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+
+
+Independent Submission V. Smyslov
+Request for Comments: 9385 ELVIS-PLUS
+Category: Informational May 2023
+ISSN: 2070-1721
+
+
+ Using GOST Cryptographic Algorithms in the Internet Key Exchange
+ Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)
+
+Abstract
+
+ This document defines a set of cryptographic transforms for use in
+ the Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2). The transforms
+ are based on Russian cryptographic standard algorithms (called "GOST"
+ algorithms). Use of GOST ciphers in IKEv2 is defined in RFC 9227.
+ This document aims to define the use of GOST algorithms for the rest
+ of the cryptographic transforms used in IKEv2.
+
+ This specification was developed to facilitate implementations that
+ wish to support the GOST algorithms. This document does not imply
+ IETF endorsement of the cryptographic algorithms used in this
+ document.
+
+Status of This Memo
+
+ This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
+ published for informational purposes.
+
+ This is a contribution to the RFC Series, independently of any other
+ RFC stream. The RFC Editor has chosen to publish this document at
+ its discretion and makes no statement about its value for
+ implementation or deployment. Documents approved for publication by
+ the RFC Editor are not candidates for any level of Internet Standard;
+ see Section 2 of RFC 7841.
+
+ Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
+ and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
+ https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9385.
+
+Copyright Notice
+
+ Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
+ document authors. All rights reserved.
+
+ This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
+ Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
+ (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
+ publication of this document. Please review these documents
+ carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
+ to this document.
+
+Table of Contents
+
+ 1. Introduction
+ 2. Terminology and Notation
+ 3. Overview
+ 4. IKE SA Protection
+ 5. Pseudorandom Function
+ 6. Shared Key Calculation
+ 6.1. Recipient Tests
+ 7. Authentication
+ 7.1. Hash Functions
+ 7.2. ASN.1 Objects
+ 7.2.1. id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-256
+ 7.2.2. id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-512
+ 8. Security Considerations
+ 9. IANA Considerations
+ 10. References
+ 10.1. Normative References
+ 10.2. Informative References
+ Appendix A. Test Vectors
+ A.1. Scenario 1
+ A.1.1. Sub-Scenario 1: Establishment of IKE and ESP SAs Using
+ the IKE_SA_INIT and the IKE_AUTH Exchanges
+ A.1.2. Sub-Scenario 2: IKE SA Rekeying Using the
+ CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange
+ A.1.3. Sub-Scenario 3: ESP SAs Rekeying with PFS Using the
+ CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange
+ A.1.4. Sub-Scenario 4: IKE SA Deletion Using the INFORMATIONAL
+ Exchange
+ A.2. Scenario 2
+ A.2.1. Sub-Scenario 1: Establishment of IKE and ESP SAs Using
+ the IKE_SA_INIT and the IKE_AUTH Exchanges
+ A.2.2. Sub-Scenario 2: IKE SA Rekeying Using the
+ CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange
+ A.2.3. Sub-Scenario 3: ESP SAs Rekeying without PFS Using the
+ CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange
+ A.2.4. Sub-Scenario 4: IKE SA Deletion Using the INFORMATIONAL
+ Exchange
+ Author's Address
+
+1. Introduction
+
+ The Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2) defined in
+ [RFC7296] is an important part of the IP Security (IPsec)
+ architecture. It is used for the authenticated key exchange and for
+ the negotiation of various protocol parameters and features.
+
+ This document defines a number of transforms for IKEv2, based on
+ Russian cryptographic standard algorithms (often referred to as
+ "GOST" algorithms) for hash function, digital signature, and key
+ exchange method. These definitions are based on the recommendations
+ established by the Standardisation Technical Committee "Cryptographic
+ information protection", which describe how Russian cryptographic
+ standard algorithms are used in IKEv2 [GOST-IKEv2]. Along with the
+ transforms defined in [RFC9227], the transforms defined in this
+ specification allow for the use of GOST cryptographic algorithms in
+ IPsec protocols.
+
+ This specification was developed to facilitate implementations that
+ wish to support the GOST algorithms. This document does not imply
+ IETF endorsement of the cryptographic algorithms used in this
+ document.
+
+2. Terminology and Notation
+
+ The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
+ "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
+ "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
+ BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
+ capitals, as shown here.
+
+3. Overview
+
+ Russian cryptographic standard algorithms (GOST algorithms) are a set
+ of cryptographic algorithms of different types -- ciphers, hash
+ functions, digital signatures, etc. In particular, Russian
+ cryptographic standard [GOST3412-2015] defines the "Kuznyechik" and
+ "Magma" block ciphers (also defined in [RFC7801] and [RFC8891],
+ respectively). Cryptographic standard [GOST3410-2012] defines the
+ elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (also defined in
+ [RFC7091]), while [GOST3411-2012] defines two cryptographic hash
+ functions with different output lengths (also defined in [RFC6986]).
+ These hash functions are often referred to as "Streebog" hash
+ functions, although this is not an official name and is not used in
+ the provided references. The parameters for the elliptic curves used
+ in GOST signature and key exchange algorithms are defined in
+ [RFC7836].
+
+4. IKE SA Protection
+
+ IKE Security Association (SA) protection using GOST algorithms is
+ defined in [RFC9227]. In particular, two transforms of Type 1
+ (Encryption Algorithm Transform IDs) can be used for IKE SA
+ protection: ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE (32) based on the "Kuznyechik"
+ block cipher and ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE (33) based on the "Magma" block
+ cipher, both in Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM).
+
+ The information here is provided for convenience. For full details,
+ please see [RFC9227].
+
+5. Pseudorandom Function
+
+ This specification defines a new transform of Type 2 (Pseudorandom
+ Function Transform IDs): PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512 (9). This transform
+ uses the Pseudorandom Function (PRF) HMAC_GOSTR3411_2012_512 defined
+ in Section 4.1.2 of [RFC7836]. The PRF uses the GOST R 34.11-2012
+ ("Streebog") hash function with a 512-bit output defined in [RFC6986]
+ and [GOST3411-2012] with HMAC [RFC2104] construction. The PRF has a
+ 512-bit block size and a 512-bit output length.
+
+6. Shared Key Calculation
+
+ This specification defines two new transforms of Type 4 (Key Exchange
+ Method Transform IDs): GOST3410_2012_256 (33) and GOST3410_2012_512
+ (34). These transforms use the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
+ key exchange algorithm over twisted Edwards curves. The parameters
+ for these curves are defined in Appendix A.2 of [RFC7836]. In
+ particular, transform GOST3410_2012_256 uses the id-tc26-gost-
+ 3410-2012-256-paramSetA parameter set and GOST3410_2012_512 uses the
+ id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetC parameter set (both defined in
+ [RFC7836]).
+
+ The shared secret is computed as follows. The initiator randomly
+ selects its private key d_i from {1,..,q - 1}, where q is the
+ subgroup order and is a parameter of the selected curve. Then a
+ public key Q_i is computed as a point on the curve:
+
+ Q_i = d_i * G
+
+ where G is the generator for the selected curve. It is then sent to
+ the responder. The responder makes the same calculations to get d_r
+ and Q_r and sends Q_r to the initiator. After peers exchange Q_i and
+ Q_R, both sides can compute a point on the curve:
+
+ S = ((m / q) * d_i) * Q_r = ((m / q) * d_r) * Q_i
+
+ where m is the group order and is a parameter of the selected curve.
+ The shared secret K is an x coordinate of S in a little-endian
+ representation. The size of K is determined by the size of the used
+ curve and is either 256 or 512 bits.
+
+ When the GOST public key is transmitted in the Key Exchange payload
+ (Section 3.4 of [RFC7296]), it MUST be represented as x coordinate
+ immediately followed by y coordinate, each in a little-endian
+ representation. The size of each coordinate is determined by the
+ size of the used curve and is either 256 or 512 bits, so that the
+ size of the Key Exchange Data field in the Key Exchange payload is
+ either 64 or 128 octets.
+
+6.1. Recipient Tests
+
+ Upon receiving a peer's public key, implementations MUST check that
+ the key is actually a point on the curve. Otherwise, the exchange
+ fails. Implementations MUST check that the calculated public value S
+ is not an identity element of the curve. If S appears to be the
+ identity element of the curve, the exchange fails. The
+ INVALID_SYNTAX notification MAY be sent in these cases.
+
+7. Authentication
+
+ IKEv2 allows various authentication methods to be used for IKE SA
+ establishment. Some methods are tied to a particular algorithm,
+ while others may be used with different algorithms. This
+ specification makes no restrictions on using the latter ones with the
+ GOST algorithms. In particular, "Shared Key Message Integrity Code"
+ (2), defined in [RFC7296], and "NULL Authentication" (13), defined in
+ [RFC7619], can be used with GOST algorithms with no changes to the
+ process of the AUTH payload content calculation.
+
+ When the GOST digital signature algorithm is used in IKEv2 for
+ authentication purposes, the "Digital Signature" (14) authentication
+ method, defined in [RFC7427], MUST be specified in the AUTH payload.
+
+ The GOST digital signature algorithm GOST R 34.10-2012 is defined in
+ [RFC7091] and [GOST3410-2012]. There are two variants of the GOST
+ digital signature algorithm -- one over a 256-bit elliptic curve and
+ the other over a 512-bit key elliptic curve. The signature value, as
+ defined in [RFC7091] and [GOST3410-2012], consists of two integers: r
+ and s. The size of each integer is either 256 or 512 bits depending
+ on the elliptic curve used. The content of the Signature Value field
+ in the AUTH payload MUST consist of s immediately followed by r, each
+ in a big-endian representation, so that the size of the field is
+ either 64 or 128 octets. The AlgorithmIdentifier ASN.1 objects for
+ the GOST digital signature algorithm are defined in Section 7.2.
+
+7.1. Hash Functions
+
+ The GOST digital signature algorithm uses the GOST R 34.11-2012
+ ("Streebog") hash functions defined in [RFC6986] and [GOST3411-2012].
+ There are two "Streebog" hash functions: one with a 256-bit output
+ length and the other with a 512-bit output length. The former is
+ used with the GOST digital signature algorithm over a 256-bit
+ elliptic curve and the latter over a 512-bit key elliptic curve.
+
+ This specification defines two new values for the "IKEv2 Hash
+ Algorithms" registry: STREEBOG_256 (6) for the GOST hash function
+ with a 256-bit output length and STREEBOG_512 (7) for the GOST hash
+ function with a 512-bit output length. These values MUST be included
+ in the SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS notification if a corresponding GOST
+ digital signature algorithm is supported by the sender and its local
+ policy allows the use of this algorithm (see Section 4 of [RFC7427]
+ for details).
+
+7.2. ASN.1 Objects
+
+ This section lists GOST digital signature algorithm ASN.1
+ AlgorithmIdentifier objects in binary form. With GOST digital
+ signature algorithms, optional parameters in AlgorithmIdentifier
+ objects are always omitted. These objects are defined in [RFC9215]
+ and [USING-GOST-IN-CERTS] and are provided here for convenience.
+
+7.2.1. id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-256
+
+ id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
+ { iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7) tc26(1)
+ algorithms(1) signwithdigest(3) gost3410-12-256(2)}
+
+ The optional parameters field must be omitted.
+
+ Name = id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-256
+ OID = 1.2.643.7.1.1.3.2
+ Length = 12
+ 0000: 300a 0608 2a85 0307 0101 0302
+
+7.2.2. id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-512
+
+ id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
+ { iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7) tc26(1)
+ algorithms(1) signwithdigest(3) gost3410-12-512(3)}
+
+ The optional parameters field must be omitted.
+
+ Name = id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-512
+ OID = 1.2.643.7.1.1.3.3
+ Length = 12
+ 0000: 300a 0608 2a85 0307 0101 0303
+
+8. Security Considerations
+
+ The security considerations of [RFC7296] and [RFC7427] apply.
+
+ The security of GOST elliptic curves is discussed in
+ [GOST-EC-SECURITY]. The security of the "Streebog" hash functions is
+ discussed in [STREEBOG-SECURITY]. A second preimage attack on
+ "Streebog" hash functions is described in [STREEBOG-PREIMAGE] if the
+ message size exceeds 2^259 blocks. This attack is not relevant to
+ how "Streebog" hash functions are used in IKEv2.
+
+9. IANA Considerations
+
+ IANA has assigned one Transform ID in the "Transform Type 2 -
+ Pseudorandom Function Transform IDs" registry:
+
+ +========+=======================+===========+
+ | Number | Name | Reference |
+ +========+=======================+===========+
+ | 9 | PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512 | RFC 9385 |
+ +--------+-----------------------+-----------+
+
+ Table 1: New Pseudorandom Function
+ Transform ID
+
+ IANA has assigned two Transform IDs in the "Transform Type 4 - Key
+ Exchange Method Transform IDs" registry:
+
+ +========+===================+=======================+===========+
+ | Number | Name | Recipient Tests | Reference |
+ +========+===================+=======================+===========+
+ | 33 | GOST3410_2012_256 | RFC 9385, Section 6.1 | RFC 9385 |
+ +--------+-------------------+-----------------------+-----------+
+ | 34 | GOST3410_2012_512 | RFC 9385, Section 6.1 | RFC 9385 |
+ +--------+-------------------+-----------------------+-----------+
+
+ Table 2: New Key Exchange Method Transform IDs
+
+ IANA has assigned two values in the "IKEv2 Hash Algorithms" registry:
+
+ +========+================+===========+
+ | Number | Hash Algorithm | Reference |
+ +========+================+===========+
+ | 6 | STREEBOG_256 | RFC 9385 |
+ +--------+----------------+-----------+
+ | 7 | STREEBOG_512 | RFC 9385 |
+ +--------+----------------+-----------+
+
+ Table 3: New IKEv2 Hash Algorithms
+
+10. References
+
+10.1. Normative References
+
+ [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
+ Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
+
+ [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
+ 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
+ May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
+
+ [RFC6986] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and A. Degtyarev, "GOST R 34.11-2012:
+ Hash Function", RFC 6986, DOI 10.17487/RFC6986, August
+ 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6986>.
+
+ [RFC7091] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and A. Degtyarev, "GOST R 34.10-2012:
+ Digital Signature Algorithm", RFC 7091,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC7091, December 2013,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7091>.
+
+ [RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
+ Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
+ (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
+ 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
+
+ [RFC7427] Kivinen, T. and J. Snyder, "Signature Authentication in
+ the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 7427,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC7427, January 2015,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7427>.
+
+ [RFC7836] Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., Alekseev, E., Oshkin, I., Popov, V.,
+ Leontiev, S., Podobaev, V., and D. Belyavsky, "Guidelines
+ on the Cryptographic Algorithms to Accompany the Usage of
+ Standards GOST R 34.10-2012 and GOST R 34.11-2012",
+ RFC 7836, DOI 10.17487/RFC7836, March 2016,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7836>.
+
+ [RFC9215] Baryshkov, D., Ed., Nikolaev, V., and A. Chelpanov, "Using
+ GOST R 34.10-2012 and GOST R 34.11-2012 Algorithms with
+ the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure", RFC 9215,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC9215, March 2022,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9215>.
+
+ [RFC9227] Smyslov, V., "Using GOST Ciphers in the Encapsulating
+ Security Payload (ESP) and Internet Key Exchange Version 2
+ (IKEv2) Protocols", RFC 9227, DOI 10.17487/RFC9227, March
+ 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9227>.
+
+10.2. Informative References
+
+ [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
+ Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
+
+ [RFC7619] Smyslov, V. and P. Wouters, "The NULL Authentication
+ Method in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
+ (IKEv2)", RFC 7619, DOI 10.17487/RFC7619, August 2015,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7619>.
+
+ [RFC7801] Dolmatov, V., Ed., "GOST R 34.12-2015: Block Cipher
+ "Kuznyechik"", RFC 7801, DOI 10.17487/RFC7801, March 2016,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7801>.
+
+ [RFC8891] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and D. Baryshkov, "GOST R 34.12-2015:
+ Block Cipher "Magma"", RFC 8891, DOI 10.17487/RFC8891,
+ September 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8891>.
+
+ [GOST3410-2012]
+ Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology,
+ "Information technology. Cryptographic data security.
+ Signature and verification processes of [electronic]
+ digital signature", GOST R 34.10-2012, 2012. (In Russian)
+
+ [GOST3411-2012]
+ Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology,
+ "Information technology. Cryptographic data security.
+ Hashing function", GOST R 34.11-2012, 2012. (In Russian)
+
+ [GOST3412-2015]
+ Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology,
+ "Information technology. Cryptographic data security.
+ Block ciphers", GOST R 34.12-2015, 2015. (In Russian)
+
+ [GOST-IKEv2]
+ Standardisation Technical Committee "Cryptographic
+ information protection", "Information technology.
+ Cryptographic data security. Using Russian cryptographic
+ algorithms in the Internet Key Exchange protocol version 2
+ (IKEv2)", MR 26.2.001-22, 2022. (In Russian)
+
+ [GOST-IKEv2-TESTVECTORS]
+ Standardisation Technical Committee "Cryptographic
+ information protection", "Information technology.
+ Cryptographic data security. The test vectors for the use
+ of Russian cryptographic algorithms in the IKEv2 key
+ exchange protocol", MR 26.2.002-22, 2022. (In Russian)
+
+ [USING-GOST-IN-CERTS]
+ Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology,
+ "Information technology. Cryptographic data security.
+ Usage of GOST R 34.10-2012 and GOST R 34.11-2012
+ algorithms in certificate, CRL and PKCS#10 certificate
+ request in X.509 public key infrastructure",
+ R 1323565.1.023-2018, 2018. (In Russian)
+
+ [GOST-EC-SECURITY]
+ Alekseev, E., Nikolaev, V., and S. Smyshlyaev, "On the
+ security properties of Russian standardized elliptic
+ curves", DOI 10.4213/mvk260, 2018,
+ <https://doi.org/10.4213/mvk260>.
+
+ [STREEBOG-SECURITY]
+ Wang, Z., Yu, H., and X. Wang, "Cryptanalysis of GOST R
+ hash function", DOI 10.1016/j.ipl.2014.07.007, December
+ 2014, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ipl.2014.07.007>.
+
+ [STREEBOG-PREIMAGE]
+ Guo, J., Jean, J., Leurent, G., Peyrin, T., and L. Wang,
+ "The Usage of Counter Revisited: Second-Preimage Attack on
+ New Russian Standardized Hash Function", Cryptology ePrint
+ Archive, Paper 2014/675, 2014,
+ <https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/675>.
+
+Appendix A. Test Vectors
+
+ This appendix contains test vectors for two scenarios. The test
+ vectors were borrowed from [GOST-IKEv2-TESTVECTORS]. In both
+ scenarios, peers establish, rekey, and delete an IKE SA and ESP SAs.
+ The IP addresses of the peers used in both scenarios are the same:
+
+ * initiator's IP address is 10.111.10.171
+
+ * responder's IP address is 10.111.10.45
+
+ The test vectors also cover IKE message protection for transforms
+ defined in [RFC9227]. The keys SK_ei and SK_er are transform keys
+ (see Section 4.4 of [RFC9227]), and the keys K1i, K2i, K3i, K1r, K2r,
+ and K3r represent nodes in the key tree for the initiator and
+ responder correspondently. The leaf keys K3i and K3r are effectively
+ message protection keys (K_msg in terms of [RFC9227]). MGM nonces
+ (also known as Initial Counter Nonces) are defined in Section 4.3 of
+ [RFC9227]. The Initialization Vector (IV) format is defined in
+ Section 4.2 of [RFC9227], and the Additional Authenticated Data (AAD)
+ format is defined in Section 4.7 of [RFC9227].
+
+ All other keys and entities used in the test vectors are defined in
+ [RFC7296].
+
+A.1. Scenario 1
+
+ In this scenario, peers establish, rekey, and delete an IKE SA and
+ ESP SAs using the following prerequisites:
+
+ * Peers authenticate each other using a Pre-Shared Key (PSK).
+
+ * Initiator's ID is "IKE-Initiator" of type ID_FQDN.
+
+ * Responder's ID is "IKE-Responder" of type ID_FQDN.
+
+ * No NAT is present between the peers.
+
+ * IKE fragmentation is not used.
+
+ * IKE SA is created with the following transforms:
+
+ - ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE
+
+ - PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512
+
+ - GOST3410_2012_512
+
+ * ESP SAs are created with the following transforms:
+
+ - ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE
+
+ - ESN off
+
+ The 256-bit PSK used for authentication:
+
+ 00000000: e2 69 24 cf 15 32 93 47 3a 11 a4 97 a8 a4 5c b3
+ 00000010: 4e 28 31 ef 0e 28 bb 77 69 69 c6 3c 68 bf e1 0d
+
+ This scenario includes four sub-scenarios, which are described below.
+
+A.1.1. Sub-Scenario 1: Establishment of IKE and ESP SAs Using the
+ IKE_SA_INIT and the IKE_AUTH Exchanges
+
+ Initiator Responder
+
+ HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni [,N+] --->
+ <--- HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr [,N+]
+
+ HDR, SK {IDi, [IDr,] [N+,]
+ AUTH, SAi2, TSi, TSr} --->
+ <--- HDR, SK {IDr, [N+,]
+ AUTH, SAr2, TSi, TSr}
+
+ Initiator's actions:
+
+ (1) Generates random SPIi for IKE SA
+
+ 00000000: e9 d3 f3 78 19 1c 38 40
+
+ (2) Generates random IKE nonce Ni
+
+ 00000000: 48 b6 d3 b3 ab 56 f2 c8 f0 42 d5 16 e7 21 d9 31
+ 00000010: f9 ac 10 f9 7f 80 8c 51 2b d6 f4 59 93 a7 4d 13
+
+ (3) Generates ephemeral private key
+
+ 00000000: 95 07 3a 04 dc db ce 77 f5 5e 4f fe 97 0c cd 6f
+ 00000010: 0a e0 b5 c6 53 bd a0 da 47 fc 03 b5 8a e1 d5 1d
+ 00000020: 89 e6 c0 db dc b1 ea 74 59 1f 1d 0c 9f 3f 4f dc
+ 00000030: 10 d5 c9 cc a4 34 9c 3d 3e 6b dd 57 c5 d6 c9 01
+
+ (4) Computes public key
+
+ 00000000: 96 1b 9b 21 4f 7e e9 83 ec 27 a0 64 0c 77 4f be
+ 00000010: 78 31 be fd 1e 63 7d 6e 76 eb 2f 81 23 80 62 87
+ 00000020: ba 2c f7 31 a2 70 b7 3e 8a 1d 91 93 72 cf 61 c8
+ 00000030: d3 18 f6 bc f7 a0 44 c8 11 a7 fe d2 99 ea 8b 4d
+ 00000040: 59 fa a7 38 ae 03 48 d2 aa f7 ff 11 e0 60 29 dd
+ 00000050: 16 59 58 78 8e 3b e2 b5 48 36 3c ca 07 1a 5d be
+ 00000060: a7 42 79 81 74 22 6f 53 15 d2 c2 f6 06 d4 0f ed
+ 00000070: 70 f0 1c cf 89 2e ac 3c fe 01 02 91 85 06 7b d4
+
+ (5) Creates message
+
+ IKE SA Init
+ E9D3F378191C3840.0000000000000000.00000000 IKEv2 R<-I[316]
+ SA[52]{
+ P[48](#1:IKE::5#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE,
+ ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE,
+ PRF=PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512,
+ KE=GOST3410_2012_512,
+ GOST3410_2012_256}},
+ KE[136](GOST3410_2012_512){961B9B...067BD4},
+ NONCE[36]{48B6D3...A74D13},
+ N[28](NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP){92B291...F4E2BF},
+ N[28](NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP){77E199...98A613},
+ N[8](IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED)
+
+ (6) Sends message, peer receives message
+
+ 10.111.10.171:54294->10.111.15.45:500 [316]
+
+ 00000000: e9 d3 f3 78 19 1c 38 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+ 00000010: 21 20 22 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 3c 22 00 00 34
+ 00000020: 00 00 00 30 01 01 00 05 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 20
+ 00000030: 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 21 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 09
+ 00000040: 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 22 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 21
+ 00000050: 28 00 00 88 00 22 00 00 96 1b 9b 21 4f 7e e9 83
+ 00000060: ec 27 a0 64 0c 77 4f be 78 31 be fd 1e 63 7d 6e
+ 00000070: 76 eb 2f 81 23 80 62 87 ba 2c f7 31 a2 70 b7 3e
+ 00000080: 8a 1d 91 93 72 cf 61 c8 d3 18 f6 bc f7 a0 44 c8
+ 00000090: 11 a7 fe d2 99 ea 8b 4d 59 fa a7 38 ae 03 48 d2
+ 000000A0: aa f7 ff 11 e0 60 29 dd 16 59 58 78 8e 3b e2 b5
+ 000000B0: 48 36 3c ca 07 1a 5d be a7 42 79 81 74 22 6f 53
+ 000000C0: 15 d2 c2 f6 06 d4 0f ed 70 f0 1c cf 89 2e ac 3c
+ 000000D0: fe 01 02 91 85 06 7b d4 29 00 00 24 48 b6 d3 b3
+ 000000E0: ab 56 f2 c8 f0 42 d5 16 e7 21 d9 31 f9 ac 10 f9
+ 000000F0: 7f 80 8c 51 2b d6 f4 59 93 a7 4d 13 29 00 00 1c
+ 00000100: 00 00 40 04 92 b2 91 d3 9b 53 51 c8 33 c2 1f 2e
+ 00000110: 92 ef 24 88 ef f4 e2 bf 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05
+ 00000120: 77 e1 99 fe 3b 7e 33 42 b5 af ad 51 cf 97 91 4b
+ 00000130: 08 98 a6 13 00 00 00 08 00 00 40 2e
+
+ Responder's actions:
+
+ (7) Parses received message
+
+ IKE SA Init
+ E9D3F378191C3840.0000000000000000.00000000 IKEv2 I->R[316]
+ SA[52]{
+ P[48](#1:IKE::5#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE,
+ ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE,
+ PRF=PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512,
+ KE=GOST3410_2012_512,
+ GOST3410_2012_256}},
+ KE[136](GOST3410_2012_512){961B9B...067BD4},
+ NONCE[36]{48B6D3...A74D13},
+ N[28](NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP){92B291...F4E2BF},
+ N[28](NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP){77E199...98A613},
+ N[8](IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED)
+
+ (8) Generates random SPIr for IKE SA
+
+ 00000000: 8d df f4 01 fb fb 0b 14
+
+ (9) Generates random IKE nonce Nr
+
+ 00000000: fb 81 c8 80 e5 f0 35 60 99 ef 46 b2 72 44 95 0f
+ 00000010: 03 85 f4 73 92 67 b7 68 43 8f 90 69 16 fe 63 f0
+
+ (10) Generates ephemeral private key
+
+ 00000000: 7f 49 e3 77 39 db 03 cc fe fe c9 63 17 71 e9 f1
+ 00000010: 50 4b 98 79 b3 df 3b 48 bd f3 89 72 52 07 47 4f
+ 00000020: 70 29 f8 39 63 2c 89 b6 92 39 18 27 9c fb 80 f5
+ 00000030: 43 af 8b 9c 68 bb 93 22 1e 18 7d c2 1b dc e1 22
+
+ (11) Computes public key
+
+ 00000000: ad b4 e4 db b9 af 28 59 ab 76 4d 30 fd d4 7a f3
+ 00000010: 5f 8c cb 85 8c cc ca 30 5e 4a 9d 20 52 32 48 88
+ 00000020: 69 81 48 5e ae db 1e 8c 0d 8d db 12 3e f5 ef 1d
+ 00000030: 7f e8 83 39 7f e6 5d 6e 51 ca 9e ee f5 b6 ba 02
+ 00000040: db 10 87 47 ba 38 b3 17 95 60 6d a3 81 15 5c 3d
+ 00000050: 6b 86 d3 59 2f 5f 74 14 17 a9 64 20 3d 05 12 08
+ 00000060: 02 75 15 ac ff 08 7c aa 82 1d f6 89 6c f4 33 e0
+ 00000070: 01 4e 11 68 73 7e e3 e9 c6 88 ce 90 9b 39 05 48
+
+ (12) Creates message
+
+ IKE SA Init
+ E9D3F378191C3840.8DDFF401FBFB0B14.00000000 IKEv2 I<=R[300]
+ SA[36]{
+ P[32](#1:IKE::3#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE,
+ PRF=PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512,
+ KE=GOST3410_2012_512}},
+ KE[136](GOST3410_2012_512){ADB4E4...390548},
+ NONCE[36]{FB81C8...FE63F0},
+ N[28](NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP){6D7A48...683D59},
+ N[28](NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP){481A5B...905499},
+ N[8](IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED)
+
+ (13) Sends message, peer receives message
+
+ 10.111.10.171:54294<-10.111.15.45:500 [300]
+
+ 00000000: e9 d3 f3 78 19 1c 38 40 8d df f4 01 fb fb 0b 14
+ 00000010: 21 20 22 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 2c 22 00 00 24
+ 00000020: 00 00 00 20 01 01 00 03 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 20
+ 00000030: 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 09 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 22
+ 00000040: 28 00 00 88 00 22 00 00 ad b4 e4 db b9 af 28 59
+ 00000050: ab 76 4d 30 fd d4 7a f3 5f 8c cb 85 8c cc ca 30
+ 00000060: 5e 4a 9d 20 52 32 48 88 69 81 48 5e ae db 1e 8c
+ 00000070: 0d 8d db 12 3e f5 ef 1d 7f e8 83 39 7f e6 5d 6e
+ 00000080: 51 ca 9e ee f5 b6 ba 02 db 10 87 47 ba 38 b3 17
+ 00000090: 95 60 6d a3 81 15 5c 3d 6b 86 d3 59 2f 5f 74 14
+ 000000A0: 17 a9 64 20 3d 05 12 08 02 75 15 ac ff 08 7c aa
+ 000000B0: 82 1d f6 89 6c f4 33 e0 01 4e 11 68 73 7e e3 e9
+ 000000C0: c6 88 ce 90 9b 39 05 48 29 00 00 24 fb 81 c8 80
+ 000000D0: e5 f0 35 60 99 ef 46 b2 72 44 95 0f 03 85 f4 73
+ 000000E0: 92 67 b7 68 43 8f 90 69 16 fe 63 f0 29 00 00 1c
+ 000000F0: 00 00 40 04 6d 7a 48 7a 9d ce 80 6f b0 09 4b f7
+ 00000100: 8d fd ec eb 2e 68 3d 59 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05
+ 00000110: 48 1a 5b 15 12 e4 26 a3 8d 88 8b 65 8e 17 b3 f1
+ 00000120: 38 90 54 99 00 00 00 08 00 00 40 2e
+
+ Initiator's actions:
+
+ (14) Parses received message
+
+ IKE SA Init
+ E9D3F378191C3840.8DDFF401FBFB0B14.00000000 IKEv2 R=>I[300]
+ SA[36]{
+ P[32](#1:IKE::3#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE,
+ PRF=PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512,
+ KE=GOST3410_2012_512}},
+ KE[136](GOST3410_2012_512){ADB4E4...390548},
+ NONCE[36]{FB81C8...FE63F0},
+ N[28](NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP){6D7A48...683D59},
+ N[28](NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP){481A5B...905499},
+ N[8](IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED)
+
+ (15) Computes shared key
+
+ 00000000: a2 43 6c bd 2d c1 0f 81 0d f7 6f 24 ae 78 70 f2
+ 00000010: 27 5d 1b dc c5 52 0e d8 53 e5 c5 43 98 f7 35 ce
+ 00000020: 32 70 89 2b 8e 89 0b 7d b3 98 77 cd bd 31 5d 18
+ 00000030: 10 5d 8b ac 16 f0 aa fd bc dc 7c 69 75 14 48 a8
+
+ (16) Computes SKEYSEED
+
+ 00000000: fc 7b d9 80 4b 15 00 60 d2 08 17 3a 08 4b a9 2a
+ 00000010: 0f 01 cb c3 ef e9 b5 aa 15 5b 0e 80 24 68 3c 4c
+ 00000020: 6c fb e9 c8 16 7d 54 2d 48 ee 61 71 01 68 ca 68
+ 00000030: 4f 7c b0 1b 61 29 20 9a 68 88 5b 3f d7 19 0b d0
+
+ (17) Computes SK_d
+
+ 00000000: 6b 2b 83 d7 a9 10 5f f4 27 e8 05 86 b7 f0 09 31
+ 00000010: 16 43 81 ae 88 7a 3f c9 65 30 73 00 e5 82 81 52
+ 00000020: 68 07 ba e5 39 ef 6e a7 75 db 2c c9 1c d3 4b 70
+ 00000030: e0 be 97 14 81 bb 0c 80 ef b3 6e 12 2a 08 74 36
+
+ (18) Computes SK_ei
+
+ 00000000: 8c 6d f1 8f 6a ff 9f 1b 3e be 40 ef e2 64 c2 bf
+ 00000010: 8e 6e d7 4c b5 8b 0a 74 a7 30 0c 21 7e 66 c7 d4
+ 00000020: 83 00 37 c3 08 01 7e c3 0a 71 62 01
+
+ (19) Computes SK_er
+
+ 00000000: df e8 7d 5f 9c da 5e 45 b8 b9 11 02 63 6c 08 47
+ 00000010: f6 4f c5 5d 6a 7b 4b 91 52 32 0a a2 5e c0 31 34
+ 00000020: 65 20 72 e7 0a 1e ff 7d da ba 17 31
+
+ (20) Computes SK_pi
+
+ 00000000: 93 11 c6 4c d7 12 b5 40 f9 e8 7e 73 c5 28 a7 d8
+ 00000010: 89 48 1c f1 bf a3 ad 67 cf b4 d9 6a 9b fe 3c ea
+ 00000020: 2f cc 2a 5e d4 e4 0b 27 7f be c9 9d c3 8d b7 68
+ 00000030: 03 c1 f3 f8 94 af 47 8b d8 35 b8 6b c2 ca 38 16
+
+ (21) Computes SK_pr
+
+ 00000000: 7b b0 4b 24 74 9c 73 68 7f 34 a3 b8 17 6b 9e 30
+ 00000010: f2 eb 33 73 23 ff 49 1e e3 07 e7 9f 77 b6 2a ef
+ 00000020: 5a 5e a9 02 8e 90 5c 83 49 ec 1e aa a4 05 bc e1
+ 00000030: fb c4 5b f0 27 d6 9b 41 77 6f e1 48 f3 37 99 e5
+
+ (22) Computes prf(SK_pi, IDi)
+
+ 00000000: 06 d3 d4 36 ab 5b 4f 41 d4 3d fc 79 1f 13 a3 89
+ 00000010: e9 a6 6e d7 87 7d 72 d1 9d 71 78 2d 05 ee 47 fb
+ 00000020: 82 c8 8f 86 cd b5 05 1d 25 7c 1e 79 18 ef 4e 4e
+ 00000030: 8d ca f4 47 12 c6 7f 6a 32 7d d8 e8 f2 8e f8 33
+
+ (23) Uses PSK
+
+ 00000000: e2 69 24 cf 15 32 93 47 3a 11 a4 97 a8 a4 5c b3
+ 00000010: 4e 28 31 ef 0e 28 bb 77 69 69 c6 3c 68 bf e1 0d
+
+ (24) Computes prf(PSK,"Key Pad for IKEv2")
+
+ 00000000: 01 3c a5 24 59 4e bc 78 99 20 61 6c 3f 03 e5 2e
+ 00000010: 7a 75 2a 0b 78 36 bd 0a 89 ce 1d e7 8b 23 32 ae
+ 00000020: 08 9a a0 03 1d da f6 14 8c 38 c6 bd 7c 03 13 24
+ 00000030: bd af c8 ad 88 18 8f 41 d0 12 b9 e1 5a 66 8f 10
+
+ (25) Computes content of AUTH payload
+
+ 00000000: c9 9b 01 9a 89 ee 56 53 ab 28 25 a1 d7 51 54 ac
+ 00000010: 01 42 fb d6 2e bc 1e f3 65 73 63 5b 16 81 4b 97
+ 00000020: 38 b4 20 5d 09 d9 b4 21 b4 0c f4 55 27 80 e7 4c
+ 00000030: cf 66 d0 14 25 87 7c 20 84 68 d5 79 3a 74 1e e3
+
+ (26) Computes K1i (i1 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: f2 ac 10 7a 1f 92 d1 b1 1b b1 74 c3 42 76 a3 3f
+ 00000010: fa ea 1b 1e 81 10 c1 01 7a 25 9a 00 8d 76 57 de
+
+ (27) Computes K2i (i2 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 77 e0 16 18 ad 76 e8 5a 66 2f 88 c4 c0 92 ec 33
+ 00000010: 6d 23 63 28 28 d5 77 d8 84 e1 01 b1 8d 84 a7 1d
+
+ (28) Computes K3i (i3 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 36 ff fa db 84 a9 f1 21 d5 84 16 db eb af 21 a2
+ 00000010: 12 6d 5c 35 95 fe 89 cf 27 47 52 8a b7 36 92 d4
+
+ (29) Selects SPI for incoming ESP SA
+
+ 00000000: 0a de 5f cd
+
+ (30) Creates message
+
+ IKE SA Auth
+ E9D3F378191C3840.8DDFF401FBFB0B14.00000001 IKEv2 R<-I[334]
+ E[306]{
+ IDi[21](FQDN){"IKE-Initiator"},
+ AUTH[72](Preshared-Key){C99B01...741EE3},
+ N[8](INITIAL_CONTACT),
+ N[12](SET_WINDOW_SIZE){4},
+ CP[16](REQUEST){IP4.Address[0], IP4.DNS[0]},
+ SA[56]{
+ P[52](#1:ESP:0ADE5FCD:5#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE,
+ ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE,
+ ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE,
+ ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE,
+ ESN=Off}},
+ TSi[40](2#){10.111.10.171:icmp:8.0, 0.0.0.0-255.255.255.255},
+ TSr[40](2#){10.0.0.2:icmp:8.0, 10.0.0.0-10.0.0.255},
+ N[8](ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+ N[8](NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)}
+
+ (31) Composes MGM nonce
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 83 00 37 c3 08 01 7e c3 0a 71 62 01
+
+ (32) Composes AAD
+
+ 00000000: e9 d3 f3 78 19 1c 38 40 8d df f4 01 fb fb 0b 14
+ 00000010: 2e 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 01 4e 23 00 01 32
+
+ (33) Composes plaintext
+
+ 00000000: 27 00 00 15 02 00 00 00 49 4b 45 2d 49 6e 69 74
