path: root/doc/rfc/rfc2797.txt

Network Working Group                                            M. Myers
Request for Comments: 2797                                       VeriSign
Category: Standards Track                                          X. Liu
                                                                    Cisco
                                                                J. Schaad
                                                                Microsoft
                                                             J. Weinstein
                                                               April 2000


                Certificate Management Messages over CMS

Status of this Memo

   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   This document defines a Certificate Management protocol using CMS
   (CMC).  This protocol addresses two immediate needs within the
   Internet PKI community:

   1. The need for an interface to public key certification products and
      services based on [CMS] and [PKCS10], and
   2. The need in [SMIMEV3] for a certificate enrollment protocol for
      DSA-signed certificates with Diffie-Hellman public keys.

   A small number of additional services are defined to supplement the
   core certificate request service.

   Throughout this specification the term CMS is used to refer to both
   [CMS] and [PKCS7].  For both signedData and envelopedData, CMS is a
   superset of the PKCS7. In general, the use of PKCS7 in this document
   is aligned to the Cryptographic Message Syntax [CMS] that provides a
   superset of the PKCS7 syntax. The term CMC refers to this
   specification.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119].



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1.  Protocol Requirements

   -  The protocol is to be based as much as possible on the existing
      CMS, PKCS#10 and CRMF specifications.
   -  The protocol must support the current industry practice of a
      PKCS#10 request followed by a PKCS#7 response as a subset of the
      protocol.
   -  The protocol needs to easily support the multi-key enrollment
      protocols required by S/MIME and other groups.
   -  The protocol must supply a way of doing all operations in a
      single-round trip.  When this is not possible the number of round
      trips is to be minimized.
   -  The protocol will be designed such that all key generation can
      occur on the client.
   -  The mandatory algorithms must superset the required algorithms for
      S/MIME.
   -  The protocol will contain POP methods. Optional provisions for
      multiple-round trip POP will be made if necessary.
   -  The protocol will support deferred and pending responses to
      certificate request for cases where external procedures are
      required to issue a certificate.
   -  The protocol needs to support arbitrary chains of local
      registration authorities as intermediaries between certificate
      requesters and issuers.

2.  Protocol Overview

   An enrollment transaction in this specification is generally composed
   of a single round trip of messages.  In the simplest case an
   enrollment request is sent from the client to the server and an
   enrollment response is then returned from the server to the client.
   In some more complicated cases, such as delayed certificate issuance
   and polling for responses, more than one round trip is required.

   This specification supports two different request messages and two
   different response messages.

   Public key certification requests can be based on either the PKCS10
   or CRMF object.  The two different request messages are (a) the bare
   PKCS10 (in the event that no other services are needed), and (b) the
   PKCS10 or CRMF message wrapped in a CMS encapsulation as part of a
   PKIData object.

   Public key certification responses are based on the CMS signedData
   object.  The response may be either (a) a degenerate CMS signedData
   object (in the event no other services are needed), or (b) a
   ResponseBody object wrapped in a CMS signedData object.




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   No special services are provided for doing either renewal (new
   certificates with the same key) or re-keying (new certificates on new
   keys) of clients.  Instead a renewal/re-key message looks the same as
   any enrollment message, with the identity proof being supplied by
   existing certificates from the CA.

   A provision exists for Local Registration Authorities (LRAs) to
   participate in the protocol by taking client enrollment messages,
   wrapping them in a second layer of enrollment message with additional
   requirements or statements from the LRA and then passing this new
   expanded request on to the Certification Authority.

   This specification makes no assumptions about the underlying
   transport mechanism.  The use of CMS is not meant to imply an email-
   based transport.

   Optional services available through this specification are
   transaction management, replay detection (through nonces), deferred
   certificate issuance, certificate revocation requests and
   certificate/CRL retrieval.

2.1  Terminology

   There are several different terms, abbreviations and acronyms used in
   this document that we define here for convenience and consistency of
   usage:

   "End-Entity" (EE) refers to the entity that owns a key pair and for
      whom a certificate is issued.
   "LRA" or "RA" refers to a (Local) Registration Authority.  A
      registration authority acts as an intermediary between an End-
      Entity and a Certification Authority.  Multiple RAs can exist
      between the End-Entity and the Certification Authority.
   "CA" refers to a Certification Authority.  A Certification Authority
      is the entity that performs the actual issuance of a certificate.
   "Client" refers to an entity that creates a PKI request.  In this
      document both RAs and End-Entities can be clients.
   "Server" refers to the entities that process PKI requests and create
      PKI responses.  CAs and RAs can be servers in this document.
   "PKCS#10" refers the Public Key Cryptography Standard #10.  This is
      one of a set of standards defined by RSA Laboratories in the
      1980s.  PKCS#10 defines a Certificate Request Message syntax.
   "CRMF" refers to the Certificate Request Message Format RFC [CRMF].
      We are using certificate request message format defined in this
      document as part of our management protocol.
   "CMS" refers to the Cryptographic Message Syntax RFC [CMS].  This
      document provides for basic cryptographic services including
      encryption and signing with and without key management.



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   "POP" is an acronym for "Proof of Possession".  POP refers to a value
      that can be used to prove that the private key corresponding to a
      public key is in the possession and can be used by an end-entity.
   "Transport wrapper" refers to the outermost CMS wrapping layer.

2.2  Protocol Flow Charts

   Figure 1 shows the Simple Enrollment Request and Response messages.
   The contents of these messages are detailed in Sections 4.1 and 4.3
   below.

    Simple PKI Request                      Simple PKI Response
    -------------------------               --------------------------

    +----------+                            +------------------+
    | PKCS #10 |                            | CMS "certs-only" |
    +----------+--------------+             |     message      |
    |                         |             +------------------+------+
    | Certificate Request     |             |                         |
    |                         |             | CMS Signed Data,        |
    | Subject Name            |             |   no signerInfo         |
    | Subject Public Key Info |             |                         |
    |   (K_PUB)               |             | signedData contains one |
    | Attributes              |             | or more certificates in |
    |                         |             | the "certificates"      |
    +-----------+-------------+             | portion of the          |
                | signed with |             | signedData.             |
                | matching    |             |                         |
                | K_PRIV      |             | encapsulatedContentInfo |
                +-------------+             | is empty.               |
                                            |                         |
                                            +--------------+----------+
                                                           | unsigned |
                                                           +----------+

               Figure 1: Simple PKI Request and Response Messages















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    Full PKI Request                        Full PKI Response
    -----------------------                 ------------------------

    +----------------+                      +----------------+
    | CMS signedData |                      | CMS signedData |
    |     object     |                      |     object     |
    +----------------+--------+             +----------------+--------+
    |                         |             |                         |
    | PKIData object          |             | ResponseBody object     |
    |                         |             |                         |
    | Sequence of:            |             | Sequence of:            |
    | <enrollment attribute>* |             | <enrollment attribute>* |
    | <certification request>*|             | <CMS object>*           |
    | <CMS objects>*          |             | <other message>*        |
    | <other message>*        |             |                         |
    |                         |             | where * == zero or more |
    | where * == zero or more |             |                         |
    |                         |             | All certificates issued |
    | Certificate requests    |             | as part of the response |
    | are CRMF or PKCS#10     |             | are included in the     |
    | objects. Attributes are |             | "certificates" portion  |
    | (OID, ANY defined by    |             | of the signedData.      |
    | OID) pairs.             |             | Relevant CA certs and   |
    |                         |             | CRLs can be included as |
    +-------+-----------------+             | well.                   |
            | signed (keypair |             |                         |
            | used may be pre-|             +---------+---------------+
            | existing or     |                       | signed by the |
            | identified in   |                       | CA or an LRA  |
            | the request)    |                       +---------------+
            +-----------------+

               Figure 2: Full PKI Request and Response Messages

   Figure 2 shows the Full Enrollment Request and Response messages.
   The contents of these messages are detailed in Sections 4.2 and 4.4
   below.

3.  Protocol Elements

   This section covers each of the different elements that may be used
   to construct enrollment request and enrollment response messages.
   Section 4 will cover how to build the enrollment request and response
   messages.







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3.1  PKIData Object

   The new content object PKIData has been defined for this protocol.
   This new object is used as the body of the full PKI request message.
   The new body is identified by:

     id-cct-PKIData  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cct 2 }

   The ASN.1 structure corresponding to this new content type is:

   PKIData ::= SEQUENCE {
         controlSequence    SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedAttribute,
         reqSequence        SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedRequest,
         cmsSequence        SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedContentInfo,
         otherMsgSequence   SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF OtherMsg
   }

   -- controlSequence consists of a sequence of control attributes.  The
   control attributes defined in this document are found in section 5.
   As control sequences are defined by OIDs, other parties can define
   additional control attributes. Unrecognized OIDs MUST result in no
   part of the request being successfully processed.

   -- reqSequence consists of a sequence of certificate requests.  The
   certificate requests can be either a CertificateRequest (PKCS10
   request) or a CertReqMsg.  Details on each of these request types are
   found in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 respectively.

   -- cmsSequence consists of a sequence of [CMS] message objects.  This
   protocol only uses EnvelopedData, SignedData and EncryptedData.  See
   section 3.6 for more details.

   -- otherMsgSequence allows for other arbitrary data items to be
   placed into the enrollment protocol.  The {OID, any} pair of values
   allows for arbitrary definition of material.  Data objects are placed
   here while control objects are placed in the controlSequence field.
   See section 3.7 for more details.

