
+ <xsd:maxLength value="1024" />
+ </xsd:restriction>
+ </xsd:simpleType>
+
+ <xsd:simpleType name="SubjectKeyIdentifier">
+ <xsd:annotation>
+ <xsd:documentation>
+ This type holds a hex string representing the value of a
+ certificate's SubjectKeyIdentifier.
+ </xsd:documentation>
+ </xsd:annotation>
+ <xsd:restriction base="xsd:hexBinary">
+ <xsd:maxLength value="1024" />
+ </xsd:restriction>
+ </xsd:simpleType>
+
+ <xsd:simpleType name="ThisURI">
+ <xsd:annotation>
+ <xsd:documentation>
+ This type holds a URI but is length limited.
+ </xsd:documentation>
+ </xsd:annotation>
+ <xsd:restriction base="xsd:anyURI">
+ <xsd:maxLength value="1024" />
+ </xsd:restriction>
+ </xsd:simpleType>
+
+ </xsd:schema>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 22]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+2.1.3. PAL JSON Object
+
+ The following is an example PAL JSON object. The fields in the
+ object were discussed earlier, in Sections 2.1 and 2.1.1.
+
+ [
+ {
+ "type": "0003",
+ "date": "2016-12-29T09:28:00Z",
+ "size": 1234,
+ "info":
+ {
+ "uri": "https://www.example.com/.well-known/est/eecerts/1234"
+ }
+ },
+
+ {
+ "type": "0006",
+ "date": "2016-12-29T09:28:00Z",
+ "size": 1234,
+ "info":
+ {
+ "iasn":
+ {
+ "issuer": "CN=Sean Turner,O=sn3rd,C=US",
+ "serial": 0
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ ]
+
+2.2. Request PAL
+
+ Clients request their PAL with an HTTP GET [RFC7231], using an
+ operation path of "/pal". Clients indicate whether they would prefer
+ XML or JSON by including the HTTP Accept header [RFC7231] with either
+ "application/xml" or "application/json", respectively.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 23]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+2.3. Provide PAL
+
+ If the server has a PAL for the client, the server response MUST
+ contain an HTTP 200 response code with a Content-Type of
+ "application/xml" [RFC7303] or "application/json" [RFC8259].
+
+ When the server constructs a PAL, an order of precedence for PAL
+ offerings is based on the following rationale:
+
+ o /cacerts and /crls packages are the most important because they
+ support validation decisions on certificates used to sign and
+ encrypt other listed PAL items.
+
+ o /csrattrs are the next in importance, since they provide
+ information that the server would like the client to include in
+ its certificate enrollment request.
+
+ o /simpleenroll, /simplereenroll, and /fullcmc packages are next in
+ importance, since they can impact a certificate used by the client
+ to sign CMS content or a certificate to establish keys for
+ encrypting content exchanged with the client.
+
+ * A client engaged in certificate management SHOULD accept and
+ process CA-provided transactions as soon as possible to avoid
+ undue delays that might lead to protocol failure.
+
+ o /symmetrickeys, /firmware, /tamp, and /eecerts packages containing
+ keys and other types of products are last. Precedence SHOULD be
+ given to packages that the client has not previously downloaded.
+ The items listed in a PAL may not identify all of the packages
+ available for a device. This can be for any of the following
+ reasons:
+
+ * The server may temporarily withhold some outstanding PAL items
+ to simplify client processing.
+
+ * If a CA has more than one certificate ready for the client, the
+ server will provide a notice for one at a time. Pending
+ notices will be serviced in order, according to the date when
+ the certificate will be used (earliest date first).
+
+ When rejecting a request, the server specifies either an HTTP 4xx
+ error or an HTTP 5xx error.
+
+ All other return codes are handled as specified in Section 4.2.3 of
+ [RFC7030] (i.e., 202 handling and all other HTTP response codes).
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 24]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+3. Distribute EE Certificates
+
+ Numerous mechanisms exist for clients to query repositories for
+ certificates. The service provided by the /eecerts PC is different
+ in that it is not a general-purpose query for client certificates;
+ instead, it allows the server to provide peer certificates to a
+ client that the server knows through an out-of-band mechanism that
+ the client will be communicating with. For example, a router being
+ provisioned that connects to two peers can be provisioned with not
+ only its certificate but also with the peers' certificates.
+
+ The server need not authenticate or authorize the client for
+ distributing an EE certificate, because the package contents are
+ already signed by a CA (i.e., the certificate(s) in a certs-only
+ message has already been signed by a CA). The message flow is
+ similar to Figure 1, except that the connection need not be HTTPS:
+
+ | |
+ Client | Establish TLS | Server
+ | Session |
+ |<-------------------->|
+ | |
+ | Request PAL |
+ | (HTTP GET Request) |
+ |--------------------->|
+ |<---------------------|
+ | Deliver PAL |
+ | (HTTP GET Response) |
+ | |
+ | Request EE Cert(s) |
+ | (HTTP GET Request) |
+ |--------------------->|
+ |<---------------------|
+ | Deliver EE Cert(s) |
+ | (HTTP GET Response) |
+ | |
+
+ Figure 2: /eecerts Message Sequence
+
+3.1. EE Certificate Request
+
+ Clients request EE certificates with an HTTP GET [RFC7231], using an
+ operation path of "/eecerts".
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 25]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+3.2. EE Certificate Response
+
+ The response and processing of the returned error codes are identical
+ to what is described in Section 4.1.3 of [RFC7030], except that the
+ certificate provided is not the one issued to the client; instead,
+ one or more client's peer certificates are returned in the certs-only
+ message.
+
+ Clients MUST reject EE certificates that do not validate to an
+ authorized TA.
+
+4. Distribute CRLs and ARLs
+
+ CRLs (and ARLs) are needed in many instances to perform certificate
+ path validation [RFC5280]. They can be obtained from repositories if
+ their location is provided in the certificate. However, the client
+ needs to parse the certificate and perform an additional round trip
+ to retrieve them. Providing CRLs during bootstrapping obviates the
+ need for the client to parse the certificate and aids those clients
+ who might be unable to retrieve the CRL. Clients are free to obtain
+ CRLs on which they rely from sources other than the server (e.g., a
+ local directory). The /crls PC allows servers to distribute CRLs at
+ the same time that clients retrieve their certificate(s) and CA
+ certificate(s) as well as peer certificates.