+ 00000010: 69 61 74 6f 72 29 00 00 48 02 00 00 00 c9 9b 01
+ 00000020: 9a 89 ee 56 53 ab 28 25 a1 d7 51 54 ac 01 42 fb
+ 00000030: d6 2e bc 1e f3 65 73 63 5b 16 81 4b 97 38 b4 20
+ 00000040: 5d 09 d9 b4 21 b4 0c f4 55 27 80 e7 4c cf 66 d0
+ 00000050: 14 25 87 7c 20 84 68 d5 79 3a 74 1e e3 29 00 00
+ 00000060: 08 00 00 40 00 2f 00 00 0c 00 00 40 01 00 00 00
+ 00000070: 04 21 00 00 10 01 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 03 00
+ 00000080: 00 2c 00 00 38 00 00 00 34 01 03 04 05 0a de 5f
+ 00000090: cd 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 20 03 00 00 08 01 00 00
+ 000000A0: 21 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 22 03 00 00 08 01 00 00
+ 000000B0: 23 00 00 00 08 05 00 00 00 2d 00 00 28 02 00 00
+ 000000C0: 00 07 01 00 10 08 00 08 00 0a 6f 0a ab 0a 6f 0a
+ 000000D0: ab 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff ff 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff
+ 000000E0: ff 29 00 00 28 02 00 00 00 07 01 00 10 08 00 08
+ 000000F0: 00 0a 00 00 02 0a 00 00 02 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff
+ 00000100: ff 0a 00 00 00 0a 00 00 ff 29 00 00 08 00 00 40
+ 00000110: 0a 00 00 00 08 00 00 40 0b 00
+
+ (34) Encrypts plaintext using K3i as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
+
+ 00000000: a5 7d 65 70 aa c3 ef f7 df d6 5c 58 f6 2e ea 80
+ 00000010: 82 15 dc 9d ae 42 1c f0 4c e4 cd 2a 45 f0 22 96
+ 00000020: ea d2 06 cc 9b 59 97 9e 45 5d 27 5f b4 fd 55 6a
+ 00000030: 90 bb 14 da df 9f 56 b0 e8 4c 89 a5 d8 f1 f6 55
+ 00000040: a9 f0 82 90 57 28 86 a5 bd 12 85 2f 2e 51 54 29
+ 00000050: fe 04 45 a4 90 f0 f8 0e 8b e9 c7 37 05 8f 6b bb
+ 00000060: 36 b0 24 8a 5f a3 ca f3 7e 7d f9 8e 73 4b b0 14
+ 00000070: ce b0 af 63 4c 4f ea 60 f6 46 4c 61 76 7c 9f 18
+ 00000080: 0c 61 73 fa 30 9f 91 c4 22 c9 ab 61 80 5a de 8e
+ 00000090: 06 40 36 7a 71 59 a5 ad 1c 67 25 03 9b af 2b 04
+ 000000A0: 9f c1 de 51 11 7b f1 16 20 81 78 3f a8 01 d6 c8
+ 000000B0: 79 89 d9 65 3e ea 58 6d ac 48 fc 4a 9a b9 48 02
+ 000000C0: d7 2b 01 5d 6a 2d cb 65 bb ad 99 86 e2 03 08 76
+ 000000D0: 1b dd 7c 56 3c 49 a4 2c da 24 1f ad 54 79 f5 d8
+ 000000E0: 0e 52 8a 49 92 90 66 80 85 00 b7 d8 89 5f b7 f4
+ 000000F0: 92 c1 5b ed 8a 16 00 f3 9a f8 90 4b fa 6a b2 de
+ 00000100: 2a 89 74 9f 99 c7 c3 57 88 5b 88 95 5c ec 46 52
+ 00000110: 04 c4 49 08 05 ab ee 1c 80 f6
+
+ (35) Computes ICV using K3i as K_msg
+
+ 00000000: 7a 4f 14 38 e6 5f 6b 8c f5 5d 55 f5
+
+ (36) Composes IV
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+
+ (37) Sends message, peer receives message
+
+ 10.111.10.171:54294->10.111.15.45:500 [334]
+
+ 00000000: e9 d3 f3 78 19 1c 38 40 8d df f4 01 fb fb 0b 14
+ 00000010: 2e 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 01 4e 23 00 01 32
+ 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 a5 7d 65 70 aa c3 ef f7
+ 00000030: df d6 5c 58 f6 2e ea 80 82 15 dc 9d ae 42 1c f0
+ 00000040: 4c e4 cd 2a 45 f0 22 96 ea d2 06 cc 9b 59 97 9e
+ 00000050: 45 5d 27 5f b4 fd 55 6a 90 bb 14 da df 9f 56 b0
+ 00000060: e8 4c 89 a5 d8 f1 f6 55 a9 f0 82 90 57 28 86 a5
+ 00000070: bd 12 85 2f 2e 51 54 29 fe 04 45 a4 90 f0 f8 0e
+ 00000080: 8b e9 c7 37 05 8f 6b bb 36 b0 24 8a 5f a3 ca f3
+ 00000090: 7e 7d f9 8e 73 4b b0 14 ce b0 af 63 4c 4f ea 60
+ 000000A0: f6 46 4c 61 76 7c 9f 18 0c 61 73 fa 30 9f 91 c4
+ 000000B0: 22 c9 ab 61 80 5a de 8e 06 40 36 7a 71 59 a5 ad
+ 000000C0: 1c 67 25 03 9b af 2b 04 9f c1 de 51 11 7b f1 16
+ 000000D0: 20 81 78 3f a8 01 d6 c8 79 89 d9 65 3e ea 58 6d
+ 000000E0: ac 48 fc 4a 9a b9 48 02 d7 2b 01 5d 6a 2d cb 65
+ 000000F0: bb ad 99 86 e2 03 08 76 1b dd 7c 56 3c 49 a4 2c
+ 00000100: da 24 1f ad 54 79 f5 d8 0e 52 8a 49 92 90 66 80
+ 00000110: 85 00 b7 d8 89 5f b7 f4 92 c1 5b ed 8a 16 00 f3
+ 00000120: 9a f8 90 4b fa 6a b2 de 2a 89 74 9f 99 c7 c3 57
+ 00000130: 88 5b 88 95 5c ec 46 52 04 c4 49 08 05 ab ee 1c
+ 00000140: 80 f6 7a 4f 14 38 e6 5f 6b 8c f5 5d 55 f5
+
+ Responder's actions:
+
+ (38) Computes shared key
+
+ 00000000: a2 43 6c bd 2d c1 0f 81 0d f7 6f 24 ae 78 70 f2
+ 00000010: 27 5d 1b dc c5 52 0e d8 53 e5 c5 43 98 f7 35 ce
+ 00000020: 32 70 89 2b 8e 89 0b 7d b3 98 77 cd bd 31 5d 18
+ 00000030: 10 5d 8b ac 16 f0 aa fd bc dc 7c 69 75 14 48 a8
+
+ (39) Computes SKEYSEED
+
+ 00000000: fc 7b d9 80 4b 15 00 60 d2 08 17 3a 08 4b a9 2a
+ 00000010: 0f 01 cb c3 ef e9 b5 aa 15 5b 0e 80 24 68 3c 4c
+ 00000020: 6c fb e9 c8 16 7d 54 2d 48 ee 61 71 01 68 ca 68
+ 00000030: 4f 7c b0 1b 61 29 20 9a 68 88 5b 3f d7 19 0b d0
+
+ (40) Computes SK_d
+
+ 00000000: 6b 2b 83 d7 a9 10 5f f4 27 e8 05 86 b7 f0 09 31
+ 00000010: 16 43 81 ae 88 7a 3f c9 65 30 73 00 e5 82 81 52
+ 00000020: 68 07 ba e5 39 ef 6e a7 75 db 2c c9 1c d3 4b 70
+ 00000030: e0 be 97 14 81 bb 0c 80 ef b3 6e 12 2a 08 74 36
+
+ (41) Computes SK_ei
+
+ 00000000: 8c 6d f1 8f 6a ff 9f 1b 3e be 40 ef e2 64 c2 bf
+ 00000010: 8e 6e d7 4c b5 8b 0a 74 a7 30 0c 21 7e 66 c7 d4
+ 00000020: 83 00 37 c3 08 01 7e c3 0a 71 62 01
+
+ (42) Computes SK_er
+
+ 00000000: df e8 7d 5f 9c da 5e 45 b8 b9 11 02 63 6c 08 47
+ 00000010: f6 4f c5 5d 6a 7b 4b 91 52 32 0a a2 5e c0 31 34
+ 00000020: 65 20 72 e7 0a 1e ff 7d da ba 17 31
+
+ (43) Computes SK_pi
+
+ 00000000: 93 11 c6 4c d7 12 b5 40 f9 e8 7e 73 c5 28 a7 d8
+ 00000010: 89 48 1c f1 bf a3 ad 67 cf b4 d9 6a 9b fe 3c ea
+ 00000020: 2f cc 2a 5e d4 e4 0b 27 7f be c9 9d c3 8d b7 68
+ 00000030: 03 c1 f3 f8 94 af 47 8b d8 35 b8 6b c2 ca 38 16
+
+ (44) Computes SK_pr
+
+ 00000000: 7b b0 4b 24 74 9c 73 68 7f 34 a3 b8 17 6b 9e 30
+ 00000010: f2 eb 33 73 23 ff 49 1e e3 07 e7 9f 77 b6 2a ef
+ 00000020: 5a 5e a9 02 8e 90 5c 83 49 ec 1e aa a4 05 bc e1
+ 00000030: fb c4 5b f0 27 d6 9b 41 77 6f e1 48 f3 37 99 e5
+
+ (45) Extracts IV from message
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+
+ (46) Computes K1i (i1 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: f2 ac 10 7a 1f 92 d1 b1 1b b1 74 c3 42 76 a3 3f
+ 00000010: fa ea 1b 1e 81 10 c1 01 7a 25 9a 00 8d 76 57 de
+
+ (47) Computes K2i (i2 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 77 e0 16 18 ad 76 e8 5a 66 2f 88 c4 c0 92 ec 33
+ 00000010: 6d 23 63 28 28 d5 77 d8 84 e1 01 b1 8d 84 a7 1d
+
+ (48) Computes K3i (i3 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 36 ff fa db 84 a9 f1 21 d5 84 16 db eb af 21 a2
+ 00000010: 12 6d 5c 35 95 fe 89 cf 27 47 52 8a b7 36 92 d4
+
+ (49) Composes MGM nonce
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 83 00 37 c3 08 01 7e c3 0a 71 62 01
+
+ (50) Extracts ICV from message
+
+ 00000000: 7a 4f 14 38 e6 5f 6b 8c f5 5d 55 f5
+
+ (51) Extracts AAD from message
+
+ 00000000: e9 d3 f3 78 19 1c 38 40 8d df f4 01 fb fb 0b 14
+ 00000010: 2e 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 01 4e 23 00 01 32
+
+ (52) Extracts ciphertext from message
+
+ 00000000: a5 7d 65 70 aa c3 ef f7 df d6 5c 58 f6 2e ea 80
+ 00000010: 82 15 dc 9d ae 42 1c f0 4c e4 cd 2a 45 f0 22 96
+ 00000020: ea d2 06 cc 9b 59 97 9e 45 5d 27 5f b4 fd 55 6a
+ 00000030: 90 bb 14 da df 9f 56 b0 e8 4c 89 a5 d8 f1 f6 55
+ 00000040: a9 f0 82 90 57 28 86 a5 bd 12 85 2f 2e 51 54 29
+ 00000050: fe 04 45 a4 90 f0 f8 0e 8b e9 c7 37 05 8f 6b bb
+ 00000060: 36 b0 24 8a 5f a3 ca f3 7e 7d f9 8e 73 4b b0 14
+ 00000070: ce b0 af 63 4c 4f ea 60 f6 46 4c 61 76 7c 9f 18
+ 00000080: 0c 61 73 fa 30 9f 91 c4 22 c9 ab 61 80 5a de 8e
+ 00000090: 06 40 36 7a 71 59 a5 ad 1c 67 25 03 9b af 2b 04
+ 000000A0: 9f c1 de 51 11 7b f1 16 20 81 78 3f a8 01 d6 c8
+ 000000B0: 79 89 d9 65 3e ea 58 6d ac 48 fc 4a 9a b9 48 02
+ 000000C0: d7 2b 01 5d 6a 2d cb 65 bb ad 99 86 e2 03 08 76
+ 000000D0: 1b dd 7c 56 3c 49 a4 2c da 24 1f ad 54 79 f5 d8
+ 000000E0: 0e 52 8a 49 92 90 66 80 85 00 b7 d8 89 5f b7 f4
+ 000000F0: 92 c1 5b ed 8a 16 00 f3 9a f8 90 4b fa 6a b2 de
+ 00000100: 2a 89 74 9f 99 c7 c3 57 88 5b 88 95 5c ec 46 52
+ 00000110: 04 c4 49 08 05 ab ee 1c 80 f6
+
+ (53) Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3i as K_msg,
+ resulting in plaintext
+
+ 00000000: 27 00 00 15 02 00 00 00 49 4b 45 2d 49 6e 69 74
+ 00000010: 69 61 74 6f 72 29 00 00 48 02 00 00 00 c9 9b 01
+ 00000020: 9a 89 ee 56 53 ab 28 25 a1 d7 51 54 ac 01 42 fb
+ 00000030: d6 2e bc 1e f3 65 73 63 5b 16 81 4b 97 38 b4 20
+ 00000040: 5d 09 d9 b4 21 b4 0c f4 55 27 80 e7 4c cf 66 d0
+ 00000050: 14 25 87 7c 20 84 68 d5 79 3a 74 1e e3 29 00 00
+ 00000060: 08 00 00 40 00 2f 00 00 0c 00 00 40 01 00 00 00
+ 00000070: 04 21 00 00 10 01 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 03 00
+ 00000080: 00 2c 00 00 38 00 00 00 34 01 03 04 05 0a de 5f
+ 00000090: cd 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 20 03 00 00 08 01 00 00
+ 000000A0: 21 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 22 03 00 00 08 01 00 00
+ 000000B0: 23 00 00 00 08 05 00 00 00 2d 00 00 28 02 00 00
+ 000000C0: 00 07 01 00 10 08 00 08 00 0a 6f 0a ab 0a 6f 0a
+ 000000D0: ab 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff ff 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff
+ 000000E0: ff 29 00 00 28 02 00 00 00 07 01 00 10 08 00 08
+ 000000F0: 00 0a 00 00 02 0a 00 00 02 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff
+ 00000100: ff 0a 00 00 00 0a 00 00 ff 29 00 00 08 00 00 40
+ 00000110: 0a 00 00 00 08 00 00 40 0b 00
+
+ (54) Parses received message
+
+ IKE SA Auth
+ E9D3F378191C3840.8DDFF401FBFB0B14.00000001 IKEv2 I->R[334]
+ E[306]{
+ IDi[21](FQDN){"IKE-Initiator"},
+ AUTH[72](Preshared-Key){C99B01...741EE3},
+ N[8](INITIAL_CONTACT),
+ N[12](SET_WINDOW_SIZE){4},
+ CP[16](REQUEST){IP4.Address[0], IP4.DNS[0]},
+ SA[56]{
+ P[52](#1:ESP:0ADE5FCD:5#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE,
+ ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE,
+ ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE,
+ ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE,
+ ESN=Off}},
+ TSi[40](2#){10.111.10.171:icmp:8.0, 0.0.0.0-255.255.255.255},
+ TSr[40](2#){10.0.0.2:icmp:8.0, 10.0.0.0-10.0.0.255},
+ N[8](ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+ N[8](NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)}
+
+ (55) Computes prf(SK_pi, IDi)
+
+ 00000000: 06 d3 d4 36 ab 5b 4f 41 d4 3d fc 79 1f 13 a3 89
+ 00000010: e9 a6 6e d7 87 7d 72 d1 9d 71 78 2d 05 ee 47 fb
+ 00000020: 82 c8 8f 86 cd b5 05 1d 25 7c 1e 79 18 ef 4e 4e
+ 00000030: 8d ca f4 47 12 c6 7f 6a 32 7d d8 e8 f2 8e f8 33
+
+ (56) Uses PSK
+
+ 00000000: e2 69 24 cf 15 32 93 47 3a 11 a4 97 a8 a4 5c b3
+ 00000010: 4e 28 31 ef 0e 28 bb 77 69 69 c6 3c 68 bf e1 0d
+
+ (57) Computes prf(PSK,"Key Pad for IKEv2")
+
+ 00000000: 01 3c a5 24 59 4e bc 78 99 20 61 6c 3f 03 e5 2e
+ 00000010: 7a 75 2a 0b 78 36 bd 0a 89 ce 1d e7 8b 23 32 ae
+ 00000020: 08 9a a0 03 1d da f6 14 8c 38 c6 bd 7c 03 13 24
+ 00000030: bd af c8 ad 88 18 8f 41 d0 12 b9 e1 5a 66 8f 10
+
+ (58) Computes content of AUTH payload and compares it with the
+ received one
+
+ 00000000: c9 9b 01 9a 89 ee 56 53 ab 28 25 a1 d7 51 54 ac
+ 00000010: 01 42 fb d6 2e bc 1e f3 65 73 63 5b 16 81 4b 97
+ 00000020: 38 b4 20 5d 09 d9 b4 21 b4 0c f4 55 27 80 e7 4c
+ 00000030: cf 66 d0 14 25 87 7c 20 84 68 d5 79 3a 74 1e e3
+
+ (59) Computes keys for ESP SAs
+
+ 00000000: ff 42 3b a3 78 29 2b 10 52 c8 bf 06 fa ba 6d 5f
+ 00000010: e2 db 51 1b 74 1b 54 ad 35 85 e3 cf 2b 77 52 42
+ 00000020: bc 8c d8 ba dd f4 46 9e 89 41 5c d6
+ 00000000: 8c eb 84 af 18 01 18 36 b7 8d 65 be 03 ca 69 64
+ 00000010: 89 6e a8 91 03 bc 9a dc bd 49 10 ab 20 83 9f 83
+ 00000020: b1 7c 45 9d ab d8 ab 6f de 6a 62 d1
+
+ (60) Computes prf(SK_pr,IDr)
+
+ 00000000: 32 61 00 71 e8 1a d6 a1 12 8d ef 4e 2a e9 bb c2
+ 00000010: 9f 3d ba 28 1b 2a a5 10 a2 ad c6 b1 73 07 c9 f1
+ 00000020: 50 9e 1c d7 a5 85 8f a8 40 ef dd a7 ae 33 71 74
+ 00000030: c8 8b a9 f4 3a 83 0f c1 c5 3c 9b 21 9f a9 58 25
+
+ (61) Uses PSK
+
+ 00000000: e2 69 24 cf 15 32 93 47 3a 11 a4 97 a8 a4 5c b3
+ 00000010: 4e 28 31 ef 0e 28 bb 77 69 69 c6 3c 68 bf e1 0d
+
+ (62) Computes prf(PSK,"Key Pad for IKEv2")
+
+ 00000000: 01 3c a5 24 59 4e bc 78 99 20 61 6c 3f 03 e5 2e
+ 00000010: 7a 75 2a 0b 78 36 bd 0a 89 ce 1d e7 8b 23 32 ae
+ 00000020: 08 9a a0 03 1d da f6 14 8c 38 c6 bd 7c 03 13 24
+ 00000030: bd af c8 ad 88 18 8f 41 d0 12 b9 e1 5a 66 8f 10
+
+ (63) Computes content of AUTH payload
+
+ 00000000: 35 ce 8a ab dd 3d b1 5f 38 7b 2e c9 a6 24 7a 1f
+ 00000010: a7 bb a0 6f b6 5e d8 81 07 d3 43 c8 a5 db 37 51
+ 00000020: 0e 9d 9a 85 66 18 7a 0f 5c e2 1b fb 27 56 65 ed
+ 00000030: 0e 41 fe ce 5e 95 bf 8a ae 57 f6 d6 26 d2 d1 2d
+
+ (64) Computes K1r (i1 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 61 cd ad b1 01 10 71 7c dc 18 81 1d 1f aa e3 13
+ 00000010: 4b 07 f8 f7 49 a7 3d 0a 57 2f e1 61 bc ab 85 c4
+
+ (65) Computes K2r (i2 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 5f e7 47 77 da f7 54 d7 a8 e5 eb ed f9 82 c8 a9
+ 00000010: 74 0c 54 77 6f eb b8 70 a4 43 43 3e c2 9e ce a6
+
+ (66) Computes K3r (i3 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: e8 af 72 c4 c3 55 a2 6a fb ad 37 fd b4 b9 7f d6
+ 00000010: f6 c8 cc 32 3f 50 32 40 06 86 ce 85 1b 02 28 f3
+
+ (67) Selects SPI for incoming ESP SA
+
+ 00000000: 50 3c 8d af
+
+ (68) Creates message
+
+ IKE SA Auth
+ E9D3F378191C3840.8DDFF401FBFB0B14.00000001 IKEv2 I<=R[286]
+ E[258]{
+ IDr[21](FQDN){"IKE-Responder"},
+ AUTH[72](Preshared-Key){35CE8A...D2D12D},
+ N[8](INITIAL_CONTACT),
+ N[12](SET_WINDOW_SIZE){64},
+ CP[16](REPLY){IP4.Address[4]=10.1.1.2},
+ SA[32]{
+ P[28](#1:ESP:503C8DAF:2#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE,
+ ESN=Off}},
+ TSi[24](1#){10.1.1.2},
+ TSr[24](1#){10.0.0.0-10.0.0.255},
+ N[8](ADDITIONAL_TS_POSSIBLE),
+ N[8](ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+ N[8](NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)}
+
+ (69) Composes MGM nonce
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 65 20 72 e7 0a 1e ff 7d da ba 17 31
+
+ (70) Composes AAD
+
+ 00000000: e9 d3 f3 78 19 1c 38 40 8d df f4 01 fb fb 0b 14
+ 00000010: 2e 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 01 1e 24 00 01 02
+
+ (71) Composes plaintext
+
+ 00000000: 27 00 00 15 02 00 00 00 49 4b 45 2d 52 65 73 70
+ 00000010: 6f 6e 64 65 72 29 00 00 48 02 00 00 00 35 ce 8a
+ 00000020: ab dd 3d b1 5f 38 7b 2e c9 a6 24 7a 1f a7 bb a0
+ 00000030: 6f b6 5e d8 81 07 d3 43 c8 a5 db 37 51 0e 9d 9a
+ 00000040: 85 66 18 7a 0f 5c e2 1b fb 27 56 65 ed 0e 41 fe
+ 00000050: ce 5e 95 bf 8a ae 57 f6 d6 26 d2 d1 2d 29 00 00
+ 00000060: 08 00 00 40 00 2f 00 00 0c 00 00 40 01 00 00 00
+ 00000070: 40 21 00 00 10 02 00 00 00 00 01 00 04 0a 01 01
+ 00000080: 02 2c 00 00 20 00 00 00 1c 01 03 04 02 50 3c 8d
+ 00000090: af 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 20 00 00 00 08 05 00 00
+ 000000A0: 00 2d 00 00 18 01 00 00 00 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff
+ 000000B0: ff 0a 01 01 02 0a 01 01 02 29 00 00 18 01 00 00
+ 000000C0: 00 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff ff 0a 00 00 00 0a 00 00
+ 000000D0: ff 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 02 29 00 00 08 00 00 40
+ 000000E0: 0a 00 00 00 08 00 00 40 0b 00
+
+ (72) Encrypts plaintext using K3r as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
+
+ 00000000: 9b 5d 58 8a 99 44 11 d6 5b 93 7f 98 57 0d 0f 09
+ 00000010: 0c a3 d9 36 41 b5 9c 91 94 17 3a cb 00 88 24 5e
+ 00000020: 25 b7 0d 75 2f fb 4d d0 ab 2c cc 84 42 e7 f8 1b
+ 00000030: 5a e6 88 13 9a 3e b1 03 79 31 0c 69 f6 17 a2 40
+ 00000040: f8 aa 74 2e 62 29 ee 57 43 3f 10 bf 44 73 51 97
+ 00000050: 2c 93 a4 02 87 3d 37 45 2c f1 3e 16 c3 d9 ec b3
+ 00000060: b8 6f 66 1a f1 73 44 7c db 74 11 e6 07 4a 75 23
+ 00000070: 83 df 00 52 ae 68 60 39 83 4c c3 b1 d5 7a e8 7f
+ 00000080: 61 59 9e 4f 92 3c 2f 04 3b c3 ac e7 23 3f 1c a7
+ 00000090: a5 3f 4d 33 1f 46 25 9f 09 5e f4 75 e0 12 32 5b
+ 000000A0: 29 64 a4 40 1a b5 c9 cd 9e 8f 91 cc 5b 7d 14 15
+ 000000B0: d0 89 70 e0 c6 d8 e4 e0 93 ff 02 4c 69 db ab 84
+ 000000C0: d6 8f b9 f9 ed 07 aa 96 29 2a 50 c2 c4 b6 e5 cb
+ 000000D0: 8e 16 33 7a 20 a4 3b 0e f2 53 9b b1 63 c0 46 4b
+ 000000E0: d9 31 a8 98 f5 17 8a ff 0a c0
+
+ (73) Computes ICV using K3r as K_msg
+
+ 00000000: 4a db a4 67 7e a1 3c 54 22 1f cf 62
+
+ (74) Composes IV
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+
+ (75) Sends message, peer receives message
+
+ 10.111.10.171:54294<-10.111.15.45:500 [286]
+
+ 00000000: e9 d3 f3 78 19 1c 38 40 8d df f4 01 fb fb 0b 14
+ 00000010: 2e 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 01 1e 24 00 01 02
+ 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 9b 5d 58 8a 99 44 11 d6
+ 00000030: 5b 93 7f 98 57 0d 0f 09 0c a3 d9 36 41 b5 9c 91
+ 00000040: 94 17 3a cb 00 88 24 5e 25 b7 0d 75 2f fb 4d d0
+ 00000050: ab 2c cc 84 42 e7 f8 1b 5a e6 88 13 9a 3e b1 03
+ 00000060: 79 31 0c 69 f6 17 a2 40 f8 aa 74 2e 62 29 ee 57
+ 00000070: 43 3f 10 bf 44 73 51 97 2c 93 a4 02 87 3d 37 45
+ 00000080: 2c f1 3e 16 c3 d9 ec b3 b8 6f 66 1a f1 73 44 7c
+ 00000090: db 74 11 e6 07 4a 75 23 83 df 00 52 ae 68 60 39
+ 000000A0: 83 4c c3 b1 d5 7a e8 7f 61 59 9e 4f 92 3c 2f 04
+ 000000B0: 3b c3 ac e7 23 3f 1c a7 a5 3f 4d 33 1f 46 25 9f
+ 000000C0: 09 5e f4 75 e0 12 32 5b 29 64 a4 40 1a b5 c9 cd
+ 000000D0: 9e 8f 91 cc 5b 7d 14 15 d0 89 70 e0 c6 d8 e4 e0
+ 000000E0: 93 ff 02 4c 69 db ab 84 d6 8f b9 f9 ed 07 aa 96
+ 000000F0: 29 2a 50 c2 c4 b6 e5 cb 8e 16 33 7a 20 a4 3b 0e
+ 00000100: f2 53 9b b1 63 c0 46 4b d9 31 a8 98 f5 17 8a ff
+ 00000110: 0a c0 4a db a4 67 7e a1 3c 54 22 1f cf 62
+
+ Initiator's actions:
+
+ (76) Extracts IV from message
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+
+ (77) Computes K1r (i1 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 61 cd ad b1 01 10 71 7c dc 18 81 1d 1f aa e3 13
+ 00000010: 4b 07 f8 f7 49 a7 3d 0a 57 2f e1 61 bc ab 85 c4
+
+ (78) Computes K2r (i2 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 5f e7 47 77 da f7 54 d7 a8 e5 eb ed f9 82 c8 a9
+ 00000010: 74 0c 54 77 6f eb b8 70 a4 43 43 3e c2 9e ce a6
+
+ (79) Computes K3r (i3 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: e8 af 72 c4 c3 55 a2 6a fb ad 37 fd b4 b9 7f d6
+ 00000010: f6 c8 cc 32 3f 50 32 40 06 86 ce 85 1b 02 28 f3
+
+ (80) Composes MGM nonce
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 65 20 72 e7 0a 1e ff 7d da ba 17 31
+
+ (81) Extracts ICV from message
+
+ 00000000: 4a db a4 67 7e a1 3c 54 22 1f cf 62
+
+ (82) Extracts AAD from message
+
+ 00000000: e9 d3 f3 78 19 1c 38 40 8d df f4 01 fb fb 0b 14
+ 00000010: 2e 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 01 1e 24 00 01 02
+
+ (83) Extracts ciphertext from message
+
+ 00000000: 9b 5d 58 8a 99 44 11 d6 5b 93 7f 98 57 0d 0f 09
+ 00000010: 0c a3 d9 36 41 b5 9c 91 94 17 3a cb 00 88 24 5e
+ 00000020: 25 b7 0d 75 2f fb 4d d0 ab 2c cc 84 42 e7 f8 1b
+ 00000030: 5a e6 88 13 9a 3e b1 03 79 31 0c 69 f6 17 a2 40
+ 00000040: f8 aa 74 2e 62 29 ee 57 43 3f 10 bf 44 73 51 97
+ 00000050: 2c 93 a4 02 87 3d 37 45 2c f1 3e 16 c3 d9 ec b3
+ 00000060: b8 6f 66 1a f1 73 44 7c db 74 11 e6 07 4a 75 23
+ 00000070: 83 df 00 52 ae 68 60 39 83 4c c3 b1 d5 7a e8 7f
+ 00000080: 61 59 9e 4f 92 3c 2f 04 3b c3 ac e7 23 3f 1c a7
+ 00000090: a5 3f 4d 33 1f 46 25 9f 09 5e f4 75 e0 12 32 5b
+ 000000A0: 29 64 a4 40 1a b5 c9 cd 9e 8f 91 cc 5b 7d 14 15
+ 000000B0: d0 89 70 e0 c6 d8 e4 e0 93 ff 02 4c 69 db ab 84
+ 000000C0: d6 8f b9 f9 ed 07 aa 96 29 2a 50 c2 c4 b6 e5 cb
+ 000000D0: 8e 16 33 7a 20 a4 3b 0e f2 53 9b b1 63 c0 46 4b
+ 000000E0: d9 31 a8 98 f5 17 8a ff 0a c0
+
+ (84) Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3r as K_msg,
+ resulting in plaintext
+
+ 00000000: 27 00 00 15 02 00 00 00 49 4b 45 2d 52 65 73 70
+ 00000010: 6f 6e 64 65 72 29 00 00 48 02 00 00 00 35 ce 8a
+ 00000020: ab dd 3d b1 5f 38 7b 2e c9 a6 24 7a 1f a7 bb a0
+ 00000030: 6f b6 5e d8 81 07 d3 43 c8 a5 db 37 51 0e 9d 9a
+ 00000040: 85 66 18 7a 0f 5c e2 1b fb 27 56 65 ed 0e 41 fe
+ 00000050: ce 5e 95 bf 8a ae 57 f6 d6 26 d2 d1 2d 29 00 00
+ 00000060: 08 00 00 40 00 2f 00 00 0c 00 00 40 01 00 00 00
+ 00000070: 40 21 00 00 10 02 00 00 00 00 01 00 04 0a 01 01
+ 00000080: 02 2c 00 00 20 00 00 00 1c 01 03 04 02 50 3c 8d
+ 00000090: af 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 20 00 00 00 08 05 00 00
+ 000000A0: 00 2d 00 00 18 01 00 00 00 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff
+ 000000B0: ff 0a 01 01 02 0a 01 01 02 29 00 00 18 01 00 00
+ 000000C0: 00 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff ff 0a 00 00 00 0a 00 00
+ 000000D0: ff 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 02 29 00 00 08 00 00 40
+ 000000E0: 0a 00 00 00 08 00 00 40 0b 00
+
+ (85) Parses received message
+
+ IKE SA Auth
+ E9D3F378191C3840.8DDFF401FBFB0B14.00000001 IKEv2 R=>I[286]
+ E[258]{
+ IDr[21](FQDN){"IKE-Responder"},
+ AUTH[72](Preshared-Key){35CE8A...D2D12D},
+ N[8](INITIAL_CONTACT),
+ N[12](SET_WINDOW_SIZE){64},
+ CP[16](REPLY){IP4.Address[4]=10.1.1.2},
+ SA[32]{
+ P[28](#1:ESP:503C8DAF:2#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE,
+ ESN=Off}},
+ TSi[24](1#){10.1.1.2},
+ TSr[24](1#){10.0.0.0-10.0.0.255},
+ N[8](ADDITIONAL_TS_POSSIBLE),
+ N[8](ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+ N[8](NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)}
+
+ (86) Computes prf(SK_pr, IDr)
+
+ 00000000: 32 61 00 71 e8 1a d6 a1 12 8d ef 4e 2a e9 bb c2
+ 00000010: 9f 3d ba 28 1b 2a a5 10 a2 ad c6 b1 73 07 c9 f1
+ 00000020: 50 9e 1c d7 a5 85 8f a8 40 ef dd a7 ae 33 71 74
+ 00000030: c8 8b a9 f4 3a 83 0f c1 c5 3c 9b 21 9f a9 58 25
+
+ (87) Uses PSK
+
+ 00000000: e2 69 24 cf 15 32 93 47 3a 11 a4 97 a8 a4 5c b3
+ 00000010: 4e 28 31 ef 0e 28 bb 77 69 69 c6 3c 68 bf e1 0d
+
+ (88) Computes prf(PSK,"Key Pad for IKEv2")
+
+ 00000000: 01 3c a5 24 59 4e bc 78 99 20 61 6c 3f 03 e5 2e
+ 00000010: 7a 75 2a 0b 78 36 bd 0a 89 ce 1d e7 8b 23 32 ae
+ 00000020: 08 9a a0 03 1d da f6 14 8c 38 c6 bd 7c 03 13 24
+ 00000030: bd af c8 ad 88 18 8f 41 d0 12 b9 e1 5a 66 8f 10
+
+ (89) Computes content of AUTH payload and compares it with the
+ received one
+
+ 00000000: 35 ce 8a ab dd 3d b1 5f 38 7b 2e c9 a6 24 7a 1f
+ 00000010: a7 bb a0 6f b6 5e d8 81 07 d3 43 c8 a5 db 37 51
+ 00000020: 0e 9d 9a 85 66 18 7a 0f 5c e2 1b fb 27 56 65 ed
+ 00000030: 0e 41 fe ce 5e 95 bf 8a ae 57 f6 d6 26 d2 d1 2d
+
+ (90) Computes keys for ESP SAs
+
+ 00000000: ff 42 3b a3 78 29 2b 10 52 c8 bf 06 fa ba 6d 5f
+ 00000010: e2 db 51 1b 74 1b 54 ad 35 85 e3 cf 2b 77 52 42
+ 00000020: bc 8c d8 ba dd f4 46 9e 89 41 5c d6
+ 00000000: 8c eb 84 af 18 01 18 36 b7 8d 65 be 03 ca 69 64
+ 00000010: 89 6e a8 91 03 bc 9a dc bd 49 10 ab 20 83 9f 83
+ 00000020: b1 7c 45 9d ab d8 ab 6f de 6a 62 d1
+
+A.1.2. Sub-Scenario 2: IKE SA Rekeying Using the CREATE_CHILD_SA
+ Exchange
+
+ Initiator Responder
+
+ HDR, SK {SAi, Ni, KEi [,N+]} --->
+ <--- HDR, SK {SAr, Nr, KEr [,N+]}
+
+ Initiator's actions:
+
+ (1) Generates random SPIi for new IKE SA
+
+ 00000000: 43 87 64 8d 6c 9e 28 ff
+
+ (2) Generates random IKE nonce Ni
+
+ 00000000: 6c 83 67 41 1b 45 94 1d 79 94 51 2d 3f 7d 1e ce
+ 00000010: 06 76 a6 09 cc a9 3a 8f f8 17 81 ff 28 08 5a 4c
+
+ (3) Generates ephemeral private key
+
+ 00000000: cf 8f f0 df 04 24 43 b5 7e 15 2c bd 9f cd bd d9
+ 00000010: 20 b5 35 7c e8 8b a6 d7 bd 7f 32 39 3d 5e 9a 3c
+ 00000020: eb 88 4f 7f 6c 5d 03 05 fc bf 08 12 41 76 f4 a6
+ 00000030: 2e 4c f7 ce 55 18 9d 6a 54 1f f7 57 46 23 cd 26
+
+ (4) Computes public key
+
+ 00000000: 04 db 0b d3 9a ac 83 f3 e9 9d a9 11 c3 12 f6 df
+ 00000010: f6 ae 99 38 55 20 1f 83 c8 28 ed 14 f9 68 88 77
+ 00000020: ac 78 36 41 7a d7 93 a7 ee 4c 6a d7 f2 50 24 f5
+ 00000030: a8 7b 03 28 22 9f a4 66 11 20 57 64 56 7c 36 3c
+ 00000040: 72 c7 91 0a 1c fd 64 54 f1 17 97 6a 35 48 dc 8f
+ 00000050: 85 97 20 12 2f 35 55 58 9b ca 7a 84 f3 01 cf ca
+ 00000060: 78 e7 41 87 d3 3f 0f 2b 6d 78 59 ad f2 f2 c2 97
+ 00000070: db 0b 75 6e 00 38 a2 72 8d 17 6b 44 f9 8b 95 66
+
+ (5) Creates message
+
+ Create Child SA
+ E9D3F378191C3840.8DDFF401FBFB0B14.00000002 IKEv2 R<-I [281]
+ E[253]{
+ SA[44]{
+ P[40](#1:IKE:4387648D6C9E28FF:3#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE,
+ PRF=PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512,
+ KE=GOST3410_2012_512}},
+ NONCE[36]{6C8367...085A4C},
+ KE[136](GOST3410_2012_512){04DB0B...8B9566},
+ N[12](SET_WINDOW_SIZE){4}}
+
+ (6) Uses previously computed key K3i
+
+ 00000000: 36 ff fa db 84 a9 f1 21 d5 84 16 db eb af 21 a2
+ 00000010: 12 6d 5c 35 95 fe 89 cf 27 47 52 8a b7 36 92 d4
+
+ (7) Composes MGM nonce
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 01 83 00 37 c3 08 01 7e c3 0a 71 62 01
+
+ (8) Composes AAD
+
+ 00000000: e9 d3 f3 78 19 1c 38 40 8d df f4 01 fb fb 0b 14
+ 00000010: 2e 20 24 08 00 00 00 02 00 00 01 19 21 00 00 fd
+
+ (9) Composes plaintext
+
+ 00000000: 28 00 00 2c 00 00 00 28 01 01 08 03 43 87 64 8d
+ 00000010: 6c 9e 28 ff 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 20 03 00 00 08
+ 00000020: 02 00 00 09 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 22 22 00 00 24
+ 00000030: 6c 83 67 41 1b 45 94 1d 79 94 51 2d 3f 7d 1e ce
+ 00000040: 06 76 a6 09 cc a9 3a 8f f8 17 81 ff 28 08 5a 4c
+ 00000050: 29 00 00 88 00 22 00 00 04 db 0b d3 9a ac 83 f3
+ 00000060: e9 9d a9 11 c3 12 f6 df f6 ae 99 38 55 20 1f 83
+ 00000070: c8 28 ed 14 f9 68 88 77 ac 78 36 41 7a d7 93 a7
+ 00000080: ee 4c 6a d7 f2 50 24 f5 a8 7b 03 28 22 9f a4 66
+ 00000090: 11 20 57 64 56 7c 36 3c 72 c7 91 0a 1c fd 64 54
+ 000000A0: f1 17 97 6a 35 48 dc 8f 85 97 20 12 2f 35 55 58
+ 000000B0: 9b ca 7a 84 f3 01 cf ca 78 e7 41 87 d3 3f 0f 2b
+ 000000C0: 6d 78 59 ad f2 f2 c2 97 db 0b 75 6e 00 38 a2 72
+ 000000D0: 8d 17 6b 44 f9 8b 95 66 00 00 00 0c 00 00 40 01
+ 000000E0: 00 00 00 04 00
+
+ (10) Encrypts plaintext using K3i as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
+
+ 00000000: 00 16 cf 92 8a 87 4c 02 79 31 04 22 c3 d9 5f fd
+ 00000010: 5a 19 23 62 25 d1 99 c2 af 75 4d f1 3c ac c0 c1
+ 00000020: c7 db d0 fd 93 ac 6d 25 b4 19 01 e6 df e8 51 c2
+ 00000030: 88 a9 8a 26 92 98 ec ce c1 2f cf ca ce 9b 5a 6d
+ 00000040: 4c 8b cf 97 63 5a a3 e6 46 49 0f 1f 05 54 00 49
+ 00000050: 6b d8 14 f4 e2 ee b3 66 2a 13 9b dd 63 53 7a 82
+ 00000060: 2a d8 bf 48 aa db 79 21 d3 d8 ac b1 ac 8f 9b 41
+ 00000070: a7 49 81 95 d7 54 46 e2 00 9b 17 3a ab 9a 4c 8f
+ 00000080: 19 9e ac 61 cc f6 02 47 a1 7e f4 48 5b e7 3c a7
+ 00000090: 53 dc 03 9e ea 5f c4 99 60 6e db 6a 21 fe 7c 7b
+ 000000A0: 11 ed bf 44 59 73 fa 65 01 98 e4 e6 10 63 87 27
+ 000000B0: 8b f0 8c bb 94 52 dd 97 ee dc ce 88 c4 45 b4 16
+ 000000C0: f2 8b d4 74 cb 46 38 57 f4 44 88 23 44 06 d9 91
+ 000000D0: 00 ea 81 2c e7 f6 66 0f a8 45 0f 1d 8c 2d f1 02
+ 000000E0: a2 06 78 c7 e0
+
+ (11) Computes ICV using K3i as K_msg
+
+ 00000000: b1 2f da a5 96 fa 27 ee 67 de 9e 95
+
+ (12) Composes IV
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01
+
+ (13) Sends message, peer receives message
+
+ 10.111.10.171:54294->10.111.15.45:500 [281]
+
+ 00000000: e9 d3 f3 78 19 1c 38 40 8d df f4 01 fb fb 0b 14
+ 00000010: 2e 20 24 08 00 00 00 02 00 00 01 19 21 00 00 fd
+ 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 16 cf 92 8a 87 4c 02
+ 00000030: 79 31 04 22 c3 d9 5f fd 5a 19 23 62 25 d1 99 c2
+ 00000040: af 75 4d f1 3c ac c0 c1 c7 db d0 fd 93 ac 6d 25
+ 00000050: b4 19 01 e6 df e8 51 c2 88 a9 8a 26 92 98 ec ce
+ 00000060: c1 2f cf ca ce 9b 5a 6d 4c 8b cf 97 63 5a a3 e6
+ 00000070: 46 49 0f 1f 05 54 00 49 6b d8 14 f4 e2 ee b3 66
+ 00000080: 2a 13 9b dd 63 53 7a 82 2a d8 bf 48 aa db 79 21
+ 00000090: d3 d8 ac b1 ac 8f 9b 41 a7 49 81 95 d7 54 46 e2
+ 000000A0: 00 9b 17 3a ab 9a 4c 8f 19 9e ac 61 cc f6 02 47
+ 000000B0: a1 7e f4 48 5b e7 3c a7 53 dc 03 9e ea 5f c4 99
+ 000000C0: 60 6e db 6a 21 fe 7c 7b 11 ed bf 44 59 73 fa 65
+ 000000D0: 01 98 e4 e6 10 63 87 27 8b f0 8c bb 94 52 dd 97
+ 000000E0: ee dc ce 88 c4 45 b4 16 f2 8b d4 74 cb 46 38 57
+ 000000F0: f4 44 88 23 44 06 d9 91 00 ea 81 2c e7 f6 66 0f
+ 00000100: a8 45 0f 1d 8c 2d f1 02 a2 06 78 c7 e0 b1 2f da
+ 00000110: a5 96 fa 27 ee 67 de 9e 95
+
+ Responder's actions:
+
+ (14) Extracts IV from message
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01
+
+ (15) Uses previously computed key K3i
+
+ 00000000: 36 ff fa db 84 a9 f1 21 d5 84 16 db eb af 21 a2
+ 00000010: 12 6d 5c 35 95 fe 89 cf 27 47 52 8a b7 36 92 d4
+
+ (16) Composes MGM nonce
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 01 83 00 37 c3 08 01 7e c3 0a 71 62 01
+
+ (17) Extracts ICV from message
+
+ 00000000: b1 2f da a5 96 fa 27 ee 67 de 9e 95
+
+ (18) Extracts AAD from message
+
+ 00000000: e9 d3 f3 78 19 1c 38 40 8d df f4 01 fb fb 0b 14
+ 00000010: 2e 20 24 08 00 00 00 02 00 00 01 19 21 00 00 fd
+
+ (19) Extracts ciphertext from message
+
+ 00000000: 00 16 cf 92 8a 87 4c 02 79 31 04 22 c3 d9 5f fd
+ 00000010: 5a 19 23 62 25 d1 99 c2 af 75 4d f1 3c ac c0 c1
+ 00000020: c7 db d0 fd 93 ac 6d 25 b4 19 01 e6 df e8 51 c2
+ 00000030: 88 a9 8a 26 92 98 ec ce c1 2f cf ca ce 9b 5a 6d
+ 00000040: 4c 8b cf 97 63 5a a3 e6 46 49 0f 1f 05 54 00 49
+ 00000050: 6b d8 14 f4 e2 ee b3 66 2a 13 9b dd 63 53 7a 82
+ 00000060: 2a d8 bf 48 aa db 79 21 d3 d8 ac b1 ac 8f 9b 41
+ 00000070: a7 49 81 95 d7 54 46 e2 00 9b 17 3a ab 9a 4c 8f
+ 00000080: 19 9e ac 61 cc f6 02 47 a1 7e f4 48 5b e7 3c a7
+ 00000090: 53 dc 03 9e ea 5f c4 99 60 6e db 6a 21 fe 7c 7b
+ 000000A0: 11 ed bf 44 59 73 fa 65 01 98 e4 e6 10 63 87 27
+ 000000B0: 8b f0 8c bb 94 52 dd 97 ee dc ce 88 c4 45 b4 16
+ 000000C0: f2 8b d4 74 cb 46 38 57 f4 44 88 23 44 06 d9 91
+ 000000D0: 00 ea 81 2c e7 f6 66 0f a8 45 0f 1d 8c 2d f1 02
+ 000000E0: a2 06 78 c7 e0
+
+ (20) Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3i as K_msg,
+ resulting in plaintext
+
+ 00000000: 28 00 00 2c 00 00 00 28 01 01 08 03 43 87 64 8d
+ 00000010: 6c 9e 28 ff 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 20 03 00 00 08
+ 00000020: 02 00 00 09 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 22 22 00 00 24
+ 00000030: 6c 83 67 41 1b 45 94 1d 79 94 51 2d 3f 7d 1e ce
+ 00000040: 06 76 a6 09 cc a9 3a 8f f8 17 81 ff 28 08 5a 4c
+ 00000050: 29 00 00 88 00 22 00 00 04 db 0b d3 9a ac 83 f3
+ 00000060: e9 9d a9 11 c3 12 f6 df f6 ae 99 38 55 20 1f 83
+ 00000070: c8 28 ed 14 f9 68 88 77 ac 78 36 41 7a d7 93 a7
+ 00000080: ee 4c 6a d7 f2 50 24 f5 a8 7b 03 28 22 9f a4 66
+ 00000090: 11 20 57 64 56 7c 36 3c 72 c7 91 0a 1c fd 64 54
+ 000000A0: f1 17 97 6a 35 48 dc 8f 85 97 20 12 2f 35 55 58
+ 000000B0: 9b ca 7a 84 f3 01 cf ca 78 e7 41 87 d3 3f 0f 2b
+ 000000C0: 6d 78 59 ad f2 f2 c2 97 db 0b 75 6e 00 38 a2 72
+ 000000D0: 8d 17 6b 44 f9 8b 95 66 00 00 00 0c 00 00 40 01
+ 000000E0: 00 00 00 04 00
+
+ (21) Parses received message
+
+ Create Child SA
+ E9D3F378191C3840.8DDFF401FBFB0B14.00000002 IKEv2 I->R[281]
+ E[253]{
+ SA[44]{
+ P[40](#1:IKE:4387648D6C9E28FF:3#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE,
+ PRF=PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512,
+ KE=GOST3410_2012_512}},
+ NONCE[36]{6C8367...085A4C},
+ KE[136](GOST3410_2012_512){04DB0B...8B9566},
+ N[12](SET_WINDOW_SIZE){4}}
+
+ (22) Generates random SPIr for new IKE SA
+
+ 00000000: 82 d9 fa f8 74 49 b9 36
+
+ (23) Generates random IKE nonce Nr
+
+ 00000000: 5a 2d d2 68 c6 85 5d 32 d4 7b 0b 8e ae 7d c9 81
+ 00000010: be 3e 69 c1 bb f5 ae 89 55 59 c7 48 bc 96 43 7b
+
+ (24) Generates ephemeral private key
+
+ 00000000: b9 ea c6 c1 84 db 39 54 e3 e7 74 be 02 e0 c9 0b
+ 00000010: 5c b9 72 03 d4 fc a2 3f b6 cf 71 8d 4f f4 b4 c5
+ 00000020: 21 1c 93 f9 86 cc 6b cb db ff 78 51 5b b6 48 e8
+ 00000030: 44 ce c0 83 c9 d0 b8 90 08 94 db 29 9f bb c2 1a
+
+ (25) Computes public key
+
+ 00000000: b9 f9 27 a8 96 70 7a 03 58 c2 39 58 63 2d 50 20
+ 00000010: bf 69 c0 1d a6 de d4 4d 65 aa 26 c6 8f 9f e9 e9
+ 00000020: 4b bb da 1d 2f d3 60 2d 18 33 04 9b b2 25 a6 07
+ 00000030: ac 58 1b fc 3c 5b 1e f3 4b c0 f9 cb 90 14 c6 80
+ 00000040: 6e c3 73 c1 4a f7 5c 27 dd 2a e1 ba 94 9c f7 06
+ 00000050: 68 92 19 8e 85 67 f9 d2 d1 ea 3c 16 16 b9 3f 0c
+ 00000060: 8b 2d 2e d6 20 14 7e 27 18 d3 23 9e 2a 99 41 40
+ 00000070: 6a 41 c5 3f 79 9c a7 22 79 15 98 1d 98 b5 ac 4a
+
+ (26) Computes shared key
+
+ 00000000: dd e7 44 39 1c d9 66 cf d2 24 a4 bb 0a 57 b3 3e
+ 00000010: 1a 8f 5d 07 11 4d c3 47 87 1a 13 ec 84 26 03 f8
+ 00000020: ea 93 5a f5 23 a3 45 71 ff 5f f2 3d 59 43 3a 5e
+ 00000030: eb 5e 79 fa 0e 62 9e bc af ca e4 ee 7a 81 3a 84
+
+ (27) Computes SKEYSEED for new SA
+
+ 00000000: ec 5f 4f 15 ce d7 7d 2f 12 fb a1 df 5f 44 aa 88
+ 00000010: 6a ef 45 e4 04 97 86 95 15 1b 3c ac 31 cc 57 a3
+ 00000020: f0 f4 92 89 33 00 76 2b e9 fd 8b c2 ed 8b e7 36
+ 00000030: cb 17 59 55 9e cc 22 14 72 a5 79 27 27 1d 06 62
+
+ (28) Computes SK_d for new SA
+
+ 00000000: 08 58 14 7d eb c9 41 7f 7f a2 86 66 bf d4 76 37
+ 00000010: 04 27 4e bc 5d 63 f7 07 79 62 69 7a 69 3c da 7a
+ 00000020: d5 4d 6f 08 1e 14 51 66 2f 94 0d bd 29 45 9c b0
+ 00000030: 51 26 09 4b 47 52 ba 19 98 a5 c2 65 af 84 a1 34
+
+ (29) Computes SK_ei for new SA
+
+ 00000000: 18 0a 4f 98 7d a4 21 6c 68 84 94 1f d9 28 49 b9
+ 00000010: 05 30 f8 aa 43 02 7e 0d aa d3 27 e9 8c 9a 39 9a
+ 00000020: 03 a0 05 b7 b2 2d f9 90 bb 6c ff ca
+
+ (30) Computes SK_er for new SA
+
+ 00000000: 47 dc aa 71 4a 8b 66 13 d8 09 79 c7 8c 72 0a 78
+ 00000010: 06 48 6d 4f 1f 53 3a 91 1d b7 2c 86 f5 f1 4e 00
+ 00000020: 84 57 87 2b 38 70 63 27 8c dd 88 78
+
+ (31) Creates message
+
+ Create Child SA
+ E9D3F378191C3840.8DDFF401FBFB0B14.00000002 IKEv2 I<=R[281]
+ E[253]{
+ SA[44]{
+ P[40](#1:IKE:82D9FAF87449B936:3#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE,
+ PRF=PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512,
+ KE=GOST3410_2012_512}},
+ NONCE[36]{5A2DD2...96437B},
+ KE[136](GOST3410_2012_512){B9F927...B5AC4A},
+ N[12](SET_WINDOW_SIZE){64}}
+
+ (32) Uses previously computed key K3r
+
+ 00000000: e8 af 72 c4 c3 55 a2 6a fb ad 37 fd b4 b9 7f d6
+ 00000010: f6 c8 cc 32 3f 50 32 40 06 86 ce 85 1b 02 28 f3
+
+ (33) Composes MGM nonce
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 01 65 20 72 e7 0a 1e ff 7d da ba 17 31
+
+ (34) Composes AAD
+
+ 00000000: e9 d3 f3 78 19 1c 38 40 8d df f4 01 fb fb 0b 14
+ 00000010: 2e 20 24 20 00 00 00 02 00 00 01 19 21 00 00 fd
+
+ (35) Composes plaintext
+
+ 00000000: 28 00 00 2c 00 00 00 28 01 01 08 03 82 d9 fa f8
+ 00000010: 74 49 b9 36 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 20 03 00 00 08
+ 00000020: 02 00 00 09 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 22 22 00 00 24
+ 00000030: 5a 2d d2 68 c6 85 5d 32 d4 7b 0b 8e ae 7d c9 81
+ 00000040: be 3e 69 c1 bb f5 ae 89 55 59 c7 48 bc 96 43 7b
+ 00000050: 29 00 00 88 00 22 00 00 b9 f9 27 a8 96 70 7a 03
+ 00000060: 58 c2 39 58 63 2d 50 20 bf 69 c0 1d a6 de d4 4d
+ 00000070: 65 aa 26 c6 8f 9f e9 e9 4b bb da 1d 2f d3 60 2d
+ 00000080: 18 33 04 9b b2 25 a6 07 ac 58 1b fc 3c 5b 1e f3
+ 00000090: 4b c0 f9 cb 90 14 c6 80 6e c3 73 c1 4a f7 5c 27
+ 000000A0: dd 2a e1 ba 94 9c f7 06 68 92 19 8e 85 67 f9 d2
+ 000000B0: d1 ea 3c 16 16 b9 3f 0c 8b 2d 2e d6 20 14 7e 27
+ 000000C0: 18 d3 23 9e 2a 99 41 40 6a 41 c5 3f 79 9c a7 22
+ 000000D0: 79 15 98 1d 98 b5 ac 4a 00 00 00 0c 00 00 40 01
+ 000000E0: 00 00 00 40 00
+
+ (36) Encrypts plaintext using K3r as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
+
+ 00000000: fd ee 4c 8f 78 ff b6 0c fc 65 bb ef db 53 56 a2