3.2  ResponseBody Object

   The new content object ResponseBody has been defined for this
   protocol.  This new object is used as the body of the full PKI
   response message.  The new body is identified by:

       id-cct-PKIResponse OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cct 3 }






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   The ASN.1 structure corresponding to this body content type is:

   ResponseBody ::= SEQUENCE {
       controlSequence   SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedAttribute,
       cmsSequence       SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedContentInfo,
       otherMsgSequence  SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF OtherMsg
   }

   -- controlSequence consists of a sequence of control attributes.  The
   control attributes defined in this document are found in section 3.5.
   Other parties can define additional control attributes.

   -- cmsSequence consists of a sequence of [CMS] message objects.  This
   protocol only uses EnvelopedData, SignedData and EncryptedData.  See
   section 3.6 for more details.

   -- otherMsgSequence allows for other arbitrary items to be placed
   into the enrollment protocol.  The {OID, any} pair of values allows
   for arbitrary definition of material.  Data objects are placed here
   while control objects are placed in the controlSequence field. See
   section 3.7 for more details.

3.3  Certification Requests (PKCS10/CRMF)

   Certification Requests are based on either PKCS10 or CRMF messages.
   Section 3.3.1 specifies mandatory and optional requirements for
   clients and servers dealing with PKCS10 request messages.  Section
   3.3.2 specifies mandatory and optional requirements for clients and
   servers dealing with CRMF request messages.

3.3.1  PKCS10 Request Body

   Servers MUST be able to understand and process PKCS10 request bodies.
   Clients MUST produce a PKCS10 request body when using the Simple
   Enrollment Request message. Clients MAY produce a PKCS10 request body
   when using the Full Enrollment Request message.

   When producing a PKCS10 request body, clients MUST produce a PKCS10
   message body containing a subject name and public key.  Some
   certification products are operated using a central repository of
   information to assign subject names upon receipt of a public key for
   certification.  To accommodate this mode of operation, the subject
   name in a CertificationRequest MAY be NULL, but MUST be present.  CAs
   that receive a CertificationRequest with a NULL subject name MAY
   reject such requests.  If rejected and a response is returned, the CA
   MUST respond with the failInfo attribute of badRequest.





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   The client MAY incorporate one or more standard X.509 v3 extensions
   in any PKCS10 request as an ExtensionReq attribute. An ExtensionReq
   attribute is defined as

      ExtensionReq ::= SEQUENCE OF Extension

   where Extension is imported from [PKIXCERT] and ExtensionReq is
   identified by {pkcs-9 14}.

   Servers MUST be able to process all extensions defined in [PKIXCERT].
   Servers are not required to be able to process other V3 X.509
   extensions transmitted using this protocol, nor are they required to
   be able to process other, private extensions. Servers are not
   required to put all client-requested extensions into a certificate.
   Servers are permitted to modify client-requested extensions. Servers
   MUST NOT alter an extension so as to invalidate the original intent
   of a client-requested extension.  (For example changing key usage
   from key exchange to signing.) If a certification request is denied
   due to the inability to handle a requested extension and a response
   is returned, the server MUST respond with the failInfo attribute of
   unsupportedExt.

3.3.2  CRMF Request Body

   Servers MUST be able to understand and process CRMF request body.
   Clients MAY produce a CRMF message body when using the Full
   Enrollment Request message.

   This memo imposes the following additional changes on the
   construction and processing of CRMF messages:

   -  When CRMF message bodies are used in the Full Enrollment Request
      message, each CRMF message MUST include both the subject and
      publicKey fields in the CertTemplate.  As in the case of PKCS10
      requests, the subject may be encoded as NULL, but MUST be present.
   -  In general, when both CRMF and CMC controls exist with equivalent
      functionality, the CMC control SHOULD be used.  The CMC control
      MUST override any CRMF control.
   -  The regInfo field MUST NOT be used on a CRMF message.  Equivalent
      functionality is provided in the regInfo control attribute
      (section 5.12).
   -  The indirect method of proving POP is not supported in this
      protocol.  One of the other methods (including the direct method
      described in this document) MUST be used instead if POP is
      desired.  The value of encrCert in SubsequentMessage MUST NOT be
      used.





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   -  Since the subject and publicKeyValues are always present, the
      POPOSigningKeyInput MUST NOT be used when computing the value for
      POPSigningKey.

   A server is not required to use all of the values suggested by the
   client in the certificate template.  Servers MUST be able to process
   all extensions defined in [PXIXCERT].  Servers are not required to be
   able to process other V3 X.509 extension transmitted using this
   protocol, nor are they required to be able to process other, private
   extensions. Servers are permitted to modify client-requested
   extensions.  Servers MUST NOT alter an extension so as to invalidate
   the original intent of a client-requested extension. (For example
   change key usage from key exchange to signing.)  If a certificate
   request is denied due to the inability to handle a requested
   extension, the server MUST respond with a failInfo attribute of
   unsupportedExt.

3.3.3  Production of Diffie-Hellman Public Key Certification Requests

   Part of a certification request is a signature over the request;
   Diffie-Hellman is a key agreement algorithm and cannot be used to
   directly produce the required signature object.  [DH-POP] provides
   two ways to produce the necessary signature value.  This document
   also defines a signature algorithm that does not provide a POP value,
   but can be used to produce the necessary signature value.

3.3.3.1   No-Signature Signature Mechanism

   Key management (encryption/decryption) private keys cannot always be
   used to produce some type of signature value as they can be in a
   decrypt only device.  Certification requests require that the
   signature field be populated.  This section provides a signature
   algorithm specifically for that purposes.  The following object
   identifier and signature value are used to identify this signature
   type:

      id-alg-noSignature OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix id-alg(6) 2}

      NoSignatureValue ::= OCTET STRING

   The parameters for id-alg-noSignature MUST be present and MUST be
   encoded as NULL.  NoSignatureValue contains the hash of the
   certification request.  It is important to realize that there is no
   security associated with this signature type.  If this signature type
   is on a certification request and the Certification Authority policy
   requires proof-of-possession of the private key, the POP mechanism
   defined in section 5.7 MUST be used.




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3.3.3.2   Diffie-Hellman POP Signature

   CMC compliant implementations MUST support section 5 of [DH-POP].

3.3.3.3   Diffie-Hellman MAC signature

   CMC compliant implementations MAY support section 4 of [DH-POP].

3.4  Body Part Identifiers

   Each element of a PKIData or PKIResponse message has an associated
   body part identifier.  The Body Part Identifier is a 4-octet integer
   encoded in the certReqIds field for CertReqMsg objects (in a
   TaggedRequest) or in the bodyPartId field of the other objects.  The
   Body Part Identifier MUST be unique within a single PKIData or
   PKIResponse object.  Body Part Identifiers can be duplicated in
   different layers (for example a CMC message embedded within another).
   The Body Part Id of zero is reserved to designate the current PKIData
   object.  This value is used in control attributes such as the Add
   Extensions Control in the pkiDataReference field to refer to a
   request in the current PKIData object.

   Some control attribute, such as the CMC Status Info attribute, will
   also use Body Part Identifiers to refer to elements in the previous
   message.  This allows an error to be explicit about the attribute or
   request to which the error applies.

3.5  Control Attributes

   The overall control flow of how a message is processed in this
   document is based on the control attributes.  Each control attribute
   consists of an object identifier and a value based on the object
   identifier.

   Servers MUST fail the processing of an entire PKIData message if any
   included control attribute is not recognized.  The response MUST be
   the error badRequest and bodyList MUST contain the bodyPartID of the
   invalid or unrecognized control attribute.

   The syntax of a control attribute is

      TaggedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
          bodyPartID         BodyPartId,
          attrType           OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
          attrValues         SET OF AttributeValue
      }





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      -- bodyPartId is a unique integer that is used to reference this
      control attribute. The id of 0 is reserved for use as the
      reference to the current PKIData object.

      -- attrType is the OID defining the associated data in attrValues

      -- attrValues contains the set of data values used in processing
      the control attribute.

   The set of control attributes that are defined by this memo are found
   in section 5.

3.6  Content Info objects

   The cmsSequence field of the PKIRequest and PKIResponse messages
   contains zero or more tagged content info objects.  The syntax for
   this structure is

     TaggedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
         bodyPartID              BodyPartId,
         contentInfo             ContentInfo
     }

      -- bodyPartId is a unique integer that is used to reference this
      content info object. The id of 0 is reserved for use as the
      reference to the current PKIData object.

      -- contentInfo contains a ContentInfo object (defined in [CMS]).
      The three contents used in this location are SignedData,
      EnvelopedData and Data.

   EnvelopedData provides for shrouding of data.  Data allows for
   general transport of unstructured data.

   The SignedData object from [CMS] is also used in this specification
   to provide for authentication as well as serving as the general
   transport wrapper of requests and responses.

3.6.1  Signed Data

   The signedData object is used in two different locations when
   constructing enrollment messages.  The signedData object is used as a
   wrapper for a PKIData as part of the enrollment request message.  The
   signedData object is also used as the outer part of an enrollment
   response message.






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   For the enrollment response the signedData wrapper allows the server
   to sign the returning data, if any exists, and to carry the
   certificates and CRLs for the enrollment request.  If no data is
   being returned beyond the certificates, no signerInfo objects are
   placed in the signedData object.