+
+ The server need not authenticate or authorize the client for
+ distributing a CRL, because the package contents are already signed
+ by a CA (i.e., the CRLs in a crls-only message have already been
+ signed by a CA). The message flow is as depicted in Figure 2 but
+ with "CRL(s)" instead of "EE Cert(s)".
+
+4.1. CRL Request
+
+ Clients request CRLs with an HTTP GET [RFC7231], using an operation
+ path of "/crls".
+
+4.2. CRL Response
+
+ The response, and the processing of that response, are identical to
+ what is described in Section 4.1.3 of [RFC7030], except that instead
+ of providing the issued certificate one of more CRLs are returned in
+ the crls-only message.
+
+ Clients MUST reject CRLs that do not validate to an authorized TA.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 26]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+5. Symmetric Keys, Receipts, and Errors
+
+ In addition to public keys, clients often need one or more symmetric
+ keys to communicate with their peers. The /symmetrickeys PC allows
+ the server to distribute symmetric keys to clients.
+
+ Distribution of keys does not always work as planned, and clients
+ need a way to inform the server that something has gone wrong; they
+ also need a way to inform the server, if asked, that the distribution
+ process has successfully completed. The /symmetrickeys/return PC
+ allows clients to provide errors and receipts.
+
+ Clients MUST authenticate the server, and clients MUST check the
+ server's authorization.
+
+ The server MUST authenticate clients, and the server MUST check the
+ client's authorization.
+
+ HTTP GET [RFC7231] is used when the server provides the key to the
+ client (see Section 5.1), using the /symmetrickeys PC; HTTP POST
+ [RFC7231] is used when the client provides a receipt (see
+ Section 5.2) or an error (see Section 5.2) to the server with the
+ /symmetrickeys/return PC.
+
+5.1. Symmetric Keys
+
+ Servers use /symmetrickeys to provide symmetric keys to clients; the
+ symmetric key package is defined in [RFC6031].
+
+ As with the /serverkeygen PC defined in [RFC7030], the default method
+ for distributing the symmetric key uses the encryption mode of the
+ negotiated TLS cipher suite. Keys are not protected by preferred
+ key-wrapping methods such as AES Key Wrap [RFC3394] or AES Key Wrap
+ with Padding [RFC5649], because encryption of the symmetric key
+ beyond that provided by TLS is OPTIONAL. Therefore, the cipher suite
+ used to return the symmetric key MUST offer cryptographic strength
+ that is commensurate with the symmetric key being delivered to the
+ client. The cipher suite used MUST NOT have the NULL encryption
+ algorithm, as this will disclose the unprotected symmetric key. It
+ is strongly RECOMMENDED that servers always return encrypted
+ symmetric keys.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 27]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+ The following depicts the protocol flow:
+
+ | |
+ Client | Establish TLS | Server
+ | Session |
+ |<--------------------->|
+ | |
+ | Request PAL |
+ | (HTTP GET Request) |
+ |---------------------->|
+ |<----------------------|
+ | Deliver PAL |
+ | (HTTP GET Response) |
+ | |
+ | Req Symmetric Key |
+ | (HTTP GET Request) |
+ |---------------------->|
+ |<----------------------|
+ | Deliver Symmetric Key |
+ | (HTTP GET Response) |
+ | |
+
+ Figure 3: /symmetrickeys Message Sequence
+
+5.1.1. Distribute Symmetric Keys
+
+ Clients request the symmetric key from the server with an HTTP GET
+ [RFC7231], using an operation path of "/symmetrickeys".
+
+5.1.2. Symmetric Key Response
+
+ If the request is successful, the server response MUST have an
+ HTTP 200 response code with a Content-Type of "application/cms"
+ [RFC7193]. The optional application/cms encapsulatingContent and
+ innerContent parameters SHOULD be included with the Content-Type to
+ indicate the protection afforded to the returned symmetric key. The
+ returned content varies:
+
+ o If additional encryption is not being employed, the content
+ associated with application/cms is a DER-encoded [X.690] symmetric
+ key package.
+
+ o If additional encryption is employed, the content associated with
+ application/cms is DER-encoded enveloped-data that encapsulates a
+ signed-data that further encapsulates a symmetric key package.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 28]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+ o If additional encryption and origin authentication are employed,
+ the content associated with application/cms is a DER-encoded
+ signed-data that encapsulates an enveloped-data that encapsulates
+ a signed-data that further encapsulates a symmetric key package.
+
+ o If CCC (CMS Content Constraints) [RFC6010] is supported, the
+ content associated with application/cms is a DER-encoded encrypted
+ key package [RFC6032]. The encrypted key package provides three
+ choices to encapsulate keys: EncryptedData, EnvelopedData, and
+ AuthEnvelopedData. Prior to employing one of these three
+ encryption choices, the key package can be encapsulated in a
+ signed-data.
+
+ How the server knows whether the client supports the encrypted key
+ package is beyond the scope of this document.
+
+ When rejecting a request, the server specifies either an HTTP 4xx
+ error or an HTTP 5xx error.
+
+ If a symmetric key package (which might be signed) or an encrypted
+ key package (which might be signed before and after encryption) is
+ digitally signed, the client MUST reject it if the digital signature
+ does not validate back to an authorized TA.
+
+ Note: Absent a policy on the client side requiring a signature, a
+ malicious EST server can simply strip the signature, thus bypassing
+ that check. In that case, this requirement is merely a sanity check,
+ serving to detect mis-signed packages or misconfigured clients.
+
+ [RFC3370], [RFC5753], [RFC5754], [RFC6033], [RFC6160], and [RFC6161]
+ provide algorithm details for use when protecting the symmetric key
+ package and encrypted key package.