+ 00000010: d3 2d 4f 59 ff 28 38 eb 76 0b 40 5e 8d 52 e8 c1
+ 00000020: b9 75 22 b4 bb 71 8f 16 3a 97 0e 4d 95 ef bc 84
+ 00000030: 46 c6 77 1e 4b 14 73 46 89 ed d4 b4 54 a2 64 19
+ 00000040: 67 b2 98 7e 8b d4 45 31 17 1e e4 ae f4 24 44 42
+ 00000050: dd 55 a0 49 fe 08 59 d0 a1 16 69 60 8a 8e 54 d2
+ 00000060: 02 6d ae 17 5f 32 bf 14 78 f0 86 47 26 bf fb 6b
+ 00000070: 7c 17 f7 f5 62 b6 d6 a0 e5 f3 c2 af b5 28 ee d0
+ 00000080: 9b 22 8c e6 d0 58 4d 48 18 6d dd 3e 4e 33 66 ac
+ 00000090: a2 29 1f 3b 62 4a e6 4a 8c 98 18 8b 21 73 a5 88
+ 000000A0: 49 09 3b 27 88 20 40 6b a5 fc 08 37 c7 ac c9 0f
+ 000000B0: 5d 69 87 7c 37 c8 c7 fd d8 72 6d ad ac 22 27 ca
+ 000000C0: 93 d6 bd 6a 55 2a 1a 8b 2e 84 b4 0a 35 d3 ac d5
+ 000000D0: 99 c9 ac d5 6f 03 94 bf ca f5 53 e5 a5 74 57 de
+ 000000E0: 6a 5a 26 b8 e4
+
+ (37) Computes ICV using K3r as K_msg
+
+ 00000000: 04 2f 99 3f 02 19 56 c4 0d 0b 7a 45
+
+ (38) Composes IV
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01
+
+ (39) Sends message, peer receives message
+
+ 10.111.10.171:54294<-10.111.15.45:500 [281]
+
+ 00000000: e9 d3 f3 78 19 1c 38 40 8d df f4 01 fb fb 0b 14
+ 00000010: 2e 20 24 20 00 00 00 02 00 00 01 19 21 00 00 fd
+ 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 fd ee 4c 8f 78 ff b6 0c
+ 00000030: fc 65 bb ef db 53 56 a2 d3 2d 4f 59 ff 28 38 eb
+ 00000040: 76 0b 40 5e 8d 52 e8 c1 b9 75 22 b4 bb 71 8f 16
+ 00000050: 3a 97 0e 4d 95 ef bc 84 46 c6 77 1e 4b 14 73 46
+ 00000060: 89 ed d4 b4 54 a2 64 19 67 b2 98 7e 8b d4 45 31
+ 00000070: 17 1e e4 ae f4 24 44 42 dd 55 a0 49 fe 08 59 d0
+ 00000080: a1 16 69 60 8a 8e 54 d2 02 6d ae 17 5f 32 bf 14
+ 00000090: 78 f0 86 47 26 bf fb 6b 7c 17 f7 f5 62 b6 d6 a0
+ 000000A0: e5 f3 c2 af b5 28 ee d0 9b 22 8c e6 d0 58 4d 48
+ 000000B0: 18 6d dd 3e 4e 33 66 ac a2 29 1f 3b 62 4a e6 4a
+ 000000C0: 8c 98 18 8b 21 73 a5 88 49 09 3b 27 88 20 40 6b
+ 000000D0: a5 fc 08 37 c7 ac c9 0f 5d 69 87 7c 37 c8 c7 fd
+ 000000E0: d8 72 6d ad ac 22 27 ca 93 d6 bd 6a 55 2a 1a 8b
+ 000000F0: 2e 84 b4 0a 35 d3 ac d5 99 c9 ac d5 6f 03 94 bf
+ 00000100: ca f5 53 e5 a5 74 57 de 6a 5a 26 b8 e4 04 2f 99
+ 00000110: 3f 02 19 56 c4 0d 0b 7a 45
+
+ Initiator's actions:
+
+ (40) Extracts IV from message
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01
+
+ (41) Uses previously computed key K3r
+
+ 00000000: e8 af 72 c4 c3 55 a2 6a fb ad 37 fd b4 b9 7f d6
+ 00000010: f6 c8 cc 32 3f 50 32 40 06 86 ce 85 1b 02 28 f3
+
+ (42) Composes MGM nonce
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 01 65 20 72 e7 0a 1e ff 7d da ba 17 31
+
+ (43) Extracts ICV from message
+
+ 00000000: 04 2f 99 3f 02 19 56 c4 0d 0b 7a 45
+
+ (44) Extracts AAD from message
+
+ 00000000: e9 d3 f3 78 19 1c 38 40 8d df f4 01 fb fb 0b 14
+ 00000010: 2e 20 24 20 00 00 00 02 00 00 01 19 21 00 00 fd
+
+ (45) Extracts ciphertext from message
+
+ 00000000: fd ee 4c 8f 78 ff b6 0c fc 65 bb ef db 53 56 a2
+ 00000010: d3 2d 4f 59 ff 28 38 eb 76 0b 40 5e 8d 52 e8 c1
+ 00000020: b9 75 22 b4 bb 71 8f 16 3a 97 0e 4d 95 ef bc 84
+ 00000030: 46 c6 77 1e 4b 14 73 46 89 ed d4 b4 54 a2 64 19
+ 00000040: 67 b2 98 7e 8b d4 45 31 17 1e e4 ae f4 24 44 42
+ 00000050: dd 55 a0 49 fe 08 59 d0 a1 16 69 60 8a 8e 54 d2
+ 00000060: 02 6d ae 17 5f 32 bf 14 78 f0 86 47 26 bf fb 6b
+ 00000070: 7c 17 f7 f5 62 b6 d6 a0 e5 f3 c2 af b5 28 ee d0
+ 00000080: 9b 22 8c e6 d0 58 4d 48 18 6d dd 3e 4e 33 66 ac
+ 00000090: a2 29 1f 3b 62 4a e6 4a 8c 98 18 8b 21 73 a5 88
+ 000000A0: 49 09 3b 27 88 20 40 6b a5 fc 08 37 c7 ac c9 0f
+ 000000B0: 5d 69 87 7c 37 c8 c7 fd d8 72 6d ad ac 22 27 ca
+ 000000C0: 93 d6 bd 6a 55 2a 1a 8b 2e 84 b4 0a 35 d3 ac d5
+ 000000D0: 99 c9 ac d5 6f 03 94 bf ca f5 53 e5 a5 74 57 de
+ 000000E0: 6a 5a 26 b8 e4
+
+ (46) Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3r as K_msg,
+ resulting in plaintext
+
+ 00000000: 28 00 00 2c 00 00 00 28 01 01 08 03 82 d9 fa f8
+ 00000010: 74 49 b9 36 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 20 03 00 00 08
+ 00000020: 02 00 00 09 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 22 22 00 00 24
+ 00000030: 5a 2d d2 68 c6 85 5d 32 d4 7b 0b 8e ae 7d c9 81
+ 00000040: be 3e 69 c1 bb f5 ae 89 55 59 c7 48 bc 96 43 7b
+ 00000050: 29 00 00 88 00 22 00 00 b9 f9 27 a8 96 70 7a 03
+ 00000060: 58 c2 39 58 63 2d 50 20 bf 69 c0 1d a6 de d4 4d
+ 00000070: 65 aa 26 c6 8f 9f e9 e9 4b bb da 1d 2f d3 60 2d
+ 00000080: 18 33 04 9b b2 25 a6 07 ac 58 1b fc 3c 5b 1e f3
+ 00000090: 4b c0 f9 cb 90 14 c6 80 6e c3 73 c1 4a f7 5c 27
+ 000000A0: dd 2a e1 ba 94 9c f7 06 68 92 19 8e 85 67 f9 d2
+ 000000B0: d1 ea 3c 16 16 b9 3f 0c 8b 2d 2e d6 20 14 7e 27
+ 000000C0: 18 d3 23 9e 2a 99 41 40 6a 41 c5 3f 79 9c a7 22
+ 000000D0: 79 15 98 1d 98 b5 ac 4a 00 00 00 0c 00 00 40 01
+ 000000E0: 00 00 00 40 00
+
+ (47) Parses received message
+
+ Create Child SA
+ E9D3F378191C3840.8DDFF401FBFB0B14.00000002 IKEv2 R=>I[281]
+ E[253]{
+ SA[44]{
+ P[40](#1:IKE:82D9FAF87449B936:3#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE,
+ PRF=PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512,
+ KE=GOST3410_2012_512}},
+ NONCE[36]{5A2DD2...96437B},
+ KE[136](GOST3410_2012_512){B9F927...B5AC4A},
+ N[12](SET_WINDOW_SIZE){64}}
+
+ (48) Computes shared key
+
+ 00000000: dd e7 44 39 1c d9 66 cf d2 24 a4 bb 0a 57 b3 3e
+ 00000010: 1a 8f 5d 07 11 4d c3 47 87 1a 13 ec 84 26 03 f8
+ 00000020: ea 93 5a f5 23 a3 45 71 ff 5f f2 3d 59 43 3a 5e
+ 00000030: eb 5e 79 fa 0e 62 9e bc af ca e4 ee 7a 81 3a 84
+
+ (49) Computes SKEYSEED for new SA
+
+ 00000000: ec 5f 4f 15 ce d7 7d 2f 12 fb a1 df 5f 44 aa 88
+ 00000010: 6a ef 45 e4 04 97 86 95 15 1b 3c ac 31 cc 57 a3
+ 00000020: f0 f4 92 89 33 00 76 2b e9 fd 8b c2 ed 8b e7 36
+ 00000030: cb 17 59 55 9e cc 22 14 72 a5 79 27 27 1d 06 62
+
+ (50) Computes SK_d for new SA
+
+ 00000000: 08 58 14 7d eb c9 41 7f 7f a2 86 66 bf d4 76 37
+ 00000010: 04 27 4e bc 5d 63 f7 07 79 62 69 7a 69 3c da 7a
+ 00000020: d5 4d 6f 08 1e 14 51 66 2f 94 0d bd 29 45 9c b0
+ 00000030: 51 26 09 4b 47 52 ba 19 98 a5 c2 65 af 84 a1 34
+
+ (51) Computes SK_ei for new SA
+
+ 00000000: 18 0a 4f 98 7d a4 21 6c 68 84 94 1f d9 28 49 b9
+ 00000010: 05 30 f8 aa 43 02 7e 0d aa d3 27 e9 8c 9a 39 9a
+ 00000020: 03 a0 05 b7 b2 2d f9 90 bb 6c ff ca
+
+ (52) Computes SK_er for new SA
+
+ 00000000: 47 dc aa 71 4a 8b 66 13 d8 09 79 c7 8c 72 0a 78
+ 00000010: 06 48 6d 4f 1f 53 3a 91 1d b7 2c 86 f5 f1 4e 00
+ 00000020: 84 57 87 2b 38 70 63 27 8c dd 88 78
+
+A.1.3. Sub-Scenario 3: ESP SAs Rekeying with PFS Using the
+ CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange
+
+ Initiator Responder
+
+ HDR, SK {N(REKEY_SA), SAi, Ni,
+ KEi, TSi, TSr [,N+]} --->
+ <--- HDR, SK {SAr, Nr,
+ KEr, TSi, TSr [,N+]}
+
+ Initiator's actions:
+
+ (1) Generates random IKE nonce Ni
+
+ 00000000: 59 52 b2 58 00 b7 d3 f9 c3 31 23 16 6f c2 d1 d7
+ 00000010: 07 8b 99 fb 24 cf 24 30 a3 ce a6 fe d3 0f 20 9b
+
+ (2) Generates ephemeral private key
+
+ 00000000: 2f b9 df 43 dc 50 f5 17 59 c0 c7 21 ac ca 03 7a
+ 00000010: 55 87 f9 bb a6 5a 9e d4 46 98 15 c9 3a 6b 40 91
+ 00000020: e6 99 f4 f2 e5 88 14 e7 d8 9f 98 b1 59 21 05 52
+ 00000030: f0 b0 ce dc 8e c6 db 1f 9d a9 4a 6d 95 f2 cb 3d
+
+ (3) Computes public key
+
+ 00000000: 1c 55 08 b9 01 f5 76 6a 01 27 97 2d 38 b1 4a 5c
+ 00000010: b7 43 f1 64 24 ef 76 75 50 ce 4f 6f 59 ca 96 ae
+ 00000020: 54 85 9c 94 8d 04 91 62 3a 0c b6 6e 77 59 81 40
+ 00000030: 69 bf bb 80 f7 7c 29 ee 9f 9e 0c 83 b6 08 fc 43
+ 00000040: b8 c6 66 36 e5 eb a0 43 c2 56 fa 52 f9 99 b6 95
+ 00000050: 34 4c cd 49 1f c7 83 9e d7 d9 ca e3 a5 d0 3c aa
+ 00000060: e8 ee ed 2c dd 5c 81 49 ab 3c d4 fa 15 4e 29 5f
+ 00000070: 7c cd b2 f1 c1 d2 6f 8f a7 74 4d 6a d8 8a c3 60
+
+ (4) Selects SPI for new incoming ESP SA
+
+ 00000000: a4 fe 65 a1
+
+ (5) Creates message
+
+ Create Child SA
+ 4387648D6C9E28FF.82D9FAF87449B936.00000000 IKEv2 R<-I[341]
+ E[313]{
+ N[12](ESP:0ADE5FCD:REKEY_SA),
+ SA[40]{
+ P[36](#1:ESP:A4FE65A1:3#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE,
+ KE=GOST3410_2012_512,
+ ESN=Off}},
+ NONCE[36]{5952B2...0F209B},
+ KE[136](GOST3410_2012_512){1C5508...8AC360},
+ TSi[24](1#){10.1.1.2},
+ TSr[24](1#){10.0.0.0-10.0.0.255},
+ N[8](ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+ N[8](NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)}
+
+ (6) Computes K1i (i1 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 17 ec f1 84 33 9a c3 e3 93 e1 21 d7 65 3b 6c 83
+ 00000010: d4 ae 9c 29 5b 12 cc b3 c5 0c 48 19 49 eb c0 ba
+
+ (7) Computes K2i (i2 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 2d 33 c0 55 87 f2 ee ce ac 1a f2 28 64 c6 f5 ad
+ 00000010: de 2d be 7a a8 92 d0 a6 20 bc ef 25 29 7b 56 9f
+
+ (8) Computes K3i (i3 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: c9 41 22 b5 39 b7 d2 3f c4 4d a6 ae 88 2e ff b4
+ 00000010: f4 c0 90 9c bd bc 63 56 14 62 e8 8f 90 1a e7 eb
+
+ (9) Composes MGM nonce
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 03 a0 05 b7 b2 2d f9 90 bb 6c ff ca
+
+ (10) Composes AAD
+
+ 00000000: 43 87 64 8d 6c 9e 28 ff 82 d9 fa f8 74 49 b9 36
+ 00000010: 2e 20 24 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 55 29 00 01 39
+
+ (11) Composes plaintext
+
+ 00000000: 21 00 00 0c 03 04 40 09 0a de 5f cd 28 00 00 28
+ 00000010: 00 00 00 24 01 03 04 03 a4 fe 65 a1 03 00 00 08
+ 00000020: 01 00 00 20 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 22 00 00 00 08
+ 00000030: 05 00 00 00 22 00 00 24 59 52 b2 58 00 b7 d3 f9
+ 00000040: c3 31 23 16 6f c2 d1 d7 07 8b 99 fb 24 cf 24 30
+ 00000050: a3 ce a6 fe d3 0f 20 9b 2c 00 00 88 00 22 00 00
+ 00000060: 1c 55 08 b9 01 f5 76 6a 01 27 97 2d 38 b1 4a 5c
+ 00000070: b7 43 f1 64 24 ef 76 75 50 ce 4f 6f 59 ca 96 ae
+ 00000080: 54 85 9c 94 8d 04 91 62 3a 0c b6 6e 77 59 81 40
+ 00000090: 69 bf bb 80 f7 7c 29 ee 9f 9e 0c 83 b6 08 fc 43
+ 000000A0: b8 c6 66 36 e5 eb a0 43 c2 56 fa 52 f9 99 b6 95
+ 000000B0: 34 4c cd 49 1f c7 83 9e d7 d9 ca e3 a5 d0 3c aa
+ 000000C0: e8 ee ed 2c dd 5c 81 49 ab 3c d4 fa 15 4e 29 5f
+ 000000D0: 7c cd b2 f1 c1 d2 6f 8f a7 74 4d 6a d8 8a c3 60
+ 000000E0: 2d 00 00 18 01 00 00 00 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff ff
+ 000000F0: 0a 01 01 02 0a 01 01 02 29 00 00 18 01 00 00 00
+ 00000100: 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff ff 0a 00 00 00 0a 00 00 ff
+ 00000110: 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 0a 00 00 00 08 00 00 40 0b
+ 00000120: 00
+
+ (12) Encrypts plaintext using K3i as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
+
+ 00000000: 00 9b 13 cb cb f1 18 53 fc 81 2e 75 c3 03 e0 ca
+ 00000010: 55 c1 fb 55 c0 29 40 48 fc 20 f4 a8 51 5b 97 6b
+ 00000020: c6 07 4c 7d 45 54 51 0f 18 7f 43 a4 df 4b e8 e3
+ 00000030: b4 eb 68 24 4b f0 1c df 8f 1e a2 21 31 02 29 68
+ 00000040: 38 4d 68 fd 42 66 34 3e 82 46 f0 17 02 bf 65 19
+ 00000050: b0 f7 09 62 0d 12 6a 7e ad 76 57 0d 19 55 cf 01
+ 00000060: 89 9c 7e f5 5a fa 20 4f 8c 6d a4 83 b9 94 ad 4e
+ 00000070: 2a 46 08 5a 58 a1 4b 8e 53 2b a4 e6 3b fc 33 de
+ 00000080: cf cb ee 50 6d a1 9f e4 94 06 19 39 39 6b 7e 4b
+ 00000090: 83 f7 07 c0 bb 15 21 8d 8f 2d 5f 6c f6 97 68 21
+ 000000A0: 3c ce c6 67 82 00 8f f3 d7 d6 c3 f2 87 47 b8 b9
+ 000000B0: a3 0f f8 e2 0a 62 e8 f5 98 df bc f0 02 6a 3f 47
+ 000000C0: c4 f0 24 a4 80 95 bf cf 32 5a a5 22 3c a5 a8 f1
+ 000000D0: 57 d6 3b b8 06 1c b6 d7 c7 b3 58 e7 ee 69 eb 31
+ 000000E0: d6 09 db 8b 8a 1d 2b a1 f7 46 e5 b9 99 13 73 30
+ 000000F0: 1f ed 0c 82 4b cc ce 5e 25 79 1b ff 8b ca f0 b2
+ 00000100: 1e 7e 70 03 66 c7 7b 6c 10 92 f2 34 b6 e9 ce bb
+ 00000110: 65 ce d4 b5 99 f3 70 78 5f 06 f4 fe 0a 3c 00 28
+ 00000120: 68
+
+ (13) Computes ICV using K3i as K_msg
+
+ 00000000: fc 85 a4 7e 0b 41 77 54 ef 1a 03 cb
+
+ (14) Composes IV
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+
+ (15) Sends message, peer receives message
+
+ 10.111.10.171:54294->10.111.15.45:500 [341]
+
+ 00000000: 43 87 64 8d 6c 9e 28 ff 82 d9 fa f8 74 49 b9 36
+ 00000010: 2e 20 24 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 55 29 00 01 39
+ 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 9b 13 cb cb f1 18 53
+ 00000030: fc 81 2e 75 c3 03 e0 ca 55 c1 fb 55 c0 29 40 48
+ 00000040: fc 20 f4 a8 51 5b 97 6b c6 07 4c 7d 45 54 51 0f
+ 00000050: 18 7f 43 a4 df 4b e8 e3 b4 eb 68 24 4b f0 1c df
+ 00000060: 8f 1e a2 21 31 02 29 68 38 4d 68 fd 42 66 34 3e
+ 00000070: 82 46 f0 17 02 bf 65 19 b0 f7 09 62 0d 12 6a 7e
+ 00000080: ad 76 57 0d 19 55 cf 01 89 9c 7e f5 5a fa 20 4f
+ 00000090: 8c 6d a4 83 b9 94 ad 4e 2a 46 08 5a 58 a1 4b 8e
+ 000000A0: 53 2b a4 e6 3b fc 33 de cf cb ee 50 6d a1 9f e4
+ 000000B0: 94 06 19 39 39 6b 7e 4b 83 f7 07 c0 bb 15 21 8d
+ 000000C0: 8f 2d 5f 6c f6 97 68 21 3c ce c6 67 82 00 8f f3
+ 000000D0: d7 d6 c3 f2 87 47 b8 b9 a3 0f f8 e2 0a 62 e8 f5
+ 000000E0: 98 df bc f0 02 6a 3f 47 c4 f0 24 a4 80 95 bf cf
+ 000000F0: 32 5a a5 22 3c a5 a8 f1 57 d6 3b b8 06 1c b6 d7
+ 00000100: c7 b3 58 e7 ee 69 eb 31 d6 09 db 8b 8a 1d 2b a1
+ 00000110: f7 46 e5 b9 99 13 73 30 1f ed 0c 82 4b cc ce 5e
+ 00000120: 25 79 1b ff 8b ca f0 b2 1e 7e 70 03 66 c7 7b 6c
+ 00000130: 10 92 f2 34 b6 e9 ce bb 65 ce d4 b5 99 f3 70 78
+ 00000140: 5f 06 f4 fe 0a 3c 00 28 68 fc 85 a4 7e 0b 41 77
+ 00000150: 54 ef 1a 03 cb
+
+ Responder's actions:
+
+ (16) Extracts IV from message
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+
+ (17) Computes K1i (i1 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 17 ec f1 84 33 9a c3 e3 93 e1 21 d7 65 3b 6c 83
+ 00000010: d4 ae 9c 29 5b 12 cc b3 c5 0c 48 19 49 eb c0 ba
+
+ (18) Computes K2i (i2 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 2d 33 c0 55 87 f2 ee ce ac 1a f2 28 64 c6 f5 ad
+ 00000010: de 2d be 7a a8 92 d0 a6 20 bc ef 25 29 7b 56 9f
+
+ (19) Computes K3i (i3 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: c9 41 22 b5 39 b7 d2 3f c4 4d a6 ae 88 2e ff b4
+ 00000010: f4 c0 90 9c bd bc 63 56 14 62 e8 8f 90 1a e7 eb
+
+ (20) Composes MGM nonce
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 03 a0 05 b7 b2 2d f9 90 bb 6c ff ca
+
+ (21) Extracts ICV from message
+
+ 00000000: fc 85 a4 7e 0b 41 77 54 ef 1a 03 cb
+
+ (22) Extracts AAD from message
+
+ 00000000: 43 87 64 8d 6c 9e 28 ff 82 d9 fa f8 74 49 b9 36
+ 00000010: 2e 20 24 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 55 29 00 01 39
+
+ (23) Extracts ciphertext from message
+
+ 00000000: 00 9b 13 cb cb f1 18 53 fc 81 2e 75 c3 03 e0 ca
+ 00000010: 55 c1 fb 55 c0 29 40 48 fc 20 f4 a8 51 5b 97 6b
+ 00000020: c6 07 4c 7d 45 54 51 0f 18 7f 43 a4 df 4b e8 e3
+ 00000030: b4 eb 68 24 4b f0 1c df 8f 1e a2 21 31 02 29 68
+ 00000040: 38 4d 68 fd 42 66 34 3e 82 46 f0 17 02 bf 65 19
+ 00000050: b0 f7 09 62 0d 12 6a 7e ad 76 57 0d 19 55 cf 01
+ 00000060: 89 9c 7e f5 5a fa 20 4f 8c 6d a4 83 b9 94 ad 4e
+ 00000070: 2a 46 08 5a 58 a1 4b 8e 53 2b a4 e6 3b fc 33 de
+ 00000080: cf cb ee 50 6d a1 9f e4 94 06 19 39 39 6b 7e 4b
+ 00000090: 83 f7 07 c0 bb 15 21 8d 8f 2d 5f 6c f6 97 68 21
+ 000000A0: 3c ce c6 67 82 00 8f f3 d7 d6 c3 f2 87 47 b8 b9
+ 000000B0: a3 0f f8 e2 0a 62 e8 f5 98 df bc f0 02 6a 3f 47
+ 000000C0: c4 f0 24 a4 80 95 bf cf 32 5a a5 22 3c a5 a8 f1
+ 000000D0: 57 d6 3b b8 06 1c b6 d7 c7 b3 58 e7 ee 69 eb 31
+ 000000E0: d6 09 db 8b 8a 1d 2b a1 f7 46 e5 b9 99 13 73 30
+ 000000F0: 1f ed 0c 82 4b cc ce 5e 25 79 1b ff 8b ca f0 b2
+ 00000100: 1e 7e 70 03 66 c7 7b 6c 10 92 f2 34 b6 e9 ce bb
+ 00000110: 65 ce d4 b5 99 f3 70 78 5f 06 f4 fe 0a 3c 00 28
+ 00000120: 68
+
+ (24) Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3i as K_msg,
+ resulting in plaintext
+
+ 00000000: 21 00 00 0c 03 04 40 09 0a de 5f cd 28 00 00 28
+ 00000010: 00 00 00 24 01 03 04 03 a4 fe 65 a1 03 00 00 08
+ 00000020: 01 00 00 20 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 22 00 00 00 08
+ 00000030: 05 00 00 00 22 00 00 24 59 52 b2 58 00 b7 d3 f9
+ 00000040: c3 31 23 16 6f c2 d1 d7 07 8b 99 fb 24 cf 24 30
+ 00000050: a3 ce a6 fe d3 0f 20 9b 2c 00 00 88 00 22 00 00
+ 00000060: 1c 55 08 b9 01 f5 76 6a 01 27 97 2d 38 b1 4a 5c
+ 00000070: b7 43 f1 64 24 ef 76 75 50 ce 4f 6f 59 ca 96 ae
+ 00000080: 54 85 9c 94 8d 04 91 62 3a 0c b6 6e 77 59 81 40
+ 00000090: 69 bf bb 80 f7 7c 29 ee 9f 9e 0c 83 b6 08 fc 43
+ 000000A0: b8 c6 66 36 e5 eb a0 43 c2 56 fa 52 f9 99 b6 95
+ 000000B0: 34 4c cd 49 1f c7 83 9e d7 d9 ca e3 a5 d0 3c aa
+ 000000C0: e8 ee ed 2c dd 5c 81 49 ab 3c d4 fa 15 4e 29 5f
+ 000000D0: 7c cd b2 f1 c1 d2 6f 8f a7 74 4d 6a d8 8a c3 60
+ 000000E0: 2d 00 00 18 01 00 00 00 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff ff
+ 000000F0: 0a 01 01 02 0a 01 01 02 29 00 00 18 01 00 00 00
+ 00000100: 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff ff 0a 00 00 00 0a 00 00 ff
+ 00000110: 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 0a 00 00 00 08 00 00 40 0b
+ 00000120: 00
+
+ (25) Parses received message
+
+ Create Child SA
+ 4387648D6C9E28FF.82D9FAF87449B936.00000000 IKEv2 I->R[341]
+ E[313]{
+ N[12](ESP:0ADE5FCD:REKEY_SA),
+ SA[40]{
+ P[36](#1:ESP:A4FE65A1:3#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE,
+ KE=GOST3410_2012_512,
+ ESN=Off}},
+ NONCE[36]{5952B2...0F209B},
+ KE[136](GOST3410_2012_512){1C5508...8AC360},
+ TSi[24](1#){10.1.1.2},
+ TSr[24](1#){10.0.0.0-10.0.0.255},
+ N[8](ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+ N[8](NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)}
+
+ (26) Generates random IKE nonce Nr
+
+ 00000000: f1 c1 3f 5e c4 c9 70 81 cb 1f 57 fe af 3d 80 37
+ 00000010: 92 a9 ff 96 db 8f 3f 31 0a db 84 d1 24 d5 94 12
+
+ (27) Generates ephemeral private key
+
+ 00000000: 2e 75 2f 5d 6c f0 9a 59 af 47 8d e1 2a a5 aa f5
+ 00000010: c1 ef 9a fb e0 16 5e d9 59 6a c5 96 e8 88 14 62
+ 00000020: 03 81 90 4f 18 d1 60 18 fe dc 9a a1 61 b3 8b c0
+ 00000030: bf e0 d9 a0 d5 2b f2 7b 6b 60 f5 b9 4d e9 0b 36
+
+ (28) Computes public key
+
+ 00000000: de 1d 91 64 c3 3e 58 4a b3 3e 55 5d 3e f6 5b cb
+ 00000010: b5 c6 1c 09 cb 9a 17 91 81 13 5f 46 ce 52 98 c5
+ 00000020: 1e bb 77 96 c9 04 03 2d f4 e5 23 f9 75 e3 ef a8
+ 00000030: 53 52 b4 75 9c 00 55 7b 09 75 49 55 c1 65 7c 4d
+ 00000040: 67 77 00 0a bc cd bc 4c 34 c3 b3 85 ed 86 7d 3b
+ 00000050: 9f f7 15 ea 55 b5 e4 1e 45 d9 b0 4f 69 3f ee 7c
+ 00000060: 89 0e 09 3d 4b 35 2e 8a 3c 0c 33 20 c3 54 7b 44
+ 00000070: db 9f c7 96 a0 1e 9e ae b4 bd 29 73 b6 80 2d 00
+
+ (29) Selects SPI for new incoming ESP SA
+
+ 00000000: 29 0a 8e 3f
+
+ (30) Computes keys for new ESP SAs
+
+ 00000000: 4e c4 99 c2 d9 e8 fc 7f 26 fa cf df 20 8f a2 5c
+ 00000010: 85 f8 e3 0c f7 fd 11 5b 5f 80 ba c4 e6 70 8b e4
+ 00000020: 0b 90 d7 8f bd d4 c5 bd c4 31 6f 0b
+ 00000000: 3c cc d8 46 72 44 68 c6 41 84 d2 22 ea 39 7c e8
+ 00000010: aa 83 66 11 3a 26 4d 7b 07 52 6b c7 65 25 73 9d
+ 00000020: 0f 3d 80 bc 8c 34 ff 07 31 11 5e d2
+
+ (31) Creates message
+
+ Create Child SA
+ 4387648D6C9E28FF.82D9FAF87449B936.00000000 IKEv2 I<=R[337]
+ E[309]{
+ SA[40]{
+ P[36](#1:ESP:290A8E3F:3#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE,
+ KE=GOST3410_2012_512,
+ ESN=Off}},
+ NONCE[36]{F1C13F...D59412},
+ KE[136](GOST3410_2012_512){DE1D91...802D00},
+ TSi[24](1#){10.1.1.2},
+ TSr[24](1#){10.0.0.0-10.0.0.255},
+ N[8](ADDITIONAL_TS_POSSIBLE),
+ N[8](ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+ N[8](NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)}
+
+ (32) Computes K1r (i1 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 0c 45 d2 29 64 b8 72 57 11 10 3b a0 c2 66 d8 63
+ 00000010: 34 f5 22 43 bf 6b 9a 1b 67 d6 d2 d8 fc 87 75 38
+
+ (33) Computes K2r (i2 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: a9 92 d9 92 1f 15 13 bd db 61 83 43 58 2d dd e6
+ 00000010: 66 28 4f 5d 71 47 a9 d4 8e 31 2e 95 37 f8 c5 d2
+
+ (34) Computes K3r (i3 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: c1 ca 4f dd 2d 02 55 a4 11 9a 10 08 43 2d 61 ea
+ 00000010: 52 68 83 c5 ec 92 53 24 01 b0 a2 0b d2 8f 72 78
+
+ (35) Composes MGM nonce
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 84 57 87 2b 38 70 63 27 8c dd 88 78
+
+ (36) Composes AAD
+
+ 00000000: 43 87 64 8d 6c 9e 28 ff 82 d9 fa f8 74 49 b9 36
+ 00000010: 2e 20 24 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 51 21 00 01 35
+
+ (37) Composes plaintext
+
+ 00000000: 28 00 00 28 00 00 00 24 01 03 04 03 29 0a 8e 3f
+ 00000010: 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 20 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 22
+ 00000020: 00 00 00 08 05 00 00 00 22 00 00 24 f1 c1 3f 5e
+ 00000030: c4 c9 70 81 cb 1f 57 fe af 3d 80 37 92 a9 ff 96
+ 00000040: db 8f 3f 31 0a db 84 d1 24 d5 94 12 2c 00 00 88
+ 00000050: 00 22 00 00 de 1d 91 64 c3 3e 58 4a b3 3e 55 5d
+ 00000060: 3e f6 5b cb b5 c6 1c 09 cb 9a 17 91 81 13 5f 46
+ 00000070: ce 52 98 c5 1e bb 77 96 c9 04 03 2d f4 e5 23 f9
+ 00000080: 75 e3 ef a8 53 52 b4 75 9c 00 55 7b 09 75 49 55
+ 00000090: c1 65 7c 4d 67 77 00 0a bc cd bc 4c 34 c3 b3 85
+ 000000A0: ed 86 7d 3b 9f f7 15 ea 55 b5 e4 1e 45 d9 b0 4f
+ 000000B0: 69 3f ee 7c 89 0e 09 3d 4b 35 2e 8a 3c 0c 33 20
+ 000000C0: c3 54 7b 44 db 9f c7 96 a0 1e 9e ae b4 bd 29 73
+ 000000D0: b6 80 2d 00 2d 00 00 18 01 00 00 00 07 00 00 10
+ 000000E0: 00 00 ff ff 0a 01 01 02 0a 01 01 02 29 00 00 18
+ 000000F0: 01 00 00 00 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff ff 0a 00 00 00
+ 00000100: 0a 00 00 ff 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 02 29 00 00 08
+ 00000110: 00 00 40 0a 00 00 00 08 00 00 40 0b 00
+
+ (38) Encrypts plaintext using K3r as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
+
+ 00000000: 42 73 5f 2b 14 a0 27 ca 3c 90 67 80 3c 3d 99 02
+ 00000010: 1c 08 c8 67 03 0f 69 f1 c3 64 43 a6 59 74 ce b0
+ 00000020: d7 5d 29 58 53 3a f6 c3 20 04 56 ba 2e af 14 9b
+ 00000030: 2d a3 93 15 2c e5 15 e6 59 2b 7f 47 94 7f 90 82
+ 00000040: ce d3 64 cc 89 92 04 c6 bc 7b ce 61 c6 1d 7f a5
+ 00000050: 45 1c 27 e6 0b 78 1a f2 75 8f 3e 47 53 8e d7 16
+ 00000060: 11 f4 26 04 ae 5e d5 b8 84 b6 ac e6 20 28 da ca
+ 00000070: da 84 fe 0d c4 4d 29 2f 58 30 fe 93 f6 59 04 4a
+ 00000080: 9b aa 97 99 5b 5e 74 9c 5d 45 d5 99 42 16 8c ab
+ 00000090: 62 cb 9f 14 5f f5 25 92 34 5c 8d 61 45 44 55 6d
+ 000000A0: 3d 80 b0 39 f0 39 0b 43 8a f9 b7 b7 17 41 34 ce
+ 000000B0: 36 bf e3 e7 1a 68 61 72 0e f1 91 24 89 ab d7 e9
+ 000000C0: a9 b1 87 38 a1 c0 4c 42 4e 47 62 28 9e d7 1f 02
+ 000000D0: 13 40 69 38 31 f1 91 87 ec 54 11 0a 2d d9 25 15
+ 000000E0: 15 16 37 b7 71 94 11 49 5e f7 28 90 c5 1e 6b 07
+ 000000F0: d9 cf 06 a2 a2 33 0e e0 25 67 db a6 17 11 27 60
+ 00000100: c8 21 f7 79 63 aa b0 f9 7b 95 03 a7 8d 2e d7 df
+ 00000110: 58 e7 30 ab d3 c8 f1 24 40 69 fc 3f bf
+
+ (39) Computes ICV using K3r as K_msg
+
+ 00000000: 3a 2d 3c 6b 87 43 ed 6e 80 ab 27 e2
+
+ (40) Composes IV
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+
+ (41) Sends message, peer receives message
+
+ 10.111.10.171:54294<-10.111.15.45:500 [337]
+
+ 00000000: 43 87 64 8d 6c 9e 28 ff 82 d9 fa f8 74 49 b9 36
+ 00000010: 2e 20 24 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 51 21 00 01 35
+ 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 42 73 5f 2b 14 a0 27 ca
+ 00000030: 3c 90 67 80 3c 3d 99 02 1c 08 c8 67 03 0f 69 f1
+ 00000040: c3 64 43 a6 59 74 ce b0 d7 5d 29 58 53 3a f6 c3
+ 00000050: 20 04 56 ba 2e af 14 9b 2d a3 93 15 2c e5 15 e6
+ 00000060: 59 2b 7f 47 94 7f 90 82 ce d3 64 cc 89 92 04 c6
+ 00000070: bc 7b ce 61 c6 1d 7f a5 45 1c 27 e6 0b 78 1a f2
+ 00000080: 75 8f 3e 47 53 8e d7 16 11 f4 26 04 ae 5e d5 b8
+ 00000090: 84 b6 ac e6 20 28 da ca da 84 fe 0d c4 4d 29 2f
+ 000000A0: 58 30 fe 93 f6 59 04 4a 9b aa 97 99 5b 5e 74 9c
+ 000000B0: 5d 45 d5 99 42 16 8c ab 62 cb 9f 14 5f f5 25 92
+ 000000C0: 34 5c 8d 61 45 44 55 6d 3d 80 b0 39 f0 39 0b 43
+ 000000D0: 8a f9 b7 b7 17 41 34 ce 36 bf e3 e7 1a 68 61 72
+ 000000E0: 0e f1 91 24 89 ab d7 e9 a9 b1 87 38 a1 c0 4c 42
+ 000000F0: 4e 47 62 28 9e d7 1f 02 13 40 69 38 31 f1 91 87
+ 00000100: ec 54 11 0a 2d d9 25 15 15 16 37 b7 71 94 11 49
+ 00000110: 5e f7 28 90 c5 1e 6b 07 d9 cf 06 a2 a2 33 0e e0
+ 00000120: 25 67 db a6 17 11 27 60 c8 21 f7 79 63 aa b0 f9
+ 00000130: 7b 95 03 a7 8d 2e d7 df 58 e7 30 ab d3 c8 f1 24
+ 00000140: 40 69 fc 3f bf 3a 2d 3c 6b 87 43 ed 6e 80 ab 27
+ 00000150: e2
+
+ Initiator's actions:
+
+ (42) Extracts IV from message
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+
+ (43) Computes K1r (i1 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 0c 45 d2 29 64 b8 72 57 11 10 3b a0 c2 66 d8 63
+ 00000010: 34 f5 22 43 bf 6b 9a 1b 67 d6 d2 d8 fc 87 75 38
+
+ (44) Computes K2r (i2 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: a9 92 d9 92 1f 15 13 bd db 61 83 43 58 2d dd e6
+ 00000010: 66 28 4f 5d 71 47 a9 d4 8e 31 2e 95 37 f8 c5 d2
+
+ (45) Computes K3r (i3 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: c1 ca 4f dd 2d 02 55 a4 11 9a 10 08 43 2d 61 ea
+ 00000010: 52 68 83 c5 ec 92 53 24 01 b0 a2 0b d2 8f 72 78
+
+ (46) Composes MGM nonce
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 84 57 87 2b 38 70 63 27 8c dd 88 78
+
+ (47) Extracts ICV from message
+
+ 00000000: 3a 2d 3c 6b 87 43 ed 6e 80 ab 27 e2
+
+ (48) Extracts AAD from message
+
+ 00000000: 43 87 64 8d 6c 9e 28 ff 82 d9 fa f8 74 49 b9 36
+ 00000010: 2e 20 24 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 51 21 00 01 35
+
+ (49) Extracts ciphertext from message
+
+ 00000000: 42 73 5f 2b 14 a0 27 ca 3c 90 67 80 3c 3d 99 02
+ 00000010: 1c 08 c8 67 03 0f 69 f1 c3 64 43 a6 59 74 ce b0
+ 00000020: d7 5d 29 58 53 3a f6 c3 20 04 56 ba 2e af 14 9b
+ 00000030: 2d a3 93 15 2c e5 15 e6 59 2b 7f 47 94 7f 90 82
+ 00000040: ce d3 64 cc 89 92 04 c6 bc 7b ce 61 c6 1d 7f a5
+ 00000050: 45 1c 27 e6 0b 78 1a f2 75 8f 3e 47 53 8e d7 16
+ 00000060: 11 f4 26 04 ae 5e d5 b8 84 b6 ac e6 20 28 da ca
+ 00000070: da 84 fe 0d c4 4d 29 2f 58 30 fe 93 f6 59 04 4a
+ 00000080: 9b aa 97 99 5b 5e 74 9c 5d 45 d5 99 42 16 8c ab
+ 00000090: 62 cb 9f 14 5f f5 25 92 34 5c 8d 61 45 44 55 6d
+ 000000A0: 3d 80 b0 39 f0 39 0b 43 8a f9 b7 b7 17 41 34 ce
+ 000000B0: 36 bf e3 e7 1a 68 61 72 0e f1 91 24 89 ab d7 e9
+ 000000C0: a9 b1 87 38 a1 c0 4c 42 4e 47 62 28 9e d7 1f 02
+ 000000D0: 13 40 69 38 31 f1 91 87 ec 54 11 0a 2d d9 25 15
+ 000000E0: 15 16 37 b7 71 94 11 49 5e f7 28 90 c5 1e 6b 07
+ 000000F0: d9 cf 06 a2 a2 33 0e e0 25 67 db a6 17 11 27 60
+ 00000100: c8 21 f7 79 63 aa b0 f9 7b 95 03 a7 8d 2e d7 df
+ 00000110: 58 e7 30 ab d3 c8 f1 24 40 69 fc 3f bf
+
+ (50) Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3r as K_msg,
+ resulting in plaintext
+
+ 00000000: 28 00 00 28 00 00 00 24 01 03 04 03 29 0a 8e 3f
+ 00000010: 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 20 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 22
+ 00000020: 00 00 00 08 05 00 00 00 22 00 00 24 f1 c1 3f 5e
+ 00000030: c4 c9 70 81 cb 1f 57 fe af 3d 80 37 92 a9 ff 96
+ 00000040: db 8f 3f 31 0a db 84 d1 24 d5 94 12 2c 00 00 88
+ 00000050: 00 22 00 00 de 1d 91 64 c3 3e 58 4a b3 3e 55 5d
+ 00000060: 3e f6 5b cb b5 c6 1c 09 cb 9a 17 91 81 13 5f 46
+ 00000070: ce 52 98 c5 1e bb 77 96 c9 04 03 2d f4 e5 23 f9
+ 00000080: 75 e3 ef a8 53 52 b4 75 9c 00 55 7b 09 75 49 55
+ 00000090: c1 65 7c 4d 67 77 00 0a bc cd bc 4c 34 c3 b3 85
+ 000000A0: ed 86 7d 3b 9f f7 15 ea 55 b5 e4 1e 45 d9 b0 4f
+ 000000B0: 69 3f ee 7c 89 0e 09 3d 4b 35 2e 8a 3c 0c 33 20
+ 000000C0: c3 54 7b 44 db 9f c7 96 a0 1e 9e ae b4 bd 29 73
+ 000000D0: b6 80 2d 00 2d 00 00 18 01 00 00 00 07 00 00 10
+ 000000E0: 00 00 ff ff 0a 01 01 02 0a 01 01 02 29 00 00 18
+ 000000F0: 01 00 00 00 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff ff 0a 00 00 00
+ 00000100: 0a 00 00 ff 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 02 29 00 00 08
+ 00000110: 00 00 40 0a 00 00 00 08 00 00 40 0b 00
+
+ (51) Parses received message
+
+ Create Child SA
+ 4387648D6C9E28FF.82D9FAF87449B936.00000000 IKEv2 R=>I[337]
+ E[309]{
+ SA[40]{
+ P[36](#1:ESP:290A8E3F:3#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE,
+ KE=GOST3410_2012_512,
+ ESN=Off}},
+ NONCE[36]{F1C13F...D59412},
+ KE[136](GOST3410_2012_512){DE1D91...802D00},
+ TSi[24](1#){10.1.1.2},
+ TSr[24](1#){10.0.0.0-10.0.0.255},
+ N[8](ADDITIONAL_TS_POSSIBLE),
+ N[8](ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+ N[8](NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)}
+
+ (52) Computes keys for new ESP SAs
+
+ 00000000: 4e c4 99 c2 d9 e8 fc 7f 26 fa cf df 20 8f a2 5c
+ 00000010: 85 f8 e3 0c f7 fd 11 5b 5f 80 ba c4 e6 70 8b e4
+ 00000020: 0b 90 d7 8f bd d4 c5 bd c4 31 6f 0b
+ 00000000: 3c cc d8 46 72 44 68 c6 41 84 d2 22 ea 39 7c e8
+ 00000010: aa 83 66 11 3a 26 4d 7b 07 52 6b c7 65 25 73 9d
+ 00000020: 0f 3d 80 bc 8c 34 ff 07 31 11 5e d2
+
+A.1.4. Sub-Scenario 4: IKE SA Deletion Using the INFORMATIONAL Exchange
+
+ Initiator Responder
+
+ HDR, SK {D} --->
+ <--- HDR, SK { }
+
+ Initiator's actions:
+
+ (1) Creates message
+
+ Informational
+ 4387648D6C9E28FF.82D9FAF87449B936.00000003 IKEv2 R<-I[61]
+ E[33]{
+ D[8](IKE)}
+
+ (2) Uses previously computed key K3i
+
+ 00000000: c9 41 22 b5 39 b7 d2 3f c4 4d a6 ae 88 2e ff b4
+ 00000010: f4 c0 90 9c bd bc 63 56 14 62 e8 8f 90 1a e7 eb
+
+ (3) Composes MGM nonce
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 03 03 a0 05 b7 b2 2d f9 90 bb 6c ff ca
+
+ (4) Composes AAD
+
+ 00000000: 43 87 64 8d 6c 9e 28 ff 82 d9 fa f8 74 49 b9 36
+ 00000010: 2e 20 25 08 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 3d 2a 00 00 21
+
+ (5) Composes plaintext
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 08 01 00 00 00 00
+
+ (6) Encrypts plaintext using K3i as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
+
+ 00000000: 3e 17 6f 6c 23 48 06 e9 fd
+
+ (7) Computes ICV using K3i as K_msg
+
+ 00000000: 23 7b a2 fc d5 1c 6f 2c c0 1e 21 e4
+
+ (8) Composes IV
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03
+
+ (9) Sends message, peer receives message
+
+ 10.111.10.171:54294->10.111.15.45:500 [61]
+
+ 00000000: 43 87 64 8d 6c 9e 28 ff 82 d9 fa f8 74 49 b9 36
+ 00000010: 2e 20 25 08 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 3d 2a 00 00 21
+ 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 3e 17 6f 6c 23 48 06 e9
+ 00000030: fd 23 7b a2 fc d5 1c 6f 2c c0 1e 21 e4
+
+ Responder's actions:
+
+ (10) Extracts IV from message
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03
+
+ (11) Uses previously computed key K3i
+
+ 00000000: c9 41 22 b5 39 b7 d2 3f c4 4d a6 ae 88 2e ff b4
+ 00000010: f4 c0 90 9c bd bc 63 56 14 62 e8 8f 90 1a e7 eb
+
+ (12) Composes MGM nonce
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 03 03 a0 05 b7 b2 2d f9 90 bb 6c ff ca
+
+ (13) Extracts ICV from message
+
+ 00000000: 23 7b a2 fc d5 1c 6f 2c c0 1e 21 e4
+
+ (14) Extracts AAD from message
+
+ 00000000: 43 87 64 8d 6c 9e 28 ff 82 d9 fa f8 74 49 b9 36
+ 00000010: 2e 20 25 08 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 3d 2a 00 00 21
+
+ (15) Extracts ciphertext from message
+
+ 00000000: 3e 17 6f 6c 23 48 06 e9 fd
+
+ (16) Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3i as K_msg,
+ resulting in plaintext
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 08 01 00 00 00 00
+
+ (17) Parses received message
+
+ Informational
+ 4387648D6C9E28FF.82D9FAF87449B936.00000003 IKEv2 I->R[61]
+ E[33]{
+ D[8](IKE)}
+
+ (18) Creates message
+
+ Informational
+ 4387648D6C9E28FF.82D9FAF87449B936.00000003 IKEv2 I<=R[53]
+ E[25]{}
+
+ (19) Uses previously computed key K3r
+
+ 00000000: c1 ca 4f dd 2d 02 55 a4 11 9a 10 08 43 2d 61 ea
+ 00000010: 52 68 83 c5 ec 92 53 24 01 b0 a2 0b d2 8f 72 78
+
+ (20) Composes MGM nonce
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 03 84 57 87 2b 38 70 63 27 8c dd 88 78
+
+ (21) Composes AAD
+
+ 00000000: 43 87 64 8d 6c 9e 28 ff 82 d9 fa f8 74 49 b9 36
+ 00000010: 2e 20 25 20 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 35 00 00 00 19
+
+ (22) Composes plaintext
+
+ 00000000: 00
+
+ (23) Encrypts plaintext using K3r as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
+
+ 00000000: f1
+
+ (24) Computes ICV using K3r as K_msg
+
+ 00000000: 38 3b 47 ed 04 4d af 44 b8 59 9a ce
+
+ (25) Composes IV
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03
+
+ (26) Sends message, peer receives message
+
+ 10.111.10.171:54294<-10.111.15.45:500 [53]
+
+ 00000000: 43 87 64 8d 6c 9e 28 ff 82 d9 fa f8 74 49 b9 36
+ 00000010: 2e 20 25 20 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 35 00 00 00 19
+ 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 f1 38 3b 47 ed 04 4d af
+ 00000030: 44 b8 59 9a ce
+
+ Initiator's actions:
+
+ (27) Extracts IV from message
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03
+
+ (28) Uses previously computed key K3r
+
+ 00000000: c1 ca 4f dd 2d 02 55 a4 11 9a 10 08 43 2d 61 ea
+ 00000010: 52 68 83 c5 ec 92 53 24 01 b0 a2 0b d2 8f 72 78
+
+ (29) Composes MGM nonce
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 03 84 57 87 2b 38 70 63 27 8c dd 88 78
+
+ (30) Extracts ICV from message
+
+ 00000000: 38 3b 47 ed 04 4d af 44 b8 59 9a ce
+
+ (31) Extracts AAD from message
+
+ 00000000: 43 87 64 8d 6c 9e 28 ff 82 d9 fa f8 74 49 b9 36
+ 00000010: 2e 20 25 20 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 35 00 00 00 19
+
+ (32) Extracts ciphertext from message
+
+ 00000000: f1
+
+ (33) Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3r as K_msg,
+ resulting in plaintext
+
+ 00000000: 00
+
+ (34) Parses received message
+
+ Informational
+ 4387648D6C9E28FF.82D9FAF87449B936.00000003 IKEv2 R=>I[53]
+ E[25]{}
+
+A.2. Scenario 2
+
+ In this scenario, peers establish, rekey, and delete an IKE SA and
+ ESP SAs using the following prerequisites:
+
+ * Peers authenticate each other using digital signatures.
+
+ * Initiator's ID is "CN=IKE Interop Test Client, O=ELVIS-PLUS, C=RU"
+ of type ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
+
+ 00000010: 30 44 31 20 30 1e 06 03 55 04 03 13 17 49 4b 45
+ 00000020: 20 49 6e 74 65 72 6f 70 20 54 65 73 74 20 43 6c
+ 00000030: 69 65 6e 74 31 13 30 11 06 03 55 04 0a 13 0a 45
+ 00000040: 4c 56 49 53 2d 50 4c 55 53 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55
+ 00000050: 04 06 13 02 52 55
+
+ * Responder's ID is "CN=IKE Interop Test Server, O=ELVIS-PLUS, C=RU"
+ of type ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
+
+ 00000010: 30 44 31 20 30 1e 06 03 55 04 03 13 17 49 4b 45
+ 00000020: 20 49 6e 74 65 72 6f 70 20 54 65 73 74 20 53 65
+ 00000030: 72 76 65 72 31 13 30 11 06 03 55 04 0a 13 0a 45
+ 00000040: 4c 56 49 53 2d 50 4c 55 53 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55
+ 00000050: 04 06 13 02 52 55
+
+ * No NAT is present between the peers, but using UDP encapsulation
+ is forced by the initiator by setting the NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP
+ notification data to all zeroes.
+
+ * IKE fragmentation is used in the IKE_AUTH exchange.
+
+ * IKE SA is created with the following transforms:
+
+ - ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE
+
+ - PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512
+
+ - GOST3410_2012_256
+
+ * ESP SAs are created with the following transforms:
+
+ - ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE
+
+ - ESN off
+
+ The certificates for this scenario were obtained from the public
+ testing CA service <https://testgost2012.cryptopro.ru/certsrv/>.
