diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'doc/rfc/rfc9635.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/rfc/rfc9635.txt | 10186 |
1 files changed, 10186 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/doc/rfc/rfc9635.txt b/doc/rfc/rfc9635.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d157b92 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/rfc/rfc9635.txt @@ -0,0 +1,10186 @@ + + + + +Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Richer, Ed. +Request for Comments: 9635 Bespoke Engineering +Category: Standards Track F. Imbault +ISSN: 2070-1721 acert.io + October 2024 + + + Grant Negotiation and Authorization Protocol (GNAP) + +Abstract + + The Grant Negotiation and Authorization Protocol (GNAP) defines a + mechanism for delegating authorization to a piece of software and + conveying the results and artifacts of that delegation to the + software. This delegation can include access to a set of APIs as + well as subject information passed directly to the software. + +Status of This Memo + + This is an Internet Standards Track document. + + This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force + (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has + received public review and has been approved for publication by the + Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on + Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841. + + Information about the current status of this document, any errata, + and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at + https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9635. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the + document authors. All rights reserved. + + This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal + Provisions Relating to IETF Documents + (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of + publication of this document. Please review these documents + carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect + to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must + include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the + Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described + in the Revised BSD License. + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction + 1.1. Terminology + 1.2. Roles + 1.3. Elements + 1.4. Trust Relationships + 1.5. Protocol Flow + 1.6. Sequences + 1.6.1. Overall Protocol Sequence + 1.6.2. Redirect-Based Interaction + 1.6.3. User Code Interaction + 1.6.4. Asynchronous Authorization + 1.6.5. Software-Only Authorization + 1.6.6. Refreshing an Expired Access Token + 1.6.7. Requesting Subject Information Only + 1.6.8. Cross-User Authentication + 2. Requesting Access + 2.1. Requesting Access to Resources + 2.1.1. Requesting a Single Access Token + 2.1.2. Requesting Multiple Access Tokens + 2.2. Requesting Subject Information + 2.3. Identifying the Client Instance + 2.3.1. Identifying the Client Instance by Reference + 2.3.2. Providing Displayable Client Instance Information + 2.3.3. Authenticating the Client Instance + 2.4. Identifying the User + 2.4.1. Identifying the User by Reference + 2.5. Interacting with the User + 2.5.1. Start Mode Definitions + 2.5.2. Interaction Finish Methods + 2.5.3. Hints + 3. Grant Response + 3.1. Request Continuation + 3.2. Access Tokens + 3.2.1. Single Access Token + 3.2.2. Multiple Access Tokens + 3.3. Interaction Modes + 3.3.1. Redirection to an Arbitrary URI + 3.3.2. Launch of an Application URI + 3.3.3. Display of a Short User Code + 3.3.4. Display of a Short User Code and URI + 3.3.5. Interaction Finish + 3.4. Returning Subject Information + 3.4.1. Assertion Formats + 3.5. Returning a Dynamically Bound Client Instance Identifier + 3.6. Error Response + 4. Determining Authorization and Consent + 4.1. Starting Interaction with the End User + 4.1.1. Interaction at a Redirected URI + 4.1.2. Interaction at the Static User Code URI + 4.1.3. Interaction at a Dynamic User Code URI + 4.1.4. Interaction through an Application URI + 4.2. Post-Interaction Completion + 4.2.1. Completing Interaction with a Browser Redirect to the + Callback URI + 4.2.2. Completing Interaction with a Direct HTTP Request + Callback + 4.2.3. Calculating the Interaction Hash + 5. Continuing a Grant Request + 5.1. Continuing after a Completed Interaction + 5.2. Continuing during Pending Interaction (Polling) + 5.3. Modifying an Existing Request + 5.4. Revoking a Grant Request + 6. Token Management + 6.1. Rotating the Access Token Value + 6.1.1. Binding a New Key to the Rotated Access Token + 6.2. Revoking the Access Token + 7. Securing Requests from the Client Instance + 7.1. Key Formats + 7.1.1. Key References + 7.1.2. Key Protection + 7.2. Presenting Access Tokens + 7.3. Proving Possession of a Key with a Request + 7.3.1. HTTP Message Signatures + 7.3.2. Mutual TLS + 7.3.3. Detached JWS + 7.3.4. Attached JWS + 8. Resource Access Rights + 8.1. Requesting Resources by Reference + 9. Discovery + 9.1. RS-First Method of AS Discovery + 9.2. Dynamic Grant Endpoint Discovery + 10. IANA Considerations + 10.1. HTTP Authentication Scheme Registration + 10.2. Media Type Registration + 10.2.1. application/gnap-binding-jwsd + 10.2.2. application/gnap-binding-jws + 10.2.3. application/gnap-binding-rotation-jwsd + 10.2.4. application/gnap-binding-rotation-jws + 10.3. GNAP Grant Request Parameters + 10.3.1. Registration Template + 10.3.2. Initial Contents + 10.4. GNAP Access Token Flags + 10.4.1. Registration Template + 10.4.2. Initial Contents + 10.5. GNAP Subject Information Request Fields + 10.5.1. Registration Template + 10.5.2. Initial Contents + 10.6. GNAP Assertion Formats + 10.6.1. Registration Template + 10.6.2. Initial Contents + 10.7. GNAP Client Instance Fields + 10.7.1. Registration Template + 10.7.2. Initial Contents + 10.8. GNAP Client Instance Display Fields + 10.8.1. Registration Template + 10.8.2. Initial Contents + 10.9. GNAP Interaction Start Modes + 10.9.1. Registration Template + 10.9.2. Initial Contents + 10.10. GNAP Interaction Finish Methods + 10.10.1. Registration Template + 10.10.2. Initial Contents + 10.11. GNAP Interaction Hints + 10.11.1. Registration Template + 10.11.2. Initial Contents + 10.12. GNAP Grant Response Parameters + 10.12.1. Registration Template + 10.12.2. Initial Contents + 10.13. GNAP Interaction Mode Responses + 10.13.1. Registration Template + 10.13.2. Initial Contents + 10.14. GNAP Subject Information Response Fields + 10.14.1. Registration Template + 10.14.2. Initial Contents + 10.15. GNAP Error Codes + 10.15.1. Registration Template + 10.15.2. Initial Contents + 10.16. GNAP Key Proofing Methods + 10.16.1. Registration Template + 10.16.2. Initial Contents + 10.17. GNAP Key Formats + 10.17.1. Registration Template + 10.17.2. Initial Contents + 10.18. GNAP Authorization Server Discovery Fields + 10.18.1. Registration Template + 10.18.2. Initial Contents + 11. Security Considerations + 11.1. TLS Protection in Transit + 11.2. Signing Requests from the Client Software + 11.3. MTLS Message Integrity + 11.4. MTLS Deployment Patterns + 11.5. Protection of Client Instance Key Material + 11.6. Protection of Authorization Server + 11.7. Symmetric and Asymmetric Client Instance Keys + 11.8. Generation of Access Tokens + 11.9. Bearer Access Tokens + 11.10. Key-Bound Access Tokens + 11.11. Exposure of End-User Credentials to Client Instance + 11.12. Mixing Up Authorization Servers + 11.13. Processing of Client-Presented User Information + 11.14. Client Instance Pre-registration + 11.15. Client Instance Impersonation + 11.16. Client-Hosted Logo URI + 11.17. Interception of Information in the Browser + 11.18. Callback URI Manipulation + 11.19. Redirection Status Codes + 11.20. Interception of Responses from the AS + 11.21. Key Distribution + 11.22. Key Rotation Policy + 11.23. Interaction Finish Modes and Polling + 11.24. Session Management for Interaction Finish Methods + 11.25. Calculating Interaction Hash + 11.26. Storage of Information during Interaction and Continuation + 11.27. Denial of Service (DoS) through Grant Continuation + 11.28. Exhaustion of Random Value Space + 11.29. Front-Channel URIs + 11.30. Processing Assertions + 11.31. Stolen Token Replay + 11.32. Self-Contained Stateless Access Tokens + 11.33. Network Problems and Token and Grant Management + 11.34. Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) + 11.35. Multiple Key Formats + 11.36. Asynchronous Interactions + 11.37. Compromised RS + 11.38. AS-Provided Token Keys + 12. Privacy Considerations + 12.1. Surveillance + 12.1.1. Surveillance by the Client + 12.1.2. Surveillance by the Authorization Server + 12.2. Stored Data + 12.3. Intrusion + 12.4. Correlation + 12.4.1. Correlation by Clients + 12.4.2. Correlation by Resource Servers + 12.4.3. Correlation by Authorization Servers + 12.5. Disclosure in Shared References + 13. References + 13.1. Normative References + 13.2. Informative References + Appendix A. Comparison with OAuth 2.0 + Appendix B. Example Protocol Flows + B.1. Redirect-Based User Interaction + B.2. Secondary Device Interaction + B.3. No User Involvement + B.4. Asynchronous Authorization + B.5. Applying OAuth 2.0 Scopes and Client IDs + Appendix C. Interoperability Profiles + C.1. Web-Based Redirection + C.2. Secondary Device + Appendix D. Guidance for Extensions + Appendix E. JSON Structures and Polymorphism + Acknowledgements + Authors' Addresses + +1. Introduction + + GNAP allows a piece of software, the client instance, to request + delegated authorization to resource servers and subject information. + The delegated access to the resource server can be used by the client + instance to access resources and APIs on behalf a resource owner, and + delegated access to subject information can in turn be used by the + client instance to make authentication decisions. This delegation is + facilitated by an authorization server, usually on behalf of a + resource owner. The end user operating the software can interact + with the authorization server to authenticate, provide consent, and + authorize the request as a resource owner. + + The process by which the delegation happens is known as a grant, and + GNAP allows for the negotiation of the grant process over time by + multiple parties acting in distinct roles. + + This specification focuses on the portions of the delegation process + facing the client instance. In particular, this specification + defines interoperable methods for a client instance to request, + negotiate, and receive access to information facilitated by the + authorization server. This specification additionally defines + methods for the client instance to access protected resources at a + resource server. This specification also discusses discovery + mechanisms that enable the client instance to configure itself + dynamically. The means for an authorization server and resource + server to interoperate are discussed in [GNAP-RS]. + + The focus of this protocol is to provide interoperability between the + different parties acting in each role, not to specify implementation + details of each. Where appropriate, GNAP may make recommendations + about internal implementation details, but these recommendations are + to ensure the security of the overall deployment rather than to be + prescriptive in the implementation. + + This protocol solves many of the same use cases as OAuth 2.0 + [RFC6749], OpenID Connect [OIDC], and the family of protocols that + have grown up around that ecosystem. However, GNAP is not an + extension of OAuth 2.0 and is not intended to be directly compatible + with OAuth 2.0. GNAP seeks to provide functionality and solve use + cases that OAuth 2.0 cannot easily or cleanly address. Appendix A + further details the protocol rationale compared to OAuth 2.0. GNAP + and OAuth 2.0 will likely exist in parallel for many deployments, and + considerations have been taken to facilitate the mapping and + transition from existing OAuth 2.0 systems to GNAP. Some examples of + these can be found in Appendix B.5. + +1.1. Terminology + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and + "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in + BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all + capitals, as shown here. + + This document contains non-normative examples of partial and complete + HTTP messages, JSON structures, URIs, query components, keys, and + other elements. Whenever possible, the document uses URI as a + generic term, since it aligns with the recommendations in [RFC3986] + and better matches the intent that the identifier may be reachable + through various/generic means (compared to URLs). Some examples use + a single trailing backslash (\) to indicate line wrapping for long + values, as per [RFC8792]. The \ character and leading spaces on + wrapped lines are not part of the value. + + This document uses the term "mutual TLS" as defined by [RFC8705]. + The shortened form "MTLS" is used to mean the same thing. + + For brevity, the term "signature" on its own is used in this document + to refer to both digital signatures (which use asymmetric + cryptography) and keyed Message Authentication Codes (MACs) (which + use symmetric cryptography). Similarly, the verb "sign" refers to + the generation of either a digital signature or a keyed MAC over a + given signature base. The qualified term "digital signature" refers + specifically to the output of an asymmetric cryptographic signing + operation. + +1.2. Roles + + The parties in GNAP perform actions under different roles. Roles are + defined by the actions taken and the expectations leveraged on the + role by the overall protocol. + + +-------------+ +------------+ + | | | | + |Authorization| | Resource | + | Server | | Server | + | |<--+ +--->| | + +-----+-------+ | | +------------+ + ║ | | + ║ +--+---+---+ + ║ | Client | + ║ | Instance | + ║ +----+-----+ + ║ ║ + .----+----. ║ .----------. + | | +=====+ | + | Resource | | End | + | Owner | ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ | User | + | | | | + `---------` `----------` + + Legend: + ===== indicates interaction between a human and computer + ----- indicates interaction between two pieces of software + ~ ~ ~ indicates a potential equivalence or out-of-band + communication between roles + + Figure 1: Roles in GNAP + + Authorization Server (AS): Server that grants delegated privileges + to a particular instance of client software in the form of access + tokens or other information (such as subject information). The AS + is uniquely defined by the grant endpoint URI, which is the + absolute URI where grant requests are started by clients. + + Client: Application that consumes resources from one or several + resource servers, possibly requiring access privileges from one or + several ASes. The client is operated by the end user, or it runs + autonomously on behalf of a resource owner. + + For example, a client can be a mobile application, a web + application, a backend data processor, etc. + + Note: This specification differentiates between a specific + instance (the client instance, identified by its unique key) and + the software running the instance (the client software). For some + kinds of client software, there could be many instances of that + software, each instance with a different key. + + Resource Server (RS): Server that provides an API on protected + resources, where operations on the API require a valid access + token issued by a trusted AS. + + Resource Owner (RO): Subject entity that may grant or deny + operations on resources it has authority upon. + + Note: The act of granting or denying an operation may be manual + (i.e., through an interaction with a physical person) or automatic + (i.e., through predefined organizational rules). + + End user: Natural person that operates a client instance. + + Note: That natural person may or may not be the same entity as the + RO. + + The design of GNAP does not assume any one deployment architecture + but instead attempts to define roles that can be fulfilled in a + number of different ways for different use cases. As long as a given + role fulfills all of its obligations and behaviors as defined by the + protocol, GNAP does not make additional requirements on its structure + or setup. + + Multiple roles can be fulfilled by the same party, and a given party + can switch roles in different instances of the protocol. For + example, in many instances, the RO and end user are the same person, + where a user authorizes the client instance to act on their own + behalf at the RS. In this case, one party fulfills the roles of both + RO and end user, but the roles themselves are still defined + separately from each other to allow for other use cases where they + are fulfilled by different parties. + + As another example, in some complex scenarios, an RS receiving + requests from one client instance can act as a client instance for a + downstream secondary RS in order to fulfill the original request. In + this case, one piece of software is both an RS and a client instance + from different perspectives, and it fulfills these roles separately + as far as the overall protocol is concerned. + + A single role need not be deployed as a monolithic service. For + example, a client instance could have frontend components that are + installed on the end user's device as well as a backend system that + the frontend communicates with. If both of these components + participate in the delegation protocol, they are both considered part + of the client instance. If there are several copies of the client + software that run separately but all share the same key material, + such as a deployed cluster, then this cluster is considered a single + client instance. In these cases, the distinct components of what is + considered a GNAP client instance may use any number of different + communication mechanisms between them, all of which would be + considered an implementation detail of the client instances and out + of scope of GNAP. + + As another example, an AS could likewise be built out of many + constituent components in a distributed architecture. The component + that the client instance calls directly could be different from the + component that the RO interacts with to drive consent, since API + calls and user interaction have different security considerations in + many environments. Furthermore, the AS could need to collect + identity claims about the RO from one system that deals with user + attributes while generating access tokens at another system that + deals with security rights. From the perspective of GNAP, all of + these are pieces of the AS and together fulfill the role of the AS as + defined by the protocol. These pieces may have their own internal + communications mechanisms, which are considered out of scope of GNAP. + +1.3. Elements + + In addition to the roles above, the protocol also involves several + elements that are acted upon by the roles throughout the process. + + Access Token: A data artifact representing a set of rights and/or + attributes. + + Note: An access token can be first issued to a client instance + (requiring authorization by the RO) and subsequently rotated. + + Grant: (verb): To permit an instance of client software to receive + some attributes at a specific time and with a specific duration of + validity and/or to exercise some set of delegated rights to access + a protected resource. + + (noun): The act of granting permission to a client instance. + + Privilege: Right or attribute associated with a subject. + + Note: The RO defines and maintains the rights and attributes + associated to the protected resource and might temporarily + delegate some set of those privileges to an end user. This + process is referred to as "privilege delegation". + + Protected Resource: Protected API that is served by an RS and that + can be accessed by a client, if and only if a valid and sufficient + access token is provided. + + Note: To avoid complex sentences, the specification document may + simply refer to "resource" instead of "protected resource". + + Right: Ability given to a subject to perform a given operation on a + resource under the control of an RS. + + Subject: Person or organization. The subject decides whether and + under which conditions its attributes can be disclosed to other + parties. + + Subject Information: Set of statements and attributes asserted by an + AS about a subject. These statements can be used by the client + instance as part of an authentication decision. + +1.4. Trust Relationships + + GNAP defines its trust objective as follows: the RO trusts the AS to + ensure access validation and delegation of protected resources to end + users, through third party clients. + + This trust objective can be decomposed into trust relationships + between software elements and roles, especially the pairs end user/ + RO, end user/client, client/AS, RS/RO, AS/RO, and AS/RS. Trust of an + agent by its pair can exist if the pair is informed that the agent + has made a promise to follow the protocol in the past (e.g., pre- + registration and uncompromised cryptographic components) or if the + pair is able to infer by indirect means that the agent has made such + a promise (e.g., a compliant client request). Each agent defines its + own valuation function of promises given or received. Examples of + such valuations can be the benefits from interacting with other + agents (e.g., safety in client access and interoperability with + identity standards), the cost of following the protocol (including + its security and privacy requirements and recommendations), a ranking + of promise importance (e.g., a policy decision made by the AS), the + assessment of one's vulnerability or risk of not being able to defend + against threats, etc. Those valuations may depend on the context of + the request. For instance, depending on the specific case in which + GNAP is used, the AS may decide to either take into account or + discard hints provided by the client, or the RS may refuse bearer + tokens. Some promises can be affected by previous interactions + (e.g., repeated requests). + + Below are details of each trust relationship: + + end user/RO: This relationship exists only when the end user and the + RO are different, in which case the end user needs some out-of- + band mechanism of getting the RO consent (see Section 4). GNAP + generally assumes that humans can be authenticated, thanks to + identity protocols (for instance, through an id_token assertion as + described in Section 2.2). + + end user/client: The client acts as a user agent. Depending on the + technology used (browser, single-page application (SPA), mobile + application, Internet of Things (IoT) device, etc.), some + interactions may or may not be possible (as described in + Section 2.5.1). Client developers implement requirements and + generally some recommendations or best practices, so that the end + users may confidently use their software. However, end users + might also face an attacker's client software or a poorly + implemented client without even realizing it. + + end user/AS: When the client supports the interaction feature (see + Section 3.3), the end user interacts with the AS through an AS- + provided interface. In many cases, this happens through a front- + channel interaction through the end user's browser. See + Section 11.29 for some considerations in trusting these + interactions. + + client/AS: An honest AS may face an attacker's client (as discussed + just above), or the reverse, and GNAP aims to make common attacks + impractical. This specification makes access tokens opaque to the + client and defines the request/response scheme in detail, + therefore avoiding extra trust hypotheses from this critical piece + of software. Yet, the AS may further define cryptographic + attestations or optional rules to simplify the access of clients + it already trusts, due to past behavior or organizational policies + (see Section 2.3). + + RS/RO: On behalf of the RO, the RS promises to protect its resources + from unauthorized access and only accepts valid access tokens + issued by a trusted AS. In case tokens are key bound, proper + validation of the proofing method is expected from the RS. + + AS/RO: The AS is expected to follow the decisions made by the RO, + through either interactive consent requests, repeated + interactions, or automated rules (as described in Section 1.6). + Privacy considerations aim to reduce the risk of an honest but + too-curious AS or the consequences of an unexpected user data + exposure. + + AS/RS: The AS promises to issue valid access tokens to legitimate + client requests (i.e., after carrying out appropriate due + diligence, as defined in the GNAP). Some optional configurations + are covered by [GNAP-RS]. + + A global assumption made by GNAP is that authorization requests are + security and privacy sensitive, and appropriate measures are detailed + in Sections 11 and 12, respectively. + + A formal trust model is out of scope of this specification, but one + could be developed using techniques such as the Promise Theory + [promise-theory]. + +1.5. Protocol Flow + + GNAP is fundamentally designed to allow delegated access to APIs and + other information, such as subject information, using a multi-stage, + stateful process. This process allows different parties to provide + information into the system to alter and augment the state of the + delegated access and its artifacts. + + The underlying requested grant moves through several states as + different actions take place during the protocol, as shown in + Figure 2. + + .-----. + | | + +------+--+ | Continue + .---Need Interaction---->| | | + / | Pending |<--` + / .--Finish Interaction--+ | + / / (approve/deny) +----+----+ + / / | + / / | Cancel + / v v + +-+----------+ +===========+ + | | ║ ║ +---Request-->| Processing +------Finalize---->║ Finalized ║ + | | ║ ║ + +-+----------+ +===========+ + \ ^ ^ + \ \ | Revoke or + \ \ | Finalize + \ \ +-----+----+ + \ `-----Update---------+ | + \ | Approved |<--. + `-----No Interaction--->| | | + +-------+--+ | Continue + | | + `-----` + + Figure 2: State Diagram of a Grant Request in GNAP + + The state of the grant request is defined and managed by the AS, + though the client instance also needs to manage its view of the grant + request over time. The means by which these roles manage their state + are outside the scope of this specification. + + _Processing_: When a request for access (Section 2) is received by + the AS, a new grant request is created and placed in the + _processing_ state by the AS. This state is also entered when an + existing grant request is updated by the client instance and when + interaction is completed. In this state, the AS processes the + context of the grant request to determine whether interaction with + the end user or RO is required for approval of the request. The + grant request has to exit this state before a response can be + returned to the client instance. If approval is required, the + request moves to the _pending_ state, and the AS returns a + continuation response (Section 3.1) along with any appropriate + interaction responses (Section 3.3). If no such approval is + required, such as when the client instance is acting on its own + behalf or the AS can determine that access has been fulfilled, the + request moves to the _approved_ state where access tokens for API + access (Section 3.2) and subject information (Section 3.4) can be + issued to the client instance. If the AS determines that no + additional processing can occur (such as a timeout or an + unrecoverable error), the grant request is moved to the + _finalized_ state and is terminated. + + _Pending_: When a request needs to be approved by an RO, or + interaction with the end user is required, the grant request + enters a state of _pending_. In this state, no access tokens can + be granted, and no subject information can be released to the + client instance. While a grant request is in this state, the AS + seeks to gather the required consent and authorization (Section 4) + for the requested access. A grant request in this state is always + associated with a continuation access token bound to the client + instance's key (see Section 3.1 for details of the continuation + access token). If no interaction finish method (Section 2.5.2) is + associated with this request, the client instance can send a + polling continuation request (Section 5.2) to the AS. This + returns a continuation response (Section 3.1) while the grant + request remains in this state, allowing the client instance to + continue to check the state of the pending grant request. If an + interaction finish method (Section 2.5.2) is specified in the + grant request, the client instance can continue the request after + interaction (Section 5.1) to the AS to move this request to the + _processing_ state to be re-evaluated by the AS. Note that this + occurs whether the grant request has been approved or denied by + the RO, since the AS needs to take into account the full context + of the request before determining the next step for the grant + request. When other information is made available in the context + of the grant request, such as through the asynchronous actions of + the RO, the AS moves this request to the _processing_ state to be + re-evaluated. If the AS determines that no additional interaction + can occur, e.g., all the interaction methods have timed out or a + revocation request (Section 5.4) is received from the client + instance, the grant request can be moved to the _finalized_ state. + + _Approved_: When a request has been approved by an RO and no further + interaction with the end user is required, the grant request + enters a state of _approved_. In this state, responses to the + client instance can include access tokens for API access + (Section 3.2) and subject information (Section 3.4). If + continuation and updates are allowed for this grant request, the + AS can include the continuation response (Section 3.1). In this + state, post-interaction continuation requests (Section 5.1) are + not allowed and will result in an error, since all interaction is + assumed to have been completed. If the client instance sends a + polling continuation request (Section 5.2) while the request is in + this state, new access tokens (Section 3.2) can be issued in the + response. Note that this always creates a new access token, but + any existing access tokens could be rotated and revoked using the + token management API (Section 6). The client instance can send an + update continuation request (Section 5.3) to modify the requested + access, causing the AS to move the request back to the + _processing_ state for re-evaluation. If the AS determines that + no additional tokens can be issued and that no additional updates + are to be accepted (e.g., the continuation access tokens have + expired), the grant is moved to the _finalized_ state. + + _Finalized_: After the access tokens are issued, if the AS does not + allow any additional updates on the grant request, the grant + request enters the _finalized_ state. This state is also entered + when an existing grant request is revoked by the client instance + (Section 5.4) or otherwise revoked by the AS (such as through out- + of-band action by the RO). This state can also be entered if the + AS determines that no additional processing is possible, for + example, if the RO has denied the requested access or if + interaction is required but no compatible interaction methods are + available. Once in this state, no new access tokens can be + issued, no subject information can be returned, and no + interactions can take place. Once in this state, the grant + request is dead and cannot be revived. If future access is + desired by the client instance, a new grant request can be + created, unrelated to this grant request. + + While it is possible to deploy an AS in a stateless environment, GNAP + is a stateful protocol, and such deployments will need a way to + manage the current state of the grant request in a secure and + deterministic fashion without relying on other components, such as + the client software, to keep track of the current state. + +1.6. Sequences + + GNAP can be used in a variety of ways to allow the core delegation + process to take place. Many portions of this process are + conditionally present depending on the context of the deployments, + and not every step in this overview will happen in all circumstances. + + Note that a connection between roles in this process does not + necessarily indicate that a specific protocol message is sent across + the wire between the components fulfilling the roles in question or + that a particular step is required every time. For example, for a + client instance interested in only getting subject information + directly and not calling an RS, all steps involving the RS below do + not apply. + + In some circumstances, the information needed at a given stage is + communicated out of band or is pre-configured between the components + or entities performing the roles. For example, one entity can + fulfill multiple roles, so explicit communication between the roles + is not necessary within the protocol flow. Additionally, some + components may not be involved in all use cases. For example, a + client instance could be calling the AS just to get direct user + information and have no need to get an access token to call an RS. + +1.6.1. Overall Protocol Sequence + + The following diagram provides a general overview of GNAP, including + many different optional phases and connections. The diagrams in the + following sections provide views of GNAP under more specific + circumstances. These additional diagrams use the same conventions as + the overall diagram below. + + .----------. .----------. + | End user | ~ ~ ~ ~ | Resource | + | | | Owner (RO) | + `----+-----` `-----+----` + ║ ║ + ║ ║ + (A) (B) + ║ ║ + ║ ║ + +-----+--+ ║ +------------+ + | Client | (1) ║ | Resource | + |Instance| ║ | Server | + | | +-----------+---+ | (RS) | + | +--(2)-->| Authorization | | | + | |<-(3)---+ Server | | | + | | | (AS) | | | + | +--(4)-->| | | | + | |<-(5)---+ | | | + | | | | | | + | +---------------(6)------------->| | + | | | | (7) | | + | |<--------------(8)------------->| | + | | | | | | + | +--(9)-->| | | | + | |<-(10)--+ | | | + | | | | | | + | +---------------(11)------------>| | + | | | | (12) | | + | +--(13)->| | | | + | | | | | | + +--------+ +---------------+ +------------+ + + Legend: + ===== indicates a possible interaction with a human + ----- indicates an interaction between protocol roles + ~ ~ ~ indicates a potential equivalence or out-of-band + communication between roles + + Figure 3: Overall Sequence of GNAP + + * (A) The end user interacts with the client instance to indicate a + need for resources on behalf of the RO. This could identify the + RS that the client instance needs to call, the resources needed, + or the RO that is needed to approve the request. Note that the RO + and end user are often the same entity in practice, but GNAP makes + no general assumption that they are. + + * (1) The client instance determines what access is needed and which + AS to approach for access. Note that for most situations, the + client instance is pre-configured with which AS to talk to and + which kinds of access it needs, but some more dynamic processes + are discussed in Section 9.1. + + * (2) The client instance requests access at the AS (Section 2). + + * (3) The AS processes the request and determines what is needed to + fulfill the request (see Section 4). The AS sends its response to + the client instance (Section 3). + + * (B) If interaction is required, the AS interacts with the RO + (Section 4) to gather authorization. The interactive component of + the AS can function using a variety of possible mechanisms, + including web page redirects, applications, challenge/response + protocols, or other methods. The RO approves the request for the + client instance being operated by the end user. Note that the RO + and end user are often the same entity in practice, and many of + GNAP's interaction methods allow the client instance to facilitate + the end user interacting with the AS in order to fulfill the role + of the RO. + + * (4) The client instance continues the grant at the AS (Section 5). + This action could occur in response to receiving a signal that + interaction has finished (Section 4.2) or through a periodic + polling mechanism, depending on the interaction capabilities of + the client software and the options active in the grant request. + + * (5) If the AS determines that access can be granted, it returns a + response to the client instance (Section 3), including an access + token (Section 3.2) for calling the RS and any directly returned + information (Section 3.4) about the RO. + + * (6) The client instance uses the access token (Section 7.2) to + call the RS. + + * (7) The RS determines if the token is sufficient for the request + by examining the token. The means of the RS determining this + access are out of scope of this specification, but some options + are discussed in [GNAP-RS]. + + * (8) The client instance calls the RS (Section 7.2) using the + access token until the RS or client instance determines that the + token is no longer valid. + + * (9) When the token no longer works, the client instance rotates + the access token (Section 6.1). + + * (10) The AS issues a new access token (Section 3.2) to the client + instance with the same rights as the original access token + returned in (5). + + * (11) The client instance uses the new access token (Section 7.2) + to call the RS. + + * (12) The RS determines if the new token is sufficient for the + request, as in (7). + + * (13) The client instance disposes of the token (Section 6.2) once + the client instance has completed its access of the RS and no + longer needs the token. + + The following sections and Appendix B contain specific guidance on + how to use GNAP in different situations and deployments. For + example, it is possible for the client instance to never request an + access token and never call an RS, just as it is possible to have no + end user involved in the delegation process. + +1.6.2. Redirect-Based Interaction + + In this example flow, the client instance is a web application that + wants access to resources on behalf of the current user, who acts as + both the end user and the RO. Since the client instance is capable + of directing the user to an arbitrary URI and receiving responses + from the user's browser, interaction here is handled through front- + channel redirects using the user's browser. The redirection URI used + for interaction is a service hosted by the AS in this example. The + client instance uses a persistent session with the user to ensure the + same user that is starting the interaction is the user that returns + from the interaction. + + +--------+ +--------+ .----. + | Client | | AS | | End | + |Instance| | | | User | + | |<=(1)== Start Session ===============================+ | + | | | | | | + | +--(2)--- Request Access --------->| | | | + | | | | | | + | |<-(3)-- Interaction Needed -------+ | | | + | | | | | | + | +==(4)== Redirect for Interaction ===================>| | + | | | | +------+ + | | | |<==(5)==>| | + | | | | AuthN | RO | + | | | | | | + | | | |<==(6)==>| | + | | | | AuthZ +------+ + | | | | | End | + | |<=(7)== Redirect for Continuation ===================+ User | + | | | | `----` + | +--(8)--- Continue Request ------->| | + | | | | + | |<-(9)----- Grant Access ----------+ | + | | | | + | | | | +--------+ + | +--(10)-- Access API ---------------------------->| RS | + | | | | | | + | |<-(11)-- API Response ---------------------------| | + | | | | +--------+ + +--------+ +--------+ + + Figure 4: Diagram of a Redirect-Based Interaction + + * (1) The client instance establishes a session with the user, in + the role of the end user. + + * (2) The client instance requests access to the resource + (Section 2). The client instance indicates that it can redirect + to an arbitrary URI (Section 2.5.1.1) and receive a redirect from + the browser (Section 2.5.2.1). The client instance stores + verification information for its redirect in the session created + in (1). + + * (3) The AS determines that interaction is needed and responds + (Section 3) with a URI to send the user to (Section 3.3.1) and + information needed to verify the redirect (Section 3.3.5) in (7). + The AS also includes information the client instance will need to + continue the request (Section 3.1) in (8). The AS associates this + continuation information with an ongoing request that will be + referenced in (4), (6), and (8). + + * (4) The client instance stores the verification and continuation + information from (3) in the session from (1). The client instance + then redirects the user to the URI (Section 4.1.1) given by the AS + in (3). The user's browser loads the interaction redirect URI. + The AS loads the pending request based on the incoming URI + generated in (3). + + * (5) The user authenticates at the AS, taking on the role of the + RO. + + * (6) As the RO, the user authorizes the pending request from the + client instance. + + * (7) When the AS is done interacting with the user, the AS + redirects the user back (Section 4.2.1) to the client instance + using the redirect URI provided in (2). The redirect URI is + augmented with an interaction reference that the AS associates + with the ongoing request created in (2) and referenced in (4). + The redirect URI is also augmented with a hash of the security + information provided in (2) and (3). The client instance loads + the verification information from (2) and (3) from the session + created in (1). The client instance calculates a hash + (Section 4.2.3) based on this information and continues only if + the hash validates. Note that the client instance needs to ensure + that the parameters for the incoming request match those that it + is expecting from the session created in (1). The client instance + also needs to be prepared for the end user never being returned to + the client instance and handle timeouts appropriately. + + * (8) The client instance loads the continuation information from + (3) and sends the interaction reference from (7) in a request to + continue the request (Section 5.1). The AS validates the + interaction reference, ensuring that the reference is associated + with the request being continued. + + * (9) If the request has been authorized, the AS grants access to + the information in the form of access tokens (Section 3.2) and + direct subject information (Section 3.4) to the client instance. + + * (10) The client instance uses the access token (Section 7.2) to + call the RS. + + * (11) The RS validates the access token and returns an appropriate + response for the API. + + An example set of protocol messages for this method can be found in + Appendix B.1. + +1.6.3. User Code Interaction + + In this example flow, the client instance is a device that is capable + of presenting a short, human-readable code to the user and directing + the user to enter that code at a known URI. The user enters the code + at a URI that is an interactive service hosted by the AS in this + example. The client instance is not capable of presenting an + arbitrary URI to the user, nor is it capable of accepting incoming + HTTP requests from the user's browser. The client instance polls the + AS while it is waiting for the RO to authorize the request. The + user's interaction is assumed to occur on a secondary device. In + this example, it is assumed that the user is both the end user and + RO. Note that since the user is not assumed to be interacting with + the client instance through the same web browser used for interaction + at the AS, the user is not shown as being connected to the client + instance in this diagram. + + +--------+ +--------+ .----. + | Client | | AS | | End | + |Instance+--(1)--- Request Access --------->| | | User | + | | | | | | + | |<-(2)-- Interaction Needed -------+ | | | + | | | | | | + | +==(3)==== Display User Code ========================>| | + | | | | | | + | | | |<==(4)===+ | + | | | |Open URI | | + | | | | +------+ + | | | |<==(5)==>| RO | + | | | | AuthN | | + | +--(9)--- Continue Request (A) --->| | | | + | | | |<==(6)==>| | + | |<-(10)-- Not Yet Granted (Wait) --+ | Code | | + | | | | | | + | | | |<==(7)==>| | + | | | | AuthZ | | + | | | | | | + | | | |<==(8)==>| | + | | | |Complete | | + | | | | +------+ + | +--(11)-- Continue Request (B) --->| | | End | + | | | | | User | + | |<-(12)----- Grant Access ---------+ | `----` + | | | | + | | | | +--------+ + | +--(13)-- Access API ---------------------------->| RS | + | | | | | | + | |<-(14)-- API Response ---------------------------+ | + | | | | +--------+ + +--------+ +--------+ + + Figure 5: Diagram of a User-Code-Based Interaction + + * (1) The client instance requests access to the resource + (Section 2). The client instance indicates that it can display a + user code (Section 2.5.1.3). + + * (2) The AS determines that interaction is needed and responds + (Section 3) with a user code to communicate to the user + (Section 3.3.3). The AS also includes information the client + instance will need to continue the request (Section 3.1) in (8) + and (10). The AS associates this continuation information with an + ongoing request that will be referenced in (4), (6), (8), and + (10). + + * (3) The client instance stores the continuation information from + (2) for use in (8) and (10). The client instance then + communicates the code to the user (Section 4.1.2) given by the AS + in (2). + + * (4) The user directs their browser to the user code URI. This URI + is stable and can be communicated via the client software's + documentation, the AS documentation, or the client software + itself. Since it is assumed that the RO will interact with the AS + through a secondary device, the client instance does not provide a + mechanism to launch the RO's browser at this URI. + + * (5) The end user authenticates at the AS, taking on the role of + the RO. + + * (6) The RO enters the code communicated in (3) to the AS. The AS + validates this code against a current request in process. + + * (7) As the RO, the user authorizes the pending request from the + client instance. + + * (8) When the AS is done interacting with the user, the AS + indicates to the RO that the request has been completed. + + * (9) Meanwhile, the client instance loads the continuation + information stored at (3) and continues the request (Section 5). + The AS determines which ongoing access request is referenced here + and checks its state. + + * (10) If the access request has not yet been authorized by the RO + in (6), the AS responds to the client instance to continue the + request (Section 3.1) at a future time through additional polled + continuation requests. This response can include updated + continuation information as well as information regarding how long + the client instance should wait before calling again. The client + instance replaces its stored continuation information from the + previous response (2). Note that the AS may need to determine + that the RO has not approved the request in a sufficient amount of + time and return an appropriate error to the client instance. + + * (11) The client instance continues to poll the AS (Section 5.2) + with the new continuation information in (9). + + * (12) If the request has been authorized, the AS grants access to + the information in the form of access tokens (Section 3.2) and + direct subject information (Section 3.4) to the client instance. + + * (13) The client instance uses the access token (Section 7.2) to + call the RS. + + * (14) The RS validates the access token and returns an appropriate + response for the API. + + An example set of protocol messages for this method can be found in + Appendix B.2. + +1.6.4. Asynchronous Authorization + + In this example flow, the end user and RO roles are fulfilled by + different parties, and the RO does not interact with the client + instance. The AS reaches out asynchronously to the RO during the + request process to gather the RO's authorization for the client + instance's request. The client instance polls the AS while it is + waiting for the RO to authorize the request. + + +--------+ +--------+ .----. + | Client | | AS | | RO | + |Instance+--(1)--- Request Access --------->| | | | + | | | | | | + | |<-(2)-- Not Yet Granted (Wait) ---+ | | | + | | | |<==(3)==>| | + | | | | AuthN | | + | +--(6)--- Continue Request (A) --->| | | | + | | | |<==(4)==>| | + | |<-(7)-- Not Yet Granted (Wait) ---+ | AuthZ | | + | | | | | | + | | | |<==(5)==>| | + | | | |Completed| | + | | | | | | + | +--(8)--- Continue Request (B) --->| | `----` + | | | | + | |<-(9)------ Grant Access ---------+ | + | | | | + | | | | +--------+ + | +--(10)-- Access API ---------------------------->| RS | + | | | | | | + | |<-(11)-- API Response ---------------------------+ | + | | | | +--------+ + +--------+ +--------+ + + Figure 6: Diagram of an Asynchronous Authorization Process, with + No End-User Interaction + + * (1) The client instance requests access to the resource + (Section 2). The client instance does not send any interaction + modes to the server, indicating that it does not expect to + interact with the RO. The client instance can also signal which + RO it requires authorization from, if known, by using the subject + request field (Section 2.2) and user request field (Section 2.4). + It's also possible for the AS to determine which RO needs to be + contacted by the nature of what access is being requested. + + * (2) The AS determines that interaction is needed, but the client + instance cannot interact with the RO. The AS responds (Section 3) + with the information the client instance will need to continue the + request (Section 3.1) in (6) and (8), including a signal that the + client instance should wait before checking the status of the + request again. The AS associates this continuation information + with an ongoing request that will be referenced in (3), (4), (5), + (6), and (8). + + * (3) The AS determines which RO to contact based on the request in + (1), through a combination of the user request (Section 2.4), the + subject request (Section 2.2), the access request (Section 2.1), + and other policy information. The AS contacts the RO and + authenticates them. + + * (4) The RO authorizes the pending request from the client + instance. + + * (5) When the AS is done interacting with the RO, the AS indicates + to the RO that the request has been completed. + + * (6) Meanwhile, the client instance loads the continuation + information stored at (2) and continues the request (Section 5). + The AS determines which ongoing access request is referenced here + and checks its state. + + * (7) If the access request has not yet been authorized by the RO in + (6), the AS responds to the client instance to continue the + request (Section 3.1) at a future time through additional polling. + Note that this response is not an error message, since no error + has yet occurred. This response can include refreshed credentials + as well as information regarding how long the client instance + should wait before calling again. The client instance replaces + its stored continuation information from the previous response + (2). Note that the AS may need to determine that the RO has not + approved the request in a sufficient amount of time and return an + appropriate error to the client instance. + + * (8) The client instance continues to poll the AS (Section 5.2) + with the new continuation information from (7). + + * (9) If the request has been authorized, the AS grants access to + the information in the form of access tokens (Section 3.2) and + direct subject information (Section 3.4) to the client instance. + + * (10) The client instance uses the access token (Section 7.2) to + call the RS. + + * (11) The RS validates the access token and returns an appropriate + response for the API. + + An example set of protocol messages for this method can be found in + Appendix B.4. + + Additional considerations for asynchronous interactions like this are + discussed in Section 11.36. + +1.6.5. Software-Only Authorization + + In this example flow, the AS policy allows the client instance to + make a call on its own behalf, without the need for an RO to be + involved at runtime to approve the decision. Since there is no + explicit RO, the client instance does not interact with an RO. + + +--------+ +--------+ + | Client | | AS | + |Instance+--(1)--- Request Access --->| | + | | | | + | |<-(2)---- Grant Access -----+ | + | | | | +--------+ + | +--(3)--- Access API ------------------->| RS | + | | | | | | + | |<-(4)--- API Response ------------------+ | + | | | | +--------+ + +--------+ +--------+ + + Figure 7: Diagram of a Software-Only Authorization, with No End + User or Explicit Resource Owner + + * (1) The client instance requests access to the resource + (Section 2). The client instance does not send any interaction + modes to the server. + + * (2) The AS determines that the request has been authorized based + on the identity of the client instance making the request and the + access requested (Section 2.1). The AS grants access to the + resource in the form of access tokens (Section 3.2) to the client + instance. Note that direct subject information (Section 3.4) is + not generally applicable in this use case, as there is no user + involved. + + * (3) The client instance uses the access token (Section 7.2) to + call the RS. + + * (4) The RS validates the access token and returns an appropriate + response for the API. + + An example set of protocol messages for this method can be found in + Appendix B.3. + +1.6.6. Refreshing an Expired Access Token + + In this example flow, the client instance receives an access token to + access an RS through some valid GNAP process. The client instance + uses that token at the RS for some time, but eventually the access + token expires. The client instance then gets a refreshed access + token by rotating the expired access token's value at the AS using + the token management API. + + +--------+ +--------+ + | Client | | AS | + |Instance+--(1)--- Request Access ----------------->| | + | | | | + | |<-(2)--- Grant Access --------------------+ | + | | | | + | | +--------+ | | + | +--(3)--- Access Resource --->| RS | | | + | | | | | | + | |<-(4)--- Success Response ---+ | | | + | | | | | | + | | ( Time Passes ) | | | | + | | | | | | + | +--(5)--- Access Resource --->| | | | + | | | | | | + | |<-(6)--- Error Response -----+ | | | + | | +--------+ | | + | | | | + | +--(7)--- Rotate Token ------------------->| | + | | | | + | |<-(8)--- Rotated Token -------------------+ | + | | | | + +--------+ +--------+ + + Figure 8: Diagram of the Process of Refreshing an Expired Access + Token + + * (1) The client instance requests access to the resource + (Section 2). + + * (2) The AS grants access to the resource (Section 3) with an + access token (Section 3.2) usable at the RS. The access token + response includes a token management URI. + + * (3) The client instance uses the access token (Section 7.2) to + call the RS. + + * (4) The RS validates the access token and returns an appropriate + response for the API. + + * (5) Time passes and the client instance uses the access token to + call the RS again. + + * (6) The RS validates the access token and determines that the + access token is expired. The RS responds to the client instance + with an error. + + * (7) The client instance calls the token management URI returned in + (2) to rotate the access token (Section 6.1). The client instance + uses the access token (Section 7.2) in this call as well as the + appropriate key; see Section 6.1 for details. + + * (8) The AS validates the rotation request, including the signature + and keys presented in (7), and refreshes the access token + (Section 3.2.1). The response includes a new version of the + access token and can also include updated token management + information, which the client instance will store in place of the + values returned in (2). + +1.6.7. Requesting Subject Information Only + + In this scenario, the client instance does not call an RS and does + not request an access token. Instead, the client instance only + requests and is returned direct subject information (Section 3.4). + Many different interaction modes can be used in this scenario, so + these are shown only in the abstract as functions of the AS here. + + +--------+ +--------+ .