3.6.2  Enveloped Data

   EnvelopedData is the primary method of providing confidentiality for
   sensitive information in this protocol.  The protocol currently uses
   EnvelopedData to provide encryption of an entire request (see section
   4.5).  The envelopedData object would also be used to wrap private
   key material for key archival.

   Servers MUST implement envelopedData according to [CMS].  There is an
   ambiguity (about encrypting content types other than id-data) in the
   PKCS7 specification that has lead to non-interoperability.

3.7  Other Message Bodies

   The other message body portion of the message allows for arbitrary
   data objects to be carried as part of a message.  This is intended to
   contain data that is not already wrapped in a CMS contentInfo object.
   The data is ignored unless a control attribute references the data by
   bodyPartId.

     OtherMsg ::= SEQUENCE {
         bodyPartID        BodyPartID,
         otherMsgType      OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
         otherMsgValue     ANY DEFINED BY otherMsgType }

   -- bodyPartID contains the unique id of this object

   -- otherMsgType contains the OID defining both the usage of this body
   part and the syntax of the value associated with this body part

   -- otherMsgValue contains the data associated with the message body
   part.

4.  PKI Messages

   This section discusses the details of putting together the different
   enrollment request and response messages.








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4.1  Simple Enrollment Request

   The simplest form of an enrollment request is a plain PKCS10 message.
   If this form of enrollment request is used for a private key that is
   capable of generating a signature, the PKCS10 MUST be signed with
   that private key.  If this form of the enrollment request is used for
   a D-H key, then the D-H POP mechanism described in [DH-POP] MUST be
   used.

   Servers MUST support the Simple Enrollment Request message. If the
   Simple Enrollment Request message is used, servers MUST return the
   Simple Enrollment Response message (see Section 4.3) if the
   enrollment request is granted.  If the enrollment request fails, the
   Full Enrollment Response MAY be returned or no response MAY be
   returned.

   Many advanced services specified in this memo are not supported by
   the Simple Enrollment Request message.

4.2  Full PKI Request

   The Full Enrollment Request provides the most functionality and
   flexibility.  Clients SHOULD use the Full Enrollment Request message
   when enrolling.  Servers MUST support the Full Enrollment Request
   message.  An enrollment response (full or simple as appropriate) MUST
   be returned to all Full Enrollment Requests.

   The Full Enrollment Request message consists of a PKIData object
   wrapped in a signedData CMS object. The objects in the PKIData are
   ordered as follows:

   1. All Control Attributes,
   2. All certification requests,
   3. All CMS objects,
   4. All other messages.

   Each element in a Full Enrollment Request is identified by a Body
   Part Identifier. If duplicate ids are found, the server MUST return
   the error badRequest with a bodyPartID of 0.

   The signedData object wrapping the PKIData may be signed either by
   the private key material of the signature certification request, or
   by a previously certified signature key. If the private key of a
   signature certification request is being used, then:
   a) the certification request containing the corresponding public key
      MUST include a Subject Key Identifier extension request,
   b) the subjectKeyIdentifier form of signerInfo MUST be used, and




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   c) the value of the subjectKeyIdentifier form of signerInfo MUST be
      the Subject Key Identifier specified in the corresponding
      certification request.

   (The subjectKeyIdentifier form of signerInfo is used here because no
   certificates have yet been issued for the signing key.) If the
   request key is used for signing, there MUST be only one signerInfo
   object in the signedData object.

   When creating a message to renew a certificate, the following should
   be taken into consideration:

   1. The identification and identityProof control statements are not
      required.  The same information is provided by the use of an
      existing certificate from the CA when signing the enrollment
      message.
   2. CAs and LRAs may impose additional restrictions on the signing
      certificate used.  They may require that the most recently issued
      signing certificate for an entity be used.
   3. A renewal message may occur either by creating a new set of keys,
      or by re-using an existing set of keys.  Some CAs may prevent re-
      use of keys by policy.  In this case the CA MUST return NOKEYREUSE
      as the failure code.

4.3  Simple Enrollment Response

   Servers SHOULD use the simple enrollment response message whenever
   possible.  Clients MUST be able to process the simple enrollment
   response message.  The simple enrollment response message consists of
   a signedData object with no signerInfo objects on it.  The
   certificates requested are returned in the certificate bag of the
   signedData object.

   Clients MUST NOT assume the certificates are in any order. Servers
   SHOULD include all intermediate certificates needed to form complete
   chains to one or more self-signed certificates, not just the newly
   issued certificate(s). The server MAY additionally return CRLs in the
   CRL bag.  Servers MAY include the self-signed certificates. Clients
   MUST NOT implicitly trust included self-signed certificate(s) merely
   due to its presence in the certificate bag. In the event clients
   receive a new self-signed certificate from the server, clients SHOULD
   provide a mechanism to enable the user to explicitly trust the
   certificate.








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4.4  Full PKI Response

   Servers MUST return full PKI response messages if a) a full PKI
   request message failed or b) additional services other than returning
   certificates are required.  Servers MAY return full PKI responses
   with failure information for simple PKI requests. Following section
   4.3 above, servers returning only certificates and a success status
   to the client SHOULD use the simple PKI response message.

   Clients MUST be able to process a full PKI response message.

   The full enrollment response message consists of a signedData object
   encapsulating a responseBody object.  In a responseBody object all
   Control Attributes MUST precede all CMS objects.  The certificates
   granted in an enrollment response are returned in the certificates
   field of the immediately encapsulating signedData object.

   Clients MUST NOT assume the certificates are in any order. Servers
   SHOULD include all intermediate certificates needed to form complete
   chains one ore more self-signed certificates, not just the newly
   issued certificate(s). The server MAY additionally return CRLs in the
   CRL bag.  Servers MAY include the self-signed certificates. Clients
   MUST NOT implicitly trust included self-signed certificate(s) merely
   due to its presence in the certificate bag. In the event clients
   receive a new self-signed certificate from the server, clients SHOULD
   provide a mechanism to enable the user to explicitly trust the
   certificate.

4.5  Application of Encryption to a PKI Message

   There are occasions where a PKI request or response message must be
   encrypted in order to prevent any information about the enrollment
   from being accessible to unauthorized entities.  This section
   describes the means used to encrypt a PKI message.  This section is
   not applicable to a simple enrollment message.

   Confidentiality is provided by wrapping the PKI message (a signedData
   object) in a CMS EnvelopedData object.  The nested content type in
   the EnvelopedData is id-signedData.  Note that this is different from
   S/MIME where there is a MIME layer placed between the encrypted and
   signed data objects.  It is recommended that if an enveloped data
   layer is applied to a PKI message, a second signing layer be placed
   outside of the enveloped data layer.  The following figure shows how
   this nesting would be done:







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     Normal              Option 1                  Option 2
     ------              --------                  --------
     SignedData          EnvelopedData             SignedData
      PKIData             SignedData                EnvelopedData
                           PKIData                   SignedData
                                                      PKIData

   Options 1 and 2 provide the benefit of preventing leakage of
   sensitive data by encrypting the information.  LRAs can remove the
   enveloped data wrapping, and replace or forward without further
   processing. Section 6 contains more information about LRA processing.

   PKI Messages MAY be encrypted or transmitted in the clear.  Servers
   MUST provided support for all three versions.

   Alternatively, an authenticated, secure channel could exist between
   the parties requiring encryption.  Clients and servers MAY use such
   channels instead of the technique described above to provide secure,
   private communication of PKI request and response messages.

5.  Control Attributes

   Control attributes are carried as part of both PKI requests and
   responses. Each control attribute is encoded as a unique Object
   Identifier followed by that data for the control attribute.  The
   encoding of the data is based on the control attribute object
   identifier.  Processing systems would first detect the OID and
   process the corresponding attribute value prior to processing the
   message body.

   The following table lists the names, OID and syntactic structure for
   each of the control attributes documented in this memo.



















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   Control Attribute         OID            Syntax
   -----------------       ----------     --------------
   cMCStatusInfo           id-cmc 1       CMCStatusInfo
   identification          id-cmc 2       UTF8String
   identityProof           id-cmc 3       OCTET STRING
   dataReturn              id-cmc 4       OCTET STRING
   transactionId           id-cmc 5       INTEGER
   senderNonce             id-cmc 6       OCTET STRING
   recipientNonce          id-cmc 7       OCTET STRING
   addExtensions           id-cmc 8       AddExtensions
   encryptedPOP            id-cmc 9       EncryptedPOP
   decryptedPOP            id-cmc 10      DecryptedPOP
   lraPOPWitness           id-cmc 11      LraPOPWitness
   getCert                 id-cmc 15      GetCert
   getCRL                  id-cmc 16      GetCRL
   revokeRequest           id-cmc 17      RevokeRequest
   regInfo                 id-cmc 18      OCTET STRING
   responseInfo            id-cmc 19      OCTET STRING
   QueryPending            id-cmc 21      OCTET STRING
   idPOPLinkRandom         id-cmc 22      OCTET STRING
   idPOPLinkWitness        id-cmc 23      OCTET STRING
   idConfirmCertAcceptance id-cmc 24      CMCCertId

5.1  CMC Status Info Control Attribute

   The CMC status info control is used in full PKI Response messages to
   return information on a client request.  Servers MAY emit multiple
   CMC status info controls referring to a single body part. Clients
   MUST be able to deal with multiple CMC status info controls in a
   response message. This statement uses the following ASN.1 definition:

      CMCStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
           cMCStatus           CMCStatus,
           bodyList            SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartID,
           statusString        UTF8String OPTIONAL,
           otherInfo           CHOICE {
             failInfo            CMCFailInfo,
             pendInfo            PendInfo } OPTIONAL
      }

      PendInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
           pendToken           OCTET STRING,
           pendTime            GeneralizedTime
      }







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      -- cMCStatus is described in section 5.1.1

      -- bodyList contains the list of body parts in the request message
      to which this status information applies.  If an error is being
      returned for a simple enrollment message, body list will contain a
      single integer of value '1'.