+
+ The initiator's certificate private key (little endian):
+
+ 0000000000: 76 e9 dd b3 f3 a2 08 a2 4e a5 81 9c ae 41 da b4
+ 0000000010: 77 3c 1d d5 dc eb af e6 58 b1 47 d2 d8 29 ce 71
+ 0000000020: 18 a9 85 5d 28 5b 3c e3 23 bd 80 ac 2f 00 cc b6
+ 0000000030: 61 4c 42 a1 65 61 02 cf 33 eb 1f 5f 02 ce 8a b9
+
+ The initiator's certificate:
+
+ 0000000000: 30 82 04 f7 30 82 04 a4 a0 03 02 01 02 02 13 7c
+ 0000000010: 00 03 da a8 9e 1e ff 9e 79 05 fb bb 00 01 00 03
+ 0000000020: da a8 30 0a 06 08 2a 85 03 07 01 01 03 02 30 82
+ 0000000030: 01 0a 31 18 30 16 06 05 2a 85 03 64 01 12 0d 31
+ 0000000040: 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 30 31 32 33 31 1a 30 18
+ 0000000050: 06 08 2a 85 03 03 81 03 01 01 12 0c 30 30 31 32
+ 0000000060: 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 30 31 2f 30 2d 06 03 55 04
+ 0000000070: 09 0c 26 d1 83 d0 bb 2e 20 d0 a1 d1 83 d1 89 d1
+ 0000000080: 91 d0 b2 d1 81 d0 ba d0 b8 d0 b9 20 d0 b2 d0 b0
+ 0000000090: d0 bb 20 d0 b4 2e 20 31 38 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55
+ 00000000A0: 04 06 13 02 52 55 31 19 30 17 06 03 55 04 08 0c
+ 00000000B0: 10 d0 b3 2e 20 d0 9c d0 be d1 81 d0 ba d0 b2 d0
+ 00000000C0: b0 31 15 30 13 06 03 55 04 07 0c 0c d0 9c d0 be
+ 00000000D0: d1 81 d0 ba d0 b2 d0 b0 31 25 30 23 06 03 55 04
+ 00000000E0: 0a 0c 1c d0 9e d0 9e d0 9e 20 22 d0 9a d0 a0 d0
+ 00000000F0: 98 d0 9f d0 a2 d0 9e 2d d0 9f d0 a0 d0 9e 22 31
+ 0000000100: 3b 30 39 06 03 55 04 03 0c 32 d0 a2 d0 b5 d1 81
+ 0000000110: d1 82 d0 be d0 b2 d1 8b d0 b9 20 d0 a3 d0 a6 20
+ 0000000120: d0 9e d0 9e d0 9e 20 22 d0 9a d0 a0 d0 98 d0 9f
+ 0000000130: d0 a2 d0 9e 2d d0 9f d0 a0 d0 9e 22 30 1e 17 0d
+ 0000000140: 32 31 31 30 30 31 30 36 31 30 31 30 5a 17 0d 32
+ 0000000150: 32 30 31 30 31 30 36 32 30 31 30 5a 30 44 31 20
+ 0000000160: 30 1e 06 03 55 04 03 13 17 49 4b 45 20 49 6e 74
+ 0000000170: 65 72 6f 70 20 54 65 73 74 20 43 6c 69 65 6e 74
+ 0000000180: 31 13 30 11 06 03 55 04 0a 13 0a 45 4c 56 49 53
+ 0000000190: 2d 50 4c 55 53 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02
+ 00000001A0: 52 55 30 81 aa 30 21 06 08 2a 85 03 07 01 01 01
+ 00000001B0: 02 30 15 06 09 2a 85 03 07 01 02 01 02 01 06 08
+ 00000001C0: 2a 85 03 07 01 01 02 03 03 81 84 00 04 81 80 ee
+ 00000001D0: 2f 0a 0e 09 1e 7e 04 ef ba 5b 62 a2 52 86 e1 9c
+ 00000001E0: 24 50 30 50 b0 b4 8a 37 35 b5 fc af 28 94 ec b5
+ 00000001F0: 9b 92 41 5b 69 e2 c9 ba 24 de 6a 72 c4 ef 44 bb
+ 0000000200: 89 a1 05 14 1b 87 3d 6a a3 72 3e 17 ca 7f 39 28
+ 0000000210: ce 16 8b dd 07 52 87 6a 0d 77 42 6d 99 2b 46 2c
+ 0000000220: fd 4b b2 7c d7 c7 17 08 12 54 63 47 9d 14 3d 61
+ 0000000230: ed f2 95 ab 11 80 69 02 a7 66 60 50 7e a4 53 6d
+ 0000000240: ad 01 49 b2 16 8a 95 1d cf 1a 57 93 56 14 5e a3
+ 0000000250: 82 02 59 30 82 02 55 30 0e 06 03 55 1d 0f 01 01
+ 0000000260: ff 04 04 03 02 05 a0 30 13 06 03 55 1d 25 04 0c
+ 0000000270: 30 0a 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 03 11 30 1d 06 03
+ 0000000280: 55 1d 0e 04 16 04 14 40 81 b1 d1 18 75 f0 da 6b
+ 0000000290: 3c 50 5f cd 73 1d d9 77 f2 d7 c1 30 1f 06 03 55
+ 00000002A0: 1d 23 04 18 30 16 80 14 9b 85 5e fb 81 dc 4d 59
+ 00000002B0: 07 51 63 cf be df da 2c 7f c9 44 3c 30 82 01 0f
+ 00000002C0: 06 03 55 1d 1f 04 82 01 06 30 82 01 02 30 81 ff
+ 00000002D0: a0 81 fc a0 81 f9 86 81 b5 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f
+ 00000002E0: 74 65 73 74 67 6f 73 74 32 30 31 32 2e 63 72 79
+ 00000002F0: 70 74 6f 70 72 6f 2e 72 75 2f 43 65 72 74 45 6e
+ 0000000300: 72 6f 6c 6c 2f 21 30 34 32 32 21 30 34 33 35 21
+ 0000000310: 30 34 34 31 21 30 34 34 32 21 30 34 33 65 21 30
+ 0000000320: 34 33 32 21 30 34 34 62 21 30 34 33 39 25 32 30
+ 0000000330: 21 30 34 32 33 21 30 34 32 36 25 32 30 21 30 34
+ 0000000340: 31 65 21 30 34 31 65 21 30 34 31 65 25 32 30 21
+ 0000000350: 30 30 32 32 21 30 34 31 61 21 30 34 32 30 21 30
+ 0000000360: 34 31 38 21 30 34 31 66 21 30 34 32 32 21 30 34
+ 0000000370: 31 65 2d 21 30 34 31 66 21 30 34 32 30 21 30 34
+ 0000000380: 31 65 21 30 30 32 32 28 31 29 2e 63 72 6c 86 3f
+ 0000000390: 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 74 65 73 74 67 6f 73 74 32
+ 00000003A0: 30 31 32 2e 63 72 79 70 74 6f 70 72 6f 2e 72 75
+ 00000003B0: 2f 43 65 72 74 45 6e 72 6f 6c 6c 2f 74 65 73 74
+ 00000003C0: 67 6f 73 74 32 30 31 32 28 31 29 2e 63 72 6c 30
+ 00000003D0: 81 da 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 01 01 04 81 cd 30
+ 00000003E0: 81 ca 30 44 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 30 02 86 38
+ 00000003F0: 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 74 65 73 74 67 6f 73 74 32
+ 0000000400: 30 31 32 2e 63 72 79 70 74 6f 70 72 6f 2e 72 75
+ 0000000410: 2f 43 65 72 74 45 6e 72 6f 6c 6c 2f 72 6f 6f 74
+ 0000000420: 32 30 31 38 2e 63 72 74 30 3f 06 08 2b 06 01 05
+ 0000000430: 05 07 30 01 86 33 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 74 65 73
+ 0000000440: 74 67 6f 73 74 32 30 31 32 2e 63 72 79 70 74 6f
+ 0000000450: 70 72 6f 2e 72 75 2f 6f 63 73 70 32 30 31 32 67
+ 0000000460: 2f 6f 63 73 70 2e 73 72 66 30 41 06 08 2b 06 01
+ 0000000470: 05 05 07 30 01 86 35 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 74 65
+ 0000000480: 73 74 67 6f 73 74 32 30 31 32 2e 63 72 79 70 74
+ 0000000490: 6f 70 72 6f 2e 72 75 2f 6f 63 73 70 32 30 31 32
+ 00000004A0: 67 73 74 2f 6f 63 73 70 2e 73 72 66 30 0a 06 08
+ 00000004B0: 2a 85 03 07 01 01 03 02 03 41 00 21 ee 3b e1 fd
+ 00000004C0: 0f 36 90 92 c4 a2 35 26 e8 dc 4e b8 ef 89 40 70
+ 00000004D0: d2 91 39 bc 79 a6 e2 f7 c1 06 bd d5 d6 ff 72 a5
+ 00000004E0: 6c f2 c0 c3 75 e9 ca 67 81 c1 93 96 b4 bd 18 12
+ 00000004F0: 4c 37 f7 d9 73 d6 4c 8a a6 c4 0a
+
+ 0 1271: SEQUENCE {
+ 4 1188: SEQUENCE {
+ 8 3: [0] {
+ 10 1: INTEGER 2
+ : }
+ 13 19: INTEGER
+ : 7c 00 03 da a8 9e 1e ff 9e 79 05 fb bb 00 01 00
+ : 03 da a8
+ 34 10: SEQUENCE {
+ 36 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : gost2012Signature256 (1 2 643 7 1 1 3 2)
+ : }
+ 46 266: SEQUENCE {
+ 50 24: SET {
+ 52 22: SEQUENCE {
+ 54 5: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 100 1'
+ 61 13: NumericString '1234567890123'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 76 26: SET {
+ 78 24: SEQUENCE {
+ 80 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 3 131 1 1'
+ 90 12: NumericString '001234567890'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 104 47: SET {
+ 106 45: SEQUENCE {
+ 108 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : streetAddress (2 5 4 9)
+ 113 38: UTF8String 'ул. Сущёвский вал д. 18'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 153 11: SET {
+ 155 9: SEQUENCE {
+ 157 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : countryName (2 5 4 6)
+ 162 2: PrintableString 'RU'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 166 25: SET {
+ 168 23: SEQUENCE {
+ 170 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : stateOrProvinceName (2 5 4 8)
+ 175 16: UTF8String 'г. Москва'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 193 21: SET {
+ 195 19: SEQUENCE {
+ 197 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : localityName (2 5 4 7)
+ 202 12: UTF8String 'Москва'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 216 37: SET {
+ 218 35: SEQUENCE {
+ 220 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : organizationName (2 5 4 10)
+ 225 28: UTF8String 'ООО "КРИПТО-ПРО"'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 255 59: SET {
+ 257 57: SEQUENCE {
+ 259 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : commonName (2 5 4 3)
+ 264 50: UTF8String
+ : 'Тестовый УЦ ООО "КРИПТО-ПРО"'
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ 316 30: SEQUENCE {
+ 318 13: UTCTime 01/10/2021 06:10:10 GMT
+ 333 13: UTCTime 01/01/2022 06:20:10 GMT
+ : }
+ 348 68: SEQUENCE {
+ 350 32: SET {
+ 352 30: SEQUENCE {
+ 354 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : commonName (2 5 4 3)
+ 359 23: PrintableString 'IKE Interop Test Client'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 384 19: SET {
+ 386 17: SEQUENCE {
+ 388 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : organizationName (2 5 4 10)
+ 393 10: PrintableString 'ELVIS-PLUS'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 405 11: SET {
+ 407 9: SEQUENCE {
+ 409 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : countryName (2 5 4 6)
+ 414 2: PrintableString 'RU'
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ 418 170: SEQUENCE {
+ 421 33: SEQUENCE {
+ 423 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : gost2012PublicKey512 (1 2 643 7 1 1 1 2)
+ 433 21: SEQUENCE {
+ 435 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : cryptoPro2012Sign512A (1 2 643 7 1 2 1 2 1)
+ 446 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : gost2012Digest512 (1 2 643 7 1 1 2 3)
+ : }
+ : }
+ 456 132: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
+ 460 128: OCTET STRING
+ : ee 2f 0a 0e 09 1e 7e 04 ef ba 5b 62 a2 52 86 e1
+ : 9c 24 50 30 50 b0 b4 8a 37 35 b5 fc af 28 94 ec
+ : b5 9b 92 41 5b 69 e2 c9 ba 24 de 6a 72 c4 ef 44
+ : bb 89 a1 05 14 1b 87 3d 6a a3 72 3e 17 ca 7f 39
+ : 28 ce 16 8b dd 07 52 87 6a 0d 77 42 6d 99 2b 46
+ : 2c fd 4b b2 7c d7 c7 17 08 12 54 63 47 9d 14 3d
+ : 61 ed f2 95 ab 11 80 69 02 a7 66 60 50 7e a4 53
+ : 6d ad 01 49 b2 16 8a 95 1d cf 1a 57 93 56 14 5e
+ : }
+ : }
+ 591 601: [3] {
+ 595 597: SEQUENCE {
+ 599 14: SEQUENCE {
+ 601 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
+ 606 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
+ 609 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
+ 611 2: BIT STRING 5 unused bits
+ : '101'B
+ : }
+ : }
+ 615 19: SEQUENCE {
+ 617 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : extKeyUsage (2 5 29 37)
+ 622 12: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
+ 624 10: SEQUENCE {
+ 626 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : ipsecIKE (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 17)
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ 636 29: SEQUENCE {
+ 638 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
+ 643 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
+ 645 20: OCTET STRING
+ : 40 81 b1 d1 18 75 f0 da 6b 3c 50 5f cd 73 1d d9
+ : 77 f2 d7 c1
+ : }
+ : }
+ 667 31: SEQUENCE {
+ 669 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35)
+ 674 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
+ 676 22: SEQUENCE {
+ 678 20: [0]
+ : 9b 85 5e fb 81 dc 4d 59 07 51 63 cf be df da 2c
+ : 7f c9 44 3c
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ 700 271: SEQUENCE {
+ 704 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31)
+ 709 262: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
+ 713 258: SEQUENCE {
+ 717 255: SEQUENCE {
+ 720 252: [0] {
+ 723 249: [0] {
+ 726 181: [6]
+ : 'http://testgost2012.cryptopro.ru/CertEnroll/!042'
+ : '2!0435!0441!0442!043e!0432!044b!0439%20!0423!042'
+ : '6%20!041e!041e!041e%20!0022!041a!0420!0418!041f!'
+ : '0422!041e-!041f!0420!041e!0022(1).crl'
+ 910 63: [6]
+ : 'http://testgost2012.cryptopro.ru/CertEnroll/test'
+ : 'gost2012(1).crl'
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ 975 218: SEQUENCE {
+ 978 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : authorityInfoAccess (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 1)
+ 988 205: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
+ 991 202: SEQUENCE {
+ 994 68: SEQUENCE {
+ 996 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : caIssuers (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 2)
+ 1006 56: [6]
+ : 'http://testgost2012.cryptopro.ru/CertEnroll/root'
+ : '2018.crt'
+ : }
+ 1064 63: SEQUENCE {
+ 1066 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : ocsp (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1)
+ 1076 51: [6]
+ : 'http://testgost2012.cryptopro.ru/ocsp2012g/ocsp.'
+ : 'srf'
+ : }
+ 1129 65: SEQUENCE {
+ 1131 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : ocsp (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1)
+ 1141 53: [6]
+ : 'http://testgost2012.cryptopro.ru/ocsp2012gst/ocs'
+ : 'p.srf'
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ 1196 10: SEQUENCE {
+ 1198 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : gost2012Signature256 (1 2 643 7 1 1 3 2)
+ : }
+ 1208 65: BIT STRING
+ : 21 ee 3b e1 fd 0f 36 90 92 c4 a2 35 26 e8 dc 4e
+ : b8 ef 89 40 70 d2 91 39 bc 79 a6 e2 f7 c1 06 bd
+ : d5 d6 ff 72 a5 6c f2 c0 c3 75 e9 ca 67 81 c1 93
+ : 96 b4 bd 18 12 4c 37 f7 d9 73 d6 4c 8a a6 c4 0a
+ : }
+
+ The responder's certificate private key (little endian):
+
+ 0000000000: cb 73 0c 81 6f ac 6d 81 9f 82 ae 15 a9 08 12 17
+ 0000000010: d3 1b 97 64 b7 1c 34 0d d3 dd 90 1f 15 8c 9b 06
+
+ The responder's certificate:
+
+ 0000000000: 30 82 04 b2 30 82 04 5f a0 03 02 01 02 02 13 7c
+ 0000000010: 00 03 d9 02 ec f9 34 3e c8 aa d6 59 00 01 00 03
+ 0000000020: d9 02 30 0a 06 08 2a 85 03 07 01 01 03 02 30 82
+ 0000000030: 01 0a 31 18 30 16 06 05 2a 85 03 64 01 12 0d 31
+ 0000000040: 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 30 31 32 33 31 1a 30 18
+ 0000000050: 06 08 2a 85 03 03 81 03 01 01 12 0c 30 30 31 32
+ 0000000060: 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 30 31 2f 30 2d 06 03 55 04
+ 0000000070: 09 0c 26 d1 83 d0 bb 2e 20 d0 a1 d1 83 d1 89 d1
+ 0000000080: 91 d0 b2 d1 81 d0 ba d0 b8 d0 b9 20 d0 b2 d0 b0
+ 0000000090: d0 bb 20 d0 b4 2e 20 31 38 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55
+ 00000000A0: 04 06 13 02 52 55 31 19 30 17 06 03 55 04 08 0c
+ 00000000B0: 10 d0 b3 2e 20 d0 9c d0 be d1 81 d0 ba d0 b2 d0
+ 00000000C0: b0 31 15 30 13 06 03 55 04 07 0c 0c d0 9c d0 be
+ 00000000D0: d1 81 d0 ba d0 b2 d0 b0 31 25 30 23 06 03 55 04
+ 00000000E0: 0a 0c 1c d0 9e d0 9e d0 9e 20 22 d0 9a d0 a0 d0
+ 00000000F0: 98 d0 9f d0 a2 d0 9e 2d d0 9f d0 a0 d0 9e 22 31
+ 0000000100: 3b 30 39 06 03 55 04 03 0c 32 d0 a2 d0 b5 d1 81
+ 0000000110: d1 82 d0 be d0 b2 d1 8b d0 b9 20 d0 a3 d0 a6 20
+ 0000000120: d0 9e d0 9e d0 9e 20 22 d0 9a d0 a0 d0 98 d0 9f
+ 0000000130: d0 a2 d0 9e 2d d0 9f d0 a0 d0 9e 22 30 1e 17 0d
+ 0000000140: 32 31 30 39 33 30 31 33 32 34 30 36 5a 17 0d 32
+ 0000000150: 31 31 32 33 30 31 33 33 34 30 36 5a 30 44 31 20
+ 0000000160: 30 1e 06 03 55 04 03 13 17 49 4b 45 20 49 6e 74
+ 0000000170: 65 72 6f 70 20 54 65 73 74 20 53 65 72 76 65 72
+ 0000000180: 31 13 30 11 06 03 55 04 0a 13 0a 45 4c 56 49 53
+ 0000000190: 2d 50 4c 55 53 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02
+ 00000001A0: 52 55 30 66 30 1f 06 08 2a 85 03 07 01 01 01 01
+ 00000001B0: 30 13 06 07 2a 85 03 02 02 24 00 06 08 2a 85 03
+ 00000001C0: 07 01 01 02 02 03 43 00 04 40 5b b3 14 3e f4 70
+ 00000001D0: c1 70 d7 f3 27 25 d8 53 7c e6 de 6d 8c 29 f6 b2
+ 00000001E0: 32 64 56 dc b1 77 f2 3d fa f4 2a 5c f3 74 86 7f
+ 00000001F0: 04 72 51 c1 cf b3 43 36 f5 95 a2 af 05 47 57 1a
+ 0000000200: 55 c0 78 a4 9d 64 26 b8 61 14 a3 82 02 59 30 82
+ 0000000210: 02 55 30 0e 06 03 55 1d 0f 01 01 ff 04 04 03 02
+ 0000000220: 05 a0 30 13 06 03 55 1d 25 04 0c 30 0a 06 08 2b
+ 0000000230: 06 01 05 05 07 03 11 30 1d 06 03 55 1d 0e 04 16
+ 0000000240: 04 14 e0 d3 f0 09 ad ce 6c a5 47 ba 9b f7 a6 a5
+ 0000000250: 1b 06 14 ba a5 43 30 1f 06 03 55 1d 23 04 18 30
+ 0000000260: 16 80 14 9b 85 5e fb 81 dc 4d 59 07 51 63 cf be
+ 0000000270: df da 2c 7f c9 44 3c 30 82 01 0f 06 03 55 1d 1f
+ 0000000280: 04 82 01 06 30 82 01 02 30 81 ff a0 81 fc a0 81
+ 0000000290: f9 86 81 b5 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 74 65 73 74 67
+ 00000002A0: 6f 73 74 32 30 31 32 2e 63 72 79 70 74 6f 70 72
+ 00000002B0: 6f 2e 72 75 2f 43 65 72 74 45 6e 72 6f 6c 6c 2f
+ 00000002C0: 21 30 34 32 32 21 30 34 33 35 21 30 34 34 31 21
+ 00000002D0: 30 34 34 32 21 30 34 33 65 21 30 34 33 32 21 30
+ 00000002E0: 34 34 62 21 30 34 33 39 25 32 30 21 30 34 32 33
+ 00000002F0: 21 30 34 32 36 25 32 30 21 30 34 31 65 21 30 34
+ 0000000300: 31 65 21 30 34 31 65 25 32 30 21 30 30 32 32 21
+ 0000000310: 30 34 31 61 21 30 34 32 30 21 30 34 31 38 21 30
+ 0000000320: 34 31 66 21 30 34 32 32 21 30 34 31 65 2d 21 30
+ 0000000330: 34 31 66 21 30 34 32 30 21 30 34 31 65 21 30 30
+ 0000000340: 32 32 28 31 29 2e 63 72 6c 86 3f 68 74 74 70 3a
+ 0000000350: 2f 2f 74 65 73 74 67 6f 73 74 32 30 31 32 2e 63
+ 0000000360: 72 79 70 74 6f 70 72 6f 2e 72 75 2f 43 65 72 74
+ 0000000370: 45 6e 72 6f 6c 6c 2f 74 65 73 74 67 6f 73 74 32
+ 0000000380: 30 31 32 28 31 29 2e 63 72 6c 30 81 da 06 08 2b
+ 0000000390: 06 01 05 05 07 01 01 04 81 cd 30 81 ca 30 44 06
+ 00000003A0: 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 30 02 86 38 68 74 74 70 3a
+ 00000003B0: 2f 2f 74 65 73 74 67 6f 73 74 32 30 31 32 2e 63
+ 00000003C0: 72 79 70 74 6f 70 72 6f 2e 72 75 2f 43 65 72 74
+ 00000003D0: 45 6e 72 6f 6c 6c 2f 72 6f 6f 74 32 30 31 38 2e
+ 00000003E0: 63 72 74 30 3f 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 86
+ 00000003F0: 33 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 74 65 73 74 67 6f 73 74
+ 0000000400: 32 30 31 32 2e 63 72 79 70 74 6f 70 72 6f 2e 72
+ 0000000410: 75 2f 6f 63 73 70 32 30 31 32 67 2f 6f 63 73 70
+ 0000000420: 2e 73 72 66 30 41 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 30 01
+ 0000000430: 86 35 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 74 65 73 74 67 6f 73
+ 0000000440: 74 32 30 31 32 2e 63 72 79 70 74 6f 70 72 6f 2e
+ 0000000450: 72 75 2f 6f 63 73 70 32 30 31 32 67 73 74 2f 6f
+ 0000000460: 63 73 70 2e 73 72 66 30 0a 06 08 2a 85 03 07 01
+ 0000000470: 01 03 02 03 41 00 a5 39 5f ca 48 e1 c2 93 c1 e0
+ 0000000480: 8a 64 74 0f 6b 86 a2 15 9b 46 29 d0 42 71 4f ce
+ 0000000490: e7 52 d7 d7 3d aa 47 ce cf 52 63 8f 26 b2 17 5f
+ 00000004A0: ad 96 57 76 ea 5f d0 87 bb 12 29 e4 06 0e e1 5f
+ 00000004B0: fd 59 81 fb 34 6d
+
+ 0 1202: SEQUENCE {
+ 4 1119: SEQUENCE {
+ 8 3: [0] {
+ 10 1: INTEGER 2
+ : }
+ 13 19: INTEGER
+ : 7c 00 03 d9 02 ec f9 34 3e c8 aa d6 59 00 01 00
+ : 03 d9 02
+ 34 10: SEQUENCE {
+ 36 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : gost2012Signature256 (1 2 643 7 1 1 3 2)
+ : }
+ 46 266: SEQUENCE {
+ 50 24: SET {
+ 52 22: SEQUENCE {
+ 54 5: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 100 1'
+ 61 13: NumericString '1234567890123'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 76 26: SET {
+ 78 24: SEQUENCE {
+ 80 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 3 131 1 1'
+ 90 12: NumericString '001234567890'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 104 47: SET {
+ 106 45: SEQUENCE {
+ 108 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : streetAddress (2 5 4 9)
+ 113 38: UTF8String 'ул. Сущёвский вал д. 18'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 153 11: SET {
+ 155 9: SEQUENCE {
+ 157 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : countryName (2 5 4 6)
+ 162 2: PrintableString 'RU'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 166 25: SET {
+ 168 23: SEQUENCE {
+ 170 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : stateOrProvinceName (2 5 4 8)
+ 175 16: UTF8String 'г. Москва'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 193 21: SET {
+ 195 19: SEQUENCE {
+ 197 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : localityName (2 5 4 7)
+ 202 12: UTF8String 'Москва'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 216 37: SET {
+ 218 35: SEQUENCE {
+ 220 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : organizationName (2 5 4 10)
+ 225 28: UTF8String 'ООО "КРИПТО-ПРО"'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 255 59: SET {
+ 257 57: SEQUENCE {
+ 259 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : commonName (2 5 4 3)
+ 264 50: UTF8String
+ : 'Тестовый УЦ ООО "КРИПТО-ПРО"'
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ 316 30: SEQUENCE {
+ 318 13: UTCTime 30/09/2021 13:24:06 GMT
+ 333 13: UTCTime 30/12/2021 13:34:06 GMT
+ : }
+ 348 68: SEQUENCE {
+ 350 32: SET {
+ 352 30: SEQUENCE {
+ 354 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : commonName (2 5 4 3)
+ 359 23: PrintableString 'IKE Interop Test Server'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 384 19: SET {
+ 386 17: SEQUENCE {
+ 388 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : organizationName (2 5 4 10)
+ 393 10: PrintableString 'ELVIS-PLUS'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 405 11: SET {
+ 407 9: SEQUENCE {
+ 409 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : countryName (2 5 4 6)
+ 414 2: PrintableString 'RU'
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ 418 102: SEQUENCE {
+ 420 31: SEQUENCE {
+ 422 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : gost2012PublicKey256 (1 2 643 7 1 1 1 1)
+ 432 19: SEQUENCE {
+ 434 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : cryptoProSignXA (1 2 643 2 2 36 0)
+ 443 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : gost2012Digest256 (1 2 643 7 1 1 2 2)
+ : }
+ : }
+ 453 67: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
+ 456 64: OCTET STRING
+ : 5b b3 14 3e f4 70 c1 70 d7 f3 27 25 d8 53 7c e6
+ : de 6d 8c 29 f6 b2 32 64 56 dc b1 77 f2 3d fa f4
+ : 2a 5c f3 74 86 7f 04 72 51 c1 cf b3 43 36 f5 95
+ : a2 af 05 47 57 1a 55 c0 78 a4 9d 64 26 b8 61 14
+ : }
+ : }
+ 522 601: [3] {
+ 526 597: SEQUENCE {
+ 530 14: SEQUENCE {
+ 532 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
+ 537 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
+ 540 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
+ 542 2: BIT STRING 5 unused bits
+ : '101'B
+ : }
+ : }
+ 546 19: SEQUENCE {
+ 548 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : extKeyUsage (2 5 29 37)
+ 553 12: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
+ 555 10: SEQUENCE {
+ 557 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : ipsecIKE (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 17)
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ 567 29: SEQUENCE {
+ 569 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
+ 574 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
+ 576 20: OCTET STRING
+ : e0 d3 f0 09 ad ce 6c a5 47 ba 9b f7 a6 a5 1b 06
+ : 14 ba a5 43
+ : }
+ : }
+ 598 31: SEQUENCE {
+ 600 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35)
+ 605 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
+ 607 22: SEQUENCE {
+ 609 20: [0]
+ : 9b 85 5e fb 81 dc 4d 59 07 51 63 cf be df dA 2C
+ : 7f C9 44 3c
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ 631 271: SEQUENCE {
+ 635 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31)
+ 640 262: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
+ 644 258: SEQUENCE {
+ 648 255: SEQUENCE {
+ 651 252: [0] {
+ 654 249: [0] {
+ 657 181: [6]
+ : 'http://testgost2012.cryptopro.ru/CertEnroll/!042'
+ : '2!0435!0441!0442!043e!0432!044b!0439%20!0423!042'
+ : '6%20!041e!041e!041e%20!0022!041a!0420!0418!041f!'
+ : '0422!041e-!041f!0420!041e!0022(1).crl'
+ 841 63: [6]
+ : 'http://testgost2012.cryptopro.ru/CertEnroll/test'
+ : 'gost2012(1).crl'
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ 906 218: SEQUENCE {
+ 909 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : authorityInfoAccess (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 1)
+ 919 205: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
+ 922 202: SEQUENCE {
+ 925 68: SEQUENCE {
+ 927 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : caIssuers (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 2)
+ 937 56: [6]
+ : 'http://testgost2012.cryptopro.ru/CertEnroll/root'
+ : '2018.crt'
+ : }
+ 995 63: SEQUENCE {
+ 997 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : ocsp (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1)
+ 1007 51: [6]
+ : 'http://testgost2012.cryptopro.ru/ocsp2012g/ocsp.'
+ : 'srf'
+ : }
+ 1060 65: SEQUENCE {
+ 1062 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : ocsp (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1)
+ 1072 53: [6]
+ : 'http://testgost2012.cryptopro.ru/ocsp2012gst/ocs'
+ : 'p.srf'
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ 1127 10: SEQUENCE {
+ 1129 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : gost2012Signature256 (1 2 643 7 1 1 3 2)
+ : }
+ 1139 65: BIT STRING
+ : a5 39 5f ca 48 e1 c2 93 c1 e0 8a 64 74 0f 6b 86
+ : a2 15 9b 46 29 d0 42 71 4f ce e7 52 d7 d7 3d aa
+ : 47 ce cf 52 63 8f 26 b2 17 5f ad 96 57 76 ea 5f
+ : d0 87 bb 12 29 e4 06 0e e1 5f fd 59 81 fb 34 6d
+ : }
+
+ CA certificate:
+
+ 0000000000: 30 82 05 1c 30 82 04 c9 a0 03 02 01 02 02 10 3b
+ 0000000010: 20 8a e5 fd 46 68 86 49 a0 50 fa af a8 83 93 30
+ 0000000020: 0a 06 08 2a 85 03 07 01 01 03 02 30 82 01 0a 31
+ 0000000030: 18 30 16 06 05 2a 85 03 64 01 12 0d 31 32 33 34
+ 0000000040: 35 36 37 38 39 30 31 32 33 31 1a 30 18 06 08 2a
+ 0000000050: 85 03 03 81 03 01 01 12 0c 30 30 31 32 33 34 35
+ 0000000060: 36 37 38 39 30 31 2f 30 2d 06 03 55 04 09 0c 26
+ 0000000070: d1 83 d0 bb 2e 20 d0 a1 d1 83 d1 89 d1 91 d0 b2
+ 0000000080: d1 81 d0 ba d0 b8 d0 b9 20 d0 b2 d0 b0 d0 bb 20
+ 0000000090: d0 b4 2e 20 31 38 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13
+ 00000000A0: 02 52 55 31 19 30 17 06 03 55 04 08 0c 10 d0 b3
+ 00000000B0: 2e 20 d0 9c d0 be d1 81 d0 ba d0 b2 d0 b0 31 15
+ 00000000C0: 30 13 06 03 55 04 07 0c 0c d0 9c d0 be d1 81 d0
+ 00000000D0: ba d0 b2 d0 b0 31 25 30 23 06 03 55 04 0a 0c 1c
+ 00000000E0: d0 9e d0 9e d0 9e 20 22 d0 9a d0 a0 d0 98 d0 9f
+ 00000000F0: d0 a2 d0 9e 2d d0 9f d0 a0 d0 9e 22 31 3b 30 39
+ 0000000100: 06 03 55 04 03 0c 32 d0 a2 d0 b5 d1 81 d1 82 d0
+ 0000000110: be d0 b2 d1 8b d0 b9 20 d0 a3 d0 a6 20 d0 9e d0
+ 0000000120: 9e d0 9e 20 22 d0 9a d0 a0 d0 98 d0 9f d0 a2 d0
+ 0000000130: 9e 2d d0 9f d0 a0 d0 9e 22 30 1e 17 0d 31 38 30
+ 0000000140: 39 31 32 31 30 31 39 33 30 5a 17 0d 32 33 30 39
+ 0000000150: 31 32 31 30 32 38 35 35 5a 30 82 01 0a 31 18 30
+ 0000000160: 16 06 05 2a 85 03 64 01 12 0d 31 32 33 34 35 36
+ 0000000170: 37 38 39 30 31 32 33 31 1a 30 18 06 08 2a 85 03
+ 0000000180: 03 81 03 01 01 12 0c 30 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37
+ 0000000190: 38 39 30 31 2f 30 2d 06 03 55 04 09 0c 26 d1 83
+ 00000001A0: d0 bb 2e 20 d0 a1 d1 83 d1 89 d1 91 d0 b2 d1 81
+ 00000001B0: d0 ba d0 b8 d0 b9 20 d0 b2 d0 b0 d0 bb 20 d0 b4
+ 00000001C0: 2e 20 31 38 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 52
+ 00000001D0: 55 31 19 30 17 06 03 55 04 08 0c 10 d0 b3 2e 20
+ 00000001E0: d0 9c d0 be d1 81 d0 ba d0 b2 d0 b0 31 15 30 13
+ 00000001F0: 06 03 55 04 07 0c 0c d0 9c d0 be d1 81 d0 ba d0
+ 0000000200: b2 d0 b0 31 25 30 23 06 03 55 04 0a 0c 1c d0 9e
+ 0000000210: d0 9e d0 9e 20 22 d0 9a d0 a0 d0 98 d0 9f d0 a2
+ 0000000220: d0 9e 2d d0 9f d0 a0 d0 9e 22 31 3b 30 39 06 03
+ 0000000230: 55 04 03 0c 32 d0 a2 d0 b5 d1 81 d1 82 d0 be d0
+ 0000000240: b2 d1 8b d0 b9 20 d0 a3 d0 a6 20 d0 9e d0 9e d0
+ 0000000250: 9e 20 22 d0 9a d0 a0 d0 98 d0 9f d0 a2 d0 9e 2d
+ 0000000260: d0 9f d0 a0 d0 9e 22 30 66 30 1f 06 08 2a 85 03
+ 0000000270: 07 01 01 01 01 30 13 06 07 2a 85 03 02 02 23 01
+ 0000000280: 06 08 2a 85 03 07 01 01 02 02 03 43 00 04 40 98
+ 0000000290: 1f fd a9 50 cd 21 86 30 f4 59 06 72 a9 d6 3d 6b
+ 00000002A0: c0 33 82 06 46 37 e3 dc 21 4a b1 f8 9f b7 56 ec
+ 00000002B0: a5 2d b5 81 87 b6 9d c2 2e df fd 09 33 53 9c 18
+ 00000002C0: 32 ac d7 42 2e 09 a5 f4 36 a3 a5 c1 d2 22 f0 a3
+ 00000002D0: 82 01 fe 30 82 01 fa 30 36 06 05 2a 85 03 64 6f
+ 00000002E0: 04 2d 0c 2b 22 d0 9a d1 80 d0 b8 d0 bf d1 82 d0
+ 00000002F0: be d0 9f d1 80 d0 be 20 43 53 50 22 20 28 d0 b2
+ 0000000300: d0 b5 d1 80 d1 81 d0 b8 d1 8f 20 34 2e 30 29 30
+ 0000000310: 82 01 21 06 05 2a 85 03 64 70 04 82 01 16 30 82
+ 0000000320: 01 12 0c 2b 22 d0 9a d1 80 d0 b8 d0 bf d1 82 d0
+ 0000000330: be d0 9f d1 80 d0 be 20 43 53 50 22 20 28 d0 b2
+ 0000000340: d0 b5 d1 80 d1 81 d0 b8 d1 8f 20 34 2e 30 29 0c
+ 0000000350: 41 d0 a3 d0 b4 d0 be d1 81 d1 82 d0 be d0 b2 d0
+ 0000000360: b5 d1 80 d1 8f d1 8e d1 89 d0 b8 d0 b9 20 d1 86
+ 0000000370: d0 b5 d0 bd d1 82 d1 80 20 22 d0 9a d1 80 d0 b8
+ 0000000380: d0 bf d1 82 d0 be d0 9f d1 80 d0 be 20 d0 a3 d0
+ 0000000390: a6 22 0c 4f d0 a1 d0 b5 d1 80 d1 82 d0 b8 d1 84
+ 00000003A0: d0 b8 d0 ba d0 b0 d1 82 20 d1 81 d0 be d0 be d1
+ 00000003B0: 82 d0 b2 d0 b5 d1 82 d1 81 d1 82 d0 b2 d0 b8 d1
+ 00000003C0: 8f 20 e2 84 96 20 d0 a1 d0 a4 2f 30 30 30 2d 30
+ 00000003D0: 30 30 30 20 d0 be d1 82 20 30 30 2e 30 30 2e 30
+ 00000003E0: 30 30 30 0c 4f d0 a1 d0 b5 d1 80 d1 82 d0 b8 d1
+ 00000003F0: 84 d0 b8 d0 ba d0 b0 d1 82 20 d1 81 d0 be d0 be
+ 0000000400: d1 82 d0 b2 d0 b5 d1 82 d1 81 d1 82 d0 b2 d0 b8
+ 0000000410: d1 8f 20 e2 84 96 20 d0 a1 d0 a4 2f 30 30 30 2d
+ 0000000420: 30 30 30 30 20 d0 be d1 82 20 30 30 2e 30 30 2e
+ 0000000430: 30 30 30 30 30 0b 06 03 55 1d 0f 04 04 03 02 01
+ 0000000440: 86 30 0f 06 03 55 1d 13 01 01 ff 04 05 30 03 01
+ 0000000450: 01 ff 30 1d 06 03 55 1d 0e 04 16 04 14 9b 85 5e
+ 0000000460: fb 81 dc 4d 59 07 51 63 cf be df da 2c 7f c9 44
+ 0000000470: 3c 30 12 06 09 2b 06 01 04 01 82 37 15 01 04 05
+ 0000000480: 02 03 01 00 01 30 25 06 03 55 1d 20 04 1e 30 1c
+ 0000000490: 30 08 06 06 2a 85 03 64 71 01 30 08 06 06 2a 85
+ 00000004A0: 03 64 71 02 30 06 06 04 55 1d 20 00 30 23 06 09
+ 00000004B0: 2b 06 01 04 01 82 37 15 02 04 16 04 14 c8 da 66
+ 00000004C0: cb b6 97 d2 3e c9 67 1d c2 5b 64 3a ab dc bb cf
+ 00000004D0: 69 30 0a 06 08 2a 85 03 07 01 01 03 02 03 41 00
+ 00000004E0: 3e 95 cd d8 1f 95 bd 09 ab 73 82 f5 04 e0 f2 66
+ 00000004F0: 12 32 82 9b 2b 03 cc 4b c0 b3 73 f8 e7 0d d6 bd
+ 0000000500: 83 c8 27 2d 01 c1 ec ef 65 5d ac 77 fd dd da 9d
+ 0000000510: 04 e2 bf e8 02 7f 87 36 1b cf ac 7a 28 9c 21 fe
+
+ 0 1308: SEQUENCE {
+ 4 1225: SEQUENCE {
+ 8 3: [0] {
+ 10 1: INTEGER 2
+ : }
+ 13 16: INTEGER
+ : 3b 20 8a e5 fd 46 68 86 49 a0 50 fa af a8 83 93
+ 31 10: SEQUENCE {
+ 33 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : gost2012Signature256 (1 2 643 7 1 1 3 2)
+ : }
+ 43 266: SEQUENCE {
+ 47 24: SET {
+ 49 22: SEQUENCE {
+ 51 5: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 100 1'
+ 58 13: NumericString '1234567890123'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 73 26: SET {
+ 75 24: SEQUENCE {
+ 77 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 3 131 1 1'
+ 87 12: NumericString '001234567890'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 101 47: SET {
+ 103 45: SEQUENCE {
+ 105 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : streetAddress (2 5 4 9)
+ 110 38: UTF8String 'ул. Сущёвский вал д. 18'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 150 11: SET {
+ 152 9: SEQUENCE {
+ 154 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : countryName (2 5 4 6)
+ 159 2: PrintableString 'RU'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 163 25: SET {
+ 165 23: SEQUENCE {
+ 167 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : stateOrProvinceName (2 5 4 8)
+ 172 16: UTF8String 'г. Москва'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 190 21: SET {
+ 192 19: SEQUENCE {
+ 194 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : localityName (2 5 4 7)
+ 199 12: UTF8String 'Москва'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 213 37: SET {
+ 215 35: SEQUENCE {
+ 217 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : organizationName (2 5 4 10)
+ 222 28: UTF8String 'ООО "КРИПТО-ПРО"'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 252 59: SET {
+ 254 57: SEQUENCE {
+ 256 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : commonName (2 5 4 3)
+ 261 50: UTF8String
+ : 'Тестовый УЦ ООО "КРИПТО-ПРО"'
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ 313 30: SEQUENCE {
+ 315 13: UTCTime 12/09/2018 10:19:30 GMT
+ 330 13: UTCTime 12/09/2023 10:28:55 GMT
+ : }
+ 345 266: SEQUENCE {
+ 349 24: SET {
+ 351 22: SEQUENCE {
+ 353 5: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 100 1'
+ 360 13: NumericString '1234567890123'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 375 26: SET {
+ 377 24: SEQUENCE {
+ 379 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 3 131 1 1'
+ 389 12: NumericString '001234567890'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 403 47: SET {
+ 405 45: SEQUENCE {
+ 407 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : streetAddress (2 5 4 9)
+ 412 38: UTF8String 'ул. Сущёвский вал д. 18'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 452 11: SET {
+ 454 9: SEQUENCE {
+ 456 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : countryName (2 5 4 6)
+ 461 2: PrintableString 'RU'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 465 25: SET {
+ 467 23: SEQUENCE {
+ 469 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : stateOrProvinceName (2 5 4 8)
+ 474 16: UTF8String 'г. Москва'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 492 21: SET {
+ 494 19: SEQUENCE {
+ 496 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : localityName (2 5 4 7)
+ 501 12: UTF8String 'Москва'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 515 37: SET {
+ 517 35: SEQUENCE {
+ 519 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : organizationName (2 5 4 10)
+ 524 28: UTF8String 'ООО "КРИПТО-ПРО"'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 554 59: SET {
+ 556 57: SEQUENCE {
+ 558 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : commonName (2 5 4 3)
+ 563 50: UTF8String
+ : 'Тестовый УЦ ООО "КРИПТО-ПРО"'
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ 615 102: SEQUENCE {
+ 617 31: SEQUENCE {
+ 619 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : gost2012PublicKey256 (1 2 643 7 1 1 1 1)
+ 629 19: SEQUENCE {
+ 631 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : cryptoProSignA (1 2 643 2 2 35 1)
+ 640 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : gost2012Digest256 (1 2 643 7 1 1 2 2)
+ : }
+ : }
+ 650 67: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
+ 653 64: OCTET STRING
+ : 98 1f fd a9 50 cd 21 86 30 f4 59 06 72 a9 d6 3d
+ : 6b c0 33 82 06 46 37 e3 dc 21 4a b1 f8 9f b7 56
+ : ec a5 2d b5 81 87 b6 9d c2 2e df fd 09 33 53 9c
+ : 18 32 ac d7 42 2e 09 a5 f4 36 a3 a5 c1 d2 22 f0
+ : }
+ : }
+ 719 510: [3] {
+ 723 506: SEQUENCE {
+ 727 54: SEQUENCE {
+ 729 5: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 100 111'
+ 736 45: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
+ 738 43: UTF8String
+ : '"КриптоПро CSP" (версия 4.0)'
+ : }
+ : }
+ 783 289: SEQUENCE {
+ 787 5: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 100 112'
+ 794 278: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
+ 798 274: SEQUENCE {
+ 802 43: UTF8String
+ : '"КриптоПро CSP" (версия 4.0)'
+ 847 65: UTF8String
+ : 'Удостоверяющий центр "КриптоПро УЦ"'
+ 914 79: UTF8String
+ : 'Сертификат соответствия № СФ/000-0000 от 00.00.'
+ : '0000'
+ 995 79: UTF8String
+ : 'Сертификат соответствия № СФ/000-0000 от 00.00.'
+ : '0000'
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ 1076 11: SEQUENCE {
+ 1078 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
+ 1083 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
+ 1085 2: BIT STRING 1 unused bit
+ : '1100001'B
+ : }
+ : }
+ 1089 15: SEQUENCE {
+ 1091 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
+ 1096 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
+ 1099 5: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
+ 1101 3: SEQUENCE {
+ 1103 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ 1106 29: SEQUENCE {
+ 1108 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
+ 1113 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
+ 1115 20: OCTET STRING
+ : 9b 85 5e fb 81 dc 4d 59 07 51 63 cf be df da 2c
+ : 7f c9 44 3c
+ : }
+ : }
+ 1137 18: SEQUENCE {
+ 1139 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : cAKeyCertIndexPair (1 3 6 1 4 1 311 21 1)
+ 1150 5: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
+ 1152 3: INTEGER 65537
+ : }
+ : }
+ 1157 37: SEQUENCE {
+ 1159 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32)
+ 1164 30: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
+ 1166 28: SEQUENCE {
+ 1168 8: SEQUENCE {
+ 1170 6: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 100 113 1'
+ : }
+ 1178 8: SEQUENCE {
+ 1180 6: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 100 113 2'
+ : }
+ 1188 6: SEQUENCE {
+ 1190 4: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : anyPolicy (2 5 29 32 0)
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ 1196 35: SEQUENCE {
+ 1198 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : certSrvPreviousCertHash (1 3 6 1 4 1 311 21 2)
+ 1209 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
+ 1211 20: OCTET STRING
+ : c8 da 66 cb b6 97 d2 3e c9 67 1d c2 5b 64 3a ab
+ : dc bb cf 69
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ : }
+ 1233 10: SEQUENCE {
+ 1235 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ : gost2012Signature256 (1 2 643 7 1 1 3 2)
+ : }
+ 1245 65: BIT STRING
+ : 3e 95 cd d8 1f 95 bd 09 ab 73 82 f5 04 e0 f2 66
+ : 12 32 82 9b 2b 03 cc 4b c0 b3 73 f8 e7 0d d6 bd
+ : 83 c8 27 2d 01 c1 ec ef 65 5d ac 77 fd dd da 9d
+ : 04 e2 bf e8 02 7f 87 36 1b cf ac 7a 28 9c 21 fe
+ : }
+
+ This scenario includes four sub-scenarios, which are described below.
