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+
+Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) H. Sharma, Ed.
+Request for Comments: 9654 Netskope Inc
+Obsoletes: 8954 August 2024
+Updates: 6960
+Category: Standards Track
+ISSN: 2070-1721
+
+
+ Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Nonce Extension
+
+Abstract
+
+ RFC 8954 imposed size constraints on the optional Nonce extension for
+ the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). OCSP is used to check
+ the status of a certificate, and the Nonce extension is used to
+ cryptographically bind an OCSP response message to a particular OCSP
+ request message.
+
+ Some environments use cryptographic algorithms that generate a Nonce
+ value that is longer than 32 octets. This document also modifies the
+ "Nonce" section of RFC 6960 to clearly define and differentiate the
+ encoding format and values for easier implementation and
+ understanding. This document obsoletes RFC 8954, which includes
+ updated ASN.1 modules for OCSP, and updates RFC 6960.
+
+Status of This Memo
+
+ This is an Internet Standards Track document.
+
+ This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
+ (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
+ received public review and has been approved for publication by the
+ Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
+ Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
+
+ Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
+ and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
+ https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9654.
+
+Copyright Notice
+
+ Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
+ document authors. All rights reserved.
+
+ This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
+ Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
+ (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
+ publication of this document. Please review these documents
+ carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
+ to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
+ include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
+ Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
+ in the Revised BSD License.
+
+Table of Contents
+
+ 1. Introduction
+ 1.1. Requirements Language
+ 2. OCSP Extensions
+ 2.1. Nonce Extension
+ 3. Security Considerations
+ 3.1. Replay Attack
+ 4. IANA Considerations
+ 5. References
+ 5.1. Normative References
+ 5.2. Informative References
+ Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules
+ A.1. OCSP in ASN.1 - 1998 Syntax
+ A.2. OCSP in ASN.1 - 2008 Syntax
+ Acknowledgements
+ Author's Address
+
+1. Introduction
+
+ The Nonce extension was previously defined in Section 4.4.1 of
+ [RFC6960]. The Nonce cryptographically binds an OCSP request and a
+ response. It guarantees the freshness of an OCSP response and avoids
+ replay attacks. This extension was updated in [RFC8954]. [RFC8954]
+ limits the maximum Nonce length to 32 octets. To support
+ cryptographic algorithms that generate a Nonce that is longer than 32
+ octets, this document updates the maximum allowed size of the Nonce
+ to 128 octets. In addition, this document recommends that the OCSP
+ requester and responder use a Nonce with a minimum length of 32
+ octets.
+
+1.1. Requirements Language
+
+ The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
+ "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
+ "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
+ BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
+ capitals, as shown here.
+
+2. OCSP Extensions
+
+ The message formats for OCSP requests and responses are defined in
+ [RFC6960] and the Nonce extension was updated in [RFC8954].
+ [RFC6960] also defines the standard extensions for OCSP messages
+ based on the extension model employed in X.509 version 3 certificates
+ (see [RFC5280]). [RFC8954] replaces Section 4.4.1 of [RFC6960] to
+ limit the minimum and maximum length for the Nonce value. This
+ document extends the maximum allowed nonce length to 128 octets and
+ does not change the specifications of any of the other extensions
+ defined in [RFC6960].
+
+2.1. Nonce Extension
+
+ The Nonce cryptographically binds a request and a response to prevent
+ replay attacks. The Nonce is included as one of the
+ requestExtensions in requests; in responses, it is included as one of
+ the responseExtensions. In both the request and the response, the
+ Nonce is identified by the object identifier id-pkix-ocsp-nonce,
+ while the extnValue is the encoded value of Nonce. If the Nonce
+ extension is present, then the length of the Nonce MUST be at least 1
+ octet and can be up to 128 octets. Implementations compliant with
+ [RFC8954] will not be able to process nonces generated per the new
+ specification with sizes in excess of the limit (32 octets) specified
+ in [RFC8954].
+
+ An OCSP requester that implements the extension in this document MUST
+ use a minimum length of 32 octets for Nonce in the Nonce extension.