----. + | Client | | AS | | End | + |Instance| | | | User | + | +--(1)--- Request Access --------->| | | | + | | | | | | + | |<-(2)-- Interaction Needed -------+ | | | + | | | | | | + | +==(3)== Facilitate Interaction =====================>| | + | | | | +------+ + | | | |<==(4)==>| RO | + | | | | AuthN | | + | | | | | | + | | | |<==(5)==>| | + | | | | AuthZ +------+ + | | | | | End | + | |<=(6)== Signal Continuation =========================+ User | + | | | | `----` + | +--(7)--- Continue Request ------->| | + | | | | + | |<-(8)----- Grant Access ----------+ | + | | | | + +--------+ +--------+ + + Figure 9: Diagram of the Process of Requesting and Releasing Subject + Information apart from Access Tokens + + * (1) The client instance requests access to subject information + (Section 2). + + * (2) The AS determines that interaction is needed and responds + (Section 3) with appropriate information for facilitating user + interaction (Section 3.3). + + * (3) The client instance facilitates the user interacting with the + AS (Section 4) as directed in (2). + + * (4) The user authenticates at the AS, taking on the role of the + RO. + + * (5) As the RO, the user authorizes the pending request from the + client instance. + + * (6) When the AS is done interacting with the user, the AS returns + the user to the client instance and signals continuation. + + * (7) The client instance loads the continuation information from + (2) and calls the AS to continue the request (Section 5). + + * (8) If the request has been authorized, the AS grants access to + the requested direct subject information (Section 3.4) to the + client instance. At this stage, the user is generally considered + "logged in" to the client instance based on the identifiers and + assertions provided by the AS. Note that the AS can restrict the + subject information returned, and it might not match what the + client instance requested; see Section 3.4 for details. + +1.6.8. Cross-User Authentication + + In this scenario, the end user and RO are two different people. + Here, the client instance already knows who the end user is, likely + through a separate authentication process. The end user, operating + the client instance, needs to get subject information about another + person in the system, the RO. The RO is given an opportunity to + release this information using an asynchronous interaction method + with the AS. This scenario would apply, for instance, when the end + user is an agent in a call center and the RO is a customer + authorizing the call-center agent to access their account on their + behalf. + + .----. .----. + | End | | RO | + | User |<=================(1)== Identify RO ==================>| | + | | | | + | | +--------+ +--------+ | | + | +==(2)==>| Client | | AS | | | + | | RO ID |Instance| | | | | + | | | | | | | | + | | | +--(3)-- Req. ---->| | | | + | | | | | | | | + | | | |<-(4)-- Res. -----+ | | | + | | | | | |<==(5)==>| | + | | | | | | AuthN | | + | | | | | | | | + | | | | | |<==(6)==>| | + | | | | | | AuthZ | | + | | | | | | | | + | | | | | |<==(7)==>| | + | | | |<-(8)--- Finish --+ |Completed| | + | | | | | | | | + | | | +--(9)--- Cont. -->| | | | + | | | | | | | | + | | | |<-(10)-- Subj. ---+ | | | + | |<=(11)==+ | Info | | | | + | | Return | | | | | | + | | RO | | | | | | + | | Info | | | | | | + `----` +--------+ +--------+ `----` + + Figure 10: Diagram of Cross-User Authorization, Where the End + User and RO Are Different + + Precondition: The end user is authenticated to the client instance, + and the client instance has an identifier representing the end user + that it can present to the AS. This identifier should be unique to + the particular session with the client instance and the AS. The + client instance is also known to the AS and allowed to access this + advanced functionality where the information of someone other than + the end user is returned to the client instance. + + * (1) The RO communicates a human-readable identifier to the end + user, such as an email address or account number. This + communication happens out of band from the protocol, such as over + the phone between parties. Note that the RO is not interacting + with the client instance. + + * (2) The end user communicates the identifier to the client + instance. The means by which the identifier is communicated to + the client instance are out of scope for this specification. + + * (3) The client instance requests access to subject information + (Section 2). The request includes the RO's identifier in the + sub_ids field of the subject information request (Section 2.2) and + the end user's identifier in the user field (Section 2.4). The + request includes no interaction start methods, since the end user + is not expected to be the one interacting with the AS. The + request does include the push-based interaction finish method + (Section 2.5.2.2) to allow the AS to signal to the client instance + when the interaction with the RO has concluded. + + * (4) The AS sees that the identifiers for the end user and subject + being requested are different. The AS determines that it can + reach out to the RO asynchronously for approval. While it is + doing so, the AS returns a continuation response (Section 3.1) + with a finish nonce to allow the client instance to continue the + grant request after interaction with the RO has concluded. + + * (5) The AS contacts the RO and has them authenticate to the + system. The means for doing this are outside the scope of this + specification, but the identity of the RO is known from the + Subject Identifier sent in (3). + + * (6) The RO is prompted to authorize the end user's request via the + client instance. Since the end user was identified in (3) via the + user field, the AS can show this information to the RO during the + authorization request. + + * (7) The RO completes the authorization with the AS. The AS marks + the request as _approved_. + + * (8) The RO pushes the interaction finish message (Section 4.2.2) + to the client instance. Note that in the case the RO cannot be + reached or the RO denies the request, the AS still sends the + interaction finish message to the client instance, after which the + client instance can negotiate next steps if possible. + + * (9) The client instance validates the interaction finish message + and continues the grant request (Section 5.1). + + * (10) The AS returns the RO's subject information (Section 3.4) to + the client instance. + + * (11) The client instance can display or otherwise utilize the RO's + user information in its session with the end user. Note that + since the client instance requested different sets of user + information in (3), the client instance does not conflate the end + user with the RO. + + Additional considerations for asynchronous interactions like this are + discussed in Section 11.36. + +2. Requesting Access + + To start a request, the client instance sends an HTTP POST with a + JSON [RFC8259] document to the grant endpoint of the AS. The grant + endpoint is a URI that uniquely identifies the AS to client instances + and serves as the identifier for the AS. The document is a JSON + object where each field represents a different aspect of the client + instance's request. Each field is described in detail in a + subsection below. + + access_token (object / array of objects): Describes the rights and + properties associated with the requested access token. REQUIRED + if requesting an access token. See Section 2.1. + + subject (object): Describes the information about the RO that the + client instance is requesting to be returned directly in the + response from the AS. REQUIRED if requesting subject information. + See Section 2.2. + + client (object / string): Describes the client instance that is + making this request, including the key that the client instance + will use to protect this request, any continuation requests at the + AS, and any user-facing information about the client instance used + in interactions. REQUIRED. See Section 2.3. + + user (object / string): Identifies the end user to the AS in a + manner that the AS can verify, either directly or by interacting + with the end user to determine their status as the RO. OPTIONAL. + See Section 2.4. + + interact (object): Describes the modes that the client instance + supports for allowing the RO to interact with the AS and modes for + the client instance to receive updates when interaction is + complete. REQUIRED if interaction is supported. See Section 2.5. + + Additional members of this request object can be defined by + extensions using the "GNAP Grant Request Parameters" registry + (Section 10.3). + + A non-normative example of a grant request is below: + + { + "access_token": { + "access": [ + { + "type": "photo-api", + "actions": [ + "read", + "write", + "dolphin" + ], + "locations": [ + "https://server.example.net/", + "https://resource.local/other" + ], + "datatypes": [ + "metadata", + "images" + ] + }, + "dolphin-metadata" + ] + }, + "client": { + "display": { + "name": "My Client Display Name", + "uri": "https://example.net/client" + }, + "key": { + "proof": "httpsig", + "jwk": { + "kty": "RSA", + "e": "AQAB", + "kid": "xyz-1", + "alg": "RS256", + "n": "kOB5rR4Jv0GMeL...." + } + } + }, + "interact": { + "start": ["redirect"], + "finish": { + "method": "redirect", + "uri": "https://client.example.net/return/123455", + "nonce": "LKLTI25DK82FX4T4QFZC" + } + }, + "subject": { + "sub_id_formats": ["iss_sub", "opaque"], + "assertion_formats": ["id_token"] + } + } + + Sending a request to the grant endpoint creates a grant request in + the _processing_ state. The AS processes this request to determine + whether interaction or authorization are necessary (moving to the + _pending_ state) or if access can be granted immediately (moving to + the _approved_ state). + + The request MUST be sent as a JSON object in the content of the HTTP + POST request with Content-Type application/json. A key proofing + mechanism MAY define an alternative content type, as long as the + content is formed from the JSON object. For example, the attached + JSON Web Signature (JWS) key proofing mechanism (see Section 7.3.4) + places the JSON object into the payload of a JWS wrapper, which is in + turn sent as the message content. + +2.1. Requesting Access to Resources + + If the client instance is requesting one or more access tokens for + the purpose of accessing an API, the client instance MUST include an + access_token field. This field MUST be an object (for a single + access token (Section 2.1.1)) or an array of these objects (for + multiple access tokens (Section 2.1.2)), as described in the + following subsections. + +2.1.1. Requesting a Single Access Token + + To request a single access token, the client instance sends an + access_token object composed of the following fields. + + access (array of objects/strings): Describes the rights that the + client instance is requesting for the access token to be used at + the RS. REQUIRED. See Section 8. + + label (string): A unique name chosen by the client instance to refer + to the resulting access token. The value of this field is opaque + to the AS and is not intended to be exposed to or used by the end + user. If this field is included in the request, the AS MUST + include the same label in the token response (Section 3.2). + REQUIRED if used as part of a request for multiple access tokens + (Section 2.1.2); OPTIONAL otherwise. + + flags (array of strings): A set of flags that indicate desired + attributes or behavior to be attached to the access token by the + AS. OPTIONAL. + + The values of the flags field defined by this specification are as + follows: + + "bearer": If this flag is included, the access token being requested + is a bearer token. If this flag is omitted, the access token is + bound to the key used by the client instance in this request (or + that key's most recent rotation), and the access token MUST be + presented using the same key and proofing method. Methods for + presenting bound and bearer access tokens are described in + Section 7.2. See Section 11.9 for additional considerations on + the use of bearer tokens. + + Flag values MUST NOT be included more than once. If the request + includes a flag value multiple times, the AS MUST return an + invalid_flag error defined in Section 3.6. + + Additional flags can be defined by extensions using the "GNAP Access + Token Flags" registry (Section 10.4). + + In the following non-normative example, the client instance is + requesting access to a complex resource described by a pair of access + request object. + + "access_token": { + "access": [ + { + "type": "photo-api", + "actions": [ + "read", + "write", + "delete" + ], + "locations": [ + "https://server.example.net/", + "https://resource.local/other" + ], + "datatypes": [ + "metadata", + "images" + ] + }, + { + "type": "walrus-access", + "actions": [ + "foo", + "bar" + ], + "locations": [ + "https://resource.other/" + ], + "datatypes": [ + "data", + "pictures", + "walrus whiskers" + ] + } + ], + "label": "token1-23" + } + + If access is approved, the resulting access token is valid for the + described resource. Since the bearer flag is not provided in this + example, the token is bound to the client instance's key (or its most + recent rotation). The token is labeled "token1-23". The token + response structure is described in Section 3.2.1. + +2.1.2. Requesting Multiple Access Tokens + + To request that multiple access tokens be returned in a single + response, the client instance sends an array of objects as the value + of the access_token parameter. Each object MUST conform to the + request format for a single access token request, as specified in + Section 2.1.1. Additionally, each object in the array MUST include + the label field, and all values of these fields MUST be unique within + the request. If the client instance does not include a label value + for any entry in the array or the values of the label field are not + unique within the array, the AS MUST return an "invalid_request" + error (Section 3.6). + + The following non-normative example shows a request for two separate + access tokens: token1 and token2. + + "access_token": [ + { + "label": "token1", + "access": [ + { + "type": "photo-api", + "actions": [ + "read", + "write", + "dolphin" + ], + "locations": [ + "https://server.example.net/", + "https://resource.local/other" + ], + "datatypes": [ + "metadata", + "images" + ] + }, + "dolphin-metadata" + ] + }, + { + "label": "token2", + "access": [ + { + "type": "walrus-access", + "actions": [ + "foo", + "bar" + ], + "locations": [ + "https://resource.other/" + ], + "datatypes": [ + "data", + "pictures", + "walrus whiskers" + ] + } + ], + "flags": [ "bearer" ] + } + ] + + All approved access requests are returned in the response structure + for multiple access tokens (Section 3.2.2) using the values of the + label fields in the request. + +2.2. Requesting Subject Information + + If the client instance is requesting information about the RO from + the AS, it sends a subject field as a JSON object. This object MAY + contain the following fields. + + sub_id_formats (array of strings): An array of Subject Identifier + subject formats requested for the RO, as defined by [RFC9493]. + REQUIRED if Subject Identifiers are requested. + + assertion_formats (array of strings): An array of requested + assertion formats. Possible values include id_token for an OpenID + Connect ID Token [OIDC] and saml2 for a Security Assertion Markup + Language (SAML) 2 assertion [SAML2]. Additional assertion formats + can be defined in the "GNAP Assertion Formats" registry + (Section 10.6). REQUIRED if assertions are requested. + + sub_ids (array of objects): An array of Subject Identifiers + representing the subject for which information is being requested. + Each object is a Subject Identifier as defined by [RFC9493]. All + identifiers in the sub_ids array MUST identify the same subject. + If omitted, the AS SHOULD assume that subject information requests + are about the current user and SHOULD require direct interaction + or proof of presence before releasing information. OPTIONAL. + + Additional fields can be defined in the "GNAP Subject Information + Request Fields" registry (Section 10.5). + + "subject": { + "sub_id_formats": [ "iss_sub", "opaque" ], + "assertion_formats": [ "id_token", "saml2" ] + } + + The AS can determine the RO's identity and permission for releasing + this information through interaction with the RO (Section 4), AS + policies, or assertions presented by the client instance + (Section 2.4). If this is determined positively, the AS MAY return + the RO's information in its response (Section 3.4) as requested. + + Subject Identifier types requested by the client instance serve only + to identify the RO in the context of the AS and can't be used as + communication channels by the client instance, as discussed in + Section 3.4. + +2.3. Identifying the Client Instance + + When sending a new grant request to the AS, the client instance MUST + identify itself by including its client information in the client + field of the request and by signing the request with its unique key + as described in Section 7.3. Note that once a grant has been created + and is in either the _pending_ or the _approved_ state, the AS can + determine which client is associated with the grant by dereferencing + the continuation access token sent in the continuation request + (Section 5). As a consequence, the client field is not sent or + accepted for continuation requests. + + Client information is sent by value as an object or by reference as a + string (see Section 2.3.1). + + When client instance information is sent by value, the client field + of the request consists of a JSON object with the following fields. + + key (object / string): The public key of the client instance to be + used in this request as described in Section 7.1 or a reference to + a key as described in Section 7.1.1. REQUIRED. + + class_id (string): An identifier string that the AS can use to + identify the client software comprising this client instance. The + contents and format of this field are up to the AS. OPTIONAL. + + display (object): An object containing additional information that + the AS MAY display to the RO during interaction, authorization, + and management. OPTIONAL. See Section 2.3.2. + + "client": { + "key": { + "proof": "httpsig", + "jwk": { + "kty": "RSA", + "e": "AQAB", + "kid": "xyz-1", + "alg": "RS256", + "n": "kOB5rR4Jv0GMeLaY6_It_r3ORwdf8ci_JtffXyaSx8..." + } + }, + "class_id": "web-server-1234", + "display": { + "name": "My Client Display Name", + "uri": "https://example.net/client" + } + } + + Additional fields can be defined in the "GNAP Client Instance Fields" + registry (Section 10.7). + + Absent additional attestations, profiles, or trust mechanisms, both + the display and class_id fields are self-declarative, presented by + the client instance. The AS needs to exercise caution in their + interpretation, taking them as a hint but not as absolute truth. The + class_id field can be used in a variety of ways to help the AS make + sense of the particular context in which the client instance is + operating. In corporate environments, for example, different levels + of trust might apply depending on security policies. This field aims + to help the AS adjust its own access decisions for different classes + of client software. It is possible to configure a set of values and + rules during a pre-registration and then have the client instances + provide them later in runtime as a hint to the AS. In other cases, + the client runs with a specific AS in mind, so a single hardcoded + value would be acceptable (for instance, a set-top box with a + class_id claiming to be "FooBarTV version 4"). While the client + instance may not have contacted the AS yet, the value of this + class_id field can be evaluated by the AS according to a broader + context of dynamic use, alongside other related information available + elsewhere (for instance, corresponding fields in a certificate). If + the AS is not able to interpret or validate the class_id field, it + MUST either return an invalid_client error (Section 3.6) or interpret + the request as if the class_id were not present. See additional + discussion of client instance impersonation in Section 11.15. + + The client instance MUST prove possession of any presented key by the + proofing mechanism associated with the key in the request. Key + proofing methods are defined in the "GNAP Key Proofing Methods" + registry (Section 10.16), and an initial set of methods is described + in Section 7.3. + + If the same public key is sent by value on different access requests, + the AS MUST treat these requests as coming from the same client + instance for purposes of identification, authentication, and policy + application. + + If the AS does not know the client instance's public key ahead of + time, the AS can choose how to process the unknown key. Common + approaches include: + + * Allowing the request and requiring RO authorization in a trust-on- + first-use model + + * Limiting the client's requested access to only certain APIs and + information + + * Denying the request entirely by returning an invalid_client error + (Section 3.6) + + The client instance MUST NOT send a symmetric key by value in the key + field of the request, as doing so would expose the key directly + instead of simply proving possession of it. See considerations on + symmetric keys in Section 11.7. To use symmetric keys, the client + instance can send the key by reference (Section 7.1.1) or send the + entire client identity by reference (Section 2.3.1). + + The client instance's key can be pre-registered with the AS ahead of + time and associated with a set of policies and allowable actions + pertaining to that client. If this pre-registration includes other + fields that can occur in the client request object described in this + section, such as class_id or display, the pre-registered values MUST + take precedence over any values given at runtime. Additional fields + sent during a request but not present in a pre-registered client + instance record at the AS SHOULD NOT be added to the client's pre- + registered record. See additional considerations regarding client + instance impersonation in Section 11.15. + + A client instance that is capable of talking to multiple ASes SHOULD + use a different key for each AS to prevent a class of mix-up attacks + as described in Section 11.31, unless other mechanisms can be used to + assure the identity of the AS for a given request. + +2.3.1. Identifying the Client Instance by Reference + + If the client instance has an instance identifier that the AS can use + to determine appropriate key information, the client instance can + send this instance identifier as a direct reference value in lieu of + the client object. The instance identifier MAY be assigned to a + client instance at runtime through a grant response (Section 3.5) or + MAY be obtained in another fashion, such as a static registration + process at the AS. + + "client": "client-541-ab" + + When the AS receives a request with an instance identifier, the AS + MUST ensure that the key used to sign the request (Section 7.3) is + associated with the instance identifier. + + If the AS does not recognize the instance identifier, the request + MUST be rejected with an invalid_client error (Section 3.6). + +2.3.2. Providing Displayable Client Instance Information + + If the client instance has additional information to display to the + RO during any interactions at the AS, it MAY send that information in + the "display" field. This field is a JSON object that declares + information to present to the RO during any interactive sequences. + + name (string): Display name of the client software. RECOMMENDED. + + uri (string): User-facing information about the client software, + such as a web page. This URI MUST be an absolute URI. OPTIONAL. + + logo_uri (string): Display image to represent the client software. + This URI MUST be an absolute URI. The logo MAY be passed by value + by using a data: URI [RFC2397] referencing an image media type. + OPTIONAL. + + "display": { + "name": "My Client Display Name", + "uri": "https://example.net/client", + "logo_uri": "...=" + } + + Additional display fields can be defined in the "GNAP Client Instance + Display Fields" registry (Section 10.8). + + The AS SHOULD use these values during interaction with the RO. The + values are for informational purposes only and MUST NOT be taken as + authentic proof of the client instance's identity or source. The AS + MAY restrict display values to specific client instances, as + identified by their keys in Section 2.3. See additional + considerations for displayed client information in Section 11.15 and + for the logo_uri in particular in Section 11.16. + +2.3.3. Authenticating the Client Instance + + If the presented key is known to the AS and is associated with a + single instance of the client software, the process of presenting a + key and proving possession of that key is sufficient to authenticate + the client instance to the AS. The AS MAY associate policies with + the client instance identified by this key, such as limiting which + resources can be requested and which interaction methods can be used. + For example, only specific client instances with certain known keys + might be trusted with access tokens without the AS interacting + directly with the RO, as in Appendix B.3. + + The presentation of a key allows the AS to strongly associate + multiple successive requests from the same client instance with each + other. This is true when the AS knows the key ahead of time and can + use the key to authenticate the client instance, but it is also true + if the key is ephemeral and created just for this series of requests. + As such, the AS MAY allow for client instances to make requests with + unknown keys. This pattern allows for ephemeral client instances + (such as single-page applications) and client software with many + individual long-lived instances (such as mobile applications) to + generate key pairs per instance and use the keys within the protocol + without having to go through a separate registration step. The AS + MAY limit which capabilities are made available to client instances + with unknown keys. For example, the AS could have a policy saying + that only previously registered client instances can request + particular resources or that all client instances with unknown keys + have to be interactively approved by an RO. + +2.4. Identifying the User + + If the client instance knows the identity of the end user through one + or more identifiers or assertions, the client instance MAY send that + information to the AS in the user field. The client instance MAY + pass this information by value or by reference (see Section 2.4.1). + + sub_ids (array of objects): An array of Subject Identifiers for the + end user, as defined by [RFC9493]. OPTIONAL. + + assertions (array of objects): An array containing assertions as + objects, each containing the assertion format and the assertion + value as the JSON string serialization of the assertion, as + defined in Section 3.4. OPTIONAL. + + "user": { + "sub_ids": [ { + "format": "opaque", + "id": "J2G8G8O4AZ" + } ], + "assertions": [ { + "format": "id_token", + "value": "eyj..." + } ] + } + + Subject Identifiers are hints to the AS in determining the RO and + MUST NOT be taken as authoritative statements that a particular RO is + present at the client instance and acting as the end user. + + Assertions presented by the client instance SHOULD be validated by + the AS. While the details of such validation are outside the scope + of this specification, common validation steps include verifying the + signature of the assertion against a trusted signing key, verifying + the audience and issuer of the assertion map to expected values, and + verifying the time window for the assertion itself. However, note + that in many use cases, some of these common steps are relaxed. For + example, an AS acting as an identity provider (IdP) could expect that + assertions being presented using this mechanism were issued by the AS + to the client software. The AS would verify that the AS is the + issuer of the assertion, not the audience, and that the client + instance is instead the audience of the assertion. Similarly, an AS + might accept a recently expired assertion in order to help bootstrap + a new session with a specific end user. + + If the identified end user does not match the RO present at the AS + during an interaction step and the AS is not explicitly allowing a + cross-user authorization, the AS SHOULD reject the request with an + unknown_user error (Section 3.6). + + If the AS trusts the client instance to present verifiable assertions + or known Subject Identifiers, such as an opaque identifier issued by + the AS for this specific client instance, the AS MAY decide, based on + its policy, to skip interaction with the RO, even if the client + instance provides one or more interaction modes in its request. + + See Section 11.30 for considerations for the AS when accepting and + processing assertions from the client instance. + +2.4.1. Identifying the User by Reference + + The AS can identify the current end user to the client instance with + a reference that can be used by the client instance to refer to the + end user across multiple requests. If the client instance has a + reference for the end user at this AS, the client instance MAY pass + that reference as a string. The format of this string is opaque to + the client instance. + + "user": "XUT2MFM1XBIKJKSDU8QM" + + One means of dynamically obtaining such a user reference is from the + AS returning an opaque Subject Identifier as described in + Section 3.4. Other means of configuring a client instance with a + user identifier are out of scope of this specification. The lifetime + and validity of these user references are determined by the AS, and + this lifetime is not exposed to the client instance in GNAP. As + such, a client instance using such a user reference is likely to keep + using that reference until it stops working. + + User reference identifiers are not intended to be human-readable user + identifiers or structured assertions. For the client instance to + send either of these, the client can use the full user request object + (Section 2.4) instead. + + If the AS does not recognize the user reference, it MUST return an + unknown_user error (Section 3.6). + +2.5. Interacting with the User + + Often, the AS will require interaction with the RO (Section 4) in + order to approve a requested delegation to the client instance for + both access to resources and direct subject information. Many times, + the end user using the client instance is the same person as the RO, + and the client instance can directly drive interaction with the end + user by facilitating the process through means such as redirection to + a URI or launching an application. Other times, the client instance + can provide information to start the RO's interaction on a secondary + device, or the client instance will wait for the RO to approve the + request asynchronously. The client instance could also be signaled + that interaction has concluded through a callback mechanism. + + The client instance declares the parameters for interaction methods + that it can support using the interact field. + + The interact field is a JSON object with three keys whose values + declare how the client can initiate and complete the request, as well + as provide hints to the AS about user preferences such as locale. A + client instance MUST NOT declare an interaction mode it does not + support. The client instance MAY send multiple modes in the same + request. There is no preference order specified in this request. An + AS MAY respond to any, all, or none of the presented interaction + modes (Section 3.3) in a request, depending on its capabilities and + what is allowed to fulfill the request. + + start (array of objects/strings): Indicates how the client instance + can start an interaction. REQUIRED. See Section 2.5.1. + + finish (object): Indicates how the client instance can receive an + indication that interaction has finished at the AS. OPTIONAL. + See Section 2.5.2. + + hints (object): Provides additional information to inform the + interaction process at the AS. OPTIONAL. See Section 2.5.3. + + In the following non-normative example, the client instance is + indicating that it can redirect (Section 2.5.1.1) the end user to an + arbitrary URI and can receive a redirect (Section 2.5.2.1) through a + browser request. Note that the client instance does not accept a + push-style callback. The pattern of using a redirect for both + interaction start and finish is common for web-based client software. + + "interact": { + "start": ["redirect"], + "finish": { + "method": "redirect", + "uri": "https://client.example.net/return/123455", + "nonce": "LKLTI25DK82FX4T4QFZC" + } + } + + In the following non-normative example, the client instance is + indicating that it can display a user code (Section 2.5.1.3) and + direct the end user to an arbitrary URI (Section 2.5.1.1), but it + cannot accept a redirect or push-style callback. This pattern is + common for devices that have robust display capabilities but expect + the use of a secondary device to facilitate end-user interaction with + the AS, such as a set-top box capable of displaying an interaction + URL as a QR code. + + "interact": { + "start": ["redirect", "user_code"] + } + + In the following non-normative example, the client instance is + indicating that it cannot start any interaction with the end user but + that the AS can push an interaction finish message (Section 2.5.2.2) + when authorization from the RO is received asynchronously. This + pattern is common for scenarios where a service needs to be + authorized, but the RO is able to be contacted separately from the + GNAP transaction itself, such as through a push notification or + existing interactive session on a secondary device. + + "interact": { + "start": [], + "finish": { + "method": "push", + "uri": "https://client.example.net/return/123455", + "nonce": "LKLTI25DK82FX4T4QFZC" + } + } + + If all of the following conditions are true, the AS MUST return an + invalid_interaction error (Section 3.6) since the client instance + will be unable to complete the request without authorization: + + * The client instance does not provide a suitable interaction + mechanism. + + * The AS cannot contact the RO asynchronously. + + * The AS determines that interaction is required. + +2.5.1. Start Mode Definitions + + If the client instance is capable of starting interaction with the + end user, the client instance indicates this by sending an array of + start modes under the start key. Each interaction start mode has a + unique identifying name. Interaction start modes are specified in + the array either by a string, which consists of the start mode name + on its own, or by a JSON object with the required field mode: + + mode: The interaction start mode. REQUIRED. + + Interaction start modes defined as objects MAY define additional + parameters to be required in the object. + + The start array can contain both string-type and object-type modes. + + This specification defines the following interaction start modes: + + "redirect" (string): Indicates that the client instance can direct + the end user to an arbitrary URI for interaction. See + Section 2.5.1.1. + + "app" (string): Indicates that the client instance can launch an + application on the end user's device for interaction. See + Section 2.5.1.2. + + "user_code" (string): Indicates that the client instance can + communicate a short, human-readable code to the end user for use + with a stable URI. See Section 2.5.1.3. + + "user_code_uri" (string): Indicates that the client instance can + communicate a short, human-readable code to the end user for use + with a short, dynamic URI. See Section 2.5.1.4. + + Additional start modes can be defined in the "GNAP Interaction Start + Modes" registry (Section 10.9). + +2.5.1.1. Redirect to an Arbitrary URI + + If the client instance is capable of directing the end user to a URI + defined by the AS at runtime, the client instance indicates this by + including redirect in the array under the start key. The means by + which the client instance will activate this URI are out of scope of + this specification, but common methods include an HTTP redirect, + launching a browser on the end user's device, providing a scannable + image encoding, and printing out a URI to an interactive console. + While this URI is generally hosted at the AS, the client instance can + make no assumptions about its contents, composition, or relationship + to the grant endpoint URI. + + "interact": { + "start": ["redirect"] + } + + If this interaction mode is supported for this client instance and + request, the AS returns a redirect interaction response + (Section 3.3.1). The client instance manages this interaction method + as described in Section 4.1.1. + + See Section 11.29 for more considerations regarding the use of front- + channel communication techniques. + +2.5.1.2. Open an Application-Specific URI + + If the client instance can open a URI associated with an application + on the end user's device, the client instance indicates this by + including app in the array under the start key. The means by which + the client instance determines the application to open with this URI + are out of scope of this specification. + + "interact": { + "start": ["app"] + } + + If this interaction mode is supported for this client instance and + request, the AS returns an app interaction response with an app URI + payload (Section 3.3.2). The client instance manages this + interaction method as described in Section 4.1.4. + +2.5.1.3. Display a Short User Code + + If the client instance is capable of displaying or otherwise + communicating a short, human-entered code to the RO, the client + instance indicates this by including user_code in the array under the + start key. This code is to be entered at a static URI that does not + change at runtime. The client instance has no reasonable means to + communicate a dynamic URI to the RO, so this URI is usually + communicated out of band to the RO through documentation or other + messaging outside of GNAP. While this URI is generally hosted at the + AS, the client instance can make no assumptions about its contents, + composition, or relationship to the grant endpoint URI. + + "interact": { + "start": ["user_code"] + } + + If this interaction mode is supported for this client instance and + request, the AS returns a user code as specified in Section 3.3.3. + The client instance manages this interaction method as described in + Section 4.1.2. + +2.5.1.4. Display a Short User Code and URI + + If the client instance is capable of displaying or otherwise + communicating a short, human-entered code along with a short, human- + entered URI to the RO, the client instance indicates this by + including user_code_uri in the array under the start key. This code + is to be entered at the dynamic URL given in the response. While + this URL is generally hosted at the AS, the client instance can make + no assumptions about its contents, composition, or relationship to + the grant endpoint URI. + + "interact": { + "start": ["user_code_uri"] + } + + If this interaction mode is supported for this client instance and + request, the AS returns a user code and interaction URL as specified + in Section 3.3.4. The client instance manages this interaction + method as described in Section 4.1.3. + +2.5.2. Interaction Finish Methods + + If the client instance is capable of receiving a message from the AS + indicating that the RO has completed their interaction, the client + instance indicates this by sending the following members of an object + under the finish key. + + method (string): The callback method that the AS will use to contact + the client instance. REQUIRED. + + uri (string): Indicates the URI that the AS will use to signal the + client instance that interaction has completed. This URI MAY be + unique per request and MUST be hosted by or accessible to the + client instance. This URI MUST be an absolute URI and MUST NOT + contain any fragment component. If the client instance needs any + state information to tie to the front-channel interaction + response, it MUST use a unique callback URI to link to that + ongoing state. The allowable URIs and URI patterns MAY be + restricted by the AS based on the client instance's presented key + information. The callback URI SHOULD be presented to the RO + during the interaction phase before redirect. REQUIRED for + redirect and push methods. + + nonce (string): Unique ASCII string value to be used in the + calculation of the "hash" query parameter sent to the callback + URI. It must be sufficiently random to be unguessable by an + attacker. It MUST be generated by the client instance as a unique + value for this request. REQUIRED. + + hash_method (string): An identifier of a hash calculation mechanism + to be used for the callback hash in Section 4.2.3, as defined in + the IANA "Named Information Hash Algorithm Registry" [HASH-ALG]. + If absent, the default value is sha-256. OPTIONAL. + + This specification defines the following values for the method + parameter; additional values can be defined in the "GNAP Interaction + Finish Methods" registry (Section 10.10): + + "redirect": Indicates that the client instance can receive a + redirect from the end user's device after interaction with the RO + has concluded. See Section 2.5.2.1. + + "push": Indicates that the client instance can receive an HTTP POST + request from the AS after interaction with the RO has concluded. + See Section 2.5.2.2. + + If interaction finishing is supported for this client instance and + request, the AS will return a nonce (Section 3.3.5) used by the + client instance to validate the callback. All interaction finish + methods MUST use this nonce to allow the client to verify the + connection between the pending interaction request and the callback. + GNAP does this through the use of the interaction hash, defined in + Section 4.2.3. All requests to the callback URI MUST be processed as + described in Section 4.2. + + All interaction finish methods MUST require presentation of an + interaction reference for continuing this grant request. This means + that the interaction reference MUST be returned by the AS and MUST be + presented by the client as described in Section 5.1. The means by + which the interaction reference is returned to the client instance + are specific to the interaction finish method. + +2.5.2.1. Receive an HTTP Callback through the Browser + + A finish method value of redirect indicates that the client instance + will expect a request from the RO's browser using the HTTP method GET + as described in Section 4.2.1. + + The client instance's URI MUST be protected by HTTPS, be hosted on a + server local to the RO's browser ("localhost"), or use an + application-specific URI scheme that is loaded on the end user's + device. + + "interact": { + "finish": { + "method": "redirect", + "uri": "https://client.example.net/return/123455", + "nonce": "LKLTI25DK82FX4T4QFZC" + } + } + + Requests to the callback URI MUST be processed by the client instance + as described in Section 4.2.1. + + Since the incoming request to the callback URI is from the RO's + browser, this method is usually used when the RO and end user are the + same entity. See Section 11.24 for considerations on ensuring the + incoming HTTP message matches the expected context of the request. + See Section 11.29 for more considerations regarding the use of front- + channel communication techniques. + +2.5.2.2. Receive an HTTP Direct Callback + + A finish method value of push indicates that the client instance will + expect a request from the AS directly using the HTTP method POST as + described in Section 4.2.2. + + The client instance's URI MUST be protected by HTTPS, be hosted on a + server local to the RO's browser ("localhost"), or use an + application-specific URI scheme that is loaded on the end user's + device. + + "interact": { + "finish": { + "method": "push", + "uri": "https://client.example.net/return/123455", + "nonce": "LKLTI25DK82FX4T4QFZC" + } + } + + Requests to the callback URI MUST be processed by the client instance + as described in Section 4.2.2. + + Since the incoming request to the callback URI is from the AS and not + from the RO's browser, this request is not expected to have any + shared session information from the start method. See Sections 11.24 + and 11.23 for more considerations regarding the use of back-channel + and polling mechanisms like this. + +2.5.3. Hints + + The hints key is an object describing one or more suggestions from + the client instance that the AS can use to help drive user + interaction. + + This specification defines the following property under the hints + key: + + ui_locales (array of strings): Indicates the end user's preferred + locales that the AS can use during interaction, particularly + before the RO has authenticated. OPTIONAL. Section 2.5.3.1 + + The following subsection details requests for interaction hints. + Additional interaction hints can be defined in the "GNAP Interaction + Hints" registry (Section 10.11). + +2.5.3.1. Indicate Desired Interaction Locales + + If the client instance knows the end user's locale and language + preferences, the client instance can send this information to the AS + using the ui_locales field with an array of locale strings as defined + by [RFC5646]. + + "interact": { + "hints": { + "ui_locales": ["en-US", "fr-CA"] + } + } + + If possible, the AS SHOULD use one of the locales in the array, with + preference to the first item in the array supported by the AS. If + none of the given locales are supported, the AS MAY use a default + locale. + +3. Grant Response + + In response to a client instance's request, the AS responds with a + JSON object as the HTTP content. Each possible field is detailed in + the subsections below. + + continue (object): Indicates that the client instance can continue + the request by making one or more continuation requests. REQUIRED + if continuation calls are allowed for this client instance on this + grant request. See Section 3.1. + + access_token (object / array of objects): A single access token or + set of access tokens that the client instance can use to call the + RS on behalf of the RO. REQUIRED if an access token is included. + See Section 3.2. + + interact (object): Indicates that interaction through some set of + defined mechanisms needs to take place. REQUIRED if interaction + is expected. See Section 3.3. + + subject (object): Claims about the RO as known and declared by the + AS. REQUIRED if subject information is included. See + Section 3.4. + + instance_id (string): An identifier this client instance can use to + identify itself when making future requests. OPTIONAL. See + Section 3.5. + + error (object or string): An error code indicating that something + has gone wrong. REQUIRED for an error condition. See + Section 3.6. + + Additional fields can be defined by extensions to GNAP in the "GNAP + Grant Response Parameters" registry (Section 10.12). + + In the following non-normative example, the AS is returning an + interaction URI (Section 3.3.1), a callback nonce (Section 3.3.5), + and a continuation response (Section 3.1). + + NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 + + { + "interact": { + "redirect": "https://server.example.com/interact/4CF492ML\ + VMSW9MKMXKHQ", + "finish": "MBDOFXG4Y5CVJCX821LH" + }, + "continue": { + "access_token": { + "value": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU", + }, + "uri": "https://server.example.com/tx" + } + } + + In the following non-normative example, the AS is returning a bearer + access token (Section 3.2.1) with a management URI and a Subject + Identifier (Section 3.4) in the form of an opaque identifier. + + { + "access_token": { + "value": "OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0", + "flags": ["bearer"], + "manage": { + "uri": "https://server.example.com/token/PRY5NM33O", + "access_token": { + "value": "B8CDFONP21-4TB8N6.BW7ONM" + } + } + }, + "subject": { + "sub_ids": [ { + "format": "opaque", + "id": "J2G8G8O4AZ" + } ] + } + } + + In the following non-normative example, the AS is returning set of + Subject Identifiers (Section 3.4), simultaneously as an opaque + identifier, an email address, and a decentralized identifier (DID), + formatted as a set of Subject Identifiers as defined in [RFC9493]. + + { + "subject": { + "sub_ids": [ { + "format": "opaque", + "id": "J2G8G8O4AZ" + }, { + "format": "email", + "email": "user@example.com" + }, { + "format": "did", + "url": "did:example:123456" + } ] + } + } + + The response MUST be sent as a JSON object in the content of the HTTP + response with Content-Type application/json, unless otherwise + specified by the specific response (e.g., an empty response with no + Content-Type). + + The AS MUST include the HTTP Cache-Control response header field + [RFC9111] with a value set to "no-store". + +3.1. Request Continuation + + If the AS determines that the grant request can be continued by the + client instance, the AS responds with the continue field. This field + contains a JSON object with the following properties. + + uri (string): The URI at which the client instance can make + continuation requests. This URI MAY vary per request or MAY be + stable at the AS. This URI MUST be an absolute URI. The client + instance MUST use this value exactly as given when making a + continuation request (Section 5). REQUIRED. + + wait (integer): The amount of time in integer seconds the client + instance MUST wait after receiving this request continuation + response and calling the continuation URI. The value SHOULD NOT + be less than five seconds, and omission of the value MUST be + interpreted as five seconds. RECOMMENDED. + + access_token (object): A unique access token for continuing the + request, called the "continuation access token". The value of + this property MUST be an object in the format specified in + Section 3.2.1. This access token MUST be bound to the client + instance's key used in the request and MUST NOT be a bearer token. + As a consequence, the flags array of this access token MUST NOT + contain the string bearer, and the key field MUST be omitted. + This access token MUST NOT have a manage field. The client + instance MUST present the continuation access token in all + requests to the continuation URI as described in Section 7.2. + REQUIRED. + + { + "continue": { + "access_token": { + "value": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU" + }, + "uri": "https://server.example.com/continue", + "wait": 60 + } + } + + This field is REQUIRED if the grant request is in the _pending_ + state, as the field contains the information needed by the client + request to