      -- statusString contains a string with additional description
      information.  This string is human readable.

      -- failInfo is described in section 5.1.2. It provides a detailed
      error on what the failure was.  This choice is present only if
      cMCStatus is failed.

      -- pendToken is the token to be used in the queryPending control
      attribute.

      -- pendTime contains the suggested time the server wants to be
      queried about the status of the request.

   If the cMCStatus field is success, the CMC Status Info Control MAY be
   omitted unless it is only item in the response message.  If no status
   exists for a certificate request or other item requiring processing,
   then the value of success is to be assumed.

5.1.1   CMCStatus values

   CMCStatus is a field in the CMCStatusInfo structure.  This field
   contains a code representing the success or failure of a specific
   operation.  CMCStatus has the ASN.1 structure of:

      CMCStatus ::= INTEGER {
           success                (0),
           -- request was granted
           -- reserved            (1),
           -- not used, defined where the original structure was defined
           failed                 (2),
           -- you don't get what you want, more information elsewhere in
      the message
           pending                (3),
           -- the request body part has not yet been processed,
           -- requester is responsible to poll back on this
           -- pending may only be return for certificate request
      operations.
           noSupport              (4),
           -- the requested operation is not supported
           confirmRequired        (5)




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           -- conformation using the idConfirmCertAcceptance control is
      required
           -- before use of certificate
      }

5.1.2   CMCFailInfo

   CMCFailInfo conveys information relevant to the interpretation of a
   failure condition. The CMCFailInfo has the following ASN.1 structure:

      CMCFailInfo ::= INTEGER {
           badAlg            (0)
           -- Unrecognized or unsupported algorithm
           badMessageCheck   (1)
           -- integrity check failed
           badRequest        (2)
           -- transaction not permitted or supported
           badTime           (3)
           -- Message time field was not sufficiently close to the system
      time
           badCertId         (4)
           -- No certificate could be identified matching the provided
      criteria
           unsuportedExt     (5)
           -- A requested X.509 extension is not supported by the
      recipient CA.
           mustArchiveKeys   (6)
           -- Private key material must be supplied
           badIdentity       (7)
           -- Identification Attribute failed to verify
           popRequired       (8)
           -- Server requires a POP proof before issuing certificate
           popFailed         (9)
           -- POP processing failed
           noKeyReuse        (10)
           -- Server policy does not allow key re-use
           internalCAError   (11)
           tryLater          (12)
      }

   Additional failure reasons MAY be defined for closed environments
   with a need.









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5.2  Identification and IdentityProof Control Attributes

   Some CAs and LRAs require that a proof of identity be included in a
   certification request.  Many different ways of doing this exist with
   different degrees of security and reliability.  Most people are
   familiar with the request of a bank to provide your mother's maiden
   name as a form of identity proof.

   CMC provides one method of proving the client's identity based on a
   shared secret between the certificate requestor and the verifying
   authority.  If clients support full request messages, clients MUST
   implement this method of identity proof.  Servers MUST provide this
   method and MAY also have a bilateral method of similar strength
   available.

   The CMC method starts with an out-of-band transfer of a token (the
   shared secret).  The distribution of this token is beyond the scope
   of this document.  The client then uses this token for an identity
   proof as follows:

   1. The reqSequence field of the PKIData object (encoded exactly as it
      appears in the request message including the sequence type and
      length) is the value to be validated.
   2. A SHA1 hash of the token is computed.
   3. An HMAC-SHA1 value is then computed over the value produced in
      Step 1, as described in [HMAC], using the hash of the token from
      Step 2 as the shared secret value.
   4. The 160-bit HMAC-SHA1 result from Step 3 is then encoded as the
      value of the identityProof attribute.

   When the server verifies the identityProof attribute, it computes the
   HMAC-SHA1 value in the same way and compares it to the identityProof
   attribute contained in the enrollment request.

   If a server fails the verification of an identityProof attribute and
   the server returns a response message, the failInfo attribute MUST be
   present in the response and MUST have a value of badIdentity.

   Optionally, servers MAY require the inclusion of the unprotected
   identification attribute with an identification attribute.  The
   identification attribute is intended to contain either a text string
   or a numeric quantity, such as a random number, which assists the
   server in locating the shared secret needed to validate the contents
   of the identityProof attribute.  Numeric values MUST be converted to
   text string representations prior to encoding as UTF8-STRINGs in this
   attribute.  If the identification control attribute is included in





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   the message, the derivation of the shared secret in step 2 is altered
   so that the hash of the concatenation of the token and the identity
   value are hashed rather than just the token.

5.2.1  Hardware Shared Secret Token Generation

   The shared secret between the end-entity and the identity verify is
   sometimes transferred using a hardware device that generates a series
   of tokens based on some shared secret value.  The user can therefore
   prove their identity by transferring this token in plain text along
   with a name string.  The above protocol can be used with a hardware
   shared-secret token generation device by the following modifications:

   1. The identification attribute MUST be included and MUST contain the
      hardware-generated token.
   2. The shared secret value used above is the same hardware-generated
      token.
   3. All certification requests MUST have a subject name and the
      subject name MUST contain the fields required to identify the
      holder of the hardware token device.

5.3  Linking Identity and POP Information

   In a PKI Full Request message identity information about the
   creator/author of the message is carried in the signature of the CMS
   SignedData object containing all of the certificate requests.
   Proof-of-possession information for key pairs requesting
   certification, however, is carried separately for each PKCS#10 or
   CRMF message.  (For keys capable of generating a digital signature,
   the POP is provided by the signature on the PKCS#10 or CRMF request.
   For encryption-only keys the controls described in Section 5.7 below
   are used.)  In order to prevent substitution-style attacks we must
   guarantee that the same entity generated both the POP and proof-of-
   identity information.

   This section describes two mechanisms for linking identity and POP
   information: witness values cryptographically derived from the
   shared-secret (Section 5.3.1) and shared-secret/subject DN matching
   (Section 5.3.2).  Clients and servers MUST support the witness value
   technique.  Clients and servers MAY support shared-secret/subject DN
   matching or other bilateral techniques of similar strength.  The idea
   behind both mechanisms is to force the client to sign some data into
   each certificate request that can be directly associated with the
   shared-secret; this will defeat attempts to include certificate
   requests from different entities in a single Full PKI Request
   message.





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5.3.1  Witness values derived from the shared-secret

   The first technique for doing identity-POP linking works by forcing
   the client to include a piece of information cryptographically-
   derived from the shared-secret token as a signed extension within
   each certificate request (PKCS#10 or CRMF) message.  This technique
   is useful if null subject DNs are used (because, for example, the
   server can generate the subject DN for the certificate based only on
   the shared secret).  Processing begins when the client receives the
   shared-secret token out-of-band from the server.  The client then
   computes the following values:

   1. The client generates a random byte-string, R, which SHOULD be at
      least 512 bits in length.
   2. A SHA1 hash of the token is computed.
   3. An HMAC-SHA1 value is then computed over the random value produced
      in Step 1, as described in [HMAC], using the hash of the token
      from Step 2 as the shared secret.
   4. The random value produced in Step 1 is encoded as the value of an
      idPOPLinkRandom control attribute.  This control attribute MUST be
      included in the Full PKI Request message.
   5. The 160-bit HMAC-SHA1 result from Step 3 is encoded as the value
      of an idPOPLinkWitness extension to the certificate request.
      a. For CRMF, idPOPLinkWitness is included in the controls section
         of the CertRequest structure.
      b. For PKCS#10, idPOPLinkWitness is included in the attributes
         section of the CertificationRequest structure.

   Upon receipt, servers MUST verify that each certificate request
   contains a copy of the idPOPLinkWitness and that its value was
   derived in the specified manner from the shared secret and the random
   string included in the idPOPLinkRandom control attribute.

5.3.2  Shared-secret/subject DN matching

   The second technique for doing identity-POP linking is to link a
   particular subject distinguished name (subject DN) to the shared-
   secrets that are distributed out-of-band and to require that clients
   using the shared-secret to prove identity include that exact subject
   DN in every certificate request.  It is expected that many client-
   server connections using shared-secret based proof-of-identity will
   use this mechanism. (It is common not to omit the subject DN
   information from the certificate request messages.)

   When the shared secret is generated and transferred out-of-band to
   initiate the registration process (Section 5.2), a particular subject
   DN is also associated with the shared secret and communicated to the
   client.  (The subject DN generated MUST be unique per entity in



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   accordance with CA policy; a null subject DN cannot be used.  A
   common practice could be to place the identification value as part of
   the subject DN.)  When the client generates the Full PKI Request
   message, it MUST use these two pieces of information as follows:

   1. The client MUST include the specific subject DN that it received
      along with the shared secret as the subject name in every
      certificate request (PKCS#10 and/or CRMF) in the Full PKI Request.
      The subject names in the requests MUST NOT be null.
   2. The client MUST include the identityProof control attribute
      (Section 5.2), derived from the shared secret, in the Full PKI
      Request.