+
+ An OCSP responder that supports the Nonce extension MUST accept Nonce
+ lengths of at least 16 octets and up to and including 32 octets. A
+ responder MAY choose to respond without the Nonce extension for
+ requests in which the length of the Nonce is in between 1 octet and
+ 15 octets or 33 octets and 128 octets.
+
+ Responders that implement the extension in this document MUST reject
+ any OCSP request that has a Nonce with a length of either 0 octets or
+ greater than 128 octets, with the malformedRequest OCSPResponseStatus
+ as described in Section 4.2.1 of [RFC6960].
+
+ The value of the Nonce MUST be generated using a cryptographically
+ strong pseudorandom number generator (see [RFC4086]). The minimum
+ Nonce length of 1 octet is defined to provide backward compatibility
+ with older OCSP requesters that follow [RFC6960].
+
+ id-pkix-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad-ocsp }
+ id-pkix-ocsp-nonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
+ Nonce ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..128))
+
+ The following is an example of an encoded OCSP Nonce extension with a
+ 32-octet Nonce in hexadecimal format.
+
+ 30 2f 06 09 2b 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 02 04 22 04
+ 20 dd 49 d4 07 2c 44 9d a1 c3 17 bd 1c 1b df fe
+ db e1 50 31 2e c4 cd 0a dd 18 e5 bd 6f 84 bf 14
+ c8
+
+ Here is the decoded version of the above example. Offset, Length,
+ and Object Identifier are in decimal.
+
+
+ Offset Length
+ 0 47 : SEQUENCE {
+ 2 9 : OBJECT IDENTIFIER ocspNonce
+ : (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 2)
+ 13 34 : OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
+ 15 32 : OCTET STRING
+ : DD 49 D4 07 2C 44 9D A1 C3 17 BD 1C 1B DF FE DB
+ : E1 50 31 2E C4 CD 0A DD 18 E5 BD 6F 84 BF 14 C8
+ : }
+ : }
+
+3. Security Considerations
+
+ The security considerations of OCSP, in general, are described in
+ [RFC6960]. During the interval in which the previous OCSP response
+ for a certificate is not expired but the responder has a changed
+ status for that certificate, a copy of that OCSP response can be used
+ to indicate that the status of the certificate is still valid.
+ Including a requester's nonce value in the OCSP response ensures that
+ the response is the most recent response from the server and not an
+ old copy.
+
+3.1. Replay Attack
+
+ The Nonce extension is used to avoid replay attacks. Since the OCSP
+ responder may choose not to send the Nonce extension in the OCSP
+ response even if the requester has sent the Nonce extension in the
+ request [RFC5019], an on-path attacker can intercept the OCSP request
+ and respond with an earlier response from the server without the
+ Nonce extension. This can be mitigated by configuring the server to
+ use a short time interval between the thisUpdate and nextUpdate
+ fields in the OCSP response.
+
+4. IANA Considerations
+
+ For the ASN.1 modules in Appendixes A.1 and A.2, IANA has assigned
+ the following object identifiers (OIDs) in the "SMI Security for PKIX
+ Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0):
+
+ +=======+=====================+
+ | Value | Description |
+ +=======+=====================+
+ | 111 | id-mod-ocsp-2024-88 |
+ +-------+---------------------+
+ | 112 | id-mod-ocsp-2024-08 |
+ +-------+---------------------+
+
+ Table 1
+
+5. References
+
+5.1. Normative References
+
+ [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
+ Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
+
+ [RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
+ "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
+
+ [RFC5019] Deacon, A. and R. Hurst, "The Lightweight Online
+ Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Profile for High-Volume
+ Environments", RFC 5019, DOI 10.17487/RFC5019, September
+ 2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5019>.
+
+ [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
+ Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
+ Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
+ (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
+
+ [RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
+ Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
+ Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
+ RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.
+
+ [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
+ 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
+ May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
+
+ [RFC8954] Sahni, M., Ed., "Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
+ Nonce Extension", RFC 8954, DOI 10.17487/RFC8954, November
+ 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8954>.
+
+5.2. Informative References
+
+ [Err5891] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5891, RFC 6960,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5891>.
+
+ [RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
+ Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
+
+Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules
+
+ This section includes the ASN.1 modules for OCSP and replaces the
+ entirety of Section 5 of [RFC8954]. It addresses Errata ID 5891
+ [Err5891] as well.