+
+5.2. Symmetric Key Receipts and Errors
+
+ Clients use /symmetrickeys/return to provide symmetric key package
+ receipts; the key package receipt content type is defined in
+ [RFC7191]. Clients can be configured to automatically return
+ receipts after processing a symmetric key package, return receipts
+ based on processing of the key-package-identifier-and-receipt-request
+ attribute [RFC7191], or return receipts when prompted by a PAL entry.
+
+ Servers can indicate that clients return a receipt by including the
+ key-package-identifier-and-receipt-request attribute in a signed-data
+ as a signed attribute. However, this attribute only appears when
+ additional encryption is employed (see Section 5.1.2).
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 29]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+ Clients also use /symmetrickeys/return to return symmetric key
+ package errors; the key package error content type is defined in
+ [RFC7191]. Clients can be configured to automatically return errors
+ after processing a symmetric key package or based on a PAL entry.
+
+ The following depicts the protocol flow:
+
+ | |
+ Client | Establish TLS | Server
+ | Session |
+ |<-------------------->|
+ | |
+ | Request PAL |
+ | (HTTP GET Request) |
+ |--------------------->|
+ |<---------------------|
+ | Deliver PAL |
+ | (HTTP GET Response) |
+ | |
+ | Return Receipt/Error |
+ | (HTTP POST Request) |
+ |--------------------->|
+ |<---------------------|
+ | (HTTP POST Response) |
+ | status code only |
+ | no content |
+ | |
+
+ Figure 4: /symmetrickeys/return Message Sequence
+
+5.2.1. Provide Symmetric Key Receipt or Error
+
+ Clients return symmetric key receipts and errors to the server with
+ an HTTP POST [RFC7231], using an operation path of
+ "/symmetrickeys/return". The returned content varies:
+
+ o The key package receipt is digitally signed [RFC7191]; the
+ Content-Type is "application/cms" [RFC7193]; and the associated
+ content is signed-data, which encapsulates a key package receipt.
+
+ o If the key package error is not digitally signed, the Content-Type
+ is "application/cms" and the associated content is a key package
+ error. If the key package error is digitally signed, the
+ Content-Type is "application/cms" and the associated content is
+ signed-data, which encapsulates a key package error.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 30]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+ The optional application/cms encapsulatingContent and innerContent
+ parameters SHOULD be included with the Content-Type to indicate the
+ protection afforded to the receipt or error.
+
+ [RFC3370], [RFC5753], [RFC5754], and [RFC7192] provide algorithm
+ details for use when protecting the key package receipt or key
+ package error.
+
+5.2.2. Symmetric Key Receipt or Error Response
+
+ If the client successfully provides a receipt or error, the server
+ response has an HTTP 204 response code (i.e., no content is
+ returned).
+
+ When rejecting a request, the server specifies either an HTTP 4xx
+ error or an HTTP 5xx error.
+
+ If a key package receipt or key package error is digitally signed,
+ the server MUST reject it if the digital signature does not validate
+ back to an authorized TA.
+
+6. Firmware, Receipts, and Errors
+
+ Servers can distribute object code for cryptographic algorithms and
+ software with the firmware package [RFC4108].
+
+ Clients MUST authenticate the server, and clients MUST check the
+ server's authorization.
+
+ The server MUST authenticate the client, and the server MUST check
+ the client's authorization.
+
+ The /firmware PC uses an HTTP GET [RFC7231], and the /firmware/return
+ PC uses an HTTP POST [RFC7231]. GET is used when the client
+ retrieves firmware from the server (see Section 6.1); POST is used
+ when the client provides a receipt (see Section 6.2) or an error (see
+ Section 6.2).
+
+6.1. Firmware
+
+ The /firmware URI is used by servers to provide firmware packages to
+ clients.
+
+ The message flow is as depicted in Figure 3 modulo replacing
+ "Symmetric Key" with "Firmware Package".
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 31]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+6.1.1. Distribute Firmware
+
+ Clients request firmware from the server with an HTTP GET [RFC7231],
+ using an operation path of "/firmware".
+
+6.1.2. Firmware Response
+
+ If the request is successful, the server response MUST have an
+ HTTP 200 response code with a Content-Type of "application/cms"
+ [RFC7193]. The optional encapsulatingContent and innerContent
+ parameters SHOULD be included with the Content-Type to indicate the
+ protection afforded to the returned firmware. The returned content
+ varies:
+
+ o If the firmware is unprotected, then the Content-Type is
+ "application/cms" and the content is the DER-encoded [X.690]
+ firmware package.
+
+ o If the firmware is compressed, then the Content-Type is
+ "application/cms" and the content is the DER-encoded [X.690]
+ compressed data that encapsulates the firmware package.
+
+ o If the firmware is encrypted, then the Content-Type is
+ "application/cms" and the content is the DER-encoded [X.690]
+ encrypted-data that encapsulates the firmware package (which might
+ be compressed prior to encryption).
+
+ o If the firmware is signed, then the Content-Type is
+ "application/cms" and the content is the DER-encoded [X.690]
+ signed-data that encapsulates the firmware package (which might be
+ compressed, encrypted, or compressed and then encrypted prior to
+ signature).
+
+ How the server knows whether the client supports the unprotected,
+ signed, compressed, and/or encrypted firmware package is beyond the
+ scope of this document.
+
+ When rejecting a request, the server specifies either an HTTP 4xx
+ error or an HTTP 5xx error.
+
+ If a firmware package is digitally signed, the client MUST reject it
+ if the digital signature does not validate back to an authorized TA.
+
+ [RFC3370], [RFC5753], and [RFC5754] provide algorithm details for use
+ when protecting the firmware package.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 32]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+6.2. Firmware Receipts and Errors
+
+ Clients use the /firmware/return PC to provide firmware package load
+ receipts and errors [RFC4108]. Clients can be configured to
+ automatically return receipts and errors after processing a firmware
+ package or based on a PAL entry.
+
+ The message flow is as depicted in Figure 4 modulo the receipt or
+ error is for a firmware package.
+
+6.2.1. Provide Firmware Receipt or Error
+
+ Clients return firmware receipts and errors to the server with an
+ HTTP POST [RFC7231], using an operation path of "/firmware/return".