   The server receiving this message MUST (a) validate the identityProof
   control attribute and then, (b) check that the subject DN included in
   each certificate request matches that associated with the shared
   secret.  If either of these checks fails the certificate request MUST
   be rejected.

5.3.3  Renewal and Re-Key Messages

   In a renewal or re-key message, the subject DN in (a) the certificate
   referenced by the CMS SignerInfo object, and (b) all certificate
   requests within the request message MUST match according to the
   standard name match rules described in [PKIXCERT].

5.4  Data Return Control Attribute

   The data return control attribute allows clients to send arbitrary
   data (usually some type of internal state information) to the server
   and to have the data returned as part of the enrollment response
   message.  Data placed in a data return statement is considered to be
   opaque to the server.  The same control is used for both requests and
   responses.  If the data return statement appears in an enrollment
   message, the server MUST return it as part of the enrollment response
   message.

   In the event that the information in the data return statement needs
   to be confidential, it is expected that the client would apply some
   type of encryption to the contained data, but the details of this are
   outside the scope of this specification.

   An example of using this feature is for a client to place an
   identifier marking the exact source of the private key material.
   This might be the identifier of a hardware device containing the
   private key.





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5.5  Add Extensions Control Attribute

   The Add Extensions control attribute is used by LRAs in order to
   specify additional extensions that are to be placed on certificates.
   This attribute uses the following ASN.1 definition:

     AddExtensions ::= SEQUENCE {
         pkiDataReference             BodyPartID
         certReferences               SEQUENCE OF BodyPartID,
         extensions                   SEQUENCE OF Extension
     }

      -- pkiDataReference field contains the body part id of the
      embedded request message.

      -- certReferences field is a list of references to one or more of
      the payloads contained within a PKIData.  Each element of the
      certReferences sequence MUST be equal to either the bodyPartID of
      a TaggedCertificationRequest or the certReqId of the CertRequest
      within a CertReqMsg.   By definition, the listed extensions are to
      be applied to every element referenced in the certReferences
      sequence.  If a request corresponding to bodyPartID cannot be
      found, the error badRequest is returned referencing this control
      attribute.

      -- extensions field contains the sequence of extensions to be
      applied to the referenced certificate requests.

   Servers MUST be able to process all extensions defined in [PKIXCERT].
   Servers are not required to be able to process every V3 X.509
   extension transmitted using this protocol, nor are they required to
   be able to process other, private extensions.  Servers are not
   required to put all LRA-requested extensions into a certificate.
   Servers are permitted to modify LRA-requested extensions.  Servers
   MUST NOT alter an extension so as to reverse the meaning of a
   client-requested extension If a certification request is denied due
   to the inability to handle a requested extension and a response is
   returned, the server MUST return a failInfo attribute with the value
   of unsupportedExt.

   If multiple Add Extensions statements exist in an enrollment message,
   the exact behavior is left up to the certificate issuer policy.
   However it is recommended that the following policy be used.  These
   rules would be applied to individual extensions within an Add
   Extensions control attribute (as opposed to an "all or nothing"
   approach).





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   1. If the conflict is within a single PKIData object, the certificate
      request would be rejected with an error of badRequest.

   2. If the conflict is between different PKIData objects, the
      outermost version of the extension would be used (allowing an LRA
      to override the extension requested by the end-entyt).

5.6  Transaction Management Control Attributes

   Transactions are identified and tracked using a transaction
   identifier.  If used, clients generate transaction identifiers and
   retain their value until the server responds with a message that
   completes the transaction.  Servers correspondingly include received
   transaction identifiers in the response.

   The transactionId attribute identifies a given transaction.  It is
   used between client and server to manage the state of an operation.
   Clients MAY include a transactionID attribute in request messages.
   If the original request contains a transactionID attribute, all
   subsequent request and response messages MUST include the same
   transactionID attribute.  A server MUST use only transactionIds in
   the outermost PKIdata object. TransactionIds on inner PKIdata objects
   are for intermediate entities.

   Replay protection can be supported through the use of sender and
   recipient nonces. If nonces are used, in the first message of a
   transaction, no recipientNonce is transmitted; a senderNonce is
   instantiated by the message originator and retained for later
   reference.  The recipient of a sender nonce reflects this value back
   to the originator as a recipientNonce and includes it's own
   senderNonce.  Upon receipt by the transaction originator of this
   message, the originator compares the value of recipientNonce to its
   retained value.  If the values match, the message can be accepted for
   further security processing.  The received value for senderNonce is
   also retained for inclusion in the next message associated with the
   same transaction.

   The senderNonce and recipientNonce attribute can be used to provide
   application-level replay prevention. Clients MAY include a
   senderNonce in the initial request message.  Originating messages
   include only a value for senderNonce. If a message includes a
   senderNonce, the response MUST include the transmitted value of the
   previously received senderNonce as recipientNonce and include new
   value for senderNonce. A server MUST use only nonces in the outermost
   PKIdata object. Nonces on inner PKIdata objects are for intermediate
   entities.





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5.7  Proof-of-possession (POP) for encryption-only keys

   Everything described in this section is optional to implement, for
   both servers and clients. Servers MAY require this POP method be used
   only if another POP method is unavailable. Servers SHOULD reject all
   requests contained within a PKIData if any required POP is missing
   for any element within the PKIData.

   Many servers require proof that an entity requesting a certificate
   for a public key actually possesses the corresponding private
   component of the key pair.  For keys that can be used as signature
   keys, signing the certification request with the private key serves
   as a POP on that key pair.  With keys that can only be used for
   encryption operations, POP MUST be performed by forcing the client to
   decrypt a value.  See Section 5 of [CRMF] for a detailed discussion
   of POP.

   By necessity, POP for encryption-only keys cannot be done in one
   round-trip, since there are four distinct phases:

   1. Client tells the server about the public component of a new
      encryption key pair.
   2. Server sends the client a POP challenge, encrypted with the
      presented public encryption key, which the client must decrypt.
   3. Client decrypts the POP challenge and sends it back to the server.
   4. Server validates the decrypted POP challenge and continues
      processing the certificate request.

   CMC defines two different attributes.  The first deals with the
   encrypted challenge sent from the server to the user in step 2.  The
   second deals with the decrypted challenge sent from the client to the
   server in step 3.

   The encryptedPOP attribute is used to send the encrypted challenge
   from the server to the client.  As such, it is encoded as a tagged
   attribute within the controlSequence of a ResponseBody.  (Note that
   we assume that the message sent in Step 1 above is an enrollment
   request and that the response in step 2 is a Full Enrollment Response
   including a failureInfo specifying that a POP is explicitly required,
   and providing the POP challenge in the encryptedPOP attribute.)

      EncryptedPOP ::= SEQUENCE {

           request        TaggedRequest,
           cms            contentInfo,
           thePOPAlgID    AlgorithmIdentifier,
           witnessAlgID   AlgorithmIdentifier,
           witness        OCTET STRING



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      }

      DecryptedPOP ::= SEQUENCE {
           bodyPartID     BodyPartID,
           thePOPAlgID    AlgorithmIdentifier,
           thePOP         OCTET STRING
      }

   The encrypted POP algorithm works as follows:

   1. The server generates a random value y and associates it with the
      request.
   2. The server returns the encrypted pop with the following fields
      set:
      a. request is the certificate request in the original request
         message (it is included here so the client need not key a copy
         of the request),
      b. cms is an EnvelopedData object, the content type being id-data
         and the content being the value y.  If the certificate request
         contains a subject key identifier (SKI) extension, then the
         recipient identifier SHOULD be the SKI.  If the
         issuerAndSerialNumber form is used, the IsserName MUST be
         encoded as NULL and the SerialNumber as the bodyPartId of the
         certificate request,
      c. thePOPAlgID contains the algorithm to be used in computing the
         return POP value,
      d. witnessAlgID contains the hash algorithm used on y to create
         the field witness,
      e. witness contains the hashed value of y.
   3. The client decrypts the cms field to obtain the value y.  The
      client computes H(y) using the witnessAlgID and compares to the
      value of witness.  If the values do not compare or the decryption
      is not successful, the client MUST abort the enrollment process.
      The client aborts the process by sending a request message
      containing a CMCStatusInfo control attribute with failInfo value
      of popFailed.
   4. The client creates the decryptedPOP as part of a new PKIData
      message.  The fields in the decryptedPOP are:
      a. bodyPartID refers to the certificate request in the new
         enrollment message,
      b. thePOPAlgID is copied from the encryptedPOP,
      c. thePOP contains the possession proof.  This value is computed
         by thePOPAlgID using the value y and request referenced in
         (4a).
   5. The server then re-computes the value of thePOP from its cached
      value of y and the request and compares to the value of thePOP.
      If the values do not match, the server MUST NOT issue the
      certificate.  The server MAY re-issue a new challenge or MAY fail



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      the request altogether.

   When defining the algorithms for thePOPAlgID and witnessAlgID care
   must be taken to ensure that the result of witnessAlgID is not a
   useful value to shortcut the computation with thePOPAlgID.  Clients
   MUST implement SHA-1 for witnessAlgID.  Clients MUST implement HMAC-
   SHA1 for thePOPAlgID.  The value of y is used as the secret value in
   the HMAC algorithm and the request referenced in (4a) is used as the
   data.  If y is greater than 64 bytes, only the first 64 bytes of y
   are used as the secret.