+
+ Appendix A.1 includes an ASN.1 module that conforms to the 1998
+ version of ASN.1 for all syntax elements of OCSP. This module
+ replaces the module in Appendix B.1 of [RFC6960].
+
+ Appendix A.2 includes an ASN.1 module, corresponding to the module
+ present in Appendix A.1, that conforms to the 2008 version of ASN.1.
+ This module replaces the modules in Section 4 of [RFC5912] and
+ Appendix B.2 of [RFC6960]. Although a 2008 ASN.1 module is provided,
+ the module in Appendix A.1 remains the normative module per the
+ policy of the PKIX Working Group.
+
+A.1. OCSP in ASN.1 - 1998 Syntax
+
+ <CODE BEGINS>
+ OCSP-2024-88
+ { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
+ security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
+ id-mod-ocsp-2024-88(111) }
+
+ DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
+ BEGIN
+
+ IMPORTS
+ AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax, CRLReason, GeneralName
+ FROM PKIX1Implicit88 -- From [RFC5280]
+ { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
+ internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
+ id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit(19) }
+
+ Name, CertificateSerialNumber, Extensions,
+ id-kp, id-ad-ocsp, Certificate, AlgorithmIdentifier
+ FROM PKIX1Explicit88 -- From [RFC5280]
+ { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
+ internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
+ id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(18) } ;
+
+ OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
+ tbsRequest TBSRequest,
+ optionalSignature [0] EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL }
+
+ TBSRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
+ version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
+ requestorName [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL,
+ requestList SEQUENCE OF Request,
+ requestExtensions [2] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
+
+ Signature ::= SEQUENCE {
+ signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
+ signature BIT STRING,
+ certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF
+ Certificate OPTIONAL }
+
+ Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) }
+
+ Nonce ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..128))
+
+ Request ::= SEQUENCE {
+ reqCert CertID,
+ singleRequestExtensions [0] EXPLICIT
+ Extensions OPTIONAL }
+
+ CertID ::= SEQUENCE {
+ hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
+ issuerNameHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's DN
+ issuerKeyHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's public key
+ serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber }
+
+ OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
+ responseStatus OCSPResponseStatus,
+ responseBytes [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }
+
+ OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED {
+ successful (0), -- Response has valid confirmations
+ malformedRequest (1), -- Illegal confirmation request
+ internalError (2), -- Internal error in issuer
+ tryLater (3), -- Try again later
+ -- (4) is not used
+ sigRequired (5), -- Must sign the request
+ unauthorized (6) -- Request unauthorized
+ }
+
+ ResponseBytes ::= SEQUENCE {
+ responseType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+ response OCTET STRING }
+
+ BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
+ tbsResponseData ResponseData,
+ signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
+ signature BIT STRING,
+ certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF
+ Certificate OPTIONAL }
+
+ ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE {
+ version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
+ responderID ResponderID,
+ producedAt GeneralizedTime,
+ -- The format for GeneralizedTime is
+ -- as specified in Section 4.1.2.5.2
+ -- [RFC5280]
+ responses SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,
+ responseExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
+
+ ResponderID ::= CHOICE {
+ byName [1] Name,
+ byKey [2] KeyHash }
+
+ KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING
+ -- SHA-1 hash of responder's public key (i.e., the
+ -- SHA-1 hash of the value of the BIT STRING
+ -- subjectPublicKey [excluding the tag, length, and
+ -- number of unused bits] in the responder's
+ -- certificate)
+
+ SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
+ certID CertID,
+ certStatus CertStatus,
+ thisUpdate GeneralizedTime,
+ nextUpdate [0] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
+ singleExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
+
+ CertStatus ::= CHOICE {
+ good [0] IMPLICIT NULL,
+ revoked [1] IMPLICIT RevokedInfo,
+ unknown [2] IMPLICIT UnknownInfo }
+
+ RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ revocationTime GeneralizedTime,
+ revocationReason [0] EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL }
+
+ UnknownInfo ::= NULL
+
+ ArchiveCutoff ::= GeneralizedTime
+
+ AcceptableResponses ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+
+ ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE {
+ issuer Name,
+ locator AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax }
+
+ CrlID ::= SEQUENCE {
+ crlUrl [0] EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL,