+
+A.2.1. Sub-Scenario 1: Establishment of IKE and ESP SAs Using the
+ IKE_SA_INIT and the IKE_AUTH Exchanges
+
+ Initiator Responder
+
+ HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni [,N+] --->
+ <--- HDR, N(INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD)
+
+ HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni [,N+] --->
+ <--- HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr
+ [,CERTREQ] [,N+]
+
+ HDR, SK {IDi, [CERT,]
+ [CERTREQ,] [IDr,] [N+,]
+ AUTH, SAi2, TSi, TSr} --->
+ <--- HDR, SK {IDr, [CERT,] [N+,]
+ AUTH, SAr2, TSi, TSr}
+
+ Initiator's actions:
+
+ (1) Generates random SPIi for IKE SA
+
+ 00000000: 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78
+
+ (2) Generates random IKE nonce Ni
+
+ 00000000: 98 44 d5 40 ef 89 46 f4 55 20 0a 55 73 dc ad 73
+ 00000010: dd 2a 6f a8 31 f8 49 05 f5 8e 17 a2 6c cc 01 1f
+
+ (3) Generates ephemeral private key (512 bit)
+
+ 00000000: 82 fb 1c 90 c3 a3 c2 16 7f 76 15 5d 69 06 f8 47
+ 00000010: 3e fe 83 3e 21 cd e7 a4 e5 cd d9 71 ef d3 c5 db
+ 00000020: 7e de 50 70 48 96 90 01 0c 81 02 b9 4b 56 f6 47
+ 00000030: cb 27 40 25 58 55 80 32 e9 59 17 10 3b 0f eb 3b
+
+ (4) Computes public key
+
+ 00000000: 89 77 c6 d7 2b 08 5d d5 48 b1 ea 5d 99 c5 03 09
+ 00000010: c6 62 fe d7 7d 84 a4 d8 8b 9b a5 c8 3a 7a 05 86
+ 00000020: e2 0d 8d 9b 5d ce 01 18 e2 d2 da 73 83 ee 30 ad
+ 00000030: 49 88 44 6f bd 18 78 b4 bb da c9 df 1a ca d1 2a
+ 00000040: 05 98 75 da 9e 9a 21 e4 db 71 8f af d1 96 c7 8b
+ 00000050: de 9a b2 98 f7 55 bb 74 38 34 a4 da 47 ab 86 15
+ 00000060: d4 c8 33 70 b7 02 79 b8 7f c2 97 6d 03 8f 2d 08
+ 00000070: d7 ab ac 85 4c bf 5a f6 27 57 ad fe 61 50 5e 45
+
+ (5) Creates message
+
+ IKE SA Init
+ 9280E0822E758778.0000000000000000.00000000 IKEv2 R<-I[328]
+ SA[52]{
+ P[48](#1:IKE::5#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE,
+ ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE,
+ PRF=PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512,
+ KE=GOST3410_2012_512,
+ GOST3410_2012_256}},
+ KE[136](GOST3410_2012_512){8977C6...505E45},
+ NONCE[36]{9844D5...CC011F},
+ N[28](NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP){000000...000000},
+ N[28](NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP){7D2124...4E6F10},
+ N[8](IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED),
+ N[12](SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS){STREEBOG_256, STREEBOG_512}
+
+ (6) Sends message, peer receives message
+
+ 10.111.10.171:54294->10.111.15.45:500 [328]
+
+ 00000000: 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+ 00000010: 21 20 22 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 48 22 00 00 34
+ 00000020: 00 00 00 30 01 01 00 05 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 20
+ 00000030: 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 21 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 09
+ 00000040: 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 22 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 21
+ 00000050: 28 00 00 88 00 22 00 00 89 77 c6 d7 2b 08 5d d5
+ 00000060: 48 b1 ea 5d 99 c5 03 09 c6 62 fe d7 7d 84 a4 d8
+ 00000070: 8b 9b a5 c8 3a 7a 05 86 e2 0d 8d 9b 5d ce 01 18
+ 00000080: e2 d2 da 73 83 ee 30 ad 49 88 44 6f bd 18 78 b4
+ 00000090: bb da c9 df 1a ca d1 2a 05 98 75 da 9e 9a 21 e4
+ 000000A0: db 71 8f af d1 96 c7 8b de 9a b2 98 f7 55 bb 74
+ 000000B0: 38 34 a4 da 47 ab 86 15 d4 c8 33 70 b7 02 79 b8
+ 000000C0: 7f c2 97 6d 03 8f 2d 08 d7 ab ac 85 4c bf 5a f6
+ 000000D0: 27 57 ad fe 61 50 5e 45 29 00 00 24 98 44 d5 40
+ 000000E0: ef 89 46 f4 55 20 0a 55 73 dc ad 73 dd 2a 6f a8
+ 000000F0: 31 f8 49 05 f5 8e 17 a2 6c cc 01 1f 29 00 00 1c
+ 00000100: 00 00 40 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+ 00000110: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05
+ 00000120: 7d 21 24 87 89 d7 95 71 bd a2 2d 22 9d 51 d0 71
+ 00000130: e9 4e 6f 10 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 2e 00 00 00 0c
+ 00000140: 00 00 40 2f 00 06 00 07
+
+ Responder's actions:
+
+ (7) Parses received message
+
+ IKE SA Init
+ 9280E0822E758778.0000000000000000.00000000 IKEv2 I->R[328]
+ SA[52]{
+ P[48](#1:IKE::5#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE,
+ ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE,
+ PRF=PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512,
+ KE=GOST3410_2012_512,
+ GOST3410_2012_256}},
+ KE[136](GOST3410_2012_512){8977C6...505E45},
+ NONCE[36]{9844D5...CC011F},
+ N[28](NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP){000000...000000},
+ N[28](NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP){7D2124...4E6F10},
+ N[8](IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED),
+ N[12](SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS){STREEBOG_256, STREEBOG_512}
+
+ (8) Creates message
+
+ IKE SA Init
+ 9280E0822E758778.0000000000000000.00000000 IKEv2 I<=R[38]
+ N[10](INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD){GOST3410_2012_256}
+
+ (9) Sends message, peer receives message
+
+ 10.111.10.171:54294<-10.111.15.45:500 [38]
+
+ 00000000: 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+ 00000010: 29 20 22 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 26 00 00 00 0a
+ 00000020: 00 00 00 11 00 21
+
+ Initiator's actions:
+
+ (10) Parses received message
+
+ IKE SA Init
+ 9280E0822E758778.0000000000000000.00000000 IKEv2 R=>I[38]
+ N[10](INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD){GOST3410_2012_256}}
+
+ (11) Generates ephemeral private key (256 bit)
+
+ 00000000: b9 7c ac df 01 43 44 dd 54 92 33 63 4a 6e da 64
+ 00000010: 38 5b 6a 9c c0 3c 6c 41 c5 02 eb 63 d1 e6 24 21
+
+ (12) Computes public key
+
+ 00000000: 7d b0 49 81 88 6d 1b 02 b2 a6 35 c5 8b ea 90 8c
+ 00000010: 3e 16 de e5 43 13 22 0b ad f5 89 9f 7f 85 54 2d
+ 00000020: 3e db 1e de 85 f7 d5 5d 6f 83 c5 d0 31 bd 31 49
+ 00000030: dd 29 c5 16 16 7d ec 86 16 d8 85 e6 e4 50 ab 46
+
+ (13) Creates message
+
+ IKE SA Init
+ 9280E0822E758778.0000000000000000.00000000 IKEv2 R<-I[264]
+ SA[52]{
+ P[48](#1:IKE::5#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE,
+ ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE,
+ PRF=PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512,
+ KE=GOST3410_2012_512,
+ GOST3410_2012_256}},
+ KE[72](GOST3410_2012_256){7DB049...50AB46},
+ NONCE[36]{9844D5...CC011F},
+ N[28](NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP){000000...000000},
+ N[28](NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP){7D2124...4E6F10},
+ N[8](IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED),
+ N[12](SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS){STREEBOG_256, STREEBOG_512}
+
+ (14) Sends message, peer receives message
+
+ 10.111.10.171:54294->10.111.15.45:500 [264]
+
+ 00000000: 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+ 00000010: 21 20 22 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 08 22 00 00 34
+ 00000020: 00 00 00 30 01 01 00 05 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 20
+ 00000030: 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 21 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 09
+ 00000040: 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 22 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 21
+ 00000050: 28 00 00 48 00 21 00 00 7d b0 49 81 88 6d 1b 02
+ 00000060: b2 a6 35 c5 8b ea 90 8c 3e 16 de e5 43 13 22 0b
+ 00000070: ad f5 89 9f 7f 85 54 2d 3e db 1e de 85 f7 d5 5d
+ 00000080: 6f 83 c5 d0 31 bd 31 49 dd 29 c5 16 16 7d ec 86
+ 00000090: 16 d8 85 e6 e4 50 ab 46 29 00 00 24 98 44 d5 40
+ 000000A0: ef 89 46 f4 55 20 0a 55 73 dc ad 73 dd 2a 6f a8
+ 000000B0: 31 f8 49 05 f5 8e 17 a2 6c cc 01 1f 29 00 00 1c
+ 000000C0: 00 00 40 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+ 000000D0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05
+ 000000E0: 7d 21 24 87 89 d7 95 71 bd a2 2d 22 9d 51 d0 71
+ 000000F0: e9 4e 6f 10 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 2e 00 00 00 0c
+ 00000100: 00 00 40 2f 00 06 00 07
+
+ Responder's actions:
+
+ (15) Parses received message
+
+ IKE SA Init
+ 9280E0822E758778.0000000000000000.00000000 IKEv2 I->R[264]
+ SA[52]{
+ P[48](#1:IKE::5#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE,
+ ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE,
+ PRF=PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512,
+ KE=GOST3410_2012_512,
+ GOST3410_2012_256}},
+ KE[72](GOST3410_2012_256){7DB049...50AB46},
+ NONCE[36]{9844D5...CC011F},
+ N[28](NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP){000000...000000},
+ N[28](NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP){7D2124...4E6F10},
+ N[8](IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED),
+ N[12](SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS){STREEBOG_256, STREEBOG_512}
+
+ (16) Generates random SPIr for IKE SA
+
+ 00000000: db 57 8d 97 de 11 9d 1e
+
+ (17) Generates random IKE nonce Nr
+
+ 00000000: 6c de 24 c1 2c 0a 10 d5 c3 fe 55 e8 7e 90 30 66
+ 00000010: ee 54 5b 24 1c 3c 01 dd b3 98 06 ae d3 b5 00 48
+
+ (18) Generates ephemeral private key
+
+ 00000000: 46 fd 19 da 1c 77 e8 4c 12 69 cf c8 a2 2a 0b e9
+ 00000010: 70 db c1 2c 9f 6d 88 0a 70 71 22 03 68 c6 fd 2d
+
+ (19) Computes public key
+
+ 00000000: 49 c2 40 f6 ac 35 f1 70 a7 c2 37 5e 9a 78 3c 09
+ 00000010: 59 8d 55 3b 30 5b 64 58 db 2f 3c 36 f4 b1 db ad
+ 00000020: ff c8 f4 b2 bd 14 cf 96 5b b2 d6 80 51 69 67 06
+ 00000030: bd 16 39 0e 6d 07 83 e4 9d ed fd 04 f1 9e 07 a2
+
+ (20) Computes hash of CA public key
+
+ 00000000: 5e 9e 50 5f 58 b0 a5 7a 33 45 83 49 66 0f 1c 3c
+ 00000010: 7a 67 71 98
+
+ (21) Creates message
+
+ IKE SA Init
+ 9280E0822E758778.DB578D97DE119D1E.00000000 IKEv2 I<=R[273]
+ SA[36]{
+ P[32](#1:IKE::3#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE,
+ PRF=PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512,
+ KE=GOST3410_2012_256}},
+ KE[72](GOST3410_2012_256){49C240...9E07A2},
+ NONCE[36]{6CDE24...B50048},
+ N[28](NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP){A4DCA3...2F5B3F},
+ N[28](NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP){BA7D7A...7AB7C9},
+ CERTREQ[25](X.509 Cert){5E9E50...677198},
+ N[8](IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED),
+ N[12](SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS){STREEBOG_256, STREEBOG_512}
+
+ (22) Sends message, peer receives message
+
+ 10.111.10.171:54294<-10.111.15.45:500 [273]
+
+ 00000000: 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97 de 11 9d 1e
+ 00000010: 21 20 22 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 11 22 00 00 24
+ 00000020: 00 00 00 20 01 01 00 03 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 21
+ 00000030: 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 09 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 21
+ 00000040: 28 00 00 48 00 21 00 00 49 c2 40 f6 ac 35 f1 70
+ 00000050: a7 c2 37 5e 9a 78 3c 09 59 8d 55 3b 30 5b 64 58
+ 00000060: db 2f 3c 36 f4 b1 db ad ff c8 f4 b2 bd 14 cf 96
+ 00000070: 5b b2 d6 80 51 69 67 06 bd 16 39 0e 6d 07 83 e4
+ 00000080: 9d ed fd 04 f1 9e 07 a2 29 00 00 24 6c de 24 c1
+ 00000090: 2c 0a 10 d5 c3 fe 55 e8 7e 90 30 66 ee 54 5b 24
+ 000000A0: 1c 3c 01 dd b3 98 06 ae d3 b5 00 48 29 00 00 1c
+ 000000B0: 00 00 40 04 a4 dc a3 62 54 e8 4b 53 2b ff e7 d2
+ 000000C0: 26 83 f3 8f 28 2f 5b 3f 26 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05
+ 000000D0: ba 7d 7a b8 48 82 72 f6 30 91 b6 ae 2b dd fb 48
+ 000000E0: ba 7a b7 c9 29 00 00 19 04 5e 9e 50 5f 58 b0 a5
+ 000000F0: 7a 33 45 83 49 66 0f 1c 3c 7a 67 71 98 29 00 00
+ 00000100: 08 00 00 40 2e 00 00 00 0c 00 00 40 2f 00 06 00
+ 00000110: 07
+
+ Initiator's actions:
+
+ (23) Parses received message
+
+ IKE SA Init
+ 9280E0822E758778.DB578D97DE119D1E.00000000 IKEv2 R=>I[273]
+ SA[36]{
+ P[32](#1:IKE::3#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE,
+ PRF=PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512,
+ KE=GOST3410_2012_256}},
+ KE[72](GOST3410_2012_256){49C240...9E07A2},
+ NONCE[36]{6CDE24...B50048},
+ N[28](NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP){A4DCA3...2F5B3F},
+ N[28](NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP){BA7D7A...7AB7C9},
+ CERTREQ[25](X.509 Cert){5E9E50...677198},
+ N[8](IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED),
+ N[12](SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS){STREEBOG_256, STREEBOG_512}
+
+ (24) Computes shared key
+
+ 00000000: bd 04 9d 0f 9c 5f 58 af c7 e4 01 bc 18 59 01 7c
+ 00000010: 88 28 f9 f2 9f 33 01 5d 49 9a 7d 14 74 d4 31 ac
+
+ (25) Computes SKEYSEED
+
+ 00000000: 9b ed 6c 79 64 b3 de 3a e4 9e dd 62 04 5a f0 8b
+ 00000010: 43 88 33 d4 e6 9e 73 16 a1 1a 9e b2 b4 19 13 c5
+ 00000020: d0 6d fb 86 40 11 c3 02 bb e5 a3 b5 e4 4a c4 c0
+ 00000030: 9d 18 c6 94 de c3 c5 14 82 e7 a2 51 fe c4 98 ca
+
+ (26) Computes SK_d
+
+ 00000000: c2 21 15 fd d3 99 3b 2a 43 60 c4 59 34 b0 be 3f
+ 00000010: 53 ef 6e b1 dd 88 ad 72 55 dd 83 22 5c 6f e1 d6
+ 00000020: 1f 1e ab 06 f9 41 cb c8 ea f9 dc fc 19 a0 2d bf
+ 00000030: 9a 0a 3f 3a 9a 45 1f 08 b6 a9 2c 62 52 b7 26 34
+
+ (27) Computes SK_ei
+
+ 00000000: 18 4e 4e 0f 36 28 bf 3c 9c 04 8e 93 bf a0 77 53
+ 00000010: 91 34 12 81 42 e6 4e 62 7f db a5 ed 98 60 50 ff
+ 00000020: b4 e1 3e 23
+
+ (28) Computes SK_er
+
+ 00000000: e9 27 59 2f 09 49 68 1e 0e 62 db c6 19 06 73 13
+ 00000010: cf da 5c 02 27 3e 4a b4 78 98 b4 86 d0 e9 34 f4
+ 00000020: a5 bb 18 2f
+
+ (29) Computes SK_pi
+
+ 00000000: 30 2c 10 8d 0f 61 47 00 f1 40 4f a9 4f af b5 30
+ 00000010: 11 ba 5f 24 39 32 85 12 4e 7e 71 75 50 15 a6 93
+ 00000020: c3 d0 5e 40 2e 21 8e b1 59 09 cd a4 eb b4 91 68
+ 00000030: 29 42 fe e2 d8 76 8f a6 96 55 1f ab 6c 9b 00 f8
+
+ (30) Computes SK_pr
+
+ 00000000: 6f 81 72 cb 96 58 fb 0e 17 70 b6 b9 1f a9 69 a9
+ 00000010: fc c7 27 4f b4 e1 85 90 a0 c7 9f f9 72 11 61 2a
+ 00000020: 35 b7 b7 96 d3 6a bb a5 aa b1 b8 34 8d 99 c6 f3
+ 00000030: 2b fc 32 56 c1 94 71 04 55 bd 89 6a bf c3 8b fe
+
+ (31) Computes prf(SK_pi, IDi)
+
+ 00000000: ce e8 8b d1 7e 3c 83 32 eb d1 29 08 de dc 71 f4
+ 00000010: 8f ba 09 b8 ca 5b 10 e2 f4 44 29 5c 97 7b 26 01
+ 00000020: a4 ba 83 c8 ea 40 92 0f 88 18 bd e7 e1 c9 45 cf
+ 00000030: ff 99 48 05 0d f4 93 a6 cd 54 46 d7 eb 7a 52 94
+
+ (32) Uses private key for signing (little endian)
+
+ 00000000: 76 E9 DD B3 F3 A2 08 A2 4E A5 81 9C AE 41 DA B4
+ 00000010: 77 3C 1D D5 DC EB AF E6 58 B1 47 D2 D8 29 CE 71
+ 00000020: 18 A9 85 5D 28 5B 3C E3 23 BD 80 AC 2F 00 CC B6
+ 00000030: 61 4C 42 A1 65 61 02 CF 33 EB 1F 5F 02 CE 8A B9
+
+ (33) Uses random number for signing
+
+ 00000000: 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
+ 00000010: 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
+ 00000020: 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
+ 00000030: 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
+
+ (34) Computes signature using algorithm id-tc26-signwithdigest-
+ gost3410-12-512
+
+ 00000000: 6a 3e 59 0d 72 1e 55 a3 c0 d1 2f 8a 9b 4e 44 10
+ 00000010: 58 59 bd 62 9e e7 12 31 e5 7d 01 53 f3 84 40 dd
+ 00000020: ac 73 ed 09 3a 10 d9 6e 7f eb 80 6c 11 9e 91 f3
+ 00000030: 7c 3c b0 55 f7 4b ec 0e 78 36 10 95 02 09 86 b3
+ 00000040: 27 04 2a 83 3c 89 36 1b 73 cf 7b c9 e0 df a2 07
+ 00000050: 12 1e 69 52 4d 89 1b de 6e 48 d1 34 fa 21 78 22
+ 00000060: 88 2e 30 86 c0 80 0a 2d 74 af 08 ff 35 75 a5 79
+ 00000070: e3 85 40 22 6b a8 42 f6 72 24 bf 29 87 58 a8 20
+
+ (35) Computes K1i (i1 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 3c 57 d7 c8 9f 50 98 fc 86 81 d6 8a 4e 5d 83 c6
+ 00000010: 1e 42 e6 e7 60 67 05 8d f5 2e 10 13 12 15 32 58
+
+ (36) Computes K2i (i2 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 0b 88 0a 1b c8 3e 61 79 82 08 db 13 31 08 63 3c
+ 00000010: 17 62 17 cb 7d 18 ce 70 37 84 85 f4 89 49 d0 06
+
+ (37) Computes K3i (i3 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 18 63 41 67 49 6e cf 48 56 71 4d aa 42 63 5c 11
+ 00000010: 2e 26 5b e2 7b c7 53 a4 09 82 e5 5a 7e f4 65 4d
+
+ (38) Selects SPI for incoming ESP SA
+
+ 00000000: 6c 0c a5 70
+
+ (39) Computes hash of CA public key
+
+ 00000000: 5e 9e 50 5f 58 b0 a5 7a 33 45 83 49 66 0f 1c 3c
+ 00000010: 7a 67 71 98
+
+ (40) Creates message splitting it into 4 fragments
+
+ IKE SA Auth
+ #9280E0822E758778.DB578D97DE119D1E.00000001 IKEv2 R<-I[1847]
+ E[1819]->4*EF[...]{
+ IDi[78](DN){CN=IKE Interop Test Client,O=ELVIS-PLUS,C=RU},
+ CERT[1280](X.509 Cert){308204...A6C40A},
+ CERTREQ[25](X.509 Cert){5E9E50...677198},
+ IDr[78](DN){CN=IKE Interop Test Server,O=ELVIS-PLUS,C=RU},
+ AUTH[149](Sig){id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-512[12]:
+ 6A3E59...58A820},
+ N[8](INITIAL_CONTACT),
+ N[12](SET_WINDOW_SIZE){4},
+ CP[16](REQUEST){IP4.Address[0], IP4.DNS[0]},
+ SA[56]{
+ P[52](#1:ESP:6C0CA570:5#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE,
+ ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE,
+ ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE,
+ ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE,
+ ESN=Off}},
+ TSi[40](2#){10.111.10.171:icmp:8.0, 0.0.0.0-255.255.255.255},
+ TSr[40](2#){10.0.0.2:icmp:8.0, 10.0.0.0-10.0.0.255},
+ N[8](ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+ N[8](NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)}
+
+ (41) Composes MGM nonce (fragment 1)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 b4 e1 3e 23
+
+ (42) Composes AAD (fragment 1)
+
+ 00000000: 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97 de 11 9d 1e
+ 00000010: 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 20 23 00 02 04
+ 00000020: 00 01 00 04
+
+ (43) Composes plaintext (fragment 1)
+
+ 00000000: 25 00 00 4e 09 00 00 00 30 44 31 20 30 1e 06 03
+ 00000010: 55 04 03 13 17 49 4b 45 20 49 6e 74 65 72 6f 70
+ 00000020: 20 54 65 73 74 20 43 6c 69 65 6e 74 31 13 30 11
+ 00000030: 06 03 55 04 0a 13 0a 45 4c 56 49 53 2d 50 4c 55
+ 00000040: 53 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 52 55 26 00
+ 00000050: 05 00 04 30 82 04 f7 30 82 04 a4 a0 03 02 01 02
+ 00000060: 02 13 7c 00 03 da a8 9e 1e ff 9e 79 05 fb bb 00
+ 00000070: 01 00 03 da a8 30 0a 06 08 2a 85 03 07 01 01 03
+ 00000080: 02 30 82 01 0a 31 18 30 16 06 05 2a 85 03 64 01
+ 00000090: 12 0d 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 30 31 32 33 31
+ 000000A0: 1a 30 18 06 08 2a 85 03 03 81 03 01 01 12 0c 30
+ 000000B0: 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 30 31 2f 30 2d 06
+ 000000C0: 03 55 04 09 0c 26 d1 83 d0 bb 2e 20 d0 a1 d1 83
+ 000000D0: d1 89 d1 91 d0 b2 d1 81 d0 ba d0 b8 d0 b9 20 d0
+ 000000E0: b2 d0 b0 d0 bb 20 d0 b4 2e 20 31 38 31 0b 30 09
+ 000000F0: 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 52 55 31 19 30 17 06 03 55
+ 00000100: 04 08 0c 10 d0 b3 2e 20 d0 9c d0 be d1 81 d0 ba
+ 00000110: d0 b2 d0 b0 31 15 30 13 06 03 55 04 07 0c 0c d0
+ 00000120: 9c d0 be d1 81 d0 ba d0 b2 d0 b0 31 25 30 23 06
+ 00000130: 03 55 04 0a 0c 1c d0 9e d0 9e d0 9e 20 22 d0 9a
+ 00000140: d0 a0 d0 98 d0 9f d0 a2 d0 9e 2d d0 9f d0 a0 d0
+ 00000150: 9e 22 31 3b 30 39 06 03 55 04 03 0c 32 d0 a2 d0
+ 00000160: b5 d1 81 d1 82 d0 be d0 b2 d1 8b d0 b9 20 d0 a3
+ 00000170: d0 a6 20 d0 9e d0 9e d0 9e 20 22 d0 9a d0 a0 d0
+ 00000180: 98 d0 9f d0 a2 d0 9e 2d d0 9f d0 a0 d0 9e 22 30
+ 00000190: 1e 17 0d 32 31 31 30 30 31 30 36 31 30 31 30 5a
+ 000001A0: 17 0d 32 32 30 31 30 31 30 36 32 30 31 30 5a 30
+ 000001B0: 44 31 20 30 1e 06 03 55 04 03 13 17 49 4b 45 20
+ 000001C0: 49 6e 74 65 72 6f 70 20 54 65 73 74 20 43 6c 69
+ 000001D0: 65 6e 74 31 13 30 11 06 03 55 04 0a 13 0a 45 4c
+ 000001E0: 56 49 53 2d 50 4c 55 53 31 0b 30 00
+
+ (44) Encrypts plaintext using K3i as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
+ (fragment 1)
+
+ 00000000: 03 45 60 11 15 25 f5 45 bb 0e f4 25 26 e2 14 8c
+ 00000010: a7 01 82 f6 9c 6e 42 f1 a3 9b 9e ac a6 dd 0d 9c
+ 00000020: ff 79 15 ed b9 0c 81 a0 b4 29 61 fb 55 1b c1 73
+ 00000030: 4d de 1f b2 5f 1f cb 84 5d 12 24 85 52 c4 f2 1d
+ 00000040: 01 a7 92 ad 55 4d 90 d0 58 d2 1a 5e f6 dc 4e 73
+ 00000050: d4 9b 08 66 d7 64 de 10 e6 75 69 20 e3 7b 6c f0
+ 00000060: 4b 8b ff 60 39 f1 19 31 72 dd c1 09 33 5b 1d 56
+ 00000070: ee 0c 1c 42 d7 f3 04 d3 5b 9a 6e cf 7f b3 1f ac
+ 00000080: 34 a6 ee e0 ac 87 b8 88 99 75 a6 ae dc b5 30 38
+ 00000090: eb 3d 48 fd cc 69 64 f8 c6 61 ce e9 e1 24 ba aa
+ 000000A0: 25 5e e6 ea 8b 0c ef 20 31 bf a9 ae 6d e2 82 d4
+ 000000B0: ab 2c d7 af ca 62 fe bd 7c 8f a9 dc d3 63 05 d7
+ 000000C0: ba 92 56 66 44 ad 5d 9d 1e 9a 27 2e 22 6e 5b 0c
+ 000000D0: af 84 6b c6 a7 cf ca 72 f8 8e d3 a1 bc d4 7c 5b
+ 000000E0: 7e 26 7f b3 05 d8 62 ef ad d6 07 70 d7 4b 33 e4
+ 000000F0: 26 84 e6 eb 5b 65 5c a7 71 29 45 15 d9 b0 83 6a
+ 00000100: 52 5f a9 d8 dd f1 d8 62 c7 d7 3d e9 69 0e c5 b1
+ 00000110: e1 de 20 6c 3d 5f f7 f7 9f f6 a5 7b 4d a5 4e e9
+ 00000120: b4 c4 c2 7d cc 43 62 77 57 37 d3 40 48 b2 c0 5b
+ 00000130: 48 ab d0 94 79 ef 3d 04 e3 d8 6d 42 56 ed cd 94
+ 00000140: b4 23 2c fa f0 6b 39 ad 41 a3 b3 8f ec b8 6c ef
+ 00000150: e1 98 3a b2 fb a8 fd 21 96 8a bf 3a 65 47 8a e9
+ 00000160: 69 60 44 02 2c ec 7a 86 74 fe 1d 9b 08 5e b8 5e
+ 00000170: f8 ca 37 20 5f a7 74 8c 12 88 f2 d8 9e d4 94 29
+ 00000180: c2 db f9 fb 35 a0 cf 21 2b da 8b 9e cc 52 84 eb
+ 00000190: c4 12 39 3e e6 18 fb f7 57 6c b5 1e 10 3d 11 9c
+ 000001A0: 29 9c 41 73 69 d8 d0 9d 71 2b 77 66 87 65 51 19
+ 000001B0: db 27 a0 dd aa 64 ba fd c0 5f e1 4e da 7c 20 fc
+ 000001C0: 8c 13 ab 2d c2 9c 37 9d 7e 51 cb 29 03 10 52 dc
+ 000001D0: f8 09 61 cc 12 9a a0 8e 1b e4 52 f8 72 bd 7a 86
+ 000001E0: db 93 7c 55 b8 1e 7f 21 d4 e6 02 f2
+
+ (45) Computes ICV using K3i as K_msg (fragment 1)
+
+ 00000000: b1 51 cd e6 dc 64 12 1c
+
+ (46) Composes IV (fragment 1)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+
+ (47) Composes MGM nonce (fragment 2)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 01 b4 e1 3e 23
+
+ (48) Composes AAD (fragment 2)
+
+ 00000000: 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97 de 11 9d 1e
+ 00000010: 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 20 00 00 02 04
+ 00000020: 00 02 00 04
+
+ (49) Composes plaintext (fragment 2)
+
+ 00000000: 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 52 55 30 81 aa 30 21 06
+ 00000010: 08 2a 85 03 07 01 01 01 02 30 15 06 09 2a 85 03
+ 00000020: 07 01 02 01 02 01 06 08 2a 85 03 07 01 01 02 03
+ 00000030: 03 81 84 00 04 81 80 ee 2f 0a 0e 09 1e 7e 04 ef
+ 00000040: ba 5b 62 a2 52 86 e1 9c 24 50 30 50 b0 b4 8a 37
+ 00000050: 35 b5 fc af 28 94 ec b5 9b 92 41 5b 69 e2 c9 ba
+ 00000060: 24 de 6a 72 c4 ef 44 bb 89 a1 05 14 1b 87 3d 6a
+ 00000070: a3 72 3e 17 ca 7f 39 28 ce 16 8b dd 07 52 87 6a
+ 00000080: 0d 77 42 6d 99 2b 46 2c fd 4b b2 7c d7 c7 17 08
+ 00000090: 12 54 63 47 9d 14 3d 61 ed f2 95 ab 11 80 69 02
+ 000000A0: a7 66 60 50 7e a4 53 6d ad 01 49 b2 16 8a 95 1d
+ 000000B0: cf 1a 57 93 56 14 5e a3 82 02 59 30 82 02 55 30
+ 000000C0: 0e 06 03 55 1d 0f 01 01 ff 04 04 03 02 05 a0 30
+ 000000D0: 13 06 03 55 1d 25 04 0c 30 0a 06 08 2b 06 01 05
+ 000000E0: 05 07 03 11 30 1d 06 03 55 1d 0e 04 16 04 14 40
+ 000000F0: 81 b1 d1 18 75 f0 da 6b 3c 50 5f cd 73 1d d9 77
+ 00000100: f2 d7 c1 30 1f 06 03 55 1d 23 04 18 30 16 80 14
+ 00000110: 9b 85 5e fb 81 dc 4d 59 07 51 63 cf be df da 2c
+ 00000120: 7f c9 44 3c 30 82 01 0f 06 03 55 1d 1f 04 82 01
+ 00000130: 06 30 82 01 02 30 81 ff a0 81 fc a0 81 f9 86 81
+ 00000140: b5 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 74 65 73 74 67 6f 73 74
+ 00000150: 32 30 31 32 2e 63 72 79 70 74 6f 70 72 6f 2e 72
+ 00000160: 75 2f 43 65 72 74 45 6e 72 6f 6c 6c 2f 21 30 34
+ 00000170: 32 32 21 30 34 33 35 21 30 34 34 31 21 30 34 34
+ 00000180: 32 21 30 34 33 65 21 30 34 33 32 21 30 34 34 62
+ 00000190: 21 30 34 33 39 25 32 30 21 30 34 32 33 21 30 34
+ 000001A0: 32 36 25 32 30 21 30 34 31 65 21 30 34 31 65 21
+ 000001B0: 30 34 31 65 25 32 30 21 30 30 32 32 21 30 34 31
+ 000001C0: 61 21 30 34 32 30 21 30 34 31 38 21 30 34 31 66
+ 000001D0: 21 30 34 32 32 21 30 34 31 65 2d 21 30 34 31 66
+ 000001E0: 21 30 34 32 30 21 30 34 31 65 21 00
+
+ (50) Encrypts plaintext using K3i as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
+ (fragment 2)
+
+ 00000000: 3c b1 b4 aa 04 56 27 1b 45 04 f7 70 1b 17 16 16
+ 00000010: 85 16 ee b3 88 7d 08 64 2d 24 b8 1d 7e ac c9 72
+ 00000020: 73 07 d3 d9 ef 5d 08 8b 47 97 5a 98 53 00 ec 13
+ 00000030: cc 5a 46 7b 16 a2 14 6a f1 ea 17 71 9b 75 1d 46
+ 00000040: 9d 6d 8c 3a a2 b2 75 c5 c9 4c 16 56 73 03 16 40
+ 00000050: 42 fe a2 5a cc c7 ed 37 91 b1 eb e5 56 2a 01 bc
+ 00000060: a2 83 ac 05 f1 a7 56 e5 f2 bb f4 18 7f 05 82 14
+ 00000070: 70 de af 44 d4 cc a9 0a 95 6d c1 96 11 3d cf e1
+ 00000080: aa 27 f1 87 60 d2 32 c1 1e 91 bf 60 00 5f d3 fb
+ 00000090: a4 55 2e f0 0b 08 14 ed a3 63 54 4c b8 7b 5c 71
+ 000000A0: 69 d1 3b 0c 6c 93 f3 99 2e fe 36 98 90 a1 05 ee
+ 000000B0: 35 d2 da f8 81 59 f5 17 23 33 40 99 99 42 37 b0
+ 000000C0: 0d 94 0a bd 00 cf 1c be 0e d0 13 93 e2 27 5a a5
+ 000000D0: c5 e8 a0 25 5a 2d ad 6c b4 bc 64 37 05 ac cd 22
+ 000000E0: 92 13 83 ab e8 87 93 29 82 dc 47 b4 1c 92 4d 36
+ 000000F0: ef ba 10 3d 42 2d d6 2c d5 6b 95 99 2d 17 61 c4
+ 00000100: c5 13 ed 55 a5 e5 b2 65 ac 25 24 21 c4 25 7f 6f
+ 00000110: 68 fb ce 8f 17 60 e9 ac 9c 52 9f d5 d4 a7 14 35
+ 00000120: 89 a4 1f de 21 a9 51 3c 1d 73 00 10 ba a6 7c 24
+ 00000130: fb b9 20 21 5e df 63 8a c8 1f b1 55 05 5a 70 a8
+ 00000140: b5 f4 23 9e 22 c0 2a 7c a5 11 01 c3 5e 3d 52 2a
+ 00000150: b8 1d c5 19 b5 55 cc 8e f0 8d 6e 93 36 10 cd e3
+ 00000160: c8 a5 a6 2e 90 53 fa 92 64 16 6c 4f da 9b e5 f8
+ 00000170: 91 c5 ea b4 60 64 db ed d5 bc fc 3a 73 62 ce b2
+ 00000180: ff 7a 15 95 0d 77 00 ee 5c a8 c5 89 2f 39 13 59
+ 00000190: dd 52 ea 11 ae 28 82 36 be aa 29 68 4c f6 63 d5
+ 000001A0: 93 a5 54 3d 8f 13 26 0a 87 34 b9 81 1c 2c cd d5
+ 000001B0: 79 3a 65 6d 1c 6e 32 be b0 77 b7 b3 e4 ae b8 72
+ 000001C0: f9 44 59 e9 14 46 67 56 93 ca 70 d1 ac 25 05 62
+ 000001D0: f7 55 c2 9e 2e 11 a7 29 01 24 77 4a 6f 1c ba f6
+ 000001E0: 4a 4f 83 75 29 1e c7 a9 68 29 02 d0
+
+ (51) Computes ICV using K3i as K_msg (fragment 2)
+
+ 00000000: b4 68 c7 4d eb dd bd 92
+
+ (52) Composes IV (fragment 2)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01
+
+ (53) Composes MGM nonce (fragment 3)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 02 b4 e1 3e 23
+
+ (54) Composes AAD (fragment 3)
+
+ 00000000: 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97 de 11 9d 1e
+ 00000010: 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 20 00 00 02 04
+ 00000020: 00 03 00 04
+
+ (55) Composes plaintext (fragment 3)
+
+ 00000000: 30 30 32 32 28 31 29 2e 63 72 6c 86 3f 68 74 74
+ 00000010: 70 3a 2f 2f 74 65 73 74 67 6f 73 74 32 30 31 32
+ 00000020: 2e 63 72 79 70 74 6f 70 72 6f 2e 72 75 2f 43 65
+ 00000030: 72 74 45 6e 72 6f 6c 6c 2f 74 65 73 74 67 6f 73
+ 00000040: 74 32 30 31 32 28 31 29 2e 63 72 6c 30 81 da 06
+ 00000050: 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 01 01 04 81 cd 30 81 ca 30
+ 00000060: 44 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 30 02 86 38 68 74 74
+ 00000070: 70 3a 2f 2f 74 65 73 74 67 6f 73 74 32 30 31 32
+ 00000080: 2e 63 72 79 70 74 6f 70 72 6f 2e 72 75 2f 43 65
+ 00000090: 72 74 45 6e 72 6f 6c 6c 2f 72 6f 6f 74 32 30 31
+ 000000A0: 38 2e 63 72 74 30 3f 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 30
+ 000000B0: 01 86 33 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 74 65 73 74 67 6f
+ 000000C0: 73 74 32 30 31 32 2e 63 72 79 70 74 6f 70 72 6f
+ 000000D0: 2e 72 75 2f 6f 63 73 70 32 30 31 32 67 2f 6f 63
+ 000000E0: 73 70 2e 73 72 66 30 41 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07
+ 000000F0: 30 01 86 35 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 74 65 73 74 67
+ 00000100: 6f 73 74 32 30 31 32 2e 63 72 79 70 74 6f 70 72
+ 00000110: 6f 2e 72 75 2f 6f 63 73 70 32 30 31 32 67 73 74
+ 00000120: 2f 6f 63 73 70 2e 73 72 66 30 0a 06 08 2a 85 03
+ 00000130: 07 01 01 03 02 03 41 00 21 ee 3b e1 fd 0f 36 90
+ 00000140: 92 c4 a2 35 26 e8 dc 4e b8 ef 89 40 70 d2 91 39
+ 00000150: bc 79 a6 e2 f7 c1 06 bd d5 d6 ff 72 a5 6c f2 c0
+ 00000160: c3 75 e9 ca 67 81 c1 93 96 b4 bd 18 12 4c 37 f7
+ 00000170: d9 73 d6 4c 8a a6 c4 0a 24 00 00 19 04 5e 9e 50
+ 00000180: 5f 58 b0 a5 7a 33 45 83 49 66 0f 1c 3c 7a 67 71
+ 00000190: 98 27 00 00 4e 09 00 00 00 30 44 31 20 30 1e 06
+ 000001A0: 03 55 04 03 13 17 49 4b 45 20 49 6e 74 65 72 6f
+ 000001B0: 70 20 54 65 73 74 20 53 65 72 76 65 72 31 13 30
+ 000001C0: 11 06 03 55 04 0a 13 0a 45 4c 56 49 53 2d 50 4c
+ 000001D0: 55 53 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 52 55 29
+ 000001E0: 00 00 95 0e 00 00 00 0c 30 0a 06 00
+
+ (56) Encrypts plaintext using K3i as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
+ (fragment 3)
+
+ 00000000: e7 72 d9 51 90 b1 a2 bc 81 8d d6 56 bf 7a 81 e0
+ 00000010: 1a a1 70 8b 35 a0 7e 5f e8 df 58 3d 75 5d d2 4c
+ 00000020: 4c ce 17 77 3f 28 9c ca 7a a4 23 23 f0 c7 ff ff
+ 00000030: 98 ee e3 1a 27 39 4d 90 1a b7 5b 44 11 16 11 3a
+ 00000040: ea bf 83 66 da 92 2a 3a 3d bd b5 40 c8 bc f6 ed
+ 00000050: cb 1d 5a 8e 30 f0 06 72 dc 6c da c1 45 7b e8 25
+ 00000060: ca 93 2a b2 fe 4a db 00 90 e3 31 78 26 8d ae c8
+ 00000070: 39 66 80 7d e5 01 5f 21 d6 c3 40 46 19 e4 43 9d
+ 00000080: 23 c6 c1 18 06 49 bd f5 dc 8c 1b 19 b0 60 0c a3
+ 00000090: ad f5 5c 57 e8 8e 37 e6 ea b6 79 11 b8 f1 16 ba
+ 000000A0: a6 d9 09 1f 0d e0 3c 07 b8 ce 9d 11 a3 c6 f7 e4
+ 000000B0: 62 e8 94 7b ad b9 8a 6b 9c f1 f8 43 cf 7e fc 5e
+ 000000C0: 44 ab bf b1 88 f5 67 1e 84 5f 82 63 f3 13 89 55
+ 000000D0: f5 ef 86 c3 db 48 37 f8 26 3c c4 6d a5 fc b5 69
+ 000000E0: 56 0d 2d f3 c0 98 dd e7 53 da 0a 28 87 2f 38 ab
+ 000000F0: a9 ec 60 a6 c4 54 c6 68 e7 6b e3 4b 54 bf b5 82
+ 00000100: 44 c9 b9 45 bc 9e f5 58 d8 76 63 92 cd 52 ec 82
+ 00000110: 80 d6 43 86 10 16 eb 7b 32 e4 ee ba ec 09 b6 4f
+ 00000120: 35 1a bf da d7 de 40 fa b5 d2 40 f2 73 09 2d 52
+ 00000130: 83 bd 56 a6 6b d3 9f 8a c2 c5 66 c6 6b 22 fb 6a
+ 00000140: 00 b2 8a ac 9d 8b fc 8d 41 af 80 92 16 51 e2 cb
+ 00000150: 89 62 9b 77 2b 1e 38 01 df fc 1f 81 2d 95 8b 9e
+ 00000160: 1d 1e ad 9c c0 0d fc 77 6e 35 13 16 26 28 1a 29
+ 00000170: 19 7f f8 08 5a 0f 09 4f 6f ba 7f 4c 5b cd 0c c2
+ 00000180: 71 ab ea 82 a2 d2 d1 1b 17 fd dc c3 54 03 85 14
+ 00000190: f4 90 47 2e 67 d7 93 c3 67 7e 8a f7 43 1a b3 41
+ 000001A0: 32 f7 b0 58 38 6e 24 c8 96 d9 94 d3 54 89 2d 61
+ 000001B0: 10 a9 9c 22 51 52 02 c9 b7 8d cc 5b 28 6d cb 55
+ 000001C0: 5d 2f 97 8a 8f 3f 27 56 73 eb ec 5d e4 64 91 49
+ 000001D0: 3b 88 f2 0a fc ed a5 67 a9 e3 71 ef 31 ce a0 33
+ 000001E0: fc d8 ea 4d 1e 3f dc 89 c8 89 e2 c3
+
+ (57) Computes ICV using K3i as K_msg (fragment 3)
+
+ 00000000: 54 4f 9b aa dd af bd ca
+
+ (58) Composes IV (fragment 3)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02
+
+ (59) Composes MGM nonce (fragment 4)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 03 b4 e1 3e 23
+
+ (60) Composes AAD (fragment 4)
+
+ 00000000: 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97 de 11 9d 1e
+ 00000010: 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 01 7a 00 00 01 5e
+ 00000020: 00 04 00 04
+
+ (61) Composes plaintext (fragment 4)
+
+ 00000000: 08 2a 85 03 07 01 01 03 03 6a 3e 59 0d 72 1e 55
+ 00000010: a3 c0 d1 2f 8a 9b 4e 44 10 58 59 bd 62 9e e7 12
+ 00000020: 31 e5 7d 01 53 f3 84 40 dd ac 73 ed 09 3a 10 d9
+ 00000030: 6e 7f eb 80 6c 11 9e 91 f3 7c 3c b0 55 f7 4b ec
+ 00000040: 0e 78 36 10 95 02 09 86 b3 27 04 2a 83 3c 89 36
+ 00000050: 1b 73 cf 7b c9 e0 df a2 07 12 1e 69 52 4d 89 1b
+ 00000060: de 6e 48 d1 34 fa 21 78 22 88 2e 30 86 c0 80 0a
+ 00000070: 2d 74 af 08 ff 35 75 a5 79 e3 85 40 22 6b a8 42
+ 00000080: f6 72 24 bf 29 87 58 a8 20 29 00 00 08 00 00 40
+ 00000090: 00 2f 00 00 0c 00 00 40 01 00 00 00 04 21 00 00
+ 000000A0: 10 01 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 03 00 00 2c 00 00
+ 000000B0: 38 00 00 00 34 01 03 04 05 6c 0c a5 70 03 00 00
+ 000000C0: 08 01 00 00 20 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 21 03 00 00
+ 000000D0: 08 01 00 00 22 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 23 00 00 00
+ 000000E0: 08 05 00 00 00 2d 00 00 28 02 00 00 00 07 01 00
+ 000000F0: 10 08 00 08 00 0a 6f 0a ab 0a 6f 0a ab 07 00 00
+ 00000100: 10 00 00 ff ff 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff 29 00 00
+ 00000110: 28 02 00 00 00 07 01 00 10 08 00 08 00 0a 00 00
+ 00000120: 02 0a 00 00 02 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff ff 0a 00 00
+ 00000130: 00 0a 00 00 ff 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 0a 00 00 00
+ 00000140: 08 00 00 40 0b 00
+
+ (62) Encrypts plaintext using K3i as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
+ (fragment 4)
+
+ 00000000: e0 8a 0b 04 ee f8 47 c2 52 96 71 9f 9d 39 0c 91
+ 00000010: ea 6a 16 7c 80 31 a0 fd 76 cc c4 f1 8f 1a d3 be
+ 00000020: fa 78 6b df c1 c6 73 83 be 36 69 c4 8a 87 ed 11
+ 00000030: 90 31 a8 fd f9 0a 5c e4 d4 23 c9 e6 b3 96 ac b6
+ 00000040: 8e bd fc 27 58 79 9f cc 8b ac 6b 59 e4 70 4b 05
+ 00000050: 23 16 ed 49 25 f3 de 02 2e ce ae 86 e8 b4 ca b4
+ 00000060: 96 ad 5b f6 2b c2 47 33 6f da f3 97 3c 13 ed 1f
+ 00000070: 7a da 93 b5 69 6a b5 10 93 38 75 ea b7 34 a3 87
+ 00000080: b6 83 c7 da 8a a1 d9 2a 0b 22 e2 ab 63 2b 57 2b
+ 00000090: 88 e3 ea be 7b fc dc 26 ac b8 bb 15 96 f9 c2 f4
+ 000000A0: 60 17 e4 09 18 ae 78 b8 73 02 6b 0e 20 cc b1 cd
+ 000000B0: b4 4d 94 7f f3 16 28 9a d2 bd 26 77 4b a5 85 56
+ 000000C0: b1 81 8b 9c c3 0a 7f 67 fe 6a 61 15 f1 45 66 f3
+ 000000D0: 36 fc a5 bb 1f d7 6d e7 1d 9f 3f b5 cc 60 19 48
+ 000000E0: 17 f7 08 28 1c 58 9f 2b 7a 0b b9 50 bd 02 ea b8
+ 000000F0: 1e 03 1f 52 6a 7a fc e5 b4 6b 00 cf 0d 83 1f d2
+ 00000100: 3f f2 ad 43 d4 86 6e c1 88 d2 87 d6 1f ac a3 30
+ 00000110: 7b c1 5b 6a 3d 4c 20 72 5d 2c ca bf 87 a2 ce 1d
+ 00000120: b3 fa c7 7c 22 cd 66 fc be 49 22 32 17 ee 6e 5e
+ 00000130: 62 c1 ca 12 2b 5d 3d 7b ae b5 3e 53 c5 98 05 1f
+ 00000140: 42 53 49 d1 2c c2
+
+ (63) Computes ICV using K3i as K_msg (fragment 4)
+
+ 00000000: d2 25 f1 d0 38 65 b7 b6
+
+ (64) Composes IV (fragment 4)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03
+
+ (65) Sends message fragment (1), peer receives message fragment (1)
+
+ 10.111.10.171:54295->10.111.15.45:4500 [548]
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97
+ 00000010: de 11 9d 1e 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 20
+ 00000020: 23 00 02 04 00 01 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+ 00000030: 03 45 60 11 15 25 f5 45 bb 0e f4 25 26 e2 14 8c
+ 00000040: a7 01 82 f6 9c 6e 42 f1 a3 9b 9e ac a6 dd 0d 9c
+ 00000050: ff 79 15 ed b9 0c 81 a0 b4 29 61 fb 55 1b c1 73
+ 00000060: 4d de 1f b2 5f 1f cb 84 5d 12 24 85 52 c4 f2 1d
+ 00000070: 01 a7 92 ad 55 4d 90 d0 58 d2 1a 5e f6 dc 4e 73
+ 00000080: d4 9b 08 66 d7 64 de 10 e6 75 69 20 e3 7b 6c f0
+ 00000090: 4b 8b ff 60 39 f1 19 31 72 dd c1 09 33 5b 1d 56
+ 000000A0: ee 0c 1c 42 d7 f3 04 d3 5b 9a 6e cf 7f b3 1f ac
+ 000000B0: 34 a6 ee e0 ac 87 b8 88 99 75 a6 ae dc b5 30 38
+ 000000C0: eb 3d 48 fd cc 69 64 f8 c6 61 ce e9 e1 24 ba aa
+ 000000D0: 25 5e e6 ea 8b 0c ef 20 31 bf a9 ae 6d e2 82 d4
+ 000000E0: ab 2c d7 af ca 62 fe bd 7c 8f a9 dc d3 63 05 d7
+ 000000F0: ba 92 56 66 44 ad 5d 9d 1e 9a 27 2e 22 6e 5b 0c
+ 00000100: af 84 6b c6 a7 cf ca 72 f8 8e d3 a1 bc d4 7c 5b
+ 00000110: 7e 26 7f b3 05 d8 62 ef ad d6 07 70 d7 4b 33 e4
+ 00000120: 26 84 e6 eb 5b 65 5c a7 71 29 45 15 d9 b0 83 6a
+ 00000130: 52 5f a9 d8 dd f1 d8 62 c7 d7 3d e9 69 0e c5 b1