continue the request as described in Section 5. Note that + the continuation access token is bound to the client instance's key; + therefore, the client instance MUST sign all continuation requests + with its key as described in Section 7.3 and MUST present the + continuation access token in its continuation request. + +3.2. Access Tokens + + If the AS has successfully granted one or more access tokens to the + client instance, the AS responds with the access_token field. This + field contains either a single access token as described in + Section 3.2.1 or an array of access tokens as described in + Section 3.2.2. + + The client instance uses any access tokens in this response to call + the RS as described in Section 7.2. + + The grant request MUST be in the _approved_ state to include this + field in the response. + +3.2.1. Single Access Token + + If the client instance has requested a single access token and the AS + has granted that access token, the AS responds with the + "access_token" field. The value of this field is an object with the + following properties. + + value (string): The value of the access token as a string. The + value is opaque to the client instance. The value MUST be limited + to the token68 character set defined in Section 11.2 of [HTTP] to + facilitate transmission over HTTP headers and within other + protocols without requiring additional encoding. REQUIRED. + + label (string): The value of the label the client instance provided + in the associated token request (Section 2.1), if present. + REQUIRED for multiple access tokens or if a label was included in + the single access token request; OPTIONAL for a single access + token where no label was included in the request. + + manage (object): Access information for the token management API for + this access token. If provided, the client instance MAY manage + its access token as described in Section 6. This management API + is a function of the AS and is separate from the RS the client + instance is requesting access to. OPTIONAL. + + access (array of objects/strings): A description of the rights + associated with this access token, as defined in Section 8. If + included, this MUST reflect the rights associated with the issued + access token. These rights MAY vary from what was requested by + the client instance. REQUIRED. + + expires_in (integer): The number of seconds in which the access will + expire. The client instance MUST NOT use the access token past + this time. Note that the access token MAY be revoked by the AS or + RS at any point prior to its expiration. OPTIONAL. + + key (object / string): The key that the token is bound to, if + different from the client instance's presented key. The key MUST + be an object or string in a format described in Section 7.1. The + client instance MUST be able to dereference or process the key + information in order to be able to sign subsequent requests using + the access token (Section 7.2). When the key is provided by value + from the AS, the token shares some security properties with bearer + tokens as discussed in Section 11.38. It is RECOMMENDED that keys + returned for use with access tokens be key references as described + in Section 7.1.1 that the client instance can correlate to its + known keys. OPTIONAL. + + flags (array of strings): A set of flags that represent attributes + or behaviors of the access token issued by the AS. OPTIONAL. + + The value of the manage field is an object with the following + properties: + + uri (string): The URI of the token management API for this access + token. This URI MUST be an absolute URI. This URI MUST NOT + include the value of the access token being managed or the value + of the access token used to protect the URI. This URI SHOULD be + different for each access token issued in a request. REQUIRED. + + access_token (object): A unique access token for continuing the + request, called the "token management access token". The value of + this property MUST be an object in the format specified in + Section 3.2.1. This access token MUST be bound to the client + instance's key used in the request (or its most recent rotation) + and MUST NOT be a bearer token. As a consequence, the flags array + of this access token MUST NOT contain the string bearer, and the + key field MUST be omitted. This access token MUST NOT have a + manage field. This access token MUST NOT have the same value as + the token it is managing. The client instance MUST present the + continuation access token in all requests to the continuation URI + as described in Section 7.2. REQUIRED. + + The values of the flags field defined by this specification are as + follows: + + "bearer": Flag indicating whether the token is a bearer token, not + bound to a key and proofing mechanism. If the bearer flag is + present, the access token is a bearer token, and the key field in + this response MUST be omitted. See Section 11.9 for additional + considerations on the use of bearer tokens. + + "durable": Flag indicating a hint of AS behavior on token rotation. + If this flag is present, then the client instance can expect a + previously issued access token to continue to work after it has + been rotated (Section 6.1) or the underlying grant request has + been modified (Section 5.3), resulting in the issuance of new + access tokens. If this flag is omitted, the client instance can + anticipate a given access token could stop working after token + rotation or grant request modification. Note that a token flagged + as durable can still expire or be revoked through any normal + means. + + Flag values MUST NOT be included more than once. + + Additional flags can be defined by extensions using the "GNAP Access + Token Flags" registry (Section 10.4). + + If the bearer flag and the key field in this response are omitted, + the token is bound to the key used by the client instance + (Section 2.3) in its request for access. If the bearer flag is + omitted and the key field is present, the token is bound to the key + and proofing mechanism indicated in the key field. The means by + which the AS determines how to bind an access token to a key other + than that presented by the client instance are out of scope for this + specification, but common practices include pre-registering specific + keys in a static fashion. + + The client software MUST reject any access token where the flags + field contains the bearer flag and the key field is present with any + value. + + The following non-normative example shows a single access token bound + to the client instance's key used in the initial request. The access + token has a management URI and has access to three described + resources (one using an object and two described by reference + strings). + + NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 + + "access_token": { + "value": "OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0", + "manage": { + "uri": "https://server.example.com/token/PRY5NM33O", + "access_token": { + "value": "B8CDFONP21-4TB8N6.BW7ONM" + } + }, + "access": [ + { + "type": "photo-api", + "actions": [ + "read", + "write", + "dolphin" + ], + "locations": [ + "https://server.example.net/", + "https://resource.local/other" + ], + "datatypes": [ + "metadata", + "images" + ] + }, + "read", "dolphin-metadata" + ] + } + + The following non-normative example shows a single bearer access + token with access to two described resources. + + "access_token": { + "value": "OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0", + "flags": ["bearer"], + "access": [ + "finance", "medical" + ] + } + + If the client instance requested a single access token + (Section 2.1.1), the AS MUST NOT respond with the structure for + multiple access tokens. + +3.2.2. Multiple Access Tokens + + If the client instance has requested multiple access tokens and the + AS has granted at least one of them, the AS responds with the + "access_token" field. The value of this field is a JSON array, the + members of which are distinct access tokens as described in + Section 3.2.1. Each object MUST have a unique label field, + corresponding to the token labels chosen by the client instance in + the request for multiple access tokens (Section 2.1.2). + + In the following non-normative example, two tokens are issued under + the names token1 and token2, and only the first token has a + management URI associated with it. + + NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 + + "access_token": [ + { + "label": "token1", + "value": "OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0", + "manage": { + "uri": "https://server.example.com/token/PRY5NM33O", + "access_token": { + "value": "B8CDFONP21-4TB8N6.BW7ONM" + } + }, + "access": [ "finance" ] + }, + { + "label": "token2", + "value": "UFGLO2FDAFG7VGZZPJ3IZEMN21EVU71FHCARP4J1", + "access": [ "medical" ] + } + } + + Each access token corresponds to one of the objects in the + access_token array of the client instance's request (Section 2.1.2). + + The AS MAY refuse to issue one or more of the requested access tokens + for any reason. In such cases, the refused token is omitted from the + response, and all of the other issued access tokens are included in + the response under their respective requested labels. If the client + instance requested multiple access tokens (Section 2.1.2), the AS + MUST NOT respond with a single access token structure, even if only a + single access token is granted. In such cases, the AS MUST respond + with a structure for multiple access tokens containing one access + token. + + "access_token": [ + { + "label": "token2", + "value": "8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219-OS9M2PMHKUR64TBRP1LT0", + "manage": { + "uri": "https://server.example.com/token/PRY5NM33O", + "access_token": { + "value": "B8CDFONP21-4TB8N6.BW7ONM" + } + }, + "access": [ "fruits" ] + } + ] + + The parameters of each access token are separate. For example, each + access token is expected to have a unique value and (if present) + label, and each access token likely has different access rights + associated with it. Each access token could also be bound to + different keys with different proofing mechanisms. + +3.3. Interaction Modes + + If the client instance has indicated a capability to interact with + the RO in its request (Section 2.5) and the AS has determined that + interaction is both supported and necessary, the AS responds to the + client instance with any of the following values in the interact + field of the response. There is no preference order for interaction + modes in the response, and it is up to the client instance to + determine which ones to use. All supported interaction methods are + included in the same interact object. + + redirect (string): Redirect to an arbitrary URI. REQUIRED if the + redirect interaction start mode is possible for this request. See + Section 3.3.1. + + app (string): Launch of an application URI. REQUIRED if the app + interaction start mode is possible for this request. See + Section 3.3.2. + + user_code (string): Display a short user code. REQUIRED if the + user_code interaction start mode is possible for this request. + See Section 3.3.3. + + user_code_uri (object): Display a short user code and URI. REQUIRED + if the user_code_uri interaction start mode is possible for this + request. Section 3.3.4 + + finish (string): A unique ASCII string value provided by the AS as a + nonce. This is used by the client instance to verify the callback + after interaction is completed. REQUIRED if the interaction + finish method requested by the client instance is possible for + this request. See Section 3.3.5. + + expires_in (integer): The number of integer seconds after which this + set of interaction responses will expire and no longer be usable + by the client instance. If the interaction methods expire, the + client MAY restart the interaction process for this grant request + by sending an update (Section 5.3) with a new interaction request + field (Section 2.5). OPTIONAL. If omitted, the interaction + response modes returned do not expire but MAY be invalidated by + the AS at any time. + + Additional interaction mode responses can be defined in the "GNAP + Interaction Mode Responses" registry (Section 10.13). + + The AS MUST NOT respond with any interaction mode that the client + instance did not indicate in its request, and the AS MUST NOT respond + with any interaction mode that the AS does not support. Since + interaction responses include secret or unique information, the AS + SHOULD respond to each interaction mode only once in an ongoing + request, particularly if the client instance modifies its request + (Section 5.3). + + The grant request MUST be in the _pending_ state to include this + field in the response. + +3.3.1. Redirection to an Arbitrary URI + + If the client instance indicates that it can redirect to an arbitrary + URI (Section 2.5.1.1) and the AS supports this mode for the client + instance's request, the AS responds with the "redirect" field, which + is a string containing the URI for the end user to visit. This URI + MUST be unique for the request and MUST NOT contain any security- + sensitive information such as user identifiers or access tokens. + + "interact": { + "redirect": "https://interact.example.com/4CF492MLVMSW9MKMXKHQ" + } + + The URI returned is a function of the AS, but the URI itself MAY be + completely distinct from the grant endpoint URI that the client + instance uses to request access (Section 2), allowing an AS to + separate its user-interaction functionality from its backend security + functionality. The AS will need to dereference the specific grant + request and its information from the URI alone. If the AS does not + directly host the functionality accessed through the redirect URI, + then the means for the interaction functionality to communicate with + the rest of the AS are out of scope for this specification. + + The client instance sends the end user to the URI to interact with + the AS. The client instance MUST NOT alter the URI in any way. The + means for the client instance to send the end user to this URI are + out of scope of this specification, but common methods include an + HTTP redirect, launching the system browser, displaying a scannable + code, or printing out the URI in an interactive console. See details + of the interaction in Section 4.1.1. + +3.3.2. Launch of an Application URI + + If the client instance indicates that it can launch an application + URI (Section 2.5.1.2) and the AS supports this mode for the client + instance's request, the AS responds with the "app" field, which is a + string containing the URI for the client instance to launch. This + URI MUST be unique for the request and MUST NOT contain any security- + sensitive information such as user identifiers or access tokens. + + "interact": { + "app": "https://app.example.com/launch?tx=4CF492MLV" + } + + The means for the launched application to communicate with the AS are + out of scope for this specification. + + The client instance launches the URI as appropriate on its platform; + the means for the client instance to launch this URI are out of scope + of this specification. The client instance MUST NOT alter the URI in + any way. The client instance MAY attempt to detect if an installed + application will service the URI being sent before attempting to + launch the application URI. See details of the interaction in + Section 4.1.4. + +3.3.3. Display of a Short User Code + + If the client instance indicates that it can display a short, user- + typeable code (Section 2.5.1.3) and the AS supports this mode for the + client instance's request, the AS responds with a "user_code" field. + This field is string containing a unique short code that the user can + type into a web page. To facilitate usability, this string MUST + consist only of characters that can be easily typed by the end user + (such as ASCII letters or numbers) and MUST be processed by the AS in + a case-insensitive manner (see Section 4.1.2). The string MUST be + randomly generated so as to be unguessable by an attacker within the + time it is accepted. The time in which this code will be accepted + SHOULD be short lived, such as several minutes. It is RECOMMENDED + that this code be between six and eight characters in length. + + "interact": { + "user_code": "A1BC3DFF" + } + + The client instance MUST communicate the "user_code" value to the end + user in some fashion, such as displaying it on a screen or reading it + out audibly. This code is used by the interaction component of the + AS as a means of identifying the pending grant request and does not + function as an authentication factor for the RO. + + The URI that the end user is intended to enter the code into MUST be + stable, since the client instance is expected to have no means of + communicating a dynamic URI to the end user at runtime. + + As this interaction mode is designed to facilitate interaction via a + secondary device, it is not expected that the client instance + redirect the end user to the URI where the code is entered. If the + client instance is capable of communicating a short arbitrary URI to + the end user for use with the user code, the client instance SHOULD + instead use the "user_code_uri" mode (Section 2.5.1.4). If the + client instance is capable of communicating a long arbitrary URI to + the end user, such as through a scannable code, the client instance + SHOULD use the "redirect" mode (Section 2.5.1.1) for this purpose, + instead of or in addition to the user code mode. + + See details of the interaction in Section 4.1.2. + +3.3.4. Display of a Short User Code and URI + + If the client instance indicates that it can display a short, user- + typeable code (Section 2.5.1.3) and the AS supports this mode for the + client instance's request, the AS responds with a "user_code_uri" + object that contains the following members. + + code (string): A unique short code that the end user can type into a + provided URI. To facilitate usability, this string MUST consist + only of characters that can be easily typed by the end user (such + as ASCII letters or numbers) and MUST be processed by the AS in a + case-insensitive manner (see Section 4.1.3). The string MUST be + randomly generated so as to be unguessable by an attacker within + the time it is accepted. The time in which this code will be + accepted SHOULD be short lived, such as several minutes. It is + RECOMMENDED that this code be between six and eight characters in + length. REQUIRED. + + uri (string): The interaction URI that the client instance will + direct the RO to. This URI MUST be short enough to be + communicated to the end user by the client instance. It is + RECOMMENDED that this URI be short enough for an end user to type + in manually. The URI MUST NOT contain the code value. This URI + MUST be an absolute URI. REQUIRED. + + "interact": { + "user_code_uri": { + "code": "A1BC3DFF", + "uri": "https://s.example/device" + } + } + + The client instance MUST communicate the "code" to the end user in + some fashion, such as displaying it on a screen or reading it out + audibly. This code is used by the interaction component of the AS as + a means of identifying the pending grant request and does not + function as an authentication factor for the RO. + + The client instance MUST also communicate the URI to the end user. + Since it is expected that the end user will continue interaction on a + secondary device, the URI needs to be short enough to allow the end + user to type or copy it to a secondary device without mistakes. + + The URI returned is a function of the AS, but the URI itself MAY be + completely distinct from the grant endpoint URI that the client + instance uses to request access (Section 2), allowing an AS to + separate its user-interaction functionality from its backend security + functionality. If the AS does not directly host the functionality + accessed through the given URI, then the means for the interaction + functionality to communicate with the rest of the AS are out of scope + for this specification. + + See details of the interaction in Section 4.1.2. + +3.3.5. Interaction Finish + + If the client instance indicates that it can receive a post- + interaction redirect or push at a URI (Section 2.5.2) and the AS + supports this mode for the client instance's request, the AS responds + with a finish field containing a nonce that the client instance will + use in validating the callback as defined in Section 4.2. + + "interact": { + "finish": "MBDOFXG4Y5CVJCX821LH" + } + + When the interaction is completed, the interaction component of the + AS MUST contact the client instance using the means defined by the + finish method as described in Section 4.2. + + If the AS returns the finish field, the client instance MUST NOT + continue a grant request before it receives the associated + interaction reference on the callback URI. See details in + Section 4.2. + +3.4. Returning Subject Information + + If information about the RO is requested and the AS grants the client + instance access to that data, the AS returns the approved information + in the "subject" response field. The AS MUST return the subject + field only in cases where the AS is sure that the RO and the end user + are the same party. This can be accomplished through some forms of + interaction with the RO (Section 4). + + This field is an object with the following properties. + + sub_ids (array of objects): An array of Subject Identifiers for the + RO, as defined by [RFC9493]. REQUIRED if returning Subject + Identifiers. + + assertions (array of objects): An array containing assertions as + objects, each containing the assertion object described below. + REQUIRED if returning assertions. + + updated_at (string): Timestamp as a date string as described in + [RFC3339], indicating when the identified account was last + updated. The client instance MAY use this value to determine if + it needs to request updated profile information through an + identity API. The definition of such an identity API is out of + scope for this specification. RECOMMENDED. + + Assertion objects contain the following fields: + + format (string): The assertion format. Possible formats are listed + in Section 3.4.1. Additional assertion formats can be defined in + the "GNAP Assertion Formats" registry (Section 10.6). REQUIRED. + + value (string): The assertion value as the JSON string serialization + of the assertion. REQUIRED. + + The following non-normative example contains an opaque identifier and + an OpenID Connect ID Token: + + "subject": { + "sub_ids": [ { + "format": "opaque", + "id": "XUT2MFM1XBIKJKSDU8QM" + } ], + "assertions": [ { + "format": "id_token", + "value": "eyj..." + } ] + } + + Subject Identifiers returned by the AS SHOULD uniquely identify the + RO at the AS. Some forms of Subject Identifiers are opaque to the + client instance (such as the subject of an issuer and subject pair), + while other forms (such as email address and phone number) are + intended to allow the client instance to correlate the identifier + with other account information at the client instance. The client + instance MUST NOT request or use any returned Subject Identifiers for + communication purposes (see Section 2.2). That is, a Subject + Identifier returned in the format of an email address or a phone + number only identifies the RO to the AS and does not indicate that + the AS has validated that the represented email address or phone + number in the identifier is suitable for communication with the + current user. To get such information, the client instance MUST use + an identity protocol to request and receive additional identity + claims. The details of an identity protocol and associated schema + are outside the scope of this specification. + + The AS MUST ensure that the returned subject information represents + the RO. In most cases, the AS will also ensure that the returned + subject information represents the end user authenticated + interactively at the AS. The AS SHOULD NOT reuse Subject Identifiers + for multiple different ROs. + + The "sub_ids" and "assertions" response fields are independent of + each other. That is, a returned assertion MAY use a different + Subject Identifier than other assertions and Subject Identifiers in + the response. However, all Subject Identifiers and assertions + returned MUST refer to the same party. + + The client instance MUST interpret all subject information in the + context of the AS from which the subject information is received, as + is discussed in Section 6 of [SP80063C]. For example, one AS could + return an email identifier of "user@example.com" for one RO, and a + different AS could return that same email identifier of + "user@example.com" for a completely different RO. A client instance + talking to both ASes needs to differentiate between these two + accounts by accounting for the AS source of each identifier and not + assuming that either has a canonical claim on the identifier without + additional configuration and trust agreements. Otherwise, a rogue AS + could exploit this to take over a targeted account asserted by a + different AS. + + Extensions to this specification MAY define additional response + properties in the "GNAP Subject Information Response Fields" registry + (Section 10.14). + + The grant request MUST be in the _approved_ state to return this + field in the response. + + See Section 11.30 for considerations that the client instance has to + make when accepting and processing assertions from the AS. + +3.4.1. Assertion Formats + + The following assertion formats are defined in this specification: + + id_token: An OpenID Connect ID Token [OIDC], in JSON Web Token (JWT) + compact format as a single string. + + saml2: A SAML 2.0 assertion [SAML2], encoded as a single base64url + string with no padding. + +3.5. Returning a Dynamically Bound Client Instance Identifier + + Many parts of the client instance's request can be passed as either a + value or a reference. The use of a reference in place of a value + allows for a client instance to optimize requests to the AS. + + Some references, such as for the client instance's identity + (Section 2.3.1) or the requested resources (Section 8.1), can be + managed statically through an admin console or developer portal + provided by the AS or RS. The developer of the client software can + include these values in their code for a more efficient and compact + request. + + If desired, the AS MAY also generate and return an instance + identifier dynamically to the client instance in the response to + facilitate multiple interactions with the same client instance over + time. The client instance SHOULD use this instance identifier in + future requests in lieu of sending the associated data values in the + client field. + + Dynamically generated client instance identifiers are string values + that MUST be protected by the client instance as secrets. Instance + identifier values MUST be unguessable and MUST NOT contain any + information that would compromise any party if revealed. Instance + identifier values are opaque to the client instance, and their + content is determined by the AS. The instance identifier MUST be + unique per client instance at the AS. + + instance_id (string): A string value used to represent the + information in the client object that the client instance can use + in a future request, as described in Section 2.3.1. OPTIONAL. + + The following non-normative example shows an instance identifier + alongside an issued access token. + + { + "instance_id": "7C7C4AZ9KHRS6X63AJAO", + "access_token": { + "value": "OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0" + } + } + +3.6. Error Response + + If the AS determines that the request cannot be completed for any + reason, it responds to the client instance with an error field in the + response message. This field is either an object or a string. + + When returned as an object, the object contains the following fields: + + code (string): A single ASCII error code defining the error. The + value MUST be defined in the "GNAP Error Codes" registry + (Section 10.15). REQUIRED. + + description (string): A human-readable string description of the + error intended for the developer of the client. The value is + chosen by the implementation. OPTIONAL. + + This specification defines the following code values: + + "invalid_request": The request is missing a required parameter, + includes an invalid parameter value, or is otherwise malformed. + + "invalid_client": The request was made from a client that was not + recognized or allowed by the AS, or the client's signature + validation failed. + + "invalid_interaction": The client instance has provided an + interaction reference that is incorrect for this request, or the + interaction modes in use have expired. + + "invalid_flag": The flag configuration is not valid. + + "invalid_rotation": The token rotation request is not valid. + + "key_rotation_not_supported": The AS does not allow rotation of this + access token's key. + + "invalid_continuation": The continuation of the referenced grant + could not be processed. + + "user_denied": The RO denied the request. + + "request_denied": The request was denied for an unspecified reason. + + "unknown_user": The user presented in the request is not known to + the AS or does not match the user present during interaction. + + "unknown_interaction": The interaction integrity could not be + established. + + "too_fast": The client instance did not respect the timeout in the + wait response before the next call. + + "too_many_attempts": A limit has been reached in the total number of + reasonable attempts. This number is either defined statically or + adjusted based on runtime conditions by the AS. + + Additional error codes can be defined in the "GNAP Error Codes" + registry (Section 10.15). + + For example, if the RO denied the request while interacting with the + AS, the AS would return the following error when the client instance + tries to continue the grant request: + + { + "error": { + "code": "user_denied", + "description": "The RO denied the request" + } + } + + Alternatively, the AS MAY choose to only return the error as codes + and provide the error as a string. Since the description field is + not intended to be machine-readable, the following response is + considered functionally equivalent to the previous example for the + purposes of the client software's understanding: + + { + "error": "user_denied" + } + + If an error state is reached but the grant is in the _pending_ state + (and therefore the client instance can continue), the AS MAY include + the continue field in the response along with the error, as defined + in Section 3.1. This allows the client instance to modify its + request for access, potentially leading to prompting the RO again. + Other fields MUST NOT be included in the response. + +4. Determining Authorization and Consent + + When the client instance makes its initial request (Section 2) to the + AS for delegated access, it is capable of asking for several + different kinds of information in response: + + * the access being requested, in the access_token request parameter + + * the subject information being requested, in the subject request + parameter + + * any additional requested information defined by extensions of this + protocol + + When the grant request is in the _processing_ state, the AS + determines what authorizations and consents are required to fulfill + this requested delegation. The details of how the AS makes this + determination are out of scope for this document. However, there are + several common patterns defined and supported by GNAP for fulfilling + these requirements, including information sent by the client + instance, information gathered through the interaction process, and + information supplied by external parties. An individual AS can + define its own policies and processes for deciding when and how to + gather the necessary authorizations and consent and how those are + applied to the grant request. + + To facilitate the AS fulfilling this request, the client instance + sends information about the actions the client software can take, + including: + + * starting interaction with the end user, in the interact request + parameter + + * receiving notification that interaction with the RO has concluded, + in the interact request parameter + + * any additional capabilities defined by extensions of this protocol + + The client instance can also supply information directly to the AS in + its request. The client instance can send several kinds of things, + including: + + * the identity of the client instance, known from the keys or + identifiers in the client request parameter + + * the identity of the end user, in the user request parameter + + * any additional information presented by the client instance in the + request defined by extensions of this protocol + + The AS will process this presented information in the context of the + client instance's request and can only trust the information as much + as it trusts the presentation and context of that request. If the AS + determines that the information presented in the initial request is + sufficient for granting the requested access, the AS MAY move the + grant request to the _approved_ state and return results immediately + in its response (Section 3) with access tokens and subject + information. + + If the AS determines that additional runtime authorization is + required, the AS can either deny the request outright (if there is no + possible recovery) or move the grant request to the _pending_ state + and use a number of means at its disposal to gather that + authorization from the appropriate ROs, including: + + * starting interaction with the end user facilitated by the client + software, such as a redirection or user code + + * challenging the client instance through a challenge-response + mechanism + + * requesting that the client instance present specific additional + information, such as a user's credential or an assertion + + * contacting an RO through an out-of-band mechanism, such as a push + notification + + * executing an auxiliary software process through an out-of-band + mechanism, such as querying a digital wallet + + The process of gathering authorization and consent in GNAP is left + deliberately flexible to allow for a wide variety of different + deployments, interactions, and methodologies. In this process, the + AS can gather consent from the RO or apply the RO's policy as + necessitated by the access that has been requested. The AS can + sometimes determine which RO needs to prompt for consent based on + what has been requested by the client instance, such as a specific RS + record, an identified subject, or a request requiring specific access + such as approval by an administrator. In other cases, the request is + applied to whichever RO is present at the time of consent gathering. + This pattern is especially prevalent when the end user is sent to the + AS for an interactive session, during which the end user takes on the + role of the RO. In these cases, the end user is delegating their own + access as RO to the client instance. + + The client instance can indicate that it is capable of facilitating + interaction with the end user, another party, or another piece of + software through its interaction start request (Section 2.5.1). + Here, the AS usually needs to interact directly with the end user to + determine their identity, determine their status as an RO, and + collect their consent. If the AS has determined that authorization + is required and the AS can support one or more of the requested + interaction start methods, the AS returns the associated interaction + start responses (Section 3.3). The client instance SHOULD initiate + one or more of these interaction methods (Section 4.1) in order to + facilitate the granting of the request. If more than one interaction + start method is available, the means by which the client chooses + which methods to follow are out of scope of this specification. + + After starting interaction, the client instance can then make a + continuation request (Section 5) either in response to a signal + indicating the finish of the interaction (Section 4.2), after a time- + based polling, or through some other method defined by an extension + of this specification through the "GNAP Interaction Mode Responses" + registry (Section 10.13). + + If the grant request is not in the _approved_ state, the client + instance can repeat the interaction process by sending a grant update + request (Section 5.3) with new interaction methods (Section 2.5). + + The client instance MUST use each interaction method once at most if + a response can be detected. The AS MUST handle any interact request + as a one-time-use mechanism and SHOULD apply suitable timeouts to any + interaction start methods provided, including user codes and + redirection URIs. The client instance SHOULD apply suitable timeouts + to any interaction finish method. + + In order to support client software deployed in disadvantaged network + conditions, the AS MAY allow for processing of the same interaction + method multiple times if the AS can determine that the request is + from the same party and the results are idempotent. For example, if + a client instance launches a redirect to the AS but does not receive + a response within a reasonable time, the client software can launch + the redirect again, assuming that it never reached the AS in the + first place. However, if the AS in question receives both requests, + it could mistakenly process them separately, creating an undefined + state for the client instance. If the AS can determine that both + requests come from the same origin or under the same session, and the + requests both came before any additional state change to the grant + occurs, the AS can reasonably conclude that the initial response was + not received and the same response can be returned to the client + instance. + + If the AS instead has a means of contacting the RO directly, it could + do so without involving the client instance in its consent-gathering + process. For example, the AS could push a notification to a known RO + and have the RO approve the pending request asynchronously. These + interactions can be through an interface of the AS itself (such as a + hosted web page), through another application (such as something + installed on the RO's device), through a messaging fabric, or any + other means. + + When interacting with an RO, the AS can use various strategies to + determine the authorization of the requested grant, including: + + * authenticate the RO through a local account or some other means, + such as federated login + + * validate the RO through presentation of claims, attributes, or + other information + + * prompt the RO for consent for the requested delegation + + * describe to the RO what information is being released, to whom, + and for what purpose + + * provide warnings to the RO about potential attacks or negative + effects of allowing the information + + * allow the RO to modify the client instance's requested access, + including limiting or expanding that access + + * provide the RO with artifacts such as receipts to facilitate an + audit trail of authorizations + + * allow the RO to deny the requested delegation + + The AS is also allowed to request authorization from more than one + RO, if the AS deems fit. For example, a medical record might need to + be released by both an attending nurse and a physician, or both + owners of a bank account need to sign off on a transfer request. + Alternatively, the AS could require N of M possible ROs to approve a + given request. In some circumstances, the AS could even determine + that the end user present during the interaction is not the + appropriate RO for a given request and reach out to the appropriate + RO asynchronously. + + The RO is also allowed to define an automated policy at the AS to + determine which kind of end user can get access to the resource and + under which conditions. For instance, such a condition might require + the end user to log in and accept the RO's legal provisions. + Alternatively, client software could be acting without an end user, + and the RO's policy allows issuance of access tokens to specific + instances of that client software without human interaction. + + While all of these cases are supported by GNAP, the details of their + implementation and the methods for determining which ROs or related + policies are required for a given request are out of scope for this + specification. + +4.1. Starting Interaction with the End User + + When a grant request is in the _pending_ state, the interaction start + methods sent by the client instance can be used to facilitate + interaction with the end user. To initiate an interaction start + method indicated by the interaction start responses (Section 3.3) + from the AS, the client instance follows the steps defined by that + interaction start mode. The actions of the client instance required + for the interaction start modes defined in this specification are + described in the following subsections. Interaction start modes + defined in extensions to this specification MUST define the expected + actions of the client software when that interaction start mode is + used. + + If the client instance does not start an interaction start mode + within an AS-determined amount of time, the AS MUST reject attempts + to use the interaction start modes. If the client instance has + already begun one interaction start mode and the interaction has been + successfully completed, the AS MUST reject attempts to use other + interaction start modes. For example, if a user code has been + successfully entered for a grant request, the AS will need to reject + requests to an arbitrary redirect URI on the same grant request in + order to prevent an attacker from capturing and altering an active + authorization process. + +4.1.1. Interaction at a Redirected URI + + When the end user is directed to an arbitrary URI through the + "redirect" mode (Section 3.3.1), the client instance facilitates + opening the URI through the end user's web browser. The client + instance could launch the URI through the system browser, provide a + clickable link, redirect the user through HTTP response codes, or + display the URI in a form the end user can use to launch, such as a + multidimensional barcode. In all cases, the URI is accessed with an + HTTP GET request, and the resulting page is assumed to allow direct + interaction with the end user through an HTTP user agent. With this + method, it is common (though not required) for the RO to be the same + party as the end user, since the client instance has to communicate + the redirection URI to the end user. + + In many cases, the URI indicates a web page hosted at the AS, + allowing the AS to authenticate the end user as the RO and + interactively provide consent. The URI value is used to identify the + grant request being authorized. If the URI cannot be associated with + a currently active request, the AS MUST display an error to the RO + and MUST NOT attempt to redirect the RO back to any client instance, + even if a redirect finish method is supplied (Section 2.5.2.1). If + the URI is not hosted by the AS directly, the means of communication + between the AS and the service provided by this URI are out of scope + for this specification. + + The client instance MUST NOT modify the URI when launching it; in + particular, the client instance MUST NOT add any parameters to the + URI. The URI MUST be reachable from the end user's browser, though + the URI MAY be opened on a separate device from the client instance + itself. The URI MUST be accessible from an HTTP GET request, and it + MUST be protected by HTTPS, be hosted on a server local to the RO's + browser ("localhost"), or use an application-specific URI scheme that + is loaded on the end user's device. + +4.1.2. Interaction at the Static User Code URI + + When the end user is directed to enter a short code through the + "user_code" mode (Section 3.3.3), the client instance communicates + the user code to the end user and directs the end user to enter that + code at an associated URI. The client instance MAY format the user + code in such a way as to facilitate memorability and transfer of the + code, so long as this formatting does not alter the value as accepted + at the user code URI. For example, a client instance receiving the + user code "A1BC3DFF" could choose to display this to the user as + "A1BC 3DFF", breaking up the long string into two shorter strings. + + When processing input codes, the AS MUST transform the input string + to remove invalid characters. In the above example, the space in + between the two parts would be removed upon its entry into the + interactive form at the user code URI. Additionally, the AS MUST + treat user input as case insensitive. For example, if the user + inputs the string "a1bc 3DFF", the AS will treat the input the same + as "A1BC3DFF". To facilitate this, it is RECOMMENDED that the AS use + only ASCII letters and numbers as valid characters for the user code. + + It is RECOMMENDED that the AS choose from character values that are + easily copied and typed without ambiguity. For example, some glyphs + have multiple Unicode code points for the same visual character, and + the end user could potentially type a different character than what + the AS has returned. For additional considerations of + internationalized character strings, see [RFC8264]. + + This mode is designed to be used when the client instance is not able + to communicate or facilitate launching an arbitrary URI. The + associated URI could be statically configured with the client + instance or in the client software's documentation. As a + consequence, these URIs SHOULD be short. The user code URI MUST be + reachable from the end user's browser, though the URI is usually + opened on a separate device from the client instance itself. The URI + MUST be accessible from an HTTP GET request, and it MUST be protected + by HTTPS, be hosted on a server local to the RO's browser + ("localhost"), or use an application-specific URI scheme that is + loaded on the end user's device. + + In many cases, the URI indicates a web page hosted at the AS, + allowing the AS to authenticate the end user as the RO and + interactively provide consent. The value of the user code is used to + identify the grant request being authorized. If the user code cannot + be associated with a currently active request, the AS MUST display an + error to the RO and MUST NOT attempt to redirect the RO back to any + client instance, even if a redirect finish method is supplied + (Section 2.5.2.1). If the interaction component at the user code URI + is not hosted by the AS directly, the means of communication between + the AS and this URI, including communication of the user code itself, + are out of scope for this specification. + + When the RO enters this code at the user code URI, the AS MUST + uniquely identify the pending request that the code was associated + with. If the AS does not recognize the entered code, the interaction + component MUST display an error to the user. If the AS detects too + many unrecognized code enter attempts, the interaction component + SHOULD display an error to the user indicating too many attempts and + MAY take additional actions such as slowing down the input + interactions. The user should be warned as such an error state is + approached, if possible. + +4.1.3. Interaction at a Dynamic User Code URI + + When the end user is directed to enter a short code through the + "user_code_uri" mode (Section 3.3.4), the client instance + communicates the user code and associated URI to the end user and + directs the end user to enter that code at the URI. The client + instance MAY format the user code in such a way as to facilitate + memorability and transfer of the code, so long as this formatting + does not alter the value as accepted at the user code URI. For + example, a client instance receiving the user code "A1BC3DFF" could + choose to display this to the user as "A1BC 3DFF", breaking up the + long string into two shorter strings. + + When processing input codes, the AS MUST transform the input string + to remove invalid characters. In the above example, the space in + between the two parts would be removed upon its entry into the + interactive form at the user code URI. Additionally, the AS MUST + treat user input as case insensitive. For example, if the user + inputs the string "a1bc 3DFF", the AS will treat the input the same + as "A1BC3DFF". To facilitate this, it is RECOMMENDED that the AS use + only ASCII letters and numbers as valid characters for the user code. + + This mode is used when the client instance is not able to facilitate + launching a complex arbitrary URI but can communicate arbitrary + values like URIs. As a consequence, these URIs SHOULD be short + enough to allow the URI to be typed by the end user, such as a total + length of 20 characters or fewer. The client instance MUST NOT + modify the URI when communicating it to the end user; in particular + the client instance MUST NOT add any parameters to the URI. The user + code URI MUST be reachable from the end user's browser, though the + URI is usually be opened on a separate device from the client + instance itself. The URI MUST be accessible from an HTTP GET + request, and it MUST be protected by HTTPS, be hosted on a server + local to the RO's browser ("localhost"), or use an application- + specific URI scheme that is loaded on the end user's device. + + In many cases, the URI indicates a web page hosted at the AS, + allowing the AS to authenticate the end user as the RO and + interactively provide consent. The value of the user code is used to + identify the grant request being authorized. If the user code cannot + be associated with a currently active request, the AS MUST display an + error to the RO and MUST NOT attempt to redirect the RO back to any + client instance, even if a redirect finish method is supplied + (Section 2.5.2.1). If the interaction component at the user code URI + is not hosted by the AS directly, the means of communication between + the AS and this URI, including communication of the user code itself, + are out of scope for this specification. + + When the RO enters this code at the given URI, the AS MUST uniquely + identify the pending request that the code was associated with. If + the AS does not recognize the entered code, the interaction component + MUST display an error to the user. If the AS detects too many + unrecognized code enter attempts, the interaction component SHOULD + display an error to the user indicating too many attempts and MAY + take additional actions such as slowing down the input interactions. + The user should be warned as such an error state is approached, if + possible. + +4.1.4. Interaction through an Application URI + + When the client instance is directed to launch an application through + the "app" mode (Section 3.3.2), the client launches the URI as + appropriate to the system, such as through a deep link or custom URI + scheme registered to a mobile application. The means by which the AS + and the launched application communicate with each other and perform + any of the required actions are out of scope for this specification. + +4.2. Post-Interaction Completion + + If an interaction "finish" method (Section 3.3.5) is associated with + the current request, the AS MUST follow the appropriate method upon + completion of interaction in order to signal the client instance to + continue, except for some limited error cases discussed below. If a + finish method is not available, the AS SHOULD instruct the RO to + return to the client instance upon completion. In such cases, it is + expected that the client instance will poll the continuation endpoint + as described in Section 5.2. + + The AS MUST create an interaction reference and associate that + reference with the current interaction and the underlying pending + request. The interaction reference value is an ASCII string + consisting of only unreserved characters per Section 2.3 of + [RFC3986]. The interaction reference value MUST be sufficiently + random so as not to be guessable by an attacker. The interaction + reference MUST be one-time-use to prevent interception and replay + attacks. + + The AS MUST calculate a hash value based on the client instance, AS + nonces, and the interaction reference, as described in Section 4.2.3. + The client instance will use this value to validate the "finish" + call. + + All interaction finish methods MUST define a way to convey the hash + and interaction reference back to the client instance. When an + interaction finish method is used, the client instance MUST present + the interaction reference back to the AS as part of its continuation + request (Section 5.1). + + Note that in many error cases, such as when the RO has denied access, + the "finish" method is still enacted by the AS. This pattern allows + the client instance to potentially recover from the error state by + modifying its request or providing additional information directly to + the AS in a continuation request. The AS MUST NOT follow the + "finish" method in the following circumstances: + + * The AS has determined that any URIs involved with the finish + method are dangerous or blocked. + + * The AS cannot determine which ongoing grant request is being + referenced. + + * The ongoing grant request has been canceled or otherwise blocked. + +4.2.1. Completing Interaction with a Browser Redirect to the Callback + URI + + When using the redirect interaction finish method defined in Sections + 2.5.2.1 and 3.3.5, the AS signals to the client