+ The optional encapsulatingContent and innerContent parameters SHOULD
+ be included with the Content-Type to indicate the protection afforded
+ to the returned firmware receipt or error. The returned content
+ varies:
+
+ o If the firmware receipt is not digitally signed, the Content-Type
+ is "application/cms" [RFC7193] and the content is the DER-encoded
+ firmware receipt.
+
+ o If the firmware receipt is digitally signed, the Content-Type is
+ "application/cms" and the content is the DER-encoded signed-data
+ encapsulating the firmware receipt.
+
+ o If the firmware error is not digitally signed, the Content-Type is
+ "application/cms" and the content is the DER-encoded firmware
+ error.
+
+ o If the firmware error is digitally signed, the Content-Type is
+ "application/cms" and the content is the DER-encoded signed-data
+ encapsulating the firmware error.
+
+ [RFC3370], [RFC5753], and [RFC5754] provide algorithm details for use
+ when protecting the firmware receipt or firmware error.
+
+6.2.2. Firmware Receipt or Error Response
+
+ If the request is successful, the server response MUST have an
+ HTTP 204 response code (i.e., no content is returned).
+
+ When rejecting a request, the server MUST specify either an HTTP 4xx
+ error or an HTTP 5xx error.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 33]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+ If a firmware receipt or firmware error is digitally signed, the
+ server MUST reject it if the digital signature does not validate back
+ to an authorized TA.
+
+7. Trust Anchor Management Protocol
+
+ Servers distribute TAMP packages to manage TAs in a client's trust
+ anchor databases; TAMP packages are defined in [RFC5934]. TAMP will
+ allow the flexibility for a device to load TAs while maintaining an
+ operational state. Unlike other systems that require new software
+ loads when new PKI Roots are authorized for use, TAMP allows for
+ automated management of roots for provisioning or replacement
+ as needed.
+
+ Clients MUST authenticate the server, and clients MUST check the
+ server's authorization.
+
+ The server MUST authenticate the client, and the server MUST check
+ the client's authorization.
+
+ The /tamp PC uses an HTTP GET [RFC7231], and the tamp/return PC uses
+ an HTTP POST [RFC7231]. GET is used when the server requests that
+ the client retrieve a TAMP package (see Section 7.1); POST is used
+ when the client provides a confirm (see Section 7.2), provides a
+ response (see Section 7.2), or provides an error (see Section 7.2)
+ for the TAMP package.
+
+7.1. TAMP Status Query, Trust Anchor Update, Apex Trust Anchor Update,
+ Community Update, and Sequence Number Adjust
+
+ Clients use the /tamp PC to retrieve the TAMP packages: TAMP Status
+ Query, Trust Anchor Update, Apex Trust Anchor Update, Community
+ Update, and Sequence Number Adjust. Clients can be configured to
+ periodically poll the server for these packages or contact the server
+ based on a PAL entry.
+
+ The message flow is as depicted in Figure 3 modulo replacing
+ "Symmetric Key" with the appropriate TAMP message.
+
+7.1.1. Request TAMP Packages
+
+ Clients request the TAMP packages from the server with an HTTP GET
+ [RFC7231], using an operation path of "/tamp".
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 34]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+7.1.2. Return TAMP Packages
+
+ If the request is successful, the server response MUST have an
+ HTTP 200 response code and a Content-Type of:
+
+ o application/tamp-status-query for TAMP Status Query
+
+ o application/tamp-update for Trust Anchor Update
+
+ o application/tamp-apex-update for Apex Trust Anchor Update
+
+ o application/tamp-community-update for Community Update
+
+ o application/tamp-sequence-adjust for Sequence Number Adjust
+
+ As specified in [RFC5934], these content types are digitally signed
+ and clients must support validating the packages directly signed by
+ TAs. For this specification, clients MUST support validation with a
+ certificate and clients MUST reject it if the digital signature does
+ not validate back to an authorized TA.
+
+ [RFC3370], [RFC5753], and [RFC5754] provide algorithm details for use
+ when protecting the TAMP packages.
+
+7.2. TAMP Responses, Confirms, and Errors
+
+ Clients return the TAMP Status Query Response, Trust Anchor Update
+ Confirm, Apex Trust Anchor Update Confirm, Community Update Confirm,
+ Sequence Number Adjust Confirm, and TAMP Error to servers, using the
+ /tamp/return PC. Clients can be configured to automatically return
+ responses, confirms, and errors after processing a TAMP package or
+ based on a PAL entry.
+
+ The message flow is as depicted in Figure 4 modulo replacing
+ "Receipt/Error" with the appropriate TAMP response, confirm, or
+ error.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 35]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+7.2.1. Provide TAMP Responses, Confirms, or Errors
+
+ Clients provide the TAMP responses, confirms, and errors to the
+ server with an HTTP POST, using an operation path of "/tamp/return".
+ The Content-Type is:
+
+ o application/tamp-status-response for TAMP Status Query Response
+
+ o application/tamp-update-confirm for Trust Anchor Update Confirm
+
+ o application/tamp-apex-update-confirm for Apex Trust Anchor Update
+ Confirm
+
+ o application/tamp-community-update-confirm for Community Update
+ Confirm
+
+ o application/tamp-sequence-adjust-confirm for Sequence Number
+ Adjust Confirm
+
+ o application/tamp-error for TAMP Error
+
+ As specified in [RFC5934], these content types should be signed. If
+ signed, a signed-data encapsulates the TAMP content.
+
+ [RFC3370], [RFC5753], and [RFC5754] provide algorithm details for use
+ when protecting the TAMP packages.
+
+7.2.2. TAMP Responses, Confirms, and Error Responses
+
+ If the request is successful, the server response MUST have an
+ HTTP 204 response code (i.e., no content is returned).
+
+ When rejecting a request, the server MUST specify either an HTTP 4xx
+ error or an HTTP 5xx error.
+
+ If the package is digitally signed, the server MUST reject it if the
+ digital signature does not validate back to an authorized TA.