+ 00000140: e1 de 20 6c 3d 5f f7 f7 9f f6 a5 7b 4d a5 4e e9
+ 00000150: b4 c4 c2 7d cc 43 62 77 57 37 d3 40 48 b2 c0 5b
+ 00000160: 48 ab d0 94 79 ef 3d 04 e3 d8 6d 42 56 ed cd 94
+ 00000170: b4 23 2c fa f0 6b 39 ad 41 a3 b3 8f ec b8 6c ef
+ 00000180: e1 98 3a b2 fb a8 fd 21 96 8a bf 3a 65 47 8a e9
+ 00000190: 69 60 44 02 2c ec 7a 86 74 fe 1d 9b 08 5e b8 5e
+ 000001A0: f8 ca 37 20 5f a7 74 8c 12 88 f2 d8 9e d4 94 29
+ 000001B0: c2 db f9 fb 35 a0 cf 21 2b da 8b 9e cc 52 84 eb
+ 000001C0: c4 12 39 3e e6 18 fb f7 57 6c b5 1e 10 3d 11 9c
+ 000001D0: 29 9c 41 73 69 d8 d0 9d 71 2b 77 66 87 65 51 19
+ 000001E0: db 27 a0 dd aa 64 ba fd c0 5f e1 4e da 7c 20 fc
+ 000001F0: 8c 13 ab 2d c2 9c 37 9d 7e 51 cb 29 03 10 52 dc
+ 00000200: f8 09 61 cc 12 9a a0 8e 1b e4 52 f8 72 bd 7a 86
+ 00000210: db 93 7c 55 b8 1e 7f 21 d4 e6 02 f2 b1 51 cd e6
+ 00000220: dc 64 12 1c
+
+ (66) Sends message fragment (2), peer receives message fragment (2)
+
+ 10.111.10.171:54295->10.111.15.45:4500 [548]
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97
+ 00000010: de 11 9d 1e 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 20
+ 00000020: 00 00 02 04 00 02 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01
+ 00000030: 3c b1 b4 aa 04 56 27 1b 45 04 f7 70 1b 17 16 16
+ 00000040: 85 16 ee b3 88 7d 08 64 2d 24 b8 1d 7e ac c9 72
+ 00000050: 73 07 d3 d9 ef 5d 08 8b 47 97 5a 98 53 00 ec 13
+ 00000060: cc 5a 46 7b 16 a2 14 6a f1 ea 17 71 9b 75 1d 46
+ 00000070: 9d 6d 8c 3a a2 b2 75 c5 c9 4c 16 56 73 03 16 40
+ 00000080: 42 fe a2 5a cc c7 ed 37 91 b1 eb e5 56 2a 01 bc
+ 00000090: a2 83 ac 05 f1 a7 56 e5 f2 bb f4 18 7f 05 82 14
+ 000000A0: 70 de af 44 d4 cc a9 0a 95 6d c1 96 11 3d cf e1
+ 000000B0: aa 27 f1 87 60 d2 32 c1 1e 91 bf 60 00 5f d3 fb
+ 000000C0: a4 55 2e f0 0b 08 14 ed a3 63 54 4c b8 7b 5c 71
+ 000000D0: 69 d1 3b 0c 6c 93 f3 99 2e fe 36 98 90 a1 05 ee
+ 000000E0: 35 d2 da f8 81 59 f5 17 23 33 40 99 99 42 37 b0
+ 000000F0: 0d 94 0a bd 00 cf 1c be 0e d0 13 93 e2 27 5a a5
+ 00000100: c5 e8 a0 25 5a 2d ad 6c b4 bc 64 37 05 ac cd 22
+ 00000110: 92 13 83 ab e8 87 93 29 82 dc 47 b4 1c 92 4d 36
+ 00000120: ef ba 10 3d 42 2d d6 2c d5 6b 95 99 2d 17 61 c4
+ 00000130: c5 13 ed 55 a5 e5 b2 65 ac 25 24 21 c4 25 7f 6f
+ 00000140: 68 fb ce 8f 17 60 e9 ac 9c 52 9f d5 d4 a7 14 35
+ 00000150: 89 a4 1f de 21 a9 51 3c 1d 73 00 10 ba a6 7c 24
+ 00000160: fb b9 20 21 5e df 63 8a c8 1f b1 55 05 5a 70 a8
+ 00000170: b5 f4 23 9e 22 c0 2a 7c a5 11 01 c3 5e 3d 52 2a
+ 00000180: b8 1d c5 19 b5 55 cc 8e f0 8d 6e 93 36 10 cd e3
+ 00000190: c8 a5 a6 2e 90 53 fa 92 64 16 6c 4f da 9b e5 f8
+ 000001A0: 91 c5 ea b4 60 64 db ed d5 bc fc 3a 73 62 ce b2
+ 000001B0: ff 7a 15 95 0d 77 00 ee 5c a8 c5 89 2f 39 13 59
+ 000001C0: dd 52 ea 11 ae 28 82 36 be aa 29 68 4c f6 63 d5
+ 000001D0: 93 a5 54 3d 8f 13 26 0a 87 34 b9 81 1c 2c cd d5
+ 000001E0: 79 3a 65 6d 1c 6e 32 be b0 77 b7 b3 e4 ae b8 72
+ 000001F0: f9 44 59 e9 14 46 67 56 93 ca 70 d1 ac 25 05 62
+ 00000200: f7 55 c2 9e 2e 11 a7 29 01 24 77 4a 6f 1c ba f6
+ 00000210: 4a 4f 83 75 29 1e c7 a9 68 29 02 d0 b4 68 c7 4d
+ 00000220: eb dd bd 92
+
+ (67) Sends message fragment (3), peer receives message fragment (3)
+
+ 10.111.10.171:54295->10.111.15.45:4500 [548]
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97
+ 00000010: de 11 9d 1e 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 20
+ 00000020: 00 00 02 04 00 03 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02
+ 00000030: e7 72 d9 51 90 b1 a2 bc 81 8d d6 56 bf 7a 81 e0
+ 00000040: 1a a1 70 8b 35 a0 7e 5f e8 df 58 3d 75 5d d2 4c
+ 00000050: 4c ce 17 77 3f 28 9c ca 7a a4 23 23 f0 c7 ff ff
+ 00000060: 98 ee e3 1a 27 39 4d 90 1a b7 5b 44 11 16 11 3a
+ 00000070: ea bf 83 66 da 92 2a 3a 3d bd b5 40 c8 bc f6 ed
+ 00000080: cb 1d 5a 8e 30 f0 06 72 dc 6c da c1 45 7b e8 25
+ 00000090: ca 93 2a b2 fe 4a db 00 90 e3 31 78 26 8d ae c8
+ 000000A0: 39 66 80 7d e5 01 5f 21 d6 c3 40 46 19 e4 43 9d
+ 000000B0: 23 c6 c1 18 06 49 bd f5 dc 8c 1b 19 b0 60 0c a3
+ 000000C0: ad f5 5c 57 e8 8e 37 e6 ea b6 79 11 b8 f1 16 ba
+ 000000D0: a6 d9 09 1f 0d e0 3c 07 b8 ce 9d 11 a3 c6 f7 e4
+ 000000E0: 62 e8 94 7b ad b9 8a 6b 9c f1 f8 43 cf 7e fc 5e
+ 000000F0: 44 ab bf b1 88 f5 67 1e 84 5f 82 63 f3 13 89 55
+ 00000100: f5 ef 86 c3 db 48 37 f8 26 3c c4 6d a5 fc b5 69
+ 00000110: 56 0d 2d f3 c0 98 dd e7 53 da 0a 28 87 2f 38 ab
+ 00000120: a9 ec 60 a6 c4 54 c6 68 e7 6b e3 4b 54 bf b5 82
+ 00000130: 44 c9 b9 45 bc 9e f5 58 d8 76 63 92 cd 52 ec 82
+ 00000140: 80 d6 43 86 10 16 eb 7b 32 e4 ee ba ec 09 b6 4f
+ 00000150: 35 1a bf da d7 de 40 fa b5 d2 40 f2 73 09 2d 52
+ 00000160: 83 bd 56 a6 6b d3 9f 8a c2 c5 66 c6 6b 22 fb 6a
+ 00000170: 00 b2 8a ac 9d 8b fc 8d 41 af 80 92 16 51 e2 cb
+ 00000180: 89 62 9b 77 2b 1e 38 01 df fc 1f 81 2d 95 8b 9e
+ 00000190: 1d 1e ad 9c c0 0d fc 77 6e 35 13 16 26 28 1a 29
+ 000001A0: 19 7f f8 08 5a 0f 09 4f 6f ba 7f 4c 5b cd 0c c2
+ 000001B0: 71 ab ea 82 a2 d2 d1 1b 17 fd dc c3 54 03 85 14
+ 000001C0: f4 90 47 2e 67 d7 93 c3 67 7e 8a f7 43 1a b3 41
+ 000001D0: 32 f7 b0 58 38 6e 24 c8 96 d9 94 d3 54 89 2d 61
+ 000001E0: 10 a9 9c 22 51 52 02 c9 b7 8d cc 5b 28 6d cb 55
+ 000001F0: 5d 2f 97 8a 8f 3f 27 56 73 eb ec 5d e4 64 91 49
+ 00000200: 3b 88 f2 0a fc ed a5 67 a9 e3 71 ef 31 ce a0 33
+ 00000210: fc d8 ea 4d 1e 3f dc 89 c8 89 e2 c3 54 4f 9b aa
+ 00000220: dd af bd ca
+
+ (68) Sends message fragment (4), peer receives message fragment (4)
+
+ 10.111.10.171:54295->10.111.15.45:4500 [382]
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97
+ 00000010: de 11 9d 1e 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 01 7a
+ 00000020: 00 00 01 5e 00 04 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03
+ 00000030: e0 8a 0b 04 ee f8 47 c2 52 96 71 9f 9d 39 0c 91
+ 00000040: ea 6a 16 7c 80 31 a0 fd 76 cc c4 f1 8f 1a d3 be
+ 00000050: fa 78 6b df c1 c6 73 83 be 36 69 c4 8a 87 ed 11
+ 00000060: 90 31 a8 fd f9 0a 5c e4 d4 23 c9 e6 b3 96 ac b6
+ 00000070: 8e bd fc 27 58 79 9f cc 8b ac 6b 59 e4 70 4b 05
+ 00000080: 23 16 ed 49 25 f3 de 02 2e ce ae 86 e8 b4 ca b4
+ 00000090: 96 ad 5b f6 2b c2 47 33 6f da f3 97 3c 13 ed 1f
+ 000000A0: 7a da 93 b5 69 6a b5 10 93 38 75 ea b7 34 a3 87
+ 000000B0: b6 83 c7 da 8a a1 d9 2a 0b 22 e2 ab 63 2b 57 2b
+ 000000C0: 88 e3 ea be 7b fc dc 26 ac b8 bb 15 96 f9 c2 f4
+ 000000D0: 60 17 e4 09 18 ae 78 b8 73 02 6b 0e 20 cc b1 cd
+ 000000E0: b4 4d 94 7f f3 16 28 9a d2 bd 26 77 4b a5 85 56
+ 000000F0: b1 81 8b 9c c3 0a 7f 67 fe 6a 61 15 f1 45 66 f3
+ 00000100: 36 fc a5 bb 1f d7 6d e7 1d 9f 3f b5 cc 60 19 48
+ 00000110: 17 f7 08 28 1c 58 9f 2b 7a 0b b9 50 bd 02 ea b8
+ 00000120: 1e 03 1f 52 6a 7a fc e5 b4 6b 00 cf 0d 83 1f d2
+ 00000130: 3f f2 ad 43 d4 86 6e c1 88 d2 87 d6 1f ac a3 30
+ 00000140: 7b c1 5b 6a 3d 4c 20 72 5d 2c ca bf 87 a2 ce 1d
+ 00000150: b3 fa c7 7c 22 cd 66 fc be 49 22 32 17 ee 6e 5e
+ 00000160: 62 c1 ca 12 2b 5d 3d 7b ae b5 3e 53 c5 98 05 1f
+ 00000170: 42 53 49 d1 2c c2 d2 25 f1 d0 38 65 b7 b6
+
+ Responder's actions:
+
+ (69) Computes shared key
+
+ 00000000: bd 04 9d 0f 9c 5f 58 af c7 e4 01 bc 18 59 01 7c
+ 00000010: 88 28 f9 f2 9f 33 01 5d 49 9a 7d 14 74 d4 31 ac
+
+ (70) Computes SKEYSEED
+
+ 00000000: 9b ed 6c 79 64 b3 de 3a e4 9e dd 62 04 5a f0 8b
+ 00000010: 43 88 33 d4 e6 9e 73 16 a1 1a 9e b2 b4 19 13 c5
+ 00000020: d0 6d fb 86 40 11 c3 02 bb e5 a3 b5 e4 4a c4 c0
+ 00000030: 9d 18 c6 94 de c3 c5 14 82 e7 a2 51 fe c4 98 ca
+
+ (71) Computes SK_d
+
+ 00000000: c2 21 15 fd d3 99 3b 2a 43 60 c4 59 34 b0 be 3f
+ 00000010: 53 ef 6e b1 dd 88 ad 72 55 dd 83 22 5c 6f e1 d6
+ 00000020: 1f 1e ab 06 f9 41 cb c8 ea f9 dc fc 19 a0 2d bf
+ 00000030: 9a 0a 3f 3a 9a 45 1f 08 b6 a9 2c 62 52 b7 26 34
+
+ (72) Computes SK_ei
+
+ 00000000: 18 4e 4e 0f 36 28 bf 3c 9c 04 8e 93 bf a0 77 53
+ 00000010: 91 34 12 81 42 e6 4e 62 7f db a5 ed 98 60 50 ff
+ 00000020: b4 e1 3e 23
+
+ (73) Computes SK_er
+
+ 00000000: e9 27 59 2f 09 49 68 1e 0e 62 db c6 19 06 73 13
+ 00000010: cf da 5c 02 27 3e 4a b4 78 98 b4 86 d0 e9 34 f4
+ 00000020: a5 bb 18 2f
+
+ (74) Computes SK_pi
+
+ 00000000: 30 2c 10 8d 0f 61 47 00 f1 40 4f a9 4f af b5 30
+ 00000010: 11 ba 5f 24 39 32 85 12 4e 7e 71 75 50 15 a6 93
+ 00000020: c3 d0 5e 40 2e 21 8e b1 59 09 cd a4 eb b4 91 68
+ 00000030: 29 42 fe e2 d8 76 8f a6 96 55 1f ab 6c 9b 00 f8
+
+ (75) Computes SK_pr
+
+ 00000000: 6f 81 72 cb 96 58 fb 0e 17 70 b6 b9 1f a9 69 a9
+ 00000010: fc c7 27 4f b4 e1 85 90 a0 c7 9f f9 72 11 61 2a
+ 00000020: 35 b7 b7 96 d3 6a bb a5 aa b1 b8 34 8d 99 c6 f3
+ 00000030: 2b fc 32 56 c1 94 71 04 55 bd 89 6a bf c3 8b fe
+
+ (76) Extracts IV from message (fragment 1)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+
+ (77) Computes K1i (i1 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 3c 57 d7 c8 9f 50 98 fc 86 81 d6 8a 4e 5d 83 c6
+ 00000010: 1e 42 e6 e7 60 67 05 8d f5 2e 10 13 12 15 32 58
+
+ (78) Computes K2i (i2 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 0b 88 0a 1b c8 3e 61 79 82 08 db 13 31 08 63 3c
+ 00000010: 17 62 17 cb 7d 18 ce 70 37 84 85 f4 89 49 d0 06
+
+ (79) Computes K3i (i3 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 18 63 41 67 49 6e cf 48 56 71 4d aa 42 63 5c 11
+ 00000010: 2e 26 5b e2 7b c7 53 a4 09 82 e5 5a 7e f4 65 4d
+
+ (80) Composes MGM nonce (fragment 1)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 b4 e1 3e 23
+
+ (81) Extracts ICV from message (fragment 1)
+
+ 00000000: b1 51 cd e6 dc 64 12 1c
+
+ (82) Extracts AAD from message (fragment 1)
+
+ 00000000: 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97 de 11 9d 1e
+ 00000010: 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 20 23 00 02 04
+ 00000020: 00 01 00 04
+
+ (83) Extracts ciphertext from message (fragment 1)
+
+ 00000000: 03 45 60 11 15 25 f5 45 bb 0e f4 25 26 e2 14 8c
+ 00000010: a7 01 82 f6 9c 6e 42 f1 a3 9b 9e ac a6 dd 0d 9c
+ 00000020: ff 79 15 ed b9 0c 81 a0 b4 29 61 fb 55 1b c1 73
+ 00000030: 4d de 1f b2 5f 1f cb 84 5d 12 24 85 52 c4 f2 1d
+ 00000040: 01 a7 92 ad 55 4d 90 d0 58 d2 1a 5e f6 dc 4e 73
+ 00000050: d4 9b 08 66 d7 64 de 10 e6 75 69 20 e3 7b 6c f0
+ 00000060: 4b 8b ff 60 39 f1 19 31 72 dd c1 09 33 5b 1d 56
+ 00000070: ee 0c 1c 42 d7 f3 04 d3 5b 9a 6e cf 7f b3 1f ac
+ 00000080: 34 a6 ee e0 ac 87 b8 88 99 75 a6 ae dc b5 30 38
+ 00000090: eb 3d 48 fd cc 69 64 f8 c6 61 ce e9 e1 24 ba aa
+ 000000A0: 25 5e e6 ea 8b 0c ef 20 31 bf a9 ae 6d e2 82 d4
+ 000000B0: ab 2c d7 af ca 62 fe bd 7c 8f a9 dc d3 63 05 d7
+ 000000C0: ba 92 56 66 44 ad 5d 9d 1e 9a 27 2e 22 6e 5b 0c
+ 000000D0: af 84 6b c6 a7 cf ca 72 f8 8e d3 a1 bc d4 7c 5b
+ 000000E0: 7e 26 7f b3 05 d8 62 ef ad d6 07 70 d7 4b 33 e4
+ 000000F0: 26 84 e6 eb 5b 65 5c a7 71 29 45 15 d9 b0 83 6a
+ 00000100: 52 5f a9 d8 dd f1 d8 62 c7 d7 3d e9 69 0e c5 b1
+ 00000110: e1 de 20 6c 3d 5f f7 f7 9f f6 a5 7b 4d a5 4e e9
+ 00000120: b4 c4 c2 7d cc 43 62 77 57 37 d3 40 48 b2 c0 5b
+ 00000130: 48 ab d0 94 79 ef 3d 04 e3 d8 6d 42 56 ed cd 94
+ 00000140: b4 23 2c fa f0 6b 39 ad 41 a3 b3 8f ec b8 6c ef
+ 00000150: e1 98 3a b2 fb a8 fd 21 96 8a bf 3a 65 47 8a e9
+ 00000160: 69 60 44 02 2c ec 7a 86 74 fe 1d 9b 08 5e b8 5e
+ 00000170: f8 ca 37 20 5f a7 74 8c 12 88 f2 d8 9e d4 94 29
+ 00000180: c2 db f9 fb 35 a0 cf 21 2b da 8b 9e cc 52 84 eb
+ 00000190: c4 12 39 3e e6 18 fb f7 57 6c b5 1e 10 3d 11 9c
+ 000001A0: 29 9c 41 73 69 d8 d0 9d 71 2b 77 66 87 65 51 19
+ 000001B0: db 27 a0 dd aa 64 ba fd c0 5f e1 4e da 7c 20 fc
+ 000001C0: 8c 13 ab 2d c2 9c 37 9d 7e 51 cb 29 03 10 52 dc
+ 000001D0: f8 09 61 cc 12 9a a0 8e 1b e4 52 f8 72 bd 7a 86
+ 000001E0: db 93 7c 55 b8 1e 7f 21 d4 e6 02 f2
+
+ (84) Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3i as K_msg,
+ resulting in plaintext (fragment 1)
+
+ 00000000: 25 00 00 4e 09 00 00 00 30 44 31 20 30 1e 06 03
+ 00000010: 55 04 03 13 17 49 4b 45 20 49 6e 74 65 72 6f 70
+ 00000020: 20 54 65 73 74 20 43 6c 69 65 6e 74 31 13 30 11
+ 00000030: 06 03 55 04 0a 13 0a 45 4c 56 49 53 2d 50 4c 55
+ 00000040: 53 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 52 55 26 00
+ 00000050: 05 00 04 30 82 04 f7 30 82 04 a4 a0 03 02 01 02
+ 00000060: 02 13 7c 00 03 da a8 9e 1e ff 9e 79 05 fb bb 00
+ 00000070: 01 00 03 da a8 30 0a 06 08 2a 85 03 07 01 01 03
+ 00000080: 02 30 82 01 0a 31 18 30 16 06 05 2a 85 03 64 01
+ 00000090: 12 0d 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 30 31 32 33 31
+ 000000A0: 1a 30 18 06 08 2a 85 03 03 81 03 01 01 12 0c 30
+ 000000B0: 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 30 31 2f 30 2d 06
+ 000000C0: 03 55 04 09 0c 26 d1 83 d0 bb 2e 20 d0 a1 d1 83
+ 000000D0: d1 89 d1 91 d0 b2 d1 81 d0 ba d0 b8 d0 b9 20 d0
+ 000000E0: b2 d0 b0 d0 bb 20 d0 b4 2e 20 31 38 31 0b 30 09
+ 000000F0: 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 52 55 31 19 30 17 06 03 55
+ 00000100: 04 08 0c 10 d0 b3 2e 20 d0 9c d0 be d1 81 d0 ba
+ 00000110: d0 b2 d0 b0 31 15 30 13 06 03 55 04 07 0c 0c d0
+ 00000120: 9c d0 be d1 81 d0 ba d0 b2 d0 b0 31 25 30 23 06
+ 00000130: 03 55 04 0a 0c 1c d0 9e d0 9e d0 9e 20 22 d0 9a
+ 00000140: d0 a0 d0 98 d0 9f d0 a2 d0 9e 2d d0 9f d0 a0 d0
+ 00000150: 9e 22 31 3b 30 39 06 03 55 04 03 0c 32 d0 a2 d0
+ 00000160: b5 d1 81 d1 82 d0 be d0 b2 d1 8b d0 b9 20 d0 a3
+ 00000170: d0 a6 20 d0 9e d0 9e d0 9e 20 22 d0 9a d0 a0 d0
+ 00000180: 98 d0 9f d0 a2 d0 9e 2d d0 9f d0 a0 d0 9e 22 30
+ 00000190: 1e 17 0d 32 31 31 30 30 31 30 36 31 30 31 30 5a
+ 000001A0: 17 0d 32 32 30 31 30 31 30 36 32 30 31 30 5a 30
+ 000001B0: 44 31 20 30 1e 06 03 55 04 03 13 17 49 4b 45 20
+ 000001C0: 49 6e 74 65 72 6f 70 20 54 65 73 74 20 43 6c 69
+ 000001D0: 65 6e 74 31 13 30 11 06 03 55 04 0a 13 0a 45 4c
+ 000001E0: 56 49 53 2d 50 4c 55 53 31 0b 30 00
+
+ (85) Extracts IV from message (fragment 2)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01
+
+ (86) Uses previously computed key K3i
+
+ 00000000: 18 63 41 67 49 6e cf 48 56 71 4d aa 42 63 5c 11
+ 00000010: 2e 26 5b e2 7b c7 53 a4 09 82 e5 5a 7e f4 65 4d
+
+ (87) Composes MGM nonce (fragment 2)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 01 b4 e1 3e 23
+
+ (88) Extracts ICV from message (fragment 2)
+
+ 00000000: b4 68 c7 4d eb dd bd 92
+
+ (89) Extracts AAD from message (fragment 2)
+
+ 00000000: 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97 de 11 9d 1e
+ 00000010: 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 20 00 00 02 04
+ 00000020: 00 02 00 04
+
+ (90) Extracts ciphertext from message (fragment 2)
+
+ 00000000: 3c b1 b4 aa 04 56 27 1b 45 04 f7 70 1b 17 16 16
+ 00000010: 85 16 ee b3 88 7d 08 64 2d 24 b8 1d 7e ac c9 72
+ 00000020: 73 07 d3 d9 ef 5d 08 8b 47 97 5a 98 53 00 ec 13
+ 00000030: cc 5a 46 7b 16 a2 14 6a f1 ea 17 71 9b 75 1d 46
+ 00000040: 9d 6d 8c 3a a2 b2 75 c5 c9 4c 16 56 73 03 16 40
+ 00000050: 42 fe a2 5a cc c7 ed 37 91 b1 eb e5 56 2a 01 bc
+ 00000060: a2 83 ac 05 f1 a7 56 e5 f2 bb f4 18 7f 05 82 14
+ 00000070: 70 de af 44 d4 cc a9 0a 95 6d c1 96 11 3d cf e1
+ 00000080: aa 27 f1 87 60 d2 32 c1 1e 91 bf 60 00 5f d3 fb
+ 00000090: a4 55 2e f0 0b 08 14 ed a3 63 54 4c b8 7b 5c 71
+ 000000A0: 69 d1 3b 0c 6c 93 f3 99 2e fe 36 98 90 a1 05 ee
+ 000000B0: 35 d2 da f8 81 59 f5 17 23 33 40 99 99 42 37 b0
+ 000000C0: 0d 94 0a bd 00 cf 1c be 0e d0 13 93 e2 27 5a a5
+ 000000D0: c5 e8 a0 25 5a 2d ad 6c b4 bc 64 37 05 ac cd 22
+ 000000E0: 92 13 83 ab e8 87 93 29 82 dc 47 b4 1c 92 4d 36
+ 000000F0: ef ba 10 3d 42 2d d6 2c d5 6b 95 99 2d 17 61 c4
+ 00000100: c5 13 ed 55 a5 e5 b2 65 ac 25 24 21 c4 25 7f 6f
+ 00000110: 68 fb ce 8f 17 60 e9 ac 9c 52 9f d5 d4 a7 14 35
+ 00000120: 89 a4 1f de 21 a9 51 3c 1d 73 00 10 ba a6 7c 24
+ 00000130: fb b9 20 21 5e df 63 8a c8 1f b1 55 05 5a 70 a8
+ 00000140: b5 f4 23 9e 22 c0 2a 7c a5 11 01 c3 5e 3d 52 2a
+ 00000150: b8 1d c5 19 b5 55 cc 8e f0 8d 6e 93 36 10 cd e3
+ 00000160: c8 a5 a6 2e 90 53 fa 92 64 16 6c 4f da 9b e5 f8
+ 00000170: 91 c5 ea b4 60 64 db ed d5 bc fc 3a 73 62 ce b2
+ 00000180: ff 7a 15 95 0d 77 00 ee 5c a8 c5 89 2f 39 13 59
+ 00000190: dd 52 ea 11 ae 28 82 36 be aa 29 68 4c f6 63 d5
+ 000001A0: 93 a5 54 3d 8f 13 26 0a 87 34 b9 81 1c 2c cd d5
+ 000001B0: 79 3a 65 6d 1c 6e 32 be b0 77 b7 b3 e4 ae b8 72
+ 000001C0: f9 44 59 e9 14 46 67 56 93 ca 70 d1 ac 25 05 62
+ 000001D0: f7 55 c2 9e 2e 11 a7 29 01 24 77 4a 6f 1c ba f6
+ 000001E0: 4a 4f 83 75 29 1e c7 a9 68 29 02 d0
+
+ (91) Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3i as K_msg,
+ resulting in plaintext (fragment 2)
+
+ 00000000: 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 52 55 30 81 aa 30 21 06
+ 00000010: 08 2a 85 03 07 01 01 01 02 30 15 06 09 2a 85 03
+ 00000020: 07 01 02 01 02 01 06 08 2a 85 03 07 01 01 02 03
+ 00000030: 03 81 84 00 04 81 80 ee 2f 0a 0e 09 1e 7e 04 ef
+ 00000040: ba 5b 62 a2 52 86 e1 9c 24 50 30 50 b0 b4 8a 37
+ 00000050: 35 b5 fc af 28 94 ec b5 9b 92 41 5b 69 e2 c9 ba
+ 00000060: 24 de 6a 72 c4 ef 44 bb 89 a1 05 14 1b 87 3d 6a
+ 00000070: a3 72 3e 17 ca 7f 39 28 ce 16 8b dd 07 52 87 6a
+ 00000080: 0d 77 42 6d 99 2b 46 2c fd 4b b2 7c d7 c7 17 08
+ 00000090: 12 54 63 47 9d 14 3d 61 ed f2 95 ab 11 80 69 02
+ 000000A0: a7 66 60 50 7e a4 53 6d ad 01 49 b2 16 8a 95 1d
+ 000000B0: cf 1a 57 93 56 14 5e a3 82 02 59 30 82 02 55 30
+ 000000C0: 0e 06 03 55 1d 0f 01 01 ff 04 04 03 02 05 a0 30
+ 000000D0: 13 06 03 55 1d 25 04 0c 30 0a 06 08 2b 06 01 05
+ 000000E0: 05 07 03 11 30 1d 06 03 55 1d 0e 04 16 04 14 40
+ 000000F0: 81 b1 d1 18 75 f0 da 6b 3c 50 5f cd 73 1d d9 77
+ 00000100: f2 d7 c1 30 1f 06 03 55 1d 23 04 18 30 16 80 14
+ 00000110: 9b 85 5e fb 81 dc 4d 59 07 51 63 cf be df da 2c
+ 00000120: 7f c9 44 3c 30 82 01 0f 06 03 55 1d 1f 04 82 01
+ 00000130: 06 30 82 01 02 30 81 ff a0 81 fc a0 81 f9 86 81
+ 00000140: b5 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 74 65 73 74 67 6f 73 74
+ 00000150: 32 30 31 32 2e 63 72 79 70 74 6f 70 72 6f 2e 72
+ 00000160: 75 2f 43 65 72 74 45 6e 72 6f 6c 6c 2f 21 30 34
+ 00000170: 32 32 21 30 34 33 35 21 30 34 34 31 21 30 34 34
+ 00000180: 32 21 30 34 33 65 21 30 34 33 32 21 30 34 34 62
+ 00000190: 21 30 34 33 39 25 32 30 21 30 34 32 33 21 30 34
+ 000001A0: 32 36 25 32 30 21 30 34 31 65 21 30 34 31 65 21
+ 000001B0: 30 34 31 65 25 32 30 21 30 30 32 32 21 30 34 31
+ 000001C0: 61 21 30 34 32 30 21 30 34 31 38 21 30 34 31 66
+ 000001D0: 21 30 34 32 32 21 30 34 31 65 2d 21 30 34 31 66
+ 000001E0: 21 30 34 32 30 21 30 34 31 65 21 00
+
+ (92) Extracts IV from message (fragment 3)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02
+
+ (93) Uses previously computed key K3i
+
+ 00000000: 18 63 41 67 49 6e cf 48 56 71 4d aa 42 63 5c 11
+ 00000010: 2e 26 5b e2 7b c7 53 a4 09 82 e5 5a 7e f4 65 4d
+
+ (94) Composes MGM nonce (fragment 3)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 02 b4 e1 3e 23
+
+ (95) Extracts ICV from message (fragment 3)
+
+ 00000000: 54 4f 9b aa dd af bd ca
+
+ (96) Extracts AAD from message (fragment 3)
+
+ 00000000: 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97 de 11 9d 1e
+ 00000010: 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 20 00 00 02 04
+ 00000020: 00 03 00 04
+
+ (97) Extracts ciphertext from message (fragment 3)
+
+ 00000000: e7 72 d9 51 90 b1 a2 bc 81 8d d6 56 bf 7a 81 e0
+ 00000010: 1a a1 70 8b 35 a0 7e 5f e8 df 58 3d 75 5d d2 4c
+ 00000020: 4c ce 17 77 3f 28 9c ca 7a a4 23 23 f0 c7 ff ff
+ 00000030: 98 ee e3 1a 27 39 4d 90 1a b7 5b 44 11 16 11 3a
+ 00000040: ea bf 83 66 da 92 2a 3a 3d bd b5 40 c8 bc f6 ed
+ 00000050: cb 1d 5a 8e 30 f0 06 72 dc 6c da c1 45 7b e8 25
+ 00000060: ca 93 2a b2 fe 4a db 00 90 e3 31 78 26 8d ae c8
+ 00000070: 39 66 80 7d e5 01 5f 21 d6 c3 40 46 19 e4 43 9d
+ 00000080: 23 c6 c1 18 06 49 bd f5 dc 8c 1b 19 b0 60 0c a3
+ 00000090: ad f5 5c 57 e8 8e 37 e6 ea b6 79 11 b8 f1 16 ba
+ 000000A0: a6 d9 09 1f 0d e0 3c 07 b8 ce 9d 11 a3 c6 f7 e4
+ 000000B0: 62 e8 94 7b ad b9 8a 6b 9c f1 f8 43 cf 7e fc 5e
+ 000000C0: 44 ab bf b1 88 f5 67 1e 84 5f 82 63 f3 13 89 55
+ 000000D0: f5 ef 86 c3 db 48 37 f8 26 3c c4 6d a5 fc b5 69
+ 000000E0: 56 0d 2d f3 c0 98 dd e7 53 da 0a 28 87 2f 38 ab
+ 000000F0: a9 ec 60 a6 c4 54 c6 68 e7 6b e3 4b 54 bf b5 82
+ 00000100: 44 c9 b9 45 bc 9e f5 58 d8 76 63 92 cd 52 ec 82
+ 00000110: 80 d6 43 86 10 16 eb 7b 32 e4 ee ba ec 09 b6 4f
+ 00000120: 35 1a bf da d7 de 40 fa b5 d2 40 f2 73 09 2d 52
+ 00000130: 83 bd 56 a6 6b d3 9f 8a c2 c5 66 c6 6b 22 fb 6a
+ 00000140: 00 b2 8a ac 9d 8b fc 8d 41 af 80 92 16 51 e2 cb
+ 00000150: 89 62 9b 77 2b 1e 38 01 df fc 1f 81 2d 95 8b 9e
+ 00000160: 1d 1e ad 9c c0 0d fc 77 6e 35 13 16 26 28 1a 29
+ 00000170: 19 7f f8 08 5a 0f 09 4f 6f ba 7f 4c 5b cd 0c c2
+ 00000180: 71 ab ea 82 a2 d2 d1 1b 17 fd dc c3 54 03 85 14
+ 00000190: f4 90 47 2e 67 d7 93 c3 67 7e 8a f7 43 1a b3 41
+ 000001A0: 32 f7 b0 58 38 6e 24 c8 96 d9 94 d3 54 89 2d 61
+ 000001B0: 10 a9 9c 22 51 52 02 c9 b7 8d cc 5b 28 6d cb 55
+ 000001C0: 5d 2f 97 8a 8f 3f 27 56 73 eb ec 5d e4 64 91 49
+ 000001D0: 3b 88 f2 0a fc ed a5 67 a9 e3 71 ef 31 ce a0 33
+ 000001E0: fc d8 ea 4d 1e 3f dc 89 c8 89 e2 c3
+
+ (98) Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3i as K_msg,
+ resulting in plaintext (fragment 3)
+
+ 00000000: 30 30 32 32 28 31 29 2e 63 72 6c 86 3f 68 74 74
+ 00000010: 70 3a 2f 2f 74 65 73 74 67 6f 73 74 32 30 31 32
+ 00000020: 2e 63 72 79 70 74 6f 70 72 6f 2e 72 75 2f 43 65
+ 00000030: 72 74 45 6e 72 6f 6c 6c 2f 74 65 73 74 67 6f 73
+ 00000040: 74 32 30 31 32 28 31 29 2e 63 72 6c 30 81 da 06
+ 00000050: 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 01 01 04 81 cd 30 81 ca 30
+ 00000060: 44 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 30 02 86 38 68 74 74
+ 00000070: 70 3a 2f 2f 74 65 73 74 67 6f 73 74 32 30 31 32
+ 00000080: 2e 63 72 79 70 74 6f 70 72 6f 2e 72 75 2f 43 65
+ 00000090: 72 74 45 6e 72 6f 6c 6c 2f 72 6f 6f 74 32 30 31
+ 000000A0: 38 2e 63 72 74 30 3f 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 30
+ 000000B0: 01 86 33 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 74 65 73 74 67 6f
+ 000000C0: 73 74 32 30 31 32 2e 63 72 79 70 74 6f 70 72 6f
+ 000000D0: 2e 72 75 2f 6f 63 73 70 32 30 31 32 67 2f 6f 63
+ 000000E0: 73 70 2e 73 72 66 30 41 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07
+ 000000F0: 30 01 86 35 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 74 65 73 74 67
+ 00000100: 6f 73 74 32 30 31 32 2e 63 72 79 70 74 6f 70 72
+ 00000110: 6f 2e 72 75 2f 6f 63 73 70 32 30 31 32 67 73 74
+ 00000120: 2f 6f 63 73 70 2e 73 72 66 30 0a 06 08 2a 85 03
+ 00000130: 07 01 01 03 02 03 41 00 21 ee 3b e1 fd 0f 36 90
+ 00000140: 92 c4 a2 35 26 e8 dc 4e b8 ef 89 40 70 d2 91 39
+ 00000150: bc 79 a6 e2 f7 c1 06 bd d5 d6 ff 72 a5 6c f2 c0
+ 00000160: c3 75 e9 ca 67 81 c1 93 96 b4 bd 18 12 4c 37 f7
+ 00000170: d9 73 d6 4c 8a a6 c4 0a 24 00 00 19 04 5e 9e 50
+ 00000180: 5f 58 b0 a5 7a 33 45 83 49 66 0f 1c 3c 7a 67 71
+ 00000190: 98 27 00 00 4e 09 00 00 00 30 44 31 20 30 1e 06
+ 000001A0: 03 55 04 03 13 17 49 4b 45 20 49 6e 74 65 72 6f
+ 000001B0: 70 20 54 65 73 74 20 53 65 72 76 65 72 31 13 30
+ 000001C0: 11 06 03 55 04 0a 13 0a 45 4c 56 49 53 2d 50 4c
+ 000001D0: 55 53 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 52 55 29
+ 000001E0: 00 00 95 0e 00 00 00 0c 30 0a 06 00
+
+ (99) Extracts IV from message (fragment 4)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03
+
+ (100) Uses previously computed key K3i
+
+ 00000000: 18 63 41 67 49 6e cf 48 56 71 4d aa 42 63 5c 11
+ 00000010: 2e 26 5b e2 7b c7 53 a4 09 82 e5 5a 7e f4 65 4d
+
+ (101) Composes MGM nonce (fragment 4)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 03 b4 e1 3e 23
+
+ (102) Extracts ICV from message (fragment 4)
+
+ 00000000: d2 25 f1 d0 38 65 b7 b6
+
+ (103) Extracts AAD from message (fragment 4)
+
+ 00000000: 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97 de 11 9d 1e
+ 00000010: 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 01 7a 00 00 01 5e
+ 00000020: 00 04 00 04
+
+ (104) Extracts ciphertext from message (fragment 4)
+
+ 00000000: e0 8a 0b 04 ee f8 47 c2 52 96 71 9f 9d 39 0c 91
+ 00000010: ea 6a 16 7c 80 31 a0 fd 76 cc c4 f1 8f 1a d3 be
+ 00000020: fa 78 6b df c1 c6 73 83 be 36 69 c4 8a 87 ed 11
+ 00000030: 90 31 a8 fd f9 0a 5c e4 d4 23 c9 e6 b3 96 ac b6
+ 00000040: 8e bd fc 27 58 79 9f cc 8b ac 6b 59 e4 70 4b 05
+ 00000050: 23 16 ed 49 25 f3 de 02 2e ce ae 86 e8 b4 ca b4
+ 00000060: 96 ad 5b f6 2b c2 47 33 6f da f3 97 3c 13 ed 1f
+ 00000070: 7a da 93 b5 69 6a b5 10 93 38 75 ea b7 34 a3 87
+ 00000080: b6 83 c7 da 8a a1 d9 2a 0b 22 e2 ab 63 2b 57 2b
+ 00000090: 88 e3 ea be 7b fc dc 26 ac b8 bb 15 96 f9 c2 f4
+ 000000A0: 60 17 e4 09 18 ae 78 b8 73 02 6b 0e 20 cc b1 cd
+ 000000B0: b4 4d 94 7f f3 16 28 9a d2 bd 26 77 4b a5 85 56
+ 000000C0: b1 81 8b 9c c3 0a 7f 67 fe 6a 61 15 f1 45 66 f3
+ 000000D0: 36 fc a5 bb 1f d7 6d e7 1d 9f 3f b5 cc 60 19 48
+ 000000E0: 17 f7 08 28 1c 58 9f 2b 7a 0b b9 50 bd 02 ea b8
+ 000000F0: 1e 03 1f 52 6a 7a fc e5 b4 6b 00 cf 0d 83 1f d2
+ 00000100: 3f f2 ad 43 d4 86 6e c1 88 d2 87 d6 1f ac a3 30
+ 00000110: 7b c1 5b 6a 3d 4c 20 72 5d 2c ca bf 87 a2 ce 1d
+ 00000120: b3 fa c7 7c 22 cd 66 fc be 49 22 32 17 ee 6e 5e
+ 00000130: 62 c1 ca 12 2b 5d 3d 7b ae b5 3e 53 c5 98 05 1f
+ 00000140: 42 53 49 d1 2c c2
+
+ (105) Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3i as K_msg,
+ resulting in plaintext (fragment 4)
+
+ 00000000: 08 2a 85 03 07 01 01 03 03 6a 3e 59 0d 72 1e 55
+ 00000010: a3 c0 d1 2f 8a 9b 4e 44 10 58 59 bd 62 9e e7 12
+ 00000020: 31 e5 7d 01 53 f3 84 40 dd ac 73 ed 09 3a 10 d9
+ 00000030: 6e 7f eb 80 6c 11 9e 91 f3 7c 3c b0 55 f7 4b ec
+ 00000040: 0e 78 36 10 95 02 09 86 b3 27 04 2a 83 3c 89 36
+ 00000050: 1b 73 cf 7b c9 e0 df a2 07 12 1e 69 52 4d 89 1b
+ 00000060: de 6e 48 d1 34 fa 21 78 22 88 2e 30 86 c0 80 0a
+ 00000070: 2d 74 af 08 ff 35 75 a5 79 e3 85 40 22 6b a8 42
+ 00000080: f6 72 24 bf 29 87 58 a8 20 29 00 00 08 00 00 40
+ 00000090: 00 2f 00 00 0c 00 00 40 01 00 00 00 04 21 00 00
+ 000000A0: 10 01 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 03 00 00 2c 00 00
+ 000000B0: 38 00 00 00 34 01 03 04 05 6c 0c a5 70 03 00 00
+ 000000C0: 08 01 00 00 20 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 21 03 00 00
+ 000000D0: 08 01 00 00 22 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 23 00 00 00
+ 000000E0: 08 05 00 00 00 2d 00 00 28 02 00 00 00 07 01 00
+ 000000F0: 10 08 00 08 00 0a 6f 0a ab 0a 6f 0a ab 07 00 00
+ 00000100: 10 00 00 ff ff 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff 29 00 00
+ 00000110: 28 02 00 00 00 07 01 00 10 08 00 08 00 0a 00 00
+ 00000120: 02 0a 00 00 02 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff ff 0a 00 00
+ 00000130: 00 0a 00 00 ff 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 0a 00 00 00
+ 00000140: 08 00 00 40 0b 00
+
+ (106) Reassembles message from received fragments and parses it
+
+ IKE SA Auth
+ #9280E0822E758778.DB578D97DE119D1E.00000001 IKEv2 I->R[1847]
+ 4*EF[...]->E[1819]{
+ IDi[78](DN){CN=IKE Interop Test Client,O=ELVIS-PLUS,C=RU},
+ CERT[1280](X.509 Cert){308204...A6C40A},
+ CERTREQ[25](X.509 Cert){5E9E50...677198},
+ IDr[78](DN){CN=IKE Interop Test Server,O=ELVIS-PLUS,C=RU},
+ AUTH[149](Sig){id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-512[12]:
+ 6A3E59...58A820},
+ N[8](INITIAL_CONTACT),
+ N[12](SET_WINDOW_SIZE){4},
+ CP[16](REQUEST){IP4.Address[0], IP4.DNS[0]},
+ SA[56]{
+ P[52](#1:ESP:6C0CA570:5#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE,
+ ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE,
+ ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE,
+ ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE,
+ ESN=Off}},
+ TSi[40](2#){10.111.10.171:icmp:8.0, 0.0.0.0-255.255.255.255},
+ TSr[40](2#){10.0.0.2:icmp:8.0, 10.0.0.0-10.0.0.255},
+ N[8](ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+ N[8](NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)}
+
+ (107) Computes prf(SK_pi, IDi)
+
+ 00000000: ce e8 8b d1 7e 3c 83 32 eb d1 29 08 de dc 71 f4
+ 00000010: 8f ba 09 b8 ca 5b 10 e2 f4 44 29 5c 97 7b 26 01
+ 00000020: a4 ba 83 c8 ea 40 92 0f 88 18 bd e7 e1 c9 45 cf
+ 00000030: ff 99 48 05 0d f4 93 a6 cd 54 46 d7 eb 7a 52 94
+
+ (108) Uses initiator's public key
+
+ 00000010: EE 2F 0A 0E 09 1E 7E 04 EF BA 5B 62 A2 52 86 E1
+ 00000020: 9C 24 50 30 50 B0 B4 8A 37 35 B5 FC AF 28 94 EC
+ 00000030: B5 9B 92 41 5B 69 E2 C9 BA 24 DE 6A 72 C4 EF 44
+ 00000040: BB 89 A1 05 14 1B 87 3D 6A A3 72 3E 17 CA 7F 39
+ 00000050: 28 CE 16 8B DD 07 52 87 6A 0D 77 42 6D 99 2B 46
+ 00000060: 2C FD 4B B2 7C D7 C7 17 08 12 54 63 47 9D 14 3D
+ 00000070: 61 ED F2 95 AB 11 80 69 02 A7 66 60 50 7E A4 53
+ 00000080: 6D AD 01 49 B2 16 8A 95 1D CF 1A 57 93 56 14 5E
+
+ (109) Verifies signature from AUTH payload using algorithm id-tc26-
+ signwithdigest-gost3410-12-512
+
+ 00000000: 6a 3e 59 0d 72 1e 55 a3 c0 d1 2f 8a 9b 4e 44 10
+ 00000010: 58 59 bd 62 9e e7 12 31 e5 7d 01 53 f3 84 40 dd
+ 00000020: ac 73 ed 09 3a 10 d9 6e 7f eb 80 6c 11 9e 91 f3
+ 00000030: 7c 3c b0 55 f7 4b ec 0e 78 36 10 95 02 09 86 b3
+ 00000040: 27 04 2a 83 3c 89 36 1b 73 cf 7b c9 e0 df a2 07
+ 00000050: 12 1e 69 52 4d 89 1b de 6e 48 d1 34 fa 21 78 22
+ 00000060: 88 2e 30 86 c0 80 0a 2d 74 af 08 ff 35 75 a5 79
+ 00000070: e3 85 40 22 6b a8 42 f6 72 24 bf 29 87 58 a8 20
+
+ (110) Computes keys for ESP SAs
+
+ 00000000: 98 ab 7e db 78 03 a1 e6 c7 21 43 ee b9 7f 5f 56
+ 00000010: 45 bb 51 cd 0b b7 09 a1 af 34 02 87 69 4d 7b a0
+ 00000020: 1d 14 a0 cc
+ 00000000: 70 31 4d 57 94 8b 7e 5c 6f 29 d5 68 1b fd 43 2b
+ 00000010: 19 4e 64 6d 8f 8a 8d 1e ba 72 24 59 c7 0c de 81
+ 00000020: e2 04 84 af
+
+ (111) Computes prf(SK_pr,IDr)
+
+ 00000000: 7d c8 6a 33 12 02 5c 21 1f ab dc 83 0b 01 a5 27
+ 00000010: 82 a2 f2 1f 64 c6 e9 5e 0e c0 4c e5 d9 11 8d 8e
+ 00000020: b9 5c ef fa b0 a3 37 75 94 20 7c e4 60 60 ed 9d
+ 00000030: fa 5e cb 7e e7 79 05 ab fb 51 1b 03 a8 2c c5 6a
+
+ (112) Uses private key for signing (little endian)
+
+ 00000000: CB 73 0C 81 6F AC 6D 81 9F 82 AE 15 A9 08 12 17
+ 00000010: D3 1B 97 64 B7 1C 34 0D D3 DD 90 1F 15 8C 9B 06
+
+ (113) Uses random number for signing
+
+ 00000000: 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02
+ 00000010: 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02
+
+ (114) Computes signature using algorithm id-tc26-signwithdigest-
+ gost3410-12-256
+
+ 00000000: c8 40 af f7 46 6f 7b eb d2 b9 1c 5a 80 d0 00 93
+ 00000010: c2 5e 44 16 40 47 f7 8e 61 9c da a5 16 94 83 c5
+ 00000020: 68 5f e8 4d 03 e7 c2 cd 08 07 b8 f3 46 66 6d 05
+ 00000030: 76 c0 d5 e7 60 1d 59 49 09 45 52 c4 95 a7 5a d3
+
+ (115) Computes K1r (i1 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 35 e4 d1 65 2e ec 24 89 e4 c9 58 b1 b9 05 1b 83
+ 00000010: 62 5e 65 d7 61 73 d9 1c cf 84 60 64 b9 f2 e7 51
+
+ (116) Computes K2r (i2 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 86 8c 89 42 41 d7 30 da 1a 4a 67 69 3a 32 4d 38
+ 00000010: f3 54 02 9f f7 7d b7 bc 5a ee 3b 60 2b 3f 05 56
+
+ (117) Computes K3r (i3 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 31 95 e8 c6 67 af 42 d8 ce f1 e8 99 c6 8b 2a c2
+ 00000010: 29 aa 3d c0 ff 18 5f 3d 79 4a 14 6b 9f ac d0 bb
+
+ (118) Selects SPI for incoming ESP SA
+
+ 00000000: 34 ff 8a 25
+
+ (119) Creates message splitting it into 4 fragments
+
+ IKE SA Auth
+ #9280E0822E758778.DB578D97DE119D1E.00000001 IKEv2 I<=R[1563]
+ E[1535]->4*EF[...]{
+ IDr[78](DN){CN=IKE Interop Test Server,O=ELVIS-PLUS,C=RU},
+ CERT[1211](X.509 Cert){308204...FB346D},
+ AUTH[85](Sig){id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-256[12]:
+ C840AF...A75AD3},
+ N[8](INITIAL_CONTACT),
+ N[12](SET_WINDOW_SIZE){64},
+ CP[16](REPLY){IP4.Address[4]=10.1.1.3},
+ SA[32]{
+ P[28](#1:ESP:34FF8A25:2#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE,
+ ESN=Off}},
+ TSi[24](1#){10.1.1.3},
+ TSr[24](1#){10.0.0.0-10.0.0.255},
+ N[8](ADDITIONAL_TS_POSSIBLE),
+ N[8](ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+ N[8](NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)}
+
+ (120) Composes MGM nonce (fragment 1)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 a5 bb 18 2f
+
+ (121) Composes AAD (fragment 1)
+
+ 00000000: 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97 de 11 9d 1e
+ 00000010: 35 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 20 24 00 02 04
+ 00000020: 00 01 00 04
+
+ (122) Composes plaintext (fragment 1)
+
+ 00000000: 25 00 00 4e 09 00 00 00 30 44 31 20 30 1e 06 03
+ 00000010: 55 04 03 13 17 49 4b 45 20 49 6e 74 65 72 6f 70
+ 00000020: 20 54 65 73 74 20 53 65 72 76 65 72 31 13 30 11
+ 00000030: 06 03 55 04 0a 13 0a 45 4c 56 49 53 2d 50 4c 55
+ 00000040: 53 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 52 55 27 00
+ 00000050: 04 bb 04 30 82 04 b2 30 82 04 5f a0 03 02 01 02
+ 00000060: 02 13 7c 00 03 d9 02 ec f9 34 3e c8 aa d6 59 00
+ 00000070: 01 00 03 d9 02 30 0a 06 08 2a 85 03 07 01 01 03
+ 00000080: 02 30 82 01 0a 31 18 30 16 06 05 2a 85 03 64 01
+ 00000090: 12 0d 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 30 31 32 33 31
+ 000000A0: 1a 30 18 06 08 2a 85 03 03 81 03 01 01 12 0c 30
+ 000000B0: 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 30 31 2f 30 2d 06
+ 000000C0: 03 55 04 09 0c 26 d1 83 d0 bb 2e 20 d0 a1 d1 83
+ 000000D0: d1 89 d1 91 d0 b2 d1 81 d0 ba d0 b8 d0 b9 20 d0
+ 000000E0: b2 d0 b0 d0 bb 20 d0 b4 2e 20 31 38 31 0b 30 09
+ 000000F0: 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 52 55 31 19 30 17 06 03 55
+ 00000100: 04 08 0c 10 d0 b3 2e 20 d0 9c d0 be d1 81 d0 ba
+ 00000110: d0 b2 d0 b0 31 15 30 13 06 03 55 04 07 0c 0c d0
+ 00000120: 9c d0 be d1 81 d0 ba d0 b2 d0 b0 31 25 30 23 06
+ 00000130: 03 55 04 0a 0c 1c d0 9e d0 9e d0 9e 20 22 d0 9a
+ 00000140: d0 a0 d0 98 d0 9f d0 a2 d0 9e 2d d0 9f d0 a0 d0
+ 00000150: 9e 22 31 3b 30 39 06 03 55 04 03 0c 32 d0 a2 d0
+ 00000160: b5 d1 81 d1 82 d0 be d0 b2 d1 8b d0 b9 20 d0 a3
+ 00000170: d0 a6 20 d0 9e d0 9e d0 9e 20 22 d0 9a d0 a0 d0
+ 00000180: 98 d0 9f d0 a2 d0 9e 2d d0 9f d0 a0 d0 9e 22 30
+ 00000190: 1e 17 0d 32 31 30 39 33 30 31 33 32 34 30 36 5a
+ 000001A0: 17 0d 32 31 31 32 33 30 31 33 33 34 30 36 5a 30
+ 000001B0: 44 31 20 30 1e 06 03 55 04 03 13 17 49 4b 45 20
+ 000001C0: 49 6e 74 65 72 6f 70 20 54 65 73 74 20 53 65 72
+ 000001D0: 76 65 72 31 13 30 11 06 03 55 04 0a 13 0a 45 4c
+ 000001E0: 56 49 53 2d 50 4c 55 53 31 0b 30 00
+
+ (123) Encrypts plaintext using K3r as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
+ (fragment 1)
+
+ 00000000: 73 f2 45 3e fb 6a 26 28 67 7d 14 e3 bf 0a 90 74
+ 00000010: c9 95 6a 40 d5 4e a6 77 cf 58 2e b8 ae 52 f4 25
+ 00000020: f7 82 bc d9 f0 74 4e 38 51 90 07 70 27 f8 01 27
+ 00000030: 17 da f4 ba bc 1e 02 0b 73 ec cc 7b f8 b3 68 64
+ 00000040: f3 48 65 33 3b ab ac 19 11 d3 f7 78 b4 f8 d1 3f
+ 00000050: 6d 46 93 37 a6 58 48 3a 7d d0 8a 9c 84 ab de eb
+ 00000060: 0d d4 8d ab 75 20 18 27 42 fe 24 ee ba c4 a4 6e
+ 00000070: db 80 68 3c 84 7e d6 36 50 d4 1b 1c bc c5 9f 18
+ 00000080: 41 af 48 52 c1 7e a2 f0 e4 bc 0a 3c 64 34 81 ca
+ 00000090: df 96 ba 51 91 f1 06 13 b2 04 23 c8 70 3a ea 64
+ 000000A0: e9 ea ce c2 db aa 12 90 28 0c 9d f9 89 02 a8 5e
+ 000000B0: 66 f5 6e ce dd e7 2c 4a 45 54 de 5e b8 76 73 67
+ 000000C0: 2d a3 a0 52 91 74 ff b7 eb e4 ea d1 2b 04 76 f7
+ 000000D0: ff 4b 1c b8 45 7e 8a 60 e7 1e ec 13 3e c1 d8 d0
+ 000000E0: 78 be f4 79 77 06 ce 76 04 64 ad e7 10 19 65 2b
+ 000000F0: 45 66 23 3d 34 7a 40 6c 36 c0 20 73 47 d8 7a b6
+ 00000100: 2b 0f 56 04 7a c0 41 ab 18 23 11 78 7f 4f d4 f5
+ 00000110: 7d 2e 06 a5 15 ee de 84 9f c2 0a f6 c8 1e a4 30
+ 00000120: 70 42 07 c8 5e 97 08 69 12 27 58 c3 c7 b7 db 7a
+ 00000130: 8c 50 3a 3a 5c bf 3a a7 73 40 8f 9c 18 f6 13 77
+ 00000140: 63 c1 60 06 36 a1 43 ab 88 08 c9 cc ad f2 88 ca