+ crlNum [1] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ crlTime [2] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }
+
+ PreferredSignatureAlgorithms ::= SEQUENCE OF
+ PreferredSignatureAlgorithm
+
+ PreferredSignatureAlgorithm ::= SEQUENCE {
+ sigIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier,
+ certIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL }
+
+
+ -- Object Identifiers
+
+ id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 }
+ id-pkix-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad-ocsp }
+ id-pkix-ocsp-basic OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 1 }
+ id-pkix-ocsp-nonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
+ id-pkix-ocsp-crl OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 3 }
+ id-pkix-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 4 }
+ id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 5 }
+ id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 6 }
+ id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 7 }
+ id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 8 }
+ id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 9 }
+
+ END
+ <CODE ENDS>
+
+A.2. OCSP in ASN.1 - 2008 Syntax
+
+ <CODE BEGINS>
+ OCSP-2024-08
+ { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
+ security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
+ id-mod-ocsp-2024-08(112) }
+
+ DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
+ BEGIN
+
+ IMPORTS
+ Extensions{}, EXTENSION
+ FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
+ { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
+ internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
+ id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) }
+
+ AlgorithmIdentifier{}, DIGEST-ALGORITHM,
+ SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, PUBLIC-KEY
+ FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
+ { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
+ internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
+ id-mod(0) id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }
+
+ AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax, GeneralName,
+ CrlEntryExtensions, CRLReason
+ FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
+ { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
+ internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
+ id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59) }
+
+ Name, Certificate, CertificateSerialNumber,
+ id-kp, id-ad-ocsp
+ FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
+ { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
+ internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
+ id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) }
+
+ sa-dsaWithSHA1, sa-rsaWithMD2,
+ sa-rsaWithMD5, sa-rsaWithSHA1
+ FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
+ { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
+ internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
+ id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) } ;
+
+ OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
+ tbsRequest TBSRequest,
+ optionalSignature [0] EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL }
+
+ TBSRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
+ version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
+ requestorName [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL,
+ requestList SEQUENCE OF Request,
+ requestExtensions [2] EXPLICIT Extensions
+ {{ re-ocsp-nonce | re-ocsp-response |
+ re-ocsp-preferred-signature-algorithms,
+ ... }} OPTIONAL }
+
+ Signature ::= SEQUENCE {
+ signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
+ { SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {...}},
+ signature BIT STRING,
+ certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF
+ Certificate OPTIONAL }
+
+ Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) }
+
+ Nonce ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..128))
+
+ Request ::= SEQUENCE {
+ reqCert CertID,
+ singleRequestExtensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions
+ {{ re-ocsp-service-locator,
+ ... }} OPTIONAL }
+
+ CertID ::= SEQUENCE {
+ hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
+ { DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
+ issuerNameHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's DN
+ issuerKeyHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's public key
+ serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber }
+
+ OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
+ responseStatus OCSPResponseStatus,
+ responseBytes [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }
+
+ OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED {
+ successful (0), -- Response has valid confirmations
+ malformedRequest (1), -- Illegal confirmation request
+ internalError (2), -- Internal error in issuer
+ tryLater (3), -- Try again later
+ -- (4) is not used
+ sigRequired (5), -- Must sign the request
+ unauthorized (6) -- Request unauthorized
+ }
+
+ RESPONSE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
+
+ ResponseSet RESPONSE ::= { basicResponse, ... }
+
+ ResponseBytes ::= SEQUENCE {
+ responseType RESPONSE.&id ({ResponseSet}),
+ response OCTET STRING (CONTAINING RESPONSE.