+
+8. Asymmetric Keys, Receipts, and Errors
+
+ [RFC7030] defines the /serverkeygen PC to support server-side
+ generation of asymmetric keys. Keys are returned as either a) an
+ unprotected PKCS #8 when additional security beyond TLS is not
+ employed or b) a CMS asymmetric key package content type that is
+ encapsulated in a signed-data content type that is further
+ encapsulated in an enveloped-data content type when additional
+ security beyond TLS is requested.
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 36]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+ Some implementations prefer the use of other CMS content types to
+ encapsulate the asymmetric key package. This document extends the
+ content types that can be returned; see Section 8.1.
+
+ [RFC7191] defines content types for key package receipts and errors.
+ This document defines the /serverkeygen/return PC to add support for
+ returning receipts and errors for asymmetric key packages; see
+ Section 8.2.
+
+ PKCS #12 [RFC7292] (sometimes referred to as "PFX" (Personal
+ Information Exchange) or "P12") is often used to distribute
+ asymmetric private keys and associated certificates. This document
+ extends the /serverkeygen PC to allow servers to distribute
+ server-generated asymmetric private keys and the associated
+ certificate to clients using PKCS #12; see Section 8.3.
+
+8.1. Asymmetric Key Encapsulation
+
+ CMS supports a number of content types to encapsulate other CMS
+ content types; [RFC7030] includes one such possibility. Note that
+ when only relying on TLS the returned key is not a CMS content type.
+ This document extends the CMS content types that can be returned.
+
+ If the client supports CCC [RFC6010], then the client can indicate
+ that it supports encapsulated asymmetric keys in the encrypted key
+ package [RFC5958] by including the encrypted key package's OID in a
+ content type attribute [RFC2985] in the CSR (Certificate Signing
+ Request) -- aka the certification request -- that it provides to the
+ server. If the client knows a priori that the server supports the
+ encrypted key package content type, then the client need not include
+ the content type attribute in the CSR.
+
+ In all instances defined herein, the Content-Type is
+ "application/cms" [RFC7193]. The optional encapsulatingContent and
+ innerContent parameters SHOULD be included with the Content-Type to
+ indicate the protection afforded to the returned asymmetric key
+ package.
+
+ If additional encryption and origin authentication are employed, the
+ content associated with application/cms is a DER-encoded signed-data
+ that encapsulates an enveloped-data that encapsulates a signed-data
+ that further encapsulates an asymmetric key package.
+
+ If CCC is supported and additional encryption is employed, the
+ content associated with application/cms is a DER-encoded encrypted
+ key package [RFC6032] content type that encapsulates a signed-data
+ that further encapsulates an asymmetric key package.
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 37]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+ If CCC is supported and if additional encryption and additional
+ origin authentication are employed, the content associated with
+ application/cms is a DER-encoded signed-data that encapsulates an
+ encrypted key package content type that encapsulates a signed-data
+ that further encapsulates an asymmetric key package.
+
+ The encrypted key package [RFC6032] provides three choices to
+ encapsulate keys: EncryptedData, EnvelopedData, and
+ AuthEnvelopedData, with EnvelopedData being the
+ mandatory-to-implement choice.
+
+ When rejecting a request, the server specifies either an HTTP 4xx
+ error or an HTTP 5xx error.
+
+ If an asymmetric key package or an encrypted key package is digitally
+ signed, the client MUST reject it if the digital signature does not
+ validate back to an authorized TA.
+
+ Note: Absent a policy on the client side requiring a signature, a
+ malicious EST server can simply strip the signature, thus bypassing
+ that check. In that case, this requirement is merely a sanity check,
+ serving to detect mis-signed packages or misconfigured clients.
+
+ [RFC3370], [RFC5753], [RFC5754], [RFC6033], [RFC6161], and [RFC6162]
+ provide algorithm details for use when protecting the asymmetric key
+ package and encrypted key package.
+
+8.2. Asymmetric Key Package Receipts and Errors
+
+ Clients can be configured to automatically return receipts after
+ processing an asymmetric key package, return receipts based on
+ processing of the key-package-identifier-and-receipt-request
+ attribute [RFC7191], or return receipts when prompted by a PAL entry.
+ Servers can indicate that clients return a receipt by including the
+ key-package-identifier-and-receipt-request attribute [RFC7191] in a
+ signed-data as a signed attribute.
+
+ The protocol flow is identical to that depicted in Figure 4 modulo
+ the receipt or error is for asymmetric keys.
+
+ The server and client processing is as described in Sections 5.2.1
+ and 5.2.2 modulo the PC, which, for Asymmetric Key Packages, is
+ "/serverkeygen/return".
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 38]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+8.3. PKCS #12
+
+ PFX is widely deployed and supports protecting keys in the same
+ fashion as CMS, but it does so differently.
+
+8.3.1. Server-Side Key Generation Request
+
+ Similar to the other server-generated asymmetric keys provided
+ through the /serverkeygen PC:
+
+ o The certificate request is HTTPS POSTed and is the same format as
+ for the "/simpleenroll" and "/simplereenroll" path extensions with
+ the same content type.
+
+ o In all respects, the server SHOULD treat the CSR as it would any
+ enroll or re-enroll CSR; the only distinction here is that the
+ server MUST ignore the public key values and signature in the CSR.
+ These are included in the request only to allow the reuse of
+ existing codebases for generating and parsing such requests.
+
+ PBE (password-based encryption) shrouding of PKCS #12 is supported,
+ and this specification makes no attempt to alter this de facto
+ standard. As such, there is no support of the DecryptKeyIdentifier
+ specified in [RFC7030] for use with PKCS #12 (i.e., "enveloping"
+ is not supported). Note: The use of PBE requires that the password
+ be distributed to the client; methods to distribute this password are
+ beyond the scope of this document.
+
+8.3.2. Server-Side Key Generation Response
+
+ If the request is successful, the server response MUST have an
+ HTTP 200 response code with a Content-Type of "application/pkcs12"
+ [PKCS12] that consists of a base64-encoded DER-encoded [X.690]
+ PFX [RFC7292].
+
+ Note that this response is different than the response returned as
+ described in Section 4.4.2 of [RFC7030], because here the private key
+ and the certificate are included in the same PFX.