+ 00000150: 84 bd 45 e0 8e d9 27 a3 07 f2 63 79 b0 a8 62 9f
+ 00000160: 5f ba dc a7 f5 54 b8 4f 4f bb 1e a2 16 4b 4f 2d
+ 00000170: d4 08 4e 45 c2 c0 60 3b 73 df 6b 35 3a fe 38 2e
+ 00000180: 25 75 fc be 89 4c d2 7a 9c 1f b4 41 a6 31 d3 3d
+ 00000190: 39 a6 d1 c4 47 94 44 30 3a 2b 23 22 ba c0 a9 df
+ 000001A0: dc 1c 90 8d d1 e8 13 f9 08 68 5a 94 98 c7 3f 47
+ 000001B0: 77 79 b5 bb fb 22 56 4b 38 55 48 e8 14 d4 01 eb
+ 000001C0: 63 e9 17 da 24 69 9a 6d dc 1e 25 06 ef 77 10 46
+ 000001D0: ad 99 ad 9c 54 4f d4 68 64 ea 05 1d ef 29 ea 0e
+ 000001E0: 3c 1c 7e 27 cf 59 76 42 5b 02 04 b8
+
+ (124) Computes ICV using K3r as K_msg (fragment 1)
+
+ 00000000: 96 08 17 ed ef 01 4d a0
+
+ (125) Composes IV (fragment 1)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+
+ (126) Composes MGM nonce (fragment 2)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 01 a5 bb 18 2f
+
+ (127) Composes AAD (fragment 2)
+
+ 00000000: 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97 de 11 9d 1e
+ 00000010: 35 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 20 00 00 02 04
+ 00000020: 00 02 00 04
+
+ (128) Composes plaintext (fragment 2)
+
+ 00000000: 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 52 55 30 66 30 1f 06 08
+ 00000010: 2a 85 03 07 01 01 01 01 30 13 06 07 2a 85 03 02
+ 00000020: 02 24 00 06 08 2a 85 03 07 01 01 02 02 03 43 00
+ 00000030: 04 40 5b b3 14 3e f4 70 c1 70 d7 f3 27 25 d8 53
+ 00000040: 7c e6 de 6d 8c 29 f6 b2 32 64 56 dc b1 77 f2 3d
+ 00000050: fa f4 2a 5c f3 74 86 7f 04 72 51 c1 cf b3 43 36
+ 00000060: f5 95 a2 af 05 47 57 1a 55 c0 78 a4 9d 64 26 b8
+ 00000070: 61 14 a3 82 02 59 30 82 02 55 30 0e 06 03 55 1d
+ 00000080: 0f 01 01 ff 04 04 03 02 05 a0 30 13 06 03 55 1d
+ 00000090: 25 04 0c 30 0a 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 03 11 30
+ 000000A0: 1d 06 03 55 1d 0e 04 16 04 14 e0 d3 f0 09 ad ce
+ 000000B0: 6c a5 47 ba 9b f7 a6 a5 1b 06 14 ba a5 43 30 1f
+ 000000C0: 06 03 55 1d 23 04 18 30 16 80 14 9b 85 5e fb 81
+ 000000D0: dc 4d 59 07 51 63 cf be df da 2c 7f c9 44 3c 30
+ 000000E0: 82 01 0f 06 03 55 1d 1f 04 82 01 06 30 82 01 02
+ 000000F0: 30 81 ff a0 81 fc a0 81 f9 86 81 b5 68 74 74 70
+ 00000100: 3a 2f 2f 74 65 73 74 67 6f 73 74 32 30 31 32 2e
+ 00000110: 63 72 79 70 74 6f 70 72 6f 2e 72 75 2f 43 65 72
+ 00000120: 74 45 6e 72 6f 6c 6c 2f 21 30 34 32 32 21 30 34
+ 00000130: 33 35 21 30 34 34 31 21 30 34 34 32 21 30 34 33
+ 00000140: 65 21 30 34 33 32 21 30 34 34 62 21 30 34 33 39
+ 00000150: 25 32 30 21 30 34 32 33 21 30 34 32 36 25 32 30
+ 00000160: 21 30 34 31 65 21 30 34 31 65 21 30 34 31 65 25
+ 00000170: 32 30 21 30 30 32 32 21 30 34 31 61 21 30 34 32
+ 00000180: 30 21 30 34 31 38 21 30 34 31 66 21 30 34 32 32
+ 00000190: 21 30 34 31 65 2d 21 30 34 31 66 21 30 34 32 30
+ 000001A0: 21 30 34 31 65 21 30 30 32 32 28 31 29 2e 63 72
+ 000001B0: 6c 86 3f 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 74 65 73 74 67 6f
+ 000001C0: 73 74 32 30 31 32 2e 63 72 79 70 74 6f 70 72 6f
+ 000001D0: 2e 72 75 2f 43 65 72 74 45 6e 72 6f 6c 6c 2f 74
+ 000001E0: 65 73 74 67 6f 73 74 32 30 31 32 00
+
+ (129) Encrypts plaintext using K3r as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
+ (fragment 2)
+
+ 00000000: b1 c8 8d ae d9 6f 91 7e 5a 6a 2d 8c e0 d6 28 3e
+ 00000010: 10 59 46 12 a1 1e fa 53 c3 58 ec 4e a9 a5 92 0c
+ 00000020: fa 5e cf a3 33 4a 8b b7 56 66 54 d9 9c 64 2e b6
+ 00000030: 4d 03 3f 77 a8 17 88 f6 23 e0 2e 56 a6 a2 4c 4d
+ 00000040: 6e e3 09 8a 2e 31 a1 85 1c cf ce 95 e7 73 93 8e
+ 00000050: 9c 5a 7b 3b 49 75 96 69 d4 b0 46 f7 74 b0 0d 5d
+ 00000060: 91 3b 6d 2b a4 46 cc 5c d9 a8 38 c0 6b ad 73 35
+ 00000070: 09 aa c7 4c 91 8a 84 1c dd 3f e1 44 f7 c5 9c 61
+ 00000080: 0e b7 03 6b 84 cc 8e 93 5b d5 f6 7e 71 3a f4 2c
+ 00000090: 98 14 ad 47 e3 c3 70 dc e3 3e c0 a5 e0 e4 6d 01
+ 000000A0: 44 78 7f e3 b7 6c cb 44 29 59 96 e9 84 6d 9d 18
+ 000000B0: 89 66 16 07 46 a4 cd 72 a6 0e bd d2 a7 1c f7 21
+ 000000C0: f0 d1 67 a9 0d 1c c4 c8 30 bd 26 1f 53 7d 61 8b
+ 000000D0: ad 6f ef 3e 2c 6e 7e 69 b9 92 72 66 65 b6 06 22
+ 000000E0: 49 a1 a8 f1 2f 02 dd 41 bf f5 d1 f6 7c 93 25 6e
+ 000000F0: 52 8b a9 3f b5 40 97 02 bb 7c f5 33 a6 60 52 b8
+ 00000100: 4f 3e 80 6c 38 cf e4 8b 15 fd d0 66 75 c1 bf bb
+ 00000110: ac fc ac 01 c3 11 8e 0b 3e e9 2c 1b 5d b9 9f f6
+ 00000120: 2f d7 e8 3c c7 a9 25 8b aa 6e c6 49 6d 6f df 42
+ 00000130: 53 0e ba 70 54 d2 af c3 4d 02 e1 48 42 c5 45 53
+ 00000140: 25 59 66 25 c7 3c c6 c2 e2 99 e2 bb 47 a4 a7 be
+ 00000150: 6c 92 0d 3b 4c ab 6e d7 23 05 ea 73 07 62 e8 c0
+ 00000160: e8 78 47 af 54 c8 67 8f dd 32 59 8d 87 ac 42 0e
+ 00000170: 21 15 c4 f7 66 dc 02 cf 55 c2 e3 4d 8e 91 7a fd
+ 00000180: d7 4d 20 b0 6f 67 78 58 08 9c ba 05 8b b0 9c 16
+ 00000190: 20 51 75 12 96 e2 d5 28 ac 3e 50 26 04 6f 59 02
+ 000001A0: 28 e0 ec 2c da 70 4a 9c 15 5a 2e 52 01 e6 4e 1e
+ 000001B0: 10 6d 8d 5d 2a 81 69 0e 54 d0 5e 13 82 82 84 9a
+ 000001C0: ac a6 0e 69 4e 17 5c c1 8a 71 f8 b4 80 3b 7a e5
+ 000001D0: b8 1f 09 4a 02 14 24 07 af 6a 14 d9 52 8e da d3
+ 000001E0: 58 23 68 71 27 b2 9a 03 09 f7 80 51
+
+ (130) Computes ICV using K3r as K_msg (fragment 2)
+
+ 00000000: 89 bd 07 12 fc 3f 15 8d
+
+ (131) Composes IV (fragment 2)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01
+
+ (132) Composes MGM nonce (fragment 3)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 02 a5 bb 18 2f
+
+ (133) Composes AAD (fragment 3)
+
+ 00000000: 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97 de 11 9d 1e
+ 00000010: 35 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 20 00 00 02 04
+ 00000020: 00 03 00 04
+
+ (134) Composes plaintext (fragment 3)
+
+ 00000000: 28 31 29 2e 63 72 6c 30 81 da 06 08 2b 06 01 05
+ 00000010: 05 07 01 01 04 81 cd 30 81 ca 30 44 06 08 2b 06
+ 00000020: 01 05 05 07 30 02 86 38 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 74
+ 00000030: 65 73 74 67 6f 73 74 32 30 31 32 2e 63 72 79 70
+ 00000040: 74 6f 70 72 6f 2e 72 75 2f 43 65 72 74 45 6e 72
+ 00000050: 6f 6c 6c 2f 72 6f 6f 74 32 30 31 38 2e 63 72 74
+ 00000060: 30 3f 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 86 33 68 74
+ 00000070: 74 70 3a 2f 2f 74 65 73 74 67 6f 73 74 32 30 31
+ 00000080: 32 2e 63 72 79 70 74 6f 70 72 6f 2e 72 75 2f 6f
+ 00000090: 63 73 70 32 30 31 32 67 2f 6f 63 73 70 2e 73 72
+ 000000A0: 66 30 41 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 86 35 68
+ 000000B0: 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 74 65 73 74 67 6f 73 74 32 30
+ 000000C0: 31 32 2e 63 72 79 70 74 6f 70 72 6f 2e 72 75 2f
+ 000000D0: 6f 63 73 70 32 30 31 32 67 73 74 2f 6f 63 73 70
+ 000000E0: 2e 73 72 66 30 0a 06 08 2a 85 03 07 01 01 03 02
+ 000000F0: 03 41 00 a5 39 5f ca 48 e1 c2 93 c1 e0 8a 64 74
+ 00000100: 0f 6b 86 a2 15 9b 46 29 d0 42 71 4f ce e7 52 d7
+ 00000110: d7 3d aa 47 ce cf 52 63 8f 26 b2 17 5f ad 96 57
+ 00000120: 76 ea 5f d0 87 bb 12 29 e4 06 0e e1 5f fd 59 81
+ 00000130: fb 34 6d 29 00 00 55 0e 00 00 00 0c 30 0a 06 08
+ 00000140: 2a 85 03 07 01 01 03 02 c8 40 af f7 46 6f 7b eb
+ 00000150: d2 b9 1c 5a 80 d0 00 93 c2 5e 44 16 40 47 f7 8e
+ 00000160: 61 9c da a5 16 94 83 c5 68 5f e8 4d 03 e7 c2 cd
+ 00000170: 08 07 b8 f3 46 66 6d 05 76 c0 d5 e7 60 1d 59 49
+ 00000180: 09 45 52 c4 95 a7 5a d3 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 00
+ 00000190: 2f 00 00 0c 00 00 40 01 00 00 00 40 21 00 00 10
+ 000001A0: 02 00 00 00 00 01 00 04 0a 01 01 03 2c 00 00 20
+ 000001B0: 00 00 00 1c 01 03 04 02 34 ff 8a 25 03 00 00 08
+ 000001C0: 01 00 00 21 00 00 00 08 05 00 00 00 2d 00 00 18
+ 000001D0: 01 00 00 00 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff ff 0a 01 01 03
+ 000001E0: 0a 01 01 03 29 00 00 18 01 00 00 00
+
+ (135) Encrypts plaintext using K3r as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
+ (fragment 3)
+
+ 00000000: 08 e0 86 04 1f 8a c9 b5 68 cd 96 10 ab 59 99 3a
+ 00000010: 54 7b a9 fa d7 60 46 ec c3 bf bd 8f fa 03 ed 41
+ 00000020: 49 13 ca 8c 9c b8 0c df 81 25 e2 30 ca cb 65 b9
+ 00000030: 16 55 8e 67 f4 b3 7c b8 91 66 76 7c a4 15 98 a3
+ 00000040: 3a c9 48 64 e4 ce 9f 64 67 5d bb 7c 03 23 9e c9
+ 00000050: 81 3f da 48 ee a6 2a d8 fb ac 77 ce ed c2 a4 d9
+ 00000060: 24 d3 71 99 fc 71 2b 6c 10 d3 c3 4b b5 37 e2 55
+ 00000070: 5f d5 ee c0 d6 ff 66 15 8c e5 63 26 96 cd 3f 49
+ 00000080: 2b da 51 94 55 6e 2e e5 2e d1 b4 91 81 50 85 8a
+ 00000090: 84 bd fe 52 ec ce 1b 6b bd 7d 12 b4 de a5 88 c4
+ 000000A0: b7 78 d3 3d 2d 46 ef dc 0f 91 43 be 08 7a ba fa
+ 000000B0: b3 2a c2 17 30 99 79 ae 3a 00 f0 3f 47 4a 9b 11
+ 000000C0: 4d 7b 1b 28 0a 44 5b 1a af 35 4d c3 2b 6b be 11
+ 000000D0: 89 03 b9 de cf 37 57 53 1e a4 f3 3f ce 52 a6 d8
+ 000000E0: 7e 9d d8 d4 2f 9f f5 8f 3c c6 cb 2f 56 e0 97 2d
+ 000000F0: b2 0e 10 66 3b 3c ec 34 50 99 a3 7d 42 ec 96 eb
+ 00000100: 87 48 72 2c 0a 6d af b9 4b 62 48 89 36 01 21 ab
+ 00000110: 8e 79 10 54 9c 83 ab a9 8a 6c 37 c7 ac dc a1 7e
+ 00000120: 41 0e 58 de da aa 95 71 fb 34 50 8a ef 37 0b c4
+ 00000130: 56 ca 4b 2c 75 b7 c7 d9 74 22 c2 65 1a e4 4f 94
+ 00000140: 20 f6 e9 44 f1 69 5e d2 18 d3 30 2e 85 74 25 be
+ 00000150: 2a 88 e2 ce fe 75 ca fa 25 f9 2e 88 8c ed 6f dd
+ 00000160: c3 c5 53 2e da 14 fd 96 28 4a b7 81 3a b3 d5 44
+ 00000170: 26 e2 84 21 f2 5c 0a ed bf c4 34 1c a4 91 5e f3
+ 00000180: 47 ef 0e 9e fb ee 34 95 5d 21 72 43 c9 63 af b4
+ 00000190: f2 98 4a 36 57 77 fc e7 57 52 b2 4d bf 34 2a 98
+ 000001A0: ea 70 cd d7 a9 da 4c 0d 19 05 d4 1e dd 36 c7 c4
+ 000001B0: 31 54 18 2a ef 0e 30 44 97 31 15 57 cd d4 88 52
+ 000001C0: 4e 42 c8 20 89 8d 35 7b 8e 03 96 b4 74 fb ec 3b
+ 000001D0: 14 c2 64 49 92 f2 1f 3d ff 84 2d 92 4c b9 01 04
+ 000001E0: 3d 0a 2a 28 33 de 43 44 6b cf 79 0e
+
+ (136) Computes ICV using K3r as K_msg (fragment 3)
+
+ 00000000: 7d 7c 57 8f 91 d0 c9 eb
+
+ (137) Composes IV (fragment 3)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02
+
+ (138) Composes MGM nonce (fragment 4)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 03 a5 bb 18 2f
+
+ (139) Composes AAD (fragment 4)
+
+ 00000000: 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97 de 11 9d 1e
+ 00000010: 35 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 5e 00 00 00 42
+ 00000020: 00 04 00 04
+
+ (140) Composes plaintext (fragment 4)
+
+ 00000000: 00 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff ff 0a 00 00 00 0a 00 00
+ 00000010: ff 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 02 29 00 00 08 00 00 40
+ 00000020: 0a 00 00 00 08 00 00 40 0b 00
+
+ (141) Encrypts plaintext using K3r as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
+ (fragment 4)
+
+ 00000000: 81 fa 5d 7a 67 13 b7 93 f4 2c 01 b8 d1 02 8c ab
+ 00000010: 8e 80 47 25 6e c5 69 e3 0c 84 cd 35 9a 0f 7a cc
+ 00000020: 0a 92 7a 74 77 dc ba 60 ac 4a
+
+ (142) Computes ICV using K3r as K_msg (fragment 4)
+
+ 00000000: 6c 27 70 e0 8a 82 bd 4b
+
+ (143) Composes IV (fragment 4)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03
+
+ (144) Sends message fragment (1), peer receives message fragment (1)
+
+ 10.111.10.171:54295<-10.111.15.45:4500 [548]
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97
+ 00000010: de 11 9d 1e 35 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 20
+ 00000020: 24 00 02 04 00 01 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+ 00000030: 73 f2 45 3e fb 6a 26 28 67 7d 14 e3 bf 0a 90 74
+ 00000040: c9 95 6a 40 d5 4e a6 77 cf 58 2e b8 ae 52 f4 25
+ 00000050: f7 82 bc d9 f0 74 4e 38 51 90 07 70 27 f8 01 27
+ 00000060: 17 da f4 ba bc 1e 02 0b 73 ec cc 7b f8 b3 68 64
+ 00000070: f3 48 65 33 3b ab ac 19 11 d3 f7 78 b4 f8 d1 3f
+ 00000080: 6d 46 93 37 a6 58 48 3a 7d d0 8a 9c 84 ab de eb
+ 00000090: 0d d4 8d ab 75 20 18 27 42 fe 24 ee ba c4 a4 6e
+ 000000A0: db 80 68 3c 84 7e d6 36 50 d4 1b 1c bc c5 9f 18
+ 000000B0: 41 af 48 52 c1 7e a2 f0 e4 bc 0a 3c 64 34 81 ca
+ 000000C0: df 96 ba 51 91 f1 06 13 b2 04 23 c8 70 3a ea 64
+ 000000D0: e9 ea ce c2 db aa 12 90 28 0c 9d f9 89 02 a8 5e
+ 000000E0: 66 f5 6e ce dd e7 2c 4a 45 54 de 5e b8 76 73 67
+ 000000F0: 2d a3 a0 52 91 74 ff b7 eb e4 ea d1 2b 04 76 f7
+ 00000100: ff 4b 1c b8 45 7e 8a 60 e7 1e ec 13 3e c1 d8 d0
+ 00000110: 78 be f4 79 77 06 ce 76 04 64 ad e7 10 19 65 2b
+ 00000120: 45 66 23 3d 34 7a 40 6c 36 c0 20 73 47 d8 7a b6
+ 00000130: 2b 0f 56 04 7a c0 41 ab 18 23 11 78 7f 4f d4 f5
+ 00000140: 7d 2e 06 a5 15 ee de 84 9f c2 0a f6 c8 1e a4 30
+ 00000150: 70 42 07 c8 5e 97 08 69 12 27 58 c3 c7 b7 db 7a
+ 00000160: 8c 50 3a 3a 5c bf 3a a7 73 40 8f 9c 18 f6 13 77
+ 00000170: 63 c1 60 06 36 a1 43 ab 88 08 c9 cc ad f2 88 ca
+ 00000180: 84 bd 45 e0 8e d9 27 a3 07 f2 63 79 b0 a8 62 9f
+ 00000190: 5f ba dc a7 f5 54 b8 4f 4f bb 1e a2 16 4b 4f 2d
+ 000001A0: d4 08 4e 45 c2 c0 60 3b 73 df 6b 35 3a fe 38 2e
+ 000001B0: 25 75 fc be 89 4c d2 7a 9c 1f b4 41 a6 31 d3 3d
+ 000001C0: 39 a6 d1 c4 47 94 44 30 3a 2b 23 22 ba c0 a9 df
+ 000001D0: dc 1c 90 8d d1 e8 13 f9 08 68 5a 94 98 c7 3f 47
+ 000001E0: 77 79 b5 bb fb 22 56 4b 38 55 48 e8 14 d4 01 eb
+ 000001F0: 63 e9 17 da 24 69 9a 6d dc 1e 25 06 ef 77 10 46
+ 00000200: ad 99 ad 9c 54 4f d4 68 64 ea 05 1d ef 29 ea 0e
+ 00000210: 3c 1c 7e 27 cf 59 76 42 5b 02 04 b8 96 08 17 ed
+ 00000220: ef 01 4d a0
+
+ (145) Sends message fragment (2), peer receives message fragment (2)
+
+ 10.111.10.171:54295<-10.111.15.45:4500 [548]
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97
+ 00000010: de 11 9d 1e 35 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 20
+ 00000020: 00 00 02 04 00 02 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01
+ 00000030: b1 c8 8d ae d9 6f 91 7e 5a 6a 2d 8c e0 d6 28 3e
+ 00000040: 10 59 46 12 a1 1e fa 53 c3 58 ec 4e a9 a5 92 0c
+ 00000050: fa 5e cf a3 33 4a 8b b7 56 66 54 d9 9c 64 2e b6
+ 00000060: 4d 03 3f 77 a8 17 88 f6 23 e0 2e 56 a6 a2 4c 4d
+ 00000070: 6e e3 09 8a 2e 31 a1 85 1c cf ce 95 e7 73 93 8e
+ 00000080: 9c 5a 7b 3b 49 75 96 69 d4 b0 46 f7 74 b0 0d 5d
+ 00000090: 91 3b 6d 2b a4 46 cc 5c d9 a8 38 c0 6b ad 73 35
+ 000000A0: 09 aa c7 4c 91 8a 84 1c dd 3f e1 44 f7 c5 9c 61
+ 000000B0: 0e b7 03 6b 84 cc 8e 93 5b d5 f6 7e 71 3a f4 2c
+ 000000C0: 98 14 ad 47 e3 c3 70 dc e3 3e c0 a5 e0 e4 6d 01
+ 000000D0: 44 78 7f e3 b7 6c cb 44 29 59 96 e9 84 6d 9d 18
+ 000000E0: 89 66 16 07 46 a4 cd 72 a6 0e bd d2 a7 1c f7 21
+ 000000F0: f0 d1 67 a9 0d 1c c4 c8 30 bd 26 1f 53 7d 61 8b
+ 00000100: ad 6f ef 3e 2c 6e 7e 69 b9 92 72 66 65 b6 06 22
+ 00000110: 49 a1 a8 f1 2f 02 dd 41 bf f5 d1 f6 7c 93 25 6e
+ 00000120: 52 8b a9 3f b5 40 97 02 bb 7c f5 33 a6 60 52 b8
+ 00000130: 4f 3e 80 6c 38 cf e4 8b 15 fd d0 66 75 c1 bf bb
+ 00000140: ac fc ac 01 c3 11 8e 0b 3e e9 2c 1b 5d b9 9f f6
+ 00000150: 2f d7 e8 3c c7 a9 25 8b aa 6e c6 49 6d 6f df 42
+ 00000160: 53 0e ba 70 54 d2 af c3 4d 02 e1 48 42 c5 45 53
+ 00000170: 25 59 66 25 c7 3c c6 c2 e2 99 e2 bb 47 a4 a7 be
+ 00000180: 6c 92 0d 3b 4c ab 6e d7 23 05 ea 73 07 62 e8 c0
+ 00000190: e8 78 47 af 54 c8 67 8f dd 32 59 8d 87 ac 42 0e
+ 000001A0: 21 15 c4 f7 66 dc 02 cf 55 c2 e3 4d 8e 91 7a fd
+ 000001B0: d7 4d 20 b0 6f 67 78 58 08 9c ba 05 8b b0 9c 16
+ 000001C0: 20 51 75 12 96 e2 d5 28 ac 3e 50 26 04 6f 59 02
+ 000001D0: 28 e0 ec 2c da 70 4a 9c 15 5a 2e 52 01 e6 4e 1e
+ 000001E0: 10 6d 8d 5d 2a 81 69 0e 54 d0 5e 13 82 82 84 9a
+ 000001F0: ac a6 0e 69 4e 17 5c c1 8a 71 f8 b4 80 3b 7a e5
+ 00000200: b8 1f 09 4a 02 14 24 07 af 6a 14 d9 52 8e da d3
+ 00000210: 58 23 68 71 27 b2 9a 03 09 f7 80 51 89 bd 07 12
+ 00000220: fc 3f 15 8d
+
+ (146) Sends message fragment (3), peer receives message fragment (3)
+
+ 10.111.10.171:54295<-10.111.15.45:4500 [548]
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97
+ 00000010: de 11 9d 1e 35 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 20
+ 00000020: 00 00 02 04 00 03 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02
+ 00000030: 08 e0 86 04 1f 8a c9 b5 68 cd 96 10 ab 59 99 3a
+ 00000040: 54 7b a9 fa d7 60 46 ec c3 bf bd 8f fa 03 ed 41
+ 00000050: 49 13 ca 8c 9c b8 0c df 81 25 e2 30 ca cb 65 b9
+ 00000060: 16 55 8e 67 f4 b3 7c b8 91 66 76 7c a4 15 98 a3
+ 00000070: 3a c9 48 64 e4 ce 9f 64 67 5d bb 7c 03 23 9e c9
+ 00000080: 81 3f da 48 ee a6 2a d8 fb ac 77 ce ed c2 a4 d9
+ 00000090: 24 d3 71 99 fc 71 2b 6c 10 d3 c3 4b b5 37 e2 55
+ 000000A0: 5f d5 ee c0 d6 ff 66 15 8c e5 63 26 96 cd 3f 49
+ 000000B0: 2b da 51 94 55 6e 2e e5 2e d1 b4 91 81 50 85 8a
+ 000000C0: 84 bd fe 52 ec ce 1b 6b bd 7d 12 b4 de a5 88 c4
+ 000000D0: b7 78 d3 3d 2d 46 ef dc 0f 91 43 be 08 7a ba fa
+ 000000E0: b3 2a c2 17 30 99 79 ae 3a 00 f0 3f 47 4a 9b 11
+ 000000F0: 4d 7b 1b 28 0a 44 5b 1a af 35 4d c3 2b 6b be 11
+ 00000100: 89 03 b9 de cf 37 57 53 1e a4 f3 3f ce 52 a6 d8
+ 00000110: 7e 9d d8 d4 2f 9f f5 8f 3c c6 cb 2f 56 e0 97 2d
+ 00000120: b2 0e 10 66 3b 3c ec 34 50 99 a3 7d 42 ec 96 eb
+ 00000130: 87 48 72 2c 0a 6d af b9 4b 62 48 89 36 01 21 ab
+ 00000140: 8e 79 10 54 9c 83 ab a9 8a 6c 37 c7 ac dc a1 7e
+ 00000150: 41 0e 58 de da aa 95 71 fb 34 50 8a ef 37 0b c4
+ 00000160: 56 ca 4b 2c 75 b7 c7 d9 74 22 c2 65 1a e4 4f 94
+ 00000170: 20 f6 e9 44 f1 69 5e d2 18 d3 30 2e 85 74 25 be
+ 00000180: 2a 88 e2 ce fe 75 ca fa 25 f9 2e 88 8c ed 6f dd
+ 00000190: c3 c5 53 2e da 14 fd 96 28 4a b7 81 3a b3 d5 44
+ 000001A0: 26 e2 84 21 f2 5c 0a ed bf c4 34 1c a4 91 5e f3
+ 000001B0: 47 ef 0e 9e fb ee 34 95 5d 21 72 43 c9 63 af b4
+ 000001C0: f2 98 4a 36 57 77 fc e7 57 52 b2 4d bf 34 2a 98
+ 000001D0: ea 70 cd d7 a9 da 4c 0d 19 05 d4 1e dd 36 c7 c4
+ 000001E0: 31 54 18 2a ef 0e 30 44 97 31 15 57 cd d4 88 52
+ 000001F0: 4e 42 c8 20 89 8d 35 7b 8e 03 96 b4 74 fb ec 3b
+ 00000200: 14 c2 64 49 92 f2 1f 3d ff 84 2d 92 4c b9 01 04
+ 00000210: 3d 0a 2a 28 33 de 43 44 6b cf 79 0e 7d 7c 57 8f
+ 00000220: 91 d0 c9 eb
+
+ (147) Sends message fragment (4), peer receives message fragment (4)
+
+ 10.111.10.171:54295<-10.111.15.45:4500 [98]
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97
+ 00000010: de 11 9d 1e 35 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 5e
+ 00000020: 00 00 00 42 00 04 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03
+ 00000030: 81 fa 5d 7a 67 13 b7 93 f4 2c 01 b8 d1 02 8c ab
+ 00000040: 8e 80 47 25 6e c5 69 e3 0c 84 cd 35 9a 0f 7a cc
+ 00000050: 0a 92 7a 74 77 dc ba 60 ac 4a 6c 27 70 e0 8a 82
+ 00000060: bd 4b
+
+ Initiator's actions:
+
+ (148) Extracts IV from message (fragment 1)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+
+ (149) Computes K1r (i1 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 35 e4 d1 65 2e ec 24 89 e4 c9 58 b1 b9 05 1b 83
+ 00000010: 62 5e 65 d7 61 73 d9 1c cf 84 60 64 b9 f2 e7 51
+
+ (150) Computes K2r (i2 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 86 8c 89 42 41 d7 30 da 1a 4a 67 69 3a 32 4d 38
+ 00000010: f3 54 02 9f f7 7d b7 bc 5a ee 3b 60 2b 3f 05 56
+
+ (151) Computes K3r (i3 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 31 95 e8 c6 67 af 42 d8 ce f1 e8 99 c6 8b 2a c2
+ 00000010: 29 aa 3d c0 ff 18 5f 3d 79 4a 14 6b 9f ac d0 bb
+
+ (152) Composes MGM nonce (fragment 1)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 a5 bb 18 2f
+
+ (153) Extracts ICV from message (fragment 1)
+
+ 00000000: 96 08 17 ed ef 01 4d a0
+
+ (154) Extracts AAD from message (fragment 1)
+
+ 00000000: 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97 de 11 9d 1e
+ 00000010: 35 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 20 24 00 02 04
+ 00000020: 00 01 00 04
+
+ (155) Extracts ciphertext from message (fragment 1)
+
+ 00000000: 73 f2 45 3e fb 6a 26 28 67 7d 14 e3 bf 0a 90 74
+ 00000010: c9 95 6a 40 d5 4e a6 77 cf 58 2e b8 ae 52 f4 25
+ 00000020: f7 82 bc d9 f0 74 4e 38 51 90 07 70 27 f8 01 27
+ 00000030: 17 da f4 ba bc 1e 02 0b 73 ec cc 7b f8 b3 68 64
+ 00000040: f3 48 65 33 3b ab ac 19 11 d3 f7 78 b4 f8 d1 3f
+ 00000050: 6d 46 93 37 a6 58 48 3a 7d d0 8a 9c 84 ab de eb
+ 00000060: 0d d4 8d ab 75 20 18 27 42 fe 24 ee ba c4 a4 6e
+ 00000070: db 80 68 3c 84 7e d6 36 50 d4 1b 1c bc c5 9f 18
+ 00000080: 41 af 48 52 c1 7e a2 f0 e4 bc 0a 3c 64 34 81 ca
+ 00000090: df 96 ba 51 91 f1 06 13 b2 04 23 c8 70 3a ea 64
+ 000000A0: e9 ea ce c2 db aa 12 90 28 0c 9d f9 89 02 a8 5e
+ 000000B0: 66 f5 6e ce dd e7 2c 4a 45 54 de 5e b8 76 73 67
+ 000000C0: 2d a3 a0 52 91 74 ff b7 eb e4 ea d1 2b 04 76 f7
+ 000000D0: ff 4b 1c b8 45 7e 8a 60 e7 1e ec 13 3e c1 d8 d0
+ 000000E0: 78 be f4 79 77 06 ce 76 04 64 ad e7 10 19 65 2b
+ 000000F0: 45 66 23 3d 34 7a 40 6c 36 c0 20 73 47 d8 7a b6
+ 00000100: 2b 0f 56 04 7a c0 41 ab 18 23 11 78 7f 4f d4 f5
+ 00000110: 7d 2e 06 a5 15 ee de 84 9f c2 0a f6 c8 1e a4 30
+ 00000120: 70 42 07 c8 5e 97 08 69 12 27 58 c3 c7 b7 db 7a
+ 00000130: 8c 50 3a 3a 5c bf 3a a7 73 40 8f 9c 18 f6 13 77
+ 00000140: 63 c1 60 06 36 a1 43 ab 88 08 c9 cc ad f2 88 ca
+ 00000150: 84 bd 45 e0 8e d9 27 a3 07 f2 63 79 b0 a8 62 9f
+ 00000160: 5f ba dc a7 f5 54 b8 4f 4f bb 1e a2 16 4b 4f 2d
+ 00000170: d4 08 4e 45 c2 c0 60 3b 73 df 6b 35 3a fe 38 2e
+ 00000180: 25 75 fc be 89 4c d2 7a 9c 1f b4 41 a6 31 d3 3d
+ 00000190: 39 a6 d1 c4 47 94 44 30 3a 2b 23 22 ba c0 a9 df
+ 000001A0: dc 1c 90 8d d1 e8 13 f9 08 68 5a 94 98 c7 3f 47
+ 000001B0: 77 79 b5 bb fb 22 56 4b 38 55 48 e8 14 d4 01 eb
+ 000001C0: 63 e9 17 da 24 69 9a 6d dc 1e 25 06 ef 77 10 46
+ 000001D0: ad 99 ad 9c 54 4f d4 68 64 ea 05 1d ef 29 ea 0e
+ 000001E0: 3c 1c 7e 27 cf 59 76 42 5b 02 04 b8
+
+ (156) Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3r as K_msg,
+ resulting in plaintext (fragment 1)
+
+ 00000000: 25 00 00 4e 09 00 00 00 30 44 31 20 30 1e 06 03
+ 00000010: 55 04 03 13 17 49 4b 45 20 49 6e 74 65 72 6f 70
+ 00000020: 20 54 65 73 74 20 53 65 72 76 65 72 31 13 30 11
+ 00000030: 06 03 55 04 0a 13 0a 45 4c 56 49 53 2d 50 4c 55
+ 00000040: 53 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 52 55 27 00
+ 00000050: 04 bb 04 30 82 04 b2 30 82 04 5f a0 03 02 01 02
+ 00000060: 02 13 7c 00 03 d9 02 ec f9 34 3e c8 aa d6 59 00
+ 00000070: 01 00 03 d9 02 30 0a 06 08 2a 85 03 07 01 01 03
+ 00000080: 02 30 82 01 0a 31 18 30 16 06 05 2a 85 03 64 01
+ 00000090: 12 0d 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 30 31 32 33 31
+ 000000A0: 1a 30 18 06 08 2a 85 03 03 81 03 01 01 12 0c 30
+ 000000B0: 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 30 31 2f 30 2d 06
+ 000000C0: 03 55 04 09 0c 26 d1 83 d0 bb 2e 20 d0 a1 d1 83
+ 000000D0: d1 89 d1 91 d0 b2 d1 81 d0 ba d0 b8 d0 b9 20 d0
+ 000000E0: b2 d0 b0 d0 bb 20 d0 b4 2e 20 31 38 31 0b 30 09
+ 000000F0: 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 52 55 31 19 30 17 06 03 55
+ 00000100: 04 08 0c 10 d0 b3 2e 20 d0 9c d0 be d1 81 d0 ba
+ 00000110: d0 b2 d0 b0 31 15 30 13 06 03 55 04 07 0c 0c d0
+ 00000120: 9c d0 be d1 81 d0 ba d0 b2 d0 b0 31 25 30 23 06
+ 00000130: 03 55 04 0a 0c 1c d0 9e d0 9e d0 9e 20 22 d0 9a
+ 00000140: d0 a0 d0 98 d0 9f d0 a2 d0 9e 2d d0 9f d0 a0 d0
+ 00000150: 9e 22 31 3b 30 39 06 03 55 04 03 0c 32 d0 a2 d0
+ 00000160: b5 d1 81 d1 82 d0 be d0 b2 d1 8b d0 b9 20 d0 a3
+ 00000170: d0 a6 20 d0 9e d0 9e d0 9e 20 22 d0 9a d0 a0 d0
+ 00000180: 98 d0 9f d0 a2 d0 9e 2d d0 9f d0 a0 d0 9e 22 30
+ 00000190: 1e 17 0d 32 31 30 39 33 30 31 33 32 34 30 36 5a
+ 000001A0: 17 0d 32 31 31 32 33 30 31 33 33 34 30 36 5a 30
+ 000001B0: 44 31 20 30 1e 06 03 55 04 03 13 17 49 4b 45 20
+ 000001C0: 49 6e 74 65 72 6f 70 20 54 65 73 74 20 53 65 72
+ 000001D0: 76 65 72 31 13 30 11 06 03 55 04 0a 13 0a 45 4c
+ 000001E0: 56 49 53 2d 50 4c 55 53 31 0b 30 00
+
+ (157) Extracts IV from message (fragment 2)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01
+
+ (158) Uses previously computed key K3r
+
+ 00000000: 31 95 e8 c6 67 af 42 d8 ce f1 e8 99 c6 8b 2a c2
+ 00000010: 29 aa 3d c0 ff 18 5f 3d 79 4a 14 6b 9f ac d0 bb
+
+ (159) Composes MGM nonce (fragment 2)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 01 a5 bb 18 2f
+
+ (160) Extracts ICV from message (fragment 2)
+
+ 00000000: 89 bd 07 12 fc 3f 15 8d
+
+ (161) Extracts AAD from message (fragment 2)
+
+ 00000000: 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97 de 11 9d 1e
+ 00000010: 35 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 20 00 00 02 04
+ 00000020: 00 02 00 04
+
+ (162) Extracts ciphertext from message (fragment 2)
+
+ 00000000: b1 c8 8d ae d9 6f 91 7e 5a 6a 2d 8c e0 d6 28 3e
+ 00000010: 10 59 46 12 a1 1e fa 53 c3 58 ec 4e a9 a5 92 0c
+ 00000020: fa 5e cf a3 33 4a 8b b7 56 66 54 d9 9c 64 2e b6
+ 00000030: 4d 03 3f 77 a8 17 88 f6 23 e0 2e 56 a6 a2 4c 4d
+ 00000040: 6e e3 09 8a 2e 31 a1 85 1c cf ce 95 e7 73 93 8e
+ 00000050: 9c 5a 7b 3b 49 75 96 69 d4 b0 46 f7 74 b0 0d 5d
+ 00000060: 91 3b 6d 2b a4 46 cc 5c d9 a8 38 c0 6b ad 73 35
+ 00000070: 09 aa c7 4c 91 8a 84 1c dd 3f e1 44 f7 c5 9c 61
+ 00000080: 0e b7 03 6b 84 cc 8e 93 5b d5 f6 7e 71 3a f4 2c
+ 00000090: 98 14 ad 47 e3 c3 70 dc e3 3e c0 a5 e0 e4 6d 01
+ 000000A0: 44 78 7f e3 b7 6c cb 44 29 59 96 e9 84 6d 9d 18
+ 000000B0: 89 66 16 07 46 a4 cd 72 a6 0e bd d2 a7 1c f7 21
+ 000000C0: f0 d1 67 a9 0d 1c c4 c8 30 bd 26 1f 53 7d 61 8b
+ 000000D0: ad 6f ef 3e 2c 6e 7e 69 b9 92 72 66 65 b6 06 22
+ 000000E0: 49 a1 a8 f1 2f 02 dd 41 bf f5 d1 f6 7c 93 25 6e
+ 000000F0: 52 8b a9 3f b5 40 97 02 bb 7c f5 33 a6 60 52 b8
+ 00000100: 4f 3e 80 6c 38 cf e4 8b 15 fd d0 66 75 c1 bf bb
+ 00000110: ac fc ac 01 c3 11 8e 0b 3e e9 2c 1b 5d b9 9f f6
+ 00000120: 2f d7 e8 3c c7 a9 25 8b aa 6e c6 49 6d 6f df 42
+ 00000130: 53 0e ba 70 54 d2 af c3 4d 02 e1 48 42 c5 45 53
+ 00000140: 25 59 66 25 c7 3c c6 c2 e2 99 e2 bb 47 a4 a7 be
+ 00000150: 6c 92 0d 3b 4c ab 6e d7 23 05 ea 73 07 62 e8 c0
+ 00000160: e8 78 47 af 54 c8 67 8f dd 32 59 8d 87 ac 42 0e
+ 00000170: 21 15 c4 f7 66 dc 02 cf 55 c2 e3 4d 8e 91 7a fd
+ 00000180: d7 4d 20 b0 6f 67 78 58 08 9c ba 05 8b b0 9c 16
+ 00000190: 20 51 75 12 96 e2 d5 28 ac 3e 50 26 04 6f 59 02
+ 000001A0: 28 e0 ec 2c da 70 4a 9c 15 5a 2e 52 01 e6 4e 1e
+ 000001B0: 10 6d 8d 5d 2a 81 69 0e 54 d0 5e 13 82 82 84 9a
+ 000001C0: ac a6 0e 69 4e 17 5c c1 8a 71 f8 b4 80 3b 7a e5
+ 000001D0: b8 1f 09 4a 02 14 24 07 af 6a 14 d9 52 8e da d3
+ 000001E0: 58 23 68 71 27 b2 9a 03 09 f7 80 51
+
+ (163) Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3r as K_msg,
+ resulting in plaintext (fragment 2)
+
+ 00000000: 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 52 55 30 66 30 1f 06 08
+ 00000010: 2a 85 03 07 01 01 01 01 30 13 06 07 2a 85 03 02
+ 00000020: 02 24 00 06 08 2a 85 03 07 01 01 02 02 03 43 00
+ 00000030: 04 40 5b b3 14 3e f4 70 c1 70 d7 f3 27 25 d8 53
+ 00000040: 7c e6 de 6d 8c 29 f6 b2 32 64 56 dc b1 77 f2 3d
+ 00000050: fa f4 2a 5c f3 74 86 7f 04 72 51 c1 cf b3 43 36
+ 00000060: f5 95 a2 af 05 47 57 1a 55 c0 78 a4 9d 64 26 b8
+ 00000070: 61 14 a3 82 02 59 30 82 02 55 30 0e 06 03 55 1d
+ 00000080: 0f 01 01 ff 04 04 03 02 05 a0 30 13 06 03 55 1d
+ 00000090: 25 04 0c 30 0a 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 03 11 30
+ 000000A0: 1d 06 03 55 1d 0e 04 16 04 14 e0 d3 f0 09 ad ce
+ 000000B0: 6c a5 47 ba 9b f7 a6 a5 1b 06 14 ba a5 43 30 1f
+ 000000C0: 06 03 55 1d 23 04 18 30 16 80 14 9b 85 5e fb 81
+ 000000D0: dc 4d 59 07 51 63 cf be df da 2c 7f c9 44 3c 30
+ 000000E0: 82 01 0f 06 03 55 1d 1f 04 82 01 06 30 82 01 02
+ 000000F0: 30 81 ff a0 81 fc a0 81 f9 86 81 b5 68 74 74 70
+ 00000100: 3a 2f 2f 74 65 73 74 67 6f 73 74 32 30 31 32 2e
+ 00000110: 63 72 79 70 74 6f 70 72 6f 2e 72 75 2f 43 65 72
+ 00000120: 74 45 6e 72 6f 6c 6c 2f 21 30 34 32 32 21 30 34
+ 00000130: 33 35 21 30 34 34 31 21 30 34 34 32 21 30 34 33
+ 00000140: 65 21 30 34 33 32 21 30 34 34 62 21 30 34 33 39
+ 00000150: 25 32 30 21 30 34 32 33 21 30 34 32 36 25 32 30
+ 00000160: 21 30 34 31 65 21 30 34 31 65 21 30 34 31 65 25
+ 00000170: 32 30 21 30 30 32 32 21 30 34 31 61 21 30 34 32
+ 00000180: 30 21 30 34 31 38 21 30 34 31 66 21 30 34 32 32
+ 00000190: 21 30 34 31 65 2d 21 30 34 31 66 21 30 34 32 30
+ 000001A0: 21 30 34 31 65 21 30 30 32 32 28 31 29 2e 63 72
+ 000001B0: 6c 86 3f 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 74 65 73 74 67 6f
+ 000001C0: 73 74 32 30 31 32 2e 63 72 79 70 74 6f 70 72 6f
+ 000001D0: 2e 72 75 2f 43 65 72 74 45 6e 72 6f 6c 6c 2f 74
+ 000001E0: 65 73 74 67 6f 73 74 32 30 31 32 00
+
+ (164) Extracts IV from message (fragment 3)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02
+
+ (165) Uses previously computed key K3r
+
+ 00000000: 31 95 e8 c6 67 af 42 d8 ce f1 e8 99 c6 8b 2a c2
+ 00000010: 29 aa 3d c0 ff 18 5f 3d 79 4a 14 6b 9f ac d0 bb
+
+ (166) Composes MGM nonce (fragment 3)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 02 a5 bb 18 2f
+
+ (167) Extracts ICV from message (fragment 3)
+
+ 00000000: 7d 7c 57 8f 91 d0 c9 eb
+
+ (168) Extracts AAD from message (fragment 3)
+
+ 00000000: 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97 de 11 9d 1e
+ 00000010: 35 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 20 00 00 02 04
+ 00000020: 00 03 00 04
+
+ (169) Extracts ciphertext from message (fragment 3)
+
+ 00000000: 08 e0 86 04 1f 8a c9 b5 68 cd 96 10 ab 59 99 3a
+ 00000010: 54 7b a9 fa d7 60 46 ec c3 bf bd 8f fa 03 ed 41
+ 00000020: 49 13 ca 8c 9c b8 0c df 81 25 e2 30 ca cb 65 b9
+ 00000030: 16 55 8e 67 f4 b3 7c b8 91 66 76 7c a4 15 98 a3
+ 00000040: 3a c9 48 64 e4 ce 9f 64 67 5d bb 7c 03 23 9e c9
+ 00000050: 81 3f da 48 ee a6 2a d8 fb ac 77 ce ed c2 a4 d9
+ 00000060: 24 d3 71 99 fc 71 2b 6c 10 d3 c3 4b b5 37 e2 55
+ 00000070: 5f d5 ee c0 d6 ff 66 15 8c e5 63 26 96 cd 3f 49
+ 00000080: 2b da 51 94 55 6e 2e e5 2e d1 b4 91 81 50 85 8a
+ 00000090: 84 bd fe 52 ec ce 1b 6b bd 7d 12 b4 de a5 88 c4
+ 000000A0: b7 78 d3 3d 2d 46 ef dc 0f 91 43 be 08 7a ba fa
+ 000000B0: b3 2a c2 17 30 99 79 ae 3a 00 f0 3f 47 4a 9b 11
+ 000000C0: 4d 7b 1b 28 0a 44 5b 1a af 35 4d c3 2b 6b be 11
+ 000000D0: 89 03 b9 de cf 37 57 53 1e a4 f3 3f ce 52 a6 d8
+ 000000E0: 7e 9d d8 d4 2f 9f f5 8f 3c c6 cb 2f 56 e0 97 2d
+ 000000F0: b2 0e 10 66 3b 3c ec 34 50 99 a3 7d 42 ec 96 eb
+ 00000100: 87 48 72 2c 0a 6d af b9 4b 62 48 89 36 01 21 ab
+ 00000110: 8e 79 10 54 9c 83 ab a9 8a 6c 37 c7 ac dc a1 7e
+ 00000120: 41 0e 58 de da aa 95 71 fb 34 50 8a ef 37 0b c4
+ 00000130: 56 ca 4b 2c 75 b7 c7 d9 74 22 c2 65 1a e4 4f 94
+ 00000140: 20 f6 e9 44 f1 69 5e d2 18 d3 30 2e 85 74 25 be
+ 00000150: 2a 88 e2 ce fe 75 ca fa 25 f9 2e 88 8c ed 6f dd
+ 00000160: c3 c5 53 2e da 14 fd 96 28 4a b7 81 3a b3 d5 44
+ 00000170: 26 e2 84 21 f2 5c 0a ed bf c4 34 1c a4 91 5e f3
+ 00000180: 47 ef 0e 9e fb ee 34 95 5d 21 72 43 c9 63 af b4
+ 00000190: f2 98 4a 36 57 77 fc e7 57 52 b2 4d bf 34 2a 98
+ 000001A0: ea 70 cd d7 a9 da 4c 0d 19 05 d4 1e dd 36 c7 c4
+ 000001B0: 31 54 18 2a ef 0e 30 44 97 31 15 57 cd d4 88 52
+ 000001C0: 4e 42 c8 20 89 8d 35 7b 8e 03 96 b4 74 fb ec 3b
+ 000001D0: 14 c2 64 49 92 f2 1f 3d ff 84 2d 92 4c b9 01 04
+ 000001E0: 3d 0a 2a 28 33 de 43 44 6b cf 79 0e
+
+ (170) Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3r as K_msg,
+ resulting in plaintext (fragment 3)
+
+ 00000000: 28 31 29 2e 63 72 6c 30 81 da 06 08 2b 06 01 05
+ 00000010: 05 07 01 01 04 81 cd 30 81 ca 30 44 06 08 2b 06
+ 00000020: 01 05 05 07 30 02 86 38 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 74
+ 00000030: 65 73 74 67 6f 73 74 32 30 31 32 2e 63 72 79 70
+ 00000040: 74 6f 70 72 6f 2e 72 75 2f 43 65 72 74 45 6e 72
+ 00000050: 6f 6c 6c 2f 72 6f 6f 74 32 30 31 38 2e 63 72 74
+ 00000060: 30 3f 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 86 33 68 74
+ 00000070: 74 70 3a 2f 2f 74 65 73 74 67 6f 73 74 32 30 31
+ 00000080: 32 2e 63 72 79 70 74 6f 70 72 6f 2e 72 75 2f 6f
+ 00000090: 63 73 70 32 30 31 32 67 2f 6f 63 73 70 2e 73 72
+ 000000A0: 66 30 41 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 86 35 68
+ 000000B0: 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 74 65 73 74 67 6f 73 74 32 30
+ 000000C0: 31 32 2e 63 72 79 70 74 6f 70 72 6f 2e 72 75 2f
+ 000000D0: 6f 63 73 70 32 30 31 32 67 73 74 2f 6f 63 73 70
+ 000000E0: 2e 73 72 66 30 0a 06 08 2a 85 03 07 01 01 03 02
+ 000000F0: 03 41 00 a5 39 5f ca 48 e1 c2 93 c1 e0 8a 64 74
+ 00000100: 0f 6b 86 a2 15 9b 46 29 d0 42 71 4f ce e7 52 d7
+ 00000110: d7 3d aa 47 ce cf 52 63 8f 26 b2 17 5f ad 96 57
+ 00000120: 76 ea 5f d0 87 bb 12 29 e4 06 0e e1 5f fd 59 81
+ 00000130: fb 34 6d 29 00 00 55 0e 00 00 00 0c 30 0a 06 08
+ 00000140: 2a 85 03 07 01 01 03 02 c8 40 af f7 46 6f 7b eb
+ 00000150: d2 b9 1c 5a 80 d0 00 93 c2 5e 44 16 40 47 f7 8e
+ 00000160: 61 9c da a5 16 94 83 c5 68 5f e8 4d 03 e7 c2 cd
+ 00000170: 08 07 b8 f3 46 66 6d 05 76 c0 d5 e7 60 1d 59 49
+ 00000180: 09 45 52 c4 95 a7 5a d3 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 00
+ 00000190: 2f 00 00 0c 00 00 40 01 00 00 00 40 21 00 00 10
+ 000001A0: 02 00 00 00 00 01 00 04 0a 01 01 03 2c 00 00 20
+ 000001B0: 00 00 00 1c 01 03 04 02 34 ff 8a 25 03 00 00 08
+ 000001C0: 01 00 00 21 00 00 00 08 05 00 00 00 2d 00 00 18
+ 000001D0: 01 00 00 00 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff ff 0a 01 01 03
+ 000001E0: 0a 01 01 03 29 00 00 18 01 00 00 00
+
+ (171) Extracts IV from message (fragment 4)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03
+
+ (172) Uses previously computed key K3r
+
+ 00000000: 31 95 e8 c6 67 af 42 d8 ce f1 e8 99 c6 8b 2a c2
+ 00000010: 29 aa 3d c0 ff 18 5f 3d 79 4a 14 6b 9f ac d0 bb
+
+ (173) Composes MGM nonce (fragment 4)
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 03 a5 bb 18 2f
+
+ (174) Extracts ICV from message (fragment 4)
+
+ 00000000: 6c 27 70 e0 8a 82 bd 4b
+
+ (175) Extracts AAD from message (fragment 4)
+
+ 00000000: 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97 de 11 9d 1e
+ 00000010: 35 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 5e 00 00 00 42
+ 00000020: 00 04 00 04
+
+ (176) Extracts ciphertext from message (fragment 4)
+
+ 00000000: 81 fa 5d 7a 67 13 b7 93 f4 2c 01 b8 d1 02 8c ab
+ 00000010: 8e 80 47 25 6e c5 69 e3 0c 84 cd 35 9a 0f 7a cc
+ 00000020: 0a 92 7a 74 77 dc ba 60 ac 4a
+
+ (177) Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3r as K_msg,
+ resulting in plaintext (fragment 4)
+
+ 00000000: 00 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff ff 0a 00 00 00 0a 00 00
+ 00000010: ff 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 02 29 00 00 08 00 00 40
+ 00000020: 0a 00 00 00 08 00 00 40 0b 00
+
+ (178) Reassembles message from received fragments and parses it
+
+ IKE SA Auth
+ #9280E0822E758778.DB578D97DE119D1E.00000001 IKEv2 R=>I[1563]
+ 4*EF[...]->E[1535]{
+ IDr[78](DN){CN=IKE Interop Test Server,O=ELVIS-PLUS,C=RU},
+ CERT[1211](X.509 Cert){308204...FB346D},
+ AUTH[85](Sig){id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-256[12]:
+ C840AF...A75AD3},
+ N[8](INITIAL_CONTACT),
+ N[12](SET_WINDOW_SIZE){64},
+ CP[16](REPLY){IP4.Address[4]=10.1.1.3},
+ SA[32]{
+ P[28](#1:ESP:34FF8A25:2#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE,
+ ESN=Off}},
+ TSi[24](1#){10.1.1.3},
+ TSr[24](1#){10.0.0.0-10.0.0.255},
+ N[8](ADDITIONAL_TS_POSSIBLE),
+ N[8](ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+ N[8](NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)}
+
+ (179) Computes prf(SK_pr, IDr)
+
+ 00000000: 7d c8 6a 33 12 02 5c 21 1f ab dc 83 0b 01 a5 27
+ 00000010: 82 a2 f2 1f 64 c6 e9 5e 0e c0 4c e5 d9 11 8d 8e
+ 00000020: b9 5c ef fa b0 a3 37 75 94 20 7c e4 60 60 ed 9d
+ 00000030: fa 5e cb 7e e7 79 05 ab fb 51 1b 03 a8 2c c5 6a
+
+ (180) Uses responder's public key
+
+ 00000000: 5B B3 14 3E F4 70 C1 70 D7 F3 27 25 D8 53 7C E6
+ 00000010: DE 6D 8C 29 F6 B2 32 64 56 DC B1 77 F2 3D FA F4
+ 00000020: 2A 5C F3 74 86 7F 04 72 51 C1 CF B3 43 36 F5 95
+ 00000030: A2 AF 05 47 57 1A 55 C0 78 A4 9D 64 26 B8 61 14
+
+ (181) Verifies signature from AUTH payload using algorithm id-tc26-
+ signwithdigest-gost3410-12-256
+
+ 00000000: c8 40 af f7 46 6f 7b eb d2 b9 1c 5a 80 d0 00 93