instance that + interaction is complete and the request can be continued by directing + the RO (in their browser) back to the client instance's redirect URI. + + The AS secures this redirect by adding the hash and interaction + reference as query parameters to the client instance's redirect URI. + + hash: The interaction hash value as described in Section 4.2.3. + REQUIRED. + + interact_ref: The interaction reference generated for this + interaction. REQUIRED. + + The means of directing the RO to this URI are outside the scope of + this specification, but common options include redirecting the RO + from a web page and launching the system browser with the target URI. + See Section 11.19 for considerations on which HTTP status code to use + when redirecting a request that potentially contains credentials. + + NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 + + https://client.example.net/return/123455\ + ?hash=x-gguKWTj8rQf7d7i3w3UhzvuJ5bpOlKyAlVpLxBffY\ + &interact_ref=4IFWWIKYBC2PQ6U56NL1 + + The client instance MUST be able to process a request on the URI. If + the URI is HTTP, the request MUST be an HTTP GET. + + When receiving the request, the client instance MUST parse the query + parameters to extract the hash and interaction reference values. The + client instance MUST calculate and validate the hash value as + described in Section 4.2.3. If the hash validates, the client + instance sends a continuation request to the AS as described in + Section 5.1, using the interaction reference value received here. If + the hash does not validate, the client instance MUST NOT send the + interaction reference to the AS. + +4.2.2. Completing Interaction with a Direct HTTP Request Callback + + When using the push interaction finish method defined in Sections + 2.5.2.1 and 3.3.5, the AS signals to the client instance that + interaction is complete and the request can be continued by sending + an HTTP POST request to the client instance's callback URI. + + The HTTP message content is a JSON object consisting of the following + two fields: + + hash (string): The interaction hash value as described in + Section 4.2.3. REQUIRED. + + interact_ref (string): The interaction reference generated for this + interaction. REQUIRED. + + POST /push/554321 HTTP/1.1 + Host: client.example.net + Content-Type: application/json + + { + "hash": "pjdHcrti02HLCwGU3qhUZ3wZXt8IjrV_BtE3oUyOuKNk", + "interact_ref": "4IFWWIKYBC2PQ6U56NL1" + } + + Since the AS is making an outbound connection to a URI supplied by an + outside party (the client instance), the AS MUST protect itself + against Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks when making this + call, as discussed in Section 11.34. + + When receiving the request, the client instance MUST parse the JSON + object and validate the hash value as described in Section 4.2.3. If + either fails, the client instance MUST return an unknown_interaction + error (Section 3.6). If the hash validates, the client instance + sends a continuation request to the AS as described in Section 5.1, + using the interaction reference value received here. + +4.2.3. Calculating the Interaction Hash + + The "hash" parameter in the request to the client instance's callback + URI ties the front-channel response to an ongoing request by using + values known only to the parties involved. This security mechanism + allows the client instance to protect itself against several kinds of + session fixation and injection attacks as discussed in Section 11.25. + The AS MUST always provide this hash, and the client instance MUST + validate the hash when received. + + To calculate the "hash" value, the party doing the calculation + creates a hash base string by concatenating the following values in + the following order using a single newline (0x0A) character to + separate them: + + * the "nonce" value sent by the client instance in the interaction + finish field of the initial request (Section 2.5.2) + + * the AS's nonce value from the interaction finish response + (Section 3.3.5) + + * the "interact_ref" returned from the AS as part of the interaction + finish method (Section 4.2) + + * the grant endpoint URI the client instance used to make its + initial request (Section 2) + + There is no padding or whitespace before or after any of the lines + and no trailing newline character. The following non-normative + example shows a constructed hash base string consisting of these four + elements. + + VJLO6A4CATR0KRO + MBDOFXG4Y5CVJCX821LH + 4IFWWIKYB2PQ6U56NL1 + https://server.example.com/tx + + The party then hashes the bytes of the ASCII encoding of this string + with the appropriate algorithm based on the "hash_method" parameter + under the "finish" key of the interaction finish request + (Section 2.5.2). The resulting byte array from the hash function is + then encoded using URL-Safe base64 with no padding [RFC4648]. The + resulting string is the hash value. + + If provided, the "hash_method" value MUST be one of the hash name + strings defined in the IANA "Named Information Hash Algorithm + Registry" [HASH-ALG]. If the "hash_method" value is not present in + the client instance's request, the algorithm defaults to "sha-256". + + For example, the "sha-256" hash method consists of hashing the input + string with the 256-bit SHA2 algorithm. The following is the encoded + "sha-256" hash of the hash base string in the example above. + + x-gguKWTj8rQf7d7i3w3UhzvuJ5bpOlKyAlVpLxBffY + + As another example, the "sha3-512" hash method consists of hashing + the input string with the 512-bit SHA3 algorithm. The following is + the encoded "sha3-512" hash of the hash base string in the example + above. + + NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 + + pyUkVJSmpqSJMaDYsk5G8WCvgY91l-agUPe1wgn-cc5rUtN69gPI2-S_s-Eswed8iB4\ + PJ_a5Hg6DNi7qGgKwSQ + +5. Continuing a Grant Request + + While it is possible for the AS to return an approved grant response + (Section 3) with all the client instance's requested information + (including access tokens (Section 3.2) and subject information + (Section 3.4)) immediately, it's more common that the AS will place + the grant request into the _pending_ state and require communication + with the client instance several times over the lifetime of a grant + request. This is often part of facilitating interaction (Section 4), + but it could also be used to allow the AS and client instance to + continue negotiating the parameters of the original grant request + (Section 2) through modification of the request. + + The ability to continue an already-started request allows the client + instance to perform several important functions, including presenting + additional information from interaction, modifying the initial + request, and revoking a grant request in progress. + + To enable this ongoing negotiation, the AS provides a continuation + API to the client software. The AS returns a continue field in the + response (Section 3.1) that contains information the client instance + needs to access this API, including a URI to access as well as a + special access token to use during the requests, called the + "continuation access token". + + All requests to the continuation API are protected by a bound + continuation access token. The continuation access token is bound to + the same key and method the client instance used to make the initial + request (or its most recent rotation). As a consequence, when the + client instance makes any calls to the continuation URI, the client + instance MUST present the continuation access token as described in + Section 7.2 and present proof of the client instance's key (or its + most recent rotation) by signing the request as described in + Section 7.3. The AS MUST validate the signature and ensure that it + is bound to the appropriate key for the continuation access token. + + Access tokens other than the continuation access tokens MUST NOT be + usable for continuation requests. Conversely, continuation access + tokens MUST NOT be usable to make authorized requests to RSs, even if + co-located within the AS. + + In the following non-normative example, the client instance makes a + POST request to a unique URI and signs the request with HTTP message + signatures: + + POST /continue/KSKUOMUKM HTTP/1.1 + Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU + Host: server.example.com + Content-Length: 0 + Signature-Input: sig1=... + Signature: sig1=... + + The AS MUST be able to tell from the client instance's request which + specific ongoing request is being accessed, using a combination of + the continuation URI and the continuation access token. If the AS + cannot determine a single active grant request to map the + continuation request to, the AS MUST return an invalid_continuation + error (Section 3.6). + + In the following non-normative example, the client instance makes a + POST request to a stable continuation endpoint URI with the + interaction reference (Section 5.1), includes the access token, and + signs with HTTP message signatures: + + POST /continue HTTP/1.1 + Host: server.example.com + Content-Type: application/json + Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU + Signature-Input: sig1=... + Signature: sig1=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... + + { + "interact_ref": "4IFWWIKYBC2PQ6U56NL1" + } + + In the following non-normative alternative example, the client + instance had been provided a continuation URI unique to this ongoing + grant request: + + POST /tx/rxgIIEVMBV-BQUO7kxbsp HTTP/1.1 + Host: server.example.com + Content-Type: application/json + Authorization: GNAP eyJhbGciOiJub25lIiwidHlwIjoiYmFkIn0 + Signature-Input: sig1=... + Signature: sig1=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... + + { + "interact_ref": "4IFWWIKYBC2PQ6U56NL1" + } + + In both cases, the AS determines which grant is being asked for based + on the URI and continuation access token provided. + + If a wait parameter was included in the continuation response + (Section 3.1), the client instance MUST NOT call the continuation URI + prior to waiting the number of seconds indicated. If no wait period + is indicated, the client instance MUST NOT poll immediately and + SHOULD wait at least 5 seconds. If the client instance does not + respect the given wait period, the AS MUST return the too_fast error + (Section 3.6). + + The response from the AS is a JSON object of a grant response and MAY + contain any of the fields described in Section 3, as described in + more detail in the subsections below. + + If the AS determines that the client instance can make further + requests to the continuation API, the AS MUST include a new + continuation response (Section 3.1). The new continuation response + MUST include a continuation access token as well, and this token + SHOULD be a new access token, invalidating the previous access token. + If the AS does not return a new continuation response, the client + instance MUST NOT make an additional continuation request. If a + client instance does so, the AS MUST return an invalid_continuation + error (Section 3.6). + + For continuation functions that require the client instance to send + message content, the content MUST be a JSON object. + + For all requests to the grant continuation API, the AS MAY make use + of long polling mechanisms such as those discussed in [RFC6202]. + That is to say, instead of returning the current status immediately, + the long polling technique allows the AS additional time to process + and fulfill the request before returning the HTTP response to the + client instance. For example, when the AS receives a continuation + request but the grant request is in the _processing_ state, the AS + could wait until the grant request has moved to the _pending_ or + _approved_ state before returning the response message. + +5.1. Continuing after a Completed Interaction + + When the AS responds to the client instance's finish method as in + Section 4.2.1, this response includes an interaction reference. The + client instance MUST include that value as the field interact_ref in + a POST request to the continuation URI. + + POST /continue HTTP/1.1 + Host: server.example.com + Content-Type: application/json + Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU + Signature-Input: sig1=... + Signature: sig1=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... + + { + "interact_ref": "4IFWWIKYBC2PQ6U56NL1" + } + + Since the interaction reference is a one-time-use value as described + in Section 4.2.1, if the client instance needs to make additional + continuation calls after this request, the client instance MUST NOT + include the interaction reference in subsequent calls. If the AS + detects a client instance submitting an interaction reference when + the request is not in the _pending_ state, the AS MUST return a + too_many_attempts error (Section 3.6) and SHOULD invalidate the + ongoing request by moving it to the _finalized_ state. + + If the grant request is in the _approved_ state, the grant response + (Section 3) MAY contain any newly created access tokens (Section 3.2) + or newly released subject information (Section 3.4). The response + MAY contain a new continuation response (Section 3.1) as described + above. The response SHOULD NOT contain any interaction responses + (Section 3.3). + + If the grant request is in the _pending_ state, the grant response + (Section 3) MUST NOT contain access tokens or subject information and + MAY contain a new interaction response (Section 3.3) to any + interaction methods that have not been exhausted at the AS. + + For example, if the request is successful in causing the AS to issue + access tokens and release opaque subject claims, the response could + look like this: + + NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 + + { + "access_token": { + "value": "OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0", + "manage": { + "uri": "https://server.example.com/token/PRY5NM33O", + "access_token": { + "value": "B8CDFONP21-4TB8N6.BW7ONM" + } + } + }, + "subject": { + "sub_ids": [ { + "format": "opaque", + "id": "J2G8G8O4AZ" + } ] + } + } + + With the above example, the client instance cannot make an additional + continuation request because a continue field is not included. + + In the following non-normative example, the RO has denied the client + instance's request, and the AS responds with the following response: + + { + "error": "user_denied", + "continue": { + "access_token": { + "value": "33OMUKMKSKU80UPRY5NM" + }, + "uri": "https://server.example.com/continue", + "wait": 30 + } + } + + In the preceding example, the AS includes the continue field in the + response. Therefore, the client instance can continue the grant + negotiation process, perhaps modifying the request as discussed in + Section 5.3. + +5.2. Continuing during Pending Interaction (Polling) + + When the client instance does not include a finish parameter, the + client instance will often need to poll the AS until the RO has + authorized the request. To do so, the client instance makes a POST + request to the continuation URI as in Section 5.1 but does not + include message content. + + POST /continue HTTP/1.1 + Host: server.example.com + Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU + Signature-Input: sig1=... + Signature: sig1=... + + If the grant request is in the _approved_ state, the grant response + (Section 3) MAY contain any newly created access tokens (Section 3.2) + or newly released subject claims (Section 3.4). The response MAY + contain a new continuation response (Section 3.1) as described above. + If a continue field is included, it SHOULD include a wait field to + facilitate a reasonable polling rate by the client instance. The + response SHOULD NOT contain interaction responses (Section 3.3). + + If the grant request is in the _pending_ state, the grant response + (Section 3) MUST NOT contain access tokens or subject information and + MAY contain a new interaction response (Section 3.3) to any + interaction methods that have not been exhausted at the AS. + + For example, if the request has not yet been authorized by the RO, + the AS could respond by telling the client instance to make another + continuation request in the future. In the following non-normative + example, a new, unique access token has been issued for the call, + which the client instance will use in its next continuation request. + + { + "continue": { + "access_token": { + "value": "33OMUKMKSKU80UPRY5NM" + }, + "uri": "https://server.example.com/continue", + "wait": 30 + } + } + + If the request is successful in causing the AS to issue access tokens + and release subject information, the response could look like the + following non-normative example: + + NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 + + { + "access_token": { + "value": "OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0", + "manage": { + "uri": "https://server.example.com/token/PRY5NM33O", + "access_token": { + "value": "B8CDFONP21-4TB8N6.BW7ONM" + } + } + }, + "subject": { + "sub_ids": [ { + "format": "opaque", + "id": "J2G8G8O4AZ" + } ] + } + } + + See Section 11.23 for considerations on polling for continuation + without an interaction finish method. + + In error conditions, the AS responds to the client instance with an + error code as discussed in Section 3.6. For example, if the client + instance has polled too many times before the RO has approved the + request, the AS would respond with a message like the following: + + { + "error": "too_many_attempts" + } + + Since this response does not include a continue field, the client + instance cannot continue to poll the AS for additional updates and + the grant request is _finalized_. If the client instance still needs + access to the resource, it will need to start with a new grant + request. + +5.3. Modifying an Existing Request + + The client instance might need to modify an ongoing request, whether + or not tokens have already been issued or subject information has + already been released. In such cases, the client instance makes an + HTTP PATCH request to the continuation URI and includes any fields it + needs to modify. Fields that aren't included in the request are + considered unchanged from the original request. + + A grant request associated with a modification request MUST be in the + _approved_ or _pending_ state. When the AS receives a valid + modification request, the AS MUST place the grant request into the + _processing_ state and re-evaluate the authorization in the new + context created by the update request, since the extent and context + of the request could have changed. + + The client instance MAY include the access_token and subject fields + as described in Sections 2.1 and 2.2. Inclusion of these fields + override any values in the initial request, which MAY trigger + additional requirements and policies by the AS. For example, if the + client instance is asking for more access, the AS could require + additional interaction with the RO to gather additional consent. If + the client instance is asking for more limited access, the AS could + determine that sufficient authorization has been granted to the + client instance and return the more limited access rights + immediately. If the grant request was previously in the _approved_ + state, the AS could decide to remember the larger scale of access + rights associated with the grant request, allowing the client + instance to make subsequent requests of different subsets of granted + access. The details of this processing are out of scope for this + specification, but a one possible approach is as follows: + + 1. A client instance requests access to Foo, and this is granted by + the RO. This results in an access token: AT1. + + 2. The client instance later modifies the grant request to include + Foo and Bar together. Since the client instance was previously + granted Foo under this grant request, the RO is prompted to allow + the client instance access to Foo and Bar together. This results + in a new access token: AT2. This access token has access to both + Foo and Bar. The rights of the original access token AT1 are not + modified. + + 3. The client instance makes another grant modification to ask only + for Bar. Since the client instance was previously granted Foo and + Bar together under this grant request, the RO is not prompted, + and the access to Bar is granted in a new access token: AT3. + This new access token does not allow access to Foo. + + 4. The original access token AT1 expires, and the client seeks a new + access token to replace it. The client instance makes another + grant modification to ask only for Foo. Since the client instance + was previously granted Foo and Bar together under this grant + request, the RO is not prompted, and the access to Foo is granted + in a new access token: AT4. This new access token does not allow + access to Bar. + + All four access tokens are independent of each other and associated + with the same underlying grant request. Each of these access tokens + could possibly also be rotated using token management, if available. + For example, instead of asking for a new token to replace AT1, the + client instance could ask for a refresh of AT1 using the rotation + method of the token management API. This would result in a refreshed + AT1 with a different token value and expiration from the original AT1 + but with the same access rights of allowing only access to Foo. + + The client instance MAY include the interact field as described in + Section 2.5. Inclusion of this field indicates that the client + instance is capable of driving interaction with the end user, and + this field replaces any values from a previous request. The AS MAY + respond to any of the interaction responses as described in + Section 3.3, just like it would to a new request. + + The client instance MAY include the user field as described in + Section 2.4 to present new assertions or information about the end + user. The AS SHOULD check that this presented user information is + consistent with any user information previously presented by the + client instance or otherwise associated with this grant request. + + The client instance MUST NOT include the client field of the request, + since the client instance is assumed not to have changed. + Modification of client instance information, including rotation of + keys associated with the client instance, is outside the scope of + this specification. + + The client instance MUST NOT include post-interaction responses such + as those described in Section 5.1. + + Modification requests MUST NOT alter previously issued access tokens. + Instead, any access tokens issued from a continuation are considered + new, separate access tokens. The AS MAY revoke previously issued + access tokens after a modification has occurred. + + If the modified request can be granted immediately by the AS (the + grant request is in the _approved_ state), the grant response + (Section 3) MAY contain any newly created access tokens (Section 3.2) + or newly released subject claims (Section 3.4). The response MAY + contain a new continuation response (Section 3.1) as described above. + If interaction can occur, the response SHOULD contain interaction + responses (Section 3.3) as well. + + For example, a client instance initially requests a set of resources + using references: + + POST /tx HTTP/1.1 + Host: server.example.com + Content-Type: application/json + Signature-Input: sig1=... + Signature: sig1=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... + + { + "access_token": { + "access": [ + "read", "write" + ] + }, + "interact": { + "start": ["redirect"], + "finish": { + "method": "redirect", + "uri": "https://client.example.net/return/123455", + "nonce": "LKLTI25DK82FX4T4QFZC" + } + }, + "client": "987YHGRT56789IOLK" + } + + Access is granted by the RO, and a token is issued by the AS. In its + final response, the AS includes a continue field, which includes a + separate access token for accessing the continuation API: + + { + "continue": { + "access_token": { + "value": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU" + }, + "uri": "https://server.example.com/continue", + "wait": 30 + }, + "access_token": { + "value": "RP1LT0-OS9M2P_R64TB", + "access": [ + "read", "write" + ] + } + } + + This continue field allows the client instance to make an eventual + continuation call. Some time later, the client instance realizes + that it no longer needs "write" access and therefore modifies its + ongoing request, here asking for just "read" access instead of both + "read" and "write" as before. + + PATCH /continue HTTP/1.1 + Host: server.example.com + Content-Type: application/json + Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU + Signature-Input: sig1=... + Signature: sig1=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... + + { + "access_token": { + "access": [ + "read" + ] + } + ... + } + + The AS replaces the previous access from the first request, allowing + the AS to determine if any previously granted consent already + applies. In this case, the AS would determine that reducing the + breadth of the requested access means that new access tokens can be + issued to the client instance without additional interaction or + consent. The AS would likely revoke previously issued access tokens + that had the greater access rights associated with them, unless they + had been issued with the durable flag. + + { + "continue": { + "access_token": { + "value": "M33OMUK80UPRY5NMKSKU" + }, + "uri": "https://server.example.com/continue", + "wait": 30 + }, + "access_token": { + "value": "0EVKC7-2ZKwZM_6N760", + "access": [ + "read" + ] + } + } + + As another example, the client instance initially requests read-only + access but later needs to step up its access. The initial request + could look like the following HTTP message: + + POST /tx HTTP/1.1 + Host: server.example.com + Content-Type: application/json + Signature-Input: sig1=... + Signature: sig1=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... + + { + "access_token": { + "access": [ + "read" + ] + }, + "interact": { + "start": ["redirect"], + "finish": { + "method": "redirect", + "uri": "https://client.example.net/return/123455", + "nonce": "LKLTI25DK82FX4T4QFZC" + } + }, + "client": "987YHGRT56789IOLK" + } + + Access is granted by the RO, and a token is issued by the AS. In its + final response, the AS includes a continue field: + + { + "continue": { + "access_token": { + "value": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU" + }, + "uri": "https://server.example.com/continue", + "wait": 30 + }, + "access_token": { + "value": "RP1LT0-OS9M2P_R64TB", + "access": [ + "read" + ] + } + } + + This allows the client instance to make an eventual continuation + call. The client instance later realizes that it now needs "write" + access in addition to the "read" access. Since this is an expansion + of what it asked for previously, the client instance also includes a + new interaction field in case the AS needs to interact with the RO + again to gather additional authorization. Note that the client + instance's nonce and callback are different from the initial request. + Since the original callback was already used in the initial exchange + and the callback is intended for one-time use, a new one needs to be + included in order to use the callback again. + + PATCH /continue HTTP/1.1 + Host: server.example.com + Content-Type: application/json + Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU + Signature-Input: sig1=... + Signature: sig1=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... + + { + "access_token": { + "access": [ + "read", "write" + ] + }, + "interact": { + "start": ["redirect"], + "finish": { + "method": "redirect", + "uri": "https://client.example.net/return/654321", + "nonce": "K82FX4T4LKLTI25DQFZC" + } + } + } + + From here, the AS can determine that the client instance is asking + for more than it was previously granted, but since the client + instance has also provided a mechanism to interact with the RO, the + AS can use that to gather the additional consent. The protocol + continues as it would with a new request. Since the old access + tokens are good for a subset of the rights requested here, the AS + might decide to not revoke them. However, any access tokens granted + after this update process are new access tokens and do not modify the + rights of existing access tokens. + +5.4. Revoking a Grant Request + + If the client instance wishes to cancel an ongoing grant request and + place it into the _finalized_ state, the client instance makes an + HTTP DELETE request to the continuation URI. + + DELETE /continue HTTP/1.1 + Host: server.example.com + Content-Type: application/json + Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU + Signature-Input: sig1=... + Signature: sig1=... + + If the request is successfully revoked, the AS responds with HTTP + status code 204 (No Content). The AS SHOULD revoke all associated + access tokens, if possible. The AS SHOULD disable all token rotation + and other token management functions on such access tokens, if + possible. Once the grant request is in the _finalized_ state, it + MUST NOT be moved to any other state. + + If the request is not revoked, the AS responds with an + invalid_continuation error (Section 3.6). + +6. Token Management + + If an access token response includes the manage field as described in + Section 3.2.1, the client instance MAY call this URI to manage the + access token with the rotate and revoke actions defined in the + following subsections. Other actions are undefined by this + specification. + + { + "access_token": { + "value": "OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0", + "flags": ["bearer"], + "manage": { + "uri": "https://server.example.com/token/PRY5NM33O", + "access_token": { + "value": "B8CDFONP21-4TB8N6.BW7ONM" + } + } + } + } + + The token management access token issued under the manage field is + used to protect all calls to the token management API. The client + instance MUST present proof of the key associated with the token + along with the value of the token management access token. + + The AS MUST validate the proof and ensure that it is associated with + the token management access token. + + The AS MUST uniquely identify the token being managed from the token + management URI, the token management access token, or a combination + of both. + +6.1. Rotating the Access Token Value + + If the client instance has an access token and that access token + expires, the client instance might want to rotate the access token to + a new value without expiration. Rotating an access token consists of + issuing a new access token in place of an existing access token, with + the same rights and properties as the original token, apart from an + updated token value and expiration time. + + To rotate an access token, the client instance makes an HTTP POST to + the token management URI with no message content, sending the access + token in the authorization header as described in Section 7.2 and + signing the request with the appropriate key. + + POST /token/PRY5NM33O HTTP/1.1 + Host: server.example.com + Authorization: GNAP B8CDFONP21-4TB8N6.BW7ONM + Signature-Input: sig1=... + Signature: sig1=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... + + The client instance cannot request to alter the access rights + associated with the access token during a rotation request. To get + an access token with different access rights for this grant request, + the client instance has to call the continuation API's update + functionality (Section 5.3) to get a new access token. The client + instance can also create a new grant request with the required access + rights. + + The AS validates that the token management access token presented is + associated with the management URI, that the AS issued the token to + the given client instance, and that the presented key is the correct + key for the token management access token. The AS determines which + access token is being rotated from the token management URI, the + token management access token, or both. + + If the token is validated and the key is appropriate for the request, + the AS MUST invalidate the current access token value associated with + this URI, if possible. Note that stateless access tokens can make + proactive revocation difficult within a system; see Section 11.32. + + For successful rotations, the AS responds with an HTTP status code + 200 (OK) with JSON-formatted message content consisting of the + rotated access token in the access_token field described in + Section 3.2.1. The value of the access token MUST NOT be the same as + the current value of the access token used to access the management + API. The response MUST include an access token management URI, and + the value of this URI MAY be different from the URI used by the + client instance to make the rotation call. The client instance MUST + use this new URI to manage the rotated access token. + + The access rights in the access array for the rotated access token + MUST be included in the response and MUST be the same as the token + before rotation. + + NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 + + { + "access_token": { + "value": "FP6A8H6HY37MH13CK76LBZ6Y1UADG6VEUPEER5H2", + "manage": { + "uri": "https://server.example.com/token/PRY5NM33O", + "access_token": { + "value": "B8CDFONP21-4TB8N6.BW7ONM" + } + }, + "expires_in": 3600, + "access": [ + { + "type": "photo-api", + "actions": [ + "read", + "write", + "dolphin" + ], + "locations": [ + "https://server.example.net/", + "https://resource.local/other" + ], + "datatypes": [ + "metadata", + "images" + ] + }, + "read", "dolphin-metadata" + ] + } + } + + If the AS is unable or unwilling to rotate the value of the access + token, the AS responds with an invalid_rotation error (Section 3.6). + Upon receiving such an error, the client instance MUST consider the + access token to not have changed its state. + +6.1.1. Binding a New Key to the Rotated Access Token + + If the client instance wishes to bind a new presentation key to an + access token, the client instance MUST present both the new key and + the proof of previous key material in the access token rotation + request. The client instance makes an HTTP POST as a JSON object + with the following field: + + key: The new key value or reference in the format described in + Section 7.1. Note that keys passed by value are always public + keys. REQUIRED when doing key rotation. + + The proofing method and parameters for the new key MUST be the same + as those established for the previous key. + + The client instance MUST prove possession of both the currently bound + key and the newly requested key simultaneously in the rotation + request. Specifically, the signature from the previous key MUST + cover the value or reference of the new key, and the signature of the + new key MUST cover the signature value of the old key. The means of + doing so vary depending on the proofing method in use. For example, + the HTTP message signatures proofing method uses multiple signatures + in the request as described in Section 7.3.1.1. This is shown in the + following example. + + POST /token/PRY5NM33O HTTP/1.1 + Host: server.example.com + Authorization: GNAP B8CDFONP21-4TB8N6.BW7ONM + Signature-Input: \ + sig1=("@method" "@target-uri" "content-digest" \ + "authorization"),\ + sig2=("@method" "@target-uri" "content-digest" \ + "authorization" "signature";key="sig1" \ + "signature-input";key="sig1") + Signature: sig1=..., sig2=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... + + { + "key": { + "proof": "httpsig", + "jwk": { + "kty": "RSA", + "e": "AQAB", + "kid": "xyz-2", + "alg": "RS256", + "n": "kOB5rR4Jv0GMeLaY6_It_r3ORwdf8ci_JtffXyaSx8xY..." + } + } + } + + Failure to present the appropriate proof of either the new key or the + previous key for the access token, as defined by the proofing method, + MUST result in an invalid_rotation error code from the AS + (Section 3.6). + + An attempt to change the proofing method or parameters, including an + attempt to rotate the key of a bearer token (which has no key), MUST + result in an invalid_rotation error code returned from the AS + (Section 3.6). + + If the AS does not allow rotation of the access token's key for any + reason, including but not limited to lack of permission for this + client instance or lack of capability by the AS, the AS MUST return a + key_rotation_not_supported error code (Section 3.6). + +6.2. Revoking the Access Token + + If the client instance wishes to revoke the access token proactively, + such as when a user indicates to the client instance that they no + longer wish for it to have access or the client instance application + detects that it is being uninstalled, the client instance can use the + token management URI to indicate to the AS that the AS SHOULD + invalidate the access token for all purposes. + + The client instance makes an HTTP DELETE request to the token + management URI, presenting the access token and signing the request + with the appropriate key. + + DELETE /token/PRY5NM33O HTTP/1.1 + Host: server.example.com + Authorization: GNAP B8CDFONP21-4TB8N6.BW7ONM + Signature-Input: sig1=... + Signature: sig1=... + + If the key presented is associated with the token (or the client + instance, in the case of a bearer token), the AS MUST invalidate the + access token, if possible, and return an HTTP response code 204. + + 204 No Content + + Though the AS MAY revoke an access token at any time for any reason, + the token management function is specifically for the client + instance's use. If the access token has already expired or has been + revoked through other means, the AS SHOULD honor the revocation + request to the token management URI as valid, since the end result is + that the token is still not usable. + +7. Securing Requests from the Client Instance + + In GNAP, the client instance secures its requests to an AS and RS by + presenting an access token, proof of a key that it possesses (aka, a + "key proof"), or both an access token and key proof together. + + * When an access token is used with a key proof, this is a bound + token request. This type of request is used for calls to the RS + as well as the AS during grant negotiation. + + * When a key proof is used with no access token, this is a non- + authorized signed request. This type of request is used for calls + to the AS to initiate a grant negotiation. + + * When an access token is used with no key proof, this is a bearer + token request. This type of request is used only for calls to the + RS and only with access tokens that are not bound to any key as + described in Section 3.2.1. + + * When neither an access token nor key proof are used, this is an + unsecured request. This type of request is used optionally for + calls to the RS as part of an RS-first discovery process as + described in Section 9.1. + +7.1. Key Formats + + Several different places in GNAP require the presentation of key + material by value or by reference. Key material sent by value is + sent using a JSON object with several fields described in this + section. + + All keys are associated with a specific key proofing method. The + proofing method associated with the key is indicated using the proof + field of the key object. + + proof (string or object): The form of proof that the client instance + will use when presenting the key. The valid values of this field + and the processing requirements for each are detailed in + Section 7.3. REQUIRED. + + A key presented by value MUST be a public key and MUST be presented + in only one supported format, as discussed in Section 11.35. Note + that while most formats present the full value of the public key, + some formats present a value cryptographically derived from the + public key. See additional discussion of the presentation of public + keys in Section 11.7. + + jwk (object): The public key and its properties represented as a + JSON Web Key (JWK) [RFC7517]. A JWK MUST contain the alg + (Algorithm) and kid (Key ID) parameters. The alg parameter MUST + NOT be "none". The x5c (X.509 Certificate Chain) parameter MAY be + used to provide the X.509 representation of the provided public + key. OPTIONAL. + + cert (string): The Privacy-Enhanced Mail (PEM) serialized value of + the certificate used to sign the request, with optional internal + whitespace per [RFC7468]. The PEM header and footer are + optionally removed. OPTIONAL. + + cert#S256 (string): The certificate thumbprint calculated as per + MTLS for OAuth [RFC8705] in base64url encoding. Note that this + format does not include the full public key. OPTIONAL. + + Additional key formats can be defined in the "GNAP Key Formats" + registry (Section 10.17). + + The following non-normative example shows a single key presented in + two different formats. The example key is intended to be used with + the HTTP message signatures proofing mechanism (Section 7.3.1), as + indicated by the httpsig value of the proof field. + + As a JWK: + + "key": { + "proof": "httpsig", + "jwk": { + "kty": "RSA", + "e": "AQAB", + "kid": "xyz-1", + "alg": "RS256", + "n": "kOB5rR4Jv0GMeLaY6_It_r3ORwdf8ci_JtffXyaSx8xY..." + } + } + + As a certificate in PEM format: + + "key": { + "proof": "httpsig", + "cert": "MIIEHDCCAwSgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFA..." + } + + When the key is presented in GNAP, proof of this key material MUST be + used to bind the request, the nature of which varies with the + location in the protocol where the key is used. For a key used as + part of a client instance's initial request in Section 2.3, the key + value represents the client instance's public key, and proof of that + key MUST be presented in that request. For a key used as part of an + access token response in Section 3.2.1, the proof of that key MUST be + used when the client instance later presents the access token to the + RS. + +7.1.1. Key References + + Keys in GNAP can also be passed by reference such that the party + receiving the reference will be able to determine the appropriate + keying material for use in that part of the protocol. A key + reference is a single opaque string. + + "key": "S-P4XJQ_RYJCRTSU1.63N3E" + + Keys referenced in this manner MAY be shared symmetric keys. See the + additional considerations for symmetric keys in Section 11.7. The + key reference MUST NOT contain any unencrypted private or shared + symmetric key information. + + Keys referenced in this manner MUST be bound to a single proofing + mechanism. + + The means of dereferencing this reference to a key value and proofing + mechanism are out of scope for this specification. Commonly, key + references are created by the AS and do not necessarily need to be + understood by the client. These types of key references are an + internal reference to the AS, such as an identifier of a record in a + database. In other applications, it can be useful to use key + references that are resolvable by both clients and the AS, which + could be accomplished by a client publishing a public key at a URI, + for example. For interoperability, this method could later be + described as an extension, but doing so is out of scope for this + specification. + +7.1.2. Key Protection + + The security of GNAP relies on the cryptographic security of the keys + themselves. When symmetric keys are used in GNAP, a key management + system or secure key derivation mechanism MUST be used to supply the + keys. Symmetric keys MUST NOT be a human-memorable password or a + value derived from one. Symmetric keys MUST NOT be passed by value + from the client instance to the AS. + + Additional security considerations apply when rotating keys (see + Section 11.22). + +7.2. Presenting Access Tokens + + Access tokens are issued to client instances in GNAP to allow the + client instance to make an authorized call to an API. The method the + client instance uses to send an access token depends on whether the + token is bound to a key and, if so, which proofing method is + associated with the key. This information is conveyed by the key + parameter and the bearer flag in the access token response structure + (Section 3.2.1). + + If the flags field does not contain the bearer flag and the key is + absent, the access token MUST be sent using the same key and proofing + mechanism that the client instance used in its initial request (or + its most recent rotation). + + If the flags field does not contain the bearer flag and the key value + is an object as described in Section 7.1, the access token MUST be + sent using the key and proofing mechanism defined by the value of the + proof field within the key object. + + The access token MUST be sent using the HTTP Authorization request + header field and the "GNAP" authorization scheme along with a key + proof as described in Section 7.3 for the key bound to the access + token. For example, an access token bound using HTTP message + signatures would be sent as follows: + + NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 + + GET /stuff HTTP/1.1 + Host: resource.example.com + Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU + Signature-Input: sig1=("@method" "@target-uri" "authorization")\ + ;created=1618884473;keyid="gnap-rsa";nonce="NAOEJF12ER2";tag="gnap" + Signature: sig1=:FQ+EjWqc38uLFByKa5y+c4WyYYwCTGUhidWKfr5L1Cha8FiPEw\ + DxG7nWttpBLS/B6VLfkZJogPbclySs9MDIsAIJwHnzlcJjwXWR2lfvm2z3X7EkJHm\ + Zp4SmyKOS34luAiKR1xwf32NYFolHmZf/SbHZJuWvQuS4U33C+BbsXz8MflFH1Dht\ + H/C1E5i244gSbdLCPxzABc/Q0NHVSLo1qaouYIvnxXB8OT3K7mwWjsLh1GC5vFThb\ + 3XQ363r6f0OPRa4qWHhubR/d/J/lNOjbBdjq9AJ69oqNJ+A2XT+ZCrVasEJE0OBvD\ + auQoiywhb8BMB7+PEINsPk5/8UvaNxbw==: + + If the flags field contains the bearer flag, the access token is a + bearer token that MUST be sent using the Authorization request header + field method defined in [RFC6750]. + + Authorization: Bearer OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0 + + The Form-Encoded Body Parameter and URI Query Parameter methods of + [RFC6750] MUST NOT be used for GNAP access tokens. + +7.3. Proving Possession of a Key with a Request + + Any keys presented by the client instance to the AS or RS MUST be + validated as part of the request in which they are presented. The + type of binding used is indicated by the proof parameter of the key + object in Section 7.1. Key proofing methods are specified either by + a string, which consists of the key proofing method name on its own, + or by a JSON object with the required field method: + + method: The name of the key proofing method to be used. REQUIRED. + + Individual methods defined as objects MAY define additional + parameters as members in this object. + + Values for the method defined by this specification are as follows: + + "httpsig" (string or object): HTTP message signing. See + Section 7.3.1. + + "mtls" (string): MTLS certificate verification. See Section 7.3.2. + + "jwsd" (string): A detached JWS signature header. See + Section 7.3.3. + + "jws" (string): Attached JWS Payload. See Section 7.3.4. + + Additional proofing methods can be defined in the "GNAP Key Proofing + Methods" registry (Section 10.16). + + Proofing methods MAY be defined as both an object and a string. For + example, the httpsig method can be specified as an object with its + parameters explicitly declared, such as: + + { + "proof": { + "method": "httpsig", + "alg": "ecdsa-p384-sha384", + "content-digest-alg": "sha-256" + } + } + + The httpsig method also defines default behavior when it is passed as + a string form, using the signature algorithm specified by the + associated key material and the content digest is calculated using + sha-256. This configuration can be selected using the following + shortened form: + + { + "proof": "httpsig" + } + + All key binding methods used by this specification MUST cover all + relevant portions of the request, including anything that would + change the nature of the request, to allow for secure validation of + the request. Relevant aspects include the URI being called, the HTTP + method being used, any relevant HTTP headers and values, and the HTTP + message content itself. The verifier of the signed message MUST + validate all components of the signed message to ensure that nothing + has been tampered with or substituted in a way that would change the + nature of the request. Definitions of key binding methods MUST + enumerate how these requirements are fulfilled. + + When a key proofing mechanism is bound to an access token, the key + being presented MUST be the key associated with the access token, and + the access token MUST be covered by the signature method of the + proofing mechanism. + + The key binding methods in this section MAY be used by other + components making calls as part of GNAP, such as the extensions + allowing the RS to make calls to the AS defined in [GNAP-RS]. To + facilitate this extended use, "signer" and "verifier" are used as + generic terms in the subsections below. In the core functions of + GNAP specified in this document, the "signer" is the client instance, + and the "verifier" is the AS (for grant requests) or RS (for resource + requests), as appropriate. + + When used for delegation in GNAP, these key binding mechanisms allow + the AS to ensure that the keys presented by the client instance in + the initial request are in control of the party calling any follow-up + or continuation requests. To facilitate this requirement, the + continuation response (Section 3.1) includes an access token bound to + the client instance's key (Section 2.3), and that key (or its most + recent rotation) MUST be proved in all continuation requests + (Section 5). Token management requests (Section 6) are similarly + bound to either the access token's own key or, in the case of bearer + tokens, the client instance's key. + + In the following subsections, unless otherwise noted, the RS256 JSON + Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) signature algorithm (defined in + Section 3.3 of [RFC7518]) is applied using the following RSA key + (presented here in JWK format): + + NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 + + { + "kid": "gnap-rsa", + "p": "xS4-YbQ0SgrsmcA7xDzZKuVNxJe3pCYwdAe6efSy4hdDgF9-vhC5gjaRk\ + i1wWuERSMW4Tv44l5HNrL-Bbj_nCJxr_HAOaesDiPn2PnywwEfg3Nv95Nn-\ + eilhqXRaW-tJKEMjDHu_fmJBeemHNZI412gBnXdGzDVo22dvYoxd6GM", + "kty": "RSA", + "q": "rVdcT_uy-CD0GKVLGpEGRR7k4JO6Tktc8MEHkC6NIFXihk_6vAIOCzCD6\ + LMovMinOYttpRndKoGTNdJfWlDFDScAs8C5n2y1STCQPRximBY-bw39-aZq\ + JXMxOLyPjzuVgiTOCBIvLD6-8-mvFjXZk_eefD0at6mQ5qV3U1jZt88", + "d": "FHlhdTF0ozTliDxMBffT6aJVKZKmbbFJOVNten9c3lXKB3ux3NAb_D2dB\ + 7inp9EV23oWrDspFtvCvD9dZrXgRKMHofkEpo_SSvBZfgtH-OTkbY_TqtPF\ + FLPKAw0JX5cFPnn4Q2xE4n-dQ7tpRCKl59vZLHBrHShr90zqzFp0AKXU5fj\ + b1gC9LPwsFA2Fd7KXmI1drQQEVq9R-o18Pnn4BGQNQNjO_VkcJTiBmEIVT_\ + KJRPdpVJAmbgnYWafL_hAfeb_dK8p85yurEVF8nCK5oO3EPrqB7IL4UqaEn\ + 5Sl3u0j8x5or-xrrAoNz-gdOv7ONfZY6NFoa-3f8q9wBAHUuQ", + "e": "AQAB", + "qi": "ogpNEkDKg22Rj9cDV_-PJBZaXMk66Fp557RT1tafIuqJRHEufSOYnsto\ + bWPJ0gHxv1gVJw3gm-zYvV-wTMNgr2wVsBSezSJjPSjxWZtmT2z68W1DuvK\ + kZy15vz7Jd85hmDlriGcXNCoFEUsGLWkpHH9RwPIzguUHWmTt8y0oXyI", + "dp": "dvCKGI2G7RLh3WyjoJ_Dr6hZ3LhXweB3YcY3qdD9BnxZ71mrLiMQg4c_\ + EBnwqCETN_5sStn2cRc2JXnvLP3G8t7IFKHTT_i_TSTacJ7uT04MSa053Y3\ + RfwbvLjRNPR0UKAE3ZxROUoIaVNuU_6-QMf8-2ilUv2GIOrCN87gP_Vk", + "alg": "RS256", + "dq": "iMZmELaKgT9_W_MRT-UfDWtTLeFjIGRW8aFeVmZk9R7Pnyt8rNzyN-IQ\ + M40ql8u8J6vc2GmQGfokLlPQ6XLSCY68_xkTXrhoU1f-eDntkhP7L6XawSK\ + Onv5F2H7wyBQ75HUmHTg8AK2B_vRlMyFKjXbVlzKf4kvqChSGEz4IjQ", + "n": "hYOJ-XOKISdMMShn_G4W9m20mT0VWtQBsmBBkI2cmRt4Ai8BfYdHsFzAt\ + YKOjpBR1RpKpJmVKxIGNy0g6Z3ad2XYsh8KowlyVy8IkZ8NMwSrcUIBZGYX\ + jHpwjzvfGvXH_5KJlnR3_uRUp4Z4Ujk2bCaKegDn11V2vxE41hqaPUnhRZx\ + e0jRETddzsE3mu1SK8dTCROjwUl14mUNo8iTrTm4n0qDadz8BkPo-uv4BC0\ + bunS0K3bA_3UgVp7zBlQFoFnLTO2uWp_muLEWGl67gBq9MO3brKXfGhi3kO\ + zywzwPTuq-cVQDyEN7aL0SxCb3Hc4IdqDaMg8qHUyObpPitDQ" + } + + Key proofing methods SHOULD define a mechanism to allow the rotation + of keys discussed in Section 6.1.1. Key rotation mechanisms MUST + define a way for presenting proof of two keys simultaneously with the + following attributes: + + * The value of or reference to the new key material MUST be signed + by the existing key. Generally speaking, this amounts to using + the existing key to sign the content of the message that contains + the new key. + + * The signature of the old key MUST be signed by the new key. + Generally speaking, this means including the signature value of + the old key under the coverage of the new key. + +7.3.1. HTTP Message Signatures + + This method is indicated by the method value httpsig and can be + declared in either object form or string form. + + When the proofing method is specified in object form, the following + parameters are defined: + + alg: The HTTP signature algorithm, from the "HTTP Signature + Algorithms" registry. REQUIRED. + + content-digest-alg: The algorithm used for the Content-Digest field, + used to protect the content when present in the message. + REQUIRED. + + This example uses the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm + (ECDSA) signing algorithm over the P384 curve and the SHA-512 hashing + algorithm for the content digest. + + { + "proof": { + "method": "httpsig", + "alg": "ecdsa-p384-sha384", + "content-digest-alg": "sha-512" + } + } + + When the proofing method is specified in string form, the signing + algorithm MUST be derived from the key material (such as using the + JWS algorithm in a JWK formatted key), and the content digest + algorithm MUST be sha-256. + + { + "proof": "httpsig" + } + + When using this method, the signer creates an HTTP message signature + as described in [RFC9421]. The covered components of the signature + MUST include the following: + + "@method": The method used in the HTTP request. + + "@target-uri": The full request URI of