+
+ When rejecting a request, the server MUST specify either an HTTP 4xx
+ error or an HTTP 5xx error. The response data's Content-Type MAY be
+ "text/plain" [RFC2046] to convey human-readable error messages.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 39]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+9. PAL and Certificate Enrollment
+
+ The /fullcmc PC is defined in [RFC7030]; the CMC (Certificate
+ Management over Cryptographic Message Syntax) requirements and
+ packages are defined in [RFC5272], [RFC5273], [RFC5274], and
+ [RFC6402]. This section describes PAL interactions.
+
+ Under normal circumstances, the client-server interactions for PKI
+ enrollment are as follows:
+
+ Client Server
+ --------------------->
+ POST req: PKIRequest
+ Content-Type: application/pkcs10
+ or
+ POST req: PKIRequest
+ Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime
+ smime-type=CMC-request
+
+ <--------------------
+ POST res: PKIResponse
+ Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime
+ smime-type=certs-only
+ or
+ POST res: PKIResponse
+ Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime
+ smime-type=CMC-response
+
+ If the response is rejected during the same session:
+
+ Client Server
+ --------------------->
+ POST req: PKIRequest
+ Content-Type: application/pkcs10
+ or
+ POST req: PKIRequest
+ Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime
+ smime-type=CMC-request
+
+ <--------------------
+ POST res: empty
+ HTTPS Status Code
+ or
+ POST res: PKIResponse
+ Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime
+ smime-type=CMC-response
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 40]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+ If the request is to be filled later:
+
+ Client Server
+ --------------------->
+ POST req: PKIRequest
+ Content-Type: application/pkcs10
+ or
+ POST req: PKIRequest
+ Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime
+ smime-type=CMC-request
+
+ <--------------------
+ POST res: empty
+ HTTPS Status Code
+ + Retry-After
+ or
+ POST res: PKIResponse (pending)
+ Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime
+ smime-type=CMC-response
+
+ --------------------->
+ POST req: PKIRequest (same request)
+ Content-Type: application/pkcs10
+ or
+ POST req: PKIRequest (CMC Status Info only)
+ Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime
+ smime-type=CMC-request
+
+ <--------------------
+ POST res: PKIResponse
+ Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime
+ smime-type=certs-only
+ or
+ POST res: PKIResponse
+ Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime
+ smime-type=CMC-response
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 41]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+ With the PAL, the client begins after pulling the PAL and a Start
+ Issuance PAL package type, essentially adding the following before
+ the request:
+
+ Client Server
+ --------------------->
+ GET req: PAL
+ <--------------------
+ GET res: PAL
+ Content-Type: application/xml
+
+ The client then proceeds as above with a simple PKI enrollment or a
+ full CMC enrollment, or it begins enrollment assisted by a CSR:
+
+ Client Server
+ --------------------->
+ GET req: DS certificate with CSR
+
+ <--------------------
+ GET res: PAL
+ Content-Type: application/csrattrs
+
+ For immediately rejected requests, CMC works well. If the server
+ prematurely closes the connection, then the procedures in
+ Section 6.3.1 of [RFC7230] apply. But this might leave the client
+ and server in a different state. The client could merely resubmit
+ the request, but another option, documented herein, is for the client
+ to instead download the PAL to see if the server has processed the
+ request. Clients might also use this process when they are unable to
+ remain connected to the server for the entire enrollment process; if
+ the server does not or is not able to return a PKIData indicating a
+ status of pending, then the client will not know whether the request
+ was received. If a client uses the PAL and reconnects to determine
+ if the certification or rekey or renew request was processed:
+
+ o Clients MUST authenticate the server, and clients MUST check the
+ server's authorization.
+
+ o The server MUST authenticate the client, and the server MUST check
+ the client's authorization.
+
+ o Clients retrieve the PAL, using the /pal URI.
+
+ o Clients and servers use the operation path of "/simpleenroll",
+ "simplereenroll", or "/fullcmc", based on the PAL entry, with an
+ HTTP GET [RFC7231] to get the success or failure response.
+
+ Responses are as specified in [RFC7030].
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 42]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+10. Security Considerations
+
+ This document relies on many other specifications; however, all of
+ the security considerations in [RFC7030] apply. Refer also to the
+ following:
+
+ o For HTTP, HTTPS, and TLS security considerations, see [RFC7231],
+ [RFC2818], and [RFC5246].
+
+ o For URI security considerations, see [RFC3986].
+
+ o For content type security considerations, see [RFC4073],
+ [RFC4108], [RFC5272], [RFC5652], [RFC5751], [RFC5934], [RFC5958],
+ [RFC6031], [RFC6032], [RFC6268], [RFC6402], [RFC7191], and
+ [RFC7292].
+
+ o For algorithms used to protect packages, see [RFC3370], [RFC5649],
+ [RFC5753], [RFC5754], [RFC5959], [RFC6033], [RFC6160], [RFC6161],
+ [RFC6162], and [RFC7192].
+
+ o For random numbers, see [RFC4086].
+
+ o For server-generated asymmetric key pairs, see [RFC7030].
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 43]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+11. IANA Considerations
+
+ IANA has created the "PAL Package Types" registry and performed three
+ registrations: PAL Name Space, PAL XML Schema, and PAL Package Types.
+
+11.1. PAL Name Space
+
+ This section registers a new XML namespace [XMLNS],
+ "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pal", per the guidelines in [RFC3688]:
+
+ URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pal
+ Registrant Contact: Sean Turner (sean@sn3rd.com)
+ XML:
+ BEGIN
+ <?xml version="1.0"?>
+ <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN"
+ "https://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
+ <html xmlns="https://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en">
+ <head>
+ <title>Package Availability List</title>
+ </head>
+ <body>
+ <h1>Namespace for Package Availability List</h1>
+ <h2>urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pal</h2>
+ <p>See RFC 8295</p>
+ </body>
+ </html>
+ END
+
+11.2. PAL XML Schema
+
+ This section registers an XML schema as per the guidelines in
+ [RFC3688].