   One potential problem with the algorithm above is the amount of state
   that a CA needs to keep in order to verify the returned POP value.
   This describes one of many possible ways of addressing the problem by
   reducing the amount of state kept on the CA to a single (or small
   set) of values.

   1. Server generates random seed x, constant across all requests. (The
      value of x would normally be altered on a regular basis and kept
      for a short time afterwards.)
   2. For certificate request R, server computes y = F(x,R).  F can be,
      for example, HMAC-SHA1(x,R).  All that's important for
      statelessness is that y be consistently computable with only known
      state constant x and function F, other inputs coming from the cert
      request structure.  y should not be predictable based on knowledge
      of R, thus the use of a OWF like HMAC-SHA1.

5.8  LRA POP Witnesses Control Attribute

   In an enrollment scenario involving an LRAs the CA may allow (or
   require) the LRA to perform the POP protocol with the entity
   requesting certification.  In this case the LRA needs a way to inform
   the CA it has done the POP.  This control attribute has been created
   to address this issue.

   The ASN.1 structure for the LRA POP witness is as follows:

      LraPopWitness ::= SEQUENCE {
          pkiDataBodyid   BodyPartID,
          bodyIds         SEQUENCE of BodyPartID
      }

      -- pkiDataBodyid field contains the body part id of the nested CMS
      body object containing the client's full request message.
      pkiDataBodyid is set to 0 if the request is in the current
      PKIRequest body.





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      -- bodyIds contains a list of certificate requests for which the
      LRA has performed an out-of-band authentication.  The method of
      authentication could be archival of private key material,
      challenge-response or other means.

   If a certificate server does not allow for an LRA to do the POP
   verification, it returns an error of POPFAILURE.  The CA MUST NOT
   start a challenge-response to re-verify the POP itself.

5.9  Get Certificate Control Attribute

   Everything described in this section is optional to implement.

   The get certificate control attribute is used to retrieve previously
   issued certificates from a repository of certificates.  A Certificate
   Authority, an LRA or an independent service may provide this
   repository.  The clients expected to use this facility are those
   operating in a resource-constrained environment.  (An example of a
   resource-constrained client would be a low-end IP router that does
   not retain its own certificate in non-volatile memory.)

   The get certificate control attribute has the following ASN.1
   structure:

      GetCert ::= SEQUENCE {
          issuerName    GeneralName,
          serialNumber  INTEGER }

   The service responding to the request will place the requested
   certificate in the certificates field of a SignedData object.  If the
   get certificate attribute is the only control in a Full PKI Request
   message, the response would be a Simple Enrollment Response.

5.10 Get CRL Control Attribute

   Everything described in this section is optional to implement.

   The get CRL control attribute is used to retrieve CRLs from a
   repository of CRLs.  A Certification Authority, an LRA or an
   independent service may provide this repository.  The clients
   expected to use this facility are those where a fully deployed
   directory is either infeasible or undesirable.

   The get CRL control attribute has the following ASN.1 structure:







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      GetCRL ::= SEQUENCE {
          issuerName    Name,
          cRLName       GeneralName OPTIONAL,
          time          GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
          reasons       ReasonFlags OPTIONAL }

   The fields in a GetCRL have the following meanings:

      -- issuerName is the name of the CRL issuer.

      -- cRLName may be the value of CRLDistributionPoints in the
      subject certificate or equivalent value in the event the
      certificate does not contain such a value.

      -- time is used by the client to specify from among potentially
      several issues of CRL that one whose thisUpdate value is less than
      but nearest to the specified time.  In the absence of a time
      component, the CA always returns with the most recent CRL.

      -- reasons is used to specify from among CRLs partitioned by
      revocation reason.  Implementers should bear in mind that while a
      specific revocation request has a single CRLReason code--and
      consequently entries in the CRL would have a single CRLReason code
      value--a single CRL can aggregate information for one or more
      reasonFlags.

   A service responding to the request will place the requested CRL in
   the crls field of a SignedData object.  If the get CRL attribute is
   the only control in a full enrollment message, the response would be
   a simple enrollment response.

5.11 Revocation Request Control Attribute

   The revocation request control attribute is used to request that a
   certificate be revoked.

   The revocation request control attribute has the following ASN.1
   syntax:

      RevRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
          issuerName      Name,
          serialNumber    INTEGER,
          reason          CRLReason,
          invalidityDate  GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
          sharedSecret    OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
          comment         UTF8string OPTIONAL }





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      -- issuerName contains the issuerName of the certificate to be
      revoked.

      -- serialNumber contains the serial number of the certificate to
      be revoked

      -- reason contains the suggested CRLReason code for why the
      certificate is being revoked.  The CA can use this value at its
      discretion in building the CRL.

      -- invalidityDate contains the suggested value for the Invalidity
      Date CRL Extension.  The CA can use this value at its discretion
      in building the CRL.

      -- sharedSecret contains a secret value registered by the EE when
      the certificate was obtained to allow for revocation of a
      certificate in the event of key loss.

      -- comment contains a human readable comment.

   For a revocation request to become a reliable object in the event of
   a dispute, a strong proof of originator authenticity is required.
   However, in the instance when an end-entity has lost use of its
   signature private key, it is impossible for the end-entity to produce
   a digital signature (prior to the certification of a new signature
   key pair). The RevRequest provides for the optional transmission from
   the end-entity to the CA of a shared secret that may be used as an
   alternative authenticator in the instance of loss of use. The
   acceptability of this practice is a matter of local security policy.

   (Note that in some situations a Registration Authority may be
   delegated authority to revoke certificates on behalf of some
   population within its scope control.  In these situations the CA
   would accept the LRA's digital signature on the request to revoke a
   certificate, independent of whether the end entity still had access
   to the private component of the key pair.)

   Clients MUST provide the capability to produce a digitally signed
   revocation request control attribute.  Clients SHOULD be capable of
   producing an unsigned revocation request containing the end-entity's
   shared secret.  If a client provides shared secret based self-
   revocation, the client MUST be capable of producing a revocation
   request containing the shared secret. Servers MUST be capable of
   accepting both forms of revocation requests.

   The structure of an unsigned, shared secret based revocation request
   is a matter of local implementation.  The shared secret does not need
   to be encrypted when sent in a revocation request.  The shared secret



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   has a one-time use, that of causing the certificate to be revoked,
   and public knowledge of the shared secret after the certificate has
   been revoked is not a problem.  Clients need to inform users that the
   same shared secret SHOULD NOT be used for multiple certificates.

   A full response message MUST be returned for a revocation request.

5.12 Registration and Response Information Control Attributes

   The regInfo control attribute is for clients and LRAs to pass
   additional information as part a PKI request.  The regInfo control
   attribute uses the ASN.1 structure:

      RegInfo ::= OCTET STRING

   The content of this data is based on bilateral agreement between the
   client and server.

   If a server (or LRA) needs to return information back to a requestor
   in response to data submitted in a regInfo attribute, then that data
   is returned as a responseInfo control attribute.  The content of the
   OCTET STRING for response information is based on bilateral agreement
   between the client and server.

5.13 Query Pending Control Attribute

   In some environments, process requirements for manual intervention or
   other identity checking can cause a delay in returning the
   certificate related to a certificate request. The query pending
   attribute allows for a client to query a server about the state of a
   pending certificate request.  The server returns a token as part of
   the CMCStatusInfo attribute (in the otherInfo field).  The client
   puts the token into the query pending attribute to identify the
   correct request to the server.  The server can also return a
   suggested time for the client to query for the state of a pending
   certificate request.

   The ASN.1 structure used by the query pending control attribute is:

      QueryPending ::= OCTET STRING

   If a server returns a pending state (the transaction is still
   pending), the otherInfo MAY be omitted.  If it is not omitted then
   the same value MUST be returned (the token MUST NOT change during the
   request).






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5.14 Confirm Certificate Acceptance

   Some Certification Authorities require that clients give a positive
   conformation that the certificates issued to it are acceptable.  The
   Confirm Certificate Acceptance control attribute is used for that
   purpose.  If the CMCStatusInfo on a certificate request is
   confirmRequired, then the client MUST return a Confirm Certificate

   Acceptance prior to any usage of the certificate.  Clients SHOULD
   wait for the response from the server that the conformation has been
   received.

   The confirm certificate acceptance structure is:

      CMCCertId ::= IssuerSerial

      -- CMCCertId contains the issuer and serial number of the
      certificate being accepted.

   Servers MUST return a full enrollment response for a confirm
   certificate acceptance control.

6.  Local Registration Authorities

   This specification permits the use of Local Registration Authorities
   (LRAs).  An LRA sits between the end-entity and the Certification
   Authority.  From the end-entity's perspective, the LRA appears to be
   the Certification Authority and from the server the LRA appears to be
   a client.  LRAs receive the enrollment messages, perform local
   processing and then forward onto Certificate Authorities. Some of the
   types of local processing that an LRA can perform include:

   -  batching multiple enrollment messages together,
   -  challenge/response POP proofs,
   -  addition of private or standardized certificate extensions to all
      requests,
   -  archival of private key material,
   -  routing of requests to different CAs.

   When an LRA receives an enrollment message it has three options: it
   may forward the message without modification, it may add a new
   wrapping layer to the message, or it may remove one or more existing
   layers and add a new wrapping layer.