the HTTP request. + + When the message contains request content, the covered components + MUST also include the following: + + "content-digest": The Content-Digest header as defined in [RFC9530]. + When the request message has content, the signer MUST calculate + this field value and include the field in the request. The + verifier MUST validate this field value. REQUIRED when the + message request contains message content. + + When the request is bound to an access token, the covered components + MUST also include the following: + + "authorization": The Authorization header used to present the access + token as discussed in Section 7.2. + + Other message components MAY also be included. + + The signer MUST include the tag signature parameter with the value + gnap, and the verifier MUST verify that the parameter exists with + this value. The signer MUST include the created signature parameter + with a timestamp of when the signature was created, and the verifier + MUST ensure that the creation timestamp is sufficiently close to the + current time given expected network delay and clock skew. The signer + SHOULD include the nonce parameter with a unique and unguessable + value. When included, the verifier MUST determine that the nonce + value is unique within a reasonably short time period such as several + minutes. + + If the signer's key presented is a JWK, the keyid parameter of the + signature MUST be set to the kid value of the JWK, and the signing + algorithm used MUST be the JWS algorithm denoted by the key's alg + field of the JWK. + + The explicit alg signature parameter MUST NOT be included in the + signature, since the algorithm will be derived from either the key + material or the proof value. + + In the following non-normative example, the message content is a JSON + object: + + NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 + + { + "access_token": { + "access": [ + "dolphin-metadata" + ] + }, + "interact": { + "start": ["redirect"], + "finish": { + "method": "redirect", + "uri": "https://client.foo/callback", + "nonce": "VJLO6A4CAYLBXHTR0KRO" + } + }, + "client": { + "key": { + "proof": "httpsig", + "jwk": { + "kid": "gnap-rsa", + "kty": "RSA", + "e": "AQAB", + "alg": "PS512", + "n": "hYOJ-XOKISdMMShn_G4W9m20mT0VWtQBsmBBkI2cmRt4Ai8Bf\ + YdHsFzAtYKOjpBR1RpKpJmVKxIGNy0g6Z3ad2XYsh8KowlyVy8IkZ8NMwSrcUIBZG\ + YXjHpwjzvfGvXH_5KJlnR3_uRUp4Z4Ujk2bCaKegDn11V2vxE41hqaPUnhRZxe0jR\ + ETddzsE3mu1SK8dTCROjwUl14mUNo8iTrTm4n0qDadz8BkPo-uv4BC0bunS0K3bA_\ + 3UgVp7zBlQFoFnLTO2uWp_muLEWGl67gBq9MO3brKXfGhi3kOzywzwPTuq-cVQDyE\ + N7aL0SxCb3Hc4IdqDaMg8qHUyObpPitDQ" + } + } + "display": { + "name": "My Client Display Name", + "uri": "https://client.foo/" + }, + } + } + + This content is hashed for the Content-Digest header using sha-256 + into the following encoded value: + + sha-256=:q2XBmzRDCREcS2nWo/6LYwYyjrlN1bRfv+HKLbeGAGg=: + + The HTTP message signature input string is calculated to be the + following: + + NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 + + "@method": POST + "@target-uri": https://server.example.com/gnap + "content-digest": \ + sha-256=:q2XBmzRDCREcS2nWo/6LYwYyjrlN1bRfv+HKLbeGAGg=: + "content-length": 988 + "content-type": application/json + "@signature-params": ("@method" "@target-uri" "content-digest" \ + "content-length" "content-type");created=1618884473\ + ;keyid="gnap-rsa";nonce="NAOEJF12ER2";tag="gnap" + + This leads to the following full HTTP message request: + + NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 + + POST /gnap HTTP/1.1 + Host: server.example.com + Content-Type: application/json + Content-Length: 988 + Content-Digest: sha-256=:q2XBmzRDCREcS2nWo/6LYwYyjrlN1bRfv+HKLbeGAG\ + g=: + Signature-Input: sig1=("@method" "@target-uri" "content-digest" \ + "content-length" "content-type");created=1618884473\ + ;keyid="gnap-rsa";nonce="NAOEJF12ER2";tag="gnap" + Signature: sig1=:c2uwTa6ok3iHZsaRKl1ediKlgd5cCAYztbym68XgX8gSOgK0Bt\ + +zLJ19oGjSAHDjJxX2gXP2iR6lh9bLMTfPzbFVn4Eh+5UlceP+0Z5mES7v0R1+eHe\ + OqBl0YlYKaSQ11YT7n+cwPnCSdv/6+62m5zwXEEftnBeA1ECorfTuPtau/yrTYEvD\ + 9A/JqR2h9VzAE17kSlSSsDHYA6ohsFqcRJavX29duPZDfYgkZa76u7hJ23yVxoUpu\ + 2J+7VUdedN/72N3u3/z2dC8vQXbzCPTOiLru12lb6vnBZoDbUGsRR/zHPauxhj9T+\ + 218o5+tgwYXw17othJSxIIOZ9PkIgz4g==: + + { + "access_token": { + "access": [ + "dolphin-metadata" + ] + }, + "interact": { + "start": ["redirect"], + "finish": { + "method": "redirect", + "uri": "https://client.foo/callback", + "nonce": "VJLO6A4CAYLBXHTR0KRO" + } + }, + "client": { + "key": { + "proof": "httpsig", + "jwk": { + "kid": "gnap-rsa", + "kty": "RSA", + "e": "AQAB", + "alg": "PS512", + "n": "hYOJ-XOKISdMMShn_G4W9m20mT0VWtQBsmBBkI2cmRt4Ai8Bf\ + YdHsFzAtYKOjpBR1RpKpJmVKxIGNy0g6Z3ad2XYsh8KowlyVy8IkZ8NMwSrcUIBZG\ + YXjHpwjzvfGvXH_5KJlnR3_uRUp4Z4Ujk2bCaKegDn11V2vxE41hqaPUnhRZxe0jR\ + ETddzsE3mu1SK8dTCROjwUl14mUNo8iTrTm4n0qDadz8BkPo-uv4BC0bunS0K3bA_\ + 3UgVp7zBlQFoFnLTO2uWp_muLEWGl67gBq9MO3brKXfGhi3kOzywzwPTuq-cVQDyE\ + N7aL0SxCb3Hc4IdqDaMg8qHUyObpPitDQ" + } + } + "display": { + "name": "My Client Display Name", + "uri": "https://client.foo/" + }, + } + } + + The verifier MUST ensure that the signature covers all required + message components. If the HTTP message includes content, the + verifier MUST calculate and verify the value of the Content-Digest + header. The verifier MUST validate the signature against the + expected key of the signer. + + A received message MAY include multiple signatures, each with its own + label. The verifier MUST examine all included signatures until it + finds (at least) one that is acceptable according to its policy and + meets the requirements in this section. + +7.3.1.1. Key Rotation Using HTTP Message Signatures + + When rotating a key using HTTP message signatures, the message, which + includes the new public key value or reference, is first signed with + the old key following all of the requirements in Section 7.3.1. The + message is then signed again with the new key by following all of the + requirements in Section 7.3.1 again, with the following additional + requirements: + + * The covered components MUST include the Signature and Signature- + Input values from the signature generated with the old key. + + * The tag value MUST be gnap-rotate. + + For example, the following request to the token management endpoint + for rotating a token value contains the new key in the request. The + message is first signed using the old key, and the resulting + signature is placed in "old-key": + + NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 + + POST /token/PRY5NM33 HTTP/1.1 + Host: server.example.com + Authorization: GNAP 4398.34-12-asvDa.a + Content-Digest: sha-512=:Fb/A5vnawhuuJ5xk2RjGrbbxr6cvinZqd4+JPY85u/\ + JNyTlmRmCOtyVhZ1Oz/cSS4tsYen6fzpCwizy6UQxNBQ==: + Signature-Input: old-key=("@method" "@target-uri" "content-digest" \ + "authorization");created=1618884475;keyid="test-key-ecc-p256"\ + ;tag="gnap" + Signature: old-key=:vN4IKYsJl2RLFe+tYEm4dHM4R4BToqx5D2FfH4ge5WOkgxo\ + dI2QRrjB8rysvoSEGvAfiVJOWsGcPD1lU639Amw==: + + { + "key": { + "proof": "httpsig", + "jwk": { + "kty": "RSA", + "e": "AQAB", + "kid": "xyz-2", + "alg": "RS256", + "n": "kOB5rR4Jv0GMeLaY6_It_r3ORwdf8ci_JtffXyaSx8xY..." + } + } + } + + The signer then creates a new signature using the new key, adding the + signature input and value to the signature base. + + NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 + + "@method": POST + "@target-uri": https://server.example.com/token/PRY5NM33 + "content-digest": sha-512=:Fb/A5vnawhuuJ5xk2RjGrbbxr6cvinZqd4+JPY85\ + u/JNyTlmRmCOtyVhZ1Oz/cSS4tsYen6fzpCwizy6UQxNBQ==: + "authorization": GNAP 4398.34-12-asvDa.a + "signature";key="old-key": :YdDJjDn2Sq8FR82e5IcOLWmmf6wILoswlnRcz+n\ + M+e8xjFDpWS2YmiMYDqUdri2UiJsZx63T1z7As9Kl6HTGkQ==: + "signature-input";key="old-key": ("@method" "@target-uri" \ + "content-digest" "authorization");created=1618884475\ + ;keyid="test-key-ecc-p256";tag="gnap" + "@signature-params": ("@method" "@target-uri" "content-digest" \ + "authorization" "signature";key="old-key" "signature-input"\ + ;key="old-key");created=1618884480;keyid="xyz-2" + ;tag="gnap-rotate" + + This signature is then added to the message: + + NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 + + POST /token/PRY5NM33 HTTP/1.1 + Host: server.example.com + Authorization: GNAP 4398.34-12-asvDa.a + Content-Digest: sha-512=:Fb/A5vnawhuuJ5xk2RjGrbbxr6cvinZqd4+JPY85u/\ + JNyTlmRmCOtyVhZ1Oz/cSS4tsYen6fzpCwizy6UQxNBQ==: + Signature-Input: old-key=("@method" "@target-uri" "content-digest" \ + "authorization");created=1618884475;keyid="test-key-ecc-p256"\ + ;tag="gnap", \ + new-key=("@method" "@target-uri" "content-digest" \ + "authorization" "signature";key="old-key" "signature-input"\ + ;key="old-key");created=1618884480;keyid="xyz-2" + ;tag="gnap-rotate" + Signature: old-key=:vN4IKYsJl2RLFe+tYEm4dHM4R4BToqx5D2FfH4ge5WOkgxo\ + dI2QRrjB8rysvoSEGvAfiVJOWsGcPD1lU639Amw==:, \ + new-key=:VWUExXQ0geWeTUKhCfDT7WJyT++OHSVbfPA1ukW0o7mmstdbvIz9iOuH\ + DRFzRBm0MQPFVMpLDFXQdE3vi2SL3ZjzcX2qLwzAtyRB9+RsV2caAA80A5ZGMoo\ + gUsKPk4FFDN7KRUZ0vT9Mo9ycx9Dq/996TOWtAmq5z0YUYEwwn+T6+NcW8rFtms\ + s1ZfXG0EoAfV6ve25p+x40Y1rvDHsfkakTRB4J8jWVDybSe39tjIKQBo3uicDVw\ + twewBMNidIa+66iF3pWj8w9RSb0cncEgvbkHgASqaZeXmxxG4gM8p1HH9v/OqQT\ + Oggm5gTWmCQs4oxEmWsfTOxefunfh3X+Qw==: + + { + "key": { + "proof": "httpsig", + "jwk": { + "kty": "RSA", + "e": "AQAB", + "kid": "xyz-2", + "alg": "RS256", + "n": "kOB5rR4Jv0GMeLaY6_It_r3ORwdf8ci_JtffXyaSx8xY..." + } + } + } + + The verifier MUST validate both signatures before processing the + request for key rotation. + +7.3.2. Mutual TLS + + This method is indicated by the method value mtls in string form. + + { + "proof": "mtls" + } + + The signer presents its TLS client certificate during TLS negotiation + with the verifier. + + In the following non-normative example, the certificate is + communicated to the application through the Client-Cert header field + from a TLS reverse proxy as per [RFC9440], leading to the following + full HTTP request message: + + POST /gnap HTTP/1.1 + Host: server.example.com + Content-Type: application/jose + Content-Length: 1567 + Client-Cert: \ + :MIIC6jCCAdKgAwIBAgIGAXjw74xPMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMDYxNDAyBgNVBAMM\ + K05JWU15QmpzRGp5QkM5UDUzN0Q2SVR6a3BEOE50UmppOXlhcEV6QzY2bVEwHhcN\ + MjEwNDIwMjAxODU0WhcNMjIwMjE0MjAxODU0WjA2MTQwMgYDVQQDDCtOSVlNeUJq\ + c0RqeUJDOVA1MzdENklUemtwRDhOdFJqaTl5YXBFekM2Nm1RMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG\ + 9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAhYOJ+XOKISdMMShn/G4W9m20mT0VWtQBsmBB\ + kI2cmRt4Ai8BfYdHsFzAtYKOjpBR1RpKpJmVKxIGNy0g6Z3ad2XYsh8KowlyVy8I\ + kZ8NMwSrcUIBZGYXjHpwjzvfGvXH/5KJlnR3/uRUp4Z4Ujk2bCaKegDn11V2vxE4\ + 1hqaPUnhRZxe0jRETddzsE3mu1SK8dTCROjwUl14mUNo8iTrTm4n0qDadz8BkPo+\ + uv4BC0bunS0K3bA/3UgVp7zBlQFoFnLTO2uWp/muLEWGl67gBq9MO3brKXfGhi3k\ + OzywzwPTuq+cVQDyEN7aL0SxCb3Hc4IdqDaMg8qHUyObpPitDQIDAQABMA0GCSqG\ + SIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQBnYFK0eYHy+hVf2D58usj39lhL5znb/q9G35GBd/XsWfCE\ + wHuLOSZSUmG71bZtrOcx0ptle9bp2kKl4HlSTTfbtpuG5onSa3swRNhtKtUy5NH9\ + W/FLViKWfoPS3kwoEpC1XqKY6l7evoTCtS+kTQRSrCe4vbNprCAZRxz6z1nEeCgu\ + NMk38yTRvx8ihZpVOuU+Ih+dOtVe/ex5IAPYxlQsvtfhsUZqc7IyCcy72WHnRHlU\ + fn3pJm0S5270+Yls3Iv6h3oBAP19i906UjiUTNH3g0xMW+V4uLxgyckt4wD4Mlyv\ + jnaQ7Z3sR6EsXMocAbXHIAJhwKdtU/fLgdwL5vtx: + + + { + "access_token": { + "access": [ + "dolphin-metadata" + ] + }, + "interact": { + "start": ["redirect"], + "finish": { + "method": "redirect", + "uri": "https://client.foo/callback", + "nonce": "VJLO6A4CAYLBXHTR0KRO" + } + }, + "client": { + "key": { + "proof": "mtls", + "cert": "MIIC6jCCAdKgAwIBAgIGAXjw74xPMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMD\ + YxNDAyBgNVBAMMK05JWU15QmpzRGp5QkM5UDUzN0Q2SVR6a3BEOE50UmppOXlhcEV\ + 6QzY2bVEwHhcNMjEwNDIwMjAxODU0WhcNMjIwMjE0MjAxODU0WjA2MTQwMgYDVQQD\ + DCtOSVlNeUJqc0RqeUJDOVA1MzdENklUemtwRDhOdFJqaTl5YXBFekM2Nm1RMIIBI\ + jANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAhYOJ+XOKISdMMShn/G4W9m20mT\ + 0VWtQBsmBBkI2cmRt4Ai8BfYdHsFzAtYKOjpBR1RpKpJmVKxIGNy0g6Z3ad2XYsh8\ + KowlyVy8IkZ8NMwSrcUIBZGYXjHpwjzvfGvXH/5KJlnR3/uRUp4Z4Ujk2bCaKegDn\ + 11V2vxE41hqaPUnhRZxe0jRETddzsE3mu1SK8dTCROjwUl14mUNo8iTrTm4n0qDad\ + z8BkPo+uv4BC0bunS0K3bA/3UgVp7zBlQFoFnLTO2uWp/muLEWGl67gBq9MO3brKX\ + fGhi3kOzywzwPTuq+cVQDyEN7aL0SxCb3Hc4IdqDaMg8qHUyObpPitDQIDAQABMA0\ + GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQBnYFK0eYHy+hVf2D58usj39lhL5znb/q9G35GBd/Xs\ + WfCEwHuLOSZSUmG71bZtrOcx0ptle9bp2kKl4HlSTTfbtpuG5onSa3swRNhtKtUy5\ + NH9W/FLViKWfoPS3kwoEpC1XqKY6l7evoTCtS+kTQRSrCe4vbNprCAZRxz6z1nEeC\ + guNMk38yTRvx8ihZpVOuU+Ih+dOtVe/ex5IAPYxlQsvtfhsUZqc7IyCcy72WHnRHl\ + Ufn3pJm0S5270+Yls3Iv6h3oBAP19i906UjiUTNH3g0xMW+V4uLxgyckt4wD4Mlyv\ + jnaQ7Z3sR6EsXMocAbXHIAJhwKdtU/fLgdwL5vtx" + } + "display": { + "name": "My Client Display Name", + "uri": "https://client.foo/" + }, + }, + "subject": { + "formats": ["iss_sub", "opaque"] + } + } + + The verifier compares the TLS client certificate presented during + MTLS negotiation to the expected key of the signer. Since the TLS + connection covers the entire message, there are no additional + requirements to check. + + Note that in many instances, the verifier will not do a full + certificate chain validation of the presented TLS client certificate, + as the means of trust for this certificate could be in something + other than a PKI system, such as a static registration or trust-on- + first-use. See Sections 11.3 and 11.4 for some additional + considerations for this key proofing method. + +7.3.2.1. Key Rotation Using MTLS + + Since it is not possible to present two client authenticated + certificates to a MTLS connection simultaneously, dynamic key + rotation for this proofing method is not defined. Instead, key + rotation for MTLS-based client instances is expected to be managed + through deployment practices, as discussed in Section 11.4. + +7.3.3. Detached JWS + + This method is indicated by the method value jwsd in string form. + + { + "proof": "jwsd" + } + + The signer creates a JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] object as + follows. + + To protect the request, the JOSE header of the signature contains the + following claims: + + kid (string): The key identifier. REQUIRED if the key is presented + in JWK format. This MUST be the value of the kid field of the + key. + + alg (string): The algorithm used to sign the request. The algorithm + MUST be appropriate to the key presented. If the key is presented + as a JWK, this MUST be equal to the alg parameter of the key. The + algorithm MUST NOT be none. REQUIRED. + + typ (string): The type header, value "gnap-binding-jwsd". REQUIRED. + + htm (string): The HTTP method used to make this request, as a case- + sensitive ASCII string. Note that most public HTTP methods are in + uppercase ASCII by convention. REQUIRED. + + uri (string): The HTTP URI used for this request. This value MUST + be an absolute URI, including all path and query components and no + fragment components. REQUIRED. + + created (integer): A timestamp of when the signature was created, in + integer seconds since UNIX Epoch. REQUIRED. + + When the request is bound to an access token, the JOSE header MUST + also include the following: + + ath (string): The hash of the access token. The value MUST be the + result of base64url encoding (with no padding) the SHA-256 digest + of the ASCII encoding of the associated access token's value. + REQUIRED. + + If the HTTP request has content (such as an HTTP POST or PUT method), + the payload of the JWS object is the base64url encoding (without + padding) of the SHA-256 digest of the bytes of the content. If the + request being made does not have content (such as an HTTP GET, + OPTIONS, or DELETE method), the JWS signature is calculated over an + empty payload. + + The signer presents the signed object in compact form [RFC7515] in + the Detached-JWS header field. + + In the following non-normative example, the JOSE header contains the + following parameters: + + { + "alg": "RS256", + "kid": "gnap-rsa", + "uri": "https://server.example.com/gnap", + "htm": "POST", + "typ": "gnap-binding-jwsd", + "created": 1618884475 + } + + The request content is the following JSON object: + + NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 + + { + "access_token": { + "access": [ + "dolphin-metadata" + ] + }, + "interact": { + "start": ["redirect"], + "finish": { + "method": "redirect", + "uri": "https://client.foo/callback", + "nonce": "VJLO6A4CAYLBXHTR0KRO" + } + }, + "client": { + "key": { + "proof": "jwsd", + "jwk": { + "kid": "gnap-rsa", + "kty": "RSA", + "e": "AQAB", + "alg": "RS256", + "n": "hYOJ-XOKISdMMShn_G4W9m20mT0VWtQBsmBBkI2cmRt4Ai8Bf\ + YdHsFzAtYKOjpBR1RpKpJmVKxIGNy0g6Z3ad2XYsh8KowlyVy8IkZ8NMwSrcUIBZG\ + YXjHpwjzvfGvXH_5KJlnR3_uRUp4Z4Ujk2bCaKegDn11V2vxE41hqaPUnhRZxe0jR\ + ETddzsE3mu1SK8dTCROjwUl14mUNo8iTrTm4n0qDadz8BkPo-uv4BC0bunS0K3bA_\ + 3UgVp7zBlQFoFnLTO2uWp_muLEWGl67gBq9MO3brKXfGhi3kOzywzwPTuq-cVQDyE\ + N7aL0SxCb3Hc4IdqDaMg8qHUyObpPitDQ" + } + } + "display": { + "name": "My Client Display Name", + "uri": "https://client.foo/" + }, + } + } + + This is hashed to the following base64-encoded value: + + PGiVuOZUcN1tRtUS6tx2b4cBgw9mPgXG3IPB3wY7ctc + + This leads to the following full HTTP request message: + + NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 + + POST /gnap HTTP/1.1 + Host: server.example.com + Content-Type: application/json + Content-Length: 983 + Detached-JWS: eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImNyZWF0ZWQiOjE2MTg4ODQ0NzUsImh0b\ + SI6IlBPU1QiLCJraWQiOiJnbmFwLXJzYSIsInR5cCI6ImduYXAtYmluZGluZytqd3\ + NkIiwidXJpIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vZ25hcCJ9.PGiVuO\ + ZUcN1tRtUS6tx2b4cBgw9mPgXG3IPB3wY7ctc.fUq-SV-A1iFN2MwCRW_yolVtT2_\ + TZA2h5YeXUoi5F2Q2iToC0Tc4drYFOSHIX68knd68RUA7yHqCVP-ZQEd6aL32H69e\ + 9zuMiw6O_s4TBKB3vDOvwrhYtDH6fX2hP70cQoO-47OwbqP-ifkrvI3hVgMX9TfjV\ + eKNwnhoNnw3vbu7SNKeqJEbbwZfpESaGepS52xNBlDNMYBQQXxM9OqKJaXffzLFEl\ + -Xe0UnfolVtBraz3aPrPy1C6a4uT7wLda3PaTOVtgysxzii3oJWpuz0WP5kRujzDF\ + wX_EOzW0jsjCSkL-PXaKSpZgEjNjKDMg9irSxUISt1C1T6q3SzRgfuQ + + + { + "access_token": { + "access": [ + "dolphin-metadata" + ] + }, + "interact": { + "start": ["redirect"], + "finish": { + "method": "redirect", + "uri": "https://client.foo/callback", + "nonce": "VJLO6A4CAYLBXHTR0KRO" + } + }, + "client": { + "key": { + "proof": "jwsd", + "jwk": { + "kid": "gnap-rsa", + "kty": "RSA", + "e": "AQAB", + "alg": "RS256", + "n": "hYOJ-XOKISdMMShn_G4W9m20mT0VWtQBsmBBkI2cmRt4Ai8Bf\ + YdHsFzAtYKOjpBR1RpKpJmVKxIGNy0g6Z3ad2XYsh8KowlyVy8IkZ8NMwSrcUIBZG\ + YXjHpwjzvfGvXH_5KJlnR3_uRUp4Z4Ujk2bCaKegDn11V2vxE41hqaPUnhRZxe0jR\ + ETddzsE3mu1SK8dTCROjwUl14mUNo8iTrTm4n0qDadz8BkPo-uv4BC0bunS0K3bA_\ + 3UgVp7zBlQFoFnLTO2uWp_muLEWGl67gBq9MO3brKXfGhi3kOzywzwPTuq-cVQDyE\ + N7aL0SxCb3Hc4IdqDaMg8qHUyObpPitDQ" + } + } + "display": { + "name": "My Client Display Name", + "uri": "https://client.foo/" + }, + } + } + + When the verifier receives the Detached-JWS header, it MUST parse and + validate the JWS object. The signature MUST be validated against the + expected key of the signer. If the HTTP message request contains + content, the verifier MUST calculate the hash of the content just as + the signer does, with no normalization or transformation of the + request. All required fields MUST be present, and their values MUST + be valid. All fields MUST match the corresponding portions of the + HTTP message. For example, the htm field of the JWS header has to be + the same as the HTTP verb used in the request. + + Note that this proofing method depends on a specific cryptographic + algorithm, SHA-256, in two ways: 1) the ath hash algorithm is + hardcoded and 2) the payload of the detached/attached signature is + computed using a hardcoded hash. A future version of this document + may address crypto-agility for both these uses by replacing ath with + a new header that upgrades the algorithm and possibly defining a new + JWS header that indicates the HTTP content's hash method. + +7.3.3.1. Key Rotation Using Detached JWS + + When rotating a key using detached JWS, the message, which includes + the new public key value or reference, is first signed with the old + key as described above using a JWS object with typ header value + "gnap-binding-rotation-jwsd". The value of the JWS object is then + taken as the payload of a new JWS object, to be signed by the new key + using the parameters above. + + The value of the new JWS object is sent in the Detached-JWS header. + +7.3.4. Attached JWS + + This method is indicated by the method value jws in string form. + + { + "proof": "jws" + } + + The signer creates a JWS [RFC7515] object as follows. + + To protect the request, the JWS header contains the following claims: + + kid (string): The key identifier. REQUIRED if the key is presented + in JWK format. This MUST be the value of the kid field of the + key. + + alg (string): The algorithm used to sign the request. MUST be + appropriate to the key presented. If the key is presented as a + JWK, this MUST be equal to the alg parameter of the key. MUST NOT + be none. REQUIRED. + + typ (string): The type header, value "gnap-binding-jws". REQUIRED. + + htm (string): The HTTP method used to make this request, as a case- + sensitive ASCII string. (Note that most public HTTP methods are + in uppercase.) REQUIRED. + + uri (string): The HTTP URI used for this request, including all path + and query components and no fragment components. REQUIRED. + + created (integer): A timestamp of when the signature was created, in + integer seconds since UNIX Epoch. REQUIRED. + + When the request is bound to an access token, the JOSE header MUST + also include the following: + + ath (string): The hash of the access token. The value MUST be the + result of base64url encoding (with no padding) the SHA-256 digest + of the ASCII encoding of the associated access token's value. + REQUIRED. + + If the HTTP request has content (such as an HTTP POST or PUT method), + the payload of the JWS object is the JSON serialized content of the + request, and the object is signed according to JWS and serialized + into compact form [RFC7515]. The signer presents the JWS as the + content of the request along with a content type of application/jose. + The verifier MUST extract the payload of the JWS and treat it as the + request content for further processing. + + If the request being made does not have content (such as an HTTP GET, + OPTIONS, or DELETE method), the JWS signature is calculated over an + empty payload and passed in the Detached-JWS header as described in + Section 7.3.3. + + In the following non-normative example, the JOSE header contains the + following parameters: + + { + "alg": "RS256", + "kid": "gnap-rsa", + "uri": "https://server.example.com/gnap", + "htm": "POST", + "typ": "gnap-binding-jws", + "created": 1618884475 + } + + The request content, used as the JWS Payload, is the following JSON + object: + + NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 + + { + "access_token": { + "access": [ + "dolphin-metadata" + ] + }, + "interact": { + "start": ["redirect"], + "finish": { + "method": "redirect", + "uri": "https://client.foo/callback", + "nonce": "VJLO6A4CAYLBXHTR0KRO" + } + }, + "client": { + "key": { + "proof": "jws", + "jwk": { + "kid": "gnap-rsa", + "kty": "RSA", + "e": "AQAB", + "alg": "RS256", + "n": "hYOJ-XOKISdMMShn_G4W9m20mT0VWtQBsmBBkI2cmRt4Ai8Bf\ + YdHsFzAtYKOjpBR1RpKpJmVKxIGNy0g6Z3ad2XYsh8KowlyVy8IkZ8NMwSrcUIBZG\ + YXjHpwjzvfGvXH_5KJlnR3_uRUp4Z4Ujk2bCaKegDn11V2vxE41hqaPUnhRZxe0jR\ + ETddzsE3mu1SK8dTCROjwUl14mUNo8iTrTm4n0qDadz8BkPo-uv4BC0bunS0K3bA_\ + 3UgVp7zBlQFoFnLTO2uWp_muLEWGl67gBq9MO3brKXfGhi3kOzywzwPTuq-cVQDyE\ + N7aL0SxCb3Hc4IdqDaMg8qHUyObpPitDQ" + } + } + "display": { + "name": "My Client Display Name", + "uri": "https://client.foo/" + }, + }, + "subject": { + "formats": ["iss_sub", "opaque"] + } + } + + This leads to the following full HTTP request message: + + NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 + + POST /gnap HTTP/1.1 + Host: server.example.com + Content-Type: application/jose + Content-Length: 1047 + + eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImNyZWF0ZWQiOjE2MTg4ODQ0NzUsImh0bSI6IlBPU1QiLCJ\ + raWQiOiJnbmFwLXJzYSIsInR5cCI6ImduYXAtYmluZGluZytqd3NkIiwidXJpIjoiaH\ + R0cHM6Ly9zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vZ25hcCJ9.CnsKICAgICJhY2Nlc3NfdG9r\ + ZW4iOiB7CiAgICAgICAgImFjY2VzcyI6IFsKICAgICAgICAgICAgImRvbHBoaW4tbWV\ + 0YWRhdGEiCiAgICAgICAgXQogICAgfSwKICAgICJpbnRlcmFjdCI6IHsKICAgICAgIC\ + Aic3RhcnQiOiBbInJlZGlyZWN0Il0sCiAgICAgICAgImZpbmlzaCI6IHsKICAgICAgI\ + CAgICAgIm1ldGhvZCI6ICJyZWRpcmVjdCIsCiAgICAgICAgICAgICJ1cmkiOiAiaHR0\ + cHM6Ly9jbGllbnQuZm9vL2NhbGxiYWNrIiwKICAgICAgICAgICAgIm5vbmNlIjogIlZ\ + KTE82QTRDQVlMQlhIVFIwS1JPIgogICAgICAgIH0KICAgIH0sCiAgICAiY2xpZW50Ij\ + ogewogICAgICAicHJvb2YiOiAiandzIiwKICAgICAgImtleSI6IHsKICAgICAgICAia\ + ndrIjogewogICAgICAgICAgICAia2lkIjogImduYXAtcnNhIiwKICAgICAgICAgICAg\ + Imt0eSI6ICJSU0EiLAogICAgICAgICAgICAiZSI6ICJBUUFCIiwKICAgICAgICAgICA\ + gImFsZyI6ICJSUzI1NiIsCiAgICAgICAgICAgICJuIjogImhZT0otWE9LSVNkTU1TaG\ + 5fRzRXOW0yMG1UMFZXdFFCc21CQmtJMmNtUnQ0QWk4QmZZZEhzRnpBdFlLT2pwQlIxU\ + nBLcEptVkt4SUdOeTBnNlozYWQyWFlzaDhLb3dseVZ5OElrWjhOTXdTcmNVSUJaR1lY\ + akhwd2p6dmZHdlhIXzVLSmxuUjNfdVJVcDRaNFVqazJiQ2FLZWdEbjExVjJ2eEU0MWh\ + xYVBVbmhSWnhlMGpSRVRkZHpzRTNtdTFTSzhkVENST2p3VWwxNG1VTm84aVRyVG00bj\ + BxRGFkejhCa1BvLXV2NEJDMGJ1blMwSzNiQV8zVWdWcDd6QmxRRm9GbkxUTzJ1V3Bfb\ + XVMRVdHbDY3Z0JxOU1PM2JyS1hmR2hpM2tPenl3endQVHVxLWNWUUR5RU43YUwwU3hD\ + YjNIYzRJZHFEYU1nOHFIVXlPYnBQaXREUSIKICAgICAgICB9CiAgICAgIH0KICAgICA\ + gImRpc3BsYXkiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgIm5hbWUiOiAiTXkgQ2xpZW50IERpc3BsYXkgTm\ + FtZSIsCiAgICAgICAgInVyaSI6ICJodHRwczovL2NsaWVudC5mb28vIgogICAgICB9L\ + AogICAgfSwKICAgICJzdWJqZWN0IjogewogICAgICAgICJmb3JtYXRzIjogWyJpc3Nf\ + c3ViIiwgIm9wYXF1ZSJdCiAgICB9Cn0K.MwNoVMQp5hVxI0mCs9LlOUdFtkDXaA1_eT\ + vOXq7DOGrtDKH7q4vP2xUq3fH2jRAZqnobo0WdPP3eM3NH5QUjW8pa6_QpwdIWkK7r-\ + u_52puE0lPBp7J4U2w4l9gIbg8iknsmWmXeY5F6wiGT8ptfuEYGgmloAJd9LIeNvD3U\ + LW2h2dz1Pn2eDnbyvgB0Ugae0BoZB4f69fKWj8Z9wvTIjk1LZJN1PcL7_zT8Lrlic9a\ + PyzT7Q9ovkd1s-4whE7TrnGUzFc5mgWUn_gsOpsP5mIIljoEEv-FqOW2RyNYulOZl0Q\ + 8EnnDHV_vPzrHlUarbGg4YffgtwkQhdK72-JOxYQ + + When the verifier receives an attached JWS request, it MUST parse and + validate the JWS object. The signature MUST be validated against the + expected key of the signer. All required fields MUST be present, and + their values MUST be valid. All fields MUST match the corresponding + portions of the HTTP message. For example, the htm field of the JWS + header has to be the same as the HTTP verb used in the request. + + Note that this proofing method depends on a specific cryptographic + algorithm, SHA-256, in two ways: the ath hash algorithm is hardcoded, + and computing the payload of the detached/attached signature also + uses a hardcoded hash. A future version of this document may address + crypto-agility for both these uses by replacing ath with a new header + that upgrades the algorithm and possibly defining a new header that + indicates the HTTP content's hash method. + +7.3.4.1. Key Rotation Using Attached JWS + + When rotating a key using attached JWS, the message, which includes + the new public key value or reference, is first signed with the old + key using a JWS object with typ header value "gnap-binding-rotation- + jws". The value of the JWS object is then taken as the payload of a + new JWS object, to be signed by the new key. + +8. Resource Access Rights + + GNAP provides a rich structure for describing the protected resources + hosted by RSs and accessed by client software. This structure is + used when the client instance requests an access token (Section 2.1) + and when an access token is returned (Section 3.2). GNAP's structure + is designed to be analogous to the OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization + Requests data structure defined in [RFC9396]. + + The root of this structure is a JSON array. The elements of the JSON + array represent rights of access that are associated with the access + token. Individual rights of access can be defined by the RS as + either an object or a string. The resulting access is the union of + all elements within the array. + + The access associated with the access token is described using + objects that each contain multiple dimensions of access. Each object + contains a REQUIRED type property that determines the type of API + that the token is used for and the structure of the rest of the + object. There is no expected interoperability between different type + definitions. + + type (string): The type of resource request as a string. This field + MAY define which other fields are allowed in the request object. + REQUIRED. + + The value of the type field is under the control of the AS. This + field MUST be compared using an exact byte match of the string value + against known types by the AS. The AS MUST ensure that there is no + collision between different authorization data types that it + supports. The AS MUST NOT do any collation or normalization of data + types during comparison. It is RECOMMENDED that designers of + general-purpose APIs use a URI for this field to avoid collisions + between multiple API types protected by a single AS. + + While it is expected that many APIs will have their own properties, + this specification defines a set of common data fields that are + designed to be usable across different types of APIs. This + specification does not require the use of these common fields by an + API definition but, instead, provides them as reusable generic + components for API designers to make use of. The allowable values of + all fields are determined by the API being protected, as defined by a + particular type value. + + actions (array of strings): The types of actions the client instance + will take at the RS as an array of strings (for example, a client + instance asking for a combination of "read" and "write" access). + + locations (array of strings): The location of the RS as an array of + strings. These strings are typically URIs identifying the + location of the RS. + + datatypes (array of strings): The kinds of data available to the + client instance at the RS's API as an array of strings (for + example, a client instance asking for access to raw "image" data + and "metadata" at a photograph API). + + identifier (string): A string identifier indicating a specific + resource at the RS (for example, a patient identifier for a + medical API or a bank account number for a financial API). + + privileges (array of strings): The types or levels of privilege + being requested at the resource (for example, a client instance + asking for administrative-level access or access when the RO is no + longer online). + + The following non-normative example describes three kinds of access + (read, write, and delete) to each of two different locations and two + different data types (metadata and images) for a single access token + using the fictitious photo-api type definition. + + "access": [ + { + "type": "photo-api", + "actions": [ + "read", + "write", + "delete" + ], + "locations": [ + "https://server.example.net/", + "https://resource.local/other" + ], + "datatypes": [ + "metadata", + "images" + ] + } + ] + + While the exact semantics of interpreting the fields of an access + request object are subject to the definition of the type, it is + expected that the access requested for each object in the array is + the cross-product of all fields of the object. That is to say, the + object represents a request for all actions listed to be used at all + locations listed for all possible datatypes listed within the object. + Assuming the request above was granted, the client instance could + assume that it would be able to do a read action against the images + on the first server as well as a delete action on the metadata of the + second server, or any other combination of these fields, using the + same access token. + + To request a different combination of access, such as requesting one + of the possible actions against one of the possible locations and a + different choice of possible actions against a different one of the + possible locations, the client instance can include multiple separate + objects in the resources array. The total access rights for the + resulting access token are the union of all objects. The following + non-normative example uses the same fictitious photo-api type + definition to request a single access token with more specifically + targeted access rights by using two discrete objects within the + request. + + "access": [ + { + "type": "photo-api", + "actions": [ + "read" + ], + "locations": [ + "https://server.example.net/" + ], + "datatypes": [ + "images" + ] + }, + { + "type": "photo-api", + "actions": [ + "write", + "delete" + ], + "locations": [ + "https://resource.local/other" + ], + "datatypes": [ + "metadata" + ] + } + ] + + The access requested here is for read access to images on one server + as well as write and delete access for metadata on a different server + (importantly, without requesting write or delete access to images on + the first server). + + It is anticipated that API designers will use a combination of common + fields defined in this specification as well as fields specific to + the API itself. The following non-normative example shows the use of + both common and API-specific fields as part of two different + fictitious API type values. The first access request includes the + actions, locations, and datatypes fields specified here as well as + the API-specific geolocation field. The second access request + includes the actions and identifier fields specified here as well as + the API-specific currency field. + + "access": [ + { + "type": "photo-api", + "actions": [ + "read", + "write" + ], + "locations": [ + "https://server.example.net/", + "https://resource.local/other" + ], + "datatypes": [ + "metadata", + "images" + ], + "geolocation": [ + { lat: -32.364, lng: 153.207 }, + { lat: -35.364, lng: 158.207 } + ] + }, + { + "type": "financial-transaction", + "actions": [ + "withdraw" + ], + "identifier": "account-14-32-32-3", + "currency": "USD" + } + ] + + If this request is approved, the resulting access token's access + rights will be the union of the requested types of access for each of + the two APIs, just as above. + +8.1. Requesting Resources by Reference + + Instead of sending an object describing the requested resource + (Section 8), access rights MAY be communicated as a string known to + the AS representing the access being requested. Just like access + rights communicated as an object, access rights communicated as + reference strings indicate a specific access at a protected resource. + In the following non-normative example, three distinct resource + access rights are being requested. + + "access": [ + "read", "dolphin-metadata", "some other thing" + ] + + This value is opaque to the client instance and MAY be any valid JSON + string; therefore, it could include spaces, Unicode characters, and + properly escaped string sequences. However, in some situations, the + value is intended to be seen and understood by the client software's + developer. In such cases, the API designer choosing any such human- + readable strings SHOULD take steps to ensure the string values are + not easily confused by a developer, such as by limiting the strings + to easily disambiguated characters. + + This functionality is similar in practice to OAuth 2.0's scope + parameter [RFC6749], where a single string represents the set of + access rights requested by the client instance. As such, the + reference string could contain any valid OAuth 2.0 scope value, as in + Appendix B.5. Note that the reference string here is not bound to + the same character restrictions as OAuth 2.0's scope definition. + + A single access array MAY include both object-type and string-type + resource items. In this non-normative example, the client instance + is requesting access to a photo-api and financial-transaction API + type as well as the reference values of read, dolphin-metadata, and + some other thing. + + "access": [ + { + "type": "photo-api", + "actions": [ + "read", + "write", + "delete" + ], + "locations": [ + "https://server.example.net/", + "https://resource.local/other" + ], + "datatypes": [ + "metadata", + "images" + ] + }, + "read", + "dolphin-metadata", + { + "type": "financial-transaction", + "actions": [ + "withdraw" + ], + "identifier": "account-14-32-32-3", + "currency": "USD" + }, + "some other thing" + ] + + The requested access is the union of all elements of the array, + including both objects and reference strings. + + In order to facilitate the use of both object and reference strings + to access the same kind of APIs, the API designer can define a clear + mapping between these forms. One possible approach for choosing + reference string values is to use the same value as the type + parameter from the fully specified object, with the API defining a + set of default behaviors in this case. For example, an API + definition could declare the following string: + + "access": [ + "photo-api" + ] + + As being equivalent to the following fully defined object: + + "access": [ + { + "type": "photo-api", + "actions": [ "read", "write", "delete" ], + "datatypes": [ "metadata", "image" ] + } + ] + + The exact mechanisms for relating reference strings is up to the API + designer. These are enforced by the AS, and the details are out of + scope for this specification. + +9. Discovery + + By design, GNAP minimizes the need for any pre-flight discovery. To + begin a request, the client instance only needs to know the grant + endpoint of the AS (a single URI) and which keys it will use to sign + the request. Everything else can be negotiated dynamically in the + course of the protocol. + + However, the AS can have limits on its allowed functionality. If the + client instance wants to optimize its calls to the AS before making a + request, it MAY send an HTTP OPTIONS request to the grant request + endpoint to retrieve the server's discovery information. The AS MUST + respond with a JSON document with Content-Type application/json + containing a single object with the following fields: + + grant_request_endpoint (string): The location of the AS's grant + request endpoint. The location MUST be an absolute URL [RFC3986] + with a scheme component (which MUST be "https"), a host component, + and optionally port, path, and query components and no fragment + components. This URL MUST match the URL the client instance used + to make the discovery request. REQUIRED. + + interaction_start_modes_supported (array of strings): A list of the + AS's interaction start methods. The values of this list + correspond to the possible values for the interaction start field + of the request (Section 2.5.1) and MUST be values from the "GNAP + Interaction Start Modes" registry (Section 10.9). OPTIONAL. + + interaction_finish_methods_supported (array of strings): A list of + the AS's interaction finish methods. The values of this list + correspond to the possible values for the method element of the + interaction finish field of the request (Section 2.5.2) and MUST + be values from the "GNAP Interaction Finish Methods" registry + (Section 10.10). OPTIONAL. + + key_proofs_supported (array of strings): A list of the AS's + supported key proofing mechanisms. The values of this list + correspond to possible values of the proof field of the key + section of the request (Section 7.1) and MUST be values from the + "GNAP Key Proofing Methods" registry (Section 10.16). OPTIONAL. + + sub_id_formats_supported (array of strings): A list of the AS's + supported Subject Identifier formats. The values of this list + correspond to possible values of the Subject Identifier field of + the request (Section 2.2) and MUST be values from the "Subject + Identifier Formats" registry [Subj-ID-Formats]. OPTIONAL. + + assertion_formats_supported (array of strings): A list of the AS's + supported assertion formats. The values of this list correspond + to possible values of the subject assertion field of the request + (Section 2.2) and MUST be values from the "GNAP Assertion Formats" + registry (Section 10.6). OPTIONAL. + + key_rotation_supported (boolean): The boolean "true" indicates that + rotation of access token bound keys by the client (Section 6.1.1) + is supported by the AS. The absence of this field or a boolean + "false" value indicates that this feature is not supported. + + The information returned from this method is for optimization + purposes only. The AS MAY deny any request, or any portion of a + request, even if it lists a capability as supported. For example, if + a given client instance can be registered with the mtls key proofing + mechanism but the AS also returns other proofing methods from the + discovery document, then the AS will still deny a request from that + client instance using a different proofing mechanism. Similarly, an + AS with key_rotation_supported set to "true" can still deny any + request for rotating any access token's key for a variety of reasons. + + Additional fields can be defined in the "GNAP Authorization Server + Discovery Fields" registry (Section 10.18). + +9.1. RS-First Method of AS Discovery + + If the client instance calls an RS without an access token or with an + invalid access token, the RS SHOULD be explicit about the fact that + GNAP needs to be used to access the resource by responding with the + WWW-Authenticate header field and a GNAP challenge. + + In some situations, the client instance might want to know with which + specific AS it needs to negotiate for access to that RS. The RS MAY + additionally return the following OPTIONAL parameters: + + as_uri: The URI of the grant endpoint of the GNAP AS. Used by the + client instance to call the AS to request an access token. + + referrer: The URI of the GNAP RS. Sent by the client instance in + the Referer header as part of the grant request. + + access: An opaque access reference as defined in Section 8.1. MUST + be sufficient for at least the action the client instance was + attempting to take at the RS and MAY allow additional access + rights as well. Sent by the client as an access right in the + grant request. + + The client instance SHOULD then use both the referrer and access + parameters in its access token request. The client instance MUST + check that the referrer parameter is equal to the URI of the RS using + the simple string comparison method in Section 6.2.1 of [RFC3986]. + + The means for the RS to determine the value for the access reference + are out of scope of this specification, but some dynamic methods are + discussed in [GNAP-RS]. + + When receiving the following response from the RS: + + NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 + + WWW-Authenticate: \ + GNAP as_uri=https://as.example/tx\ + ;access=FWWIKYBQ6U56NL1\ + ;referrer=https://rs.example + + The client instance then makes a request to the as_uri as described + in Section 2, with the value of referrer passed as an HTTP Referer + header field and the access reference passed unchanged into the + access array in the access_token portion of the request. The client + instance MAY request additional resources and other information. + + In the following non-normative example, the client instance is + requesting a single access token using the opaque access reference + FWWIKYBQ6U56NL1 received from the RS in addition to the dolphin- + metadata that the client instance has been configured with out of + band. + + POST /tx HTTP/1.1 + Host: as.example + Referer: https://rs.example/resource + Content-Type: application/json + Signature-Input: sig1=... + Signature: sig1=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... + + { + "access_token": { + "access": [ + "FWWIKYBQ6U56NL1", + "dolphin-metadata" + ] + }, + "client": "KHRS6X63AJ7C7C4AZ9AO" + } + + The client instance includes the Referer header field as a way for + the AS to know that the process is initiated through a discovery + process at the RS. + + If issued, the resulting access token would contain sufficient access + to be used at both referenced resources. + + Security considerations, especially related to the potential of a + compromised RS (Section 11.37) redirecting the requests of an + otherwise properly authenticated client, need to be carefully + considered when allowing such a discovery process. This risk can be + mitigated by an alternative pre-registration process so that the + client knows which AS protects which RS. There are also privacy + considerations related to revealing which AS is protecting a given + resource; these are discussed in Section 12.4.1. + +9.2. Dynamic Grant Endpoint Discovery + + Additional methods of discovering the appropriate grant endpoint for + a given application are outside the scope of this specification. + This limitation is intentional, as many applications rely on static + configuration between the client instance and AS, as is common in + OAuth 2.0. However, the dynamic nature of GNAP makes it a prime + candidate for other extensions defining methods for discovery of the + appropriate AS grant endpoint at runtime. Advanced use cases could + define contextual methods for securely providing this endpoint to the + client instance. Furthermore, GNAP's design intentionally requires + the client instance to only know the grant endpoint and not + additional parameters, since other functions and values can be + disclosed and negotiated during the grant process. + +10. IANA Considerations + + IANA has added values to existing registries as well as created 16 + registries for GNAP [GNAP-REG] and populated those registries with + initial values as described in this section. + + All use of value typing is based on data types in [RFC8259] and MUST + be one of the following: number, object, string, boolean, or array. + When the type is array, the contents of the array MUST be specified, + as in "array of objects" when one subtype is allowed or "array of + strings/objects" when multiple simultaneous subtypes are allowed. + When the type is object, the structure of the object MUST be + specified in the definition. If a parameter is available in + different types, each type SHOULD be registered separately. + + General guidance for extension parameters is found in Appendix D. + +10.1. HTTP Authentication Scheme Registration + + IANA has registered of the following scheme in the "HTTP + Authentication Schemes" registry [Auth-Schemes] defined in + Section 18.5 of [HTTP]: + + Authentication Scheme Name: GNAP + + Reference: Section 7.2 of RFC 9635 + +10.2. Media Type Registration + + Per this section, IANA has registered the following media types + [RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry [MediaTypes] as described in + [RFC6838]. + +10.2.1. application/gnap-binding-jwsd + + This media type indicates that the content is a GNAP message to be + bound with a detached JWS mechanism. + + Type name: application + + Subtype name: gnap-binding-jwsd + + Required parameters: N/A + + Optional parameters: N/A + + Encoding considerations: binary + + Security considerations: See Section 11 of RFC 9635. + + Interoperability considerations: N/A + + Published specification: RFC 9635 + + Applications that use this media type: GNAP + + Fragment identifier considerations: N/A + + Additional information: + + Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A + Magic number(s): N/A + File extension(s): N/A + Macintosh file type code(s): N/A + + Person & email address to contact for further information: IETF GNAP + Working Group (txauth@ietf.org) + + Intended usage: COMMON + + Restrictions on usage: none + + Author: IETF GNAP Working Group (txauth@ietf.org) + + Change Controller: IETF + +10.2.2. application/gnap-binding-jws + + This media type indicates that the content is a GNAP message to be + bound with an attached JWS mechanism. + + Type name: application + + Subtype name: gnap-binding-jws + + Required parameters: N/A + + Optional parameters: N/A + + Encoding considerations: binary + + Security considerations: See Section 11 of RFC 9635. + + Interoperability considerations: N/A + + Published specification: RFC 9635 + + Applications that use this media type: GNAP + + Fragment identifier considerations: N/A + + Additional information: + + Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A + Magic number(s): N/A + File extension(s): N/A + Macintosh file type code(s): N/A + + Person & email address to contact for further information: IETF GNAP + Working Group (txauth@ietf.org) + + Intended usage: COMMON + + Restrictions on usage: none + + Author: IETF GNAP Working Group (txauth@ietf.org) + + Change Controller: IETF + +10.2.3. application/gnap-binding-rotation-jwsd + + This media type indicates that the content is a GNAP token rotation + message to be bound with a detached JWS mechanism. + + Type name: application + + Subtype name: gnap-binding-rotation-jwsd + + Required parameters: N/A + + Optional parameters: N/A + + Encoding considerations: binary + + Security considerations: See Section 11 of RFC 9635. + + Interoperability considerations: N/A + + Published specification: RFC 9635 + + Applications that use this media type: GNAP + + Fragment identifier considerations: N/A + + Additional information: + + Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A + Magic number(s): N/A + File extension(s): N/A + Macintosh file type code(s): N/A + + Person & email address to contact for further information: IETF GNAP + Working Group (txauth@ietf.org) + + Intended usage: COMMON + + Restrictions on usage: none + + Author: IETF GNAP Working Group (txauth@ietf.org) + + Change Controller: IETF + +10.2.4. application/gnap-binding-rotation-jws + + This media type indicates that the content is a GNAP token rotation + message to be bound with an attached JWS mechanism. + + Type name: application + + Subtype name: gnap-binding-rotation-jws + + Required parameters: N/A + + Optional parameters: N/A + + Encoding considerations: binary + + Security considerations: See Section 11 of RFC 9635. + + Interoperability considerations: N/A + + Published specification: RFC 9635 + + Applications that use this media type: GNAP + + Fragment identifier considerations: N/A + + Additional information: + + Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A + Magic number(s): N/A + File extension(s): N/A + Macintosh file type code(s): N/A + + Person & email address to contact for further information: IETF GNAP + Working Group (txauth@ietf.org) + + Intended usage: COMMON + + Restrictions on usage: none + + Author: IETF GNAP Working Group (txauth@ietf.org) + + Change Controller: IETF + +10.3. GNAP Grant Request Parameters + + This document defines a GNAP grant request, for which IANA has + created and maintains a new registry titled "GNAP Grant Request + Parameters". Initial values for this registry are given in + Section 10.3.2. Future assignments and modifications to existing + assignments are to be made through the Specification Required + registration policy [RFC8126]. + + The designated expert (DE) is expected to ensure the following: + + * All registrations follow the template presented in Section 10.3.1. + + * The request parameter's definition is sufficiently orthogonal to + existing functionality provided by existing parameters. + + * Registrations for the same name with different types are + sufficiently close in functionality so as not to cause confusion + for developers. + + * The request parameter's definition specifies the expected behavior + of the AS in response to the request parameter for each potential + state of the grant request. + +10.3.1. Registration Template + + Name: + An identifier for the parameter. + + Type: + The JSON type allowed for the value. + + Reference: + Reference to one or more documents that specify the value, + preferably including a URI that can be used to retrieve a copy of + the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also + be included but is not required. + +10.3.2. Initial Contents + + +==============+==================+===========================+ + | Name | Type | Reference | + +==============+==================+===========================+ + | access_token | object | Section 2.1.1 of RFC 9635 | + +--------------+------------------+---------------------------+ + | access_token | array of objects | Section 2.1.2 of RFC 9635 | + +--------------+------------------+---------------------------+ + | subject | object | Section 2.2 of RFC 9635 | + +--------------+------------------+---------------------------+ + | client | object | Section 2.3 of RFC 9635 | + +--------------+------------------+---------------------------+ + | client | string | Section 2.3.1 of RFC 9635 | + +--------------+------------------+---------------------------+ + | user | object | Section 2.4 of RFC 9635 | + +--------------+------------------+---------------------------+ + | user | string | Section 2.4.1 of RFC 9635 | + +--------------+------------------+---------------------------+ + | interact | object | Section 2.5 of RFC 9635 | + +--------------+------------------+---------------------------+ + | interact_ref | string | Section 5.1 of RFC 9635 | + +--------------+------------------+---------------------------+ + + Table 1 + +10.4. GNAP Access Token Flags + + This document defines GNAP access token flags, for which IANA has + created and maintains a new registry titled "GNAP Access Token + Flags". Initial values for this registry are given in + Section 10.4.2. Future assignments and modifications to existing + assignments are to be made through the Specification Required + registration policy [RFC8126]. + + The DE is expected to ensure the following: + + * All registrations follow the template presented in Section 10.4.1. + + * The flag specifies whether it applies to requests for tokens to + the AS, responses with tokens from