+
+ URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:pal
+ Registrant Contact: Sean Turner (sean@sn3rd.com)
+ XML: See Section 2.1.2.
+
+11.3. PAL Package Types
+
+ IANA has created a new registry named "PAL Package Types". This
+ registry is for PAL package types whose initial values are found in
+ Section 2.1.1. Future registrations of PAL package types are subject
+ to Expert Review, as defined in RFC 8126 [RFC8126]. Package types
+ MUST be paired with a media type; package types specify the path
+ components to be used that in turn specify the media type used.
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 44]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+12. References
+
+12.1. Normative References
+
+ [RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
+ Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>.
+
+ [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
+ Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
+
+ [RFC2585] Housley, R. and P. Hoffman, "Internet X.509 Public Key
+ Infrastructure Operational Protocols: FTP and HTTP",
+ RFC 2585, DOI 10.17487/RFC2585, May 1999,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2585>.
+
+ [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
+
+ [RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
+ Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC2985, November 2000,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2985>.
+
+ [RFC3370] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
+ Algorithms", RFC 3370, DOI 10.17487/RFC3370, August 2002,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3370>.
+
+ [RFC3394] Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard
+ (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, DOI 10.17487/RFC3394,
+ September 2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3394>.
+
+ [RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
+
+ [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
+ Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
+ RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 45]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+ [RFC4073] Housley, R., "Protecting Multiple Contents with the
+ Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 4073,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC4073, May 2005,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4073>.
+
+ [RFC4108] Housley, R., "Using Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) to
+ Protect Firmware Packages", RFC 4108,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC4108, August 2005,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4108>.
+
+ [RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
+ (LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names",
+ RFC 4514, DOI 10.17487/RFC4514, June 2006,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4514>.
+
+ [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
+ (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
+
+ [RFC5272] Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS
+ (CMC)", RFC 5272, DOI 10.17487/RFC5272, June 2008,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5272>.
+
+ [RFC5273] Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS
+ (CMC): Transport Protocols", RFC 5273,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC5273, June 2008,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5273>.
+
+ [RFC5274] Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management Messages
+ over CMS (CMC): Compliance Requirements", RFC 5274,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC5274, June 2008,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5274>.
+
+ [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
+ Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
+ Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
+ (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
+
+ [RFC5649] Housley, R. and M. Dworkin, "Advanced Encryption Standard
+ (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm", RFC 5649,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC5649, September 2009,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5649>.
+
+ [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
+ RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 46]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+ [RFC5751] Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet
+ Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message
+ Specification", RFC 5751, DOI 10.17487/RFC5751,
+ January 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5751>.
+
+ [RFC5753] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Use of Elliptic Curve
+ Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in Cryptographic Message
+ Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5753, DOI 10.17487/RFC5753,
+ January 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5753>.
+
+ [RFC5754] Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic
+ Message Syntax", RFC 5754, DOI 10.17487/RFC5754,
+ January 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5754>.
+
+ [RFC5934] Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor
+ Management Protocol (TAMP)", RFC 5934,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC5934, August 2010,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5934>.
+
+ [RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.
+
+ [RFC5959] Turner, S., "Algorithms for Asymmetric Key Package Content
+ Type", RFC 5959, DOI 10.17487/RFC5959, August 2010,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5959>.
+
+ [RFC5967] Turner, S., "The application/pkcs10 Media Type", RFC 5967,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC5967, August 2010,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5967>.
+
+ [RFC6010] Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Cryptographic
+ Message Syntax (CMS) Content Constraints Extension",
+ RFC 6010, DOI 10.17487/RFC6010, September 2010,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6010>.
+
+ [RFC6031] Turner, S. and R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax
+ (CMS) Symmetric Key Package Content Type", RFC 6031,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC6031, December 2010,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6031>.
+
+ [RFC6032] Turner, S. and R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax
+ (CMS) Encrypted Key Package Content Type", RFC 6032,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC6032, December 2010,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6032>.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 47]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+ [RFC6033] Turner, S., "Algorithms for Cryptographic Message Syntax
+ (CMS) Encrypted Key Package Content Type", RFC 6033,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC6033, December 2010,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6033>.
+
+ [RFC6160] Turner, S., "Algorithms for Cryptographic Message Syntax
+ (CMS) Protection of Symmetric Key Package Content Types",
+ RFC 6160, DOI 10.17487/RFC6160, April 2011,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6160>.
+
+ [RFC6161] Turner, S., "Elliptic Curve Algorithms for Cryptographic
+ Message Syntax (CMS) Encrypted Key Package Content Type",
+ RFC 6161, DOI 10.17487/RFC6161, April 2011,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6161>.
+
+ [RFC6162] Turner, S., "Elliptic Curve Algorithms for Cryptographic
+ Message Syntax (CMS) Asymmetric Key Package Content Type",
+ RFC 6162, DOI 10.17487/RFC6162, April 2011,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6162>.
+
+ [RFC6268] Schaad, J. and S. Turner, "Additional New ASN.1 Modules
+ for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public
+ Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 6268,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC6268, July 2011,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6268>.
+
+ [RFC6402] Schaad, J., "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
+ Updates", RFC 6402, DOI 10.17487/RFC6402, November 2011,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6402>.
+
+ [RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
+ "Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.
+
+ [RFC7303] Thompson, H. and C. Lilley, "XML Media Types", RFC 7303,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC7303, July 2014,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7303>.
+
+ [RFC7191] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Key
+ Package Receipt and Error Content Types", RFC 7191,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC7191, April 2014,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7191>.
+
+ [RFC7192] Turner, S., "Algorithms for Cryptographic Message Syntax
+ (CMS) Key Package Receipt and Error Content Types",
+ RFC 7192, DOI 10.17487/RFC7192, April 2014,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7192>.
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 48]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+ [RFC7193] Turner, S., Housley, R., and J. Schaad, "The
+ application/cms Media Type", RFC 7193,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC7193, April 2014,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7193>.
+
+ [RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext
+ Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
+ RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
+
+ [RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext
+ Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content",
+ RFC 7231, DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
+
+ [RFC7292] Moriarty, K., Ed., Nystrom, M., Parkinson, S., Rusch, A.,
+ and M. Scott, "PKCS #12: Personal Information Exchange
+ Syntax v1.1", RFC 7292, DOI 10.17487/RFC7292, July 2014,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7292>.