   When an LRA adds a new wrapping layer to a message it creates a new
   PKIData object.  The new layer contains any control attributes
   required (for example if the LRA does the POP proof for an encryption
   key or the addExtension control attribute to modify an enrollment



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   request) and the client enrollment message.  The client enrollment
   message is placed in the cmsSequence if it is a Full Enrollment
   message and in the reqSequence if it is a Simple Enrollment message.
   If an LRA is batching multiple client messages together, then each
   client enrollment message is placed into the appropriate location in
   the LRA's PKIData object along with all relevant control attributes.

   (If multiple LRAs are in the path between the end-entity and the
   Certification Authority, this will lead to multiple wrapping layers
   on the message.)

   In processing an enrollment message, an LRA MUST NOT alter any
   certificate request body (PKCS #10 or CRMF) as any alteration would
   invalidate the signature on the request and thus the POP for the
   private key.

   An example of how this would look is illustrated by the following
   figure:

      SignedData (by LRA)
        PKIData
          controlSequence
                  LRA added control statements
          reqSequence
                  Zero or more Simple CertificationRequests from clients
          cmsSequence
                  Zero or more Full PKI messages from clients
                     SignedData (by client)
                         PKIData

   Under some circumstances an LRA is required to remove wrapping
   layers.  The following sections look at the processing required if
   encryption layers and signing layers need to be removed.

6.1  Encryption Removal

   There are two cases that require an LRA to remove or change
   encryption in an enrollment message.  In the first case the
   encryption was applied for the purposes of protecting the entire
   enrollment request from unauthorized entities.  If the CA does not
   have a recipient info entry in the encryption layer, the LRA MUST
   remove the encryption layer.  The LRA MAY add a new encryption layer
   with or without adding a new signing layer.

   The second change of encryption that may be required is to change the
   encryption inside of a signing layer.  In this case the LRA MUST
   remove all signing layers containing the encryption.  All control
   statements MUST be merged according to local policy rules as each



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   signing layer is removed and the resulting merged controls MUST be
   placed in a new signing layer provided by the LRA.  If the signing
   layer provided by the end-entity needs to be removed to the LRA can
   remove the layer.

6.2  Signature Layer Removal

   Only two instances exist where an LRA should remove a signature layer
   on a Full Enrollment message.  If an encryption needs to be modified
   within the message, or if a Certificate Authority will not accept
   secondary delegation (i.e. multiple LRA signatures).  In all other
   situations LRAs SHOULD NOT remove a signing layer from a message.

   If an LRA removes a signing layer from a message, all control
   statements MUST be merged according to local policy rules.  The
   resulting merged control statements MUST be placed in a new signing
   layer provided by the LRA.

7.  Transport Wrapping

   Not all methods of transporting data allow for sending unlabeled raw
   binary data, in may cases standard methods of encoding can be used to
   greatly ease this issue.  These methods normally consist of wrapping
   some identification of the content around the binary data, possibly
   applying an encoding to the data and labeling the data.   We document
   for use three different wrapping methods.

   -- MIME wrapping is for transports that are natively MIME based such
      as HTTP and E-mail.
   -- Binary file transport is defined since floppy disk transport is
      still very common.  File transport can be done either as MIME
      wrapped (section 7.1) or bare (section 7.2).
   -- Socket based transport uses the raw BER encoded object.

7.1  MIME Wrapping

   MIME wrapping is defined for those environments that are MIME native.
   These include E-Mail based protocols as well as HTTP.

   The basic mime wrapping in this section is taken from [SMIMEV2] and
   [SMIMEV3].  Simple enrollment requests are encoded using the
   application/pkcs10 content type.  A file name MUST be included either
   in a content type or content disposition statement.  The extension
   for the file MUST be ".p10".







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   Simple enrollment response messages MUST be encoded as content-type
   application/pkcs7-mime.  An smime-type parameter MUST be on the
   content-type statement with a value of "certs-only." A file name with
   the ".p7c" extension MUST be specified as part of the content-type or
   content-disposition.

   Full enrollment request messages MUST be encoded as content-type
   application/pkcs7-mime.  The smime-type parameter MUST be included
   with a value of "CMC-enroll".  A file name with the ".p7m" extension
   MUST be specified as part of the content-type or content-disposition
   statement.

   Full enrollment response messages MUST be encoded as content-type
   application/pkcs7-mime.  The smime-type parameter MUST be included
   with a value of "CMC-response."  A file name with the ".p7m"
   extensions MUST be specified as part of the content-type or content-
   disposition.

MIME TYPE                       File Extension        SMIME-TYPE

application/pkcs10                .p10                  N/A
(simple PKI request)

application/pkcs7-mime            .p7m                  CMC-request
(full PKI request)

application/pkcs7-mime            .p7c                  certs-only
(simple PKI response)

application/pkcs7-mime            .p7m                  CMC-response
(full PKI response)

7.2  File-Based Transport

   Enrollment messages and responses may also be transferred between
   clients and servers using file system-based mechanisms, such as when
   enrollment is performed for an off-line client.  When files are used
   to transport binary, BER-encoded Full Enrollment Request and Response
   messages, the following file type extensions SHOULD be used:

   Message Type                   File Extension

   Full PKI Request                 .crq

   Full PKI Response                .crp






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7.3  Socket-Based Transport

   When enrollment messages and responses are sent over sockets, no
   wrapping is required.  Messages SHOULD be sent in their binary, BER-
   encoded form.

8.  Interoperability

8.1  Mandatory and Optional Algorithms

   CMC clients and servers MUST be capable of producing and processing
   message signatures using the Digital Signature Algorithm [DSA].  DSA
   signatures MUST be indicated by the DSA AlgorithmIdentifier value (as
   specified in section 7.2.2 of [PKIXCERT]).  PKI clients and servers
   SHOULD also be capable of producing and processing RSA signatures (as
   specified in section 7.2.1 of [PKIXCERT]).

   CMC clients and servers MUST be capable of protecting and accessing
   message encryption keys using the Diffie-Hellman (D-H) key exchange
   algorithm.  D-H/3DES protection MUST be indicated by the D-H
   AlgorithmIdentifier value specified in [CMS].  PKI clients and
   servers SHOULD also be capable of producing and processing RSA key
   transport.  When used for PKI messages, RSA key transport MUST be
   indicated as specified in section 7.2.1 of [PKIXCERT].

8.2  Minimum Conformance Requirements

   A minimally compliant CMC server:

   a) MUST accept a Full PKI Request message
      i) MUST accept CRMF Request Bodies within a Full PKI Request
      ii) MUST accept PKCS#10 Request Bodies within a Full PKI Request
   b) MUST accept a Simple Enrollment Request message
   c) MUST be able to return a Full PKI Response.  (A Full PKI Response
      is always a valid response, but for interoperability with
      downlevel clients a compliant server SHOULD use the Simple
      Enrollment Response whenever possible.)

   A minimally-complaint CMC client:

   a) MAY use either the Simple Enrollment Message or the Full PKI
      Request.
      i) clients MUST use PKCS#10 with the Simple Enrollment Message
      ii) clients MAY use either PKCS#10 or CRMF with the Full PKI
         Request
   b) MUST understand the Simple Enrollment Response.
   c) MUST understand the Full PKI Response.




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9.  Security Considerations

   Initiation of a secure communications channel between an end-entity
   and a CA or LRA (and, similarly, between an LRA and another LRA or
   CA) necessarily requires an out-of-band trust initiation mechanism.
   For example, a secure channel may be constructed between the end-
   entity and the CA via IPSEC or TLS. Many such schemes exist and the
   choice of any particular scheme for trust initiation is outside the
   scope of this document.  Implementers of this protocol are strongly
   encouraged to consider generally accepted principles of secure key
   management when integrating this capability within an overall
   security architecture.

   Mechanisms for thwarting replay attacks may be required in particular
   implementations of this protocol depending on the operational
   environment. In cases where the CA maintains significant state
   information, replay attacks may be detectable without the inclusion
   of the optional nonce mechanisms. Implementers of this protocol need
   to carefully consider environmental conditions before choosing
   whether or not to implement the senderNonce and recipientNonce
   attributes described in section 5.6.  Developers of state-constrained
   PKI clients are strongly encouraged to incorporate the use of these
   attributes.

   Under no circumstances should a signing key be archived.  Doing so
   allows the archiving entity to potentially use the key for forging
   signatures.

   Due care must be taken prior to archiving keys.  Once a key is given
   to an archiving entity, the archiving entity could use the keys in a
   way not conducive to the archiving entity.  Users should be made
   especially aware that proper verification is made of the certificate
   used to encrypt the private key material.

   Clients and servers need to do some checks on cryptographic
   parameters prior to issuing certificates to make sure that weak
   parameters are not used. A description of the small subgroup attack
   is provided in [X942].  CMC implementations ought to be aware of this
   attack when doing parameter validations.












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10. Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank Brian LaMacchia for his work in
   developing and writing up many of the concepts presented in this
   document.  The authors would also like to thank Alex Deacon and Barb
   Fox for their contributions.

11. References

   [CMS]      Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 2630,
              June 1999.

   [CRMF]     Myers, M., Adams, C., Solo, D. and D. Kemp, "Internet
              X.509 Certificate Request Message Format", RFC 2511, March
              1999.

   [DH]       B. Kaliski, "PKCS 3: Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement v1.4"

   [DH-POP]   H. Prafullchandra, J. Schaad, "Diffie-Hellman Proof-of-
              Possession Algorithms", Work in Progress.

   [HMAC]     Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M. and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February
              1997.

   [PKCS1]    Kaliski, B., "PKCS #1: RSA Encryption, Version 1.5", RFC
              2313, March 1998.