the AS, or both. + +10.4.1. Registration Template + + Name: + An identifier for the parameter. + + Allowed Use: + Where the flag is allowed to occur. Possible values are + "Request", "Response", and "Request, Response". + + Reference: + Reference to one or more documents that specify the value, + preferably including a URI that can be used to retrieve a copy of + the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also + be included but is not required. + +10.4.2. Initial Contents + + +=========+===================+====================+ + | Name | Allowed Use | Reference | + +=========+===================+====================+ + | bearer | Request, Response | Sections 2.1.1 and | + | | | 3.2.1 of RFC 9635 | + +---------+-------------------+--------------------+ + | durable | Response | Section 3.2.1 of | + | | | RFC 9635 | + +---------+-------------------+--------------------+ + + Table 2 + +10.5. GNAP Subject Information Request Fields + + This document defines a means to request subject information from the + AS to the client instance, for which IANA has created and maintains a + new registry titled "GNAP Subject Information Request Fields". + Initial values for this registry are given in Section 10.5.2. Future + assignments and modifications to existing assignments are to be made + through the Specification Required registration policy [RFC8126]. + + The DE is expected to ensure the following: + + * All registrations follow the template presented in Section 10.5.1. + + * Registrations for the same name with different types are + sufficiently close in functionality so as not to cause confusion + for developers. + +10.5.1. Registration Template + + Name: + An identifier for the parameter. + + Type: + The JSON type allowed for the value. + + Reference: + Reference to one or more documents that specify the value, + preferably including a URI that can be used to retrieve a copy of + the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also + be included but is not required. + +10.5.2. Initial Contents + + +===================+==================+=========================+ + | Name | Type | Reference | + +===================+==================+=========================+ + | sub_id_formats | array of strings | Section 2.2 of RFC 9635 | + +-------------------+------------------+-------------------------+ + | assertion_formats | array of strings | Section 2.2 of RFC 9635 | + +-------------------+------------------+-------------------------+ + | sub_ids | array of objects | Section 2.2 of RFC 9635 | + +-------------------+------------------+-------------------------+ + + Table 3 + +10.6. GNAP Assertion Formats + + This document defines a means to pass identity assertions between the + AS and client instance, for which IANA has created and maintains a + new registry titled "GNAP Assertion Formats". Initial values for + this registry are given in Section 10.6.2. Future assignments and + modifications to existing assignments are to be made through the + Specification Required registration policy [RFC8126]. + + The DE is expected to ensure the following: + + * All registrations follow the template presented in Section 10.6.1. + + * The definition specifies the serialization format of the assertion + value as used within GNAP. + +10.6.1. Registration Template + + Name: + An identifier for the assertion format. + + Reference: + Reference to one or more documents that specify the value, + preferably including a URI that can be used to retrieve a copy of + the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also + be included but is not required. + +10.6.2. Initial Contents + + +==========+===========================+ + | Name | Reference | + +==========+===========================+ + | id_token | Section 3.4.1 of RFC 9635 | + +----------+---------------------------+ + | saml2 | Section 3.4.1 of RFC 9635 | + +----------+---------------------------+ + + Table 4 + +10.7. GNAP Client Instance Fields + + This document defines a means to send information about the client + instance, for which IANA has created and maintains a new registry + titled "GNAP Client Instance Fields". Initial values for this + registry are given in Section 10.7.2. Future assignments and + modifications to existing assignments are to be made through the + Specification Required registration policy [RFC8126]. + + The DE is expected to ensure the following: + + * All registrations follow the template presented in Section 10.7.1. + + * Registrations for the same name with different types are + sufficiently close in functionality so as not to cause confusion + for developers. + +10.7.1. Registration Template + + Name: + An identifier for the parameter. + + Type: + The JSON type allowed for the value. + + Reference: + Reference to one or more documents that specify the value, + preferably including a URI that can be used to retrieve a copy of + the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also + be included but is not required. + +10.7.2. Initial Contents + + +==========+========+===========================+ + | Name | Type | Reference | + +==========+========+===========================+ + | key | object | Section 7.1 of RFC 9635 | + +----------+--------+---------------------------+ + | key | string | Section 7.1.1 of RFC 9635 | + +----------+--------+---------------------------+ + | class_id | string | Section 2.3 of RFC 9635 | + +----------+--------+---------------------------+ + | display | object | Section 2.3.2 of RFC 9635 | + +----------+--------+---------------------------+ + + Table 5 + +10.8. GNAP Client Instance Display Fields + + This document defines a means to send end-user-facing displayable + information about the client instance, for which IANA has created and + maintains a new registry titled "GNAP Client Instance Display + Fields". Initial values for this registry are given in + Section 10.8.2. Future assignments and modifications to existing + assignments are to be made through the Specification Required + registration policy [RFC8126]. + + The DE is expected to ensure the following: + + * All registrations follow the template presented in Section 10.8.1. + + * Registrations for the same name with different types are + sufficiently close in functionality so as not to cause confusion + for developers. + +10.8.1. Registration Template + + Name: + An identifier for the parameter. + + Type: + The JSON type allowed for the value. + + Reference: + Reference to one or more documents that specify the value, + preferably including a URI that can be used to retrieve a copy of + the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also + be included but is not required. + +10.8.2. Initial Contents + + +==========+========+===========================+ + | Name | Type | Reference | + +==========+========+===========================+ + | name | string | Section 2.3.2 of RFC 9635 | + +----------+--------+---------------------------+ + | uri | string | Section 2.3.2 of RFC 9635 | + +----------+--------+---------------------------+ + | logo_uri | string | Section 2.3.2 of RFC 9635 | + +----------+--------+---------------------------+ + + Table 6 + +10.9. GNAP Interaction Start Modes + + This document defines a means for the client instance to begin + interaction between the end user and the AS, for which IANA has + created and maintains a new registry titled "GNAP Interaction Start + Modes". Initial values for this registry are given in + Section 10.9.2. Future assignments and modifications to existing + assignments are to be made through the Specification Required + registration policy [RFC8126]. + + The DE is expected to ensure the following: + + * All registrations follow the template presented in Section 10.9.1. + + * Registrations for the same name with different types are + sufficiently close in functionality so as not to cause confusion + for developers. + + * Any registration using an "object" type declares all additional + parameters, their optionality, and their purpose. + + * The start mode clearly defines what actions the client is expected + to take to begin interaction, what the expected user experience + is, and any security considerations for this communication from + either party. + + * The start mode documents incompatibilities with other start modes + or finish methods, if applicable. + + * The start mode provides enough information to uniquely identify + the grant request during the interaction. For example, in the + redirect and app modes, this is done using a unique URI (including + its parameters). In the user_code and user_code_uri modes, this + is done using the value of the user code. + +10.9.1. Registration Template + + Mode: + An identifier for the interaction start mode. + + Type: + The JSON type for the value, either "string" or "object", as + described in Section 2.5.1. + + Reference: + Reference to one or more documents that specify the value, + preferably including a URI that can be used to retrieve a copy of + the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also + be included but is not required. + +10.9.2. Initial Contents + + +===============+========+=============================+ + | Mode | Type | Reference | + +===============+========+=============================+ + | redirect | string | Section 2.5.1.1 of RFC 9635 | + +---------------+--------+-----------------------------+ + | app | string | Section 2.5.1.2 of RFC 9635 | + +---------------+--------+-----------------------------+ + | user_code | string | Section 2.5.1.3 of RFC 9635 | + +---------------+--------+-----------------------------+ + | user_code_uri | string | Section 2.5.1.4 of RFC 9635 | + +---------------+--------+-----------------------------+ + + Table 7 + +10.10. GNAP Interaction Finish Methods + + This document defines a means for the client instance to be notified + of the end of interaction between the end user and the AS, for which + IANA has created and maintains a new registry titled "GNAP + Interaction Finish Methods". Initial values for this registry are + given in Section 10.10.2. Future assignments and modifications to + existing assignments are to be made through the Specification + Required registration policy [RFC8126]. + + The DE is expected to ensure the following: + + * All registrations follow the template presented in + Section 10.10.1. + + * All finish methods clearly define what actions the AS is expected + to take, what listening methods the client instance needs to + enable, and any security considerations for this communication + from either party. + + * All finish methods document incompatibilities with any start + modes, if applicable. + +10.10.1. Registration Template + + Method: + An identifier for the interaction finish method. + + Reference: + Reference to one or more documents that specify the value, + preferably including a URI that can be used to retrieve a copy of + the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also + be included but is not required. + +10.10.2. Initial Contents + + +==========+=============================+ + | Method | Reference | + +==========+=============================+ + | redirect | Section 2.5.2.1 of RFC 9635 | + +----------+-----------------------------+ + | push | Section 2.5.2.2 of RFC 9635 | + +----------+-----------------------------+ + + Table 8 + +10.11. GNAP Interaction Hints + + This document defines a set of hints that a client instance can + provide to the AS to facilitate interaction with the end user, for + which IANA has created and maintains a new registry titled "GNAP + Interaction Hints". Initial values for this registry are given in + Section 10.11.2. Future assignments and modifications to existing + assignments are to be made through the Specification Required + registration policy [RFC8126]. + + The DE is expected to ensure the following: + + * All registrations follow the template presented in + Section 10.11.1. + + * All interaction hints clearly document the expected behaviors of + the AS in response to the hint, and an AS not processing the hint + does not impede the operation of the AS or client instance. + +10.11.1. Registration Template + + Name: + An identifier for the parameter. + + Reference: + Reference to one or more documents that specify the value, + preferably including a URI that can be used to retrieve a copy of + the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also + be included but is not required. + +10.11.2. Initial Contents + + +============+===========================+ + | Name | Reference | + +============+===========================+ + | ui_locales | Section 2.5.3 of RFC 9635 | + +------------+---------------------------+ + + Table 9 + +10.12. GNAP Grant Response Parameters + + This document defines a GNAP grant response, for which IANA has + created and maintains a new registry titled "GNAP Grant Response + Parameters". Initial values for this registry are given in + Section 10.12.2. Future assignments and modifications to existing + assignments are to be made through the Specification Required + registration policy [RFC8126]. + + The DE is expected to ensure the following: + + * All registrations follow the template presented in + Section 10.12.1. + + * The response parameter's definition is sufficiently orthogonal to + existing functionality provided by existing parameters. + + * Registrations for the same name with different types are + sufficiently close in functionality so as not to cause confusion + for developers. + + * The response parameter's definition specifies grant states for + which the client instance can expect this parameter to appear in a + response message. + +10.12.1. Registration Template + + Name: + An identifier for the parameter. + + Type: + The JSON type allowed for the value. + + Reference: + Reference to one or more documents that specify the value, + preferably including a URI that can be used to retrieve a copy of + the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also + be included but is not required. + +10.12.2. Initial Contents + + +==============+==================+===========================+ + | Name | Type | Reference | + +==============+==================+===========================+ + | continue | object | Section 3.1 of RFC 9635 | + +--------------+------------------+---------------------------+ + | access_token | object | Section 3.2.1 of RFC 9635 | + +--------------+------------------+---------------------------+ + | access_token | array of objects | Section 3.2.2 of RFC 9635 | + +--------------+------------------+---------------------------+ + | interact | object | Section 3.3 of RFC 9635 | + +--------------+------------------+---------------------------+ + | subject | object | Section 3.4 of RFC 9635 | + +--------------+------------------+---------------------------+ + | instance_id | string | Section 3.5 of RFC 9635 | + +--------------+------------------+---------------------------+ + | error | object | Section 3.6 of RFC 9635 | + +--------------+------------------+---------------------------+ + + Table 10 + +10.13. GNAP Interaction Mode Responses + + This document defines a means for the AS to provide the client + instance with information that is required to complete a particular + interaction mode, for which IANA has created and maintains a new + registry titled "GNAP Interaction Mode Responses". Initial values + for this registry are given in Section 10.13.2. Future assignments + and modifications to existing assignments are to be made through the + Specification Required registration policy [RFC8126]. + + The DE is expected to ensure the following: + + * All registrations follow the template presented in + Section 10.13.1. + + * If the name of the registration matches the name of an interaction + start mode, the response parameter is unambiguously associated + with the interaction start mode of the same name. + +10.13.1. Registration Template + + Name: + An identifier for the parameter. + + Reference: + Reference to one or more documents that specify the value, + preferably including a URI that can be used to retrieve a copy of + the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also + be included but is not required. + +10.13.2. Initial Contents + + +===============+=========================+ + | Name | Reference | + +===============+=========================+ + | redirect | Section 3.3 of RFC 9635 | + +---------------+-------------------------+ + | app | Section 3.3 of RFC 9635 | + +---------------+-------------------------+ + | user_code | Section 3.3 of RFC 9635 | + +---------------+-------------------------+ + | user_code_uri | Section 3.3 of RFC 9635 | + +---------------+-------------------------+ + | finish | Section 3.3 of RFC 9635 | + +---------------+-------------------------+ + | expires_in | Section 3.3 of RFC 9635 | + +---------------+-------------------------+ + + Table 11 + +10.14. GNAP Subject Information Response Fields + + This document defines a means to return subject information from the + AS to the client instance, for which IANA has created and maintains a + new registry titled "GNAP Subject Information Response Fields". + Initial values for this registry are given in Section 10.14.2. + Future assignments and modifications to existing assignments are to + be made through the Specification Required registration policy + [RFC8126]. + + The DE is expected to ensure the following: + + * All registrations follow the template presented in + Section 10.14.1. + + * Registrations for the same name with different types are + sufficiently close in functionality so as not to cause confusion + for developers. + +10.14.1. Registration Template + + Name: + An identifier for the parameter. + + Type: + The JSON type allowed for the value. + + Reference: + Reference to one or more documents that specify the value, + preferably including a URI that can be used to retrieve a copy of + the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also + be included but is not required. + +10.14.2. Initial Contents + + +============+==================+=========================+ + | Name | Type | Reference | + +============+==================+=========================+ + | sub_ids | array of objects | Section 3.4 of RFC 9635 | + +------------+------------------+-------------------------+ + | assertions | array of objects | Section 3.4 of RFC 9635 | + +------------+------------------+-------------------------+ + | updated_at | string | Section 3.4 of RFC 9635 | + +------------+------------------+-------------------------+ + + Table 12 + +10.15. GNAP Error Codes + + This document defines a set of errors that the AS can return to the + client instance, for which IANA has created and maintains a new + registry titled "GNAP Error Codes". Initial values for this registry + are given in Section 10.15.2. Future assignments and modifications + to existing assignments are to be made through the Specification + Required registration policy [RFC8126]. + + The DE is expected to ensure the following: + + * All registrations follow the template presented in + Section 10.15.1. + + * The error response is sufficiently unique from other errors to + provide actionable information to the client instance. + + * The definition of the error response specifies all conditions in + which the error response is returned and the client instance's + expected action. + +10.15.1. Registration Template + + Error: + A unique string code for the error. + + Reference: + Reference to one or more documents that specify the value, + preferably including a URI that can be used to retrieve a copy of + the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also + be included but is not required. + +10.15.2. Initial Contents + + +============================+=========================+ + | Error | Reference | + +============================+=========================+ + | invalid_request | Section 3.6 of RFC 9635 | + +----------------------------+-------------------------+ + | invalid_client | Section 3.6 of RFC 9635 | + +----------------------------+-------------------------+ + | invalid_interaction | Section 3.6 of RFC 9635 | + +----------------------------+-------------------------+ + | invalid_flag | Section 3.6 of RFC 9635 | + +----------------------------+-------------------------+ + | invalid_rotation | Section 3.6 of RFC 9635 | + +----------------------------+-------------------------+ + | key_rotation_not_supported | Section 3.6 of RFC 9635 | + +----------------------------+-------------------------+ + | invalid_continuation | Section 3.6 of RFC 9635 | + +----------------------------+-------------------------+ + | user_denied | Section 3.6 of RFC 9635 | + +----------------------------+-------------------------+ + | request_denied | Section 3.6 of RFC 9635 | + +----------------------------+-------------------------+ + | unknown_user | Section 3.6 of RFC 9635 | + +----------------------------+-------------------------+ + | unknown_interaction | Section 3.6 of RFC 9635 | + +----------------------------+-------------------------+ + | too_fast | Section 3.6 of RFC 9635 | + +----------------------------+-------------------------+ + | too_many_attempts | Section 3.6 of RFC 9635 | + +----------------------------+-------------------------+ + + Table 13 + +10.16. GNAP Key Proofing Methods + + This document defines methods that the client instance can use to + prove possession of a key, for which IANA has created and maintains a + new registry titled "GNAP Key Proofing Methods". Initial values for + this registry are given in Section 10.16.2. Future assignments and + modifications to existing assignments are to be made through the + Specification Required registration policy [RFC8126]. + + The DE is expected to ensure the following: + + * All registrations follow the template presented in + Section 10.16.1. + + * Registrations for the same name with different types are + sufficiently close in functionality so as not to cause confusion + for developers. + + * The proofing method provides sufficient coverage of and binding to + the protocol messages to which it is applied. + + * The proofing method definition clearly enumerates how all + requirements in Section 7.3 are fulfilled by the definition. + +10.16.1. Registration Template + + Method: + A unique string code for the key proofing method. + + Type: + The JSON type allowed for the value. + + Reference: + Reference to one or more documents that specify the value, + preferably including a URI that can be used to retrieve a copy of + the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also + be included but is not required. + +10.16.2. Initial Contents + + +=========+========+===========================+ + | Method | Type | Reference | + +=========+========+===========================+ + | httpsig | string | Section 7.3.1 of RFC 9635 | + +---------+--------+---------------------------+ + | httpsig | object | Section 7.3.1 of RFC 9635 | + +---------+--------+---------------------------+ + | mtls | string | Section 7.3.2 of RFC 9635 | + +---------+--------+---------------------------+ + | jwsd | string | Section 7.3.3 of RFC 9635 | + +---------+--------+---------------------------+ + | jws | string | Section 7.3.4 of RFC 9635 | + +---------+--------+---------------------------+ + + Table 14 + +10.17. GNAP Key Formats + + This document defines formats for a public key value, for which IANA + has created and maintains a new registry titled "GNAP Key Formats". + Initial values for this registry are given in Section 10.17.2. + Future assignments and modifications to existing assignments are to + be made through the Specification Required registration policy + [RFC8126]. + + The DE is expected to ensure the following: + + * All registrations follow the template presented in + Section 10.17.1. + + * The key format specifies the structure and serialization of the + key material. + +10.17.1. Registration Template + + Format: + A unique string code for the key format. + + Reference: + Reference to one or more documents that specify the value, + preferably including a URI that can be used to retrieve a copy of + the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also + be included but is not required. + +10.17.2. Initial Contents + + +===========+=========================+ + | Format | Reference | + +===========+=========================+ + | jwk | Section 7.1 of RFC 9635 | + +-----------+-------------------------+ + | cert | Section 7.1 of RFC 9635 | + +-----------+-------------------------+ + | cert#S256 | Section 7.1 of RFC 9635 | + +-----------+-------------------------+ + + Table 15 + +10.18. GNAP Authorization Server Discovery Fields + + This document defines a discovery document for an AS, for which IANA + has created and maintains a new registry titled "GNAP Authorization + Server Discovery Fields". Initial values for this registry are given + in Section 10.18.2. Future assignments and modifications to existing + assignments are to be made through the Specification Required + registration policy [RFC8126]. + + The DE is expected to ensure the following: + + * All registrations follow the template presented in + Section 10.18.1. + + * Registrations for the same name with different types are + sufficiently close in functionality so as not to cause confusion + for developers. + + * The values in the discovery document are sufficient to provide + optimization and hints to the client instance, but knowledge of + the discovered value is not required for starting a transaction + with the AS. + +10.18.1. Registration Template + + Name: + An identifier for the parameter. + + Type: + The JSON type allowed for the value. + + Reference: + Reference to one or more documents that specify the value, + preferably including a URI that can be used to retrieve a copy of + the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also + be included but is not required. + +10.18.2. Initial Contents + + +======================================+==========+=============+ + | Name | Type | Reference | + +======================================+==========+=============+ + | grant_request_endpoint | string | Section 9 | + | | | of RFC 9635 | + +--------------------------------------+----------+-------------+ + | interaction_start_modes_supported | array of | Section 9 | + | | strings | of RFC 9635 | + +--------------------------------------+----------+-------------+ + | interaction_finish_methods_supported | array of | Section 9 | + | | strings | of RFC 9635 | + +--------------------------------------+----------+-------------+ + | key_proofs_supported | array of | Section 9 | + | | strings | of RFC 9635 | + +--------------------------------------+----------+-------------+ + | sub_id_formats_supported | array of | Section 9 | + | | strings | of RFC 9635 | + +--------------------------------------+----------+-------------+ + | assertion_formats_supported | array of | Section 9 | + | | strings | of RFC 9635 | + +--------------------------------------+----------+-------------+ + | key_rotation_supported | boolean | Section 9 | + | | | of RFC 9635 | + +--------------------------------------+----------+-------------+ + + Table 16 + +11. Security Considerations + + In addition to the normative requirements in this document, + implementors are strongly encouraged to consider these additional + security considerations in implementations and deployments of GNAP. + +11.1. TLS Protection in Transit + + All requests in GNAP made over untrusted network connections have to + be made over TLS as outlined in [BCP195] to protect the contents of + the request and response from manipulation and interception by an + attacker. This includes all requests from a client instance to the + AS, all requests from the client instance to an RS, and any requests + back to a client instance such as the push-based interaction finish + method. Additionally, all requests between a browser and other + components, such as during redirect-based interaction, need to be + made over TLS or use equivalent protection such as a network + connection local to the browser ("localhost"). + + Even though requests from the client instance to the AS are signed, + the signature method alone does not protect the request from + interception by an attacker. TLS protects the response as well as + the request, preventing an attacker from intercepting requested + information as it is returned. This is particularly important in + this specification for security artifacts such as nonces and for + personal information such as subject information. + + The use of key-bound access tokens does not negate the requirement + for protecting calls to the RS with TLS. The keys and signatures + associated with a bound access token will prevent an attacker from + using a stolen token; however, without TLS, an attacker would be able + to watch the data being sent to the RS and returned from the RS + during legitimate use of the client instance under attack. + Additionally, without TLS, an attacker would be able to profile the + calls made between the client instance and RS, possibly gaining + information about the functioning of the API between the client + software and RS software that would otherwise be unknown to the + attacker. + + Note that connections from the end user and RO's browser also need to + be protected with TLS. This applies during initial redirects to an + AS's components during interaction, during any interaction with the + RO, and during any redirect back to the client instance. Without TLS + protection on these portions of the process, an attacker could wait + for a valid request to start and then take over the RO's interaction + session. + +11.2. Signing Requests from the Client Software + + Even though all requests in GNAP need to be transmitted over TLS or + its equivalent, the use of TLS alone is not sufficient to protect all + parts of a multi-party and multi-stage protocol like GNAP, and TLS is + not targeted at tying multiple requests to each other over time. To + account for this, GNAP makes use of message-level protection and key + presentation mechanisms that strongly associate a request with a key + held by the client instance (see Section 7). + + During the initial request from a client instance to the AS, the + client instance has to identify and prove possession of a + cryptographic key. If the key is known to the AS, e.g., previously + registered or dereferenceable to a trusted source, the AS can + associate a set of policies to the client instance identified by the + key. Without the requirement that the client instance prove that it + holds that key, the AS could not trust that the connection came from + any particular client and could not apply any associated policies. + + Even more importantly, the client instance proving possession of a + key on the first request allows the AS to associate future requests + with each other by binding all future requests in that transaction to + the same key. The access token used for grant continuation is bound + to the same key and proofing mechanism used by the client instance in + its initial request; this means that the client instance needs to + prove possession of that same key in future requests, which allows + the AS to be sure that the same client instance is executing the + follow-ups for a given ongoing grant request. Therefore, the AS has + to ensure that all subsequent requests for a grant are associated + with the same key that started the grant or with the most recent + rotation of that key. This need holds true even if the initial key + is previously unknown to the AS, such as would be the case when a + client instance creates an ephemeral key for its request. Without + this ongoing association, an attacker would be able to impersonate a + client instance in the midst of a grant request, potentially stealing + access tokens and subject information with impunity. + + Additionally, all access tokens in GNAP default to be associated with + the key that was presented during the grant request that created the + access token. This association allows an RS to know that the + presenter of the access token is the same party that the token was + issued to, as identified by their keys. While non-bound bearer + tokens are an option in GNAP, these types of tokens have their own + trade-offs, which are discussed in Section 11.9. + + TLS functions at the transport layer, ensuring that only the parties + on either end of that connection can read the information passed + along that connection. Each time a new connection is made, such as + for a new HTTP request, a new trust that is mostly unrelated to + previous connections is re-established. While modern TLS does make + use of session resumption, this still needs to be augmented with + authentication methods to determine the identity of parties on the + connections. In other words, it is not possible with TLS alone to + know that the same party is making a set of calls over time, since + each time a new TLS connection is established, both the client and + the server (or the server only when using MTLS (Section 7.3.2)) have + to validate the other party's identity. Such a verification can be + achieved via methods described in [RFC9525], but these are not enough + to establish the identity of the client instance in many cases. + + To counter this, GNAP defines a set of key binding methods in + Section 7.3 that allows authentication and proof of possession by the + caller, which is usually the client instance. These methods are + intended to be used in addition to TLS on all connections. + +11.3. MTLS Message Integrity + + The MTLS key proofing mechanism (Section 7.3.2) provides a means for + a client instance to present a key using a certificate at the TLS + layer. Since TLS protects the entire HTTP message in transit, + verification of the TLS client certificate presented with the message + provides a sufficient binding between the two. However, since TLS is + functioning at a separate layer from HTTP, there is no direct + connection between the TLS key presentation and the message itself, + other than the fact that the message was presented over the TLS + channel. That is to say, any HTTP message can be presented over the + TLS channel in question with the same level of trust. The verifier + is responsible for ensuring the key in the TLS client certificate is + the one expected for a particular request. For example, if the + request is a grant request (Section 2), the AS needs to compare the + TLS client certificate presented at the TLS layer to the key + identified in the request content itself (either by value or through + a referenced identifier). + + Furthermore, the prevalence of the TLS terminating reverse proxy + (TTRP) pattern in deployments adds a wrinkle to the situation. In + this common pattern, the TTRP validates the TLS connection and then + forwards the HTTP message contents onward to an internal system for + processing. The system processing the HTTP message no longer has + access to the original TLS connection's information and context. To + compensate for this, the TTRP could inject the TLS client certificate + into the forwarded request using the HTTP Client-Cert header field + [RFC9111], giving the downstream system access to the certificate + information. The TTRP has to be trusted to provide accurate + certificate information, and the connection between the TTRP and the + downstream system also has to be protected. The TTRP could provide + some additional assurance, for example, by adding its own signature + to the Client-Cert header field using HTTP message signatures + [RFC9421]. This signature would be effectively ignored by GNAP + (since it would not use GNAP's tag parameter value) but would be + understood by the downstream service as part of its deployment. + + Additional considerations for different types of deployment patterns + and key distribution mechanisms for MTLS are found in Section 11.4. + +11.4. MTLS Deployment Patterns + + GNAP does not specify how a client instance's keys could be made + known to the AS ahead of time. The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) + can be used to manage the keys used by client instances when calling + the AS, allowing the AS to trust a root key from a trusted authority. + This method is particularly relevant to the MTLS key proofing method, + where the client instance presents its certificate to the AS as part + of the TLS connection. An AS using PKI to validate the MTLS + connection would need to ensure that the presented certificate was + issued by a trusted certificate authority before allowing the + connection to continue. PKI-based certificates would allow a key to + be revoked and rotated through management at the certificate + authority without requiring additional registration or management at + the AS. The PKI required to manage mutually authenticated TLS has + historically been difficult to deploy, especially at scale, but it + remains an appropriate solution for systems where the required + management overhead is not an impediment. + + MTLS in GNAP need not use a PKI backing, as self-signed certificates + and certificates from untrusted authorities can still be presented as + part of a TLS connection. In this case, the verifier would validate + the connection but accept whatever certificate was presented by the + client software. This specific certificate can then be bound to all + future connections from that client software by being bound to the + resulting access tokens, in a trust-on-first-use pattern. See + Section 11.3 for more considerations on MTLS as a key proofing + mechanism. + +11.5. Protection of Client Instance Key Material + + Client instances are identified by their unique keys, and anyone with + access to a client instance's key material will be able to + impersonate that client instance to all parties. This is true for + both calls to the AS as well as calls to an RS using an access token + bound to the client instance's unique key. As a consequence, it is + of utmost importance for a client instance to protect its private key + material. + + Different types of client software have different methods for + creating, managing, and registering keys. GNAP explicitly allows for + ephemeral clients such as single-page applications (SPAs) and single- + user clients (such as mobile applications) to create and present + their own keys during the initial grant request without any explicit + pre-registration step. The client software can securely generate a + key pair on the device and present the public key, along with proof + of holding the associated private key, to the AS as part of the + initial request. To facilitate trust in these ephemeral keys, GNAP + further allows for an extensible set of client information to be + passed with the request. This information can include device posture + and third-party attestations of the client software's provenance and + authenticity, depending on the needs and capabilities of the client + software and its deployment. + + From GNAP's perspective, each distinct key is a different client + instance. However, multiple client instances can be grouped together + by an AS policy and treated similarly to each other. For instance, + if an AS knows of several different keys for different servers within + a cluster, the AS can decide that authorization of one of these + servers applies to all other servers within the cluster. An AS that + chooses to do this needs to be careful with how it groups different + client keys together in its policy, since the breach of one instance + would have direct effects on the others in the cluster. + + Additionally, if an end user controls multiple instances of a single + type of client software, such as having an application installed on + multiple devices, each of these instances is expected to have a + separate key and be issued separate access tokens. However, if the + AS is able to group these separate instances together as described + above, it can streamline the authorization process for new instances + of the same client software. For example, if two client instances + can present proof of a valid installation of a piece of client + software, the AS would be able to associate the approval of the first + instance of this software to all related instances. The AS could + then choose to bypass an explicit prompt of the RO for approval + during authorization, since such approval has already been given. An + AS doing such a process would need to take assurance measures that + the different instances are in fact correlated and authentic, as well + as ensure that the expected RO is in control of the client instance. + + Finally, if multiple instances of client software each have the same + key, then from GNAP's perspective, these are functionally the same + client instance as GNAP has no reasonable way to differentiate + between them. This situation could happen if multiple instances + within a cluster can securely share secret information among + themselves. Even though there are multiple copies of the software, + the shared key makes these copies all present as a single instance. + It is considered bad practice to share keys between copies of + software unless they are very tightly integrated with each other and + can be closely managed. It is particularly bad practice to allow an + end user to copy keys between client instances and to willingly use + the same key in multiple instances. + +11.6. Protection of Authorization Server + + The AS performs critical functions in GNAP, including authenticating + client software, managing interactions with end users to gather + consent and provide notice, and issuing access tokens for client + instances to present to RSs. As such, protecting the AS is central + to any GNAP deployment. + + If an attacker is able to gain control over an AS, they would be able + to create fraudulent tokens and manipulate registration information + to allow for malicious clients. These tokens and clients would be + trusted by other components in the ecosystem under the protection of + the AS. + + If the AS uses signed access tokens, an attacker in control of the + AS's signing keys would be able to manufacture fraudulent tokens for + use at RSs under the protection of the AS. + + If an attacker is able to impersonate an AS, they would be able to + trick legitimate client instances into making signed requests for + information that could potentially be proxied to a real AS. To + combat this, all communications to the AS need to be made over TLS or + its equivalent, and the software making the connection has to + validate the certificate chain of the host it is connecting to. + + Consequently, protecting, monitoring, and auditing the AS is + paramount to preserving the security of a GNAP-protected ecosystem. + The AS presents attackers with a valuable target for attack. + Fortunately, the core focus and function of the AS is to provide + security for the ecosystem, unlike the RS whose focus is to provide + an API or the client software whose focus is to access the API. + +11.7. Symmetric and Asymmetric Client Instance Keys + + Many of the cryptographic methods used by GNAP for key proofing can + support both asymmetric and symmetric cryptography, and they can be + extended to use a wide variety of mechanisms. Implementors will find + the available guidelines on cryptographic key management provided in + [RFC4107] useful. While symmetric cryptographic systems have some + benefits in speed and simplicity, they have a distinct drawback -- + both parties need access to the same key in order to do both signing + and verification of the message. When more than two parties share + the same symmetric key, data origin authentication is not provided. + Any party that knows the symmetric key can compute a valid MAC; + therefore, the contents could originate from any one of the parties. + + Use of symmetric cryptography means that when the client instance + calls the AS to request a token, the AS needs to know the exact value + of the client instance's key (or be able to derive it) in order to + validate the key proof signature. With asymmetric keys, the client + needs to only send its public key to the AS to allow for verification + that the client holds the associated private key, regardless of + whether or not that key was pre-registered with the AS. + + Symmetric keys also have the expected advantage of providing better + protection against quantum threats in the future. Also, these types + of keys (and their secure derivations) are widely supported among + many cloud-based key management systems. + + When used to bind to an access token, a key value must be known by + the RS in order to validate the proof signature on the request. + Common methods for communicating these proofing keys include putting + information in a structured access token and allowing the RS to look + up the associated key material against the value of the access token. + With symmetric cryptography, both of these methods would expose the + signing key to the RS and, in the case of a structured access token, + potentially to any party that can see the access token itself unless + the token's payload has been encrypted. Any of these parties would + then be able to make calls using the access token by creating a valid + signature using the shared key. With asymmetric cryptography, the RS + needs to only know the public key associated with the token in order + to validate the request; therefore, the RS cannot create any new + signed calls. + + While both signing approaches are allowed, GNAP treats these two + classes of keys somewhat differently. Only the public portion of + asymmetric keys are allowed to be sent by value in requests to the AS + when establishing a connection. Since sending a symmetric key (or + the private portion of an asymmetric key) would expose the signing + material to any parties on the request path, including any attackers, + sending these kinds of keys by value is prohibited. Symmetric keys + can still be used by client instances, but only if the client + instance can send a reference to the key and not its value. This + approach allows the AS to use pre-registered symmetric keys as well + as key derivation schemes to take advantage of symmetric cryptography + without requiring key distribution at runtime, which would expose the + keys in transit. + + Both the AS and client software can use systems such as hardware + security modules to strengthen their key security storage and + generation for both asymmetric and symmetric keys (see also + Section 7.1.2). + +11.8. Generation of Access Tokens + + The contents of access tokens need to be such that only the + generating AS would be able to create them, and the contents cannot + be manipulated by an attacker to gain different or additional access + rights. + + One method for accomplishing this is to use a cryptographically + random value for the access token, generated by the AS using a secure + randomization function with sufficiently high entropy. The odds of + an attacker guessing the output of the randomization function to + collide with a valid access token are exceedingly small, and even + then, the attacker would not have any control over what the access + token would represent since that information would be held close by + the AS. + + Another method for accomplishing this is to use a structured token + that is cryptographically signed. In this case, the payload of the + access token declares to the RS what the token is good for, but the + signature applied by the AS during token generation covers this + payload. Only the AS can create such a signature; therefore, only + the AS can create such a signed token. The odds of an attacker being + able to guess a signature value with a useful payload are exceedingly + small. This technique only works if all targeted RSs check the + signature of the access token. Any RS that does not validate the + signature of all presented tokens would be susceptible to injection + of a modified or falsified token. Furthermore, an AS has to + carefully protect the keys used to sign access tokens, since anyone + with access to these signing keys would be able to create seemingly + valid access tokens using them. + +11.9. Bearer Access Tokens + + Bearer access tokens can be used by any party that has access to the + token itself, without any additional information. As a natural + consequence, any RS that a bearer token is presented to has the + technical capability of presenting that bearer token to another RS, + as long as the token is valid. It also means that any party that is + able to capture the token value in storage or in transit is able to + use the access token. While bearer tokens are inherently simpler, + this simplicity has been misapplied and abused in making needlessly + insecure systems. The downsides of bearer tokens have become more + pertinent lately as stronger authentication systems have caused some + attacks to shift to target tokens and APIs. + + In GNAP, key-bound access tokens are the default due to their higher + security properties. While bearer tokens can be used in GNAP, their + use should be limited to cases where the simplicity benefits outweigh + the significant security downsides. One common deployment pattern is + to use a gateway that takes in key-bound tokens on the outside and + verifies the signatures on the incoming requests but translates the + requests to a bearer token for use by trusted internal systems. The + bearer tokens are never issued or available outside of the internal + systems, greatly limiting the exposure of the less-secure tokens but + allowing the internal deployment to benefit from the advantages of + bearer tokens. + +11.10. Key-Bound Access Tokens + + Key-bound access tokens, as the name suggests, are bound to a + specific key and must be presented along with proof of that key + during use. The key itself is not presented at the same time as the + token, so even if a token value is captured, it cannot be used to + make a new request. This is particularly true for an RS, which will + see the token value but will not see the keys used to make the + request (assuming asymmetric cryptography is in use, see + Section 11.7). + + Key-bound access tokens provide this additional layer of protection + only when the RS checks the signature of the message presented with + the token. Acceptance of an invalid presentation signature, or + failure to check the signature entirely, would allow an attacker to + make calls with a captured access token without having access to the + related signing key material. + + In addition to validating the signature of the presentation message + itself, the RS also needs to ensure that the signing key used is + appropriate for the presented token. If an RS does not ensure that + the right keys were used to sign a message with a specific token, an + attacker would be able to capture an access token and sign the + request with their own keys, thereby negating the benefits of using + key-bound access tokens. + + The RS also needs to ensure that sufficient portions of the message + are covered by the signature. Any items outside the signature could + still affect the API's processing decisions, but these items would + not be strongly bound to the token presentation. As such, an + attacker could capture a valid request and then manipulate portions + of the request outside of the signature envelope in order to cause + unwanted actions at the protected API. + + Some key-bound tokens are susceptible to replay attacks, depending on + the details of the signing method used. Therefore, key proofing + mechanisms used with access tokens need to use replay-protection + mechanisms covered under the signature such as a per-message nonce, a + reasonably short time validity window, or other uniqueness + constraints. The details of using these will vary depending on the + key proofing mechanism in use. For example, HTTP message signatures + have both a created and nonce signature parameter as well as the + ability to cover significant portions of the HTTP message. All of + these can be used to limit the attack surface. + +11.11. Exposure of End-User Credentials to Client Instance + + As a delegation protocol, one of the main goals of GNAP is to prevent + the client software from being exposed to any credentials or + information about the end user or RO as a requirement of the + delegation process. By using the variety of interaction mechanisms, + the RO can interact with the AS without ever authenticating to the + client software and without the client software having to impersonate + the RO through replay of their credentials. + + Consequently, no interaction methods defined in this specification + require the end user to enter their credentials, but it is + technologically possible for an extension to be defined to carry such + values. Such an extension would be dangerous as it would allow rogue + client software to directly collect, store, and replay the end user's + credentials outside of any legitimate use within a GNAP request. + + The concerns of such an extension could be mitigated through use of a + challenge and response unlocked by the end user's credentials. For + example, the AS presents a challenge as part of an interaction start + method, and the client instance signs that challenge using a key + derived from a password presented by the end user. It would be + possible for the client software to collect this password in a secure + software enclave without exposing the password to the rest of the + client software or putting it across the wire to the AS. The AS can + validate this challenge response against a known password for the + identified end user. While an approach such as this does not remove + all of the concerns surrounding such a password-based scheme, it is + at least possible to implement in a more secure fashion than simply + collecting and replaying the password. Even so, such schemes should + only ever be used by trusted clients due to the ease of abusing them. + +11.12. Mixing Up Authorization Servers + + If a client instance is able to work with multiple ASes + simultaneously, it is possible for an attacker to add a compromised + AS to the client instance's configuration and cause the client + software to start a request at the compromised AS. This AS could + then proxy the client's request to a valid AS in order to attempt to + get the RO to approve access for the legitimate client instance. + + A client instance needs to always be aware of which AS it is talking + to throughout a grant process and ensure that any callback for one AS + does not get conflated with the callback to different AS. The + interaction finish hash calculation in Section 4.2.3 allows a client + instance to protect against this kind of substitution, but only if + the client instance validates the hash. If the client instance does + not use an interaction finish method or does not check the + interaction finish hash value, the compromised AS can be granted a + valid access token on behalf of the RO. See Sections 4.5.5 and 5.5 + of [AXELAND2021] for details of one such attack, which has been + addressed in this document by including the grant endpoint in the + interaction hash calculation. Note that the client instance still + needs to validate the hash for the attack to be prevented. + +11.13. Processing of Client-Presented User Information + + GNAP allows the client instance to present assertions and identifiers + of the current user to the AS as part of the initial request. This + information should only ever be taken by the AS as a hint, since the + AS has no way to tell if the represented person is present at the + client software without using an interaction mechanism. This + information does not guarantee the given user is there, but it does + constitute a statement by the client software that the AS can take + into account. + + For example, if a specific user is claimed to be present prior to + interaction, but a different user is shown to be present during + interaction, the AS can either determine this to be an error or + signal to the client instance through returned subject information + that the current user has changed from what the client instance + thought. This user information can also be used by the AS to + streamline the interaction process when the user is present. For + example, instead of having the user type in their account identifier + during interaction at a redirected URI, the AS can immediately + challenge the user for their account credentials. Alternatively, if + an existing session is detected, the AS can determine that it matches + the identifier provided by the client and subsequently skip an + explicit authentication event by the RO. + + In cases where the AS trusts the client software more completely, due + to policy or previous approval of a given client instance, the AS can + take this user information as a statement that the user is present + and could issue access tokens and release subject information without + interaction. The AS should only take such action in very limited + circumstances, as a client instance could assert whatever it likes + for the user's identifiers in its request. The AS can limit the + possibility of this by issuing randomized opaque identifiers to + client instances to represent different end-user accounts after an + initial login. + + When a client instance presents an assertion to the AS, the AS needs + to evaluate that assertion. Since the AS is unlikely to be the + intended audience of an assertion held by the client software, the AS + will need to evaluate the assertion in a different context. Even in + this case, the AS can still evaluate that the assertion was generated + by a trusted party, was appropriately signed, and is within any time + validity windows stated by the assertion. If the client instance's + audience identifier is known to the AS and can be associated with the + client instance's presented key, the AS can also evaluate that the + appropriate client instance is presenting the claimed assertion. All + of this will prevent an attacker from presenting a manufactured + assertion or one captured from an untrusted system. However, without + validating the audience of the assertion, a captured assertion could + be presented by the client instance to impersonate a given end user. + In such cases, the assertion offers little more protection than a + simple identifier would. + + A special case exists where the AS is the generator of the assertion + being presented by the client instance. In these cases, the AS can + validate that it did issue the assertion and it is associated with + the client instance presenting the assertion. + +11.14. Client Instance Pre-registration + + Each client instance is identified by its own unique key, and for + some kinds of client software such as a web server or backend system, + this identification can be facilitated by registering a single key + for a piece of client software ahead of time. This registration can + be associated with a set of display attributes to be used during the + authorization process to identify the client software to the user. + In these cases, it can be assumed that only one instance of client + software will exist, likely to serve many different users. + + A client's registration record needs to include its identifying key. + Furthermore, it is the case that any clients using symmetric + cryptography for key proofing mechanisms need to have their keys pre- + registered. The registration should also include any information + that would aid in the authorization process, such as a display name + and logo. The registration record can also limit a given client to + ask for certain kinds of information or use specific interaction + mechanisms at runtime. + + It also is sensible to pre-register client instances when the + software is acting autonomously, without the need for a runtime + approval by an RO or any interaction with an end user. In these + cases, an AS needs to rely on the trust decisions that have been + determined prior to runtime to determine what rights and tokens to + grant to a given client instance. + + However, it does not make sense to pre-register many types of + clients. Single-page applications (SPAs) and mobile/desktop + applications in particular present problems with pre-registration. + For SPAs, the instances are ephemeral in nature, and long-term + registration of a single instance leads to significant storage and + management overhead at the AS. For mobile applications, each + installation of the client software is a separate instance, and + sharing a key among all instances would be detrimental to security as + the compromise of any single installation would compromise all copies + for all users. + + An AS can treat these classes of client software differently from + each other, perhaps by allowing access to certain high-value APIs + only to pre-registered known clients or by requiring an active end- + user delegation of authority to any client software not pre- + registered. + + An AS can also provide warnings and caveats to ROs during the + authorization process, allowing the user to make an informed decision + regarding the software they are authorizing. For example, if the AS + has vetted the client software and this specific instance, it can + present a different authorization screen compared to a client + instance that is presenting all of its information at runtime. + + Finally, an AS can use platform attestations and other signals from + the client instance at runtime to determine whether or not the + software making the request is legitimate. The details of such + attestations are outside the scope of this specification, but the + client portion of a grant request provides a natural extension point + to such information through the "GNAP Client Instance Fields" + registry (Section 10.7). + +11.15. Client Instance Impersonation + + If client instances are allowed to set their own user-facing display + information, such as a display name and website URL, a malicious + client instance could impersonate legitimate client software for the + purposes of tricking users into authorizing the malicious client. + + Requiring clients to pre-register does not fully mitigate this + problem since many pre-registration systems have self-service portals + for management of client registration, allowing authenticated + developers to enter self-asserted information into the management + portal. + + An AS can mitigate this by actively filtering all self-asserted + values presented by client software, both dynamically as part of GNAP + and through a registration portal, to limit the kinds of + impersonation that could be done. + + An AS can also warn the RO about the provenance of the information it + is displaying, allowing the RO to make a more informed delegation + decision. For example, an AS can visually differentiate between a + client instance that can be traced back to a specific developer's + registration and an instance that has self-asserted its own display + information. + +11.16. Client-Hosted Logo URI + + The logo_uri client display field defined in Section 2.3.2 allows the + client instance to specify a URI from which an image can be fetched + for display during authorization decisions. When the URI points to + an externally hosted resource (as opposed to a data: URI), the + logo_uri field presents challenges in addition to the considerations + in Section 11.15. + + When a logo_uri is externally hosted, the client software (or the + host of the asset) can change the contents of the logo without + informing the AS. Since the logo is considered an aspect of the + client software's identity, this flexibility allows for a more + dynamically managed client instance that makes use of the distributed + systems. + + However, this same flexibility allows the host of the asset to change + the hosted file in a malicious way, such as replacing the image + content with malicious software for download or imitating a different + piece of client software. Additionally, the act of fetching the URI + could accidentally leak information to the image host in the HTTP + Referer header field, if one is sent. Even though GNAP intentionally + does not include security parameters in front-channel URIs wherever + possible, the AS still should take steps to ensure that this + information does not leak accidentally, such as setting a referrer + policy on image links or displaying images only from pages served + from a URI with no sensitive security or identity information. + + To avoid these issues, the AS can insist on the use of data: URIs, + though that might not be practical for all types of client software. + Alternatively, the AS could pre-fetch the content of the URI and + present its own copy to the RO instead. This practice opens the AS + to potential SSRF attacks, as discussed in Section 11.34. + +11.17. Interception of Information in the Browser + + Most information passed through the web browser is susceptible to + interception and possible manipulation by elements within the browser + such as scripts loaded within pages. Information in the URI is + exposed through browser and server logs, and it can also leak to + other parties through HTTP Referer headers. + + GNAP's design limits the information passed directly through the + browser, allowing for opaque URIs in most circumstances. For the + redirect-based interaction finish mechanism, named query parameters + are used to carry unguessable opaque values. For these, GNAP + requires creation and validation of a cryptographic hash to protect + the query parameters added to the URI and associate them with an + ongoing grant process and values not passed in the URI. The client + instance has to properly validate this hash to prevent an attacker + from injecting an interaction reference intended for a different AS + or client instance. + + Several interaction start mechanisms use URIs created by the AS and + passed to the client instance. While these URIs are opaque to the + client instance, it's possible for the AS to include parameters, + paths, and other pieces of information that could leak security data + or be manipulated by a party in the middle of the transaction. An AS + implementation can avoid this problem by creating URIs using + unguessable values that are randomized for each new grant request. + +11.18. Callback URI Manipulation + + The callback URI used in interaction finish mechanisms is defined by + the client instance. This URI is opaque to the AS but can contain + information relevant to the client instance's operations. In + particular, the client instance can include state information to + allow the callback request to be associated with an ongoing grant + request. + + Since this URI is exposed to the end user's browser, it is + susceptible to both logging and manipulation in transit before the + request is made to the client software. As such, a client instance + should never put security-critical or private information into the + callback URI in a cleartext form. For example, if the client + software includes a post-redirect target URI in its callback URI to + the AS, this target URI could be manipulated by an attacker, creating + an open redirector at the client. Instead, a client instance can use + an unguessable identifier in the URI that can then be used by the + client software to look up the details of the pending request. Since + this approach requires some form of statefulness by the client + software during the redirection process, clients that are not capable + of holding state through a redirect should not use redirect-based + interaction mechanisms. + +11.19. Redirection Status Codes + + As described in [OAUTH-SEC-TOPICS], a server should never use HTTP + status code 307 (Temporary Redirect) to redirect a request that + potentially contains user credentials. If an HTTP redirect is used + for such a request, HTTP status code 303 (See Other) should be used + instead. + + Status code 307 (Temporary Redirect), as defined in the HTTP standard + [HTTP], requires the user agent to preserve the method and content of + a request, thus submitting the content of the POST request to the + redirect target. In the HTTP standard [HTTP], only status code 303 + (See Other) unambiguously enforces rewriting the HTTP POST request to + an HTTP GET request, which eliminates the POST content from the + redirected request. For all other status codes, including status + code 302 (Found), user agents are allowed to keep a redirected POST + request as a POST and thus can resubmit the content. + + The use of status code 307 (Temporary Redirect) results in a + vulnerability when using the redirect interaction finish method + (Section 3.3.5). With this method, the AS potentially prompts the RO + to enter their credentials in a form that is then submitted back to + the AS (using an HTTP POST request). The AS checks the credentials + and, if successful, may immediately redirect the RO to the client + instance's redirect URI. Due to the use of status code 307 + (Temporary Redirect), the RO's user agent now transmits the RO's + credentials to the client instance. A malicious client instance can + then use the obtained credentials to impersonate the RO at the AS. + + Redirection away from the initial URI in an interaction session could + also leak information found in that initial URI through the HTTP + Referer header field, which would be sent by the user agent to the + redirect target. To avoid such leakage, a server can first redirect + to an internal interstitial page without any identifying or sensitive + information on the URI before processing the request. When the user + agent is ultimately redirected from this page, no part of the + original interaction URI will be found in the Referer header. + +11.20. Interception of Responses from the AS + + Responses from the AS contain information vital to both the security + and privacy operations of GNAP. This information includes nonces + used in cryptographic calculations, Subject Identifiers, assertions, + public keys, and information about what client software is requesting + and was granted. + + In addition, if bearer tokens are used or keys are issued alongside a + bound access token, the response from the AS contains all information + necessary for use of the contained access token. Any party that is + capable of viewing such a response, such as an intermediary proxy, + would be able to exfiltrate and use this token. If the access token + is instead bound to the client instance's presented key, + intermediaries no longer have sufficient information to use the + token. They can still, however, gain information about the end user + as well as the actions of the client software. + +11.21. Key Distribution + + GNAP does not define ways for the client instances keys to be + provided to the client instances, particularly in light of how those + keys are made known to the AS. These keys could be generated + dynamically on the client software or pre-registered at the AS in a + static developer portal. The keys for client instances could also be + distributed as part of the deployment process of instances of the + client software. For example, an application installation framework + could generate a key pair for each copy of client software and then + both install it into the client software upon installation and + register that instance with the AS. + + Alternatively, it's possible for the AS to generate keys to be used + with access tokens that are separate from the keys used by the client + instance to request tokens. In this method, the AS would generate + the asymmetric key pair or symmetric key and return the public key or + key reference to the client instance alongside the access token + itself. The means for the AS to return generated key values to the + client instance are out of scope, since GNAP does not allow the + transmission of private or shared key information within the protocol + itself. + + Additionally, if the token is bound to a key other than the client + instance's presented key, this opens a possible attack surface for an + attacker's AS to request an access token and then substitute their + own key material in the response to the client instance. The + attacker's AS would need to be able to use the same key as the client + instance, but this setup would allow an attacker's AS to make use of + a compromised key within a system. This attack can be prevented by + only binding access tokens to the client instance's presented keys + and by having client instances have a strong association between + which keys they expect to use and the AS they expect to use them on. + This attack is also only able to be propagated on client instances + that talk to more than one AS at runtime, which can be limited by the + client software. + +11.22. Key Rotation Policy + + When keys are rotated, there could be a delay in the propagation of + that rotation to various components in the AS's ecosystem. The AS + can define its own policy regarding the timeout of the previously + bound key, either making it immediately obsolete or allowing for a + limited grace period during which both the previously bound key and + the current key can be used for signing requests. Such a grace + period can be useful when there are multiple running copies of the + client that are coordinated with each other. For example, the client + software could be deployed as a cloud service with multiple + orchestrated nodes. Each of these copies is deployed using the same + key; therefore, all the nodes represent the same client instance to + the AS. In such cases, it can be difficult, or even impossible, to + update the keys on all these copies in the same instant. + + The need to accommodate such known delays in the system needs to be + balanced with the risk of allowing an old key to still be used. + Narrowly restricting the exposure opportunities for exploit at the AS + in terms of time, place, and method makes exploit significantly more + difficult, especially if the exception happens only once. For + example, the AS can reject requests from the previously bound key (or + any previous one before it) to cause rotation to a new key or at + least ensure that the rotation happens in an idempotent way to the + same new key. + + See also the related considerations for token values in + Section 11.33. + +11.23. Interaction Finish Modes and Polling + + During the interaction process, the client instance usually hands + control of the user experience over to another component, be it the + system browser, another application, or some action the RO is + instructed to take on another device. By using an interaction finish + method, the client instance can be securely notified by the AS when + the interaction is completed and the next phase of the protocol + should occur. This process includes information that the client + instance can use to validate the finish call from the AS and prevent + some injection, session hijacking, and phishing attacks. + + Some types of client deployment are unable to receive an interaction + finish message. Without an interaction finish method to notify it, + the client instance will need to poll the grant continuation API + while waiting for the RO to approve or deny the request. An attacker + could take advantage of this situation by capturing the interaction + start parameters and phishing a legitimate user into authorizing the + attacker's waiting client instance, which would in turn have no way + of associating the completed interaction from the targeted user with + the start of the request from the attacker. + + However, it is important to note that this pattern is practically + indistinguishable from some legitimate use cases. For example, a + smart device emits a code for the RO to enter on a separate device. + The smart device has to poll because the expected behavior is that + the interaction will take place on the separate device, without a way + to return information to the original device's context. + + As such, developers need to weigh the risks of forgoing an + interaction finish method against the deployment capabilities of the + client software and its environment. Due to the increased security, + an interaction finish method should be employed whenever possible. + +11.24. Session Management for Interaction Finish Methods + + When using an interaction finish method such as redirect or push, the + client instance receives an unsolicited inbound request from an + unknown party over HTTPS. The client instance needs to be able to + successfully associate this incoming request with a specific pending + grant request being managed by the client instance. If the client + instance is not careful and precise about this, an attacker could + associate their own session at the client instance with a stolen + interaction response. The means of preventing this vary by the type + of client software and interaction methods in use. Some common + patterns are enumerated here. + + If the end user interacts with the client instance through a web + browser and the redirect interaction finish method is used, the + client instance can ensure that the incoming HTTP request from the + finish method is presented in the same browser session that the grant + request was started in. This technique is particularly useful when + the redirect interaction start mode is used as well, since in many + cases, the end user will follow the redirection with the same browser + that they are using to interact with the client instance. The client + instance can then store the relevant pending grant information in the + session, either in the browser storage directly (such as with a + single-page application) or in an associated session store on a + backend server. In both cases, when the incoming request reaches the + client instance, the session information can be used to ensure that + the same party that started the request is present as the request + finishes. + + Ensuring that the same party that started a request is present when + that request finishes can prevent phishing attacks, where an attacker + starts a request at an honest client instance and tricks an honest RO + into authorizing it. For example, if an honest end user (that also + acts as the RO) wants to start a request through a client instance + controlled by the attacker, the attacker can start a request at an + honest client instance and then redirect the honest end user to the + interaction URI from the attackers session with the honest client + instance. If the honest end user then fails to realize that they are + not authorizing the attacker-controlled client instance (with which + it started its request) but instead the honest client instance when + interacting with the AS, the attacker's session with the honest + client instance would be authorized. This would give the attacker + access to the honest end user's resources that the honest client + instance is authorized to access. However, if after the interaction, + the AS redirects the honest end user back to the client instance + whose grant request the end user just authorized, the honest end user + is redirected to the honest client instance. The honest client + instance can then detect that the end user is not the party that + started the request, since the request at the honest client instance + was started by the attacker. This detection can prevent the attack. + This is related to the discussion in Section 11.15, because again the + attack can be prevented by the AS informing the user as much as + possible about the client instance that is to be authorized. + + If the end user does not interact with the client instance through a + web browser or the interaction start method does not use the same + browser or device that the end user is interacting through (such as + the launch of a second device through a scannable code or + presentation of a user code), the client instance will not be able to + strongly associate an incoming HTTP request with an established + session with the end user. This is also true when the push + interaction finish method is used, since the HTTP request comes + directly from the interaction component of the AS. In these + circumstances, the client instance can at least ensure that the + incoming HTTP request can be uniquely associated with an ongoing + grant request by making the interaction finish callback URI unique + for the grant when making the interaction request (Section 2.5.2). + Mobile applications and other client instances that generally serve + only a single end user at a time can use this unique incoming URL to + differentiate between a legitimate incoming request and an attacker's + stolen request. + +11.25. Calculating Interaction Hash + + While the use of GNAP's signing mechanisms and token-protected grant + API provides significant security protections to the protocol, the + interaction reference mechanism is susceptible to monitoring, + capture, and injection by an attacker. To combat this, GNAP requires + the calculation and verification of an interaction hash. A client + instance might be tempted to skip this step, but doing so leaves the + client instance open to injection and manipulation by an attacker + that could lead to additional issues. + + The calculation of the interaction hash value provides defense in + depth, allowing a client instance to protect itself from spurious + injection of interaction references when using an interaction finish + method. The AS is protected during this attack through the + continuation access token being bound to the expected interaction + reference, but without hash calculation, the attacker could cause the + client to make an HTTP request on command, which could itself be + manipulated -- for example, by including a malicious value in the + interaction reference designed to attack the AS. With both of these + in place, an attacker attempting to substitute the interaction + reference is stopped in several places. + + .----. .------. +--------+ +--------+ + | User | |Attacker| | Client | | AS | + | | | | |Instance| | | + | | | | | | | | + | | | +=(1)=>| | | | + | | | | | +-(2)->| | + | | | | | |<-(3)-+ | + | | | |<=(4)=+ | | | + | | | | | | | | + | | | +==(5)================>| | + | | | | | | | | + | | | |<================(6)==+ | + | | | | | | | | + | +==(A)================>| | | | + | | | | | +-(B)->| | + | | | | | |<-(C)-+ | + | |<=================(D)=+ | | | + | | | | | | | | + | +==(E)================================>| | + | | | | | | | | + | |<=(7)=+ | | | | | + | | | | | | | | + | +==(F)================>| | | | + | | | | | +-(G)->| | + | | | | | | | | + `----` `------` +--------+ +--------+ + + Figure 11: Interaction Hash Attack + + Prerequisites: The client instance can allow multiple end users to + access the same AS. The attacker is attempting to associate their + rights with the target user's session. + + * (1) The attacker starts a session at the client instance. + + * (2) The client instance creates a grant request with nonce CN1. + + * (3) The AS responds to the grant request with a need to interact, + nonce SN1, and a continuation token, CT1. + + * (4) The client instructs the attacker to interact at the AS. + + * (5) The attacker interacts at the AS. + + * (6) The AS completes the interact finish with interact reference + IR1 and interact hash IH1 calculated from (CN1 + SN1 + IR1 + AS). + The attacker prevents IR1 from returning to the client instance. + + * (A) The target user starts a session at the client instance. + + * (B) The client instance creates a grant request with nonce CN2. + + * (C) The AS responds to the grant request with a need to interact, + nonce SN2, and a continuation token, CT2. + + * (D) The client instance instructs the user to interact at the AS. + + * (E) The target user interacts at the AS. + + * (7) Before the target user can complete their interaction, the + attacker delivers their own interact reference IR1 into the user's + session. The attacker cannot calculate the appropriate hash + because the attacker does not have access to CN2 and SN2. + + * (F) The target user triggers the interaction finish in their own + session with the attacker's IR1. + + * (G) If the client instance is checking the interaction hash, the + attack stops here because the hash calculation of (CN2 + SN2 + IR1 + + AS) will fail. If the client instance does not check the + interaction hash, the client instance will be tricked into + submitting the interaction reference to the AS. Here, the AS will + reject the interaction request because it is presented against CT2 + and not CT1 as expected. However, an attacker who has potentially + injected CT1 as the value of CT2 would be able to continue the + attack. + + Even with additional checks in place, client instances using + interaction finish mechanisms are responsible for checking the + interaction hash to provide security to the overall system. + +11.26. Storage of Information during Interaction and Continuation + + When starting an interactive grant request, a client application has + a number of protocol elements that it needs to manage, including + nonces, references, keys, access tokens, and other elements. During + the interaction process, the client instance usually hands control of + the user experience over to another component, be it the system + browser, another application, or some action the RO is instructed to + take on another device. In order for the client instance to make its + continuation call, it will need to recall all of these protocol + elements at a future time. Usually, this means the client instance + will need to store these protocol elements in some retrievable + fashion. + + If the security protocol elements are stored on the end user's + device, such as in browser storage or in local application data + stores, capture and exfiltration of this information could allow an + attacker to continue a pending transaction instead of the client + instance. Client software can make use of secure storage mechanisms, + including hardware-based key and data storage, to prevent such + exfiltration. + + Note that in GNAP, the client instance has to choose its interaction + finish URI prior to making the first call to the AS. As such, the + interaction finish URI will often have a unique identifier for the + ongoing request, allowing the client instance to access the correct + portion of its storage. Since this URI is passed to other parties + and often used through a browser, this URI should not contain any + security-sensitive information that would be valuable to an attacker, + such as any token identifier, nonce, or user information. Instead, a + cryptographically random value is suggested, and that value should be + used to index into a secure session or storage mechanism. + +11.27. Denial of Service (DoS) through Grant Continuation + + When a client instance starts off an interactive process, it will + eventually need to continue the grant request in a subsequent message + to the AS. It's possible for a naive client implementation to + continuously send continuation requests to the AS while waiting for + approval, especially if no interaction finish method is used. Such + constant requests could overwhelm the AS's ability to respond to both + these and other requests. + + To mitigate this for well-behaved client software, the continuation + response contains a wait parameter that is intended to tell the + client instance how long it should wait until making its next + request. This value can be used to back off client software that is + checking too quickly by returning increasing wait times for a single + client instance. + + If client software ignores the wait value and makes its continuation + calls too quickly or if the client software assumes the absence of + the wait values means it should poll immediately, the AS can choose + to return errors to the offending client instance, including possibly + canceling the ongoing grant request. With well-meaning client + software, these errors can indicate a need to change the client + software's programmed behavior. + +11.28. Exhaustion of Random Value Space + + Several parts of the GNAP process make use of unguessable randomized + values, such as nonces, tokens, user codes, and randomized URIs. + Since these values are intended to be unique, a sufficiently powerful + attacker could make a large number of requests to trigger generation + of randomized values in an attempt to exhaust the random number + generation space. While this attack is particularly applicable to + the AS, client software could likewise be targeted by an attacker + triggering new grant requests against an AS. + + To mitigate this, software can ensure that its random values are + chosen from a significantly large pool so that exhaustion of that + pool is prohibitive for an attacker. Additionally, the random values + can be time-boxed in such a way that their validity windows are + reasonably short. Since many of the random values used within GNAP + are used within limited portions of the protocol, it is reasonable + for a particular random value to be valid for only a small amount of + time. For example, the nonces used for interaction finish hash + calculation need only to be valid while the client instance is + waiting for the finish callback and can be functionally expired when + the interaction has completed. Similarly, artifacts like access + tokens and the interaction reference can be limited to have lifetimes + tied to their functional utility. Finally, each different category + of artifact (nonce, token, reference, identifier, etc.) can be + generated from a separate random pool of values instead of a single + global value space. + +11.29. Front-Channel URIs + + Some interaction methods in GNAP make use of URIs accessed through + the end user's browser, known collectively as front-channel + communication. These URIs are most notably present in the redirect + interaction start method and the redirect interaction finish mode. + Since these URIs are intended to be given to the end user, the end + user and their browser will be subjected to anything hosted at that + URI including viruses, malware, and phishing scams. This kind of + risk is inherent to all redirection-based protocols, including GNAP, + when used in this way. + + When talking to a new or unknown AS, a client instance might want to + check the URI from the interaction start against a blocklist and warn + the end user before redirecting them. Many client instances will + provide an interstitial message prior to redirection in order to + prepare the user for control of the user experience being handed to + the domain of the AS, and such a method could be used to warn the + user of potential threats (for instance, a rogue AS impersonating a + well-known service provider). Client software can also prevent this + by managing an allowlist of known and trusted ASes. + + Alternatively, an attacker could start a GNAP request with a known + and trusted AS but include their own attack site URI as the callback + for the redirect finish method. The attacker would then send the + interaction start URI to the victim and get them to click on it. + Since the URI is at the known AS, the victim is inclined to do so. + The victim will then be prompted to approve the attacker's + application, and in most circumstances, the victim will then be + redirected to the attacker's site whether or not the user approved + the request. The AS could mitigate this partially by using a + blocklist and allowlist of interaction finish URIs during the client + instance's initial request, but this approach can be especially + difficult if the URI has any dynamic portion chosen by the client + software. The AS can couple these checks with policies associated + with the client instance that has been authenticated in the request. + If the AS has any doubt about the interaction finish URI, the AS can + provide an interstitial warning to the end user before processing the + redirect. + + Ultimately, all protocols that use redirect-based communication + through the user's browser are susceptible to having an attacker try + to co-opt one or more of those URIs in order to harm the user. It is + the responsibility of the AS and the client software to provide + appropriate warnings, education, and mitigation to protect end users. + +11.30. Processing Assertions + + Identity assertions can be used in GNAP to convey subject + information, both from the AS to the client instance in a response + (Section 3.4) and from the client instance to the AS in a request + (Section 2.2). In both of these circumstances, when an assertion is + passed in GNAP, the receiver of the assertion needs to parse and + process the assertion. As assertions are complex artifacts with + their own syntax and security, special care needs to be taken to + prevent the assertion values from being used as an attack vector. + + All assertion processing needs to account for the security aspects of + the assertion format in use. In particular, the processor needs to + parse the assertion from a JSON string object and apply the + appropriate cryptographic processes to ensure the integrity of the + assertion. + + For example, when SAML 2.0 assertions are used, the receiver has to + parse an XML document. There are many well-known security + vulnerabilities in XML parsers, and the XML standard itself can be + attacked through the use of processing instructions and entity + expansions to cause problems with the processor. Therefore, any + system capable of processing SAML 2.0 assertions also needs to have a + secure and correct XML parser. In addition to this, the SAML 2.0 + specification uses XML Signatures, which have their own + implementation problems that need to be accounted for. Similar + requirements exist for OpenID Connect ID Token, which is based on the + JWT format and the related JOSE cryptography suite. + +11.31. Stolen Token Replay + + If a client instance can request tokens at multiple ASes and the + client instance uses the same keys to make its requests across those + different ASes, then it is possible for an attacker to replay a + stolen token issued by an honest AS from a compromised AS, thereby + binding the stolen token to the client instance's key in a different + context. The attacker can manipulate the client instance into using + the stolen token at an RS, particularly at an RS that is expecting a + token from the honest AS. Since the honest AS issued the token and + the client instance presents the token with its expected bound key, + the attack succeeds. + + This attack has several preconditions. In this attack, the attacker + does not need access to the client instance's key and cannot use the + stolen token directly at the RS, but the attacker is able to get the + access token value in some fashion. The client instance also needs + to be configured to talk to multiple ASes, including the attacker's + controlled AS. Finally, the client instance needs to be able to be + manipulated by the attacker to call the RS while using a token issued + from the stolen AS. The RS does not need to be compromised or made + to trust the attacker's AS. + + To protect against this attack, the client instance can use a + different key for each AS that it talks to. Since the replayed token + will be bound to the key used at the honest AS, the uncompromised RS + will reject the call since the client instance will be using the key + used at the attacker's AS instead with the same token. When the MTLS + key proofing method is used, a client instance can use self-signed + certificates to use a different key for each AS that it talks to, as + discussed in Section 11.4. + + Additionally, the client instance can keep a strong association + between the RS and a specific AS that it trusts to issue tokens for + that RS. This strong binding also helps against some forms of AS + mix-up attacks (Section 11.12). Managing this binding is outside the + scope of this specification, but it can be managed either as a + configuration element for the client instance or dynamically through + discovering the AS from the RS (Section 9.1). + + The details of this attack, with additional discussion and + considerations, are available in Section 3.2 of [HELMSCHMIDT2022]. + +11.32. Self-Contained Stateless Access Tokens + + The contents and format of the access token are at the discretion of + the AS and are opaque to the client instance within GNAP. As + discussed in [GNAP-RS], the AS and RS can make use of stateless + access tokens with an internal structure and format. These access + tokens allow an RS to validate the token without having to make any + external calls at runtime, allowing for benefits in some deployments, + the discussion of which is outside the scope of this specification. + + However, the use of such self-contained access tokens has an effect + on the ability of the AS to provide certain functionality defined + within this specification. Specifically, since the access token is + self-contained, it is difficult or impossible for an AS to signal to + all RSs within an ecosystem when a specific access token has been + revoked. Therefore, an AS in such an ecosystem should probably not + offer token revocation functionality to client instances, since the + client instance's calls to such an endpoint are effectively + meaningless. However, a client instance calling the token revocation + function will also throw out its copy of the token, so such a placebo + endpoint might not be completely meaningless. Token rotation is + similarly difficult because the AS has to revoke the old access token + after a rotation call has been made. If the access tokens are + completely self-contained and non-revocable, this means that there + will be a period of time during which both the old and new access + tokens are valid and usable, which is an increased security risk for + the environment. + + These problems can be mitigated by keeping the validity time windows + of self-contained access tokens reasonably short, limiting the time + after a revocation event that a revoked token could be used. + Additionally, the AS could proactively signal to RSs under its + control identifiers for revoked tokens that have yet to expire. This + type of information push would be expected to be relatively small and + infrequent, and its implementation is outside the scope of this + specification. + +11.33. Network Problems and Token and Grant Management + + If a client instance makes a call to rotate an access token but the + network connection is dropped before the client instance receives the + response with the new access token, the system as a whole can end up + in an inconsistent state, where the AS has already rotated the old + access token and invalidated it, but the client instance only has + access to the invalidated access token and not the newly rotated + token value. If the client instance retries the rotation request, it + would fail because the client is no longer presenting a valid and + current access token. A similar situation can occur during grant + continuation, where the same client instance calls to continue or + update a grant request without successfully receiving the results of + the update. + + To combat this, both grant management (Section 5) and token + management (Section 6) can be designed to be idempotent, where + subsequent calls to the same function with the same credentials are + meant to produce the same results. For example, multiple calls to + rotate the same access token need to result in the same rotated token + value, within a reasonable time window. + + In practice, an AS can hold onto an old token value for such limited + purposes. For example, to support rotating access tokens over + unreliable networks, the AS receives the initial request to rotate an + access token and creates a new token value and returns it. The AS + also marks the old token value as having been used to create the + newly rotated token value. If the AS sees the old token value within + a small enough time window, such as a few seconds since the first + rotation attempt, the AS can return the same rotated access token + value. Furthermore, once the system has seen the newly rotated token + in use, the original token can be discarded because the client + instance has proved that it did receive the token. The result of + this is a system that is eventually self-consistent without placing + an undue complexity burden on the client instance to manage + problematic networks. + +11.34. Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) + + There are several places within GNAP where a URI can be given to a + party, causing it to fetch that URI during normal operation of the + protocol. If an attacker is able to control the value of one of + these URIs within the protocol, the attacker could cause the target + system to execute a request on a URI that is within reach of the + target system but normally unavailable to the attacker. Examples + include an attacker sending a URL of http://localhost/admin to cause + the server to access an internal function on itself or + https://192.168.0.14/ to call a service behind a firewall. Even if + the attacker does not gain access to the results of the call, the + side effects of such requests coming from a trusted host can be + problematic to the security and sanctity of such otherwise unexposed + endpoints. This can be particularly problematic if such a URI is + used to call non-HTTP endpoints, such as remote code execution + services local to the AS. + + The most vulnerable place in this specification is the push-based + post-interaction finish method (Section 4.2.2), as the client + instance is less trusted than the AS and can use this method to make + the AS call an arbitrary URI. While it is not required by the + protocol, the AS can fetch other URIs provided by the client + instance, such as the logo image or home page, for verification or + privacy-preserving purposes before displaying them to the RO as part + of a consent screen. Even if the AS does not fetch these URIs, their + use in GNAP's normal operation could cause an attack against the end + user's browser as it fetches these same attack URIs. Furthermore, + extensions to GNAP that allow or require URI fetch could also be + similarly susceptible, such as a system for having the AS fetch a + client instance's keys from a presented URI instead of the client + instance presenting the key by value. Such extensions are outside + the scope of this specification, but any system deploying such an + extension would need to be aware of this issue. + + To help mitigate this problem, similar approaches that protect + parties against malicious redirects (Section 11.29) can be used. For + example, all URIs that can result in a direct request being made by a + party in the protocol can be filtered through an allowlist or + blocklist. For example, an AS that supports the push-based + interaction finish method can compare the callback URI in the + interaction request to a known URI for a pre-registered client + instance, or it can ensure that the URI is not on a blocklist of + sensitive URLs such as internal network addresses. However, note + that because these types of calls happen outside of the view of human + interaction, it is not usually feasible to provide notification and + warning to someone before the request needs to be executed, as is the + case with redirection URLs. As such, SSRF is somewhat more difficult + to manage at runtime, and systems should generally refuse to fetch a + URI if unsure. + +11.35. Multiple Key Formats + + All keys presented by value are only allowed to be in a single + format. While it would seem beneficial to allow keys to be sent in + multiple formats in case the receiver doesn't understand one or more + of the formats used, there are security issues with such a feature. + If multiple keys formats are allowed, receivers of these key + definitions would need to be able to make sure that it's the same key + represented in each field and not simply use one of the key formats + without checking for equivalence. If equivalence is not carefully + checked, it is possible for an attacker to insert their own key into + one of the formats without needing to have control over the other + formats. This could potentially lead to a situation where one key is + used by part of the system (such as identifying the client instance) + and a different key in a different format in the same message is used + for other things (such as calculating signature validity). However, + in such cases, it is impossible for the receiver to ensure that all + formats contain the same key information since it is assumed that the + receiver cannot understand all of the formats. + + To combat this, all keys presented by value have to be in exactly one + supported format known by the receiver as discussed in Section 7.1. + In most cases, a client instance is going to be configured with its + keys in a single format, and it will simply present that format as is + to the AS in its request. A client instance capable of multiple + formats can use AS discovery (Section 9) to determine which formats + are supported, if desired. An AS should be generous in supporting + many different key formats to allow different types of client + software and client instance deployments. An AS implementation + should try to support multiple formats to allow a variety of client + software to connect. + +11.36. Asynchronous Interactions + + GNAP allows the RO to be contacted by the AS asynchronously, outside + the regular flow of the protocol. This allows for some advanced use + cases, such as cross-user authentication or information release, but + such advanced use cases have some distinct issues that implementors + need to be fully aware of before using these features. + + First, in many applications, the return of subject information to the + client instance could indicate to the client instance that the end + user is the party represented by that information, functionally + allowing the end user to authenticate to the client application. + While the details of a fully functional authentication protocol are + outside the scope of GNAP, it is a common exercise for a client + instance to request information about the end user. This is + facilitated by several interaction methods (Section 4.1) defined in + GNAP that allow the end user to begin interaction directly with the + AS. However, when the subject of the information is intentionally + not the end user, the client application will need some way to + differentiate between requests for authentication of the end user and + requests for information about a different user. Confusing these + states could lead to an attacker having their account associated with + a privileged user. Client instances can mitigate this by having + distinct code paths for primary end-user authentication and for + requesting subject information about secondary users, such as in a + call center. In such use cases, the client software used by the RO + (the caller) and the end user (the agent) are generally distinct, + allowing the AS to differentiate between the agent's corporate device + making the request and the caller's personal device approving the + request. + + Second, ROs that interact asynchronously do not usually have the same + context as an end user in an application attempting to perform the + task needing authorization. As such, the asynchronous requests for + authorization coming to the RO from the AS might have very little to + do with what the RO is doing at the time. This situation can + consequently lead to authorization fatigue on the part of the RO, + where any incoming authorization request is quickly approved and + dispatched without the RO making a proper verification of the + request. An attacker can exploit this fatigue and get the RO to + authorize the attacker's system for access. To mitigate this, AS + systems deploying asynchronous authorization should only prompt the + RO when the RO is expecting such a request, and significant user + experience engineering efforts need to be employed to ensure that the + RO can clearly make the appropriate security decision. Furthermore, + audit capability and the ability to undo access decisions that may be + ongoing are particularly important in the asynchronous case. + +11.37. Compromised RS + + An attacker may aim to gain access to confidential or sensitive + resources. The measures for hardening and monitoring RS systems + (beyond protection with access tokens) are out of the scope of this + document, but the use of GNAP to protect a system does not absolve + the RS of following best practices. GNAP generally considers that a + breach can occur and therefore advises to prefer key-bound tokens + whenever possible, which at least limits the impact of access token + leakage by a compromised or malicious RS. + +11.38. AS-Provided Token Keys + + While the most common token-issuance pattern is to bind the access + token to the client instance's presented key, it is possible for the + AS to provide a binding key along with an access token, as shown by + the key field of the token response in Section 3.2.1. This practice + allows for an AS to generate and manage the keys associated with + tokens independently of the keys known to client instances. + + If the key material is returned by value from the AS, then the client + instance will simply use this key value when presenting the token. + This can be exploited by an attacker to issue a compromised token to + an unsuspecting client, assuming that the client instance trusts the + attacker's AS to issue tokens for the target RS. In this attack, the + attacker first gets a token bound to a key under the attacker's + control. This token is likely bound to an authorization or account + controlled by the attacker. The attacker then reissues that same + token to the client instance, this time acting as an AS. The + attacker can return their own key to the client instance, tricking + the client instance into using the attacker's token. Such an attack + is also possible when the key is returned by reference, if the + attacker is able to provide a reference meaningful to the client + instance that references a key under the attacker's control. This + substitution attack is similar to some of the main issues found with + bearer tokens as discussed in Section 11.9. + + Returning a key with an access token should be limited to + circumstances where both the client and AS can be verified to be + honest and when the trade-off of not using a client instance's own + keys is worth the additional risk. + +12. Privacy Considerations + + The privacy considerations in this section are modeled after the list + of privacy threats in "Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols" + [RFC6973] and either explain how these threats are mitigated or + advise how the threats relate to GNAP. + +12.1. Surveillance + + Surveillance is the observation or monitoring of an individual's + communications or activities. Surveillance can be conducted by + observers or eavesdroppers at any point along the communications + path. + + GNAP assumes the TLS protection used throughout the spec is intact. + Without the protection of TLS, there are many points throughout the + use of GNAP that could lead to possible surveillance. Even with the + proper use of TLS, surveillance could occur by several parties + outside of the TLS-protected channels, as discussed in the + subsections below. + +12.1.1. Surveillance by the Client + + The purpose of GNAP is to authorize clients to be able to access + information on behalf of a user. So while it is expected that the + client may be aware of the user's identity as well as data being + fetched for that user, in some cases, the extent of the client may be + beyond what the user is aware of. For example, a client may be + implemented as multiple distinct pieces of software, such as a + logging service or a mobile application that reports usage data to an + external backend service. Each of these pieces could gain + information about the user without the user being aware of this + action. + + When the client software uses a hosted asset for its components, such + as its logo image, the fetch of these assets can reveal user actions + to the host. If the AS presents the logo URI to the RO in a browser + page, the browser will fetch the logo URL from the authorization + screen. This fetch will tell the host of the logo image that someone + is accessing an instance of the client software and requesting access + for it. This is particularly problematic when the host of the asset + is not the client software itself, such as when a content delivery + network is used. + +12.1.2. Surveillance by the Authorization Server + + The role of the AS is to manage the authorization of client instances + to protect access to the user's data. In this role, the AS is by + definition aware of each authorization of a client instance by a + user. When the AS shares user information with the client instance, + it needs to make sure that it has the permission from that user to do + so. + + Additionally, as part of the authorization grant process, the AS may + be aware of which RSs the client intends to use an access token at. + However, it is possible to design a system using GNAP in which this + knowledge is not made available to the AS, such as by avoiding the + use of the locations object in the authorization request. + + If the AS's implementation of access tokens is such that it requires + an RS callback to the AS to validate them, then the AS will be aware + of which RSs are actively in use and by which users and clients. To + avoid this possibility, the AS would need to structure access tokens + in such a way that they can be validated by the RS without notifying + the AS that the token is being validated. + +12.2. Stored Data + + Several parties in the GNAP process are expected to persist data at + least temporarily, if not semi-permanently, for the normal + functioning of the system. If compromised, this could lead to + exposure of sensitive information. This section documents the + potentially sensitive information each party in GNAP is expected to + store for normal operation. Naturally, it is possible for any party + to store information related to protocol mechanics (such as audit + logs, etc.) for longer than is technically necessary. + + The AS is expected to store Subject Identifiers for users + indefinitely, in order to be able to include them in the responses to + clients. The AS is also expected to store client key identifiers + associated with display information about the client, such as its + name and logo. + + The client is expected to store its client instance key indefinitely, + in order to authenticate to the AS for the normal functioning of the + GNAP flows. Additionally, the client will be temporarily storing + artifacts issued by the AS during a flow, and these artifacts ought + to be discarded by the client when the transaction is complete. + + The RS is not required to store any state for its normal operation, + as far as its part in implementing GNAP. Depending on the + implementation of access tokens, the RS may need to cache public keys + from the AS in order to validate access tokens. + +12.3. Intrusion + + Intrusion refers to the ability of various parties to send + unsolicited messages or cause denial of service for unrelated + parties. + + If the RO is different from the end user, there is an opportunity for + the end user to cause unsolicited messages to be sent to the RO if + the system prompts the RO for consent when an end user attempts to + access their data. + + The format and contents of Subject Identifiers are intentionally not + defined by GNAP. If the AS uses values for Subject Identifiers that + are also identifiers for communication channels (e.g., an email + address or phone number), this opens up the possibility for a client + to learn this information when it was not otherwise authorized to + access this kind of data about the user. + +12.4. Correlation + + The threat of correlation is the combination of various pieces of + information related to an individual in a way that defies their + expectations of what others know about them. + +12.4.1. Correlation by Clients + + The biggest risk of correlation in GNAP is when an AS returns stable, + consistent user identifiers to multiple different applications. In + this case, applications created by different parties would be able to + correlate these user identifiers out of band in order to know which + users they have in common. + + The most common example of this in practice is tracking for + advertising purposes, such that a client shares their list of user + IDs with an ad platform that is then able to retarget ads to + applications created by other parties. In contrast, a positive + example of correlation is a corporate acquisition where two + previously unrelated clients now do need to be able to identify the + same user between the two clients, such as when software systems are + intentionally connected by the end user. + + Another means of correlation comes from the use of RS-first discovery + (Section 9.1). A client instance that knows nothing other than an + RS's URL could make an unauthenticated call to the RS and learn which + AS protects the resources there. If the client instance knows + something about the AS, such as it being a single-user AS or + belonging to a specific organization, the client instance could, + through association, learn things about the resource without ever + gaining access to the resource itself. + +12.4.2. Correlation by Resource Servers + + Unrelated RSs also have an opportunity to correlate users if the AS + includes stable user identifiers in access tokens or in access token + introspection responses. + + In some cases, an RS may not actually need to be able to identify + users (such as an RS providing access to a company cafeteria menu, + which only needs to validate whether the user is a current employee), + so ASes should be thoughtful of when user identifiers are actually + necessary to communicate to RSs for the functioning of the system. + + However, note that the lack of inclusion of a user identifier in an + access token may be a risk if there is a concern that two users may + voluntarily share access tokens between them in order to access + protected resources. For example, if a website wants to limit access + to only people over 18, and such does not need to know any user + identifiers, an access token may be issued by an AS contains only the + claim "over 18". If the user is aware that this access token doesn't + reference them individually, they may be willing to share the access + token with a user who is under 18 in order to let them get access to + the website. (Note that the binding of an access token to a non- + extractable client instance key also prevents the access token from + being voluntarily shared.) + +12.4.3. Correlation by Authorization Servers + + Clients are expected to be identified by their client instance key. + If a particular client instance key is used at more than one AS, this + could open up the possibility for multiple unrelated ASes to + correlate client instances. This is especially a problem in the + common case where a client instance is used by a single individual, + as it would allow the ASes to correlate that individual between them. + If this is a concern of a client, the client should use distinct keys + with each AS. + +12.5. Disclosure in Shared References + + Throughout many parts of GNAP, the parties pass shared references + between each other, sometimes in place of the values themselves (for + example, the interact_ref value used throughout the flow). These + references are intended to be random strings and should not contain + any private or sensitive data that could potentially leak information + between parties. + +13. References + +13.1. Normative References + + [BCP195] Best Current Practice 195, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp195>. + At the time of writing, this BCP comprises the following: + + Moriarty, K. and S. Farrell, "Deprecating TLS 1.0 and TLS + 1.1", BCP 195, RFC 8996, DOI 10.17487/RFC8996, March 2021, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8996>. + + Sheffer, Y., Saint-Andre, P., and T. Fossati, + "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer + Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security + (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 9325, DOI 10.17487/RFC9325, November + 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9325>. + + [HASH-ALG] IANA, "Named Information Hash Algorithm Registry", + <https://www.iana.org/assignments/named-information/>. + + [HTTP] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, + Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110, + DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9110>. + + [OIDC] Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and + C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating + errata set 2", December 2023, + <https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>. + + [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, + DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. + + [RFC2397] Masinter, L., "The "data" URL scheme", RFC 2397, + DOI 10.17487/RFC2397, August 1998, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2397>. + + [RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet: + Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>. + + [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform + Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, + RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>. + + [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data + Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>. + + [RFC5646] Phillips, A., Ed. and M. Davis, Ed., "Tags for Identifying + Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, DOI 10.17487/RFC5646, + September 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5646>. + + [RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", + RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>. + + [RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization + Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, + DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>. + + [RFC7468] Josefsson, S. and S. Leonard, "Textual Encodings of PKIX, + PKCS, and CMS Structures", RFC 7468, DOI 10.17487/RFC7468, + April 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7468>. + + [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web + Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May + 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>. + + [RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, + DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>. + + [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC + 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, + May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. + + [RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data + Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, + DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>. + + [RFC8705] Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Sakimura, N., and T. + Lodderstedt, "OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication + and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens", RFC 8705, + DOI 10.17487/RFC8705, February 2020, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8705>. + + [RFC9111] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, + Ed., "HTTP Caching", STD 98, RFC 9111, + DOI 10.17487/RFC9111, June 2022, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9111>. + + [RFC9421] Backman, A., Ed., Richer, J., Ed., and M. Sporny, "HTTP + Message Signatures", RFC 9421, DOI 10.17487/RFC9421, + February 2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9421>. + + [RFC9493] Backman, A., Ed., Scurtescu, M., and P. Jain, "Subject + Identifiers for Security Event Tokens", RFC 9493, + DOI 10.17487/RFC9493, December 2023, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9493>. + + [RFC9530] Polli, R. and L. Pardue, "Digest Fields", RFC 9530, + DOI 10.17487/RFC9530, February 2024, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9530>. + + [SAML2] Cantor, S., Ed., Kemp, J., Ed., Philpott, R., Ed., and E. + Maler, Ed., "Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS + Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS + Standard, March 2005, <https://docs.oasis- + open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-core-2.0-os.pdf>. + +13.2. Informative References + + [Auth-Schemes] + IANA, "HTTP Authentication Schemes", + <https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-authschemes>. + + [AXELAND2021] + Axeland, Å. and O. Oueidat, "Security Analysis of Attack + Surfaces on the Grant Negotiation and Authorization + Protocol", Master's thesis, Department of Computer Science + and Engineering, Chalmers University of Technology and + University of Gothenburg, 2021, + <https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12380/304105>. + + [GNAP-REG] IANA, "Grant Negotiation and Authorization Protocol + (GNAP)", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/gnap>. + + [GNAP-RS] Richer, J., Ed. and F. Imbault, "Grant Negotiation and + Authorization Protocol Resource Server Connections", Work + in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-gnap-resource- + servers-09, 23 September 2024, + <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-gnap- + resource-servers-09>. + + [HELMSCHMIDT2022] + Helmschmidt, F., "Security Analysis of the Grant + Negotiation and Authorization Protocol", Master's thesis, + Institute of Information Security, University of Stuggart, + DOI 10.18419/opus-12203, 2022, + <http://dx.doi.org/10.18419/opus-12203>. + + [MediaTypes] + IANA, "Media Types", + <https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types>. + + [OAUTH-SEC-TOPICS] + Lodderstedt, T., Bradley, J., Labunets, A., and D. Fett, + "OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice", Work in + Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-security- + topics-29, 3 June 2024, + <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth- + security-topics-29>. + + [promise-theory] + Bergstra, J. and M. Burgess, "Promise Theory: Principles + and Applications", Second Edition, XtAxis Press, 2019, + <http://markburgess.org/promises.html>. + + [RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail + Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046, + DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>. + + [RFC4107] Bellovin, S. and R. Housley, "Guidelines for Cryptographic + Key Management", BCP 107, RFC 4107, DOI 10.17487/RFC4107, + June 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4107>. + + [RFC6202] Loreto, S., Saint-Andre, P., Salsano, S., and G. Wilkins, + "Known Issues and Best Practices for the Use of Long + Polling and Streaming in Bidirectional HTTP", RFC 6202, + DOI 10.17487/RFC6202, April 2011, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6202>. + + [RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type + Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13, + RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>. + + [RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J., + Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy + Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, + DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>. + + [RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518, + DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>. + + [RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for + Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, + RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>. + + [RFC8264] Saint-Andre, P. and M. Blanchet, "PRECIS Framework: + Preparation, Enforcement, and Comparison of + Internationalized Strings in Application Protocols", + RFC 8264, DOI 10.17487/RFC8264, October 2017, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8264>. + + [RFC8707] Campbell, B., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Resource + Indicators for OAuth 2.0", RFC 8707, DOI 10.17487/RFC8707, + February 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8707>. + + [RFC8792] Watsen, K., Auerswald, E., Farrel, A., and Q. Wu, + "Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and + RFCs", RFC 8792, DOI 10.17487/RFC8792, June 2020, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8792>. + + [RFC9396] Lodderstedt, T., Richer, J., and B. Campbell, "OAuth 2.0 + Rich Authorization Requests", RFC 9396, + DOI 10.17487/RFC9396, May 2023, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9396>. + + [RFC9440] Campbell, B. and M. Bishop, "Client-Cert HTTP Header + Field", RFC 9440, DOI 10.17487/RFC9440, July 2023, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9440>. + + [RFC9525] Saint-Andre, P. and R. Salz, "Service Identity in TLS", + RFC 9525, DOI 10.17487/RFC9525, November 2023, + <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9525>. + + [SP80063C] Grassi, P., Richer, J., Squire, S., Fenton, J., Nadeau, + E., Lefkovitz, N., Danker, J., Choong, Y., Greene, K., and + M. Theofanos, "Digital Identity Guidelines: Federation and + Assertions", NIST SP 800-63C, DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-63c, + June 2017, + <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/ + NIST.SP.800-63c.pdf>. + + [Subj-ID-Formats] + IANA, "Subject Identifier Formats", + <https://www.iana.org/assignments/secevent>. + +Appendix A. Comparison with OAuth 2.0 + + GNAP's protocol design differs from OAuth 2.0's in several + fundamental ways: + + 1. *Consent and authorization flexibility:* + + OAuth 2.0 generally assumes the user has access to a web browser. + The type of interaction available is fixed by the grant type, and + the most common interactive grant types start in the browser. + OAuth 2.0 assumes that the user using the client software is the + same user that will interact with the AS to approve access. + + GNAP allows various patterns to manage authorizations and + consents required to fulfill this requested delegation, including + information sent by the client instance, information supplied by + external parties, and information gathered through the + interaction process. GNAP allows a client instance to list + different ways that it can start and finish an interaction, and + these can be mixed together as needed for different use cases. + GNAP interactions can use a browser, but they don't have to. + Methods can use inter-application messaging protocols, out-of- + band data transfer, or anything else. GNAP allows extensions to + define new ways to start and finish an interaction, as new + methods and platforms are expected to become available over time. + GNAP is designed to allow the end user and the RO to be two + different people, but it still works in the optimized case of + them being the same party. + + 2. *Intent registration and inline negotiation:* + + OAuth 2.0 uses different "grant types" that start at different + endpoints for different purposes. Many of these require + discovery of several interrelated parameters. + + GNAP requests all start with the same type of request to the same + endpoint at the AS. Next steps are negotiated between the client + instance and AS based on software capabilities, policies + surrounding requested access, and the overall context of the + ongoing request. GNAP defines a continuation API that allows the + client instance and AS to request and send additional information + from each other over multiple steps. This continuation API uses + the same access token protection that other GNAP-protected APIs + use. GNAP allows discovery to optimize the requests, but it + isn't required thanks to the negotiation capabilities. + + GNAP is able to handle the life cycle of an authorization request + and therefore simplifies the mental model surrounding OAuth2. + For instance, there's no need for refresh tokens when the API + enables proper rotation of access tokens. + + 3. *Client instances:* + + OAuth 2.0 requires all clients to be registered at the AS and to + use a client_id known to the AS as part of the protocol. This + client_id is generally assumed to be assigned by a trusted + authority during a registration process, and OAuth places a lot + of trust on the client_id as a result. Dynamic registration + allows different classes of clients to get a client_id at + runtime, even if they only ever use it for one request. + + GNAP allows the client instance to present an unknown key to the + AS and use that key to protect the ongoing request. GNAP's + client instance identifier mechanism allows for pre-registered + clients and dynamically registered clients to exist as an + optimized case without requiring the identifier as part of the + protocol at all times. + + 4. *Expanded delegation:* + + OAuth 2.0 defines the "scope" parameter for controlling access to + APIs. This parameter has been coopted to mean a number of + different things in different protocols, including flags for + turning special behavior on and off and the return of data apart + from the access token. The "resource" indicator (defined in + [RFC8707]) and Rich Authorization Request (RAR) extensions (as + defined in [RFC9396]) expand on the "scope" concept in similar + but different ways. + + GNAP defines a rich structure for requesting access (analogous to + RAR), with string references as an optimization (analogous to + scopes). GNAP defines methods for requesting directly returned + user information, separate from API access. This information + includes identifiers for the current user and structured + assertions. GNAP makes no assumptions or demands on the format + or contents of the access token, but the RS extension allows a + negotiation of token formats between the AS and RS. + + 5. *Cryptography-based security:* + + OAuth 2.0 uses shared bearer secrets, including the client_secret + and access token, and advanced authentication and sender + constraints have been built on after the fact in inconsistent + ways. + + In GNAP, all communication between the client instance and AS is + bound to a key held by the client instance. GNAP uses the same + cryptographic mechanisms for both authenticating the client (to + the AS) and binding the access token (to the RS and the AS). + GNAP allows extensions to define new cryptographic protection + mechanisms, as new methods are expected to become available over + time. GNAP does not have the notion of "public clients" because + key information can always be sent and used dynamically. + + 6. *Privacy and usable security:* + + OAuth 2.0's deployment model assumes a strong binding between the + AS and the RS. + + GNAP is designed to be interoperable with decentralized identity + standards and to provide a human-centric authorization layer. In + addition to this specification, GNAP supports various patterns of + communication between RSs and ASes through extensions. GNAP + tries to limit the odds of a consolidation to just a handful of + popular AS services. + +Appendix B. Example Protocol Flows + + The protocol defined in this specification provides a number of + features that can be combined to solve many different kinds of + authentication scenarios. This section seeks to show examples of how + the protocol could be applied for different situations. + + Some longer fields, particularly cryptographic information, have been + truncated for display purposes in these examples. + +B.1. Redirect-Based User Interaction + + In this scenario, the user is the RO and has access to a web browser, + and the client instance can take front-channel callbacks on the same + device as the user. This combination is analogous to the OAuth 2.0 + Authorization Code grant type. + + The client instance initiates the request to the AS. Here, the + client instance identifies itself using its public key. + + POST /tx HTTP/1.1 + Host: server.example.com + Content-Type: application/json + Signature-Input: sig1=... + Signature: sig1=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... + + { + "access_token": { + "access": [ + { + "actions": [ + "read", + "write", + "dolphin" + ], + "locations": [ + "https://server.example.net/", + "https://resource.local/other" + ], + "datatypes": [ + "metadata", + "images" + ] + } + ], + }, + "client": { + "key": { + "proof": "httpsig", + "jwk": { + "kty": "RSA", + "e": "AQAB", + "kid": "xyz-1", + "alg": "RS256", + "n": "kOB5rR4Jv0GMeLaY6_It_r3ORwdf8ci_JtffXyaSx8..." + } + } + }, + "interact": { + "start": ["redirect"], + "finish": { + "method": "redirect", + "uri": "https://client.example.net/return/123455", + "nonce": "LKLTI25DK82FX4T4QFZC" + } + } + } + + The AS processes the request and determines that the RO needs to + interact. The AS returns the following response that gives the + client instance the information it needs to connect. The AS has also + indicated to the client instance that it can use the given instance + identifier to identify itself in future requests (Section 2.3.1). + + HTTP/1.1 200 OK + Content-Type: application/json + Cache-Control: no-store + + { + "interact": { + "redirect": + "https://server.example.com/interact/4CF492MLVMSW9MKM", + "finish": "MBDOFXG4Y5CVJCX821LH" + } + "continue": { + "access_token": { + "value": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU" + }, + "uri": "https://server.example.com/continue" + }, + "instance_id": "7C7C4AZ9KHRS6X63AJAO" + } + + The client instance saves the response and redirects the user to the + interaction start mode's "redirect" URI by sending the following HTTP + message to the user's browser. + + HTTP 303 Found + Location: https://server.example.com/interact/4CF492MLVMSW9MKM + + The user's browser fetches the AS's interaction URI. The user logs + in, is identified as the RO for the resource being requested, and + approves the request. Since the AS has a callback parameter that was + sent in the initial request's interaction finish method, the AS + generates the interaction reference, calculates the hash, and + redirects the user back to the client instance with these additional + values added as query parameters. + + NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 + + HTTP 302 Found + Location: https://client.example.net/return/123455\ + ?hash=x-gguKWTj8rQf7d7i3w3UhzvuJ5bpOlKyAlVpLxBffY\ + &interact_ref=4IFWWIKYBC2PQ6U56NL1 + + The client instance receives this request from the user's browser. + The client instance ensures that this is the same user that was sent + out by validating session information and retrieves the stored + pending request. The client instance uses the values in this to + validate the hash parameter. The client instance then calls the + continuation URI using the associated continuation access token and + presents the interaction reference in the request content. The + client instance signs the request as above. + + POST /continue HTTP/1.1 + Host: server.example.com + Content-Type: application/json + Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU + Signature-Input: sig1=... + Signature: sig1=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... + + { + "interact_ref": "4IFWWIKYBC2PQ6U56NL1" + } + + The AS retrieves the pending request by looking up the pending grant + request associated with the presented continuation access token. + Seeing that the grant is approved, the AS issues an access token and + returns this to the client instance. + + NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 + + HTTP/1.1 200 OK + Content-Type: application/json + Cache-Control: no-store + + { + "access_token": { + "value": "OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0", + "manage": "https://server.example.com/token/PRY5NM33O\ + M4TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1L", + "access": [{ + "actions": [ + "read", + "write", + "dolphin" + ], + "locations": [ + "https://server.example.net/", + "https://resource.local/other" + ], + "datatypes": [ + "metadata", + "images" + ] + }] + }, + "continue": { + "access_token": { + "value": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU" + }, + "uri": "https://server.example.com/continue" + } + } + +B.2. Secondary Device Interaction + + In this scenario, the user does not have access to a web browser on + the device and must use a secondary device to interact with the AS. + The client instance can display a user code or a printable QR code. + The client instance is not able to accept callbacks from the AS and + needs to poll for updates while waiting for the user to authorize the + request. + + The client instance initiates the request to the AS. + + POST /tx HTTP/1.1 + Host: server.example.com + Content-Type: application/json + Signature-Input: sig1=... + Signature: sig1=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... + + { + "access_token": { + "access": [ + "dolphin-metadata", "some other thing" + ], + }, + "client": "7C7C4AZ9KHRS6X63AJAO", + "interact": { + "start": ["redirect", "user_code"] + } + } + + The AS processes this and determines that the RO needs to interact. + The AS supports both redirect URIs and user codes for interaction, so + it includes both. Since there is no interaction finish mode, the AS + does not include a nonce but does include a "wait" parameter on the + continuation section because it expects the client instance to poll + for results. + + HTTP/1.1 200 OK + Content-Type: application/json + Cache-Control: no-store + + { + "interact": { + "redirect": "https://srv.ex/MXKHQ", + "user_code": { + "code": "A1BC3DFF" + } + }, + "continue": { + "access_token": { + "value": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU" + }, + "uri": "https://server.example.com/continue/VGJKPTKC50", + "wait": 60 + } + } + + The client instance saves the response and displays the user code + visually on its screen along with the static device URI. The client + instance also displays the short interaction URI as a QR code to be + scanned. + + If the user scans the code, they are taken to the interaction + endpoint, and the AS looks up the current pending request based on + the incoming URI. If the user instead goes to the static page and + enters the code manually, the AS looks up the current pending request + based on the value of the user code. In both cases, the user logs + in, is identified as the RO for the resource being requested, and + approves the request. Once the request has been approved, the AS + displays to the user a message to return to their device. + + Meanwhile, the client instance polls the AS every 60 seconds at the + continuation URI. The client instance signs the request using the + same key and method that it did in the first request. + + POST /continue/VGJKPTKC50 HTTP/1.1 + Host: server.example.com + Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU + Signature-Input: sig1=... + Signature: sig1=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... + + The AS retrieves the pending request based on the pending grant + request associated with the continuation access token and determines + that it has not yet been authorized. The AS indicates to the client + instance that no access token has yet been issued but it can continue + to call after another 60-second timeout. + + HTTP/1.1 200 OK + Content-Type: application/json + Cache-Control: no-store + + { + "continue": { + "access_token": { + "value": "G7YQT4KQQ5TZY9SLSS5E" + }, + "uri": "https://server.example.com/continue/ATWHO4Q1WV", + "wait": 60 + } + } + + Note that the continuation URI and access token have been rotated + since they were used by the client instance to make this call. The + client instance polls the continuation URI after a 60-second timeout + using this new information. + + POST /continue/ATWHO4Q1WV HTTP/1.1 + Host: server.example.com + Authorization: GNAP G7YQT4KQQ5TZY9SLSS5E + Signature-Input: sig1=... + Signature: sig1=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... + + The AS retrieves the pending request based on the URI and access + token, determines that it has been approved, and issues an access + token for the client to use at the RS. + + NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 + + HTTP/1.1 200 OK + Content-Type: application/json + Cache-Control: no-store + + { + "access_token": { + "value": "OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0", + "manage": "https://server.example.com/token/PRY5NM33O\ + M4TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1L", + "access": [ + "dolphin-metadata", "some other thing" + ] + } + } + +B.3. No User Involvement + + In this scenario, the client instance is requesting access on its own + behalf, with no user to interact with. + + The client instance creates a request to the AS, identifying itself + with its public key and using MTLS to make the request. + + POST /tx HTTP/1.1 + Host: server.example.com + Content-Type: application/json + + { + "access_token": { + "access": [ + "backend service", "nightly-routine-3" + ], + }, + "client": { + "key": { + "proof": "mtls", + "cert#S256": "bwcK0esc3ACC3DB2Y5_lESsXE8o9ltc05O89jdN-dg2" + } + } + } + + The AS processes this, determines that the client instance can ask + for the requested resources, and issues an access token. + + HTTP/1.1 200 OK + Content-Type: application/json + Cache-Control: no-store + + { + "access_token": { + "value": "OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0", + "manage": "https://server.example.com/token", + "access": [ + "backend service", "nightly-routine-3" + ] + } + } + +B.4. Asynchronous Authorization + + In this scenario, the client instance is requesting on behalf of a + specific RO but has no way to interact with the user. The AS can + asynchronously reach out to the RO for approval in this scenario. + + The client instance starts the request at the AS by requesting a set + of resources. The client instance also identifies a particular user. + + POST /tx HTTP/1.1 + Host: server.example.com + Content-Type: application/json + Signature-Input: sig1=... + Signature: sig1=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... + + { + "access_token": { + "access": [ + { + "type": "photo-api", + "actions": [ + "read", + "write", + "dolphin" + ], + "locations": [ + "https://server.example.net/", + "https://resource.local/other" + ], + "datatypes": [ + "metadata", + "images" + ] + }, + "read", "dolphin-metadata", + { + "type": "financial-transaction", + "actions": [ + "withdraw" + ], + "identifier": "account-14-32-32-3", + "currency": "USD" + }, + "some other thing" + ], + }, + "client": "7C7C4AZ9KHRS6X63AJAO", + "user": { + "sub_ids": [ { + "format": "opaque", + "id": "J2G8G8O4AZ" + } ] + } + } + + The AS processes this and determines that the RO needs to interact. + The AS determines that it can reach the identified user + asynchronously and that the identified user does have the ability to + approve this request. The AS indicates to the client instance that + it can poll for continuation. + + HTTP/1.1 200 OK + Content-Type: application/json + Cache-Control: no-store + + { + "continue": { + "access_token": { + "value": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU" + }, + "uri": "https://server.example.com/continue", + "wait": 60 + } + } + + The AS reaches out to the RO and prompts them for consent. In this + example scenario, the AS has an application that it can push + notifications to for the specified account. + + Meanwhile, the client instance periodically polls the AS every 60 + seconds at the continuation URI. + + POST /continue HTTP/1.1 + Host: server.example.com + Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU + Signature-Input: sig1=... + Signature: sig1=... + + The AS retrieves the pending request based on the continuation access + token and determines that it has not yet been authorized. The AS + indicates to the client instance that no access token has yet been + issued but it can continue to call after another 60-second timeout. + + HTTP/1.1 200 OK + Content-Type: application/json + Cache-Control: no-store + + { + "continue": { + "access_token": { + "value": "BI9QNW6V9W3XFJK4R02D" + }, + "uri": "https://server.example.com/continue", + "wait": 60 + } + } + + Note that the continuation access token value has been rotated since + it was used by the client instance to make this call. The client + instance polls the continuation URI after a 60-second timeout using + the new token. + + POST /continue HTTP/1.1 + Host: server.example.com + Authorization: GNAP BI9QNW6V9W3XFJK4R02D + Signature-Input: sig1=... + Signature: sig1=... + + The AS retrieves the pending request based on the handle, determines + that it has been approved, and issues an access token. + + NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 + + HTTP/1.1 200 OK + Content-Type: application/json + Cache-Control: no-store + + { + "access_token": { + "value": "OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0", + "manage": "https://server.example.com/token/PRY5NM33O\ + M4TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1L", + "access": [ + "dolphin-metadata", "some other thing" + ] + } + } + +B.5. Applying OAuth 2.0 Scopes and Client IDs + + While GNAP is not designed to be directly compatible with OAuth 2.0 + [RFC6749], considerations have been made to enable the use of OAuth + 2.0 concepts and constructs more smoothly within GNAP. + + In this scenario, the client developer has a client_id and set of + scope values from their OAuth 2.0 system and wants to apply them to + the new protocol. In OAuth 2.0, the client developer would put their + client_id and scope values as parameters into a redirect request to + the authorization endpoint. + + NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 + + HTTP 302 Found + Location: https://server.example.com/authorize\ + ?client_id=7C7C4AZ9KHRS6X63AJAO\ + &scope=read%20write%20dolphin\ + &redirect_uri=https://client.example.net/return\ + &response_type=code\ + &state=123455 + + Now the developer wants to make an analogous request to the AS using + GNAP. To do so, the client instance makes an HTTP POST and places + the OAuth 2.0 values in the appropriate places. + + POST /tx HTTP/1.1 + Host: server.example.com + Content-Type: application/json + Signature-Input: sig1=... + Signature: sig1=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... + + { + "access_token": { + "access": [ + "read", "write", "dolphin" + ], + "flags": [ "bearer" ] + }, + "client": "7C7C4AZ9KHRS6X63AJAO", + "interact": { + "start": ["redirect"], + "finish": { + "method": "redirect", + "uri": "https://client.example.net/return?state=123455", + "nonce": "LKLTI25DK82FX4T4QFZC" + } + } + } + + The client_id can be used to identify the client instance's keys that + it uses for authentication, the scopes represent resources that the + client instance is requesting, and the redirect_uri and state value + are pre-combined into a finish URI that can be unique per request. + The client instance additionally creates a nonce to protect the + callback, separate from the state parameter that it has added to its + return URI. + + From here, the protocol continues as above. + +Appendix C. Interoperability Profiles + + The GNAP specification has many different modes, options, and + mechanisms, allowing it to solve a wide variety of problems in a wide + variety of deployments. The wide applicability of GNAP makes it + difficult, if not impossible, to define a set of mandatory-to- + implement features, since one environment's required feature would be + impossible to do in another environment. While this is a large + problem in many systems, GNAP's back-and-forth negotiation process + allows parties to declare at runtime everything that they support and + then have the other party select from that the subset of items that + they also support, leading to functional compatibility in many parts + of the protocol even in an open world scenario. + + In addition, GNAP defines a set of interoperability profiles that + gather together core requirements to fix options into common + configurations that are likely to be useful to large populations of + similar applications. + + Conformant AS implementations of these profiles MUST implement at + least the features as specified in the profile and MAY implement + additional features or profiles. Conformant client implementations + of these profiles MUST implement at least the features as specified, + except where a subset of the features allows the protocol to function + (such as using polling instead of a push finish method for the + Secondary Device profile). + +C.1. Web-Based Redirection + + Implementations conformant to the web-based redirection profile of + GNAP MUST implement all of the following features: + + * Interaction Start Methods: redirect + + * Interaction Finish Methods: redirect + + * Interaction Hash Algorithms: sha-256 + + * Key Proofing Methods: httpsig with no additional parameters + + * Key Formats: jwks with signature algorithm included in the key's + alg parameter + + * JOSE Signature Algorithm: PS256 + + * Subject Identifier Formats: opaque + + * Assertion Formats: id_token + +C.2. Secondary Device + + Implementations conformant to the Secondary Device profile of GNAP + MUST implement all of the following features: + + * Interaction Start Methods: user_code and user_code_uri + + * Interaction Finish Methods: push + + * Interaction Hash Algorithms: sha-256 + + * Key Proofing Methods: httpsig with no additional parameters + + * Key Formats: jwks with signature algorithm included in the key's + alg parameter + + * JOSE Signature Algorithm: PS256 + + * Subject Identifier Formats: opaque + + * Assertion Formats: id_token + +Appendix D. Guidance for Extensions + + Extensions to this specification have a variety of places to alter + the protocol, including many fields and objects that can have + additional values in a registry (Section 10) established by this + specification. For interoperability and to preserve the security of + the protocol, extensions should register new values with IANA by + following the specified mechanism. While it may technically be + possible to extend the protocol by adding elements to JSON objects + that are not governed by an IANA registry, a recipient may ignore + such values but is also allowed to reject them. + + Most object fields in GNAP are specified with types, and those types + can allow different but related behavior. For example, the access + array can include either strings or objects, as discussed in + Section 8. The use of JSON polymorphism (Appendix E) within GNAP + allows extensions to define new fields by not only choosing a new + name but also by using an existing name with a new type. However, + the extension's definition of a new type for a field needs to fit the + same kind of item being extended. For example, a hypothetical + extension could define a string value for the access_token request + field, with a URL to download a hosted access token request. Such an + extension would be appropriate as the access_token field still + defines the access tokens being requested. However, if an extension + were to define a string value for the access_token request field, + with the value instead being something unrelated to the access token + request such as a value or key format, this would not be an + appropriate means of extension. (Note that this specific extension + example would create another form of SSRF attack surface as discussed + in Section 11.34.) + + As another example, both interaction start modes (Section 2.5.1) and + key proofing methods (Section 7.3) can be defined as either strings + or objects. An extension could take a method defined as a string, + such as app, and define an object-based version with additional + parameters. This extension should still define a method to launch an + application on the end user's device, just like app does when + specified as a string. + + Additionally, the ability to deal with different types for a field is + not expected to be equal between an AS and client software, with the + client software being assumed to be both more varied and more + simplified than the AS. Furthermore, the nature of the negotiation + process in GNAP allows the AS more chance of recovery from unknown + situations and parameters. As such, any extensions that change the + type of any field returned to a client instance should only do so + when the client instance has indicated specific support for that + extension through some kind of request parameter. + +Appendix E. JSON Structures and Polymorphism + + GNAP makes use of polymorphism within the JSON [RFC8259] structures + used for the protocol. Each portion of this protocol is defined in + terms of the JSON data type that its values can take, whether it's a + string, object, array, boolean, or number. For some fields, + different data types offer different descriptive capabilities and are + used in different situations for the same field. Each data type + provides a different syntax to express the same underlying semantic + protocol element, which allows for optimization and simplification in + many common cases. + + Even though JSON is often used to describe strongly typed structures, + JSON on its own is naturally polymorphic. In JSON, the named members + of an object have no type associated with them, and any data type can + be used as the value for any member. In practice, each member has a + semantic type that needs to make sense to the parties creating and + consuming the object. Within this protocol, each object member is + defined in terms of its semantic content, and this semantic content + might have expressions in different concrete data types for different + specific purposes. Since each object member has exactly one value in + JSON, each data type for an object member field is naturally mutually + exclusive with other data types within a single JSON object. + + For example, a resource request for a single access token is composed + of an object of resource request descriptions, while a request for + multiple access tokens is composed of an array whose member values + are all objects. Both of these represent requests for access, but + the difference in syntax allows the client instance and AS to + differentiate between the two request types in the same request. + + Another form of polymorphism in JSON comes from the fact that the + values within JSON arrays need not all be of the same JSON data type. + However, within this protocol, each element within the array needs to + be of the same kind of semantic element for the collection to make + sense, even when the data types are different from each other. + + For example, each aspect of a resource request can be described using + an object with multiple dimensional components, or the aspect can be + requested using a string. In both cases, the resource request is + being described in a way that the AS needs to interpret, but with + different levels of specificity and complexity for the client + instance to deal with. An API designer can provide a set of common + access scopes as simple strings but still allow client software + developers to specify custom access when needed for more complex + APIs. + + Extensions to this specification can use different data types for + defined fields, but each extension needs to not only declare what the + data type means but also provide justification for the data type + representing the same basic kind of thing it extends. For example, + an extension declaring an "array" representation for a field would + need to explain how the array represents something akin to the non- + array element that it is replacing. See additional discussion in + Appendix D. + +Acknowledgements + + The authors would like to thank the following individuals for their + reviews, implementations, and contributions: Åke Axeland, Aaron + Parecki, Adam Omar Oueidat, Andrii Deinega, Annabelle Backman, Dick + Hardt, Dmitri Zagidulin, Dmitry Barinov, Florian Helmschmidt, Francis + Pouatcha, George Fletcher, Haardik Haardik, Hamid Massaoud, Jacky + Yuan, Joseph Heenan, Kathleen Moriarty, Leif Johansson, Mike Jones, + Mike Varley, Nat Sakimura, Takahiko Kawasaki, Takahiro Tsuchiya, and + Yaron Sheffer. + + The authors would also like to thank the GNAP Working Group design + team (Kathleen Moriarty, Dick Hardt, Mike Jones, and the authors), + who incorporated elements from the XAuth and XYZ proposals to create + the first draft version of this document. + + In addition, the authors would like to thank Aaron Parecki and Mike + Jones for insights into how to integrate identity and authentication + systems into the core protocol. Both Justin Richer and Dick Hardt + developed the use cases, diagrams, and insights provided in the XYZ + and XAuth proposals that have been incorporated here. The authors + would like to especially thank Mike Varley and the team at SecureKey + for feedback and development of early versions of the XYZ protocol + that fed into this standards work. + + Finally, the authors want to acknowledge the immense contributions of + Aaron Parecki to the content of this document. We thank him for his + insight, input, and hard work, without which GNAP would not have + grown to what it is. + +Authors' Addresses + + Justin Richer (editor) + Bespoke Engineering + Email: ietf@justin.richer.org + URI: https://bspk.io/ + + + Fabien Imbault + acert.io + Email: fabien.imbault@acert.io + URI: https://acert.io/ |