+ 00000010: c2 5e 44 16 40 47 f7 8e 61 9c da a5 16 94 83 c5
+ 00000020: 68 5f e8 4d 03 e7 c2 cd 08 07 b8 f3 46 66 6d 05
+ 00000030: 76 c0 d5 e7 60 1d 59 49 09 45 52 c4 95 a7 5a d3
+
+ (182) Computes keys for ESP SAs
+
+ 00000000: 98 ab 7e db 78 03 a1 e6 c7 21 43 ee b9 7f 5f 56
+ 00000010: 45 bb 51 cd 0b b7 09 a1 af 34 02 87 69 4d 7b a0
+ 00000020: 1d 14 a0 cc
+ 00000000: 70 31 4d 57 94 8b 7e 5c 6f 29 d5 68 1b fd 43 2b
+ 00000010: 19 4e 64 6d 8f 8a 8d 1e ba 72 24 59 c7 0c de 81
+ 00000020: e2 04 84 af
+
+A.2.2. Sub-Scenario 2: IKE SA Rekeying Using the CREATE_CHILD_SA
+ Exchange
+
+ Initiator Responder
+
+ HDR, SK {SAi, Ni, KEi [,N+]} --->
+ <--- HDR, SK {SAr, Nr, KEr [,N+]}
+
+ Initiator's actions:
+
+ (1) Generates random SPIi for new IKE SA
+
+ 00000000: fd d9 35 89 50 d5 db 22
+
+ (2) Generates random IKE nonce Ni
+
+ 00000000: 2e 98 99 76 4a 67 1e d9 17 27 32 f2 6d 3a 93 3c
+ 00000010: 7f 21 2b 0e 59 90 cf 2a 7f 85 53 c5 ed 8a ec 37
+
+ (3) Generates ephemeral private key
+
+ 00000000: 29 2c 72 52 e0 6c fd 39 1d 55 04 e9 cf af 82 29
+ 00000010: 89 09 ff 1c ab b2 dd a5 88 f0 34 fd 2c 57 d2 28
+
+ (4) Computes public key
+
+ 00000000: 13 78 88 b1 0f 09 65 43 94 53 b7 26 5d 2a 8b 29
+ 00000010: 5f a9 d6 73 a2 d0 64 6c 98 0f 02 44 d5 5a 1d 13
+ 00000020: 7b b4 4d 18 81 c3 ee 48 35 18 a7 71 ce 4f fa 45
+ 00000030: b0 e9 74 63 37 58 32 7c ff a5 e4 98 b5 02 d4 ef
+
+ (5) Creates message
+
+ Create Child SA
+ #9280E0822E758778.DB578D97DE119D1E.00000002 IKEv2 R<-I[213]
+ E[185]{
+ SA[44]{
+ P[40](#1:IKE:FDD9358950D5DB22:3#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE,
+ PRF=PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512,
+ KE=GOST3410_2012_256}},
+ NONCE[36]{2E9899...8AEC37},
+ KE[72](GOST3410_2012_256){137888...02D4EF},
+ N[12](SET_WINDOW_SIZE){4}}
+
+ (6) Computes K3i (i3 = 1)
+
+ 00000000: da 26 f7 b5 4c 4c 97 23 3f e2 cb 53 23 82 1b 2a
+ 00000010: 40 3c 95 e1 78 2a 8f 3d 1b 0f a4 d3 ab c3 98 3d
+
+ (7) Composes MGM nonce
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 b4 e1 3e 23
+
+ (8) Composes AAD
+
+ 00000000: 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97 de 11 9d 1e
+ 00000010: 2e 20 24 08 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 d5 21 00 00 b9
+
+ (9) Composes plaintext
+
+ 00000000: 28 00 00 2c 00 00 00 28 01 01 08 03 fd d9 35 89
+ 00000010: 50 d5 db 22 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 21 03 00 00 08
+ 00000020: 02 00 00 09 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 21 22 00 00 24
+ 00000030: 2e 98 99 76 4a 67 1e d9 17 27 32 f2 6d 3a 93 3c
+ 00000040: 7f 21 2b 0e 59 90 cf 2a 7f 85 53 c5 ed 8a ec 37
+ 00000050: 29 00 00 48 00 21 00 00 13 78 88 b1 0f 09 65 43
+ 00000060: 94 53 b7 26 5d 2a 8b 29 5f a9 d6 73 a2 d0 64 6c
+ 00000070: 98 0f 02 44 d5 5a 1d 13 7b b4 4d 18 81 c3 ee 48
+ 00000080: 35 18 a7 71 ce 4f fa 45 b0 e9 74 63 37 58 32 7c
+ 00000090: ff a5 e4 98 b5 02 d4 ef 00 00 00 0c 00 00 40 01
+ 000000A0: 00 00 00 04 00
+
+ (10) Encrypts plaintext using K3i as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
+
+ 00000000: f4 d1 2b 1e 51 65 d1 0b 7f 38 c6 16 3f 6e 5e f7
+ 00000010: e0 48 24 15 6a 45 50 51 1a 6e fb 1c 1d b8 52 75
+ 00000020: 80 56 e4 da fb e5 fe 42 08 71 79 99 ef 17 7a 03
+ 00000030: fc c3 c6 b0 15 a5 72 a4 1b de e2 b5 e6 46 56 73
+ 00000040: 3f 78 57 9e 6b b4 05 4c 86 91 c3 61 00 2d 9b 89
+ 00000050: c0 0c 8b 11 0b 41 e7 92 16 7f f8 f6 5d ef f4 29
+ 00000060: 27 ef ba 8c 5f 30 fd a9 12 4c 5f 8d e9 39 97 48
+ 00000070: 9a e1 6a 91 01 c7 8c 94 aa 3b 89 bb 54 40 3b f1
+ 00000080: 8d 2b 0e 75 d8 f6 98 d2 74 e4 b7 2f f5 ac a0 41
+ 00000090: df 73 7f 1c 37 18 b9 79 8e 9d 6f ea e5 8a b6 9f
+ 000000A0: 35 d9 d4 b3 cd
+
+ (11) Computes ICV using K3i as K_msg
+
+ 00000000: 49 96 ac 4c 3f c4 fc 1d
+
+ (12) Composes IV
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00
+
+ (13) Sends message, peer receives message
+
+ 10.111.10.171:54295->10.111.15.45:4500 [217]
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97
+ 00000010: de 11 9d 1e 2e 20 24 08 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 d5
+ 00000020: 21 00 00 b9 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 f4 d1 2b 1e
+ 00000030: 51 65 d1 0b 7f 38 c6 16 3f 6e 5e f7 e0 48 24 15
+ 00000040: 6a 45 50 51 1a 6e fb 1c 1d b8 52 75 80 56 e4 da
+ 00000050: fb e5 fe 42 08 71 79 99 ef 17 7a 03 fc c3 c6 b0
+ 00000060: 15 a5 72 a4 1b de e2 b5 e6 46 56 73 3f 78 57 9e
+ 00000070: 6b b4 05 4c 86 91 c3 61 00 2d 9b 89 c0 0c 8b 11
+ 00000080: 0b 41 e7 92 16 7f f8 f6 5d ef f4 29 27 ef ba 8c
+ 00000090: 5f 30 fd a9 12 4c 5f 8d e9 39 97 48 9a e1 6a 91
+ 000000A0: 01 c7 8c 94 aa 3b 89 bb 54 40 3b f1 8d 2b 0e 75
+ 000000B0: d8 f6 98 d2 74 e4 b7 2f f5 ac a0 41 df 73 7f 1c
+ 000000C0: 37 18 b9 79 8e 9d 6f ea e5 8a b6 9f 35 d9 d4 b3
+ 000000D0: cd 49 96 ac 4c 3f c4 fc 1d
+
+ Responder's actions:
+
+ (14) Extracts IV from message
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00
+
+ (15) Computes K3i (I = 1)
+
+ 00000000: da 26 f7 b5 4c 4c 97 23 3f e2 cb 53 23 82 1b 2a
+ 00000010: 40 3c 95 e1 78 2a 8f 3d 1b 0f a4 d3 ab c3 98 3d
+
+ (16) Composes MGM nonce
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 b4 e1 3e 23
+
+ (17) Extracts ICV from message
+
+ 00000000: 49 96 ac 4c 3f c4 fc 1d
+
+ (18) Extracts AAD from message
+
+ 00000000: 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97 de 11 9d 1e
+ 00000010: 2e 20 24 08 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 d5 21 00 00 b9
+
+ (19) Extracts ciphertext from message
+
+ 00000000: f4 d1 2b 1e 51 65 d1 0b 7f 38 c6 16 3f 6e 5e f7
+ 00000010: e0 48 24 15 6a 45 50 51 1a 6e fb 1c 1d b8 52 75
+ 00000020: 80 56 e4 da fb e5 fe 42 08 71 79 99 ef 17 7a 03
+ 00000030: fc c3 c6 b0 15 a5 72 a4 1b de e2 b5 e6 46 56 73
+ 00000040: 3f 78 57 9e 6b b4 05 4c 86 91 c3 61 00 2d 9b 89
+ 00000050: c0 0c 8b 11 0b 41 e7 92 16 7f f8 f6 5d ef f4 29
+ 00000060: 27 ef ba 8c 5f 30 fd a9 12 4c 5f 8d e9 39 97 48
+ 00000070: 9a e1 6a 91 01 c7 8c 94 aa 3b 89 bb 54 40 3b f1
+ 00000080: 8d 2b 0e 75 d8 f6 98 d2 74 e4 b7 2f f5 ac a0 41
+ 00000090: df 73 7f 1c 37 18 b9 79 8e 9d 6f ea e5 8a b6 9f
+ 000000A0: 35 d9 d4 b3 cd
+
+ (20) Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3i as K_msg,
+ resulting in plaintext
+
+ 00000000: 28 00 00 2c 00 00 00 28 01 01 08 03 fd d9 35 89
+ 00000010: 50 d5 db 22 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 21 03 00 00 08
+ 00000020: 02 00 00 09 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 21 22 00 00 24
+ 00000030: 2e 98 99 76 4a 67 1e d9 17 27 32 f2 6d 3a 93 3c
+ 00000040: 7f 21 2b 0e 59 90 cf 2a 7f 85 53 c5 ed 8a ec 37
+ 00000050: 29 00 00 48 00 21 00 00 13 78 88 b1 0f 09 65 43
+ 00000060: 94 53 b7 26 5d 2a 8b 29 5f a9 d6 73 a2 d0 64 6c
+ 00000070: 98 0f 02 44 d5 5a 1d 13 7b b4 4d 18 81 c3 ee 48
+ 00000080: 35 18 a7 71 ce 4f fa 45 b0 e9 74 63 37 58 32 7c
+ 00000090: ff a5 e4 98 b5 02 d4 ef 00 00 00 0c 00 00 40 01
+ 000000A0: 00 00 00 04 00
+
+ (21) Parses received message
+
+ Create Child SA
+ #9280E0822E758778.DB578D97DE119D1E.00000002 IKEv2 I->R[213]
+ E[185]{
+ SA[44]{
+ P[40](#1:IKE:FDD9358950D5DB22:3#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE,
+ PRF=PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512,
+ KE=GOST3410_2012_256}},
+ NONCE[36]{2E9899...8AEC37},
+ KE[72](GOST3410_2012_256){137888...02D4EF},
+ N[12](SET_WINDOW_SIZE){4}}
+
+ (22) Generates random SPIr for new IKE SA
+
+ 00000000: 81 27 5d a2 98 90 1a 06
+
+ (23) Generates random IKE nonce Nr
+
+ 00000000: cf 8e 80 0f 84 c9 d8 50 06 a4 02 b5 19 2a 0f a0
+ 00000010: d7 f4 db 70 ca f1 2b 9b 02 ce 92 8d 97 20 43 96
+
+ (24) Generates ephemeral private key
+
+ 00000000: af 9a 62 7d d3 b8 23 d2 49 7f f9 0a 9d f2 55 8c
+ 00000010: ae 9c 48 ad f5 a4 ee a5 f6 24 5f 48 3c f8 42 0d
+
+ (25) Computes public key
+
+ 00000000: ba 9c bb 8d c4 51 68 1c 63 50 9c 5b 78 c2 93 be
+ 00000010: 52 9b 7a a0 6b 14 1e 0f 52 d4 a3 0e 71 d7 5b 4c
+ 00000020: aa 58 af 26 21 d9 b2 92 87 1c d9 7a 89 6f c2 7d
+ 00000030: 7d 95 96 39 a2 36 37 8f f4 b9 1d 2f a8 b7 f5 c9
+
+ (26) Computes shared key
+
+ 00000000: ae 27 a3 df af 7d bb ad f4 5c 19 64 c9 27 eb 41
+ 00000010: 14 fc 1a f8 25 cc 93 50 a2 64 5f 04 67 0a 74 cb
+
+ (27) Computes SKEYSEED for new SA
+
+ 00000000: 31 2b 7f 6a 24 23 8f ed b6 ac 40 a7 58 2e 28 54
+ 00000010: 47 53 76 20 05 c7 00 c8 87 c1 51 68 93 40 7e 2d
+ 00000020: ed 14 c4 78 9a f4 12 e7 f0 19 4d 4d 12 45 0d 42
+ 00000030: e4 b2 29 e5 57 b4 90 cc cf d5 94 84 b4 59 5e b9
+
+ (28) Computes SK_d for new SA
+
+ 00000000: 38 ec b5 1c 33 77 f8 62 29 9f 00 d9 98 5f a4 4c
+ 00000010: ea c7 97 31 01 b9 39 ce 16 2c 1c 30 dd 53 d8 97
+ 00000020: 48 49 cd ca 82 7b 57 55 e4 5a 33 1c 80 e6 b9 1f
+ 00000030: 2c 80 b2 e5 48 8a 23 9d 8e 42 32 ed 4f 63 3a f1
+
+ (29) Computes SK_ei for new SA
+
+ 00000000: 17 1c 7c 08 bd 1a 3d 50 58 e1 13 58 9d c4 21 c6
+ 00000010: a3 44 e5 c1 f5 14 e8 22 ed 94 03 2e 76 47 b1 8d
+ 00000020: 2b 3d 3b 2f
+
+ (30) Computes SK_er for new SA
+
+ 00000000: 4a a9 b7 36 1d 2c e1 e0 dc 55 b6 45 0a 38 f1 9a
+ 00000010: 83 cb 8f 79 57 5e df d8 5f 5e 22 a8 36 bd 3a 4a
+ 00000020: d2 f6 27 21
+
+ (31) Creates message
+
+ Create Child SA
+ #9280E0822E758778.DB578D97DE119D1E.00000002 IKEv2 I<=R[213]
+ E[185]{
+ SA[44]{
+ P[40](#1:IKE:81275DA298901A06:3#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE,
+ PRF=PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512,
+ KE=GOST3410_2012_256}},
+ NONCE[36]{CF8E80...204396},
+ KE[72](GOST3410_2012_256){BA9CBB...B7F5C9},
+ N[12](SET_WINDOW_SIZE){64}}
+
+ (32) Computes K3r (i3 = 1)
+
+ 00000000: 9b 6c de 40 b4 63 c4 85 db 09 b7 24 f4 60 fa d0
+ 00000010: 1f d3 f3 fa e9 f8 e9 03 0c 34 cb 51 52 51 5b 56
+
+ (33) Composes MGM nonce
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 a5 bb 18 2f
+
+ (34) Composes AAD
+
+ 00000000: 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97 de 11 9d 1e
+ 00000010: 2e 20 24 20 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 d5 21 00 00 b9
+
+ (35) Composes plaintext
+
+ 00000000: 28 00 00 2c 00 00 00 28 01 01 08 03 81 27 5d a2
+ 00000010: 98 90 1a 06 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 21 03 00 00 08
+ 00000020: 02 00 00 09 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 21 22 00 00 24
+ 00000030: cf 8e 80 0f 84 c9 d8 50 06 a4 02 b5 19 2a 0f a0
+ 00000040: d7 f4 db 70 ca f1 2b 9b 02 ce 92 8d 97 20 43 96
+ 00000050: 29 00 00 48 00 21 00 00 ba 9c bb 8d c4 51 68 1c
+ 00000060: 63 50 9c 5b 78 c2 93 be 52 9b 7a a0 6b 14 1e 0f
+ 00000070: 52 d4 a3 0e 71 d7 5b 4c aa 58 af 26 21 d9 b2 92
+ 00000080: 87 1c d9 7a 89 6f c2 7d 7d 95 96 39 a2 36 37 8f
+ 00000090: f4 b9 1d 2f a8 b7 f5 c9 00 00 00 0c 00 00 40 01
+ 000000A0: 00 00 00 40 00
+
+ (36) Encrypts plaintext using K3r as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
+
+ 00000000: 6e a0 bc 5e 58 16 91 db 1f e0 22 20 b6 75 fd e6
+ 00000010: e0 01 a7 86 0c 9c a6 77 ef cd f6 be e4 c8 31 18
+ 00000020: c7 7f 68 58 d8 85 75 6c 1d 4a 0e 66 09 86 7c 84
+ 00000030: 30 a7 2e f0 26 2b 19 da c5 25 34 5b 19 f0 97 86
+ 00000040: 54 ca 08 92 65 9c e3 92 4d ee 92 0a a0 86 d7 3f
+ 00000050: 4d d9 f2 7e 32 48 b3 9f ea 54 d2 96 99 42 30 6b
+ 00000060: b0 b4 fe 5d 4a fc 8c ff 54 f6 2f b7 ca 7b 83 01
+ 00000070: 36 85 57 78 b3 74 84 72 9d 94 2f 6f ae 4e 26 bb
+ 00000080: 6e 06 84 2b ac f8 99 29 31 ad 7b dc db c0 0f 19
+ 00000090: 5f 06 42 2d 90 d2 6a 05 8a 41 ee 24 e2 49 a5 b6
+ 000000A0: 61 e8 cb 46 3c
+
+ (37) Computes ICV using K3r as K_msg
+
+ 00000000: dc c4 ca 6d 07 cf 31 a8
+
+ (38) Composes IV
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00
+
+ (39) Sends message, peer receives message
+
+ 10.111.10.171:54295<-10.111.15.45:4500 [217]
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97
+ 00000010: de 11 9d 1e 2e 20 24 20 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 d5
+ 00000020: 21 00 00 b9 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 6e a0 bc 5e
+ 00000030: 58 16 91 db 1f e0 22 20 b6 75 fd e6 e0 01 a7 86
+ 00000040: 0c 9c a6 77 ef cd f6 be e4 c8 31 18 c7 7f 68 58
+ 00000050: d8 85 75 6c 1d 4a 0e 66 09 86 7c 84 30 a7 2e f0
+ 00000060: 26 2b 19 da c5 25 34 5b 19 f0 97 86 54 ca 08 92
+ 00000070: 65 9c e3 92 4d ee 92 0a a0 86 d7 3f 4d d9 f2 7e
+ 00000080: 32 48 b3 9f ea 54 d2 96 99 42 30 6b b0 b4 fe 5d
+ 00000090: 4a fc 8c ff 54 f6 2f b7 ca 7b 83 01 36 85 57 78
+ 000000A0: b3 74 84 72 9d 94 2f 6f ae 4e 26 bb 6e 06 84 2b
+ 000000B0: ac f8 99 29 31 ad 7b dc db c0 0f 19 5f 06 42 2d
+ 000000C0: 90 d2 6a 05 8a 41 ee 24 e2 49 a5 b6 61 e8 cb 46
+ 000000D0: 3c dc c4 ca 6d 07 cf 31 a8
+
+ Initiator's actions:
+
+ (40) Extracts IV from message
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00
+
+ (41) Computes K3r (i3 = 1)
+
+ 00000000: 9b 6c de 40 b4 63 c4 85 db 09 b7 24 f4 60 fa d0
+ 00000010: 1f d3 f3 fa e9 f8 e9 03 0c 34 cb 51 52 51 5b 56
+
+ (42) Composes MGM nonce
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 a5 bb 18 2f
+
+ (43) Extracts ICV from message
+
+ 00000000: dc c4 ca 6d 07 cf 31 a8
+
+ (44) Extracts AAD from message
+
+ 00000000: 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97 de 11 9d 1e
+ 00000010: 2e 20 24 20 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 d5 21 00 00 b9
+
+ (45) Extracts ciphertext from message
+
+ 00000000: 6e a0 bc 5e 58 16 91 db 1f e0 22 20 b6 75 fd e6
+ 00000010: e0 01 a7 86 0c 9c a6 77 ef cd f6 be e4 c8 31 18
+ 00000020: c7 7f 68 58 d8 85 75 6c 1d 4a 0e 66 09 86 7c 84
+ 00000030: 30 a7 2e f0 26 2b 19 da c5 25 34 5b 19 f0 97 86
+ 00000040: 54 ca 08 92 65 9c e3 92 4d ee 92 0a a0 86 d7 3f
+ 00000050: 4d d9 f2 7e 32 48 b3 9f ea 54 d2 96 99 42 30 6b
+ 00000060: b0 b4 fe 5d 4a fc 8c ff 54 f6 2f b7 ca 7b 83 01
+ 00000070: 36 85 57 78 b3 74 84 72 9d 94 2f 6f ae 4e 26 bb
+ 00000080: 6e 06 84 2b ac f8 99 29 31 ad 7b dc db c0 0f 19
+ 00000090: 5f 06 42 2d 90 d2 6a 05 8a 41 ee 24 e2 49 a5 b6
+ 000000A0: 61 e8 cb 46 3c
+
+ (46) Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3r as K_msg,
+ resulting in plaintext
+
+ 00000000: 28 00 00 2c 00 00 00 28 01 01 08 03 81 27 5d a2
+ 00000010: 98 90 1a 06 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 21 03 00 00 08
+ 00000020: 02 00 00 09 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 21 22 00 00 24
+ 00000030: cf 8e 80 0f 84 c9 d8 50 06 a4 02 b5 19 2a 0f a0
+ 00000040: d7 f4 db 70 ca f1 2b 9b 02 ce 92 8d 97 20 43 96
+ 00000050: 29 00 00 48 00 21 00 00 ba 9c bb 8d c4 51 68 1c
+ 00000060: 63 50 9c 5b 78 c2 93 be 52 9b 7a a0 6b 14 1e 0f
+ 00000070: 52 d4 a3 0e 71 d7 5b 4c aa 58 af 26 21 d9 b2 92
+ 00000080: 87 1c d9 7a 89 6f c2 7d 7d 95 96 39 a2 36 37 8f
+ 00000090: f4 b9 1d 2f a8 b7 f5 c9 00 00 00 0c 00 00 40 01
+ 000000A0: 00 00 00 40 00
+
+ (47) Parses received message
+
+ Create Child SA
+ #9280E0822E758778.DB578D97DE119D1E.00000002 IKEv2 R=>I[213]
+ E[185]{
+ SA[44]{
+ P[40](#1:IKE:81275DA298901A06:3#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE,
+ PRF=PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512,
+ KE=GOST3410_2012_256}},
+ NONCE[36]{CF8E80...204396},
+ KE[72](GOST3410_2012_256){BA9CBB...B7F5C9},
+ N[12](SET_WINDOW_SIZE){64}}
+
+ (48) Computes shared key
+
+ 00000000: ae 27 a3 df af 7d bb ad f4 5c 19 64 c9 27 eb 41
+ 00000010: 14 fc 1a f8 25 cc 93 50 a2 64 5f 04 67 0a 74 cb
+
+ (49) Computes SKEYSEED for new SA
+
+ 00000000: 31 2b 7f 6a 24 23 8f ed b6 ac 40 a7 58 2e 28 54
+ 00000010: 47 53 76 20 05 c7 00 c8 87 c1 51 68 93 40 7e 2d
+ 00000020: ed 14 c4 78 9a f4 12 e7 f0 19 4d 4d 12 45 0d 42
+ 00000030: e4 b2 29 e5 57 b4 90 cc cf d5 94 84 b4 59 5e b9
+
+ (50) Computes SK_d for new SA
+
+ 00000000: 38 ec b5 1c 33 77 f8 62 29 9f 00 d9 98 5f a4 4c
+ 00000010: ea c7 97 31 01 b9 39 ce 16 2c 1c 30 dd 53 d8 97
+ 00000020: 48 49 cd ca 82 7b 57 55 e4 5a 33 1c 80 e6 b9 1f
+ 00000030: 2c 80 b2 e5 48 8a 23 9d 8e 42 32 ed 4f 63 3a f1
+
+ (51) Computes SK_ei for new SA
+
+ 00000000: 17 1c 7c 08 bd 1a 3d 50 58 e1 13 58 9d c4 21 c6
+ 00000010: a3 44 e5 c1 f5 14 e8 22 ed 94 03 2e 76 47 b1 8d
+ 00000020: 2b 3d 3b 2f
+
+ (52) Computes SK_er for new SA
+
+ 00000000: 4a a9 b7 36 1d 2c e1 e0 dc 55 b6 45 0a 38 f1 9a
+ 00000010: 83 cb 8f 79 57 5e df d8 5f 5e 22 a8 36 bd 3a 4a
+ 00000020: d2 f6 27 21
+
+A.2.3. Sub-Scenario 3: ESP SAs Rekeying without PFS Using the
+ CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange
+
+ Initiator Responder
+
+ HDR, SK {N(REKEY_SA), SAi, Ni,
+ TSi, TSr [,N+]} --->
+ <--- HDR, SK {SAr, Nr,
+ TSi, TSr [,N+]}
+
+ Initiator's actions:
+
+ (1) Generates random IKE nonce Ni
+
+ 00000000: b5 48 18 7d 30 d8 ea 49 20 d0 9d 42 de 9e 91 ce
+ 00000010: b3 1c 41 85 37 66 d8 9e c6 a6 f8 08 93 f4 48 23
+
+ (2) Computes K1i (i1 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 28 b9 3c 93 ea db 74 38 64 87 8a 28 8d e0 38 5c
+ 00000010: 14 cb ea 9f 67 58 a6 ee e2 2d c9 37 bb c8 41 69
+
+ (3) Computes K2i (i2 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 75 11 35 65 e6 29 70 2a d9 7d 38 a8 3a e3 aa 8a
+ 00000010: 9e fb 80 af f5 52 71 be c9 c6 c3 4b 4b 40 96 44
+
+ (4) Computes K3i (i3 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 45 6f 03 f7 ad 75 eb e9 52 b8 8f 0d e8 36 47 69
+ 00000010: 4d 2e f2 ba 15 e6 8c 89 1c 99 62 64 fb 0e 70 0a
+
+ (5) Selects SPI for new incoming ESP SA
+
+ 00000000: 9a 8c 6a 9b
+
+ (6) Creates message
+
+ Create Child SA
+ #FDD9358950D5DB22.81275DA298901A06.00000000 IKEv2 R<-I[193]
+ E[165]{
+ N[12](ESP:6C0CA570:REKEY_SA),
+ SA[32]{
+ P[28](#1:ESP:9A8C6A9B:2#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE,
+ ESN=Off}},
+ NONCE[36]{B54818...F44823},
+ TSi[24](1#){10.1.1.3},
+ TSr[24](1#){10.0.0.0-10.0.0.255},
+ N[8](ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+ N[8](NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)}
+
+ (7) Composes MGM nonce
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 2b 3d 3b 2f
+
+ (8) Composes AAD
+
+ 00000000: fd d9 35 89 50 d5 db 22 81 27 5d a2 98 90 1a 06
+ 00000010: 2e 20 24 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c1 29 00 00 a5
+
+ (9) Composes plaintext
+
+ 00000000: 21 00 00 0c 03 04 40 09 6c 0c a5 70 28 00 00 20
+ 00000010: 00 00 00 1c 01 03 04 02 9a 8c 6a 9b 03 00 00 08
+ 00000020: 01 00 00 21 00 00 00 08 05 00 00 00 2c 00 00 24
+ 00000030: b5 48 18 7d 30 d8 ea 49 20 d0 9d 42 de 9e 91 ce
+ 00000040: b3 1c 41 85 37 66 d8 9e c6 a6 f8 08 93 f4 48 23
+ 00000050: 2d 00 00 18 01 00 00 00 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff ff
+ 00000060: 0a 01 01 03 0a 01 01 03 29 00 00 18 01 00 00 00
+ 00000070: 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff ff 0a 00 00 00 0a 00 00 ff
+ 00000080: 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 0a 00 00 00 08 00 00 40 0b
+ 00000090: 00
+
+ (10) Encrypts plaintext using K3i as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
+
+ 00000000: 47 71 bb 57 2a 1a 58 a6 44 cb 60 d4 8e 5c cc 0a
+ 00000010: b9 34 0f 34 80 cf a2 38 54 f6 70 3b 98 4e 8f 9f
+ 00000020: 3b 5c 5a 04 06 dc e9 d4 d3 54 c6 4d 73 09 10 c5
+ 00000030: 4e 26 c4 27 fd cb 54 e1 cf e0 fd b4 9f f8 00 41
+ 00000040: 41 c8 58 b2 c9 3a d8 e0 19 40 a3 89 ee 26 d4 84
+ 00000050: 69 e9 52 68 d5 e1 ee f0 89 6e d3 95 34 62 ad 2e
+ 00000060: e6 77 17 b8 6c 25 52 7f d8 70 9c 36 0b c8 1d 1a
+ 00000070: 43 50 82 2a be b6 31 ff 2f 43 11 f7 d0 60 bf 62
+ 00000080: b9 08 c3 09 a3 78 fb 5e 76 57 91 5d 48 1c aa d2
+ 00000090: a3
+
+ (11) Computes ICV using K3i as K_msg
+
+ 00000000: b3 05 bd 43 2f 87 0c 3f
+
+ (12) Composes IV
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+
+ (13) Sends message, peer receives message
+
+ 10.111.10.171:54295->10.111.15.45:4500 [197]
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 fd d9 35 89 50 d5 db 22 81 27 5d a2
+ 00000010: 98 90 1a 06 2e 20 24 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c1
+ 00000020: 29 00 00 a5 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 47 71 bb 57
+ 00000030: 2a 1a 58 a6 44 cb 60 d4 8e 5c cc 0a b9 34 0f 34
+ 00000040: 80 cf a2 38 54 f6 70 3b 98 4e 8f 9f 3b 5c 5a 04
+ 00000050: 06 dc e9 d4 d3 54 c6 4d 73 09 10 c5 4e 26 c4 27
+ 00000060: fd cb 54 e1 cf e0 fd b4 9f f8 00 41 41 c8 58 b2
+ 00000070: c9 3a d8 e0 19 40 a3 89 ee 26 d4 84 69 e9 52 68
+ 00000080: d5 e1 ee f0 89 6e d3 95 34 62 ad 2e e6 77 17 b8
+ 00000090: 6c 25 52 7f d8 70 9c 36 0b c8 1d 1a 43 50 82 2a
+ 000000A0: be b6 31 ff 2f 43 11 f7 d0 60 bf 62 b9 08 c3 09
+ 000000B0: a3 78 fb 5e 76 57 91 5d 48 1c aa d2 a3 b3 05 bd
+ 000000C0: 43 2f 87 0c 3f
+
+ Responder's actions:
+
+ (14) Extracts IV from message
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+
+ (15) Computes K1i (i1 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 28 b9 3c 93 ea db 74 38 64 87 8a 28 8d e0 38 5c
+ 00000010: 14 cb ea 9f 67 58 a6 ee e2 2d c9 37 bb c8 41 69
+
+ (16) Computes K2i (i2 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 75 11 35 65 e6 29 70 2a d9 7d 38 a8 3a e3 aa 8a
+ 00000010: 9e fb 80 af f5 52 71 be c9 c6 c3 4b 4b 40 96 44
+
+ (17) Computes K3i (i3 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 45 6f 03 f7 ad 75 eb e9 52 b8 8f 0d e8 36 47 69
+ 00000010: 4d 2e f2 ba 15 e6 8c 89 1c 99 62 64 fb 0e 70 0a
+
+ (18) Composes MGM nonce
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 2b 3d 3b 2f
+
+ (19) Extracts ICV from message
+
+ 00000000: b3 05 bd 43 2f 87 0c 3f
+
+ (20) Extracts AAD from message
+
+ 00000000: fd d9 35 89 50 d5 db 22 81 27 5d a2 98 90 1a 06
+ 00000010: 2e 20 24 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c1 29 00 00 a5
+
+ (21) Extracts ciphertext from message
+
+ 00000000: 47 71 bb 57 2a 1a 58 a6 44 cb 60 d4 8e 5c cc 0a
+ 00000010: b9 34 0f 34 80 cf a2 38 54 f6 70 3b 98 4e 8f 9f
+ 00000020: 3b 5c 5a 04 06 dc e9 d4 d3 54 c6 4d 73 09 10 c5
+ 00000030: 4e 26 c4 27 fd cb 54 e1 cf e0 fd b4 9f f8 00 41
+ 00000040: 41 c8 58 b2 c9 3a d8 e0 19 40 a3 89 ee 26 d4 84
+ 00000050: 69 e9 52 68 d5 e1 ee f0 89 6e d3 95 34 62 ad 2e
+ 00000060: e6 77 17 b8 6c 25 52 7f d8 70 9c 36 0b c8 1d 1a
+ 00000070: 43 50 82 2a be b6 31 ff 2f 43 11 f7 d0 60 bf 62
+ 00000080: b9 08 c3 09 a3 78 fb 5e 76 57 91 5d 48 1c aa d2
+ 00000090: a3
+
+ (22) Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3i as K_msg,
+ resulting in plaintext
+
+ 00000000: 21 00 00 0c 03 04 40 09 6c 0c a5 70 28 00 00 20
+ 00000010: 00 00 00 1c 01 03 04 02 9a 8c 6a 9b 03 00 00 08
+ 00000020: 01 00 00 21 00 00 00 08 05 00 00 00 2c 00 00 24
+ 00000030: b5 48 18 7d 30 d8 ea 49 20 d0 9d 42 de 9e 91 ce
+ 00000040: b3 1c 41 85 37 66 d8 9e c6 a6 f8 08 93 f4 48 23
+ 00000050: 2d 00 00 18 01 00 00 00 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff ff
+ 00000060: 0a 01 01 03 0a 01 01 03 29 00 00 18 01 00 00 00
+ 00000070: 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff ff 0a 00 00 00 0a 00 00 ff
+ 00000080: 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 0a 00 00 00 08 00 00 40 0b
+ 00000090: 00
+
+ (23) Parses received message
+
+ Create Child SA
+ #FDD9358950D5DB22.81275DA298901A06.00000000 IKEv2 I->R[193]
+ E[165]{
+ N[12](ESP:6C0CA570:REKEY_SA),
+ SA[32]{
+ P[28](#1:ESP:9A8C6A9B:2#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE,
+ ESN=Off}},
+ NONCE[36]{B54818...F44823},
+ TSi[24](1#){10.1.1.3},
+ TSr[24](1#){10.0.0.0-10.0.0.255},
+ N[8](ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+ N[8](NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)}
+
+ (24) Generates random IKE nonce Nr
+
+ 00000000: 41 5e a7 ed 7e 65 d3 ff d3 df ed 5f b5 c8 5c 60
+ 00000010: 2b 9c 15 14 eb 52 97 b7 fc aa 33 c4 64 f3 58 06
+
+ (25) Selects SPI for new incoming ESP SA
+
+ 00000000: 15 4f 35 39
+
+ (26) Computes keys for new ESP SAs
+
+ 00000000: 6a b6 a0 e7 05 d3 51 16 6f 4f b9 d6 59 0c c8 69
+ 00000010: 43 70 cf 6f 0d 32 c3 7d 92 75 00 4b 0a 76 35 67
+ 00000020: 64 0e 3a fe
+ 00000000: 65 56 1c 79 27 cb c6 d6 8c b8 69 0f 40 00 d2 0a
+ 00000010: c1 49 1c d1 86 88 db 88 ae f3 be 82 0c 71 b7 c9
+ 00000020: 6c cf a3 64
+
+ (27) Creates message
+
+ Create Child SA
+ #FDD9358950D5DB22.81275DA298901A06.00000000 IKEv2 I<=R[189]
+ E[161]{
+ SA[32]{
+ P[28](#1:ESP:154F3539:2#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE,
+ ESN=Off}},
+ NONCE[36]{415EA7...F35806},
+ TSi[24](1#){10.1.1.3},
+ TSr[24](1#){10.0.0.0-10.0.0.255},
+ N[8](ADDITIONAL_TS_POSSIBLE),
+ N[8](ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+ N[8](NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)}
+
+ (28) Computes K1r (i1 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 51 49 d5 41 33 91 45 dd ff 04 f5 05 e5 21 39 f2
+ 00000010: 3a 71 1c 18 ef 39 94 1e dd 0c 70 e5 14 12 43 0a
+
+ (29) Computes K2r (i2 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 0e 8f 21 54 2e fc 81 79 57 c4 c9 0b e0 25 9a 59
+ 00000010: 29 26 0e 86 20 bf d4 e6 00 32 23 43 ae f0 11 52
+
+ (30) Computes K3r (i3 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 92 b8 b2 d6 7a 2d e1 db 5f e1 39 d2 57 c8 24 5f
+ 00000010: f6 22 54 de fc 35 35 c9 24 cf a5 4a e1 5d 75 71
+
+ (31) Composes MGM nonce
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 d2 f6 27 21
+
+ (32) Composes AAD
+
+ 00000000: fd d9 35 89 50 d5 db 22 81 27 5d a2 98 90 1a 06
+ 00000010: 2e 20 24 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 bd 21 00 00 a1
+
+ (33) Composes plaintext
+
+ 00000000: 28 00 00 20 00 00 00 1c 01 03 04 02 15 4f 35 39
+ 00000010: 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 21 00 00 00 08 05 00 00 00
+ 00000020: 2c 00 00 24 41 5e a7 ed 7e 65 d3 ff d3 df ed 5f
+ 00000030: b5 c8 5c 60 2b 9c 15 14 eb 52 97 b7 fc aa 33 c4
+ 00000040: 64 f3 58 06 2d 00 00 18 01 00 00 00 07 00 00 10
+ 00000050: 00 00 ff ff 0a 01 01 03 0a 01 01 03 29 00 00 18
+ 00000060: 01 00 00 00 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff ff 0a 00 00 00
+ 00000070: 0a 00 00 ff 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 02 29 00 00 08
+ 00000080: 00 00 40 0a 00 00 00 08 00 00 40 0b 00
+
+ (34) Encrypts plaintext using K3r as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
+
+ 00000000: 2e c7 13 73 4c cc f8 f3 51 71 ac d9 7a 6e 20 2c
+ 00000010: 68 70 bb 8f 82 42 2a 14 e3 8d b8 25 10 9a 1f b6
+ 00000020: 51 ef c5 35 50 bf df 8e 96 bc 94 5a e5 4d 9d 99
+ 00000030: 9a 14 36 d1 4b 61 e1 de 3b 0d 12 94 e5 72 60 00
+ 00000040: 0f 9d dd 2b e1 97 25 4c 5c ee 48 2e 9b f7 d8 9e
+ 00000050: 01 6b 1d 92 b7 c1 7f 16 81 0f e2 e3 14 1c 27 c7
+ 00000060: 35 e9 e3 fd b8 fc 5d fb a2 ee 2f f9 b0 17 39 ca
+ 00000070: f1 2e b1 13 99 e0 da 10 1a 29 74 26 a3 63 ce 09
+ 00000080: 6a f9 1b 67 4a f2 fb 0f 17 5e 48 1a 93
+
+ (35) Computes ICV using K3r as K_msg
+
+ 00000000: 57 b4 30 41 07 50 b1 cc
+
+ (36) Composes IV
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+
+ (37) Sends message, peer receives message
+
+ 10.111.10.171:54295<-10.111.15.45:4500 [193]
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 fd d9 35 89 50 d5 db 22 81 27 5d a2
+ 00000010: 98 90 1a 06 2e 20 24 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 bd
+ 00000020: 21 00 00 a1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 2e c7 13 73
+ 00000030: 4c cc f8 f3 51 71 ac d9 7a 6e 20 2c 68 70 bb 8f
+ 00000040: 82 42 2a 14 e3 8d b8 25 10 9a 1f b6 51 ef c5 35
+ 00000050: 50 bf df 8e 96 bc 94 5a e5 4d 9d 99 9a 14 36 d1
+ 00000060: 4b 61 e1 de 3b 0d 12 94 e5 72 60 00 0f 9d dd 2b
+ 00000070: e1 97 25 4c 5c ee 48 2e 9b f7 d8 9e 01 6b 1d 92
+ 00000080: b7 c1 7f 16 81 0f e2 e3 14 1c 27 c7 35 e9 e3 fd
+ 00000090: b8 fc 5d fb a2 ee 2f f9 b0 17 39 ca f1 2e b1 13
+ 000000A0: 99 e0 da 10 1a 29 74 26 a3 63 ce 09 6a f9 1b 67
+ 000000B0: 4a f2 fb 0f 17 5e 48 1a 93 57 b4 30 41 07 50 b1
+ 000000C0: cc
+
+ Initiator's actions:
+
+ (38) Extracts IV from message
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+
+ (39) Computes K1r (i1 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 51 49 d5 41 33 91 45 dd ff 04 f5 05 e5 21 39 f2
+ 00000010: 3a 71 1c 18 ef 39 94 1e dd 0c 70 e5 14 12 43 0a
+
+ (40) Computes K2r (i2 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 0e 8f 21 54 2e fc 81 79 57 c4 c9 0b e0 25 9a 59
+ 00000010: 29 26 0e 86 20 bf d4 e6 00 32 23 43 ae f0 11 52
+
+ (41) Computes K3r (i3 = 0)
+
+ 00000000: 92 b8 b2 d6 7a 2d e1 db 5f e1 39 d2 57 c8 24 5f
+ 00000010: f6 22 54 de fc 35 35 c9 24 cf a5 4a e1 5d 75 71
+
+ (42) Composes MGM nonce
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 d2 f6 27 21
+
+ (43) Extracts ICV from message
+
+ 00000000: 57 b4 30 41 07 50 b1 cc
+
+ (44) Extracts AAD from message
+
+ 00000000: fd d9 35 89 50 d5 db 22 81 27 5d a2 98 90 1a 06
+ 00000010: 2e 20 24 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 bd 21 00 00 a1
+
+ (45) Extracts ciphertext from message
+
+ 00000000: 2e c7 13 73 4c cc f8 f3 51 71 ac d9 7a 6e 20 2c
+ 00000010: 68 70 bb 8f 82 42 2a 14 e3 8d b8 25 10 9a 1f b6
+ 00000020: 51 ef c5 35 50 bf df 8e 96 bc 94 5a e5 4d 9d 99
+ 00000030: 9a 14 36 d1 4b 61 e1 de 3b 0d 12 94 e5 72 60 00
+ 00000040: 0f 9d dd 2b e1 97 25 4c 5c ee 48 2e 9b f7 d8 9e
+ 00000050: 01 6b 1d 92 b7 c1 7f 16 81 0f e2 e3 14 1c 27 c7
+ 00000060: 35 e9 e3 fd b8 fc 5d fb a2 ee 2f f9 b0 17 39 ca
+ 00000070: f1 2e b1 13 99 e0 da 10 1a 29 74 26 a3 63 ce 09
+ 00000080: 6a f9 1b 67 4a f2 fb 0f 17 5e 48 1a 93
+
+ (46) Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3r as K_msg,
+ resulting in plaintext
+
+ 00000000: 28 00 00 20 00 00 00 1c 01 03 04 02 15 4f 35 39
+ 00000010: 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 21 00 00 00 08 05 00 00 00
+ 00000020: 2c 00 00 24 41 5e a7 ed 7e 65 d3 ff d3 df ed 5f
+ 00000030: b5 c8 5c 60 2b 9c 15 14 eb 52 97 b7 fc aa 33 c4
+ 00000040: 64 f3 58 06 2d 00 00 18 01 00 00 00 07 00 00 10
+ 00000050: 00 00 ff ff 0a 01 01 03 0a 01 01 03 29 00 00 18
+ 00000060: 01 00 00 00 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff ff 0a 00 00 00
+ 00000070: 0a 00 00 ff 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 02 29 00 00 08
+ 00000080: 00 00 40 0a 00 00 00 08 00 00 40 0b 00
+
+ (47) Parses received message
+
+ Create Child SA
+ #FDD9358950D5DB22.81275DA298901A06.00000000 IKEv2 R=>I[189]
+ E[161]{
+ SA[32]{
+ P[28](#1:ESP:154F3539:2#){
+ Encryption=ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE,
+ ESN=Off}},
+ NONCE[36]{415EA7...F35806},
+ TSi[24](1#){10.1.1.3},
+ TSr[24](1#){10.0.0.0-10.0.0.255},
+ N[8](ADDITIONAL_TS_POSSIBLE),
+ N[8](ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+ N[8](NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)}
+
+ (48) Computes keys for new ESP SAs
+
+ 00000000: 6a b6 a0 e7 05 d3 51 16 6f 4f b9 d6 59 0c c8 69
+ 00000010: 43 70 cf 6f 0d 32 c3 7d 92 75 00 4b 0a 76 35 67
+ 00000020: 64 0e 3a fe
+ 00000000: 65 56 1c 79 27 cb c6 d6 8c b8 69 0f 40 00 d2 0a
+ 00000010: c1 49 1c d1 86 88 db 88 ae f3 be 82 0c 71 b7 c9
+ 00000020: 6c cf a3 64
+
+A.2.4. Sub-Scenario 4: IKE SA Deletion Using the INFORMATIONAL Exchange
+
+ Initiator Responder
+
+ HDR, SK {D} --->
+ <--- HDR, SK { }
+
+ Initiator's actions:
+
+ (1) Creates message
+
+ Informational
+ #FDD9358950D5DB22.81275DA298901A06.00000003 IKEv2 R<-I[57]
+ E[29]{
+ D[8](IKE)}
+
+ (2) Uses previously computed key K3i
+
+ 00000000: 45 6f 03 f7 ad 75 eb e9 52 b8 8f 0d e8 36 47 69
+ 00000010: 4d 2e f2 ba 15 e6 8c 89 1c 99 62 64 fb 0e 70 0a
+
+ (3) Composes MGM nonce
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 03 2b 3d 3b 2f
+
+ (4) Composes AAD
+
+ 00000000: fd d9 35 89 50 d5 db 22 81 27 5d a2 98 90 1a 06
+ 00000010: 2e 20 25 08 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 39 2a 00 00 1d
+
+ (5) Composes plaintext
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 08 01 00 00 00 00
+
+ (6) Encrypts plaintext using K3i as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
+
+ 00000000: 4f ff 67 66 41 9c d3 ec 8e
+
+ (7) Computes ICV using K3i as K_msg
+
+ 00000000: d2 bf 0e b7 8f c5 53 03
+
+ (8) Composes IV
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03
+
+ (9) Sends message, peer receives message
+
+ 10.111.10.171:54295->10.111.15.45:4500 [61]
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 fd d9 35 89 50 d5 db 22 81 27 5d a2
+ 00000010: 98 90 1a 06 2e 20 25 08 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 39
+ 00000020: 2a 00 00 1d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 4f ff 67 66
+ 00000030: 41 9c d3 ec 8e d2 bf 0e b7 8f c5 53 03
+
+ Responder's actions:
+
+ (10) Extracts IV from message
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03
+
+ (11) Uses previously computed key K3i
+
+ 00000000: 45 6f 03 f7 ad 75 eb e9 52 b8 8f 0d e8 36 47 69
+ 00000010: 4d 2e f2 ba 15 e6 8c 89 1c 99 62 64 fb 0e 70 0a
+
+ (12) Composes MGM nonce
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 03 2b 3d 3b 2f
+
+ (13) Extracts ICV from message
+
+ 00000000: d2 bf 0e b7 8f c5 53 03
+
+ (14) Extracts AAD from message
+
+ 00000000: fd d9 35 89 50 d5 db 22 81 27 5d a2 98 90 1a 06
+ 00000010: 2e 20 25 08 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 39 2a 00 00 1d
+
+ (15) Extracts ciphertext from message
+
+ 00000000: 4f ff 67 66 41 9c d3 ec 8e
+
+ (16) Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3i as K_msg,
+ resulting in plaintext
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 08 01 00 00 00 00
+
+ (17) Parses received message
+
+ Informational
+ #FDD9358950D5DB22.81275DA298901A06.00000003 IKEv2 I->R[57]
+ E[29]{
+ D[8](IKE)}
+
+ (18) Creates message
+
+ Informational
+ #FDD9358950D5DB22.81275DA298901A06.00000003 IKEv2 I<=R[49]
+ E[21]{}
+
+ (19) Uses previously computed key K3r
+
+ 00000000: 92 b8 b2 d6 7a 2d e1 db 5f e1 39 d2 57 c8 24 5f
+ 00000010: f6 22 54 de fc 35 35 c9 24 cf a5 4a e1 5d 75 71
+
+ (20) Composes MGM nonce
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 03 d2 f6 27 21
+
+ (21) Composes AAD
+
+ 00000000: fd d9 35 89 50 d5 db 22 81 27 5d a2 98 90 1a 06
+ 00000010: 2e 20 25 20 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 31 00 00 00 15
+
+ (22) Composes plaintext
+
+ 00000000: 00
+
+ (23) Encrypts plaintext using K3r as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
+
+ 00000000: a8
+
+ (24) Computes ICV using K3r as K_msg
+
+ 00000000: ef 77 21 c9 8b c1 eb 98
+
+ (25) Composes IV
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03
+
+ (26) Sends message, peer receives message
+
+ 10.111.10.171:54295<-10.111.15.45:4500 [53]
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 fd d9 35 89 50 d5 db 22 81 27 5d a2
+ 00000010: 98 90 1a 06 2e 20 25 20 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 31
+ 00000020: 00 00 00 15 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 a8 ef 77 21
+ 00000030: c9 8b c1 eb 98
+
+ Initiator's actions:
+
+ (27) Extracts IV from message
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03
+
+ (28) Uses previously computed key K3r
+
+ 00000000: 92 b8 b2 d6 7a 2d e1 db 5f e1 39 d2 57 c8 24 5f
+ 00000010: f6 22 54 de fc 35 35 c9 24 cf a5 4a e1 5d 75 71
+
+ (29) Composes MGM nonce
+
+ 00000000: 00 00 00 03 d2 f6 27 21
+
+ (30) Extracts ICV from message
+
+ 00000000: ef 77 21 c9 8b c1 eb 98
+
+ (31) Extracts AAD from message
+
+ 00000000: fd d9 35 89 50 d5 db 22 81 27 5d a2 98 90 1a 06
+ 00000010: 2e 20 25 20 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 31 00 00 00 15
+
+ (32) Extracts ciphertext from message
+
+ 00000000: a8
+
+ (33) Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3r as K_msg,
+ resulting in plaintext
+
+ 00000000: 00
+
+ (34) Parses received message
+
+ Informational
+ #FDD9358950D5DB22.81275DA298901A06.00000003 IKEv2 R=>I[49]
+ E[21]{}
+
+Author's Address
+
+ Valery Smyslov
+ ELVIS-PLUS
+ PO Box 81
+ Moscow (Zelenograd)
+ 124460
+ Russian Federation
+ Phone: +7 495 276 0211
+ Email: svan@elvis.ru