   [PKCS7]    Kaliski, B., "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax v1.5",
              RFC 2315, October 1997.

   [PKCS8]    RSA Laboratories, "PKCS#8: Private-Key Information Syntax
              Standard, Version 1.2", November 1, 1993.

   [PKCS10]   Kaliski, B., "PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
              v1.5", RFC 2314, October 1997.

   [PKIXCERT] Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W. and D. Solo "Internet
              X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL
              Profile", RFC 2459, January 1999.

   [RFC 2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [SMIMEV2]  Dusse, S., Hoffman, P., Ramsdell, B., Lundblade, L. and L.
              Repka, "S/MIME Version 2 Message Specification", RFC 2311,
              March 1998.




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   [SMIMEV3]  Ramsdell, B., "S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification",
              RFC 2633, June 1999.

   [X942]     Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method", RFC
              2631, June 1999.

12. Authors' Addresses

   Michael Myers
   VeriSign Inc.
   1350 Charleston Road
   Mountain View, CA, 94043

   Phone: (650) 429-3402
   EMail: mmyers@verisign.com


   Xiaoyi Liu
   Cisco Systems
   170 West Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA 95134

   Phone: (480) 526-7430
   EMail: xliu@cisco.com


   Jim Schaad

   EMail:  jimsch@nwlink.com


   Jeff Weinstein

   EMail: jsw@meer.net

















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Appendix A  ASN.1 Module

EnrollmentMessageSyntax
   { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(4) internet(1)
   security(5) mechansims(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-cmc(6) }

   DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
   BEGIN

   -- EXPORTS All --
   -- The types and values defined in this module are exported for use
   -- in the other ASN.1 modules.  Other applications may use them for
   -- their own purposes.

   IMPORTS

     -- Information Directory Framework (X.501)
           Name
              FROM InformationFramework { joint-iso-itu-t ds(5)
                   modules(1) informationFramework(1) 3 }

     -- Directory Authentication Framework (X.509)
           AlgorithmIdentifier, AttributeCertificate, Certificate,
           CertificateList, CertificateSerialNumber
              FROM AuthenticationFramework { joint-iso-itu-t ds(5)
                   module(1) authenticationFramework(7) 3 }

     -- PKIX Part 1 - Implicit
        GeneralName, CRLReason, ReasonFlags
        FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
                internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
                id-pkix1-implicit-88(2)}

     -- PKIX Part 1 - Explicit
        SubjectPublicKeyInfo, Extension
        FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
                internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
                id-pkix1-explicit-88(1)}

     -- Cryptographic Message Syntax
        ContentInfo, Attribute
          FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax { 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 1}

     -- CRMF
        CertReqMsg
        FROM CRMF { 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 5 };

    id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)



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        dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) }

        id-cmc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 7}   -- CMC controls
        id-cct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 12}  -- CMC content types

    -- The following controls have simple type content (usually OCTET
STRING)

    id-cmc-identification OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 2}
    id-cmc-identityProof OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 3}
    id-cmc-dataReturn OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 4}
    id-cmc-transactionId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 5}
    id-cmc-senderNonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 6}
    id-cmc-recipientNonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 7}
    id-cmc-regInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 18}
    id-cmc-responseInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 19}
    id-cmc-queryPending OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 21}
    id-cmc-popLinkRandom OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 22)
    id-cmc-popLinkWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= (id-cmc 23)

    -- This is the content type used for a request message in the
protocol

    id-cct-PKIData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cct 2 }


    PKIData ::= SEQUENCE {
        controlSequence    SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedAttribute,
        reqSequence        SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedRequest,
        cmsSequence        SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedContentInfo,
        otherMsgSequence   SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF OtherMsg
    }

    bodyIdMax INTEGER ::= 4294967295

    BodyPartID ::= INTEGER(0..bodyIdMax)

    TaggedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
        bodyPartID         BodyPartId,
        attrType           OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
        attrValues         SET OF AttributeValue
    }

    AttributeValue ::= ANY

    TaggedRequest ::= CHOICE {
        tcr               [0] TaggedCertificationRequest,
        crm               [1] CertReqMsg



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    }

    TaggedCertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
        bodyPartID            BodyPartID,
        certificationRequest  CertificationRequest
    }

    CertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
      certificationRequestInfo  SEQUENCE {
        version                   INTEGER,
        subject                   Name,
        subjectPublicKeyInfo      SEQUENCE {
          algorithm                 AlgorithmIdentifier,
          subjectPublicKey          BIT STRING },
        attributes                [0] IMPLICIT SET OF Attribute },
      signatureAlgorithm        AlgorithmIdentifier,
      signature                 BIT STRING
    }

    TaggedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
        bodyPartID              BodyPartId,
        contentInfo             ContentInfo
    }

    OtherMsg ::= SEQUENCE {
        bodyPartID        BodyPartID,
        otherMsgType      OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
        otherMsgValue     ANY DEFINED BY otherMsgType }

    --  This defines the response message in the protocol
    id-cct-PKIResponse OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cct 3 }

    ResponseBody ::= SEQUENCE {
        controlSequence   SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedAttribute,
        cmsSequence       SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedContentInfo,
        otherMsgSequence  SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF OtherMsg
    }

    -- Used to return status state in a response

    id-cmc-cMCStatusInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 1}

    CMCStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
        cMCStatus       CMCStatus,
        bodyList        SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF INTEGER,
        statusString    UTF8String OPTIONAL,
        otherInfo        CHOICE {
          failInfo         CMCFailInfo,



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          pendInfo         PendInfo } OPTIONAL
    }

    PendInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
        pendToken        INTEGER,
        pendTime         GENERALIZEDTIME
    }

    CMCStatus ::= INTEGER {
        success         (0),
        -- you got exactly what you asked for
        failed          (2),
        -- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message
        pending         (3),
        -- the request body part has not yet been processed,
        -- requester is responsible to poll back on this
        noSupport       (4)
        -- the requested operation is not supported
    }

    CMCFailInfo ::= INTEGER {
        badAlg          (0),
        -- Unrecognized or unsupported algorithm
        badMessageCheck (1),
        -- integrity check failed
        badRequest      (2),
        -- transaction not permitted or supported
        badTime         (3),
        -- Message time field was not sufficiently close to the system
time
        badCertId       (4),
        -- No certificate could be identified matching the provided
criteria
        unsuportedExt   (5),
        -- A requested X.509 extension is not supported by the recipient
CA.
        mustArchiveKeys (6),
        -- Private key material must be supplied
        badIdentity     (7),
        -- Identification Attribute failed to verify
        popRequired     (8),
        -- Server requires a POP proof before issuing certificate
        popFailed       (9),
        -- Server failed to get an acceptable POP for the request
        noKeyReuse      (10)
        -- Server policy does not allow key re-use
        internalCAError (11)
        tryLater        (12)



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RFC 2797        Certificate Management Messages over CMS      April 2000


    }

    -- Used for LRAs to add extensions to certificate requests
    id-cmc-addExtensions OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 8}

    AddExtensions ::= SEQUENCE {
        pkiDataReference    BodyPartID,
        certReferences      SEQUENCE OF BodyPartID,
        extensions          SEQUENCE OF Extension
    }


    id-cmc-encryptedPOP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 9}
    id-cmc-decryptedPOP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 10}

    EncryptedPOP ::= SEQUENCE {
                request       TaggedRequest,
        cms             ContentInfo,
        thePOPAlgID     AlgorithmIdentifier,
        witnessAlgID    AlgorithmIdentifier,
        witness         OCTET STRING
    }

    DecryptedPOP ::= SEQUENCE {
        bodyPartID      BodyPartID,
        thePOPAlgID     AlgorithmIdentifier,
        thePOP          OCTET STRING
    }

    id-cmc-lraPOPWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 11}

    LraPopWitness ::= SEQUENCE {
        pkiDataBodyid   BodyPartID,
        bodyIds         SEQUENCE OF BodyPartID
    }


    --
    id-cmc-getCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 15}

    GetCert ::= SEQUENCE {
        issuerName      GeneralName,
        serialNumber    INTEGER }


    id-cmc-getCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 16}

    GetCRL ::= SEQUENCE {



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RFC 2797        Certificate Management Messages over CMS      April 2000


        issuerName    Name,
        cRLName       GeneralName OPTIONAL,
        time          GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
        reasons       ReasonFlags OPTIONAL }

    id-cmc-revokeRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 17}

    RevRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
        issuerName            Name,
        serialNumber          INTEGER,
        reason                CRLReason,
       invalidityDate         GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
        passphrase            OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
        comment               UTF8String OPTIONAL }

   id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkix-cmc 24}

   CMCCertId ::= IssuerSerial

   -- The following is used to request V3 extensions be added to a
certificate

   id-ExtensionReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
        rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 14}

   ExtensionReq ::= SEQUENCE OF Extension

   -- The following exists to allow Diffie-Hellman Certificate Requests
Messages to be
   -- well-formed

   id-alg-noSignature OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix id-alg(6) 2}

   NoSignatureValue ::= OCTET STRING

END















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RFC 2797        Certificate Management Messages over CMS      April 2000


Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000).  All Rights Reserved.

   This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
   others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
   or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
   and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
   kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
   included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this
   document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
   the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
   Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
   developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
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   English.

   The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
   revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.

   This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
   TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
   BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
   HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
   MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Acknowledgement

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.



















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