+
+ [RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
+ Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
+ RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
+
+ [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in
+ RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
+
+ [RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
+ Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
+
+ [XML] Bray, T., Paoli, J., Sperberg-McQueen, M., Maler, E., and
+ F. Yergeau, "Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0
+ (Fifth Edition)", World Wide Web Consortium
+ Recommendation REC-xml-20081126, November 2008,
+ <https://www.w3.org/TR/2008/REC-xml-20081126/>.
+
+ [XMLSCHEMA]
+ Malhotra, A. and P. Biron, "XML Schema Part 2: Datatypes
+ Second Edition", World Wide Web Consortium
+ Recommendation REC-xmlschema-2-20041028, October 2004,
+ <https://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-xmlschema-2-20041028>.
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 49]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+ [X.690] ITU-T, "Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
+ Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
+ Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
+ (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, ISO/IEC 8825-1,
+ August 2015, <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690/en>.
+
+12.2. Informative References
+
+ [PKCS12] IANA, "PKCS #12", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/
+ media-types/application/pkcs12>.
+
+ [RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
+ "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
+
+ [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
+ FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
+
+ [XMLNS] Bray, T., Hollander, D., Layman, A., Tobin, R., and H.
+ Thompson, "Namespaces in XML 1.0 (Third Edition)",
+ World Wide Web Consortium Recommendation
+ REC-xml-names-20091208/, December 2009,
+ <https://www.w3.org/TR/2009/REC-xml-names-20091208/>.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 50]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+Appendix A. Example Use of PAL
+
+ This is an informative appendix. It includes examples of protocol
+ flows.
+
+ Steps for using a PAL include the following:
+
+ 1. Access PAL
+
+ 2. Process PAL entries
+ 2.1. Get CA certificates
+ 2.2. Get CRLs
+ 2.3. Get CSR attributes
+ 2.4. Enroll: simple enrollment, re-enrollment, or full CMC
+ 2.5. Get Firmware, TAMP, Symmetric Keys, or EE certificates
+
+ Client Server
+ ---------------------> -+
+ GET req: | /pal
+ <--------------------- |
+ GET res: PAL |
+ Content-Type: application/xml |
+ |
+ ---------------------> -+
+ GET req: | /cacerts
+ <--------------------- |
+ GET res: CA Certificates |
+ Content-Type: application/pkcs7-smime |
+ smime-type=certs-only |
+ |
+ ---------------------> -+
+ GET req: | /crls
+ <--------------------- |
+ GET res: CRLs |
+ Content-Type: application/pkcs7-smime |
+ smime-type=crls-only |
+ |
+ ---------------------> -+
+ GET req: | /csrattrs
+ <--------------------- |
+ GET res: attributes |
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 51]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+ ---------------------> -+
+ POST req: PKIRequest | /simpleenroll and
+ Content-Type: application/pkcs10 | /simplereenroll
+ |
+ Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime | /fullcmc
+ smime-type=CMC-request |
+ |
+ <-------------------- |
+ (success or failure) |
+ POST res: PKIResponse | /simpleenroll
+ Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime | /simplereenroll
+ smime-type=certs-only | /fullcmc
+ |
+ Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime | /fullcmc
+ smime-type=CMC-response |
+ |
+ --------------------> -+
+ GET req: | /firmware
+ <-------------------- | /tamp
+ GET res: Firmware, TAMP Query | /symmetrickeys
+ + Updates, Symmetric Keys |
+ Content-Type: application/cms |
+ |
+ ---------------------> -+
+ POST res: Firmware Receipts or Errors, | /firmware/return
+ TAMP Response or Confirms or Errors, | /tamp/return
+ Symmetric Key Receipts or Errors | /symmetrickeys/
+ | return
+ |
+ Content-Type: application/cms |
+ <-------------------- |
+ POST res: empty |
+ (success or failure) |
+ --------------------> -+
+ GET req: | /eecerts
+ <-------------------- |
+ GET res: Other EE certificates |
+ Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime |
+ smime-type=certs-only |
+
+ The figure above shows /eecerts after /*/return, but this is for
+ illustrative purposes only.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 52]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+Appendix B. Additional CSR Attributes
+
+ This is an informative appendix.
+
+ In some cases, the client is severely limited in its ability to
+ encode and decode ASN.1 objects. If the client knows that a "csr"
+ template is being provided during enrollment, then it can peel the
+ returned CSR attribute, generate its keys, place the public key in
+ the certification request, and then sign the request. To accomplish
+ this, the server returns a pKCS7PDU attribute [RFC2985] in the
+ /csrattrs (the following is "pseudo ASN.1" and is only meant to show
+ the fields needed to accomplish returning a template certification
+ request):
+
+ pKCS7PDU ATTRIBUTE ::= {
+ WITH SYNTAX ContentInfo
+ ID pkcs-9-at-pkcs7PDU
+ }
+
+ pkcs-9-at-pkcs7PDU OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
+ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
+ pkcs-9-at(25) 5
+ }
+
+ The ContentInfo is a PKIData:
+
+ PKIData ::= SEQUENCE {
+ reqSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedRequest
+ }
+
+ Where TaggedRequest is a choice between the PKCS #10 or Certificate
+ Request Message Format (CRMF) requests.
+
+ TaggedRequest ::= CHOICE {
+ tcr [0] TaggedCertificationRequest,
+ crm [1] CertReqMsg
+ }
+
+ Or, the ContentInfo can be a signed-data content type that further
+ encapsulates a PKIData.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 53]
+
+RFC 8295 EST Extensions January 2018
+
+
+Acknowledgements
+
+ Thanks in no particular order go to Alexey Melnikov, Paul Hoffman,
+ Brad McInnis, Max Pritikin, Francois Rousseau, Chris Bonatti, and
+ Russ Housley for taking time to provide comments.
+
+Author's Address
+
+ Sean Turner
+ sn3rd
+
+ Email: sean@sn3rd.com
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Turner Standards Track [Page 54]
+