+ &Type({ResponseSet}{@responseType}))}
+
+ basicResponse RESPONSE ::=
+ { BasicOCSPResponse IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-basic }
+
+ BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
+ tbsResponseData ResponseData,
+ signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
+ { SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM,
+ { sa-dsaWithSHA1 |
+ sa-rsaWithSHA1 |
+ sa-rsaWithMD5 |
+ sa-rsaWithMD2,
+ ... }},
+ signature BIT STRING,
+ certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF
+ Certificate OPTIONAL }
+
+ ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE {
+ version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
+ responderID ResponderID,
+ producedAt GeneralizedTime,
+ responses SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,
+ responseExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions
+ {{ re-ocsp-nonce |
+ re-ocsp-extended-revoke,
+ ... }} OPTIONAL }
+
+ ResponderID ::= CHOICE {
+ byName [1] Name,
+ byKey [2] KeyHash }
+
+ KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING
+ -- SHA-1 hash of responder's public key
+ -- (excluding the tag and length and number
+ -- of unused bits)
+
+ SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
+ certID CertID,
+ certStatus CertStatus,
+ thisUpdate GeneralizedTime,
+ nextUpdate [0] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
+ singleExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions
+ {{ re-ocsp-crl |
+ re-ocsp-archive-cutoff |
+ CrlEntryExtensions,
+ ... }} OPTIONAL }
+
+ CertStatus ::= CHOICE {
+ good [0] IMPLICIT NULL,
+ revoked [1] IMPLICIT RevokedInfo,
+ unknown [2] IMPLICIT UnknownInfo }
+
+ RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ revocationTime GeneralizedTime,
+ revocationReason [0] EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL }
+
+ UnknownInfo ::= NULL
+
+ ArchiveCutoff ::= GeneralizedTime
+
+ AcceptableResponses ::= SEQUENCE OF RESPONSE.&id({ResponseSet})
+
+ ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE {
+ issuer Name,
+ locator AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax }
+
+ CrlID ::= SEQUENCE {
+ crlUrl [0] EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL,
+ crlNum [1] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ crlTime [2] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }
+
+ PreferredSignatureAlgorithms ::= SEQUENCE OF
+ PreferredSignatureAlgorithm
+
+ PreferredSignatureAlgorithm ::= SEQUENCE {
+ sigIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier
+ { SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {...} },
+ certIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier {PUBLIC-KEY, {...}}
+ OPTIONAL }
+
+
+ -- Certificate Extensions
+
+ ext-ocsp-nocheck EXTENSION ::= {
+ SYNTAX NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck }
+
+
+ -- Request Extensions
+
+ re-ocsp-nonce EXTENSION ::= {
+ SYNTAX Nonce IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-nonce }
+
+ re-ocsp-response EXTENSION ::= {
+ SYNTAX AcceptableResponses IDENTIFIED BY
+ id-pkix-ocsp-response }
+
+ re-ocsp-service-locator EXTENSION ::= {
+ SYNTAX ServiceLocator IDENTIFIED BY
+ id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator }
+
+ re-ocsp-preferred-signature-algorithms EXTENSION ::= {
+ SYNTAX PreferredSignatureAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY
+ id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs }
+
+
+ -- Response Extensions
+
+ re-ocsp-crl EXTENSION ::= {
+ SYNTAX CrlID IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-crl }
+
+ re-ocsp-archive-cutoff EXTENSION ::= {
+ SYNTAX ArchiveCutoff IDENTIFIED BY
+ id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff }
+
+ re-ocsp-extended-revoke EXTENSION ::= {
+ SYNTAX NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke }
+
+
+ -- Object Identifiers
+
+ id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 }
+ id-pkix-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-ad-ocsp
+ id-pkix-ocsp-basic OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 1 }
+ id-pkix-ocsp-nonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
+ id-pkix-ocsp-crl OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 3 }
+ id-pkix-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 4 }
+ id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 5 }
+ id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 6 }
+ id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 7 }
+ id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 8 }
+ id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 9 }
+
+ END
+ <CODE ENDS>
+
+Acknowledgements
+
+ The authors of this document thank Mohit Sahni for his work to
+ produce [RFC8954].
+
+ The authors also thank Russ Housley, Corey Bonnell, Michael StJohns,
+ Tomas Gustavsson, and Carl Wallace for their feedback and
+ suggestions.
+
+Author's Address
+
+ Himanshu Sharma (editor)
+ Netskope Inc
+ 2445 Augustine Dr 3rd floor
+ Santa Clara, California 95054
+ United States of America
+ Email: himanshu@netskope.com
+ URI: www.netskope.com